Population mobility and development: Southeast Asia and the Pacific

G W Jones and H V Richter, editors
Population mobility and development
Map 1 Southeast Asia and the Pacific
Summary

Governments everywhere are concerned with the rapidly changing spatial distribution of their populations, as people move to take advantage of differing opportunities or are driven out of established occupations or places of residence by changing circumstances. Research into the complex interrelationships between population mobility and development is still in its early stages. Its relevance for policy makers is not always clear. This is partly because the complementary nature of macro and micro research into population mobility is not always understood and partly because research covers such a wide range of movement.

This monograph brings together papers presented to an international conference held at the Australian National University in October 1980 to consider policy issues for development planners arising out of population mobility. The conference brought together senior officials from developing countries, academics and aid specialists for a discussion of issues in a rapidly changing field.
Preface

Each year, the Development Studies Centre organizes a major conference on a development theme. In 1978 the theme was 'Forestry in National Development' and in 1979 the focus turned to the development problems of 'Small Island States in the Pacific and Indian Oceans'. The papers presented at both these conferences were brought to a wider audience through their publication by the Development Studies Centre as numbers 17 and 23 in its monograph series.

In 1980, the topic chosen by the Executive Committee of the Centre was a most important one: 'Population Mobility and Development in Southeast Asia and the Pacific'. A sub-committee comprising Professor J.C. Caldwell, Mr R.V. Cole, Dr G.W. Jones, Dr I.S. Mitchell, Dr R.M. Sundrum and Professor R.G. Ward chose to follow the precedent set in 1979 of exploring the topic in two related ways. In the first eight months of the year, the Centre conducted a rolling seminar within the University, inviting authors from Canberra, elsewhere in Australia, and indeed as far away as New Zealand and Papua New Guinea to present papers on a wide range of sub-themes for critical discussion, after which they would revise the papers for presentation at the conference, along with papers presented by authors from further afield. The announced aim of the seminar series was

To draw out the relevance for policy-making of recent, mostly micro-level research into geographic mobility. Although the conventional themes of rural-urban migration and government resettlement programmes will receive due attention, emphasis will be given instead to the complexity of forms and directions of movement which arise as a response to the familial, social and economic circumstances in which individuals find themselves.

The seminar series ran from February to August 1980. To conclude the series, a panel discussion was held to discuss the policy implications of the papers which had been presented. The summary of the panel discussion was distributed in advance, along with a summary of each of the background papers and most of the papers themselves, to participants in the conference so that the discussions could proceed without lengthy repetition of the detailed content of the papers.
Generous financial assistance from the Australian Development Assistance Bureau enabled the Centre to invite participants to the conference from twelve different countries in Asia and the Pacific apart from Australia. They were drawn from the ranks of government officials, planners and academics, with a few from international agencies. A full list of participants is included at the end of this volume.

The conference took place in Canberra from 8 to 10 October 1980. Professor D.A. Low, Vice Chancellor of the Australian National University, gave a welcoming address to participants reflecting his long-standing interest in development issues and strong support for the Development Studies Centre, and an opening address was given by Dr Ian Mitchell, Policy Training and Organisations Division, of the Australian Development Assistance Bureau.

The Centre was indeed fortunate in the quality and originality of the papers presented at the conference, which reflected the varied and ongoing research experience of the contributors, most of whom are involved in the attempt to enrich and refine theory by testing it against village-level research. The topicality of the discussions was greatly enhanced by the contributions of the planners and the fruitful interaction between planners and researchers through the conference. As a result, the present volume should make a worthwhile contribution to the search for appropriate policies toward population mobility, not only in Southeast Asia and the Pacific but also more widely throughout the developing world.

G.W.J. and H.V.R.
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td></td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>G.W. Jones and H.V. Richter</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PART A</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation and setting of population mobility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1 The variety and forms of population mobility in Southeast Asia and Melanesia: the case of circulation</td>
<td>R.D. Bedford</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2 Mobility and uneven development in Indonesia: a critique of explanations of migration and circular migration</td>
<td>Dean Forbes</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3 Policy implications of circulation: some answers from the grassroots</td>
<td>M. Chapman</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PART B</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source and destination linkages: Southeast Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4 Population mobility and rural households in North Kelantan, Malaysia</td>
<td>A. Maude</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5 Linkages, reciprocity and remittances: the impact of rural outmigration on Malaysian rice villages</td>
<td>Lorraine Corner</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Author(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mobility in north Thailand: a view from within</td>
<td>A. Singhanetra-Renard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Circular mobility in Yogyakarta Special Region: a case study of two dukuh</td>
<td>I. Bagus Mantra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>PART C</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Source and destination linkages: Papua New Guinea and the Pacific</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Migration in Papua New Guinea: the role of the peasant household in a strategy of survival</td>
<td>R.L. Curtain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Mobility patterns in Papua New Guinea: social factors as explanatory variables</td>
<td>Louise Morauta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Remittances and rural development: migration, dependency and inequality in the south Pacific</td>
<td>J. Connell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Guest-worker movements and their consequences for donor and recipient countries: a case study</td>
<td>C. Macpherson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>PART D</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urbanization and transport: policy issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Adjustment of migrants in cities: Aborigines in Adelaide, Australia</td>
<td>Fay Gale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>The medium-sized town in the context of mobility: rural-urban linkages and decentralization policies</td>
<td>E.A. Young</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Rural-urban population movement in Fiji 1966-1976: a macro analysis</td>
<td>R. Chandra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Road transport, population mobility and development in Indonesia</td>
<td>G. Hugo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART E

Employment and mobility: policy issues

Chapter 16
Rural labour shortages in Southeast Asia and the Pacific: a review of the evidence
G.W. Jones and R. Gerard Ward 387

Chapter 17
Migration-related policies in Peninsular Malaysia: an evaluation
Paul Chan 407

References 431
List of participants 465

Maps
1 Southeast Asia and the Pacific Frontispiece
2 Malaysia 90
3 Papua New Guinea 184
Introduction

Gavin W. Jones
and
H.V. Richter

The population mobility issues for planners

If there is one thing on which developing countries (and developed countries too, for that matter) reach near unanimity it is their dissatisfaction with the distribution of population. In the United Nations' 'Fourth Population Enquiry among Governments conducted in 1978, only six declared the spatial distribution of their population to be 'acceptable', forty-two replied that it was 'unacceptable to some extent', and sixty-eight declared it to be 'highly unacceptable'. Two-thirds of the countries wanted to slow the rate of rural-urban migration, and a further 12 per cent wanted to reverse it.

This high level of dissatisfaction with population distribution and with migration flows appears to stem from a number of sources, which operate with varied intensity from country to country. Partly it is a concern with regional inequalities and the failure of migration flows to serve as an equilibrating mechanism; sometimes, indeed, migration appears to exacerbate such inequalities. Partly it is a concern that potentially volatile patterns of movement raise immense administrative and planning difficulties at the local level, or that the administrative apparatus might simply be unable to cope as large cities grow even larger. Partly, in some countries at least, it is 'the belief that dispersed and largely invisible rural masses tend to make fewer demands on the government and to constitute less of an implied threat to social order than do concentrated urbanites, many of whom have made an enormous migratory investment in expectation of economic and social betterment' (Preston 1979:195). The proclivity of the populations of Bangkok, Seoul, Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta (not to mention Canberra) to vote against their political masters is not lost on the governments in power.

Third world planners, then, are not inclined to let present trends in population redistribution simply run their course, but are interested in interventions to advance conscious purposes. Such interventions require, as their basis, an understanding of the dynamics of the existing population redistribution processes and of whether they are likely to continue, intensify or alter
direction in future; an evaluation of who gains and who loses; and assumptions on how specific interventions can orchestrate the complex forces to serve agreed ends.

On the first of these, the broad dimensions of population redistribution, and especially urbanization, processes are fairly clear though not always 'internalized' by planners and politicians. The rise in the urban proportion of population in developing countries is not exceptionally rapid by historical standards, but the growth rates of urban populations are unprecedented, because overall rates of population growth are unprecedented. Urban growth in most of the developing world results mainly from the natural increase of urban populations: roughly 60 per cent as against 40 per cent from rural-urban migration (Tabah 1980:380). The rural-urban migration, in turn, is linked to the high natural increase of rural populations and the inability of the rural economy to absorb them all. It is immediately apparent that policies aimed at reducing rates of urban growth by diverting migrants elsewhere, without squarely facing the basic underlying problem of high levels of human fertility, will be doomed to failure; yet such is the state of planning in much of Africa and parts of the Middle East and Latin America that the fundamental need to curb human fertility is not acknowledged. In the region covered by the present monograph, however, problems of human fertility have not been ignored. In many countries, birth rates have turned down sharply, and this decline has been facilitated, though not normally initiated, by government-sponsored family planning programs (Jones 1978).

Future trends in urbanization and population redistribution in the absence of specific interventions to alter them are not easy to predict, largely because there is no accepted body of theory on which such predictions could be based. Nor is there consensus among researchers and planners as to who gains and who loses from the present patterns. The final need noted earlier — predictions of the impact of specific interventions — is one of the most problematic, since such interventions are set in a matrix of changing situations and changing policies, from which it is difficult to disentangle the effect of any one intervention.

It is unfortunate that despite the concern — some might even say obsession — of third world planners with problems of population distribution, urbanization and regional planning, the state of regional development and migration theory is unsatisfactory from a planner's point of view. There are no clear guidelines even regarding the appropriateness of many widely-accepted goals, let alone prescriptions as to how to achieve them. Part of the problem is the plethora of frameworks of analysis, many of them descriptive rather than policy-directed. Ravenstein's (1885, 1889) 'laws', for example, 'may not technically qualify as theoretical statements but ... have certainly been pressed into service as such' (Zelinsky, forthcoming). They have been
developed into a general framework for migration analysis by Lee (1966), for example, which is 'appealing because of its simplicity and persuasive because of the intuitive validity of many of its hypotheses' (Todaro 1976b:19) but nevertheless offers little practical policy guidance. Davis's theory of multiphasic response (1963) is promising in linking migration to other possible adaptations to stress, but has not been pursued much further (however, see Friedlander 1969). In a more specialized field, attempts to use Lowry models for city planning in developing countries fall foul of the special characteristics of the urban 'informal sector' and the complexity of the mobility adaptations of the urban and rural poor (Hackenberg 1980:401-2).

The Todaro migration model has been the most influential over the past decade and provides a satisfactory explanation for the seeming paradox that migrants continue to move to cities when their prospects of employment are not, on the face of it, very good.1 But it has been less useful for the analysis of female migration patterns, migration of students, retired persons and renters, risk-minimization strategies of poor rural families and the spectrum of mobility options which do not involve permanent relocation. Perhaps in time a more useful general theory will develop by linking the economic approach with that of the human ecologists, whose models seek to understand migration in relation to factors grouped into organizational, technological and environmental categories (Hawley 1950; Duncan 1959; Sly and Tayman 1977).

Given that the largest third world cities are projected soon to reach populations double those of the largest cities in the world today, prescriptions for urban policy based on historical analogy are clearly worthless. Even in the more mundane matter of estimating the probable migration effects of specific government policies or pinpointing the most effective instruments for changing migration flows, 'the literature provides little specific guidance' (Yap 1977:257). In the absence of an accepted body of theory, policymakers can hardly be blamed if their decisions sometimes bear the hallmark of personal prejudices and purely political considerations rather than a careful weighing of the social costs and benefits of alternative policy options.

1 'Its fundamental contribution — i.e. the idea that migration proceeds primarily in response to differences in "expected" urban and rural real incomes and that as a result of this the observed accelerated rates of internal migration in developing countries in the context of rising urban unemployment are not only a plausible phenomenon but are in fact entirely rational from the private "expected" income maximization viewpoint of individual migrants — remains widely accepted to this day as the "received theory" in the literature on migration and economic development' (Todaro 1976:45).
There is a lack of consensus on some of the most important issues facing planners in the field of migration and urbanization. The sustainable size of cities is the first issue. Owing to a doubling of the population of developing countries in the past thirty years, and a near-doubling of the urban percentage of their population in the same period, the urban population in developing countries has grown almost four-fold. In terms of the growth of massive cities in relatively poor countries, we are entering uncharted waters. Many observers are deeply troubled by the vulnerability of such cities due to their dependence on distant sources of food and the rising costs of energy (including the kerosene and charcoal used by the poor in many cities). The growth of cities, it is argued, has been fuelled by urban-biased policies which have helped hold rural incomes down, fostered the concentration of investment in the cities and exerted a powerful pull on migrants from the resource-poor rural sector (Lipton 1977). However, some economists believe that it is very hard to set limits on the sustainable size of cities, and Mera (1979:10-11) argues that agglomerative economies continue to be generated until populations of six million or even greater are reached.

A second issue, related to the first, is the extent to which resources should be devoted to improving conditions of the poor in cities—be it through drainage, slum improvement, better public transport, better access to cheap food and to employment or whatever—when such improvements will presumably enhance the attraction of cities to the rural dweller. The question here is clearly not an 'either-or' one, but, rather one of balance between rural and urban development programs.

Many development plans confidently state the expected migration outcomes of rural development policies, even though there is little academic consensus about what these outcomes might be. Some theories suggest that migration will be stimulated while others imply that it will be reduced. Rural development is a complex activity, and rural development activities may often have unexpected results. Development planning is often based on the assumption that raising productivity and rural incomes through irrigation, double-cropping, improved inputs, credit and so forth, improving access to markets through better roads, educating rural children appropriately and providing better services will hold people in rural areas. However, improved conditions of the lower- and middle-income farmers may actually facilitate increased rural-urban migration because they may now be able to afford to send children to town for schooling and to take a chance in the urban job market. Reform of rural curricula does not always succeed in keeping children in the village either. Rather than viewing their education as a preparation for being modern farmers, children may 'see it only as education, a passport away from the village and its perceived poverty' (Findley 1979:33). Feeder roads may facilitate the movement out of the village, not only of goods, but also of people.
Rhoda (1979, 1980) concludes from an extensive review of the impact of rural development programs on rural-to-urban migration that despite Todaro model predictions to the contrary, there is no substantive evidence that rural development slows migration to the cities. Indeed, he argues that, on balance, rural development projects have probably stimulated rural-urban migration. Rhoda manages to reach some fifteen tentative generalizations about the migration impacts of particular forms of rural development, and his strongest conclusion is that 'in almost all cases, development activities in rural areas cannot be justified on the grounds that they slow rural-urban migration' (Rhoda 1980:21).

Population mobility in Southeast Asia and the Pacific

Although we have a fairly clear picture of recent trends in population redistribution in most of the countries of Southeast Asia and the Pacific (see, for example, Pryor 1979) the picture is based mainly on data collected in censuses and surveys on long-term movement across administrative boundaries. But population mobility is a many-faceted process, and the variety of forms of movement must be considered if we are to reach a balanced view of the role of mobility in the development process. Exclusive emphasis on mainly long-distance and long-term movement (for example, inter-provincial migration flows as revealed by the Indonesian census) can be surprisingly uninformative and in some respects positively misleading. It leaves us no wiser than before about the extent of permanent relocation of people from Pasuruan or Probolinggo to Surabaya, let alone the extent of other forms of mobility in the same sub-region of East Java. Unimaginative interpretation of inter-provincial migration data which showed low rates of lifetime migration between provinces with larger populations than most of the world's countries led to characterization of Javanese villagers as 'relatively immobile'. This was a misleading description, as papers in this volume by two researchers whose pioneering work has helped prove it to be misleading — Graeme Hugo and Ida Bagus Mantra — adequately demonstrate. They show what in retrospect seems fairly obvious: that in low-income countries such as Indonesia where the most modern of transport and communications technology is nevertheless available, a condition of dynamic tension is to be expected where there is juxtaposition of the traditional and the modern. Penetration of rural areas by urban forms of infrastructure, production, services and administration will be possible, and patterns of population mobility attuned at the same time to the seasonal cycle of agriculture and the needs of the diverse urban economy will develop.

2 'Just as measured levels of mobility decline as the size of the spatial unit under analysis increases, the frequency and extent of movement also decline as the application of arbitrary definitions filters out short-term moves' (Morrison, forthcoming: Ch.1).
Different approaches to studying mobility also lead to different interpretations of causation. Census data cannot tackle motivation directly, though an ecological approach to characteristics of regions experiencing net migration losses and gains may reveal factors which appear to be closely linked to the patterns of movement. On the other hand, village studies focusing on individual-level motivation may demonstrate the complexity of migration decision-making processes without necessarily revealing the key determinants of overall patterns of movement, some of which might be manipulable for policy purposes.

The region under discussion has some special features. It is one in which urban growth *per se* has not caused as much concern as has the growth of primate cities, which have often been viewed as 'parasitic' rather than 'generative' to use Hoselitz's terms (Hoselitz 1960). Planners in the region are acutely conscious of problems of traffic, air pollution, sewage and waste disposal, water supply and housing in the vast and growing primate cities. It is all very well to argue that there is no convincing economic case against the growth of very large cities. Faced with such arguments, planners in the region are likely to welcome Richardson's blunt statement that 'the theory of optimal city size is of no value to policy-makers in developing countries' (Richardson 1979: 12), though they may not welcome his argument that even in the case of the heavily congested primate city, 'the appropriate policy prescription is not to reduce its size but to improve its efficiency by spatial reorganization and better management'.

Another special feature of population redistribution policies in Southeast Asia and the Pacific is that they are formulated in a setting which neo-Marxist writers would describe as a peripheral capitalist social formation, and this broad 'setting' contains many elements which influence the patterns of mobility in quite fundamental ways. It is, in Mitchell's (1978) terms, important to study the setting, as well as the situation of mobility: to understand the broad forces which act on individuals as they take decisions affecting their mobility, even though they may be (in fact, probably are) unaware of these forces as they make their decisions on the basis of their immediate life situations. There are questions concerning the relative weight that should be given to examining the situation and setting of population mobility; but in so far as we are interested in policy implications, the question is surely one of balance rather than an 'either-or' choice. Planners in the region work within the parameters of a given socio-economic system, and prescriptions which require fundamental restructuring of that system will be of little short-term or even medium-term relevance. Nevertheless, good planning seeks the long-term welfare of people, and planners who are content to tinker with a deeply-flawed system may be serving their political masters well enough but not their wider constituency.
By contrast with more densely-populated parts of the developing world, population redistribution policies in Southeast Asia are still oriented in part to rural resettlement. In this respect the availability of virgin land has been a boon which many other countries would envy. However, there is a danger that policies once appropriate will become myopic in the rapidly-changing setting of modern Southeast Asia. Thailand's struggle to enunciate and implement suitable land settlement policies in a context of rapidly dwindling forest reserves is a case in point.

A final special feature of population mobility, especially in the South Pacific but also in the Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia region, is the importance of rural-urban migration across international boundaries, a circumstance which lends it some special problems from a planning point of view. The movement of Western Samoans to Auckland and of Kelantanese to Singapore are discussed in this volume in the papers by Macpherson and Maude.

Special features of the conference

The sub-committee set up to plan the Development Studies Centre's seminar-conference series for 1980 was faced by the dilemma that population mobility and development is a very broad topic, on which a great deal has been written. One small conference could not hope to cover the wide range of subject matter, let alone resolve all the controversies mentioned above. It was therefore important to establish a focus which would enable something fresh and valuable to be said. A unique focus was established in the following five respects:

(a) The format of the discussions. The aim was to facilitate a useful dialogue between planners and academics. The structure of the conference was, therefore, one in which the planners were given the first say and the academic paper-writers had to demonstrate the relevance of their papers to the issues already raised.

(b) An emphasis on the variety and forms of population mobility. A very high proportion of research into population mobility continues to investigate permanent relocation across arbitrary boundaries. Statements about the importance of studying the totality of mobility — and after all, the mobility options facing villagers as they contemplate their futures cover the whole gamut of permanent and temporary relocation — are frequently not backed up by a serious study of the full range of mobility patterns. The concept of circulation was, as Chapman has noted (1977:3) developed mainly on the basis of Black African and Island Pacific experience. Goldstein (1978:13) notes that 'since we still know so little about forms of movement in Asia other than those identified as migration by censuses or surveys, much more exploratory research and evaluation is essential before firm criteria for distinguishing migration from circulation can be determined'. One aim of
the conference was to give an airing to recent studies in Asia which might help us to extend the frontiers of knowledge in this area.

(c) An emphasis on micro-level studies. This is a corollary of the emphasis on the variety and forms of mobility. Since censuses and most large-scale surveys do not help us to distinguish between different forms of mobility or to investigate mobility decision-making as an element of the life choices facing individuals and families, micro-level studies are the normal vehicle for investigating such issues. Unwarranted criticisms are sometimes levelled at micro-studies on the ground that findings from one village are not replicable and therefore cannot guide policy. Such arguments are just as specious as the argument that large-scale survey data cannot guide policy because it reveals broad patterns but overlooks the nuances of migration decision-making. The point about micro-studies is that they do permit the sensitive researcher to derive insights which will simply not emerge from large-scale sample surveys. Although these insights will be time- and place-specific, they may nevertheless suggest important hypotheses which can be tested in other localities for their wider applicability. The issue, in fact, is not micro-studies versus large-scale surveys but rather how best to mesh a series of micro- and macro-studies so that synergistic benefits will be realized and the frontiers of knowledge expanded.

(d) An emphasis on unintended consequences of policy decisions. On balance, there has been an over-emphasis in past studies on policies designed to influence mobility, some of them with trivial consequences, and an under-emphasis on policies designed to meet other ends, some of which have fundamental repercussions on population mobility. In the seminar series preceding the conference, a number of such policies were identified and discussed. In most fields of planning there is a tendency to claim greater efficacy than is in fact warranted. This is perhaps especially so in the field of population mobility, where policies may be running counter, not only to the underlying forces of economic and social change, but also to policies designed to meet other important ends.\(^3\) One need only cite policies to restrict migration into the big cities, which must compete not only with the bureaucratic centralization which provides a strong incentive for industrialists to locate there but also with policies which subsidize the purchase of tractors or subsidize the price of rice to the urban consumer, and thereby either destroy jobs in rural areas or enhance the

\(^3\)In a panel discussion before the conference on the policy implications of the background papers, discussants stressed the complexity of the policy-making process, the variety of actors involved (a 'policymaker' in this context is anybody who can exert some degree of control over migration behaviour), and the disharmonious nature of the process.
attractiveness of a move to the city. The net effect of these competing policies may be to encourage rural-urban migration, even though the government can quite justifiably claim, for example, 'we have a specific policy to prevent migrants taking up residence in the city unless they have a guaranteed job'.

(e) A regional focus on the two areas of the third world with which Australia is most closely associated — Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. It can be argued that this idiosyncratic grouping does not lend itself to very productive discussion of mobility issues; to put it bluntly, Thailand and Tonga do not have much in common with regard to mobility issues. Nevertheless, aside from the obvious importance to Australia of these two regions, many of the concerns of planners, albeit differing in scale, are quite similar in nature. Malaysia and Western Samoa are both concerned with movement of labour to wealthier countries: Asian and Pacific countries face similar issues regarding appropriate rural education strategies and curriculum; provincialism is an important factor in population movement in Malaysia (quotas for state residents in land schemes), Indonesia (where tensions between transmigrants and the local populations cause concern) and Papua New Guinea (where there has been talk in some provinces of prohibiting migration and introducing pass laws). Over and above this, bringing planners and academics together from two regions which have relatively little contact with each other was expected to stimulate fresh thinking as new problems were discussed and new ways of looking at them encountered.

The concerns of the regions' planners

The first day of the conference was devoted to discussions of policy issues relating to population mobility, based on presentations by the planners and policymakers. A number of important issues were raised. Drs Kartomo Wiroshardjo noted that, in Indonesia, major objectives of government policy are higher income, improved distribution of income and stability. Aspects of development in recent years include greatly improved access to education, greatly increased penetration of radio and television, improved transportation due to road-building, the minibus revolution, increasing ownership of motorbikes, and so forth. All of these developments encourage increased mobility of the population. But while development tends to be accompanied by higher mobility, does that mobility support the attainment of development objectives, or is it merely a consequence of the achievement of development, perhaps even a liability?

Mr Sarawudh Kongsiri emphasized that the report of ESCAP's Expert Group Meeting on Migration and Human Settlements had noted that population movement in the ESCAP region (including ASEAN countries) was largely associated with high rates of population growth. The relative disparity between population and resources
constituted the major problem, and readjustment through movement between rural and urban places as well as between towns and cities raises problems in almost every field of development: 'The rapid growth rate of population and consequent urbanization in the countries of the region has created and will continue to create many problems in such areas as poverty, employment, congestion ..., inadequacy of housing availability, education and health services. Problems such as the proliferation of slums and squatter colonies, traffic congestion and inadequate community facilities and services are bound to become more acute with further urbanization.' The dominance of the capital cities in the urban hierarchy is a problem for many countries. Bangkok, with a population of 4.9 million in 1978, was forty-six times larger than the second city, Chiangmai. The Thai Government is planning a series of measures intended to slow migration to Bangkok, including incentives to establish industries in provincial centres, decentralization of some government agencies and possible disincentives to migration. A parallel strategy has been prepared to develop regional centres outside Bangkok with emphasis on control of land-use, provision of adequate urban infrastructure, creation of new jobs through industrial and commercial promotion and integrated urban, rural and regional planning. The thrust of policy is towards providing support for rural-urban migrants to move to the principal urban centres of their regions rather than to Bangkok.

Population redistribution policies included in the national development plans of all the ASEAN countries attempt either implicitly or explicitly to correct unbalanced distribution by strategies aimed at both rural and urban areas. Policies attempting to tackle problems at the urban end range from upgrading existing urban infrastructure to creating new urban centres to absorb prospective immigrants to metropolitan areas. Others include urban land-use control measures, disincentives to prospective urban migrants and decentralization of administrative and service functions.

At the rural end, to counter rural stagnation and ameliorate rural poverty, policies aim to improve agricultural production and create rural employment opportunities. The adoption of pricing policies favouring village farmers and land settlement schemes such as FELDA in Malaysia provide incentives to people to stay in rural areas. Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia have introduced incentive schemes to encourage industries to locate or relocate outside the congested national capitals.

Mr Sarawudh argued that 'now more than ever before, the need for a comprehensive population redistribution policy to be incorporated as an integral part of the national development plans is widely recognized', and that the effectiveness of such a plan 'will depend largely on the degree of understanding of the complex factors which govern mobility behaviour'.
The presentation by Mr Wilson Ifunaoa stressed the emphasis in the Solomon Islands since independence on establishment of a suitable system of local government. The equitable distribution of wealth and of employment opportunities, with consequent implications for migration, are major objectives of local government policy. A White Paper on provincial government was prepared, and a Bill was expected to be presented to Parliament in early 1981.

The extraordinary diversity of conditions within Papua New Guinea was emphasized by Mr Patrick Gaiyer and Mr Vai Reva. National Development Strategy is summarized in four national goals and directive principles: integral human development, equality and participation, national sovereignty and self-reliance, and Papua New Guinea ways. Provincial government is being given an increasing role.

Migration patterns in Papua New Guinea are very complex. Although much of the migration is short distance, the important long distance movements can be understood only in terms of the historic evolution of Papua New Guinea labour policies. In order to prevent large-scale movement to urban areas a rural development strategy is actively pursued by the government, and some believe that decentralization will discourage inter-provincial movement. Rapid population growth, increasing landlessness and the inability of subsistence techniques to adapt to rapidly expanding populations are policy issues with migration dimensions. So too are the rapid changes in the economic and social structure of rural areas, growing provincialism and the development of an urban population divorced from a rural base and rural skills. The latter has been one reason for recent rethinking of housing policy, which had emphasized the importance of continuing links between urban residents and their rural source areas, but which must now come to terms with an acute shortage of accommodation and growing problems of public provision of rental accommodation for the urban workforce.

For Western Samoa, Salale Salale notes that, in the 1960s, overseas migration and rural-urban migration were the two forms of migration of concern to planners, whereas in the 1970s circular migration also grew in importance. Overseas migration has been of great economic and social importance (see also Macpherson’s paper in this volume); with wages for unskilled labourers five or ten times as high in Auckland as in Western Samoa, the incentive to migrate has been very strong.

Samoa's Fourth Five-Year Development Plan is less sanguine than the previous plan about this movement. Employment and remittances are seen as the two key benefits, but the remittances are not always channelled into productive investments and can have negative effects on agricultural production and the pattern of consumption. Migration is selective of skilled young people who are needed at home. It has not led to economic self-reliance
and can be disrupted by overseas circumstances beyond Western Samoa's control. Lowered birth-rates are seen as essential for any longer-term solution for Samoa's population problem.

Rural-urban migration within Western Samoa has not been on such a scale as to warrant concern or a conscious policy, though it is hoped rural development programs will prevent urbanward movement increasing in volume. Circular movement of people to Apia for shopping, marketing, medical attention and church meetings has been facilitated by the upgrading of roads. While this enables rural people to benefit from urban services without increasing the permanent urban population, it is necessary for the government to provide certain services for circular migrants to make their short periods in town more beneficial and less disruptive of urban life.

Conclusion

Clearly, the planners represented in the conference, like planners in many other parts of the world, were concerned about the rapid growth of the large cities of the region. The issue is not one of optimum city size per se. If Jakarta at 6.5 million, Kuala Lumpur at 1.5 million and Suva at 100,000 are all in some sense 'too large' it can only be in relation to the rest of the national urban hierarchy and in the context of a search for balanced regional development. The planners also noted the need for better and more relevant data, the lack of comprehensive policies for population redistribution, and the lack of a consensus as to the appropriate goals and instruments of population redistribution policy. The emphasis of their policies has often changed from one Five-Year Plan to the next, reflecting changes in the underlying circumstances and issues and/or a changed perception of what the issues are and how they might be tackled.

One final point should be made by way of introduction. A special one-day seminar was held immediately preceding the conference, on the topic 'Government Resettlement Programmes in South-east Asia'. Although this seminar fitted appropriately within the topic 'Population Mobility and Development', because of the particular interest in the subject, the comprehensiveness and quality of the papers and the length of the present volume, the proceedings of that seminar are being published by the Development Studies Centre as a separate monograph.
Part A
The situation and setting of population mobility
The theoretical foundations of population mobility studies are still very much in debate. Research usually falls into one of two broad categories. It tends to be either micro-level, where the focus is on the situation in which individuals find themselves, or at macro-level, where the focus is primarily on the setting, or broad context within which movements take place. Clearly the two approaches are complementary, but integration of the two is rare.

Urban populations, especially of capital cities, are almost everywhere growing more rapidly than country averages, the main reason being rural-urban migration. A key issue for development planners is whether such rural to urban flow should be controlled, and, if so, which are the most effective policy instruments. To judge this, some elements at least in the complex interrelationships between source and destination areas need to be sorted out.

The group of papers in part A seeks to place current ideas in perspective. Each lays its main stress on the circular type of population movement, in which place of residence is not shifted, or is only temporarily shifted, rather than a long-term relocation. Bedford undertakes a detailed analysis of theory and discusses the various approaches of researchers to the study of mobility, bringing out the relevance of their findings for policy makers. Forbes seeks to place studies of movement in less developed countries firmly in their setting of peripheral capitalism. In this transitional stage of their development societies are compelled to adapt indigenous socio-economic systems to exogenous forces. Population movement of various types is one element in such adaptation, which may be related to class rather than to ethnic or regional characteristics.

The findings of micro-level studies of particular situations may be very relevant to situations in other environments, giving policy makers at least the insight to know the right questions to ask. Chapman makes a plea for policy makers to understand this and gives three examples of such field studies, discussing their policy implications for employment patterns, education and rural-urban linkages.
Chapter 1

The variety and forms of population mobility in Southeast Asia and Melanesia: the case of circulation

R. Bedford

The primary purpose of this monograph is to draw out the relevance for policy making of recent, mostly micro-level research into human spatial mobility in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. At the outset we should recognize that this is not going to be an easy task. Recent micro-level research has demonstrated clearly that we are dealing with a much more complex mobility process than was previously thought when data collected in national censuses or large-scale sample surveys formed the primary input into our analyses of patterns, causes and consequences of population movement. Abu-Lughod (1975) pointed out that an impressive volume of empirical research during the 1960s and 1970s finally dispelled the myth that theories and models of migration developed in the United States and Western Europe had equal relevance for explaining population movement in the non-western world.

Micro-level studies, by their very nature, have tended to draw attention to the particularities of mobility situations in different parts of the third world. As a consequence, evolution of theories about population movement has lagged far behind detailed description of form and process. There have been attempts to draw out common themes and to work inductively towards generalizations of wider spatial and cultural relevance, but numerous contradictions in the evidence and the usual caution by authors about the limited utility of their findings have generated more questions than answers (see, for example, Chapman 1978, Chapman and Prothero 1977, Connell et al. 1976, Goldstein 1978, Lipton 1980, Nelson 1976, Simmons et al. 1977).

The lack of a body of theory must be very frustrating for planners seeking some guidelines on policies governments could adopt to improve the quality of life of their increasingly mobile populations. Mabogunje (1979:37-8) stressed at a recent conference on the role of population redistribution policies in development planning: 'The future of most developing countries augurs to be one in which population mobility is bound to be even greater than at present, and the most cogent argument in support of government
intervention in the process is that it is vital to the whole thrust of their development.' Yet in the literature reporting the findings of micro-level research there is considerable ambivalence about the desirability of direct intervention to promote or discourage certain forms of population movement. One reason for this is a reluctance on the part of many academics to move from description and explanation of social phenomena to prescriptions for action; acknowledged deficiencies in our mobility theories discourage many from making the jump from social critic to social engineer (Forbes, in this volume). Before effective planning strategies can be devised to enhance the mobility-development nexus as Corner (in this volume) terms it, we must have a clear understanding of the causes and consequences of different forms of population movement. In this overview of recent research on the variety and forms of mobility I have chosen therefore to concentrate on some conceptual issues and the explanatory generalizations contained in the micro-studies rather than on policy prescriptions. Subsequent papers in the volume take up the latter theme with reference to particular aspects of mobility in specific countries.

Recent studies have emphasized the importance of forms of mobility which are usually short-term, repetitive or cyclical in nature, and which do not involve movers in lasting changes of residence. In the past such population circulation was excluded from the domain of migration studies. However, micro-level research over the last two decades in many parts of the third world has demonstrated that this temporary mobility is of considerable socio-economic significance, especially for labour movements. Attention is focused here on circulation in four countries in Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) and those countries that comprise Melanesia in the western Pacific (Map 1). For the purposes of this overview, 'recent literature' is defined as studies published or completed since 1975, and a list of papers dealing with aspects of population circulation is contained in Table 1.1.

Relaxation of conventional definitions of migration, and adoption of a new terminology to cater for various forms of circulation, have resulted in some conceptual confusion, so that some issues of definition and analytical focus should be examined. To establish a context for evaluating some explanations of temporary relocation, especially labour circulation, it is also necessary to draw attention to some obvious differences and a few less obvious similarities between the environments within which mobility studies have been undertaken in Southeast Asia and Melanesia. Three explanatory generalizations which are invoked either explicitly or implicitly in much of the recent micro-level research are discussed. The significance for planners of these explanations is that they lead their proponents to rather different perspectives on the desirability or otherwise of promoting population circulation. Some policy implications of these perspectives are introduced in
the final section of the paper since they underlie a number of themes which are raised in other papers in this volume.

Some conceptual issues

Defining forms of mobility. Population movement is difficult to define in a manner which has uniform meaning and relevance in a wide range of spatial, temporal and cultural contexts. The first critical issue which has to be resolved by those concerned with measuring and analysing the process of spatial relocation is one of definition — what sorts of relocation will be examined and how will 'movers' be distinguished from 'non-movers'.

Some distinction is usually drawn between 'temporary' and 'permanent' relocations, implying a continuum of moves extending from the shortest, most repetitive mobility associated with daily living, to long-term changes in place of residence in distant parts of a country or overseas. It is usually assumed that the form of spatial mobility termed 'migration' involves individuals, families or groups in the severance of connections with one habitat and the establishment of a new set of bonds in another location, frequently with the intention on the part of the mover to shift 'permanently' to another place of residence. Migration, so defined, is commonly differentiated from the numerous forms of spatial mobility which involve temporary absences from a place considered to be 'home'. Such temporary moves have been grouped under the label of 'circulation' which Zelinsky (1971:225-6) defines as a great variety of movements all having in common the lack of any declared intention of permanent or long-lasting change of residence.

There are a number of conceptual problems associated with any distinction between types of mobility which rest ultimately on the declared intentions of movers. The obvious weakness is that in spite of stated intentions to the contrary, the self-styled long-term mover may, in fact, stay only a short time at the destination before returning to the place of previous residence, while the short-term mover may end up staying at the destination and never going home as intended. Some authors, such as Young (1977a) and Ward (1980) argue that use of intent as an indicator of whether a person is a migrant or a temporary sojourner or circulator is largely spurious; this is a distinction which can only be made post facto. And yet, if one relies solely on return migration to define circulation in population movement, and makes the distinction between circulators and migrants on the basis of where people are residing at a particular time, then all that has been achieved is the replacement of one artificial division with another which may be equally spurious in many analytical contexts.

Nelson (1976:724) has argued that the distribution of
Table 1.1
Recent studies commenting on aspects of circular mobility^a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural/Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hugo (1979a)</td>
<td>Hugo (1979b)</td>
<td>Hugo (1977b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hugo (1979c)</td>
<td>IRRS (1977)</td>
<td>Hugo (1978a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maude (forthcoming)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rusli (1978)</td>
<td>Temple (1975)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td></td>
<td>McGee (1975)</td>
<td>Khoo &amp; Voon (1975)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sutlive (1977)</td>
<td>Maude (1978)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strauch (1977)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lauro (1979b)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Goldstein &amp; Goldstein (1978)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lightfoot (1980)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Singhanetra-Renard (1977)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Anderson (1975)</td>
<td>Feldman (1975)</td>
<td>del Rosario Juan &amp; Kim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>van den Muijzenberg (1975)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1977)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lopez &amp; Hollensteiner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1976)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sutlive (1977)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^aExcluding those contained in this volume.
### Table 1.1 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural/Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Papua New Guinea</strong></td>
<td>Connell (forthcoming)</td>
<td>Bedford &amp; Mamak (1976)</td>
<td>Conroy &amp; Curtain (forthcoming)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Curtain (1980b)</td>
<td>Jackson (1976b)</td>
<td>Skeldon (1978a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hamnett (forthcoming)</td>
<td>Levine &amp; Levine (1979)</td>
<td>Young (1977a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Harris &amp; Clunies Ross (1975)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Young (forthcoming)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hayano (1979)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Zuckerman (1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Heaney (1977)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Townsend (1977)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Watson (forthcoming)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Young (1977b)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Solomons</strong></td>
<td>Bathgate (forthcoming)</td>
<td>Kengava (1979)</td>
<td>Bathgate (1978)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chapman (1975)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chapman (1976)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frazer (forthcoming)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vanuatu</strong></td>
<td>Bastin (forthcoming)</td>
<td>Bonnemaison (1976)</td>
<td>Bonnemaison (1977b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(New Hebrides)</td>
<td>Bonnemaison (1979)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bonnemaison (forthcoming)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fiji</strong></td>
<td>Bedford (1978)</td>
<td>Kaurasi (1977)</td>
<td>Bedford (1979a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Irava (1977)</td>
<td>Nair (forthcoming)</td>
<td>Racule (forthcoming)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Walsh (1978)</td>
<td>Tubuna (forthcoming)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
intentions within a mobile population is at least as important as actual retention and return migration rates. This is because the behaviour of movers with respect to housing, social contacts, voluntary organizations, political interests, use of savings, and many other matters in both the places of origin and destination is determined by their mobility expectations regardless of whether or not these expectations are later realized. As she goes on to argue, if mobility is leading to a more 'permanent' redistribution of population within a particular region or nation, then current intentions may be both a more accurate guide to current behaviour, and a better predictor of eventual settlement patterns, than retention or return-flow data based on past movement patterns (Nelson 1976:724).

The definitional dilemma that confronts mobility researchers is illustrated by the bewildering array of arbitrary distinctions contained in micro-level studies. Definitions of forms of migration and circulation used in three recent inquiries in Southeast Asia and two in Melanesia are summarized in Table 1.2. The main difference in these simple typologies is the distinction between 'circular migration' and 'migration'. In the Southeast Asian studies, elapsed time in residence outside the place of origin is used as the delimiting characteristic—six months in the case of Hugo's (1978a) study, and twelve months in the inquiries by Mantra (1978) and Maude (in this volume). In the Melanesian cases cited, two different approaches are used. I relied (Bedford 1973) on stated residential intentions of the population (what Ward (1980) terms 'a realm of myth'), while Young (1977a) uses the post facto distinction between migrants and circulators mentioned earlier. Clearly we are not all talking about the same movements when we use the labels 'circulation', 'circular migration' and 'migration', and this important factor inhibits the development of more robust mobility theory which has relevance to outside narrow spatial and cultural domains. It has, in fact, been suggested recently that attempts to distinguish between forms of mobility do more to hinder than advance our understanding of the patterns, causes and consequences of this process. Thus Ward (1980) and Forbes (in this volume) argue that typologies, such as those devised by Gould and Prothero (1975) and Hugo (1978b), and simple classifications of the sort outlined in Table 1.2, tend to fragment explanation and by implication ascribe some intrinsic theoretical significance to what is purely a device to facilitate description and analysis. Indeed, undue concentration on particular subsets of total spatial mobility can generate a distorted view of the relative importance of particular kinds of movement, as well as obscuring some fundamental changes taking place within the social system as a whole.

Analytical perspectives. In a recent review of the process of labour circulation in third world countries, Mitchell (forthcoming) has emphasized the need to consider two related, but analytically different, perspectives when examining social phenomena. On the one hand there is the perspective which highlights
### Table 1.2
Definitions of forms of mobility

#### A. Southeast Asia

**Hugo (1978a) — Indonesia**

(i) **Commuting**: the mover regularly (though not necessarily every day) goes to a place outside his village to work or attend an educational institute, but returns to the village most nights.

(ii) **Circular migration**: the mover's absence usually involves him sleeping at his destination for continuous periods of up to six months.

(iii) **Migration**: the mover is absent continuously from the village for six months or more.

**Mantra (1978) — Indonesia**

(i) **Commuting**: a movement across the *dukuh* (hamlet) boundary for at least six hours and no more than twenty-four hours.

(ii) **Circulation**: a movement across the *dukuh* boundary for at least one day, but less than one year.

(iii) **Migration**: an intentional shift of residence across the *dukuh* boundary for one or more years.

**Maude (in this volume) — Malaysia**

(i) **Commuting**: involves movement to work in another district or main urban area within the same district where the person returns to live in the household at least once a week.

(ii) **Circular migration**: an absence from the village for up to twelve months.

(iii) **Migration**: an absence from the village for more than one year, although this does not necessarily mean such migrants will never return to live in their village home.

#### B. Melanesia

**Bedford (1973) — New Hebrides**

(i) **Oscillation**: routine daily movements — shopping, the journey to work and to school, visiting — and other movements involving an absence from home of less than one month.

(ii) **Circular migration**: moves involving an absence of more than one month, where the intention of the mover is to return to live in the village at some stage.

(iii) **Migration**: moves where the intention of the mover is to settle at the destination. He/she may visit the village periodically, but has no plans to return there to live.

**Young (1977a) — Papua New Guinea**

(i) **Oscillation**: routine daily movements as well as brief casual visits on business or for social reasons.

(ii) **Circular migration**: this occurs when a migrant has returned to his village of origin after a period in residence elsewhere, and has no plans for subsequent movement.

(iii) **Migration**: persons residing outside their village of origin at the time of the survey.
the setting of the social action under study; on the other there is the perspective which draws attention to the situation of this action. In the case of population movement, he notes (p. 10) 'The social setting is provided by the macroscopic economic, political and administrative structures of the regions in which the migrant is involved while the social situation is represented by the particular sets of circumstances in which migrants, actual or potential, find themselves.' The two are not mutually exclusive, but an explicit focus on one or the other can lead to very different interpretations about the phenomenon being analysed. As he goes on to point out, 'The same elemental unit of behaviour — the movement of a person from one location to another — may be construed quite differently by one theorist who is subsuming a particular move into a general explanation of the flow of population out of an impoverished rural area into an area where there are employment opportunities, and another theorist who is looking at the set of pressures backed by a system of norms which impinge upon a person with specific kinship and family obligations' (Mitchell forthcoming, p. 18).

Most of the studies listed in Table 1.1 explore and endeavour to explain the situation of circulation. The primary concern is to come to grips with the local social, economic, political and environmental contexts within which individuals make their mobility decisions. This focus on situation is at the heart of the micro-level research strategy, a strategy which Chapman summed up well with reference to mobility studies when he wrote:

Examination of such a fragmentary slice of the real world, rather than being an exercise in the unique or the exotic ... reflected the desire to sharpen the cutting edge of technique and analysis, to focus upon mobility from the standpoint of the village in all its ongoing complexity, to yield definitions that are locally relevant rather than predefined from external conventions, and finally to generate inductive models based upon a specified nucleate population (1975:144).

The strongest argument in favour of this perspective is that there is considerable spatial, temporal and cultural variability in the constellation of forces which influence individual migration decision behaviour. However, as McGee pointed out:

the problem with giving priority to the situation, and within each situation the decision-making process of individual migrants, is that individual motivations are nothing more than rationalisations of behaviour within a system. This does not take account of the fact that this behaviour is caused by the system of which the individual is part (1977: 199).

It can be argued that in our enthusiasm to adopt a more realistic approach to the study of population movement in different situations
there has been a tendency to lose sight of an important consideration: our specified nucleate populations belonged to a much larger world which could not be readily appreciated in terms of its impact on mobility decisions simply from the standpoint of the village. Mitchell (forthcoming) has stressed that it is incumbent upon the analyst who is studying social situations to be explicit about assumptions regarding social settings, given that all contemporary movement behaviour is constrained in some way by political and economic forces operating at national and international levels, as well as those influencing mobility decision-making in the local area. It is important to establish characteristics of this wider setting because the overall economic and political structure of a social system may provide basic explanations for the existence or persistence of particular forms of mobility.

In some recent studies of population movement in Southeast Asia and Melanesia much greater attention has been directed towards understanding the process by which the international capitalist economy is transforming but not destroying indigenous systems of production, consumption and movement (see, for example, studies mentioned in Table 1.1 by Forbes on mobility in Indonesia and by Curtain in Papua New Guinea). It has been suggested that the persistence of circular labour migration, for instance, is not due primarily to the desire on the part of villagers to maintain links with their rural kin and keep open options for residence and a livelihood in their 'traditional' homes. Rather, this continuing dependence on the village for social security and economic well-being is considered to be the result of policies and actions by governments, local capitalist interests, and international forces which conserve a large non-capitalist production and distribution system in order to ensure that a cheap labour reserve is retained at minimal cost to employers and the state (see, for example, Amin 1974a, Burawoy 1976, McGee 1978 and 1979). Such reasoning depends on the establishment of the setting of population movement.

Comparability of the settings of mobility is an essential precondition for cross-cultural analysis of mobility. As Mitchell (forthcoming: 14) has stressed, 'social situations cannot be compared if the settings in which they are located are radically dissimilar.' Failure to appreciate this led to what Goldstein (1976: 428) termed one of the greatest faults of which we have been guilty in mobility research: 'being locked into the same kinds of questions related to the same concepts of migrations that were developed years ago for a particular setting at a particular time'.

Environments of circulation

It is stating the obvious to point out that there is immense cultural, demographic, political, historical and ecological diversity within the area spanned by the present monograph studies.
Researchers examining circulation at micro-level have been conscious of this and reluctant to generalize findings beyond narrow spatial and cultural domains. As Hugo (1978a:299) states in his analysis of population movement in West Java, 'it is not possible to generalize in a direct way from the findings of this study to other Third World, or indeed Javan, contexts. Logan (1972) for example has pointed out the uniqueness of Java's distinctive dual economic structure while Geertz [1963b] has explained that Indonesia is not any one or small group of villages "writ large".' The most recent attempt at inductive synthesis drawing on evidence contained in village studies in the third world is Lipton's (1980) examination of the impact of mobility on rural productivity and income distribution. Although he is careful to acknowledge the great variation in aims, methods and findings in micro-level studies, Lipton considers it is possible to 'generalize in a direct way' to wider third world contexts. His central argument is that circulation of labour is generated by inequalities in the village, and that this movement worsens rather than reduces inequalities in the rural communities over time. A similar theme is developed by Connell in this volume.

Lipton (1980:4) suggests that the evidence from micro-studies demonstrates the existence of two main types of movers in a village environment which is common throughout the third world today. Typically, he claims, one finds in the village a relatively unequal distribution of land among residents, a growing proportion of landless labourers and a relatively literate population which has good urban contacts through previous migrants. From such villages move many poor people whose search for and benefits from outside employment are very different in nature from the more affluent and better educated movers. These two groups, through their different backgrounds, movement behaviour and prospects, have a polarizing impact on the rural sector which tends to increase inequalities within and between villages. This is so because movement of the affluent and better educated tends to generate income, skills, knowledge and remittances useful to the family in the village, while movement of the poor, usually less well educated small farmers and landless labourers fails to generate much extra income (beyond that required for basic subsistence) or skills, and may lead eventually to the whole household quitting the rural community of origin to wander the countryside in search of work (Lipton 1980:4). This distinction between poor and more affluent groups in the population circulating in and out of rural communities is mentioned in many of the micro-level studies listed in Table 1.1 which document mobility in Southeast Asia. It is a much less prominent theme in the Melanesian literature, and there are some fundamental differences in the environments of circulation between the two regions.

Southeast Asia. While the reality is very complex, it can be argued on the basis of evidence collected in recent studies of circulation in Southeast Asia that much movement is not simply
a matter of preference or choice; it is essential for survival among both rural and urban resident populations. One of the most important causes of circular labour migration in this part of the world is seasonal variations in the demand for labour in the rice growing areas. There is massive underutilization of labour in the sense that a substantial section of the population struggles to find subsistence for much of the year, usually through activities yielding low returns per hour worked (see, for example, Anderson 1975, Franke 1972, Geertz 1963a, Jones and Supraptalah 1976, Penny and Masri Singarimbun 1972, Jones and Ward in this volume). As Hugo (1978b) notes for Java, larger landowners may be able to produce enough to tide them over the slack periods between planting and harvesting, but the landless and those owning very small plots are usually forced to seek income elsewhere. Many join the seasonal migration of families who follow the harvest across the countryside, returning to their villages for the next season as the paddy starts to yellow in the fields again (Franke 1972). Others seek work in the urban informal sector as hawkers, ice-cream sellers, trishaw riders and so on (for examples, see Forbes 1978, Hugo 1978a and 1978b, Jellinek 1977 and 1978b). Forbes's conclusion (1978:23) that circulation of trishaw riders in Ujung Padang 'is a rational response by poor people to the realities of their environment' has wide relevance to the densely settled parts of Southeast Asia.

Geertz's concept (1963a) of rural involution, the process whereby economic activities become more and more labour intensive and complex within the established social fabric as high rates of population growth and changing agricultural systems lead to increasing pressure on scarce land resources, seems to be much more a feature of the Javanese mobility setting than of other parts of Southeast Asia. Anderson (1975) and van den Muijzenberg (1975), reviewing socio-economic changes in selected villages in Central Luzon (Philippines) where population densities are high and increasing, argue that there is little evidence of the local involutionary tendency that has been observed in Java. Few of the strategies which lead to 'an extraordinary amount of spatial mobility' (Anderson 1975:147) among these people are, as yet, explicitly related to population pressure. Singhanetra-Renard (1977), analysing mobility among villagers living within commuting distance of Chiang Mai, the major urban centre in northern Thailand, does not stress a trend towards low-productivity activities which proliferate and involute. Rather, land shortage due to population increase and changing patterns of agriculture has been accompanied by a rapid growth in commuting to Chiang Mai, especially since transport networks have improved substantially in recent years (Singhanetra-Renard cited in Goldstein 1978:29).

Circumstances obviously vary from country to country and region to region within nations, but Anderson's comment on the Sisyano of Central Luzon is echoed in many recent studies of the rural situation of circulation in Southeast Asia:
Especially significant as an index of declining economic opportunity are the striking increases in agricultural laborers, underemployed carpenters, persons dependent on relatives, sari-sari storekeepers, and the like. Most of these people are so marginally employed that they might be more accurately labeled unemployed. Many of them constitute a rootless population, moving from one place to another and from one activity to another in their attempts to scratch out a living. Some live on the margins of village society, relying heavily upon their kinsmen and neighbors, and contributing to high rates of theft of farm animals, rice, and valuables.

In general the occupational trends within the Sisyano economy indicate that despite the remarkable ability of most Sisyanos to discover or create new niches, there has been a decline in control over internal resources, a decline in opportunities other than those provided by emigration or education, and a decline in the quality of life for an ever-increasing category of residents who are marginally employed .... As things stand [the latter] appear to have no future, and there is every indication that things will get much worse for them (Anderson 1975:169-71).

Obviously this is not the whole story; as Lipton (1980) indicated, there is another important component — the more prosperous — in the circular migration flows to and from most villages. Hugo (1978a) stresses that it would be erroneous to depict all circular movement in West Java as essential in order to obtain subsistence. He notes, 'it was found in the village studies that although this motive is a dominant one among many circulatory migrants, for others circular migration is a chance to supplement their income and improve their standard of living' (Hugo 1978b:21). Maude similarly observes in his study of population mobility and its effect on rural households in part of Malaysia (in this volume): 'mobility is a major contributor to the economy of some households in North Kelantan, and a useful supplement for many others. It is also an outlet for a proportion of rural youth, who have been educated out of agriculture but not into alternative, full-time occupations.'

Most of the micro-level studies of circulation in Southeast Asia mentioned in Table 1.1 have one of the following as their central focus:

(a) rural communities within commuting distance of towns (e.g. Hugo 1977a, 1978a, 1979a; Lauro 1977, 1979b; Mantra 1977, 1978; Maude in this volume; Singhanetra-Renard 1977);

(b) particular groups operating within the urban informal sector who circulate between town and village (e.g. Forbes 1978; Hugo 1977b, 1978a; Jellinek 1977, 1978b; McGee 1975; Papanek 1975; Strauch 1977);
(c) an intrinsic and culturally-determined propensity for high levels of circulation among particular ethnic groups, such as the Minangkabau (e.g. Forbes in this volume; Naim 1976; Maude 1979 and forthcoming).

The contemporary environment of circulation as described in most of these studies contains two essential elements. On the one hand there are the densely settled rural areas where there are serious land shortages as well as widening disparities within and between communities in terms of access to and possession of productive resources. The other component is the extensive 'lower circuit' of the urban economy which embraces a very wide range of low-income and low-productivity activities. Given the labour absorptive capacity of the latter, and the seasonal nature of agricultural production in many parts of the region, circulation of labour within rural areas and between village and town is endemic. It is not an independent force, however; as Forbes points out in this volume, contemporary circulation reflects the changing structure of the economy and, in its wider setting, is a direct consequence of the incomplete capitalization of production and thus of the uneven spatial impact of capitalism.

Melanesia. In Melanesia circulation of population is also endemic but the essential environment of this mobility, as it has so far been described, is quite dissimilar to that outlined for Southeast Asia. In the first place, the agricultural system is not dominated to the same extent by seasonal fluctuations in production; the basis of the subsistence economy is root-crop horticulture which does not demand a substantial seasonal flow of labour to ensure a successful harvest. Secondly, population densities tend to be much lower and landlessness is still relatively rare among descendants of the indigenous populations (although this is not the case among descendants of immigrant Asian labour such as the Indians in Fiji). Another important difference is that urban centres in the western Pacific are very small by Asian standards (the largest town in the region is Suva with a population around 130,000) and there is only an embryo 'informal sector' in Melanesia's towns. Finally, most of the rural communities in which micro-level research into circulation has been carried out lie well outside commuting distance of towns. With a few notable exceptions, such as Chapman's (1975, 1976) pioneering research into short-term circulation in the Solomon Islands, Bastin's (forthcoming) work in Vanuatu (formerly the New Hebrides), and Bathgate's (1978, forthcoming) very detailed village study on Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands, the emphasis has been on moves which take rural residents away from their village homes for some months (see, for example, Bedford 1978 and forthcoming, Conroy 1977, Conroy and Curtain, Racule, Vele (all forthcoming), Young 1977a, 1977b, forthcoming and in this volume).

Of critical significance to the environment of circulation in Melanesia is the structure and condition of the village
economy. Fisk summarized the situation as it was a decade ago in the following words:

In most of the Pacific, the subsistence farmer, producing from his own resources the goods and services needed for his family, is still able to produce as much as he can consume, of the main items he knows how to produce, with the use of only part of the land and labour resources available to him. The result is that the subsistent, self-sufficient type of farmer in the Pacific can have a considerably higher standard of consumption than hundreds of millions of the poorer peasants of Asia, and can obtain this with relatively little regular work and virtually no money income (Fisk 1970:2).

There were exceptions to this condition of 'subsistence affluence' in Melanesia around 1970, and a decade later there are a lot more. A combination of rapid population growth combined with intensive cash cropping has led to serious competition for scarce land resources in the more densely settled parts of the New Guinea Highlands (Howlett 1973 and 1980, Howlett et al. 1976, Young 1977a), some small outlying islands (Bonnemaison 1977b, Knapman and Walter 1979), and among certain disadvantaged 'immigrant' ethnic groups such as the Indo-Fijians (Anderson 1974, Bedford 1978, Nankivell 1978). In addition there were the 'more' and 'less' affluent villagers in 1970 — an inequality which has increased sharply in recent years. Yet it cannot be denied that, to the western observer at least, villagers in Melanesia still seem much better off in terms of access to land and basic subsistence necessities than most of their counterparts in Southeast Asia.

Since the Melanesian village economy has been judged a relatively 'affluent' one, poverty has rarely surfaced as a basic cause of the process of labour circulation. The focus has rather been directed towards the impact of penetration of the market exchange economy (manifested in labour recruiting schemes, head taxes, the spread of cash cropping and plantation agriculture, mining and urban development) on indigenous socio-economic structures. These structures have been characterized by a flow of people in time and space rather than by the territorial immobility often ascribed to primitive, small-scale tribal societies. The general impression one gains from the literature is that the essential environment of circulation is one where, as Chapman and Prothero put it:

Individuals ... belong to a system that not only permits the exercise of choice but also the fulfilment of desired needs from locations outside the home place, for the simple but important reason that social structure is not localized in one community or household nor in several communities whose territories are contiguous. Circuits of travel consequently were and still are one means to achieve a desired end (1977:9-10).
Except for the case of plantation labour migration, there has been little attention to the impact which evolving economic and political structures under colonialism have had on this system of essentially free-choice circulation. Because this form of mobility was found to be as much a component of 'traditional' Melanesian society as of the colonial and post-colonial settings, a tendency has been to assume that it is both acceptable and desirable within these cultures.

The environment of circulation in Melanesia, then, has tended to be viewed from a very positive perspective. For example, Chapman and Prothero (1977:7–8) state 'it is necessary to think of circulation and these socio-economic changes in terms of concepts like "maintenance", "modification", "amplification" and "accommodation". Circulation has endured but has been modified; its incidence has been greatly magnified; but this in turn serves only to emphasize customary patterns of mobility.' Since about 1975, however, there has been a shift away from a focus on individuals within relatively affluent subsistence sectors towards disparities among rural residents in terms of their access to assets and opportunities in their home environments as well as in the wider national economy. The emergence of classes in formerly classless societies is emphasizing the need to differentiate between groups of villagers and their reasons for circulation (Connell 1979b). It has become clear that some Melanesians have far more options open for satisfying their needs and aspirations than others (Howlett 1973 and 1980, Ward and Proctor 1980).

The extent to which poverty is a basic reason for circular mobility in Melanesia is difficult to judge because most inquiries have not sought to establish the effect of increasing socio-economic differentiation within rural populations on movement behaviour. One important exception to this is in the field of education. Studies by Conroy (1976 and 1977), Curtain (1975) and Young (1977a) explore the implications of educational attainment for occupational and spatial mobility in Papua New Guinea. However, there has been little attention given to the problems of those who are not progressing far in the education system. Recent research in the small peripheral islands of eastern Fiji (Bedford 1978, Bedford and McLean 1978, Brookfield 1978a, Knapman and Walter 1979, UNESCO/UNFPA 1977) has dealt with problems of some of the less well educated: of the land-hungry villager who cannot afford to send his children to school; the Indo-Fijian peasant farmer who cannot make ends meet cultivating his small acreage of marginal land; and the life-long estate worker who perceives himself to be trapped into a mobility circuit which only includes plantations – he has no land 'back home' and cannot afford (or will not risk) leaving a job which, if very poorly paid, at least guarantees him shelter and food.

Some similarities. In spite of the considerable variations in culture, demography, ecology and economy which recent micro-
Level research has brought into sharp focus, there do seem to be some important parallels between the environments of circulation in Southeast Asia and Melanesia. At the most general level it can be argued that much contemporary circulation, irrespective of its traditional form, is a response to changes wrought in Asian and Pacific societies by the penetration and consolidation of capitalism. In terms of its spatial impact, the socio-economic changes generated by the introduction and establishment of a capitalist mode of production have been quite uneven. Indeed, uneven development is a critical structural component of the environment of circulation in all parts of Southeast Asia and Melanesia. This is a condition which is hinted at in much of the recent mobility literature, but which is rarely the starting point in the analysis.

A second similarity lies in the nature of contemporary demographic change. Throughout Southeast Asia and Melanesia population growth is rapid, and an important consequence for rural communities in large parts of the two regions has been intensifying pressure of numbers on scarce land resources. Obviously the situation described by Geertz (1963a), Penny and Masri Singarimbun (1972) and Hugo (1978a), among others, for Java is quite different in detail to that described by Howlett (1973 and 1980), Howlett et al. (1976) and Young (1977b) for parts of the Central Highlands of New Guinea. At a superficial level, however, there is a similarity. Socio-economic differentiation in rural communities is increasing both as a result of rapidly growing numbers as well as the deepening but selective penetration of the capitalist mode of production into village-based activities.

Poverty, a condition which is difficult to define statistically in a way that would have much meaning in a cross-cultural comparison between Southeast Asia and Melanesia, is increasing in the sense that certain groups in the rural and urban-based populations have a much lower standard of living than others. As numbers continue to increase rapidly in both areas, this relative poverty must also become more widespread. Thus Dean Forbes's (1978:23) comment about mobility in Ujung Pandang will become increasingly relevant in Melanesia: circulation, for many, will be 'a rational response by poor people to the realities of their environment'.

Explanation of circulation

Some explanatory generalizations have been suggested to account for rapid growth in circular forms of movement. It must be stressed at the outset that there is nothing new about circulation in either Southeast Asia or Melanesia — as Chapman and Prothero (1977:5) have pointed out: 'Circulation, rather than being transitional or ephemeral is a time-honored and enduring mode of behaviour, deeply rooted in a great variety of cultures and found at
all stages of socio-economic change.' However, the social, economic and political fabric which defines the structures within which circulation occurs has changed radically over the past two centuries or more, and while a particular form of movement has persisted, the motives underlying the use of these forms have not been constant.

The three explanatory generalizations I examine emphasize:

(i) the role of centripetal and centrifugal forces in a socio-economic environment where there is a territorial division of activities and obligations;

(ii) the relevance of a strategy of risk minimization to account for what seems on the surface to be an 'inefficient' investment of labour in a wide range of productive activities in different locations;

(iii) the nature of changes in the socio-economic structures within which individual decision-making takes place — especially changes associated with penetration of the capitalist mode of production into third world societies.

The first two, which highlight the particular sets of social and economic circumstances in which migrants find themselves, tend to lead their proponents to argue in favour of policies designed to facilitate the interchange of people between places. This attitude is criticized by some of the researchers who have examined circulation in broader political and socio-economic settings at regional, national and international levels, who suggest a more cautious approach towards adopting planning strategies that may serve to legitimize structures which generate inequalities and exploitation. Such structures have been responsible for intensifying population circulation throughout Southeast Asia and Melanesia.

Circulation in response to centripetal and centrifugal forces. In a recent attempt to articulate some basic propositions about circulation as a long-established and enduring form of population movement Chapman and Prothero made the following statements:

The basic principle of circulation in both its customary and contemporary forms, involves a territorial division of activities and obligations. In both, the territorial distinction is between, on the one hand, the security associated with the home place through access to land for food, housing materials and trading items; kinship affiliation; the care of children and the elderly; and on the other, the varied locations of political and religious leaders, kinsfolk, marriageable women and men, goods for barter or trade, ceremonials and feasts, and the introduced goods and services of commerce, medicine, education, religion, politics and entertainment (1977:8).
Western contact introduced services for political administration, religion, resource exploitation, commerce, health and education, the distribution of which were rarely a perfect 'fit' with the existing location of people. The locational discontinuities between indigenous population and introduced services resulted in the development of new forms of circulation between existing settlement (dispersed households, hamlets, villages and small towns) and the sites of these new developments (towns, mines, plantations and ports) (1977:7).

Basically, then, it is argued that movement takes place because the spatial distributions of populations on the one hand and the sources of goods and services they need or want on the other are different. The mechanism which ensures circulation between the different localities, rather than more rational re-distribution of population to match people with resources and opportunities, is an enduring conflict between two opposing sets of forces: centrifugal ones that induce the mover to leave their place of usual residence, and centripetal ones that draw them back. Thus, with reference to contemporary circulation, Chapman (1976:132) argues: 'Throughout the Solomons, as in South Central Africa, such constant mobility reflects the conflict between the centrifugal attractions of commercial, social and administrative services and wage employment, and the centripetal power of village obligations, social relationships and kinship ties.' The composition and relative power of the centrifugal and centripetal forces change over a person's lifetime, reflecting changes in roles and obligations as a child, young adult, parent, community leader, aged person and so on.

In the quite different cultural and socio-economic context of Java, Mantra uses the same approach to generalize about movement into and away from two wet rice communities in Yogyakarta Special District. He notes:

There are two sets of forces that lead people to migrate from or remain within the dukuh: centrifugal and centripetal. Too little rice land, barely sufficient food for an adequate diet, lack of local employment opportunities, and distance from advanced education tend to draw away the economically active.

Factors that encourage people to remain are the tight ties to birth place, family and kin, ownership or access to dukuh land, a basic commitment to mutual self-help and accompanying ritual, and the existence of patron/client relationships to assist the poorest households. In addition there is little information about distant places, transport and living costs outside the dukuh are high, and reports from resettlements beyond Java often are quite negative. In Kadorojo and Piring the contradictions between these centrifugal and centripetal forces are resolved by commuting
and circulation, which represent a compromise between total immobility and permanent relocation (Mantra 1978:vii).

Underpinning what Chapman (forthcoming) terms the 'continuing dialectic between the centrifugal attractions of wage employment, commercial and administrative services, and the centripetal power of village obligations, social relationships and kinship ties' is the notion of an individual set in a network of social relationships which spans a number of localities. This is not the place to examine the concept of 'social network' as it has been used by sociologists studying population movement (Mitchell (forthcoming) is useful in this regard); but an important point in the context of contemporary circulation is that physical displacement through spatial mobility need not be accompanied by social structural displacement for the individual. As Chapman and Prothero (1977:10) stress, 'where sizeable numbers are away, the social structures is bi- or multi-local and the varied destinations become a socio-spatial extension of the home community'.

Development of such a bi-local or multi-local social system requires long-term relocation of people as well as circular mobility. Writing of the evolution of such social systems spanning villages and towns in Papua New Guinea, Ryan (forthcoming) describes the occurrence of several forms of mobility: short-term circulation; long-term circulation; a form of circulation that enables the town dwellers to maintain village interests without actually returning; and permanent migration. This complex pattern embodies strategies which enable rural residents to cope with such things as increasing pressure of population on land resources, evolving land use systems, changing material aspirations (especially requirements for money), and enable urban residents to deal with insecurity of employment and housing as well as poverty through manipulation of village-based ties of kinship and affinity (Ryan forthcoming).

The networks of social relationships spanning various locations are not static; they change over time both for a particular individual and for the bi- or multi-local social system as a whole. Such village ties depend heavily on the composition of the village population; obviously those town dwellers who have no close kin in the villages have no one with whom to maintain ties (Ryan forthcoming). Morauta develops this theme when she notes:

A return to the village requires not only access to rural resources, but various forms of other assistance in the short term — a common pattern is for remittances to be concentrated almost entirely on parents .... While the migrant's parents are alive, they can act as the main sponsors of his return and facilitate his settling down through their own network of ties. Once they die ... his links with the village are very much attenuated (Morauta, in this volume).
The explanatory generalization afforded by the centripetal/centrifugal forces framework, as it has been developed by those carrying out research in Melanesia and Southeast Asia, relates to the *situation* of this movement. While the macroscopic economic and political structures which Mitchell sees as imposing critical constraints upon the 'calculus of choice the migrant or potential migrant may employ' are not totally ignored, the elaboration of setting is often very selective and rather naive. Of much greater concern to those working in the micro-scale research tradition has been an attempt to unravel the complex processes operating at local level to influence individual movement decisions. This concern has tended to distract attention from more general processes occurring within third world societies which have to be accepted, avoided or resisted by the individual and his community (Curtain, in this volume).

**Risk-minimization and the situation of circulation.** The second explanatory generalization is related to the centripetal/centrifugal forces approach, but emphasizes the notion of risk-minimization rather than resolution of a conflict between opposing interests. There is nothing novel about a focus on risk-minimizing behaviour in the context of the transformation of peasant societies with intrusion of the capitalist mode of production. Indeed, the conservative peasant can be a stereotype. Reference to circular forms of mobility as a risk-minimizing strategy are, however, rarely explicit.

In the cases of contemporary circulation in the New Hebrides and Fiji, I have argued that decisions creating the pattern of behaviour evident in circular movement are rational (Bedford 1973 and 1980). However, a behavioural model based on the assumption that individuals attempt to maximize monetary gains through movement, such as proposed by Todaro (1969), cannot adequately explain this type of mobility. Only if it is assumed that participation in activities in both the village and other areas is an economic and social necessity can circulation be said to maximize returns from time and labour. Thus Brookfield with Hart (1971) have argued that, in the game against a rapidly changing and uncertain world, Melanesians retain the security of their traditional socio-economic system, based in the village, while making selective use of opportunities for gaining access to some perceived benefits of the foreign commercial system introduced by colonialism. In this way they minimize risk as disadvantaged operators on the fringes of the commercial system, while utilizing a growing range of options for economic activity in both village and town. A combination of circumstances may favour concentration of inputs on a particular activity in a certain location, but the majority will strive to maintain their freedom of choice, and minimize risk rather than maximizing incomes, by balancing the security of their 'known world' against the uncertainties associated with full participation in the market economy. Where access to land still depends on membership of a social group and continuing interest in village affairs, physical involvement in rural-based activities remains
important for most Melanesians. Long-term absences can result in loss of social prestige and even rights to land. This explanatory generalization still has some validity in the context of circular mobility in the less densely settled parts of Melanesia which are reasonably accessible to the towns.

For large numbers of Melanesians, such an assumption of dual interests is not valid today. Options for satisfying a need for money can be met either by cash cropping in the village, or through wage employment in town; participation in both is not essential, and attempts to do so usually result in sub-optimal returns in a strictly economic sense. Similarly it seems to have much less relevance for the contemporary movement of those born on isolated small peripheral islands or among residents in areas a long way from the main towns, where many are 'functionally landless in that their land is economically disadvantaged by environmental or locational conditions which prevent them from earning a cash income' (Howlett 1980, emphasis in the original). This does not mean that population movement is dominated by emigration rather than circulation. What it does mean is that significant proportions of Melanesians do not endeavour to participate in a wide range of economic activities in both rural and urban areas. Their options are more limited, and they tend to concentrate on deriving a livelihood in and around one location, be it town or village.

In Southeast Asia, reference to a strategy of risk-minimization in the context of mobility is less explicit. In a number of studies, a distinction is drawn implicitly between the relevance of a strategy of spreading inputs over a range of productive activities which is adopted by the richer peasants, and the much smaller range of options which the poor and especially the landless peasants have (see, for example, Anderson 1975, Fernandez 1975, Hugo 1978a). Describing commuting, Hugo notes:

Thus *becak* drivers from the south of Bandung cannot earn a living from agriculture in their village and the meagre returns they obtain from strenuous hours of work in the city certainly could not keep them and their families in the city. ... The choice ... is thus between commuting and starving. In the case of a government servant from Ciwidej working in Bandung however, the decision is between a better standard of housing, food etc. in the village than in the city and the social and cultural benefit of closeness to kingroups and rural surroundings (1978a:106).

The case of the government servant has closer parallels with the Melanesian risk-minimizer than that of the *becak* driver. Yet the plight of the latter is more prevalent, in Java anyway, because as Hugo says elsewhere:

One cannot escape the conclusion that much of the circular migration of the West Javan respondents is an eminently
practical solution to the dilemma of the insufficiency of accessible income opportunities to provide for their families' subsistence if they worked permanently in the village or the city. Their decisions to maximize their income and the value gained from it by working in both rural and urban sectors and/or to 'earn in the city and spend in the village' represent a skilful and efficient use of scarce resources (1978b:27).

In a very different situation, Fernandez (1975:230-1) analyses the difference in strategies between the successful settlers in a government sponsored resettlement project at Narra in the Philippines and the landless poor who shared the dream of the planner 'that once land is acquired, prosperity will follow'. He notes that the former are people with farming and management experience. 'They have tried minimizing risk by diversifying economic activities, channeling increments from the farm to a small retail store, or transportation (pedicab) business. They are entrepreneurs and a well-demarcated social group in matters of formal education, exposure to media, travel, and employment experiences.' For the settler who was formerly landless, the situation is very different. A lack of education, financial resources and basic knowledge of land management and production resulted in many of them losing their land to the richer peasants, and slipping back into their former role as labourers for others. Their circulation between jobs was not based on the sort of risk-minimizing strategy adopted by the successful settlers; as with Hugo's becak drivers, their movement was geared simply to survival.

Discussions of risk-minimizing strategies of circulation, like those on centripetal and centrifugal forces, mainly concentrate on the situation of circulation. The wider setting, while discussed in part, is rarely a major focus. By emphasizing the situation of circulation we have drawn attention to a number of commonsense aspects of movement: the locational discontinuities of populations and the resources and opportunities they wish to use, the logical desire among Southeast Asians and Melanesians to participate in an alien monetary economy without totally abandoning the security of village social and economic institutions, and the very obvious fact that if we reduce the spatial and temporal definitions of a 'move' to absences from the place of residence of a month, a week, a day, or as some have recently done, six hours, then very high levels of circulation rather than migration will emerge from our analysis. We have focused on the act of movement; a very complex phenomenon, but one which Mitchell (forthcoming) suggests is not directly amenable to theoretical analysis. As he goes on to argue, variations in the form, periodicity and pattern of circulation, while worth pointing out, leave the central problem — the cause of circulation — largely untouched and 'we need to go beyond the descriptive facts of the phenomenon to its underlying dispositions — for which much more must be taken into account than merely the fact of movement' (Mitchell, p.7).
Political economy and the setting of circulation. The discussion so far has emphasized the extent to which micro-level research into mobility in Southeast Asia and Melanesia has drawn attention to local social, economic and political frameworks within which individuals make their decisions whether to move from, stay in or return to a particular location. Without doubt, such research has advanced our understanding of movement processes and led to numerous insights which Ward (1980) suggests 'have reversed the usual direction of flow of techniques and concepts from developed to developing areas'. However, when attempting to assign general causes and effects to patterns of mobility, so that specific policy measures can be advocated, problems can arise especially when the wider context of the behaviour under consideration is not clearly specified. There has been a resurgence of interest recently in examining the political and economic setting of mobility in Southeast Asia and Melanesia to highlight the constraints within which individuals exercise choice. This macro-perspective is not new in the mobility literature — indeed it was dissatisfaction with explanations of gross patterns of mobility which seemed to deny individuals the right to vary in their movement behaviour that encouraged the micro-level inquiry under review here in the first place. However, more recent concern with the setting of mobility departs from earlier macro-level approaches in that the starting point for analysis is elucidation of particular types of movement which have intensified as a result of intrusion of capitalism into subsistence-based economies in the third world.

Earlier studies of circulation in the two areas have not, of course, ignored the impact which penetration of capitalism had on indigenous societies and economies. Where circulation has been examined in historical perspective, reference is often made to the disruptive effect of the demand for cheap labour to work foreign-owned plantations, exploit mineral deposits, develop communications networks and construct towns and ports. Where force was not used to obtain the necessary manpower, inducements in the form of trade goods and head taxes were introduced to encourage men to seek monetary work outside their rural communities. Colonial administrations and major employers often adopted policies of paying low wages and providing minimum accommodation to temporary employees on the assumption that those seeking employment had limited pecuniary wants and would return to their villages and farms once they had obtained 'target' incomes. This circular movement of labour was thus a mechanism, in most places institutionalized by government policies, whereby members of the indigenous population satisfied a dual dependence on two economic systems within the colonial state (see, for example, in Melanesia: Bedford 1973 and 1981; Curtain 1975, 1980a, 1980b; Young 1977a; Ward 1971 and 1980).

In general, however, a distinction is drawn between circulation regulated by migrant labour schemes and government ordinances, and that which has become much more prevalent over the past twenty
years – the 'casual', 'free' or 'independent' movement between places in a political setting where legislation to restrict or channel population flows between places has been withdrawn. By the very choice of terms like 'free' and 'independent' the implication is that movers are not constrained in their choices by forces outside their comprehension or control. It is this assumption of freedom of choice which is considered naive by those concerned with establishing more precisely the structure of the setting, rather than the particulars of the situation of circulation. As Ward observed in his review of mobility research in Papua New Guinea:

To date the change from agreement to casual labour and the related change in migration patterns have been treated more at the normative and psychosocial levels and not explicitly as a reflection of the interaction of wider systems. There has therefore been a consequent loss in overall understanding, and a number of inconsistencies ... remain unexplained (1980:126).

In establishing the wider setting of circulation, it has become fashionable to draw on the inspiration of neo-Marxist writers such as Amin (1974a, 1974b, 1976) and Wallerstein (1974a, 1974b), and to emphasize that the contemporary structure of third world societies is primarily the result of the manner in which they have been integrated into an international capitalist system. Thus McGee has pointed out recently:

The continuing pattern of integration, which is responsible for a particular socio-economic formation — peripheral capitalism, is very different from the capitalist mode of production in the developed capitalist countries. While there have been significant variations in the form of this capitalist integration during the expansion of the capitalist system ... the importance of this body of theory is that it offers an explanation for the persistence of low-income, low-productivity activities and populations in the Third World ... in terms of an international system (1978:14).

This is not the place to attempt a review of circulation in Southeast Asian and Melanesian societies in terms of a Marxian framework dealing with articulation of modes of production in peripheral capitalist social formations. Curtain (1980a, 1980b), Fahey (1979) and Peet (1980) have examined selected aspects of this framework in the content of circulation in Melanesia, while Breman (1978–79), Forbes (1978) and Titus (1978) invoke a similar framework in their studies of Asian mobility. Both Curtain and Forbes examine the wider setting of circulation in papers within this volume.

What should be stressed here is that adoption of a perspective in which circulation is viewed as part of a wider process
of labour exploitation resulting from integration of Asian and Pacific societies into the international capitalist economy, leads to rather different conclusions about the consequences of this movement for the participants and their places of origin and destination to those often mentioned in the micro-studies focusing on the situation of circulation as it is perceived by individuals in villages and towns. Rather than stressing a positive role which circulation has played (and continues to play) in the development of rural communities, attention is directed to the way in which movement intensifies regional inequalities, impoverishes the village economy by requiring residents to subsidize the migrant worker, and leads to increasing stratification and hence inequality in rural society.

The very different perspective on labour circulation which emerges from an analysis of the political economy of movement is drawn into sharp relief by Breman when discussing seasonal migration of cane cutters in South Gujarat. He observes:

The utilisation of a huge army of labourers for cutting the cane in South Gujarat wholly accords with the commonly-held ideas about the harvesting of this crop in peasant societies.

It could be argued that recruitment from distant places arises out of necessity and simply follows from the fact that in the district concerned there is not sufficient manpower available for this large-scale operation. This, put briefly, is indeed what one hears said in answer to the query as to why all these *khandeshis* [migrants from Khandesh in the northwest of Maharashtra] have to be brought in. At first sight it seems a plausible enough explanation. After the construction of irrigation canals during the past decades agriculture in the Surat district has become far more labour intensive. The expansion in the number of jobs, so it is claimed, has so stretched the capacity of the local labour force that the call made upon outside labour was not to be avoided. This functionalist's interpretation of the massive movement of labour each year is reinforced with the consideration that in the months when the sugarcane is cut there are scarcely if any opportunities to make a living in the villages where the bulk of the *khandeshis* come from. How else — other than positively — shall the temporary shift of labour from an area of excess to an area of shortage be appraised when viewed in this light?

However, this is to reason from a false premise. For, in fact, local labour in South Gujarat is both present and in excess supply — to the point that when the harvest is in full swing, agricultural labourers belonging to the region have little or no work to do. It is no exaggeration to state that the coming of sugarcane cultivation — irrigation-based agriculture generally in fact — has contributed to the pauperisation of the landless class in Surat District...
The South Gujarat sugar factories do not opt in favour of *khandeshis* because of any shortage of labour in the locality, even less because of the inexperience, unwillingness or other negative features of the local landless caste to work in the cane-cutting, but because of the ease with which it is possible to enter into only a temporary relationship with migratory labour and to restrict to a bare minimum the dues implicit in the relationship ...

The seasonal migrants are available at all times (day and night), work (as little or as much) according to whatever is required and are immediately transferable (to any part of the harvest area) as is necessary. In all these respects, to employ local workers would be to diminish the degree of subordination and alienation — in principle, total — of labour in the production process (Breman 1978-79:181-2; 185-6).

The setting for labour circulation which Breman describes so vividly for South Gujarat is not uncommon. Throughout Southeast Asia and Melanesia migrant rather than local labour has been preferred by many employers operating plantations, mines and industry because it ensures greater stability in and control over unskilled workforces. By drawing attention to the political economy of migrant labour it could be argued that Breman has explained both the setting and situation of this circulation better than by focusing either on the centrifugal/centripetal forces framework anchored in the analysis of social networks or on risk minimizing behaviour in peasant societies. Without an analysis of the structure of the institutional setting there is a danger that 'motives become platitudes which mask the real reasons, because the migrant is merely rationalizing his externally controlled situation' (Swindell 1979:253).

There is, however, also a danger that too much emphasis on the forces constraining choice will lead us to the conclusion that individuals have *no* control over their actions. Such mechanistic abstractions of reality characterized those 'reassuringly simple' macro-level mobility theories of the past which denied human beings 'the creative capacity to innovate and shape the worlds from which and into which they moved' (Abu-Lughod 1975:201). Obviously there is a need for both macro- and micro-perspectives, and in this context Mitchell's comment that 'research thus becomes a working out of the dialectic between settings and situations' (MS. p.13) is particularly relevant.

**Circulation and development**

Circular forms of mobility are clearly extremely complex phenomena which are not readily amenable to manipulation by policy makers in the cause of development. The consequences of this movement, both for those involved and for their places of residence
and work, vary considerably within and between communities and populations. In a number of recent studies of circular forms of mobility in Southeast Asia and Melanesia specific policy issues are raised to ameliorate apparently harmful (usually social) consequences and enhance perceived advantages (usually economic). These suggestions are necessarily tentative, since many writers are quite uncertain as to the need for policies to encourage or discourage circulation of population and as to their likely effects. In large measure this ambivalence reflects a healthy appreciation of the complex interdependence of the mobility-development nexus; movement is both an independent and a dependent variable in the sense that it generates change in the socio-economic environment which encouraged people to move in the first place. In this context it is very difficult to isolate 'causes' from 'effects' and to identify the basic 'determinants' of mobility. This has relevance for policy making because, as Weiner (1975:27) points out, it is the assessment of determinants of mobility that leads policy makers to choose particular instruments for intervention, even though it is usually consideration of the consequences of this movement which encourages intervention in the first place.

Weiner (1975) has examined the purposes and effects of a number of 'instruments for intervention', adopted to influence the composition, direction and nature of movement flows by governments. Many of the relevant issues were reviewed by Findlay, Hanson, Mabogunje and Simmons at a UN-sponsored seminar in Bangkok in late 1979. In addition, there is an extensive policy-oriented literature on rural-urban migration in the third world which has been stimulated by, and partly reviewed in, the writings of Todaro (1969, 1976a, 1976b, 1978) — a literature which places great emphasis on identifying elements in the migration decision process that are amenable to policy manipulation. Similarly, some of the papers in the present monograph examine critically the rationale behind, as well as some of the attempts at, government intervention designed to influence movement processes (see, for example, Morauta and Young in this volume).

How relevant for policy formations is the analytical perspective which emerges directly or indirectly from the micro-level studies of circulation? Many of those who have analysed the situation of circulation, especially as it relates to rural residents, favour policies to facilitate rather than discourage short-term cyclical mobility. There are three main reasons for this view: (i) the adaptability of the process of circulation to the 'cultural focus' of these predominantly rural societies; (ii) the dissemination of material wealth, information and innovations which circulation fosters; and (iii) the implications this form of mobility has for the investment of scarce public funds in housing stock, utilities, welfare and transport services in rural and urban areas.
Where the wider setting of population movement has been emphasized, the desirability of fostering circulation has been questioned. In the case of Melanesia the main reason for this is an argument that extensive relocation of population from rural to urban areas is inevitable if the inhabitants want a capitalist society and further westernization because 'to persist with the present modes of "development" — small scale, partly subsistence/partly commercial operations — is to progress towards rural depression and poverty' (Hau'ofa 1980:486). In the Southeast Asia literature the argument is couched in very different terms. The critical issue in these countries is well expressed by Mukherji (1976:1) when he writes: 'The main human problem ... is that people are mostly moving from unemployment to underemployment, from one kind of poverty to another, resulting in a colossal waste of human resources and great human misery'. Since promotion of mobility may ultimately serve to strengthen the socio-economic structures responsible for the poverty which motivates much of the circulation, caution in devising policy instruments to promote it is advocated.

A positive perspective. An underlying assumption of many of the micro-level studies in Melanesia in particular is that indigenous peoples wish to retain links with those rural communities where they or their parents were born and where most still have rights to land. An example of such reasoning can be found in my study of circular mobility in the New Hebrides:

In these islands, where the 'cultural focus' of society rests on status as landowners, rather than proletarians, the persistent significance of the village as a centre of activity became intelligible. While access to land still depends on membership of a social group and continuing interest in village affairs, involvement in rural-based activities remains important for most New Hebrideans. Maintaining this contact may not necessitate lengthy periods of residence in the village, but some circulation between their places of employment and the village is generally considered essential (Bedford 1973:94-5).

If people wish to retain these linkages, and to use the village as the base from which to participate in a variety of economic activities such as subsistence agriculture, cash cropping, local business ventures and wage employment, then why not facilitate the circulation that makes this possible? As Elkan (1976:706) queried much more bluntly in another cultural setting where circulation is widespread, 'who is wanting a proletariat anyhow?'.

Another reason for assuming that for Melanesians (and many Southeast Asians) circulation is preferable to migration, is a belief that 'circular forms of movement, far more than permanent migration, have the potential of spreading new ideas, attitudes and knowledge to rural areas and contributing greatly to the
processes of social change' (Mantra 1978:277-8). The constant ebb and flow of population, especially the young and more innovative, bring new experiences and material wealth into the village which can be used to enhance living standards and raise levels of agricultural production. This assumption has not been tested rigorously in many places, but there is mounting evidence, especially concerning the role of remittances in rural development, which suggests that it may be unfounded (see, for example, Lipton 1980, and papers by Connell and Maude in this volume).

A related argument which has special relevance for mobility in Southeast Asia concerns what Hugo (1978a:303) terms the 'symbiotic relationship between the circulation phenomenon and the so-called urban informal sector'. Because of its labour-absorptive capacity and potential for ensuring that the rapidly increasing populations of Southeast Asian cities and their rural hinterlands get some sort of viable employment, policy measures have been advocated to aid rather than restrict the informal sector. McGee (1976) and Hugo (1978a) stress that this sector, with its wide range of labour intensive occupations, cheap shelter, and lack of any apparent regulation in the interests of 'efficiency' and 'productivity', can distribute limited amounts of money through a much larger population than would be the case if employment was restricted to wage-earning or salaried occupations for a stabilized urban workforce. Hugo (1978a:304) in particular suggests that there may be overall societal gains in encouraging growth of the informal sector and the associated circulation of poor people between city and village.

A third argument favouring circulation rests on the assumption that circular migrants make less expensive demands on city services, especially housing, than people who choose to settle with their families in urban areas. For example, Hugo states:

If all movers currently adopting circulation strategies were to move permanently into Jakarta, together with their families, enormous strain would be put on already inadequate services and housing in that city. This temporary strategy allows the existing cheap stock of housing in rural areas to be fully utilized while still achieving a concentration of labour where there are the greatest number of job opportunities [i.e. in urban areas] (1978a:303).

A similar argument has been used in the context of rural-urban circulation in Melanesia to discourage expenditure on low-cost housing schemes to accommodate people moving into 'unsightly' squatter settlements. In the first place, such housing is usually far too expensive for most residents in the settlements, especially those who do not have a regular wage or salary income. Second, for many who can afford to pay the rents, there is little interest in spending a large part of their earnings on accommodation expenses, especially if they are not intending to stay long in town (see, for example, Skeldon 1978a:42).
To facilitate population circulation cheap, efficient transport is essential, and much stress is placed on the need to improve linkages between town and country in the micro-level studies in both areas. Hugo (1978a and 1979c), Mantra (1978) and Singhanetra-Renard (1977) have emphasized how important improved road networks linking villages with towns have been for rapid increases in circular forms of mobility (especially commuting) in recent years. A similar development has been reported on some of the larger islands in Melanesia where towns are located (see, for example, Bathgate 1978 and forthcoming, Bedford and Mamak 1976, Connell 1981 and forthcoming, Tubuna forthcoming, Ward 1971). A rather different situation exists in relatively isolated small island peripheries where rising costs of sea and air transport, and a consequent deterioration in services over time, have led to a decline in population circulation. In areas such as Lau Province in eastern Fiji, for example, loss of transport service has meant a serious decline in welfare for a people who have a long history of movement to other rural, and later urban, areas for social and economic reasons (Brookfield 1978b and 1980, UNESCO/UNFPA 1977). Perceived isolation is a major source of dissatisfaction both among those who have chosen to remain in the villages as well as among their urban-based kin who would like to play a much more active role in social and economic affairs in their former homes. There is no simple solution to the accessibility problem in times of rapidly increasing fuel costs, although in areas like eastern Fiji it has been argued that recent innovations in sea transport could restore some of the linkages that are being lost as a result of rationalization of conventional cargo and passenger services (Brookfield 1980).

Depending on one's view of the most appropriate development strategies for countries with such peripheral populations, isolated communities can either be ignored in the national interest or designated 'problem areas' requiring special attention from policy makers and politicians.

Policy instruments designed specifically to encourage circular mobility are rarely detailed in the micro-level studies under review. In one of the few papers written with the policy implications of a village-oriented study of population movement in mind, Chapman (1969:132) outlined how an understanding of broad patterns of circulation 'could clearly assist the administrator in formulating and siting community development schemes, in locating extension or social services, in disseminating information, and in scheduling important or prolonged district tours. They are also relevant to the stability of labour, programmes of vocational training and the quality of education from the village's standpoint'. Throughout Chapman's analysis of the policy alternatives the emphasis is on preservation of a viable and vital village society and the need for 'a more delicately balanced policy towards the village than some employers and administrators at present seem willing to admit' (Chapman 1969:137). In at least one country in Melanesia—Papua New Guinea—national development strategies have given due recognition to the central importance of the temporary migrant to
government policy for some time now (Morauta 1979c:1). The essential argument is that, because most people were born in villages, and endeavour to maintain close links with these communities, the government will seek to preserve a pattern of movement which enables people to enjoy the benefits of both rural and urban life (PNG Central Planning Office 1976). Morauta has captured a sentiment underlying many of the micro-level studies oriented towards preservation of a rural society when she remarks in a very different context, 'it is a matter of knowing the facts in order to accommodate policy to them, rather than in knowing the facts in order to manipulate them' (p.227, this volume).

Alternative perspectives. Morauta's comment is not designed to encourage policy makers to stress the importance of temporary migration from a rural base; indeed she is drawing attention to another set of 'facts' reflecting a trend to permanent settlement in towns which some authors claim have been ignored as a result of the heavy research emphasis on circulation at micro-level rather than population redistribution at macro-level. With reference to Papua New Guinea, for example, she claims there is little recognition of the fact 'that there are thousands of people in the present urban population that cannot be regarded as temporary migrants at all' (Morauta 1979c:1). Almost a decade earlier Ward (1971:103) had warned 'the evidence suggests that to talk of temporary urban dwellers with the implication that they will go home in due course is largely wishful thinking'. His central thesis was that

migration and the rapid expansion of towns are essential for economic and social progress and that urbanisation should be facilitated and encouraged, rather than frowned on and discouraged. Increasing urbanisation, and the consequent spread of urbanism (the urban way of life) into the countryside, provide a path to more effective use of Papua New Guinea's scarce resources and a faster route to national unity than can be found in careful maintenance of the rural village ideal (Ward 1971:81).

This argument in favour of urbanization, which generated a very lively debate on the relationships between mobility and development (see, for example, papers contained in May 1977), had its roots in an assessment of the macroscopic setting of population movement in Papua New Guinea. Assuming that Papua New Guineans would inevitably seek to become more integrated into the international market exchange economy, and that their material and occupational aspirations would demand a more 'western' lifestyle, Ward (1971:80) claimed that: 'If rural life is to be maintained and modernised, the country should be urbanised as much as possible so that the advantages of urban living are spread as widely as possible; the small towns should be actively fostered and people pursuing both urban and rural occupations should be encouraged to live in small towns wherever possible.' In subsequent papers (Ward 1973 and Ward et al. 1974) he outlined various policy
alternatives, including examples of 'the way in which more imaginative policies could take advantage of the fact that most people are likely to circulate between town and country in the coming years' (Ward 1973:371). However, what concerned him deeply was the belief that Melanesians would want to remain temporary townsmen and that planning for urban areas should proceed on this basis.

In an epilogue to Ward's latest major contribution to the development debate in Melanesia, Hau'ofa (in Ward and Proctor 1980: 484-7) points out that Pacific islanders do not aim for a rise from poverty, which is not general, but rather for a shift from one form of relative affluence to another. Their aspirations for material goods and services are already very high and many seem, by action if not by rhetoric, determined to enter further into the western industrial system. Yet he argues they cannot have the basically 'western' lifestyle to which they aspire without changing, in a very fundamental way, existing systems of social relations and community life. If this is an accurate interpretation of the broader setting within which patterns of population movement are evolving, then it seems likely that towns, rather than villages, will become the dynamic centres of socio-economic activity for the majority of Melanesians in the future. In this context, policies designed to preserve a pattern of rural-urban interaction in which town residence is regarded only as temporary seem ill-advised.

An important debate, with significant implications for policy makers, has also emerged in recent years concerning aspects of the wider setting of circulation in Southeast Asia. It will be recalled that McGee (1976) and Hugo (1978a), among others, have advocated policy measures to aid the urban informal sector because of its labour-absorptive capacity. However, McGee (1978) is no longer so sure of the advisability of such a strategy. By examining the place of the informal sector in the context of the articulation of the capitalist mode of production, he is led to the conclusion that policies which favour the informal sector ultimately shore-up existing class relationships in the majority of Third World peripheral capitalist societies. Such policies advocate a continuation of poverty of the majority of Third World urban populations. The implication is that rather than tinkering with such policies of 'general aid' aimed at retooling economies there should be policies that advocate radical changes in existing class relationships and income distribution in the Third World countries (McGee 1978:19).

Forbes in his contribution to this volume has carried a similar argument much further in the explicit context of mobility in Indonesia, and he warns that 'we should treat with scepticism any suggestion that a policy focusing on mobility will by itself
bring about major changes in Indonesian society' (p.69). The basic cause of contemporary circulation is considered to be the uneven impact of capital within Indonesian society - a 'development' which has important spatial as well as socio-economic and political dimensions. To tackle the problems in this setting requires policies that will reduce the spatial and social unevenness of development that circulation reflects and helps to perpetuate.

In the light of these sorts of considerations, it seems highly desirable for those of us researching an essential ingredient of urbanization in the third world, as well as the process whereby poor people ensure their survival, to approach the question of policies designed to promote circulation with caution. High levels of circulation between village, rural employment centre and town can be as much a symptom of hopelessness and despair, as one of freedom to sample a widening range of opportunities and alternatives. In spite of Mabogunje's (1979:38) claim that 'the most cogent argument in support of government intervention in the process is that it is vital to the whole thrust of their development', it is essential that we examine our policy prescriptions in the context of the setting as well as the situation of circulation.
Chapter 2

Mobility and uneven development in Indonesia: a critique of explanations of migration and circular migration*

Dean Forbes

An \textit{a priori} classification of the various forms of migration in Indonesia might distinguish between international and intra-national patterns, inter-provincial and intra-provincial, rural-urban and rural-rural (not to mention movement between large and small towns), planned transmigration programs and spontaneous transmigration, voluntary and involuntary (company-directed) wage labour migration, and so the list goes on. Each of these classifications reflects what Geertz has called a 'phenomenological reality' (Kahn 1978), if not always to the migrant, then to the field-researcher. But this descriptive classification of patterns of mobility has inbuilt limitations: the main one is its limited usefulness in the development of theories to understand mobility. Mitchell comments:

The most obvious difficulty seems to me to be the fallacy of assuming that the most obvious feature of labour circulation is also its most important theoretical characteristic... the physical movement of an individual from location A to B such as may be recorded in official censuses or in immigration statistics is not in itself theoretically meaningful; it becomes so only when this particular act is related to other information in such a way that the movement of that individual is seen to be a manifestation, or part of some more general pattern which has logical coherence imparted to it by our understanding of it in terms of general propositions derived from some analytical discipline (1978:7-8).

Mitchell labels mobility an epiphenomenon; the point may be an obvious one but it is important nonetheless. If we reject an \textit{a priori} classification of the different forms of mobility, then we are left with phenomena which we explicitly recognize as spread along a continuum, not only of time and space, but of direction, circularity, intention and so on.

* I would like to thank Terry Hull, Gavin Jones, Terry McGee and R. Gerard Ward for their comments on this paper.
The phenomenon of circulation is the primary focus of this paper because it reflects an important theoretical aspect of human mobility. The paper is divided into four parts: the first part reviews some of the work on circulation in Indonesia, notably that of Hugo (the Jakarta-West Java literature); the second questions the arguments about 'traditional' forces and their role in mobility (the West Sumatra literature); the third considers an alternative structural approach to understanding 'uneven development' and mobility, examines circulation in South Sulawesi, and proposes that a critical theoretical distinction should be drawn between forces which allow the separation of labour in city and village and forces which integrate these spaces; finally, the fourth part discusses the implications for development of this view of mobility.

Circulation: Jakarta and West Java

Until the early 1970s the three main foci of mobility research in Indonesia were transmigration policy, the so-called peripatetic groups like the Minangkabau, and urbanization. It is only in the last few years that researchers have broken away from these traditional topics and looked at circulation as a whole. This has proved a significant step forward for which we should be grateful to the 'meticulous local level studies' of people like Hugo\(^2\) (1975a; 1975b; 1977a:57-66; 1978b:1-81; 1979a; forthcoming) in rural West Java, and, to a lesser extent, the Jakarta-centred research of Critchfield (1970), Jellinek (1978a, 1978b), Papanek (1975), Temple (1974, 1975) and others. Some of the insights they have provided into circulation can be summarized by drawing on three themes from the literature: the extent of circulation, the nature of employment in the town, and the impact of circulation on the village.

First, the extent of circulation: Hugo (1979a:204-6) makes the point that the extent of circulation far exceeds that which we might expect from the census figures. The reason is that the

---

\(^1\)Geographically, the Indonesian mobility literature, not including transmigration, can be classified under four headings: (i) Jakarta and West Java: Castles, Hugo, Jellinek, Mantra (Yogyakarta), Montgomery, Papanek, Temple; (ii) West Sumatra: Evers, Maude, Murad, Naim, Swift; (iii) other regional studies: Bruner, Cunningham, Forbes, Lineton, Siegal, Vredenburg, Withington; (iv) general studies: MacNicoll, Milone, Speare, Suharto, Sundrum, Titsu. It is no coincidence that this geographical classification corresponds, albeit loosely, with a thematic classification of the literature. Kahn (1978:110-11) argues that folk-geographic models have been an important contribution to an ideology of explanation in Indonesia.\(^2\)A summary of Hugo's work can be found in Hugo (1978b:1-81) and Goldstein (1978).
census deals in the category of permanent migration, which is defined as movement which does not result in a return journey at intervals of less than six months. In focusing on permanent migration there is no accurate measure of either commuting or circular migration, defined as a movement from village to city that results in a return migration at least once very six months. The focus on permanent migration Hugo characterizes as a concern with the 'tip of the iceberg'. In ten of the fourteen West Javan villages he examined, circular migration was dominant. Up to 15 per cent of the income of migrants in the cities of Jakarta and Bandung could be spent on transport to and from villages, whilst Hugo found that 90 per cent of so-called permanent migrants returned on a visit to villages at least once each year.

Second, the majority of West Javan migrants, according to Hugo (1978b:26-9), find urban employment in petty production,3 or, as it is otherwise known, the informal sector. The type of petty production depends on the village of origin: Hugo (1977a:64) shows how migrants from one village will ride trishaws, those from another hawk groundnuts, and so on. Not all jobs are in petty production, and Hugo points out that migrants also work in airline offices and hotels, or for the government or the army, or in factories or hospitals. By and large, though, it is the most frequent form of urban employment; the hours of work are flexible, its absorptive capacity greater than wage-enterprises, and the overall low urban wages require a flexibility of commitment that is only catered for by petty production.

Looking at circulation from the city end, Papanek (1975:17-19) found that around two-thirds of this sample of petty producers make a yearly visit home, whilst over half of that group visit two or more times. He found that the people who earned the lowest incomes and those with the least attractive jobs usually did not return to the village, but on the other hand over two-thirds of the trishaw riders and petty traders returned to the village each year.

Third, Hugo (1979a:206-10) found that the pattern of circulation had a significant impact on the rural villages of West Java. Remittances contributed some 60 per cent of household income in households containing a commuter, whilst circular migrants contributed about 50 per cent of total household income. The bulk of remittances was spent on household basics, mainly food and clothing, whilst some money was spent on education or invested in housing. Out-remittances from villages were relatively insignificant by comparison, mainly being money sent to support students in the town.

3The term petty production is used here in the Marxian sense to include petty traders and those providing small-scale, usually individual, services.
The social impact of circulation is far more mixed, according to Hugo, for on balance the social costs of circulation may well outweigh the social benefits. On the one hand the villages had problems of raising labour for gotong-royong projects, circulation produced problems of selecting village leaders, the absence of young people detracted from the village social climate, and divorce rates among migrants were higher than the average. On the other hand the return of a better-educated, more respected group of migrants with new ideas for the village was insufficient compensation for the social dislocation caused by outmigration.

In sum, the value of this research has been the rich detail it has provided about the mobility of relatively small groups of Indonesians. However, if we turn to the questions raised by Mitchell and quoted at the beginning of this paper then there is no cause for complacency, for despite the value and quality of such work, we are approaching a crisis point in mobility research. It is born out of the epistemological limitations of the inductive methodology which characterizes this research. The meticulous documentation of the patterns of mobility in West Java has provided a sound descriptive basis for the investigation of an explanation of mobility, but it is critical to appreciate its limitations. In the terminology of Mitchell (1978:11-18), we observe the careful exposition of the situation of mobility, but there is little attempt to come to terms with the setting. What we require now is a consolidation of these data in the light of our understanding of the nature of change throughout Indonesian society— that is, the way in which mobility is a reflection of economic, political and social change, and not vice versa.

Let me illustrate this critique by examining two vital aspects of Hugo's analysis. The first is his generation of a typology of migration. He divides spontaneous migrants into seven categories and forced migrants into two categories, based on three criteria: the characteristics of the move; commitment to the city; and commitment to the village (Hugo 1978b: Table 5). It is this sort of taxonomic exercise which I feel can lead us into a cul-de-sac, for it imposes a theoretical significance upon a description. If we accept, for example, a seven-fold division of spontaneous migration then we will inevitably be committed to a complex, fragmented explanation of each. In other words the form of the mobility determines the form of the explanation; my point is that this contradicts the argument that mobility is an epiphenomenon, reflecting the unity of the structure of society.

Second, the dominance of form is reflected in the unbalanced explanation Hugo (1977a:62; 1978a: ch.8; 1979a:206, 210) offers for circulation. On the one hand the explanation of 'aggregate'

4Mitchell's use of the terms situation and setting are defined in Bedford (above, p.22 and 24).
factors is quite clearly located in economic forces, but these are little more than touched upon. He concludes:

the gradient of population flow is away from areas where ecological pressures are greatest and opportunities to earn a livelihood are least, and toward areas of relative economic expansion (Hugo 1978a:297).

These are, of course, influenced by socio-cultural factors 'super-imposed on and inter-related with regional economic differentials' (ibid.). In general, these deliberations are not developed — how long have these economic forces been important, and what has given rise to this pattern of uneven development? These are the sorts of questions that need to be more thoroughly discussed.

On the other hand the discussion of the behavioural dynamics of mobility is far more complete, being located in the balance of centripetal and centrifugal forces. The economic pressures of village life have given rise to mobility, based on expectations of work in the cities.

Opposing this force is a strong environmental preference for the village especially because of its function as the locus of fundamentally important family ties and loyalties (Hugo 1978a:297).

Circulation is a product of these two processes. However, there are also 'intervening variables' which modify the raw economic pressures. These include the degree of uncertainty which surrounds the migrants, the socio-cultural pressures within the village, and the personal characteristics of the migrant, specifically stage in the life-cycle, skills and psycho-social attributes (Hugo 1978a:297-8).

In summing up, the point of this section has been to argue that if we continue depending solely on detailed empirical research on mobility we will move further into a cul-de-sac. The value of the existing micro-research cannot be doubted because it has provided us with a valuable resource bank of data on mobility, far exceeding in accuracy and quality previous data sources like the census. Nevertheless this inductive empirical approach to mobility research has resulted in an uneven development of our explanations of mobility. A typology of mobility is an unsatisfactory starting point for the development of a theory of mobility because it is essentially atheoretical and fragments the underlying structural unity of forces of change in Indonesia. The inevitable result is detailed exposition of local forces in migration (the situation) but a poor development of the broader aggregate economic, political and social forces (the setting) which are at the core of change in contemporary Indonesia.

Hugo concludes that 'it is not possible to generalize in a
direct way from the findings of this study to other Third World, or indeed Javan, contexts' (1978a:299). If this be the case, then we should ask what we are doing, for that should be precisely our task. To do it, however, we must turn to some broader questions in Indonesian society.

Mobility and 'tradition' — the Minangkabau

A second important focus of mobility research in Indonesia has been those groups seen to be particularly prone to merantau or circulation. This provides a useful opportunity to raise some questions about another, apparently more recent, trend in mobility studies. It is the tendency to point to long histories of mobility among groups as evidence of a certain continuity in forces that have given rise to mobility. A parallel argument is noticeable in recent literature on mobility in Melanesia. Chapman for instance stresses:

the antiquity of circulatory forms of movement and [thereby] to challenge the common assumption that these are transitory kinds of behaviour linked to particular processes and phases of socio-economic change — notably urbanization, modernization, and industrialization (1977:1).

Similarly, Ward (1980) was puzzled by the readiness of Papua New Guinea highlanders to volunteer for work in the Highlands Labour Scheme in the 1940s. His surprise, he argues, reflects the common (albeit hidden) assumption that highland societies were static. Once we realize that pre-colonial societies were not static but constantly changing and characterized by well-established mobility patterns then the readiness of highlanders to move is understandable.

I readily accept the importance of pre-colonial mobility patterns, but there are two aspects of this argument which I wish to question. The first is the assumption that because the form of behaviour known as circulation occurred both before and after direct colonial intervention in Indonesia or Papua New Guinea, then we can assume that the forces which gave rise to that mobility are relatively constant. The second issue which follows from this is that the 'traditional' forces within a society are the most important in explaining a pattern of mobility. This is the sort of argument put by Watson (1970) who, on evidence from Papua New Guinea, suggests that the contemporary dynamics of population movement can only be interpreted in terms of an historical social structure essential to certain human communities. No one would deny, it appears, that mobility reflects both factors internal and factors external to a society; the disagreement is over the relative balance of these factors. The argument I wish to challenge is well summarized by Chapman and Prothero when they say:
Circulation has endured but has been modified; its incidence has been greatly magnified; but this in turn serves only to emphasize customary patterns of mobility (1977:7).

These issues can be broached in an examination of the Minangkabau, perhaps the group best known in Indonesia for their proclivity to merantau. Naim defines merantau as:

leaving one's cultural territory voluntarily, whether for a short or long time, with the aim of earning a living or seeking further knowledge or experience, normally with the intention of returning home (1976:149-50).

Minangkabau are not the only group in Indonesia with a reputation for merantau: as Hugo has shown it is also important to the West Javans, a people often assumed to have little desire for circulation, and among other well known merantau are the Batak, Banjarese, Bugis and many others. Although the Minangkabau have a long history of overseas migration, in recent years the pattern of merantau has changed. Almost all circulators now move to urban areas and take up occupations quite unlike those which they left.

Though most of the people come from rural villages where the families engage in agricultural activities, practically none of them repeats the same occupation in the rantau. Instead, they engage in trade, services and intellectual occupations, which, in terms of financial return may also be considered as upward economic mobility. And yet, the old economic system, that is subsistence agriculture, is always there to receive them back whenever failure or hardluck is encountered in the rantau (Naim 1973:27).

Because of the long history of Minangkabau mobility, explanation has tended to rely on the distinctive character of Minangkabau social organization. Swift (1971:255-67) is one who has explored those aspects of Minangkabau society which might be seen to have brought about circulation. In essence Swift's explanation concentrates on the 'traditional' pressures within Minangkabau society, pointing out that their significance has increased with the changes brought about within the colonial and post-colonial society.

In the past, temporary migration and achievement in the rantau offered some escape from the tight status restrictions of the homeland, and the role of religious leader seems to have offered mobility to a few. The Dutch colonial period opened up a much wider range of opportunities for individual status improvement. Economic change increased trading opportunities, and the Minangkabau had an aptitude for trade which some local people lacked (Swift 1971:267).
Whilst Swift argues that a complex of factors gives rise to circulation, the crux of his explanation relies on the so-called traditional aspects of Minangkabau social organization. Notably these include the rivalry induced by adat (customary law) status differences, the cultural exclusiveness of the Minangkabau which supports individuals away from home, and the matrilineal extended family, which encourages economic prosperity in the rantau whilst channelling the wealth acquired towards traditional prestige ends. The Minangkabau ideal personality is an individualist, strongly oriented towards competition and achievement, unlike, according to Swift, his Malay counterpart. The result is that he is more likely to be mobile than people in cultures without the same 'traditional' pressures.

Others have considered this same aspect of Minangkabau.5 Naim, for instance, has argued that merantau is institutionalized into the Minangkabau social system:

the Minangkabau man normally has no role to play in either his mother's or his wife's lineage. His position is rather weak: in his mother's lineage (to which he actually belongs) he is not provided with a compartment or bilik for his private use, unlike all the female members, while in his wife's lineage he only visits her at night. He does not as a rule inherit a portion of the lineage property of either side. As male member of his mother's lineage he functions as protector and guardian (mamak rumah) and as such it is his duty also to enlarge and enrich the lineage properties.

Because of this precarious position he is apt to travel anywhere he wants. Before marriage he is even encouraged to go away and prove to himself that he can earn money and stand on his own feet. Merantau then can also be viewed as an initiation into manhood and as a social obligation upon the man to leave his village to acquire wealth, further his knowledge and gain experience (Naim 1973:31).

The difference is that Naim argues that this is one among a complex of pressures changing over time. Social pressures, even though they may be institutionalized, are not regarded as the determining force of circulation.6

---

5I gave the 'traditional' forces which are a product of social stratification some degree of importance in considering the background of Bugis and Makassarese migration in Ujung Pandang (Forbes 1979:48-56).

6Maude (1979:46) is also careful to put socio-cultural pressures among psychological pressures (achievement motive, which is perhaps more socio-cultural than psychological), economic pressures and education needs in his discussion of the overall high rates of mobility among the Minangkabau.
A critical reaction to the 'traditional social organization' argument focuses on the two points raised earlier. First there is the question of the importance of these 'traditional' forces in circulation. Kahn (1976) has examined Minangkabau matrilineal organization and asks whether the term 'traditional' has been used in an appropriate way. He begins by pointing out that many important decisions are now made in West Sumatra villages outside the matrilineal structures. Among these are economic decisions (particularly owing to the declining importance of subsistence agriculture), some political issues, and the sphere of marriage arrangements. These are cited as evidence of the declining significance of matriliney, yet *merantau* continues. More importantly, though, Kahn argues that the commonly used meaning of matrilineal organization derives not from the 'traditional' or pre-colonial society, but from the early colonial nineteenth century society. Kahn argues, in fact, that it was the Culture System of forced export crop production that was responsible for many of the important features of matrilineal organization. The results of the Culture System were:

the relatively static, segmentary system of clans and lineages with corporate land ownership often taken to be the hallmark of the 'traditional' Minangkabau matrilineal system (Kahn 1976:88).

In other words Kahn argues that the demand made upon Minangkabau society by the Culture System brought about a solidifying of the matrilineal structure. Moreover, he believes that this process was necessary to the success of the Culture System in West Sumatra. The result was that, as on Java, aspects of earlier Minangkabau social structure were built upon by the colonial power so that whilst the outward form appeared unchanged, in effect they no longer deserved the label 'traditional'.

If we accept Kahn's analysis, then it is misleading to consider socio-cultural forces as 'traditional'. What is more important is that it challenges the conceptual basis of the explanation. If the political and economic changes wrought by the Culture System can be seen to have altered the social structure significantly, then surely our explanation of mobility must search out these causal forces through an analysis of the underlying political and economic structure. The discussion of so-called traditional forces makes for an incomplete explanation.

By contrast, Swift devotes little time to economic explanation. He hypothesizes that 'a natural poverty of resources' might be a causal force, but rejects this on the grounds that it cannot explain migration in past times when population pressures were lower, nor can it explain the temporary nature of migration (Swift 1971:257). As Ward (1980) has noted in Papua New Guinea, 'objective' economic forces are often treated in a most superficial way. This is generally true of demographic research in Indonesia,
and I urge greater attention to detailed economic content.\textsuperscript{7} In arguing this I am reversing the overall trend of my argument which is towards bolder theories placing mobility in the context of broader changes in Indonesian society. However, this is not contradictory. My concern is rather that the empirical detail be placed clearly in a theoretical context. Thus rather than rely on a survey approach to economic questions we need to probe a whole range of issues about the village economy. We need a comprehensive understanding of both the forces of production (the ownership and quality of land and other natural resources, technology, the workforce's size, education, etc.) and the relations of production (specialization, mechanisms for redistribution and appropriation of wealth, class formation and the household economy and especially the division of labour within the house). Until we have a storehouse of such data, not only with respect to Java but throughout Indonesia, then our grasp of the importance of the economic factor in mobility will be restricted.

Before passing on to the second criticism, I might note a further line of questions which space forbids development. Kahn (1978) questions whether in fact the ethnic differentiation of the Indonesian population is a useful starting point for any social or economic analysis. He argues, in fact, that ethnicity reflects a peasant ideology. As such, admittedly it has an impact on behaviour, but as a structure it is essentially contradicted by an economically derived class structure in Indonesian society. The question of social stratification is frequently debated in Indonesia.\textsuperscript{8} I simply wish to raise the question of whether mobility might be better hypothesized as reflecting a class stratification of society rather than a regional, ethnic division.\textsuperscript{9}

\textsuperscript{7}I have not considered in this paper the excellent literature on rural change in Java, documented in the work of Collier, Franke, Stoller, White, etc., especially in the Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies.

\textsuperscript{8}An illustration of this is the unpublished collection of papers produced by the Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1979.

\textsuperscript{9}A related point was made by Titus (1978) who argued that there is little evidence for assuming an intrinsic, culturally determined difference in the propensity of Indonesians to migrate. He rejected the contrast between the relatively low level of mobility among inland peoples with closed corporate social systems with the high mobility of coastal people with a commercial 'pasisir' culture and more loosely structured social systems (Titus 1978:202).

because, he argues, the highland Toraja are now just as mobile as the lowland Bugis. Thus the assumption that different levels of mobility reflect different social systems is, according to Titus, a false one.
The second question I wish to discuss concerns the continuity of patterns of mobility before, during and after the colonial period, a question which is also discussed by Bedford in Chapter 1 of this volume. The danger is that we take a continuous pattern of mobility to be evidence that the underlying causes of mobility have similarly been continuous. This I feel is a false assumption. The structure of all parts of Indonesian society is in constant change and periodically alter, we might expect, in some fundamental dialectical manner. Naim (1973:410) recognizes an aspect of this when he discusses the complex of causes which bring about Minang-kabau mobility. Between 1900 and 1970 the form of Minangkabau migration remained more or less constant, but the forces producing this pattern were constantly changing. Some forces (e.g. political unrest) were only significant at particular periods, others increased steadily in significance (ecological, demographic, economic, educational, urban attractions) while others remained constant throughout the period or declined in significance (geographical and social-systemic). This demonstrates that a constant form of mobility, at the aggregate level, should not necessarily be assumed to imply a consistent structural cause of mobility.

However, we can take the argument further. Kahn (1976:90) explains that in West Sumatra the abolition of the Culture System in 1908 created an entirely new social formation. The merantau form of mobility continued through this period but the structure of causation was not the same before and after 1908. To assume so is to fail to appreciate the fundamental changes wrought by the colonial power through its major changes of policy. The abolition of forced cultivation, together with a gradual decline in the amount of land under colonial ownership, signalled the beginning of a chain of events which included the production of rice as a marketable commodity and drastic changes in the structure and output of the subsistence sector as a whole. These in turn were catalysts of further far-reaching social changes among the Minangkabau. Yet, throughout, the Minangkabau pattern of merantau persisted. Our task in the historical analysis of mobility, then, is not simply to relate different patterns of mobility to different social structures, but to go further and also identify the critical changes which societies undergo even when these do not immediately and obviously correspond with changes of the form of mobility.

In concluding this part, my criticism of this approach to mobility research is that once again it leads us into a cul-de-sac. Naim (1976:179) also develops a typology of migration focusing on ethnic groups and characteristics of mobility such as class of migration, mode of movement, occupational orientation and so on. The problem is neither the accuracy nor the thoroughness of such an exercise (though we might well question aspects of it) but rather its epistemological value. If we wish to progress in mobility research then we must take a new tack and look to the organization of the society in general. Moreover, we should be wary of those studies which search out traditional forces as
explanations of mobility. 'Traditional' often becomes synonymous with 'natural' forces, and this reflects not only a poverty of ideas but it can also be misused as an apology for colonialism.

Mobility and uneven development: South Sulawesi

There is not as yet much literature which attempts to locate mobility in the broader structural changes occurring within third world societies. As a result, most of the ideas raised in this part are tentative and exploratory. Some of the boldest ideas to emerge on the topic of mobility have come from Africa. Samir Amin (1974a:65-121) has argued that modern labour migration in West Africa can best be understood through the uneven impact of capitalist expansion upon the tribal societies. Mobility reflects, according to Amin, an aspect of proletarianization. The spatial impact of capital in West Africa has been to produce three broad types of regions:

(1) those organised for large-scale export production have already entered the capitalist phase, which implies private appropriation of the land and the availability of wage labour, (2) those formed as a result of colonial economic policies which have continued to be followed after independence, serving as reserves, which supply this salaried labour, and finally (3) those which are not as yet part of the system, or to be more precise those which are still only marginally so and serve only as auxiliary reserves (Amin 1974a:94).

The development by capital of certain regions, and the corresponding underdevelopment of others, have in themselves not always been sufficient to cause such widespread mobility. Different policies have been applied in different regions in order to ensure a supply of labour, ranging from coercion and the imposition of taxes to more subtle strategies of urban-oriented education. The process, though, according to Amin, has got out of hand:

it has gone beyond its intended objective as a result of its own dynamism, and beyond the society which tried to enclose it; in other words the 'rural-exodus' has become uncontrolled, uncontrollable and explosive. Such is the law of the development of social contradictions that, what is 'functional' at one stage becomes 'dysfunctional' at another, that is, it puts in jeopardy the social organization from which it grew (Amin 1974a:98).

Thus for Amin migration is a direct result of the reorganization of West African society brought about by the expansion of capitalism and its need for physical resources and, more importantly
labour.\textsuperscript{10}

Titus (1978) has examined the appropriateness of Amin's model in Indonesia by means of a macro-statistical analysis of migration patterns. He classifies Indonesia's provinces into three broad categories according to lifetime migration rates, based on data extracted from the 1971 Census. Category I includes places like D.K.I. Jakarta which are characterized by high mobility rates and high inmigration. Category II provinces (for example South Kalimantan) are characterized by low rates of mobility, and Category III provinces (West Sumatra) have high negative (that is, out) mobility.

His second task is to categorize provinces by a contrived measure of regional inequality. This is based on scores of the province's centre or periphery status, and includes measures like the presence of big urban centres and the extent to which the province is dependent upon a single export. On this basis provinces are categorized as Centre (C1 and C2 — Jakarta, North Sumatra) and three levels of periphery — P1 South Sulawesi, P2 East Kalimantan and P3 Nusatenggara — respectively less and less centre-like.

Titus then correlates the two sets of data, and comes up with three results:

The greatest mobility together with net in-migration is to be found in ... the economic 'boom' provinces of both the centre type (Jakarta, N. Sumatra) and the relatively developed periphery type (S. Sumatra, Riau, E. Kalimantan) ....

The lowest mobility and a zero-migration balance is to be found ... in the isolated and still largely self-sufficient periphery type of province i.e. E. and W. Nusatenggara ....

Finally the highest mobility together with net out-migration appears ... in the highly integrated but stagnating peripheral provinces close to the centre regions (W. Sumatra, C. Java, Yogyakarta) (Titus 1978:200).

Titus concludes that this evidence is sufficient to confirm the relevance of Amin's work to Indonesia, though he cautions that the 'socio-economically more complex intensely colonized regions' of Indonesia need to be taken into account.

Titus's paper (or for that matter, Amin's theory) is important because it provides us with a starting point and questions

\textsuperscript{10}Such a brief summary gives an oversimplified view of the Amin analysis. Apart from the original paper the reader is also referred to the collection of essays in \textit{African Perspectives}, 1978, No.1, for a detailed examination of both theoretical and empirical aspects of this type of approach to migration.
to ask. Most significantly, it demonstrates the need to examine the process of uneven development in Indonesia, the forces which have given rise to this process, and the forces which seem to be perpetuating it. The concessions to 'regional development' in the second and third five-year plans notwithstanding, the spatial economy of Indonesia is as yet imperfectly understood. Titus has compiled a *prima facie* case that demands greater attention. The approach is, however, not without its weaknesses and ambiguities. On the one hand like many theories of this kind it is clumsy in its simplification and susceptible to the label of economic determinism. On the other it crudely defines mobility as in the census as inter-provincial movement. Moreover, it fails to come to grips at all with circulation. For this we must turn to some empirical research results.

The patterns of circulation which characterize petty producers in the provincial city of Ujung Pandang, capital of the province of South Sulawesi, is a useful illustration of the patterns of mobility in Indonesia. Almost three-fourths (73.8 per cent) of respondents in my sample were born outside the town, almost all in the rural areas of South Sulawesi. The reasons for migration to the town were complex, but included economic pressures (rural poverty), political conflicts and upheaval and socio-cultural changes (e.g. social dislocation). An unresolved issue is the extent to which these changes reflected the external forces of Dutch colonial expansion, as against the internal tensions in the society, though doubtless both were involved. The experience of other colonies, and the thrust of most radical analysis, is of course the former; whilst I do not wish to dispute the importance of the expansion of capitalism it is unwise to overlook entirely (as has occasionally happened) the internal dynamic of the pre-capitalist formation.

More important at this point is the on-going pattern of circulation which characterizes petty producers. Around half, and as many as two-thirds of migrant petty producers keep in contact with their villages with regular trips back. The most mobile group are the trishaw riders, nearly half of whom make two or more trips back to the village each year. The return to the village for the harvesting of the rice is the most notable component of circulation. Some 60 per cent of trishaw riders returned to plant the rice crops, whilst 68 per cent returned for

---

11 This section is based on Chapter 8 in my doctoral thesis (Forbes 1979). By petty producers in this case I mean pedlars (specifically of fish, fruit and vegetables and ice-cream) and trishaw riders. The statistical data are drawn from a sample of 320 interviews.

12 The same point is made by Ward (1980) in his discussion of Papua New Guinea migration.
the harvest. Others of the group were a little less diligent, so that the corresponding overall figures were reduced to 36.4 per cent and 42.4 per cent.

It is almost always males who migrate to exploit employment opportunities compatible with circulation. Partly this reflects the greater range of restrictions on socially-acceptable work placed upon free female movement. The effects of the bi-locality of the family are widespread. Most (36 out of 58) trishaw riders who were active circulators lived with their spouses in Ujung Pandang, but a significant proportion, 38 per cent, had left their spouses in the village. By contrast nearly all pedlers' families lived with their spouses in the city. This raises an interesting point about the significance of family structure in mobility. Bi-locality would appear to take two different forms. On the one hand it consists of a sexual division of labour in which the female remains in the village, presumably maintaining subsistence work on village rice-land. On the other there appears to be an age or a generational division of labour. In this case the entire nuclear family circulates, whilst older relatives (parents, uncles and aunts) remain in the village and are the recipients of remittances etc.

Another important component of circulation, in some ways a mirror image of the flow of labour, is the flow of cash and goods. One-third of trishaw riders, for instance, frequently remitted cash back to the village, as well as gifts and other goods. On the other hand some (around one-quarter) brought village rice to the city. In other words there is an important circulation not only of the labour, but also of cash and goods between Ujung Pandang's petty producers and their villages of origin. The pattern in many ways resembles that found in the more detailed and extensive work of Hugo in West Java.

In order to interpret and explain this pattern we must turn to a structural model of Indonesian society. I have argued elsewhere that the economic base of Indonesia is best envisaged as three identifiable but integrated forms of production: a capitalist form, a petty commodity form and a peasant subsistence form. A description of the categories would be straightforward and need not be gone into here. Suffice it to note that the most important aspect of the model is the relationship between the forms of production: this is the focus of both theory and understanding of the dynamics of the model. The relationship might conveniently be envisaged as a triangle in which capital is at the apex and provides the most important set of relationships.

13 I have summarized this elsewhere (Forbes, forthcoming). It is based on a model developed by Kahn (1974). For a discussion of alternative methods of segmenting the mode of production in migration studies see van Binsbergen and Meilink (1978:11-16).
If we overlook the spatial dimension to the model then there are three processes of some importance. First, capital has brought about a process of uneven development of the forms of production (a 'ruralization' of the rural areas, according to Merrington (1975); it has 'underdeveloped' the subsistence sector both by the extraction of resources and by allowing the stagnation of the economy, but also by the creation of new wants that cannot be met by 'traditional' means. Second, the result has been that labour has moved to take advantage of any available alternative employment opportunities. As the demands for wage labour have been quickly satisfied, so migrants have been forced into the only alternative form of employment in petty commodity production, trade and services. Third, such petty production is partly geared to service the needs of wage labour, but incomes are restrained by the slow growth of the wage labour-force, and, more importantly, by the large number of migrants in the city and the way in which this sphere is articulated with the dominant capitalist sphere of production in the city (Forbes, forthcoming). As a result, migrants are unable to break the vital link with the rural sector. Spatial mobility is a response to this pattern of integration of the three main forms of production.

The petty producer in the city earns a very low income, but his importance to the operation of the city should not be underestimated. He produces cheap commodities and services, often of a very high standard, which are eagerly sought after by all classes within the urban population, and he also often contributes disproportionately to the city's taxes. At the same time he demands very little in the way of urban services, tolerating in many cases the most appalling conditions. Thus his role, seen in the overall context, is to guarantee the cheap price of labour for the capitalist sector (Mkandawire 1977). Whatever the function it is important to appreciate the role of circulation in perpetuating petty production. Among Ujung Pandang's trishaw riders, for instance, clearly the continuing links with the village were important in sustaining the rider in the city, the assistance taking both a tangible form (such as rice) and an intangible form (the use of the village for rest and recreation).

In the same way, the village also depended on circulation. Remittances are an important component of household income, as Hugo (1979a:206) has shown, and the seasonal flow of labour is critical to a successful harvest. The overall importance of circulation is impossible to gauge precisely, but it is possible that it represents a significant dampener on structural change in the villages. The poverty of a proportion of the rural population, and simultaneously increasing expectations, can be met, albeit inadequately, through circulation, and does not necessitate the sale of land and permanent migration. Thus circulation suspends the inevitable capitalization of the rural sector, preserving inefficient peasant landholdings through subsidizing their owners and workforce. Hugo (1979a:207) has shown that a large proportion
of remittances are spent on necessities like food and clothing whilst Crystal (1974) notes the heavy spending on ceremony by the Toraja. Remittances are generally not invested in land, and so they are not contributing to land consolidation, but rather to temporarily preserving small-holder subsistence agriculture.

This argument is located in the more far-reaching discussion of the 'conservation' and 'dissolution' of the pre-capitalist economy in the modern world system (see Bettelheim 1972). Circular mobility, it has been argued, is one among several forces which serve to conserve the pre-capitalist forms of production in the underdeveloped countries. By contrast, permanent labour migration has the opposite effect, reflecting in the process of urbanization the expansion of capital in the city and having the effect of hastening the spread of capital through the country.

The distinction between permanent and circular migration therefore is a critical one. Circulation is significant in the preservation of both petty production and peasant subsistence production. It is not, however, an independent force. It is an important link in the socio-economic structure of a society. For instance, it has been argued that in parts of Africa the lack of any urban employment has meant a decline in circular migration, and this has meant in turn the increasing capitalization of agriculture as potential urban migrants turn to cash crop production (van Binsbergen and Meilink 1978:11). Mobility is important then because of its two-pronged character. On the one hand it reflects fundamental changes in the socio-economy; on the other it in turn has a substantial impact on the nature and direction of change in the socio-economy.

Circulation is a direct consequence of the incomplete capitalization of production, and thus of the uneven spatial impact of capitalism. The city and village in these transitional social formations are far from conceptually separate. By contrast, the division of labour in Western nations between towns and rural areas is far more complete. Labour in the towns specializes in secondary, tertiary and quaternary production, whilst labour in the rural areas is almost totally devoted to primary production. The division is not perfect. For example, in Australia itinerant labour circulates between towns and the fruit-growing areas along the River Murray, but since the scale of circulation in Indonesia and Australia represent different ends of a continuum the matter is conceptually distinct.

In some ways the above discussion parallels Zelinsky's (1971) development of the idea of the 'mobility transition'. Zelinsky summarized his hypothesis as the following proposition:

There are definite, patterned regularities in the growth of personal mobility through space-time during recent history, and these regularities comprise an essential component of the modernization process (1971:221-2).
Whilst agreeing with Zelinsky that changes in society and mobility are closely related, there the essential agreement ends. Zelinsky rightly equated a society with a particular form of mobility; his mistake was to assume that changes in the society will be automatically reflected in linear fashion in changes in mobility. As I demonstrated earlier, a particular form of mobility is not necessarily the exclusive property of any particular society. Like Hugo (1978a:39-59) we should also be sceptical of applying Zelinsky's essentially western model to contemporary Indonesia. The historical conditions at the time when the West passed through the so-called 'mobility transition' are far different from those operating in contemporary Indonesia — therefore it would be naive to expect the same patterns of mobility to occur in both.

In summing up, the aim of this section has been to point to some economic models of mobility and, specifically, labour migration. The ideas presented are incomplete, but the analysis of the uneven impact of capital within the third world offers a starting point for a general theory of migration. Specifically we need to look more closely at the articulation of forms of production, for whilst the theory of uneven development may offer some guidelines, it is the empirical substance of articulation in Indonesia that will produce the details of explanation. I have intentionally concentrated upon the broader forces giving rise to mobility mainly because it is the analysis of these 'objective' forces that require the most attention, yet have been dealt with least in Indonesia. We should not overlook, however, that mobility reflects not only the objective structure of the society but also forces that operate at many different levels. 

Finally I have suggested there is an important theoretical distinction between migration and circulation. Coincidentally it is also a distinction which most Indonesian villagers make. The circulation of labour, cash and goods plays an important part in Indonesian society at the present time, being a result of the incomplete penetration of capital, and also helping to slow the rate of change in Indonesia by helping to preserve petty production and peasant subsistence farming. If the wage labour sector should expand, or if agriculture should become increasingly capitalized, then circulation may well give way to another form of mobility. The next question we must ask, though, is whether tinkering with circulation will bring about these changes.

**Mobility and development**

The jump from social critic to social engineer is a difficult one, and is undertaken with great reluctance. In many ways,

---

14Such forces are discussed by Mitchell (1978) within the framework of the setting and the situation and by Germani (1965) at the objective, normative and psycho-social level.
though, it is unavoidable for 'all scientific analysis of social phenomena carries implicit proposals for action' (Amin 1974a:119).

The main theme in this paper has been the importance of viewing mobility as a reflection of the structure and processes within Indonesian society. The very dependency of mobility upon the economic structure means it is facile to assume that tinkering with mobility patterns will promote either the capitalization of agriculture or alternatively the expansion of urban industry. If my understanding of the literature is correct, changes of this magnitude will only occur as a result of changes in the world economy or a major reorientation of national development strategy. In other words we should treat with scepticism any suggestion that a policy focusing on mobility will by itself bring about major changes in Indonesian society.

If our concern is with long-term solutions to the problems that give rise to circulation — i.e. uneven development — and to which circulation also contributes, then we must turn our attention to regional development policy in Indonesia. Titus (1978) has argued that New Order policies have failed to come to grips with regional inequality in Indonesia, and instead have tended to reinforce the inequalities which emerged in earlier colonial and mercantilist periods. He concludes:

The present development indicators as well as the persisting patterns of inter-regional migration point to a continued process of increasing inequality which is tied to the New Order development concept .... Only a more egalitarian and decentralized policy which benefits both the peripheral regions and marginal social groups will be able to end these dilemmas (Titus 1978:202).

It is impossible to explore this question further at this stage, save to note there is increasing attention to regional inequality in Indonesia at the present time, but the effectiveness of any reform will depend heavily on the New Order regime's willingness to loosen its stranglehold on decision-making and allow decentralization to take place.

There is, finally, the question of what is to be done about the immediate problems, especially in the cities, that high rates of mobility have brought. This question is discussed in some detail by Hugo (1978a:60-72). Briefly summarized, the Jakarta administration has tried (somewhat unsuccessfully) to curb migration. Hugo correctly criticizes this on the grounds that it fails to tackle the causes of mobility. Indeed, he asks whether circulation might not be better encouraged, and points to its advantages which include the availability of work in the city, the minimal services temporary urban migrants require, and the role of circulators in the dissemination of new ideas.
I am inclined to neither view. Circulation should not be stopped, nor should it be encouraged. But it must be allowed to continue, for it is the only choice many poor people have to earn a subsistence income (menoari nafkah), and it cannot be closed off until alternative opportunities arise. In the meantime, though, we must strive to understand that, like petty production generally, it is a far from satisfying means of earning a living (cf. Bedford in this volume). We must recognize that circulation reflects the spatial unevenness of development, but also that it helps to perpetuate a wide margin of inequality between the elite among the wage-earning classes and the circulating petty producer/peasant classes. Its persistence in the short term can only be tolerated if the broader processes which give rise to it are simultaneously and effectively tackled.
Chapter 3

Policy implications of circulation:
some answers from the grassroots*

M. Chapman

One of the difficulties Pacific administrators frequently encounter is inadequate basic information upon which to formulate policy. Research workers come and go, yet to tease any applications from their published statements is both a delicate and time-consuming task (Chapman 1969:119).

Since the late 1960s, many micro-studies of population movement have been conducted in Southeast Asia and the island Pacific. Few of these directly address policy issues and the epigraph above, which more than ten years ago prefaced a report to a colonial government, today needs little modification. There is, in addition, the common feeling that results from village or community research are too particularistic to be of any use to policy makers. Despite such disheartening beliefs, this paper attempts to demonstrate that both academics and planners have been needlessly cautious about what can be learned from micro-studies.

To critics, the miniscule size of the population under investigation and the time and energy spent within the confines of an encampment, a village, or an urban enclave make the term 'case study' self-evident. In fact, local-level studies of population mobility conducted from the ground up proceed from several different points of reference and employ a surprising variety of field methods. Some take an holistic approach and view the hamlet or the village as both points of origin and ultimate destination for movers. Others focus upon the city destination of different ethnic groups or of particular occupations, like construction workers or ice-cream vendors. Yet others are concerned with community reactions to national issues, such as transmigration. In this paper several studies of circulation,

* Thanks are due to Alan Stretton (University of Hong Kong) and Ida Mantra (Gadjah Mada University) for helpful comments upon an earlier version of this paper.
one particular form of people's mobility, will be selected to exemplify how research at the microscale can illuminate policy issues far beyond the limits of the particular group or local community.

Communities in circulation: two villages of south Guadalcanal

An holistic approach to population movement was taken, during the mid-1960s, in a study of two communities in the Solomon Islands (Chapman 1970). Focused upon Duidui and Pichahila, coast and inland communities of south Guadalcanal, its dominant concern was the interplay of social and economic factors in mobility behaviour. These people, somewhat isolated from north Guadalcanal and the capital of Honiara, are subsistence cultivators, generally have adequate land for food gardens and cash crops, earn money from wage labour and local coconut groves, and are noted for their independence. To discuss, in a paper about policy implications, research undertaken fifteen years ago would seem highly questionable, were it not for the fact that subsequent study and revisits in 1972, 1974, 1978 and 1980 have shown the patterns of circulation to be remarkably durable. Perhaps even more surprisingly, the practical aspects of such recurrent mobility are not basically different from those reported in 1967 to the former Western Pacific High Commission (Chapman 1969).

Observers like Allan (1957:117) have commented upon the residential stability of Solomon Islanders. If, by stability, is meant how firmly rooted are they to their home village, wherever it might be, then this is clearly correct. But given this emotional and practical tie to their own community, the people of both Duidui and Pichahila were found to be far more mobile than would have been anticipated from the stereotypes then prevalent in the social sciences. Field inquiries revealed two different kinds of circulation. Younger persons, and predominantly adult males, moved for durations of as little as ten days and as long as one year. The principal reasons were to earn money in the main town of Honiara, at district (now provincial) centres, on European-owned plantations, or from Solomon Island entrepreneurs; to visit Honiara, district and mission stations for retail, educational, medical, and administrative services; and to leave for other villages either to go to school or because of a serious dispute.

The pidgin, 'go walkabout', summarized the second form of circulation, which mainly involved families, was highly spontaneous, meant an absence of less than eight days, and rarely extended beyond the language boundary: Poleo (Duidui) and Birao (Pichahila). Such journeys were made to other villages to visit kinsfolk, discuss clan and church business, and attend a feast; to live temporarily in the shelter at the edge of the food gardens; to hunt wild
pig or trap fish; and to quit the community briefly out of shame or by way of social protest.

There are two ways in which a knowledge of such practice could assist the local administrator. One is more immediate and rather specific to the communities or their immediate hinterlands, since people's mobility could influence the siting of community development schemes, the location of extension or social services, the spread of information, even when to schedule important or prolonged official tours. Patterns of circulation are also relevant to larger questions which refer to hundreds of Solomon Island villagers and not simply to Duidui and Pichahila: the stability of labour, programs of vocational training, and the quality of education from the standpoint of the local community.

Since Solomon Islanders are the overwhelming source of labour in their country, one practical question is how to reduce the high mobility at places of employment. Heart of this problem is the basic reason for the persistent ebb and flow: the largely polarized distribution of the village-dwelling population on the one hand and the prevailing sources of employment on the other; the people's need to earn cash not only to pay their local taxes and school fees but also to obtain some items of a money economy; and the fact that housing at many work places is still only available for men, without women and children.

If employers throughout the Solomons were to offer housing for families, then the wives — and particularly the younger and frequently more sophisticated — would be willing to accompany their husbands to most work places, at least within their own island. In such a case a family would padlock its house, leave its pigs in the care of close relatives, possibly even transfer the use of its garden land. More important, there would be a greater willingness to stay away for what, to a family, is a considerable length of time: say, two to three years. Although this absence would not imply a permanent departure from the village, from the standpoint of the employer it would make for a more stable workforce and thereby reduce the country's high rate of labour turnover.

Without careful implementation, to point to the converse of this argument, such programs could have an unnecessarily negative impact upon village society. The local community can and does adjust to the loss of its able-bodied males for periods of less than one year. When, in the first three months of 1966, 18 out of 41 males aged between 21 and 54 left Duidui for wage labour, the 3-6 year-olds, the elderly and the infirm were utilized more and more to carry water, prepare vegetables, nurse infants, and keep the village swept and weeded. Yet a point can be reached where the number of families who accompanied their menfolk would be too great to permit a community to function, as indicated by reports of chiefs, big men and peers pressuring men
to remain in the village until some absentees returned (Chapman 1969:137).

The problem of less mobile wage labourers is complex but, given the prevailing nature of circulation, not incapable of solution. Even if labour turnover cannot be reduced in the immediate future, as for instance through the provision of married quarters, then its distinctly seasonal character suggests that changes in vocational training might help achieve the same goal. Employers, on the one hand, depend upon the village for their manpower; on the other, few married males are prepared to remain continuously at work because August to February are especially busy months during which new food gardens must be cleared, root crops harvested and planted, leaf dwellings built or repaired. Particularly in Honiara, the employer does not feel inclined to put any great effort into the training of even minimal skills when they are lost the moment the villager quits his job to return home — frequently never to be seen again.

This seasonal availability suggests a compromise beneficial to both parties, provided that employers adopt a long-term view. On-the-job training could begin the moment a man was hired for the period February to August, which could be regarded as a trial period leading to annual but seasonal association between employer and wage-earner. At the end of such period both parties could, if mutually satisfied, come to an arrangement whereby the Solomon Islander guaranteed his labour for the next year, in return for family housing and subsequent training in more difficult tasks. Were such to occur for three to seven years, then the cumulative experience and on-site training would about equal the non-apprenticeship programs currently available for many of the manual trades. Such a scheme would be feasible, for example, for the training of painters, carpenters, plasterers, bricklayers, plumbers, linesmen, electricians and mechanics.

As envisaged, the arrangement between employer and wage-earner would be based upon mutual understanding, with the latter losing an assured job and family housing should he not return the following year. Obviously employers would only be interested in such an annual, but seasonal, association with individuals judged to be energetic, trustworthy and manually dexterous. Solomon Islanders would be similarly unwilling unless especially impressed by the treatment received during the initial weeks of what, to them, would have been 'just another job'. Such might appeal most to smaller employers, whose scale of operation inevitably means closer and more personal contact with their employees. Programs of vocational training, in short, could be evolved to mesh with the markedly seasonal flow of labour.

The fact that throughout the Solomons comparatively few schools — like sources of wage employment — are located within the village means that most children board away from home. The
annual return of pupils at Christmas is not only an exciting
time for the community but also provides telling evidence to the
individual parents of the kind of education they have received —
and the onlooker's view is all the sharper because of the child-
ren's absence for many months, compared with their much briefer
vacation of four to six weeks. Often, and particularly in Duidui,
the older adolescents were said not to know how to work properly,
to be lazy, to want only to play. Intermittent comments were
made that particular pupils were not learning well and that it
would be wasted money for them to continue. As the length of
time away increased, the children tended to become scornful of
many village activities: an attitude that might have been less
evident had they been attending nearby institutions on a daily
or weekly basis. More regular contact with their homes would
facilitate the continuing acquisition of local skills along with
more academic information. It would also considerably alleviate
the boredom observed, especially among older adolescents, after
completion of schooling.

Upon return, the children's most obvious accomplishment was
simple English which could be used, for example, to read letters
received from absent kinsmen, the local administration, or mission
authorities. For the most part, however, it was not the knowledge
of English that was most impressive but rather its limited utility
within the village and how pupils with less than four years'
training preferred Solomons pidgin in conversation with outsiders.
It is little wonder that parents were heard sometimes to remark
that schooling 'is not much good', since the skills that children
might learn to help improve their community are not those with
which most return: for girls, simple nutrition and hygiene, first
aid, sewing, gardening methods, and handicrafts; for boys, crop
improvement, carpentry, carving, how to keep simple accounts, how
to fashion tin or metal and to mix cement. In the Solomons, as
in any third world country, the capacity of its human resources
will remain under-utilized until most villagers possess a wider
range of manual skills, a greater awareness of nutrition and health
care, a literacy based upon a lingua franca and the local language,
and an embryonic awareness of communities beyond their own.

An interventionist philosophy has coloured this discussion
of what patterns of circulation mean for labour turnover, programs
of vocational training, and the quality of education from the
standpoint of the village. Somehow some authority — national,
provincial, mission, or private — will construct family housing
at places of employment, alter conventional methods of vocational
training, and implement a curriculum more attuned to a rural
society. Since the late 1960s, in fact, low-cost housing has
become available in Honiara and concerted, if sometimes controver-
sial attempts have been made to evolve a school curriculum more
closely attuned to the needs and aspirations of village commu-
nities. But of what relevance is all of this to local groups who
have no academic mouthpiece and whose institutional environment
may be neutral, apathetic, perhaps even hostile? To what extent does circulation represent an adaptation to such circumstances and what can the policy maker learn from this?

An occupation group in circulation: construction workers in Manila

In 1975 an economist, Alan Stretton, interviewed ninety-one construction labourers in the cities of Manila, Quezon and Makati as part of a study of the building industry in Greater Manila. Based upon the literature, the expectation was that such employment was transitory, mirrored the considerable fluctuations in construction activity, and represented in general an intermediate phase between unskilled rural employment in agriculture and skilled industrial occupations in urban centres (Stretton 1977; 1978; 1981). Skilled labourers were certainly hired on a casual basis but, despite this, were found to be quite committed to the industry. Periodic circulation was the means by which they coped with irregular employment and uncertain income: if construction work was available the skilled labourers moved to Manila; when it was finished they returned to their home towns or rural villages (*barrios*).

The anchors of this employment system are independent foremen who, in 1974, accounted for 40 per cent of the floor area and 30 per cent of the value of buildings constructed in Greater Manila (Stretton 1981:327). Highly skilled artisans, for a daily wage these foremen obtain and execute contracts for small residential and non-residential buildings, as well as hire and supervise labour. Work groups vary in size from three to fifteen skilled labourers, such as carpenters and masons, and account for about half those employed on site. Most are relatives or old friends of the foreman and come from the same *barrio* or district. Economic and social pressures provide the common interest which binds a foreman with his work group, so that word is sent to the *barrio* the moment a construction job is about to begin.

Skilled labourers leave their families behind and return home for short visits every two or three weeks. Remittances are an important source of income: for some *barrio* families the only source, but for most a supplement to that earned by other adult members. For the construction worker, circulation thus 'represents a means by which he can maximise his living standards' (Stretton 1981:335). Earnings are increased by accepting employment whenever it becomes available, urban costs are kept low by living at the construction site, and families remain in the *barrio* to avoid the greater expense of city residence.

Circulation also underpins the commitment that carpenters and masons have to the building industry. It permits them to
improve skills, initially acquired at construction sites in provincial cities, that are not easily transferable to other industries. Paid relatively high wages, they claim pride in their work and to have more satisfying jobs than other labourers. Yet the precarious nature of employment and the volatility of the industry have to be balanced by the long-term security of the barrio as the locus of the extended family, of income-sharing mechanisms among relatives, and perhaps of some land as a source of food and even cash crops.

The alternative to circulation, for the labourer and his family to migrate to Manila, would be infinitely more risky. Continuous employment could only be achieved through marginal jobs fitted between construction activity, the contacts in the informal sector necessary to purchase goods and lease equipment would be difficult to sustain, and average income would be much nearer to the subsistence level. Furthermore, the cost of family housing would be higher than for the breadwinner alone and the city offers far less security in times of crisis or illness. Thus the practice of circulation endures, to the extent that 56 per cent of skilled labourers have worked in construction in Greater Manila for at least five years (Stretton 1981: Table 1).

Work groups much influence wage levels and vocational training in the building industry, despite the fact that their members are continually travelling between barrio and construction site. Skills are obtained on the job: carpenters, for instance, are trained by either the foreman or the master carpenter. Learning is by example and, since teacher and trainee are usually related, no fees are paid. The acquired skills, being easily transferred from one project to another, in time become available to the entire industry—especially since the large Manila firms are little concerned with training programs.

Skilled tradesmen who work for foremen receive wages that are beyond the legal minimum and increase in proportion to their experience. Whilst initially surprising, given a situation of surplus labour, this wage structure reflects the nature of building contracts and the close partnerships found in work gangs. Since foremen are paid a daily rate just as their skilled labourers are, there is no advantage to their hiring workers at below the minimum wage. Members of the work gang and their foreman have been together for many years, come from the same barrio, are often related, and face the same economic pressures. Blessed with a committed group and confronted by social pressures to maximize the returns to their workforce, most foremen transfer the higher cost of labour to the building owner.

This system of casual work, unlike that for wage-labourers from south Guadalcanal, has evolved gradually rather than resulted from administrative fiat or employment regulations. For the policy maker, the lessons vary according to their point of
reference. The building industry benefits greatly from the periodic circulation of a skilled and committed workforce. As demand increases, tradesmen appear at construction sites; if it falls, they return to the barrio. Consequently the turnover of workers is much less and their accumulated experience far greater than might be expected for an industry that cannot guarantee continuous employment.

By maintaining his family at home and sleeping at the construction site, the labourer makes only minimal demands upon such urban services as housing, transport, education and health. On the other hand, being concerned to remit to his family as much of his income as possible, he consumes less and thus dampens the contribution of the building industry to the urban economy. For the barrio, this system is not necessarily all positive. At times of little construction activity, these communities are expected to provide food and shelter for the urban unemployed at the very time they experience a decline in remittance income. In addition, such impact will be highly localized. Not only do foremen draw their skilled workforce from the same barrio, but also the provinces encircling Manila are more dependent upon metropolitan construction than those at farther distance.

From the standpoint of job training, the link between foremen and work group guarantees the cumulative acquisition of skills in masonry and carpentry. Yet such a system, which functions without cost to the building industry, is especially vulnerable to official intervention. Recent efforts to speed the construction of low-cost housing in Greater Manila have focused upon encouraging large-scale development, by means of low-interest loans and contracts made by semi-government financial authorities (Stretton 1978:163-8). If successful, the paradoxical result of such housing policy would be to raise construction costs, challenge if not eliminate the role of the independent foreman, and severely weaken an effective but informal method of vocational training. Ultimately, the widespread entry of large firms into low-cost housing could even destroy a stabilized system of casual employment for barrio residents. In short, there is too little appreciation, as Fan and Stretton (1980:23) emphasize, that 'policies aimed at the urban modern sector will often have a significant impact in villages quite removed from the target group'.

Ethnic groups and circulation: Fijians and Indo-Fijians in Suva

Proximity of origin communities, defined in terms of both kinship ties and simple distance, ensured the ethnic homogeneity of migrant workers and school pupils in Guadalcanal and Luzon. When the frame of reference is shifted to urban destinations, by contrast, people who circulate are more varied in their personal
attributes as well as in the regions from which they come. To what extent does ethnicity affect the intensity of circulation and of links maintained between urban domiciles and natal places? And if it does, might this indicate that comprehensive national policies will be less effective than ones that are to some extent regionally or culturally specific?

Late in 1977 a geographer, Shashikant Nair (1978; 1980), began a study of Fijians and Indo-Fijians who, although born in rural areas, had lived for at least six months in the capital city of Suva. The 400 heads of household interviewed were equally divided between the two ethnic groups and their range in both duration of stay and socio-economic position was reflected in the residential areas chosen for investigation. Nair, himself an Indo-Fijian, was concerned initially with how long people lived in Suva, their future residential intentions, and the kinds of socio-economic linkages maintained between rural and urban places. So many implications emerged from his research, however, that it provides rare documentation of how far the ethnicity of movers must be incorporated in framing policy.

Six out of ten Fijian heads of household were born in the distant islands of eastern Fiji, which have scant resources and are especially prone to hurricanes. A similar proportion of Indo-Fijians, on the other hand, came from the main island (Viti Levu) where sugar cane is grown and where the problems of a steadily-rising population and diminution of available land per capita have been compounded by the expiry of native leases. Contrary to the image of Fijians as a village people, considerably more of them than Indo-Fijians had resided in town for ten or more years. Conversely, seven times as many Fijians as Indo-Fijians expect eventually to return to their villages or rural settlements from which they originated.

The bi-locality of people who live in town and have various degrees of commitment to their natal place is sustained by a cross-flow of visitors, goods and cash. Indo-Fijians visit their rural communities more often but for shorter periods than Fijians, a pattern that reflects differential accessibility rather than — as might be expected — increasing length of residence. Kinship is the dominant reason for most visiting: to spend holidays with relatives, attend weddings or funerals, console the sick. Festivals, enshrined in both customary and religious belief, also stimulate return. Thus Hindus celebrate Diwali and Muslims Eid, and Fijians must formally introduce the new-born child to their father's village (matanigone).

Apart from visiting, there is an illuminating contrast in the ways in which Fijian and Indo-Fijian heads of household interact with their places of origin. For Fijians, the extended family, the village, and the province command support and attention of different kinds. 'Whereas links with the extended family
in the village are primarily spontaneous, those with the larger village community are somewhat spontaneous but often sanctified by tradition, while most of those with the provinces are mandatory and may be enforced by administrative authority' (Nair 1980:46). Indo-Fijians, having no residential unit of reference comparable with the Fijian village and not being bound by provincial regulations, maintain exclusive links with close kin and most usually through the remittance of money.

Fijians send cash and manufactured goods to the extended family, while traditional products (woven mats, scented coconut oil) and fresh food (root crops, fish, mangoes) flow in the opposite direction. The dominant form of contribution to the entire village is money collected in town for some communal project, through either direct donation or participation in benefit games such as kati. Reciprocal help, although less frequent, occurs during traditional ceremonies and especially before and after burial of the dead. At such times, village relatives assist with ceremonial procedures, provide labour, food and materials for the funeral feast and, most critical, represent those Suva residents unable to attend the several steps in the ceremonial sequence. Compared with rural-urban interaction at the level of the family and the village, the payments made to the province represent head tax or land rates which, although buttressed by official sanction, are ignored by about half those living in Suva.

The differential weight that Fijians and Indo-Fijians give to their rural heritage, whilst masked by the many years spent in town and the generally skilled nature of their employment, is summarized by the images they have of themselves. Fijians overwhelmingly feel they are village people (83 per cent), whereas almost half of the Indo-Fijians view themselves as townsfolk and a further fifth are either ambivalent or unsure (Nair 1980: Table 19). How ethnic differences affect movement can be captured by scoring the number and recency of visits to natal communities, the kinds of socio-economic linkages maintained with them, plus intentions about future residence. On the scale of origin-destination links thus derived, Fijians rank from high to moderate but Indo-Fijians quite low; for the former, circulation between town and country is quite intense but for the latter comparatively weak.

Culture, history, and social conditioning, rather than the attributes of movers, provide the explanation for this instructive result. Given the hierarchial nature of Fijian society, there exists a certain communalism at all levels of socio-political organization down to the village, and reciprocity is emphasized. In Nair's words:

All Fijians who wish to retain their group identity ... identify strongly with the village, which is the hearth of all tradition, where their roots lie. Fijians who live in
urban areas consequently must do far more than simply say they are of the village—their declarations have to be translated into such actions as contributing to village projects. Beyond this, Fijians are taught both formally and informally that their traditions and lifestyles must be retained at all costs, even though this often results in conflicting ideals (1980:57-8).

Reinforcing such customary mechanisms is the fact that most land is owned communally, managed at the level of the village, and may not be sold by law. Quite understandably, such vested interest in rural land makes it impossible for any Fijian to renounce all links with the natal place. This is in distinct contrast to Indo-Fijians who, being of immigrant descent, do not 'necessarily identify their rural settlements with a cultural heritage or view them as the anchor of their whole existence. Above all, there is no traditionally sanctified system of exchange amongst kin and no conditioned expectation to contribute to settlement affairs' (Nair 1980:60).

In broadest perspective, there exists a certain complementarity between Suva and the rural areas, of which circulation is the most visible manifestation. Thus Nair disagrees with attitudes evident in Fiji's Seventh Development Plan (1976-80), in which movement from rural places is conceived as an exodus that creates problems of congestion in urban destinations and depression in the origin communities. On the contrary: 'For the Fijians in particular, urban centres are regarded as locations of employment and modern amenities, and rural communities primarily as locations that offer opportunities for better social and cultural life and a chance for peaceful retirement. Consequently, people move between urban and rural places to maximize their satisfactions' (Nair 1980:75-6): an explanation identical to that offered by Stretton for the construction workers shuttling between barrios and Manila.

Based upon this practice, Nair argues for policies to help Suva residents maintain their rural interests and ultimately to implement their desire to return at, or even before retirement. Similarly, rural investment should aim to facilitate and reinforce the links movers maintain with natal communities and, at the same time, delay the outward movement of young people so that they experience the meaningful aspects of local life and find their eventual return less burdensome. Improved shipping services to the outer islands, for instance, would permit more frequent returns and more active participation in village affairs, while better roads and bus services to areas tributary to the capital would facilitate employment in town without a parallel transfer of one's domicile. More junior and senior secondary schools strategically located in rural areas would not only help children remain but also lead to a fuller experience of local lifestyles, especially given that many Fijians and Indo-Fijians had relocated for education.
Availability of money-earning opportunities within or near village areas would confer upon returning Fijians the dual advantage of a quiet life and basic needs being met. Whilst the introduction of cash-producing activities is no simple matter, better transport services could be integrated with the cultivation of high-value or off-season cash crops, or the establishment of suitable cottage industries. The great sensitivity throughout Fiji about access to land could be alleviated, Nair argues, were government to reclaim areas of forest and coastal swamp for subsequent lease or sale to Fijian and Indo-Fijian farmers, as well as to encourage under- or unutilized land to be planted with a greater variety of cash crops. Such agriculture policies would both attract more rural Fijians into the cash economy and provide landless Indo-Fijians the opportunity to settle outside urban centres.

Irrespective of the rural focus of these suggestions, Nair emphasizes the paramount need for balanced development throughout Fiji and for planners to understand that reinforcing rural-urban links also has implications for urban growth. As Stretton noted for Greater Manila, people who circulate make different demands of city services from those planning lengthy residence. Many Fijians and some Indo-Fijians preferred temporary quarters upon arrival in Suva, which suggests that authorities ought to encourage the building of low-cost rental units and to maintain a lenient attitude towards squatter settlements. If the cross-flow of people between complementary places is acknowledged, then an obsession with rural-urban drift can be avoided.

Local participants in national policy: transmigration and two Javanese dukuh

A vast literature exists on transmigration in Indonesia that, since 1905, has been the primary instrument by which successive governments have tried to ease population pressure throughout Java. From the outset, the transmigration program encountered many difficulties. Yet very little is known about these transmigrants within the context of their origin communities: who found success through resettlement to southern Sumatra, whether close links were maintained with their natal places on Java, how many became disenchanted and eventually returned. Could it be that sensitive discussion with trans-migrant families might isolate some factors of success and failure in a national policy?

In the mid-1970s, Ida Mantra (1978; 1980b) undertook a detailed study of population movement in terms of two dukuh (hamlets) in central Java. Both communities, Kadirojo and Piring, are located in the most densely-settled regencies (Bantul and Sleman) of Yogyakarta Special Region (see Fig. 7.1), both depend
upon wet-rice irrigation for their livelihood and both, since
the 1970s, have experienced a dramatic increase in short-term and
short-distance mobility through the extension of rural roads and
the appearance of the minibus. Although Mantra's research was
not primarily concerned with transmigration, he became aware of
and reported the opinions and experiences of dukuh participants

During the period of fieldwork, May 1975 to January 1976,
eleven heads of household left dukuh Kadirojo and Piring for south
Sumatra. Only two of these participated in the government-
sponsored program, and, as with former transmigrants, most made
their own arrangements and paid their own expenses. This dis-
inclination to relocate under official auspices reflects both the
complicated nature of administrative procedures and a preference
for areas where relatives or friends have already settled. Within
the dukuh, stories abound of officially-sponsored migrants being
told to prepare for departure and then, having sold their rice
fields and the basis of subsistence, being forced to wait up to
several weeks for transportation.

Perhaps even more important is that meeting one's expenses
to Sumatra leaves open the option of eventual return to Kadirojo
and Piring, so that the decision to resettle becomes a gradual
rather than a peremptory one. A common sequence is first to
visit a relative, who has previously relocated, stay for a few
months working as farm labourer or trader and then, if favourably
impressed, attempt to purchase some agricultural land. Thus
spontaneous transmigrants are not bound by government regulations,
which accounts for their being on average older, nor do they
officially transfer their residential status from dukuh to the
new settlement. Consequently it is simple for them to return if
they so choose.

Both previous and potential transmigrants from Kadirojo and
Piring favour long-settled areas in southern Sumatra, despite the
likelihood that other parts of the island might offer better
employment opportunities and lower transport costs. Quite simply,
the dominant attraction is the presence of relatives in such areas,
compounded by the relatively short distance from central Java
that reduces the expense of both relocation and return visits to
their natal communities. In Mantra's words (1978:196): 'Clusters
of kinsfolk in transmigration areas can be regarded as preferred
residential destinations and demonstrate that the greater the
number of related people who stay ..., the greater the flow of
transmigrants to that destination'.

The gradual and cumulative process of the decision to trans-
migrate, as well as the critical links of kinship, are summarized
in the life history of a Kadirojo family (Mantra 1978:233-5).
In 1967, after four years in Tanjungkarang, south Sumatra, one
brother returned to the dukuh to visit relatives and responded
to many questions about life in a colonization area: the nature of its land holding, the local people, and systems of transportation. A younger brother, asked to accompany the elder to help work his rice fields, soon learned that their cost was about one-third that in Kadiojo. In addition, the resettlement was close to a main road and nearby householders were very friendly. Within a year the younger brother had returned to the dukuh. His wife agreed to accompany him provided that, first, their home was located in the same area as the older and longer-resident brother; and second, that the family's transfer be delayed a year until the daughter could complete primary school.

In the interim, the husband sold some of the family rice fields and, accompanied by his son, returned to Tanjungkarang to buy land and build a semi-permanent dwelling. As soon as the daughter had finished her elementary education, the entire family migrated to Sumatra and left their remaining possessions in care of the husband's youngest brother. Since 1967, as a result, close links exist between two communities, one in Sumatra and the other in central Java. Letters to the dukuh from the two families contain many details about their fate and the mother is sometimes sent money, which conveys the impression that already the relocation is a success. Such positive impressions may stimulate yet other people to migrate from Kadiojo—an act which, as with the two brothers, will be preceded by prior visits to establish that sufficient agricultural land is still available at reasonable cost.

Unfortunately for the policy maker, channels of communication do not discriminate between good information and bad. Thus the negative experiences of villagers in officially-sponsored programs also flow back to the Javanese dukuh, whose inhabitants are not slow to draw unfavourable comparison. One Kadiojo family, having arrived at a resettlement area where crops could not be cultivated because of deep tree roots that bound the soil, wrote to parents to send money and promptly returned. For a local community, such facts translate into a marked reluctance to participate in official schemes of transmigration.

Given the views of dukuh residents, Mantra advocates changed tactics in the transmigration program. What is first needed in pioneer areas, he argues, is 'a small nucleus of "successful" migrants, reinforced by better logistics and improved transportation' (Mantra 1978:197), which in turn will stimulate the flow of spontaneous migrants from Javanese communities. Volunteers willing to act as such a pioneer group, and sought from amongst friends and relatives, would expand the range of destinations which transmigrants are willing to consider and anticipate the desire of potential settlers to live among their own people. Without friends or relatives in resettlement areas, dukuh inhabitants would remain disinterested in the face of official national policy or, if sufficiently courageous to participate, feel anxious
about their allotment of land upon arrival or their reception from existing residents.

In general, greatest attention ought to be paid to the links that exist and may evolve between the settlements and the origin communities of prospective participants — a conclusion parallel to that reached in Nair's (1978) study of Fijians and Indo-Fijians living in town. One method used by the Dutch in colonial Indonesia, which could usefully be copied, is to encourage successful migrants to return periodically to their natal communities. Such visits, especially at celebrations like Lebaran and Ruwah, would enable kin to demonstrate the recent improvement in their socio-economic position. Similarly, government could encourage voluntary transmigrants by meeting transport costs and subsidizing other expenditures of relocation.

Tying the threads together

The most important discoveries of the laws, methods and progress of Nature have nearly always sprung from the smallest objects which she contains (Lamarck).

Individuals, families and small groups which make up encampments, villages and urban enclaves constitute the elementary particles of society. Consequently what is known about two small communities of south Guadalcanal, construction workers in Manila, ethnic groups in Suva, and potential transmigrants in central Java can illuminate policy issues at several levels of consideration: the hamlet or village, the town or city, the region and the country.

The links between the results of local-level inquiries and their broader implications reveal 'the connexions between the large-scale expressions of human action and what is taking place in the micro-spaces where the actors actually handle their tools and materials and cooperate face-to-face' (Hägerstrand 1973:75). Again, in a comment that could apply equally to the village parents dissatisfied with their son's education, the household head sending cash and manufactured goods to his natal place, the skilled worker awaiting the foreman's call for the next construction project, and the dukuh family's disinclination to be part of transmigration: 'Individual feelings and opinions contain the seeds of further real-world changes in the aggregate. The give and take of costs and benefits in a society are so strongly associated with minute locational acts that it is necessary for ... analysts to apply the best magnifying glass in order to detect them' (Hägerstrand 1973:75).

In these days of driving philosophies and remorseless hypotheses, the evidence contained in case studies can be
variously interpreted. The circuits of movement described by the school children of south Guadalcanal, the construction labourers of Manila, the Fijian sojourners to Suva, and the transmigrants of central Java may each and all be viewed as the structural result of origin communities that lie at the margins of the world capitalist system. Alternatively, they may be seen as the family's attempt to spread risk or as a response to the complementary nature of different places or circumstances. To be sure, such differing explanations are the very heart of intellectual discourse. More critical for the policy maker, however, is details of what is happening on the ground, and before the gloss of an explanation that is conceptually defined and theoretically inspired.

For population movement, such details are relatively simple but frustratingly difficult to collect on a large scale. Who moves where, how far, for what dominant reasons? With whom is the movement made, how often, and with what success? Does mobility recur and at what points in time? Between communities of origin and destination, do links exist and what is their impact? Answers to these and other questions, if available at the microscale, can inform the nature of people's mobility at several levels of consideration beyond that of the particular group or community to which they most immediately refer.

Yet there is a deep and abiding scepticism in the literature about such a prospect. The social demographer, Sidney Goldstein writes:

To obtain [mobility] data in adequate depth, with appropriate information on motivation and impact, necessarily restricts the researcher to a few communities. This limitation, in turn, inevitably raises the question of the extent to which those communities are typical of the more general patterns characterizing a region or country as a whole, given the unique ecological, economic, and social conditions that probably typify most villages (1978:46-7).

Such concern, however well meaning, indicates a basic misunderstanding of the microstudy and manifests what might be termed the myth of uniqueness and typicality. The village and town communities studied at the microscale are neither unique, in the sense of being idiosyncratic, nor typical, in the sense of representing some statistical norm. Rather, they have been selected according to some specific criteria, that in turn reflects the kinds of theoretical, substantive, or practical questions to which the field research was addressed.

Conclusions based upon a given village or urban neighbourhood may consequently be generalized to other places which can meet the same set of contextual conditions: namely, the original criteria that defined the selection of the study communities.
Such generalizations do not derive from statistical extrapolation but from an astute mix of intuition and a detailed awareness of the inner workings of a piece of social reality. J. Clyde Mitchell, a social scientist who throughout his career has been much concerned with the 'widespread confusion about the role of the case study in systematic enquiry', notes:

The basis of inference from a single case is not that the particular case is deemed to be 'representative' or 'typical' of all cases, as is the basis of statistical inference, but that ... the logical connection between its constituent parts make relationships apparent which were formerly obscure. Generalisation from the case study is premised upon the universality of the theoretical propositions relating relevant aspects of the case to one another (forthcoming, MS. p.37).

Whilst planners and policy makers are understandably little concerned about such esoteric matters, these have their practical ramifications. First, results from micro-studies reveal far more common ground and consequently a much greater ability to generalize than is usually assumed. Second, careful comparison of field investigations and their particular context can identify different mobility reactions to changing sets of socioeconomic conditions — and in a way not possible from more aggregative research.
Part B
Source and destination linkages: Southeast Asia
Map 2 Malaysia
The second part of the monograph presents findings of micro-level studies of population mobility in different regions of Southeast Asia. Although the approaches and emphases in the four papers differ, the unifying theme is the variety of mobility patterns and the analysis of source and destination linkages: in family ties, patterns of remittances, return movement and employment.

Maude, describing mobility patterns in five study villages in the northeast Malaysian state of Kelantan, shows the quite different streams followed by permanent and short-term migrants. He analyses especially circular migration, which nowadays concentrates on Singapore, and income flows between migrants and village households. Income support from remittances is shown to be of particular importance to the poorest population group. Corner, on the other hand, studying an area in the northwest Malaysian state of Kedah, argues that the poorest are unable to participate in the benefits of migration and suggests that the children of such disadvantaged families need welfare support if they are to move.

Both Mantra and Singhanetra-Renard emphasize the emotional links between migrant and village household. Singhanetra-Renard shows that in her study area the attitude of Thai villagers to those who have migrated depends not so much on distance travelled or time away, as on the degree of contact maintained with the village and family. She therefore questions the utility of discrete time and space co-ordinates in classification of population movement. Mantra stresses the opposing forces drawing villagers to towns or retaining them in villages in Indonesia. He suggests that since villagers appear to solve this problem largely through short-term movement, government should tailor development policy to take account of this by promoting relative by small-scale regional growth centres.
Chapter 4

Population mobility and rural households
in North Kelantan, Malaysia

A. Maude

Study of the variety of forms of population movement in Southeast Asia, such as circular migration, return migration, permanent migration and commuting, has become of increasing theoretical and practical interest in the last few years. Goldstein (1978) identifies a number of questions which need to be answered if understanding of the relationships between population movement and rural and urban development is to be improved. These questions include (ibid.:60):

1. 'To what extent does one or the other form of movement in itself or in combination relieve rural pressures?'

2. 'To what extent does the interchange between urban and rural places, and particularly the interchange resulting from return movement by commuters and circular migrants, contribute to the development and modernization of rural areas through the introduction of new ideas and behavior and through the remittances of money and goods? How crucial ... are such remittances for meeting the basic needs of rural locations, thereby contributing to the more equitable distribution of income generated in the cities?'

3. Should governments encourage an even greater reliance upon commuting and circular movement?

Goldstein also summarizes the evidence from a number of recent studies, especially that of Hugo (1975b), which show that census data catch only a small part of total population mobility, much of which can only be identified through micro-studies of selected communities.

This paper attempts to contribute towards an understanding of some of these issues through a study of population mobility in five villages in North Kelantan, Malaysia (see Map 2). The region is one in which outmigration is of considerable demographic, economic and social significance. An analysis of the data on
previous place of residence collected in the 1970 Census shows that five of the six districts of North Kelantan had net migration rates greater than -10, amongst the highest rates of outmigration in Peninsular Malaysia. Types of mobility range from daily commuting, through the seasonal migration of harvest workers and the circular migration of urban labourers, to the relatively permanent migration of well-educated villagers to urban employment and the less-educated to settle land. For some households the income earned or sent back by migrants is an important part of total household income. Continued outmigration is also considered by some planners to be necessary in order to increase average farm size, and thus help raise agricultural incomes to acceptable levels. The region is therefore well-suited to a study of the effects of population mobility on rural households.

The material used in this paper was collected as part of a study into rural-urban linkages in North Kelantan undertaken in 1977. The study was not solely concerned with mobility, and therefore some of the data normally collected in a migration survey (such as migration histories) were not obtained, which makes it difficult to answer satisfactorily some questions about mobility and its effects. The area selected for the study consists of the districts of Pasir Mas and Tumpat. Five kampung (villages) were chosen to represent the main farming types found in the region (double cropping of rice, and rice combined with tobacco, vegetables, rubber and groundnuts), the main soil types (from sandy, well drained soils to heavy, poorly drained clays), and varying degrees of accessibility to the district centres Pasir Mas (1970 population: 11,233) and Tumpat (1970 population: 10,673), and the State capital, Kota Baharu (1970 population: 55,124). No kampung could be considered to be isolated, as all were accessible by road

---

1North Kelantan is defined as the districts of Tumpat, Pasir Mas, Kota Baharu, Bachok, Pasir Puteh and Machang.

2Pryor (1979:84-6 and 310-11).

\[
\text{District migration rate} = \frac{\text{no. of migrants}}{\text{district population}} \times 100
\]

\[
\text{District net migration rate} = \text{district in-migration rate} - \text{district outmigration rate}.
\]

3Fieldwork was undertaken as a member of a team from the Universiti Sains Malaysia, under the direction of Dr Kamal Salih. The assistance of the Prime Minister's Department, Government of Malaysia, which granted permission to undertake research, the Universiti Sains Malaysia, which provided a base for the project, my research colleagues at the USM, the students who carried out the interviewing, and the Australian Research Grants Committee, which funded the research, is gratefully acknowledged. A preliminary report on the study was presented in the Malaysia Programme of the Second National Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia, May 1978.
and none was more than about 2 hours by public transport from Kota Baharu. On the other hand, the area is remote from the main centres of economic growth in Malaysia, and is characterized by comparatively high population densities (up to around 400 persons per square kilometre), small farms, inequalities in land ownership, low productivity and a low level of commercialization in rice growing, low incomes by Malaysian standards, limited development of processing and manufacturing industries, and a low level of urbanization. Table 4.1 uses state data to illustrate some basic contrasts between Kelantan and the more developed West Coast states.

Data for the study were obtained through household interviews in each kampung, the interviewing being done by students of the Universiti Sains Malaysia. Sixty households were selected in each kampung by random sampling from a list of all households in the kampung, the list being stratified very simply into two groups — those households considered by local informants to be wealthy, and the rest. Each household selected was then interviewed three times over five weeks. The first questionnaire consisted of questions on household composition, occupations, education, migration and remittances; the second asked about land ownership, land use and off-farm employment; while the third was concerned with such topics as credit, agricultural advice and practices, membership and use of agricultural organizations, and income and expenditure. A complete set of questionnaires was obtained for a total of 203 households. The co-operation of household respondents was generally good, and any suspected limitations in either the completeness or the accuracy of the data collected will be noted at the appropriate place in the paper. However, the households surveyed cannot be assumed to be statistically representative of all North Kelantan villages, but only of each of the villages studied.

The following sections describe the main types of mobility identified in the survey villages, evaluate the income earned through mobility, discuss some of the broader socio-economic effects of mobility, and attempt to draw out some of the implications of the material presented.

Patterns of mobility

Population mobility is not a new phenomenon in Kelantan, but the scale, direction and character of movement has altered in

---

4Mobility in nineteenth century Malaya, including Kelantan, appears to have been high, the result of civil unrest as well as natural disasters and the exactions of rulers, but declined around the turn of century with the spread of British rule over the peninsula (Roff 1967:11).
Table 4.1
The states of West Malaysia: some economic and social indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>GDP per capita 1975 ($M at 1970 prices)</th>
<th>Population 1970 ('000)</th>
<th>Percentage of households with per capita income below $M25 per month, 1970</th>
<th>Mining &amp; manufacturing as share of state GDP 1970 (%)</th>
<th>Commerce, finance &amp; other services as share of state GDP 1970 (%)</th>
<th>Urban residents (pop. over 5,000) as % of 1970 population</th>
<th>Malays as % of 1970 population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Selangor</td>
<td>1,917</td>
<td>1,693</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negeri</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sembilan</td>
<td>1,382</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulau Pinang</td>
<td>1,323</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johor</td>
<td>1,262</td>
<td>1,326</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulau Pinang</td>
<td>1,197</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melaka</td>
<td>1,106</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perak</td>
<td>1,101</td>
<td>1,629</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kedah/Pelis</td>
<td>828</td>
<td>1,117</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terengganu</td>
<td>765</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kelantan</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>712</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures for the percentage of households with per capita incomes below $M25 per month are for Kedah only.*

response to political conditions, increasing pressure on land resources, the uneven regional development and capitalist penetration of Malaya (including Singapore) during and after the colonial period, improvements in transportation, and the spread of education.

Movement of people from Kelantan seeking temporary work elsewhere in Malaya appears to have increased since the 1930s, and during and after World War II the movement of labourers to harvest rice in Kedah and Perlis became a regular seasonal migration. This migration was a result of the growing inequality in land ownership in Kelantan (Kessler 1978:122-3), the need of many Kelantan farmers to supplement the income from their small, single-cropped rice farms, the shortage of labour in parts of Kedah and Perlis, and the fact that climatic differences between the two regions made it possible for Kelantan farmers to migrate in December and January, when the harvest in Kedah and Perlis was at its peak, and to return home in time for the harvest in Kelantan in February. Gosling (1963:185) estimates that in the 1954-55 harvest season some 7,000 workers from Kelantan entered Kedah and Perlis, while in a more recent study Selvadurai (1972:21) records that a survey of rice farmers in the Kelantan plain found that 30 per cent had in the past worked as harvesters in those two states. In the survey on which this paper is based it was found that from 5 to 39 per cent of heads of households in each village had worked as rice harvesters in Kedah or Perlis at some time in the past, with an average for the five villages of 20 per cent. The variation between kampung was at least partly related to the variety of income opportunities available in each village: the more diversified the village economy, the smaller the proportion of farmers who had temporarily worked outside the kampung.5

Seasonal migration to Kedah and Perlis has, however, declined markedly in recent years, and in the survey only from 0 to 15 per cent of households in each village had a member who had worked in those states in the past 12 months, with an average for five villages of 3 per cent. The average stay of the recent migrants in Kedah and Perlis was 4.8 weeks and their median age 36 years. This decline in the migration of harvest labour is the result of an increased demand for labour within Kelantan (as a consequence of irrigation, double-cropping and the introduction of tobacco cultivation), the growth in the supply of labour in Kedah and Perlis, the changing aspirations of rural youth, and the greater attraction of new types of temporary employment,

5Downs (1967:177) writes that in the Kelantanese kampung he studied in 1958 few farmers sought temporary work outside the village, 'thanks to the relatively diversified nature of its economy'.
especially labouring in Singapore.  

The movement of men to work as labourers (*buruh kontrek* or *buruh bangunan*) on building and construction sites in Singapore is now the predominant type of circular migration in the five survey villages. The attraction of Singapore in comparison with Kedah appears to be not only the demand for unskilled and semi-skilled construction workers and the comparatively high incomes that can be earned, but also the experience of living in a large cosmopolitan city. From 0 to 30 per cent of households in each village had a member who had been a temporary labourer in Singapore in the last 12 months, or was at present temporarily in Singapore, with an average for the five villages of 16 per cent. Heads of households made up 68 per cent of these circular migrants, with a median age of 34 years, the remainder being sons, grandsons or sons-in-law of the head of household, with a median age of 24 years. The average stay in Singapore was 9.2 weeks, but some migrants made several visits a year, generally returning home at the time of peak labour demand in rice or tobacco cultivation, while a few had ceased to take any part in farming, and returned home only to visit their families.

Other types of temporary or circular migration at present include work on plantations in Tanah Merah, Johor, Pahang and Negeri Sembilan, rubber tapping in Thailand, Terengganu or South Kelantan, and temporary cultivation of land (sometimes illegally) in South Kelantan, Terengganu or Pahang. In the survey an average of 4 per cent of households had a recent circular migrant who had not gone to Singapore or Kedah.

Circular migration enables households to supplement their income while at the same time maintaining an involvement in agricultural production, in a situation where they are unable, because of lack of skills or lack of opportunities, to obtain the employment or land that would enable them to become permanent migrants, or where they do not wish to leave their home society permanently. For many rural youths, on the other hand, circular

---

6 See Gunawan and von Liebenstein (n.d.:14). The one *kampung* still involved in the seasonal migration to Kedah and Perlis was one in which the area of rice land had been reduced several years ago as a result of flooding caused by a poorly designed irrigation scheme. The *kampung* also had the lowest per capita income and the lowest level of education of all the villages surveyed.

7 Circular migration is here defined, somewhat arbitrarily, as migration in which the periods of absence are not more than 12 months at a time, and the migrant is still regarded as a member of the household. Students living away from home are not included.

8 South Kelantan is defined as the districts of Tanah Merah and Ulu Kelantan.
migration provides an escape from the economic and social constraints of village life, and a marginal place in the urban environment for which their education and their peer society have largely prepared them. Dependence on Singapore serves to reinforce the circularity of migration, since permanent residence in Singapore by foreigners, including Malaysians, is tightly restricted. The pattern of circular migration is thus dominated by the movement to Singapore, with minor circulatory streams to Kedah and to South Kelantan and Terengganu.

Permanent migrants show quite different movement patterns. The major areas of destination are the neighbouring regions of South Kelantan, Thailand and Terengganu (44.8 per cent of all permanent migrants from the survey villages). Other important destinations are Kuala Lumpur and Selangor (15.2 per cent), and urban centres in North Kelantan (11.7 per cent had moved to Pasir Mas, Rantau Panjang or Kota Baharu).

The data on occupational distribution collected in the survey identify several types of permanent migration. Apart from the migration of women to accompany their husbands (29.9 per cent) the main types of permanent migrants are:

a. Those moving to rural areas (mostly in neighbouring, less densely populated districts in South Kelantan, Thailand and Terengganu) to settle land, farm, work as rubber tappers for smallholders and estates, engage in trade and so on (34.0 per cent). Most of the movement to settle land has been private rather than official since, because of past political differences between the Kelantan State Government and the Federal Government, the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) had until recently only one settlement scheme in Kelantan, and the State Government's own schemes have been on a limited scale. No migrant was recorded in the survey as having moved to a FELDA scheme in another state.

b. Those moving to urban areas, especially Kuala Lumpur, in search of unskilled and semi-skilled jobs (16.7 per cent).

---

9Permanent migration is defined, again somewhat arbitrarily, as migration involving an absence from the village of more than 12 months. Students living away from home are not counted as migrants, and neither are persons who have moved within the same district, unless they have moved to an urban area.

10Kelantan State Government schemes existing at the end of 1970 could accommodate, when fully developed, 7,314 families (Malaysia, Jabatan Perancang Bandar dan Kampung 1973:26-7).

11Because of the location of FELDA schemes, and the policy of reserving at least half the places in a scheme for settlers from... (footnote 11 continued on next page)
c. The migration of better educated persons to urban areas, both within Kelantan and on the West Coast, to fill semi-skilled and skilled posts in government or private employment (10.4 per cent).

d. Military service resulting in postings throughout Malaysia (6.9 per cent).

The time span involved was another aspect of the research. Permanent migration, as defined in this paper, does not mean that such migrants never return to live in their home villages. As Goldstein (1978:1) has observed, 'Recent studies ... lend strong support to the conclusion that population movement in Southeast Asia covers a spectrum from the seasonal or sporadic short-term moves by people seeking to supplement a meagre rural income to permanent migration by those attempting to substitute one set of lifetime prospects for another'. Although detailed migration histories, which are needed to analyse return migration fully, were not collected in the study, some data are available on periods of residence outside Kelantan for heads of households. Thirty-six per cent of heads of households were recorded as having at some time worked in another state or country. Of these 12 per cent had individual absences of more than one year. Most of these return migrants had worked outside the state for periods of up to four years, usually in agricultural occupations, but one had been a mine worker in Pahang for 12 years and a railway worker in various states for 4 years, and another had served in the army for 21 years. The remaining 88 per cent of heads of households who had at some time worked outside the state had been circular migrants, away from home for periods from 2 weeks to 5 months. For the present heads of households, therefore, circular migration, involving absences of less than one year, appears to have been a much more important form of mobility than return migration involving longer absences.

Commuting is a third form of mobility found in all the survey villages but was significant in only one. Commuting involves movement to work in another district or in an urban area within the same district, where the person returns to live in the household at least once a week. The occupations of commuters include government clerks, drivers, teachers, traders, hospital

Footnote 11 continued
the state in which the scheme is located, Kelantan people have had only limited opportunities to become FELDA settlers. Up to 1968 settlers from Kelantan were only 1.7 per cent of all FELDA settlers, although the state's share of the total population of Malaysia was 7.8 per cent in 1970. However, this proportion improved in the 1970s, because of a shortage of potential settlers in some of the areas of large-scale land development, and out of a group of 7,225 successful applicants in 1975, 15.7 per cent were from Kelantan (Bahirin and Perera n.d.:64-5).
workers, *beca* drivers, labourers and agricultural workers. Most had permanent jobs in Kota Baharu or Pasir Mas, but a few commuted outside their district for short periods to work intermittently as agricultural labourers.

Table 4.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village mobility characteristics, 1976-77</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Talak and Periok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population aged 15 and over (incl permanent migrants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of permanent migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(percentage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of circular migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(percentage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of commuters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(percentage)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 4.2 summarizes the relative significance of circular migration, permanent migration and commuting in the five survey villages. Kedondong stands out as having relatively high levels of both permanent and circular migration, most of it either short-distance permanent rural migration or unskilled circular migration to Singapore. Talak and Periok\(^{12}\) have relatively low levels of all types of mobility, but have the largest number still migrating to Kedah. Sakar has a relatively high percentage of commuters, very few circular migrants, and a high proportion of its permanent migrants in skilled and semi-skilled urban jobs, a pattern related to the relatively high level of education in the *kampung* (Table 4.3). Bayu Lalong and Kubang Batu have somewhat similar, and intermediate, overall levels of mobility, but differ in that Kubang Batu has a smaller proportion of circular migrants than Bayu Lalong, and a higher proportion of permanent migrants located outside Kelantan, mostly in Kuala Lumpur and Pahang.

The data on mobility presented in Table 4.3 probably understate the amount of migration from the survey villages. In the first place, the definition of a circular migrant includes only

\(^{12}\)Two adjoining *kampung* treated as one village.
those household members who had been temporarily working away from home during the 12 months before the survey, and excludes anyone who had been a temporary migrant in an earlier period. Second, the survey enumerated only migrants from households still in the village, and did not attempt to enumerate complete households who had left the *kampung*. Finally, some under-enumeration of migrants from the survey households is suspected. Figure 4.1 shows age-sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.3</th>
<th>Occupations of permanent migrants, 1976-77 (percentages)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Talak and Periok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>employee</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trader</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


pyramids for the population in the sample households. The stippled part of each pyramid includes all persons resident in the household at the time of the survey, together with temporary absentees such as students and circular migrants. The shaded part of each pyramid represents permanent migrants. Apart from the usual under-enumeration of children aged 0-4, there appears to be a shortage of males aged 15-29. However, a check with informants in two villages during the survey failed to identify any missed migrants, and under-enumeration of either permanent or circular migrants can only be suspected, not proved.

On the evidence presented here mobility in North Kelantan is not as high as in, for example, West Java (Hugo 1975b) or West Sumatra (Maude 1979:44). Clearly, however, mobility is an important aspect of rural Kelantan life, with 27 per cent of heads of households having been migrants at least once in their lifetime, 6.7 per cent of the reconstituted sample population of the five villages having been circular migrants within the last 12 months, and 13.0 per cent having become permanent migrants. In terms of
households, 32 per cent had either a current circular migrant or a head who had been a migrant in the past, or both, and could therefore be classified as circular or return migrant households, 32 per cent had lost at least one permanent migrant, while 55 per cent of households had experienced one or both of these types of migration. In terms of the numbers migrating in any one year, circular migration appears to be the most important form of mobility, followed by commuting and permanent migration, but in terms of the total number of people involved permanent migration is the dominant form, followed by circular migration and commuting.

![Graph showing age-sex profiles of population in sample households, 1976-77.]

**Figure 4.1** Age-sex profiles of population in sample households, 1976-77.

The income from population mobility

Tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 summarize the data collected in the survey on remittances sent by permanent migrants, the income brought back or sent to households by circular migrants, and the income of commuters, for the 12 months preceding the survey. The data include income in both cash and kind, but can only be regarded as approximate. Apart from the possibility that some sources of income were not revealed by respondents, and the general difficulty of determining income in an economy where it is received in irregular amounts and from a variety of sources, there were particular problems in estimating the income received by households from circular migrants. Where this income was brought back personally by the migrant, as was generally the case, rather than being remitted to the household, respondents did not always have an accurate knowledge of the amounts involved.
Table 4.4 compares the villages according to the contribution of the different types of mobility to household income. In terms of the number of households affected, circular migration was the most important source of income, with an average of 21 per cent of households in each village reporting income from this source. Remittances\(^\text{13}\) were received by an average of 12 per cent of households, and an average of 11 per cent of households received income from commuters. Commuting, on the other hand, was the most important source in terms of the total amount of income gained by households, because many commuters had well paid jobs in government agencies in Pasir Mas or Kota Baharu. Next came income from circular migration, and finally income from remittances.

Table 4.5 classifies these types of income according to the location in which the income was earned or from which it was remitted. As might be expected from the discussion earlier, the income earned by circular migrants is overwhelmingly from Singapore (74.6 per cent of all income from circular migrants), with a small contribution from Kedah (8.8 per cent). The income earned by commuters, again as is to be expected, is largely from Pasir Mas and Kota Baharu. The location of income from remittances, however, does not correspond to the location of permanent migrants. A larger proportion of remittances was received from Pasir Mas, Pahang, Kuala Lumpur and East Malaysia, and a smaller share from Tanah Merah, Ulu Kelantan, Terengganu and Thailand than might be expected from the distribution of permanent migrants. These differences can be explained in terms of the occupations of migrants and their capacity to send remittances. Whereas 40 per cent of permanent migrants were engaged in agriculture, this group, predominantly located in Tanah Merah, Ulu Kelantan, Terengganu and Thailand, contributed only 12.8 per cent of total remittances by value. Government employees, on the other hand, with generally much higher incomes, made up only 9.7 per cent of permanent migrants, but sent 19.8 per cent of remittances, while military personnel, who made up only 6.9 per cent of permanent migrants, contributed 22.9 per cent of the total value of remittances.

Almost all the remittances received were sent by sons or daughters of a head of household. Nearly 80 per cent of the income from circular migrants, on the other hand, was earned by heads of households themselves, with the remaining 20 per cent coming from sons or sons-in-law. Out of the total income from remittances and circular migration heads of households contributed 48 per cent, and sons, daughters and sons-in-law 52 per cent. The income from circular migrant sons is less than might be expected given the apparently high outmigration rate of males aged 15 to 25. Several village informants pointed out that although labourers in Singapore

\(^{13}\)Remittances include only income received from permanent migrants. Remittances sent by circular migrants are included in the income from circular migration.
Table 4.4
Annual income of households from commuters and migrants, 1976-77

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Talak and Periok</th>
<th>Sakar</th>
<th>Kedondong</th>
<th>Bayu Lala</th>
<th>Kubang Batu</th>
<th>Mean of 5 villages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per cent of households with income from</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>circular migrants</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Av. annual income of these households ($M)</td>
<td>1318</td>
<td>1053</td>
<td>1181</td>
<td>1461</td>
<td>1610</td>
<td>1325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income from circular migrants as per cent of total income of these households</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income from circular migrants as per cent of total income of all households</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent of households with income from remittances</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Av. annual income of these households ($M)</td>
<td>2814</td>
<td>4313</td>
<td>2976</td>
<td>1612</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>2729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income from permanent migrants as per cent of total income of these households</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income from permanent migrants as per cent of total income of all households</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent of households with income from commuters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Av. annual income of these households ($M)</td>
<td>1337</td>
<td>6831</td>
<td>5032</td>
<td>2575</td>
<td>1892</td>
<td>3533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income from commuters as per cent of total income of these households</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>51.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income from commuters as per cent of total income of all households</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of households</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Av. annual household income ($M)</td>
<td>1629</td>
<td>4026</td>
<td>1884</td>
<td>1663</td>
<td>2317</td>
<td>2304</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

could earn from $S9-$S14 a day, the cost of living and the temptations to spend were also high there, and some young unmarried men brought little of what they had earned back to the village. Furthermore, part of what they did bring back might be kept for their own personal consumption rather than contributed to household income. For such people, according to one villager, migration is for experience and enjoyment, and not a means to help the household economy. The best contributors to household income were married men with family responsibilities.

Table 4.4 suggests that circular migration and remittances are not significant contributors to total village income, and therefore do not help to relieve rural pressures, one of the items raised by Goldstein and noted at the beginning of this paper. They may, however, be important to low income households in enabling them to supplement their income from agriculture and local employment. Given the pressure on land resources, the unequal distribution of land and the low productivity of rice cultivation, the proportion of village households in North Kelantan with low incomes is relatively high (see Table 4.1). Table 4.6 breaks down the contribution of remittances and circular migration to household income according to the annual per capita income of the household, and suggests that circular migration affects a larger proportion of low income households (those with per capita annual household incomes below $M350) than higher income households. When income from circular migration and remittances is combined the data show that income from migration affects both a higher proportion of low income households, and forms a bigger percentage of their income, than for higher income households. For many low income households the income from migration is not only an important contributor to total household income, but is also often the main source of cash (the rest of household income largely consisting of subsistence production), and migration is therefore of crucial importance in enabling such households to pay for agricultural inputs and education, and to meet some of their living expenses.

The effect of migration on the relative distribution of income between households, however, is small. Table 4.7 compares the distribution of income between the sample households before and after including income from remittances and circular migration. The share of total income earned by all households going to the poorer three-quarters of households (poorer in terms of their total household income) is slightly increased as a result of the inclusion of income from migration, while the share of the richer one-quarter of households is correspondingly reduced. Similarly, the

---

14 In calculating per capita income children under 1 are given a weighting of 0, children 1-4 a weighting of .33, children 5-11 a weighting of .5, and children over 12 a weighting of 1. Temporary migrants are counted as household members.
## Table 4.5

Annual income from commuters and migrants by location, 1976-77

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Income from circular migrants ($M)</th>
<th>Income from commuters ($M)</th>
<th>Remittances received ($M) (%)</th>
<th>Location of permanent migrants (%)</th>
<th>Remittances sent ($M)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District urban</td>
<td></td>
<td>62700</td>
<td>2100 16.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kota Baharu urban</td>
<td></td>
<td>24420</td>
<td>700 5.4</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Kelantan rural</td>
<td></td>
<td>200</td>
<td>60 0.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanah Merah</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>2130</td>
<td>1200 9.3</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulu Kelantan</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>475 3.7</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terengganu</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>450 3.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pahang</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1925 14.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kedah/Perlis/Pulau Pinang</td>
<td>1676</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>700 5.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perak</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60 0.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuala Lumpur/Selangor</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2474 19.2</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>2635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negeri Sembilan/Malaka/Johor</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1048 8.1</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Malaysia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1080 8.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>14143</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>570 4.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60 0.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>18959</strong></td>
<td><strong>89450</strong></td>
<td><strong>12902 100.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>3685</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a Pasir Mas and Rantau Panjang.

*b The districts of Bachok, Pasir Puteh, Kota Baharu, Tumpat and Machang.

ratio between the mean household income of the top quartile and the bottom quartile of households is reduced from 8.4 to 7.4 by the inclusion of income from remittances and circular migration.

Table 4.6

Percentage of household income from migrants by per capita annual income, 1976-77

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per capita annual household income ($M)</th>
<th>0-249</th>
<th>250-349</th>
<th>350-599</th>
<th>600+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of households</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with income from remittances: No.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Av. per cent income from remittances:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittance households</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All households</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with income from circular migration: No.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Av. per cent income from circular migration:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant households</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All households</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with income from remittances and/or circular migration: No.</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Av. per cent income from remittances and/or circular migration:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant households</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All households</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Another way of assessing the contribution of the income gained through different forms of mobility is to examine the use made of this income. The survey contained questions on the use of the income from remittances, circular migration and off-farm employment (which includes commuting), and although these questions were not particularly well answered in two of the five villages some general comments can be made. Remittances were primarily used to meet general living expenses, but in some households were also used to pay for the secondary education of younger family members. Income from circular migration and from commuting was also primarily used for daily expenses, but the next most frequent
use of this income was to pay for tractor ploughing, fertilizer and other agricultural inputs, and a small amount of agricultural labour. Education was the third most important area of expenditure, followed by housing and savings. Most of the income gained through population mobility was therefore spent on consumption rather than investment, although a proportion was invested in agricultural production. A small part of this investment in agriculture can be regarded simply as replacing labour cost through migration, but for a number of low income households circular migration was the only way of meeting the costs of inputs in rice or tobacco production without going into debt, and was therefore essential to the maintenance of both subsistence and cash agricultural production.

Table 4.7
Income distribution with and without income from remittances and circular migration, 1976-77

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Households ranked by household income</th>
<th>Percentage share of total income earned by all households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Excluding income from migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First quartile (mean household income $M)</td>
<td>59.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5162)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second quartile (mean household income $M)</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1860)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third quartile (mean household income $M)</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1099)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth quartile (mean household income $M)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(613)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


To what extent does population mobility contribute to the more equitable distribution of the income generated in cities, another of Goldstein's questions quoted at the beginning of this paper? The fact that about 16 per cent of the total income of the survey households was derived from urban areas, both inside and outside Kelantan, suggests that population mobility does have the effect of redistributing income from urban to rural areas. However, the contribution of this urban-rural income transfer to income redistribution needs to be qualified in several ways:
a. Most of the urban income (80 per cent) was earned by a small number of commuter households with government jobs in nearby towns. The proportion of total household income derived from urban areas for all households other than commuter ones was only 4 per cent.

b. The income gained by village households from remittances is partly balanced by the cash and goods sent by village households to migrants, particularly to support children studying outside the state. While thirty-three households had a net gain from remittances, ten had a net loss. Table 4.5 shows that remittances sent by village households amounted to nearly 30 per cent of the value of remittances received, and because of the concentration of educational institutions in Kuala Lumpur the survey households sent more in remittances to Kuala Lumpur/Selangor than they received.

c. The net gain in income from circular migration is probably overstated, as it was not possible to take into account the capital taken by migrants from the village to pay for travel and their living expenses while looking for work.\(^{15}\)

d. Expenditure on school fees, daily transport, books, equipment and meals for students studying in nearby towns, in both government and private schools, also represents a rural-urban income transfer of doubtful long-term value to the village.\(^{16}\) Educational expenditure (less income from scholarships) in Pasir Mas town amounted to 3.9 per cent of the total household income of the survey households. Expenditure outside Pasir Mas district (or Tumpat district in the case of Talak and Periok) amounted to another 1.3 per cent of total household income, but was as high as 3.2 per cent in Sakar.

There are several other rural-urban income transfers which are difficult to quantify, such as reduced incomes as a result of

---

15 According to village informants migrants to Singapore generally took about $50 cash with them, plus some rice.

16 Whether expenditure on education should be regarded as a rural-urban income transfer or as an investment is debatable. It is true that better educated migrants are more likely to be able to assist village households with remittances in the future, but against this must be set the fact that not all migrants send remittances, the loss of potentially innovative villagers after their education, and the likelihood that many of those educated to upper secondary level may fail to find satisfactory urban jobs, yet will have received a largely academic training little suited to the needs of rural areas. See Essang and Mabawonku (1975:137-45), Odimuko and Riddell (1979:58-62), Lipton (1977: 231) and Rempel and Lobdell (1978:328).
labour shortages caused by migration, and the effects of changes in the rural-urban terms of trade. Consequently it is difficult to reach a firm conclusion on the contribution of population mobility to urban-rural income redistribution, but it seems reasonable to suggest that in general the gains to villages through migration to urban areas do no more than partly compensate for the losses that also result from this mobility. It is probably also true that, as Gugler (1968:483) has concluded for Africa, 'the development which migrant labourers bring to their host area is more substantial than the wealth they return to their home area'. This does not mean that mobility, especially circular migration, is not a sensible strategy for low income households, for whom at present it offers the best means of supplementing income and of supporting a more modern agriculture. What it does mean is that in relation to the development of the village economy as a whole the rural-urban interaction created by population mobility involves losses as well as gains for the rural area.

Other effects of population mobility

The discussion on the effects of mobility has so far concentrated on income flows between village households and migrants. This section briefly considers some other effects for which data are available from the survey, in order to provide a fuller picture of the impact of population mobility on villages in North Kelantan.

Household respondents were asked a series of questions on the effects of outmigration and return migration on their household and on the village. In Talak and Periok, where rates of migration are low, few respondents could identify any significant effects of migration, but in the other four villages several effects were noted. The broad conclusions that can be drawn from the questionnaire data, and from interviews with key informants, are:

1. Migration had produced a shortage of labour in Kubang Batu, Kedondong and Sakar, judging by the complaints of farmers. A few stated that their land could not be fully utilized because of the lack of labour, and others complained of the difficulty and expense of obtaining labour. However, this need not be interpreted as a negative effect of migration, as the increased opportunities for share cropping and agricultural labour available to those who

17 While 9.2 per cent of households said their income had increased as a result of migration, 5.8 per cent said it had decreased, and 16.4 per cent complained of labour shortages, particularly in Sakar, Kedondong and Bayu Lalang.

18 One rural-urban income transfer which can be estimated is the rent paid to urban landlords. Such payments were insignificant in four of the villages, but amounted to about 9 per cent of average household income in the fifth village.
do not migrate are positive benefits of mobility, particularly for low income households.

2. Respondents were unable to identify any ways in which the income from migration (including return migration) had been invested other than in agriculture, and no instances could be discovered of businesses started by former migrants with capital gained through migration.

3. Migration was considered to have produced some increase in knowledge and experience, but several informants pointed out that because most circular migration is to Singapore many of the skills learned there are of limited application in the *kampung*. The previously dominant seasonal movement to Kedah was possibly more effective in exposing farmers to new agricultural techniques, since rice farming in Kedah has been more advanced than in Kelantan, although respondents did not identify any such effect. One of the main innovational effects of migration, in fact, seems to have been to stimulate more young people to leave the village in search of work and experience, although there is no evidence that migration has yet become institutionalized to the extent that has occurred in West Sumatra (Maude 1979:45).

4. Community activities have suffered from the loss of young men, and in one village there were also complaints of a shortage of leaders.

5. There is some limited evidence of inter-generational conflict within families as a result of migration, especially where young men do not return to help in agriculture at times of peak labour demand, or do not contribute any income to the household.

The extent to which population mobility contributes to the development of rural areas through the introduction of new ideas, to note again one of Goldstein's questions, can be partly assessed by comparing migrant and non-migrant households in their behaviour over a range of items which may be considered to measure or indicate the acceptance of new ideas. Table 4.8 presents data on membership of Farmers' Associations, inputs used in rice farming, use of government advisory services, and attitudes to migration and family planning, and compares the responses of households who had either a current circular migrant or a head who had been a migrant in the past, or both, with households involved in neither of these types of migration. The table shows that there are few differences between migrant and non-migrant households in their acceptance of the items listed, and none of the differences are statistically significant (using the chi-squared test).

The material presented in this section is too limited to enable any firm conclusions to be drawn, but there is certainly no evidence to suggest that migration has played a significant role in introducing new ideas into the rural area, particularly ideas
that might help rural development. There are also suggestions of further negative effects of migration on village life, effects that need to be taken into account in assessing the overall benefits of population mobility.

Table 4.8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures of agricultural and attitudinal change by migrant status of household, 1976-77</th>
<th>Migrant households</th>
<th>Non-migrant households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per cent of households with a member of a Farmers' Association(^a)</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent of households using high yielding rice varieties(^b)</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>78.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean score on use of agricultural inputs(^b,c)</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent of households using government agency as first source of advice in rice growing</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>53.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent of households agreeing that migration should be encouraged(^d)</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent of households agreeing that family planning needed(^e)</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>54.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Excluding landless, non-farming households.
\(^b\) Excludes one village where lack of irrigation makes the adoption of high-yielding varieties difficult.
\(^c\) Mean number of agricultural inputs used out of a total of 5 items.
\(^d\) The question was 'Do you think that people should be encouraged to migrate from the village so that those who remain can have more land?'
\(^e\) The question was 'Do you think that family planning is needed in order to prevent a decline in farm size?'


Conclusions

The foregoing discussion suggests that income resulting from mobility is a major contributor to the economy of some households in North Kelantan, and a useful supplement for many others. It is also an outlet for a proportion of rural youth, who have been educated out of agriculture but not into alternative, full-time occupations. However, the net benefits to the rural economy as a whole resulting from mobility are relatively small, as the flow of
income into village households is balanced by a related flow of income and resources out of the rural area, most of the income gained from mobility is spent on consumption rather than investment, and migration does not seem to have led to any significant innovations. On the whole mobility has helped to maintain the village economy in the face of increasing rural pressures, and except for those households which depend on migration to pay for modern agricultural inputs, it has not produced any improvements in that economy. Migration has also not produced an increase in average farm size. This is partly because much of the migration from Kelantan is circular, and therefore does not permanently remove people from the village, partly because many permanent migrants were landless before migrating, and partly because of the sheer magnitude of outmigration needed to produce an increase in average farm size.

What are the policy implications of these conclusions?

a. The somewhat pessimistic assessment of the effects of population mobility on rural development above is broadly similar to the conclusions of Lipton (1980) and Rempel and Lobdell (1978). Mobility may assist some households to survive, but it is not a substitute for an effective program of rural and regional development.

b. An increase in the opportunities for Kelantan villagers to join FELDA land settlement schemes would enable more households to leave their village permanently, thus reducing the competition for land by those who remain. However, land settlement is unlikely to appeal to many younger migrants, whose job prospects outside their village might be improved by a more technically oriented secondary education. If outmigration is regarded by planners as desirable in North Kelantan, one of the most effective means of encouraging this is through the type of education provided in rural areas.

c. An increase in off-farm employment in unskilled and semi-skilled jobs within Kelantan would also benefit many households, and would help to maximize the income benefits of mobility while at the same time minimizing some of the negative effects noted in the paper. At present, however, district centres such as Pasir Mas are essentially administrative and service centres; they have few industries processing agricultural produce and almost no manufacturing industries.

d. The magnitude of the outmigration needed to increase average farm size is such that for the next decade or more the best that can be hoped for is to maintain average farm size at the present level. Rural planning in North Kelantan therefore needs to be based on achieving higher incomes from the present small farms, and improving off-farm income opportunities within the region.
e. Any restriction in the opportunities for circular migration will have serious repercussions on many households. Circular migration is of particular significance to low income households, and is at present heavily oriented to Singapore. Should access to Singapore be restricted in the future, or should job opportunities there for unskilled workers decline, this migration stream will switch either to other overseas areas of labour demand, such as the Middle East, or to areas within Malaysia. Migration to the Middle East from Kelantan has in fact already begun, and should it become a major migratory flow the effects on Kelantan will be considerable. Absences from the village will be longer, with consequent effects on agricultural production. On the other hand, the income remitted home by migrants is likely to be much greater than at present, yet unless schemes are devised to encourage the productive investment of these remittances, as has been the case in Turkey (Rempel and Lobdell 1978:334), such migration is likely to inhibit rather than assist rural development.19

19There are also dangers in becoming too dependent on a foreign labour market. See, for example, Birks and Sinclair (1979).
Chapter 5

Linkages, reciprocity and remittances: the impact of rural outmigration on Malaysian rice villages

Lorraine Corner

This study concentrates on a detailed examination of the processes of migration and of the processes through which its impact is felt on the community from which the migrants originated. It presents preliminary findings of a micro-level village survey, carried out in 1978-79, on the impact of migration in a Malaysian rural setting. This type of micro village study can make no claims to represent a 'typical' situation in a developing country nor, for that matter, can it claim to represent a typical Malaysian kampung (village) or even a typical Kedah double-cropping rice kampung. No attempt was made during data collection to construct a formal statistical sample from which valid statements applying to a more general population might be drawn. Special attention has been directed towards the economic and social structures within which migration takes place.

Research in the social sciences places great emphasis on the critical role which institutional factors play in determining both the form and the consequences of a variety of socio-economic processes. The advantage of the micro-level village survey as opposed to the more general sample survey is the opportunity it allows for a closer examination and appreciation of the local social and political framework within which processes are observed. Such a micro approach avoids the aggregation intrinsic in the sample survey, which assumes either a homogeneity of structural influences on all the elements of the sample, which is often difficult to justify, or the irrelevance of those structural influences which are excluded save in all but the most general aspects.

Avoidance of aggregation is both a strength and a weakness of the method. The major limitation of the micro-study is inherent in its uniqueness. The more closely the researcher delves into the structural elements of a particular community, the peculiar accidents of geography, kinship ties, norms, social or political networks which make it unique, the more he or she becomes convinced that the 'typical' village is a myth. The danger then is that the researcher may be overwhelmed by the individuality of
the study, unable to identify the elements of generality common to a wider milieu and consequently unable to offer insights of practical value to the policy maker who necessarily operates over broader horizons. It is therefore essential to refer the micro-level study continually to a general problem-directed, policy-oriented framework which will relate the specific elements of the village environment to local, regional or national issues.

In this study of rural outmigration the primary focus is the wider impact of outmigration on the rural community of origin and the implications of this for the development policies of the national economy, particularly for the goal of eradicating rural poverty. The study reported below can serve an indicative function only, pointing out topics which would require further investigation in a wider spatial context before policy makers could appreciate their importance at a regional or national level.

Although the economics discipline has strongly informed the theoretical basis of this study, an effort has been made to maintain a more general interdisciplinary perspective, recalling the observation of Simmons et al. (1977:9) that migration research has suffered from a narrow preoccupation with disciplinary concerns. A survey of the migration literature suggest that not only have investigators 'forgotten to ask the broader questions that cut across or escape conventional disciplinary boundaries' (ibid.) but also that the particular disciplinary orientation has sometimes tended to distort researchers' interpretations of their findings.

A two-way, interactive relationship exists between demographic change and socio-economic development, but researchers have often, for methodological convenience, adopted one of two approaches. The first, traditionally favoured by economists, has been to assume that demographic variables are exogenously determined and to concentrate on explaining their effects on the development process. The second, more often employed by geographers, demographers and the non-economic social scientists, takes the social and economic conditions of the area as given and proceeds to study specific elements of the demographic environment, their characteristics and the way in which they are determined. Such a division of labour is legitimate and functional to the extent that the complexity of the population-development relationship demands some degree of simplification to facilitate analysis. The pitfalls arise when the wider context of the particular study is lost from view, especially in attempting to assign cause and effect in order to advocate specific policy measures. The nature of their hypothesis predisposes those adopting the first approach to attribute causation to demographic factors while developmental difficulties are interpreted as effects (the kind of argument which identifies high rates of population growth as a cause of under-development), whereas those employing the second approach tend to seek sources of change in the social and economic environment (arguing, for example, that high rates of population growth
are a direct result of a particular set of socio-economic conditions). Reality encompasses both perspectives. The difficulty in distinguishing cause from effect is one of interdependence, the links between demographic change and economic development forming an essentially circular and holistic process, the elements of which cannot be simply or validly classified into mutually exclusive cause and effect categories.

Migration is one demographic process which reveals the intrinsic circularity of the demographic change-development nexus. Aspects of the economic environment, such as labour market conditions, which initially generate migration, may themselves be rapidly changed by the subsequent population movement which then becomes a factor in determining the form of those same economic factors. For example, a rural labour surplus may generate rural outmigration which then imposes severe seasonal strains on rural labour supply such that labour-saving agricultural technologies are introduced as an indirect result of the outmigration. General adoption of these technologies later precipitates a further outflow of displaced rural labourers. (This is a simplified but not inaccurate representation of a process currently taking place in parts of Malaysia's rice growing regions.) More immediately relevant to our present interest is the way in which current outmigration through its effects on the education of non-migrants and the quality of information available to them acts as a mechanism to promote further outmigration. An appreciation of the essentially holistic and circular nature of demographic-development relationships is another feature of the methodological perspective adopted.

Fieldwork was conducted in three rice growing 

Fieldwork was conducted in three rice growing kampung in the southwestern corner of the Muda River irrigation scheme in the north Malaysian state of Kedah between June 1978 and October 1979. Two of the kampung, Dulang Kechil (D.K.) and Dulang Besar (D.B.) are supplied with irrigation water from the irrigation authority, the Muda Agricultural Development Authority (MADA), which has overall responsibility for the agricultural and economic development of the scheme. The third, Sungei Udang (S.U.) is located on the margin of the scheme and is not officially supplied with irrigation water, although it was due to be included in the fringe area extension of the scheme by the end of 1980. However, during the survey period most farmers located there risked a second crop with the aid of the natural rainfall and, for those near the main diversionary canal which flows through S.U., supplementary water supplied unreliably by small government pumps operating on the tidal stream (see Map 2).

An initial census survey in June-July 1978 covered some 264 households in the three villages and the subsequent continuous survey studied 132-45 of these over the following 12-16 months (8 were lost through outmigration, 5 left as 'drop-outs'). A very detailed survey of income, expenditure and labour utilization
was made possible by the active (and voluntary) co-operation of a literate member in each household who maintained a daily written record of money income, home-produced and home-consumed income, cash and credit purchases and the work schedule of each household member of school age and above. These data were collected weekly by the research team over the full double-cropping cycle which ranged from an arbitrary calendar year in unirrigated S.U. (longer if households in S.U. also operated irrigated land elsewhere) to 16 months for a few households farming higher ground in D.K. where the off-season crop was particularly late. During the weekly visits additional information was gathered, including data on indebtedness, an inventory of capital equipment and major consumption stock, data on land tenure, rents, inheritance practices, cultivation techniques and a variety of other relevant institutional details. Households in the continuous survey were self-selected in that they volunteered to participate (without remuneration) and in that they did possess a literate member (often a school child) able to keep the very simple records required. However, a comparison between these participant households and all others in the initial census (which had collected demographic and economic data as well as the migration experience within the previous five-year period) revealed no significant differences between the two groups.

These procedures offered a number of advantages in relation to the study of the impact of migration. Initially the intention had been to prepare a detailed profile of those households which had experienced outmigration of some members during the preceding five years to be compared with the profile of households which had not experienced outmigration, the comparison concentrating on labour utilization and cultivation techniques. It was anticipated that participant households which subsequently migrated in toto would offer a glimpse of the profile of outmigration households (otherwise largely missing from our survey) as opposed to households from which individual members had migrated. As the fieldwork progressed, however, this comparison appeared less significant than the role of institutional factors. The emphasis was thus shifted from the original preoccupation with labour utilization to a broader concept of the impact of outmigration. In the detailed continuous budgetary survey which the fieldwork fortuitously adopted, all the advantages of a change in method were not properly realized until fieldwork had been in progress for some months. Nevertheless a data base was acquired which allows the solution of a number of problems.

Economic analysis of the impact of outmigration

Simmons et al. (1977:32) noted in their survey of research findings on internal migration that: 'research methodologies required for assessing the impact of population movements on social and economic structures in sending and receiving areas ... are not well developed', and that one of the greatest difficulties in
assessing the role of migration in rural areas arises in making an estimate of rural family income since home-produced and home-consumed items form a significant proportion of real income and defy accurate measurement and valuation (ibid.). Any comparison of money incomes between sending and receiving areas will be biased because of the under-estimation of real income in the sending areas vis-à-vis the receiving areas even if the latter are not urban areas, since the more developed rural areas are often dominated by commercial agriculture with a much reduced non-market income component. This would certainly be the case in Malaysia. The inadequacy of the data base also weakens attempts to assess the impact of remittances, since this depends so much not only on their size but also on the purposes for which they are used (ibid.: 34 and 60). Moreover, the significance of remittances in the total family budget is not simply a reflection of their size. This will be discussed below.

Economists' involvement in migration studies has frequently arisen from their concern to assess the net effects of population mobility on regional disparities in income and in levels of development. It is a concern currently shared by politicians and planners in most developing countries, including Malaysia. Does migration tend to reduce these differentials or to exacerbate them? This interest resulted initially in a preoccupation with people as a labour resource and migration as a flow of labour between economic regions in response to wage differentials. Classical economic theory adopted a rather optimistic view of the role of labour flows in reducing regional disparities. Labour could be expected to move from low wage to high wage areas, increasing the supply of labour and depressing wages there, and would decrease the labour pool in the low wage area with consequent pressure to raise wage rates in the depressed region. Capital would be attracted from the high wage economy to the low wage economy, producing further pressures towards equalization of wage rates. The differential, in the long run, would be eroded until there was no further incentive for factor movement and the efficient and harmonious development of the total economy would be assured. By the 1930s it was apparent that such optimism was not reflected in reality. Neoclassical theorists sought to account for this divergence of theory and fact. It was firstly noted that, contrary to the classical assumption, labour was not a homogeneous factor and that while spatial mobility tends to equalise returns to homogeneous factors residing in different areas it may or may not tend to reduce the differentials in per capita income between those areas (Okun and Richardson 1961:130).

A reduction of differentials depended on the income of the mobile factor in relation to average incomes in both source and destination area.
Furthermore, the fact that investment incentives were increasingly determined by factors other than labour supply and raw material endowments led to a more pessimistic view that migration might well be a dis-equilibrating force which would exacerbate existing inequalities. Proximity to the market was of growing importance, so that an area of low wages and out-migration, rather than being an attractive investment prospect was, in those terms, more likely to be shunned by capital. Similarly, there was growing recognition that migration was highly selective in terms of the characteristics of the migrant and that better educated, younger workers with more initiative were most likely to be attracted to high wage areas where their market potential was an obvious attraction to investors.

For a time the interest of the economic fraternity in migration per se became submerged in the development model building of the generation of macro-economic theorists who followed W. Arthur Lewis's (1954) pioneering work. Migration was only an implicit element of inter-sectoral labour transfers which lacked a specific spatial dimension, allowing the economists to ignore the established findings of the empirical literature on migration and to continue predicting the rural-urban (agricultural-industrial) flow of the marginal, unskilled, unemployed or under-employed surplus agricultural labourers. Since the validity of this assertion was not questioned, the impact of migration (the labour transfer) on the rural-urban development disparity could only be beneficial. Eventually, however, the thesis was questioned and efforts were made to analyse the regional impact of migration more closely.

An important contribution was made by the development of the human capital model (Yotopoulos and Nugent 1976:chs.11 and 13) which interpreted migration as an investment in future income-earning capacity from the perspective of the individual migrant, and the use of a cost-benefit framework (Sjaastad 1962:80-93). The human capital model provided a theoretical basis which accorded with the empirical findings to explain the selectivity of the migration process. The cost-benefit analysis suggested a useful approach, not only to the individual's decision whether to migrate or to stay, but also to the general impact of migration on source and destination areas. From the point of view of the source community or household, what are the costs associated with producing the migrant and the opportunities forgone as compared to the benefits which are to be gained by his migration? Assessment of the costs of producing a migrant is not conceptually difficult although actual measurement presents many practical problems. His absence as a migrant may produce both costs and benefits. Easiest to assess are the direct costs of the move, his transport and his support, if any, in the destination area until he gains employment. The opportunity costs of his move are more elusive. These may be a mix of the costs of his labour forgone (net of his maintenance in the household), his productivity and the effect of his absence on the productivity of other family and community affairs.
Possible benefits are even more difficult to evaluate. These may be direct and tangible, such as remittances. They may be indirect, such as an improved man/land ratio in the source area, although this depends largely on institutional structures and the migrant's role in the source area's economy. They may be intangible, such as the importation of new ideas, modern attitudes or new technologies, or benefits may lie in improved information flows regarding opportunities in the destination area. Alternatively this may be a cost if the net impact of outmigration is negative. A further complication is the question of the time-scale over which to weigh up the costs and benefits. The costs of producing a migrant, of feeding, clothing and educating him begin at the time of his birth or residence in the source area. The benefits accruing from his subsequent outmigration presumably continue for as long as he continues to return remittances to the sending area, or in the case of the more intangible benefits, for as long as he maintains influential contact with home. Attempts to measure costs and benefits of recent migration are apt to overvalue the costs and under-estimate the benefits, particularly in cases where present remittance flows may not be an accurate indication of expected remittance flows in the future, because the migrant has lived longer in the source region than in the destination area.

A more difficult theoretical issue confronts us if we accept the economic conventions regarding the utility of money. Macro economic theory maintains that money/resources possessed today are worth more to the consumer (have greater utility or use-value) than an identical amount received tomorrow and still greater utility than an identical sum promised further into the future. This arises partly because of the risk factor that tomorrow might not come or, even if it does, that the individual might not be around to collect, but more properly it arises because of the opportunity cost of the money/resources. Resources used to produce a migrant could have been used in some alternative way which would have produced a certain return. This loss of the next-best alternative return is described as the opportunity cost of raising the migrant. To measure the real utility of resources received at a later date, such as the benefits gained from migration, their value should be discounted by the alternative return which was forgone in rearing the migrant in the source area.

Conventional theory, however, makes no reference to the probability that next-best alternative investments for the resources involved would actually have been exploited. Observations suggest that the opportunity costs of raising an individual in a peasant society of the type with which we are dealing are relatively small since the resources so used would have yielded a very small actual return if employed in the kinds of alternative uses to which the peasant society would most probably have put them, in the past. The opportunity cost factor becomes more significant, however, as we move towards a modern market economy. The cost-benefit approach, therefore, is a useful point from which to begin a study of the
impact of outmigration, but the circularity of the migration-development relationship discussed previously must be considered, especially in any long-run assessment.

**Linkages**

Rural outmigration as we observed it in Kedah is very much a circular process involving a long and continuing relationship between sending and receiving areas. Outmigrants retain strong links with their home kampung and engage in a variety of reciprocal relationships with kin who remain behind. Much of the outmigration from the research area, particularly the household outmigration, is rural-to-rural migration focusing on destination areas in the southern less populous states of Johore and Pahang where the federal government is opening up large areas of land to new settlement under the auspices of the Federal Land Development Agency (FELDA) for the cultivation of oil palm and rubber by smallholders. Movement of D.K. families to FELDA settlements is a relatively recent phenomenon so that we could not find any FELDA outmigrants for longer-term comparison.

During the course of our survey four families in the continuous survey in D.K. were selected as official FELDA settlers and granted land on a settlement scheme. At least two other families from the same kampung but not in our survey were also selected and others had been selected in previous years. Their move was invariably a household (or family) migration since FELDA accepts only family units as settlers and sets fixed criteria for eligibility, which exclude large landowners. Such household moves were permanent, yet even these families retained strong ties with the sending area. (Some disgruntled settlers do return home after failing to adapt but we encountered no examples of this.) A few who owned small plots of rice land, and even two who were tenant operators, continued to operate their small rice holdings in Kedah, relying on wage labour, the assistance of locally-resident relatives and periodic return visits to organize transplanting and the harvest. Both husbands and wives are encouraged to work on the settlement schemes. Some obviously found small children to be a handicap and, particularly on some isolated schemes, felt schooling to be a problem for older children. In these cases the children were left in the care of relatives in the sending area until it was convenient for them to join their parents.

The strong ties between sending and receiving areas provided an excellent information flow back to Kedah on the type of opportunities available in the FELDA areas. This was particularly evident in D.K. which had provided a number of settler families. Other D.K. residents were very well informed about opportunities in Pahang and Johore, many had applications for settlement pending and at least one small farmer/fisherman was aware that selection was easier for registered residents of the state in which the
scheme was located. (Constitutionally, land is a state matter in Malaysia.) During a slack period he travelled roughly 500 kilometres to register himself as a state citizen in Pahang. Young men from a number of families periodically moved to FELDA areas to work as labourers, returning when their labour was required on the home farm or when they got homesick. While in the FELDA areas they usually stayed with relatives or former neighbours who now lived there permanently. Other individuals migrated permanently or semi-permanently to work in processing factories attached to the FELDA schemes. It was clear, particularly in D.K., that this information flow and the presence of friends and relatives on schemes was responsible for the keen interest displayed in FELDA settlement, the large number of settler applicants and the steady stream of individuals moving back and forth. The original out-migration of the first FELDA settlers from D.K. was a key factor in the subsequent outflow of other migrants.

The net impact of resource flows between the two regions is difficult to assess. As noted above, a small number of settlers retained an active economic presence in the sending area by continuing to cultivate rice land previously owned or rented there. There is no way of knowing how long they may continue this practice. To some extent it was clearly a question of hedging against the uncertainty of a new and unknown environment. If they found themselves unable to adapt they would be able to return little worse off financially. On the other hand these people grow rice because it is their preferred food and the settlement schemes grow only commercial crops. It may be economic to grow rice in Kedah rather than buy it locally in Pahang. It is only recent changes in technology, particularly mechanization of ploughing and harvesting, that makes this form of farming by remote-control feasible. With the exception of families caring for the children of FELDA settlers we found few examples of remittances sent back to Kedah from settler families although remittances from FELDA labourers and factory workers were more common. This is because new settlers are supported by a government-provided subsistence allowance and are not yet in receipt of the high incomes which can be earned on a mature scheme. In future years, as the rubber or oil palm begins to yield, the flow of remittances may well increase.¹

Settler families retaining an operating interest in land in Kedah and some of the individual outmigrants who moved on a less permanent basis (particularly the unmarried men) regularly returned during peak seasons of agricultural activity in Kedah to assist on the home farm and also to undertake wage labour, especially during the harvest. Transplanting is still to a large extent women's work, although this is changing, so there is less need for male

¹There is evidence from studies of mature FELDA schemes that a significant flow of remittances might be expected; see Cheong Kee Cheok et al. (1979:237) and MacAndrews (n.d.:285).
outmigrants to return. As there is an acute seasonal labour short-age in the region their return to some extent offsets one of the major negative effects of outmigration.

Apart from the special relationship between the research area and the FELDA settlements, similarly strong linkages can be observed between the sending area and other non-FELDA receiving areas, although these are more geographically dispersed and the linkages derive even more persistently from the personal connections of intending migrants and individuals in the destination area. As Lipton (1977:216) indicated, migration is 'epidemic'. Migrants learn from friends and relatives about prospects in other areas and are therefore more likely to be drawn from those families which already have outmigration members.

Very poor families are less likely to migrate, partly because of their greater difficulty in meeting the costs involved, and partly because of the paucity of their extra-village contacts. Such families are less likely to have formed extra-village marriage ties or to be able to afford to maintain social relationships with relatives or friends in distant places, involving such expenses as travel costs, income forgone during visits and the gifts which social conventions require the visitor to bring. Without such contacts in destination areas the would-be migrant must bear in full the costs of his accommodation and subsistence during job search and is much less likely to find employment in a society where personal contacts remain a major factor in getting a job. This is especially important in the case of the urban-bound.

Remittances

Remittances are one of the possible benefits of outmigration which are direct or tangible and therefore less difficult to assess. In our study, remittances were almost exclusively in the form of cash, rather than kind. Conceptually they are amenable to quantitative measurement. It is more difficult to assess their real contribution to total resources of individual households. For this, accurate records of all family income and expenditure are needed, including home produced and consumed items.

The survey attempted to collect such data and was probably more successful on the expenditure side than in measuring real household income. During data collection, whenever inconsistencies were noted between income received and the volume of cash outflow, attempts were made to uncover the reasons for the apparent discrepancy. These were not always forthcoming, not because of any desire to dissemble on the part of the informants but more often because they simply did not know. Our recorders were most often children or young women but the men of the household usually did the marketing because they had easiest access to transport. (Malay women rarely ride bicycles or motorcycles which are the
usual means of transport in the area.) The men appeared fairly
dependable in disclosing their expenditures but often did not think
to mention to the recorder if money was received. In some house-
holds this was relatively easily discovered if the interviewer
regularly met the man concerned during her visits. Reminded by
direct questioning there seemed no reluctance to disclose the
information. However, in other households, such as those of fisher-
men, wage labourers and bus drivers, men were rarely at home during
our visits unless, as happened from time to time we made special
arrangements to meet them for a particular purpose. Although the
recorder was asked to make inquiries regarding the discrepancy
she often neglected to do so; whether because of shyness or poor
memory was not clear. A couple of households which were families
of men with two— or more—wives provided special difficulties,
since it was not clear what income would properly be attributed
to which household.

Estimates of the amount of remittances received can thus be
subject to memory lapses, and other inaccuracies, especially when
based on questioning respondents at a single point in time about
receipt over some past time-period. Thus the estimates of re-
mittances gained in the income questions of our initial census
survey may understate actual amounts received.

A comparison between the number of households in the three
villages surveyed reporting remittances during the initial census
of June-July 1978 and the number recording remittances during
the continuous survey (August 1978 to October 1979) supports this
hypothesis. Of 264 households interviewed in the census 41 or
15.5 per cent reported receiving remittances of $30-$2400 per
annum, the median amount being $359. However, of the 132 house-
holds in the continuous survey 47 or 35.6 per cent record re-
mittances of $6-$2635 per annum with a median of $138, suggesting
that the smaller remittances are most likely to go unreported.

Table 5.1 presents a breakdown of annual remittances
received from non-resident family members during the continuous
survey while Table 5.2 indicates the pattern of monthly remittances.
The falling trend of average remittance income during the year
is related to the official abandonment of the previous off-season
crop due to a shortage of irrigation water. Data collection com-
menced with the sowing of the main season crop. The loss of the
off-season harvest had deprived households of a normal part of
their income. Drought relief provided by the government failed
to reach many households who therefore depended more heavily than
usual on remittances to finance both their subsistence and the
expenses associated with the main crop. The rising incidence of
remittances as the survey progressed suggests that in the early
months some smaller remittances were probably unreported.

Some measure of the qualitative impact of remittances is
needed, to assess their real impact on the receiving household
Table 5.1
Annual remittances from non-resident family members, three villages, 1978-79

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount received per annum</th>
<th>Number of households</th>
<th>Per cent of total</th>
<th>Cumulative percentage of those households receiving remittances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1-120</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121-260</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261-650</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>651-1300</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300 plus</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>132</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2
Monthly remittances from non-resident family members, three villages, 1978-79

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Number of households receiving remittances</th>
<th>Total amount received</th>
<th>Average amount per household</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1625</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1219</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>942</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1635</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1299</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>959</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1529</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13,480</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


and district and to indicate their significance in the cost-benefit comparison over time. Simmons et al. were clearly uncertain of their impact. They stated:

even less is known about how the remittances are used by rural communities... The money sent to the areas of origin by migrants does not necessarily contribute to the economic development of those regions. For instance, it is very
likely remittances are rarely used to increase agricultural productivity by the acquisition of modern agricultural equipment (1977:34).

On the other hand, in the same review they commented:

The income-generating effects of migrant remittances are also very widespread. Large enough amounts might be the main impetus for regional economic growth. They can be used for consumer goods or to invest in capital stock, such as modern farm implements, to raise agricultural production (ibid.:60).

The great advantage of the detailed budget data collected during the fieldwork is that they provide evidence of the uses to which the remittances are put and the general impact of remittances on the total household budget. The first thing to be noted, however, is that in our experience remittances are rarely regular, partly because many outmigrants from the research area have migrated to other rural areas where their employment is not regular. Remittances from urban-based migrants or those in the armed forces or the police tend to be received more frequently although even they are by no means regular.

One important preliminary finding seems to be that remittances are rarely used for productive investment in new agricultural equipment, etc. A household organizing a Kenduri Kahwin (wedding feast) would certainly rally contributions from outmigrant members, but a household in desperate need of a water pump to save the off-season rice crop would not think of soliciting contributions in the same way. Remittances when received are more customarily used for household expenses or, if these are adequately covered, for consumption expenditure related to the house and its contents. In fact it is often not difficult to detect the presence of an outmigrant household member in secure employment (especially police, armed forces, clerical, government servants or factory workers) by comparing the standard of the dwelling and its contents with the area of land operated and the regularity of other household income. Good indications of the role of remittances in household income where there was no resident member in permanent wage employment were modern furniture such as tables and chairs, both for eating and for entertaining (for most Malay families modern lounge chairs are purely items of conspicuous consumption since they themselves prefer to sit on the floor and the chairs are used only for guests), a television set (in S.U. where electricity was supplied) and almari (cupboards) displaying a generous store of crockery and knick-knacks. In these households it is likely that the modernizing influence of the values and consumption-oriented attitudes brought back by the migrants on their return visits were also a factor influencing the kind of expenditure undertaken. Apart from households with regular wage earning members in 'modern-sector' type employment, such as bus
drivers and conductors, other households on equivalent or higher levels of real income derived from more traditional sources were notably less devoted to this type of consumption pattern.

For the poorer families, however, the real significance of remittances was much greater, although the amounts involved were usually quite small and less frequent. This is suggested by a comparison of annual cash receipts and remittance receipts of households in the individual villages. D.K. reported a mean household cash income of $4063 per annum. Remittances were received in 28 per cent of households where they comprised 6 per cent of cash receipts. In S.U., where mean household cash income was only $3094, 50 per cent of households received remittances which contributed 16 per cent of their cash income. A few households were heavily dependent on remittances for cash: one with a cash income of $986 p.a. obtained 82 per cent as remittances; another on $1905 received 63 per cent in remittances and a third receiving $4163 p.a. in cash obtained 62 per cent in the form of remittances. The mean cash income for all households was $3779 with a range of $615-$14,723.

These families indicate the dangers inherent in using the quantitative measure of remittances as an indication of their qualitative impact on the household. Their experience also suggests the inappropriateness of applying simple discounting over time on the basis of opportunity costs in measuring the real impact of the costs and benefits of migration. Such poorer families were the small rice farmers producing mainly for domestic consumption and agricultural wage labourers operating little or no land, for whom life was invariably an uphill struggle and for whom cash was always a major constraint. Their cash income fluctuated greatly during the agricultural year. It peaked after the main season harvest with the sale of their 'surplus' padi (rice in the husk) for cash, although frequently they had to buy rice later in the season. Another possible source was the receipt of wages earned harvesting, threshing or transporting padi for other farmers. If their womenfolk engaged in transplanting for wages a minor peak occurred in the planting season but many women were so fully occupied in berderau planting on a co-operative, labour exchange basis to ensure that their own land was planted without the need for a cash outlay that they had little time for wage-earning. For the rest of the year cash income was meagre and uncertain, dependent on odd labouring jobs, such as weeding, spreading fertilizer or pesticides for larger farmers. There was also some additional income from fishing in season, unskilled building labour in urban areas, wage labour in distant places where the cropping cycle was different, etc. There were a few months in the dry season when the only cash income might be a remittance from an outmigrant son or daughter. Consequently the real value of a $20 remittance in such a month was very much greater than the value of $50 received immediately after the harvest and greater than the value to a more affluent family of a remittance of, say, $100. That $20,
assuming the family still had their own padi to eat, would be enough for survival. Similarly, looking at the long-term cost-benefit comparison, the value of that critical $20 remittance was probably greater than the value in times past of an equivalent amount of resources used up in raising the outmigrant who remitted the $20, particularly since the resources so used were probably home produced in an environment in which the pressures of the money economy were considerably less demanding.

This paper has emphasized the complexity of the network of inter-connecting links which make up the process of migration. The role of remittances and their effects on future outmigration must also be considered. Simmons et al. noted:

Remittances can also have a profound effect on further out-migration. In the case of migration to cities from agricultural areas they could lower the differential between rural and urban levels so that any incentive to migrate would be greatly diminished. On the other hand this extra income could be just the amount needed to push the rest of the family above the 'threshold' level and make them capable of surmounting the costs of migration (1977:60).

It seems, however, most unlikely that the flow of remittances could become sufficiently large to eliminate regional inequalities and the incentive for migration. In the long run this is clearly only possible if the secondary multiplier effects of remittances are sufficient to generate employment and income growth in the source area. There are few signs of this occurring in Malaysia. In our survey, remittances were found to be used more frequently for unproductive consumption expenditure with large leakages to the rest of the economy and to the international economy. On the other hand, there are signs that the extra income together with the indirect and intangible effects of the improved information flow, the establishment of personal contacts in possible destination areas, the opening-up of new horizons to minds formerly somewhat circumscribed by traditional, local boundaries, are acting to encourage the outflow of more migrants from the research area. On balance, it can be postulated that the indirect and intangible factors outweigh the significance of remittances in this process, although there are families for whom the role of remittances might be critical, such as landless families where both husband and wife labour unremittingly merely for support. Such families are unable to build up a migration fund but at the same time are the hardest hit by the introduction of mechanized agricultural technology. In the long run outmigration appears to be their only hope, yet without savings and with few extra-village contacts this also is currently barred to them. If one son or daughter is able to make the move their subsequent remittances and contacts may be critical in permitting the outmigration of this hard-pressed group, which otherwise faces a very bleak future.
Education is another route through which remittances have a concrete, although again an indirect, role in future outmigration. Remittances in a number of families are clearly a significant factor in the families' ability to maintain younger children in school to gain a better education. It is well established that, other things being equal, it is the better educated members of a community who are more likely to become migrants. This is especially true in rural outmigration, particularly in rural-urban migration, since rural employment enjoys generally low status and is considered beneath the dignity of the more educated. Furthermore curricula in schools seem almost totally irrelevant to the needs and concerns of the rural workforce or the rural community at large. As children climb the educational ladder their attention is inevitably directed towards the towns. In assisting the further education of children remittances act as a spur to future urbanward outmigration.

**Labour utilization and technological change**

At this stage of the research project, only a preliminary assessment of the impact of outmigration on labour utilization and cultivation practices can be given. A final assessment must await the processing of household work schedule data. However, it is clear that labour supply is a major constraint during seasonal peaks in demand and was particularly critical during the off-season harvest of 1979. This occurred because of a combination of unusual factors. In the first place it must be noted that mechanization of harvesting in the Muda region, although recent (within the last three or so years) has been remarkably rapid and a substantial proportion of that land which is capable of being mechanically harvested is now being so harvested.\(^2\) This appears to have resulted in very little directly observable labour displacement and small farmers, who are usually also wage labourers, and labourers seemed to have few complaints against the use of machines. The largest machines, employed on a contract basis, are in general use. Each requires up to eight men to handle the bags of *padi* during the operation and many who previously worked as threshers undertook this form of employment as a substitute. To the extent that the machines do displace labour, it is the labour of the women who formerly did much of the harvesting. Possibly the combined effects of outmigration and the noticeably reduced supply of female agricultural labourers entering or available in the market means that women wanting wage labour during the harvest can find enough on the land which is still harvested by hand. Better educational opportunities are making younger women less willing to undertake wage labour which they consider to have low status, and with rising family incomes both they and many older women, who worked

---

\(^2\)The latest MADA estimates indicate that 80-85 per cent of the total 1980 off-season crop was mechanically harvested.
for wages in the past, no longer feel compelled to contribute to household income in this way.

Another special feature in 1979 was the pattern of water supply. Because the irrigation supply had been almost exhausted by the prolonged inter-crop dry season the research district, the last area to be served in the scheme's timetable, received very little irrigation water. Farmers were obliged to wait for the first rains to begin planting. Instead of a staggered planting season as irrigation water reached different fields at different times, everyone planted as soon as the rains fell. The crop thus ripened simultaneously for all farmers in the district and all were seeking harvest labour at the same time.

The labour shortage was critical in the research area during the off-season harvest of 1979 and resulted in significant losses to farmers. The situation was aggravated by a serious shortage of diesel fuel in the state causing the mechanical harvesters to prefer to operate close to their home base and/or the supply of fuel. Contractors were reluctant to travel the longer distance to the area studied until they had exhausted all other work opportunities closer to fuel. Harvesting was delayed as farmers combed the state cari orang (looking for people) to harvest their crop or waited impatiently for the machines to come. Premature falling of the ripened grains occurred, significantly reducing yields. Many households, unable to wait, were forced to rely entirely on their own labour which, being limited, meant that the harvest dragged over two weeks instead of being completed in the more normal two days. Household members, especially women and youths, who usually did not undertake harvesting or threshing even on the home farm, were compelled to join in despite their lack of skill. The shortage of male members for threshing seemed particularly acute and it was not uncommon to see harvested padi sitting out on the wet stubble for days waiting to be threshed.

In such circumstances the loss of household members through outmigration was a serious loss, since many outmigrants were not in a position to return at short notice to assist at this critical time. The real cost of wage labour even for those able to find orang was significantly increased, not so much by a rise in wage rates, but because the employer had to bear the costs of transporting labour to and from distant places. A thriving business was built up by a few enterprising lorry owners who travelled to areas where prospective labourers might be found and carried a load of 15-30 people into a harvesting area and back again at night. (This practice was particularly necessary where female labour, for transplanting or harvesting, was involved. Practical and moral considerations demanded that the women return home each evening whereas male labour could be temporarily accommodated in the local area.)
The net impact of this situation on outmigration and the local labour market is difficult to assess. It is likely that this experience will provide an even stronger incentive to farmers to use the mechanical harvesters, particularly as a certain bond is established with the contractor and his local agent, who is usually one of the farmers in the locality, which places both parties under a degree of obligation to maintain the relationship in future seasons and gives those who have previously been customers an edge in any queues which might develop if similar conditions should recur. Undoubtedly the outmigration of actual or potential labouring members of a household is apt to force the adoption of the modern technologies. For some households with small holdings this may involve some hardship. If, in the past, household labour was sufficient to the task, the move to mechanization, or even to wage labour, imposes a drain on scarce cash reserves which might or might not be compensated by remittances. For landless families totally dependent on the wage labour of both male and female members a squeeze on income is inevitable unless wages move upwards and there will be pressure on these families to emigrate although, as noted previously, obtaining the wherewithal with which to move will be correspondingly more difficult. However, it is important to recall that social factors, in reducing the supply of female labour in the rural workforce, have also been important in forcing some of the technological changes involved. This is particularly the case in transplanting where there have been recent attempts, with rather mixed results, to introduce direct seeding, as opposed to transplanting, in an effort to bypass the bottleneck in obtaining transplanting labour and its high costs.

Policy issues

The more optimistic planners had envisaged that the outmigration of population from the relatively over-populated, land-scarce and impoverished rural areas would help to solve problems of rural poverty and regional inequality (Malaysia 1976:208 and Economic Consultants Ltd 1978:25). There are, however, indications that it may not prove a panacea. Although studies confirm that the move will be generally beneficial for the migrants themselves, their departure may produce 'backwash' effects which further disadvantage those who have not moved from the depressed region. With generally expanding prospects in the rest of the Malaysian economy this prospect is unlikely to create a demand for policies designed actively to discourage or restrict future rural outmigration.\(^3\) In the absence of compelling reasons for wishing to

\(^3\)In sit\textit{u}} development programs in Johore, Kelantan etc. may have the effect of reducing the incentives for outmigration (alternatively, they may actually increase outmigration by providing would-be migrants with access to funds for migration) but in the Malaysian context their primary motivation is poverty eradication rather than migration reduction and they are seen as complementary rather than alternative strategies.
retain rural populations in their present locations, the most useful strategy, should the findings of this study be supported by similar research in other rural communities, would require policies to minimize the detrimental effects of outmigration and to enhance the beneficial impact. Developing such policies is complicated by the intangible nature of many of the backwash effects and by the difficulty of identifying viable, appropriate targets for policy. It is not easy, for example, to conceive of policies that might effectively compensate for the declining quality of leadership, innovative management or entrepreneurial ability in depleted rural populations.

Two related target groups can be tentatively identified on the basis of the fieldwork reported above. The first comprises the small semi-subsistence farmers producing barely sufficient rice for their domestic consumption on uneconomically small plots of land and possessing no supplementary source of cash income other than rural wage labour. The predicament of this group has already been noted in several studies (Economic Consultants Ltd 1978). Their prospect of further economic deterioration as a result of general outmigration of others in the district is therefore worthy of particular attention. There is a real danger that these farmers, few in numbers but significant in both human and political terms, may become locked into a situation of increasing relative, if not absolute, poverty from which escape will become progressively more difficult. Characterized by their inadequate access to productive resources, especially land, yet tied to the rural economy by possession of tiny plots of land, the value of which might be difficult to realize if they migrate (Corner 1979), and by their lack of opportunities for migration due to paucity of knowledge, extra-village contacts, funds, etc. these families stand to suffer most from the backwash effects of outmigration. Usually unskilled and often older, with few employment opportunities other than traditional agricultural labouring, they will be hardest hit by the more rapid adoption of modern, mechanized technology which is at least partly a result of general outmigration from the rural economy. Simultaneously this erosion of their access to a cash income debar them from participating fully in the new technology to increase productivity on their small holdings because access to the new technology requires cash whereas access to the more traditional technology could be obtained through manpower, in their case family labour supplemented by deraulabour.

Caught in a two-way squeeze caused by regional outmigration, some households may also be further disadvantaged by the outmigration of their own members. Outmigration, whatever its impact on the non-movers, remains a beneficial strategy for the outmigrant.

A labour exchange which operates on a co-operative basis without payment of wages.
These hardpressed families, like others, face a general social responsibility to provide their children with an economic base from which to establish their own independent households. With household land resources quite unequal to the task and a deteriorating rural employment market, outmigration, apart from being a potentially remunerative strategy, may be the only option open to young adults not yet committed to the rural economy by responsibilities or property. However, their departure, while meeting the household's obligation to the second generation, imposes greater hardship because it reduces the supply of family labour and may prejudice the household's ability to maintain productivity even on the basis of traditional technology. This is most likely to be the case for ageing households. This prospective scenario of progressively deteriorating economic circumstances for a sector of the rural population already known to be at risk warrants further study and careful attention by politicians and planners.

The second target group which can be identified overlaps to some extent with the first but has a unique identity often not appreciated by planners. When a developing country first turns its economy on the road to modernization there will be a sizeable group of people who are not being reached by development assistance programs and who, for a variety of sociological and psychological reasons, are unlikely to be reached by additional or supplementary programs which might be devised in the future. It consists primarily of those who are poor in the quality of their human capital; the elderly, the infirm, the more tradition-bound and unprogressive whose attitudes and extremely circumscribed expectations are not infrequently the direct cause of their failure to benefit from government sponsored assistance programs. In a sense their impoverished position may be an unavoidable legacy of their prior deprivation. It may be too late to save these people from their fate, other than by direct welfare measures, but it is not too late to reach the children of such families. Rather it is imperative that the second generation be prevented from sliding into the same conditions of apathy, lack of skill, lack of education and lack of opportunity as the parents. Apart from their initial handicap, the parents are also likely to be amongst those most disadvantaged by the backwash effects of outmigration. It is therefore doubly important that their plight be recognized and positive steps taken to direct policy initiatives towards the second generation. In the face of a possibly stagnating rural population and limited opportunities for in situ development to provide employment, it may be that migration itself is the most likely solution to their problem. By improving the quality of their human capital, by education and health measures and so on, opportunities for the second generation to migrate will be enhanced. These potential victims of the backwash effects of migration may be saved by the same phenomenon that initially exacerbated their difficulties.
Chapter 6

Mobility in North Thailand: a view from within

A. Singhanetra-Renard

In recent years, a growing body of research on population mobility has questioned conventional concepts and their applicability to what field researchers have encountered in third world societies, arguing that they are built upon the experience of western society, where people readily change their permanent residence. Euro-American societies, states Chapman (1971:9), 'are mainly open systems ... where individuals or families shift successively from one domicile to another.' Third world societies, by contrast, are a 'closed or nearly closed system tied to the place of origin.' The significance of recurrent moves by people in such a system was well established at the International Seminar on the Cross-Cultural Study in Circulation, held in Honolulu in 1978, at which evidence was presented of circular mobility in various societies in Africa, Asia and the Pacific (Chapman 1978).

Within the past few years, there has been growing recognition of the importance of cyclical, short-term, and impermanent moves (Zelinsky 1971, Gould and Prothero 1975, Chapman 1976), but far less consensus of how these moves should be conceptualized in relation to the better studied phenomenon of migration. As a result, examinations have been made of impermanent versus permanent movement, circulation versus migration, and the intentions of movers versus non-movers. In all these studies, and partly to eliminate the ambiguity encountered on the ground, an arbitrary framework of time and space has been adopted to distinguish different kinds of movement.

More relevant to conceptualization is whether the criterion of the researcher's typology meshes with the indigenous one and what is the functional significance to the community or society of each type of move. Other considerations are how the people involved conceptualize their movement experience and whether they see the different moves made as discrete or mutually exclusive in terms of time and space. Hugo (1978b) suggests that the logical starting point for such questions is in the local concepts of
spatial mobility held by members of a particular society. Along this line, Olofson's pioneering efforts in Africa (1976, forthcoming a and b) illustrate that for the Hausa of Northwest Nigeria words and phrases, local expressions and sayings express the intrinsic meaning of population mobility.

This paper attempts to examine mobility in North Thailand from the viewpoint of the northern Thai (khon muang). It especially focuses on their own, or emic, classification and whether this contributes to understanding when compared with social science conventions.

Data presented in this paper were collected during fifteen months field research undertaken between February 1976 and April 1977 in Chiang Mai Province, northern Thailand. There were three major sites of fieldwork: Mae Sa village (15 km north of Chiang Mai), Chiang Mai city and other destination places of Mae Sa villagers, and sixty other villages in six districts bordering Chiang Mai city.

Greatest effort was focused on Mae Sa, a village of about a thousand residents, where eight months was devoted to collecting data at the village level. A combination of field instruments was employed to gather information on the individual, the household, and the village community through formal and informal interviews, questionnaire surveys, and participant observation (see Table 6.1, Stages 4-10). This participant observation was particularly crucial in attempting to understand mobility from the village standpoint. By residing in the village and participating in its activities, my assistants and I were able to gain considerable understanding of village ways of life, as well as of cultural and historical factors that influenced the villagers' way of thinking and shaped their modes of behaviour. It was through participant observation that I was able to guide discussions with villagers to provide indigenous words and phrases that point to their conceptualizations of mobility behaviour. Formal and informal interviews were later utilized to follow up such observations and to check the consistency of results.

Baseline, longitudinal and supplementary instruments were used to collect objective data in Mai Sa village. Baseline instruments included the household census conducted on 1 October 1976 and the economic survey (Table 6.1, Stage 5). Both de facto and de jure census enumerations were conducted simultaneously. Together, these provided information on absent residents and insights regarding the village view of temporary mobility. The census and economic surveys also served as a cross-sectional baseline for two main kinds of longitudinal data: the prospective mobility register and the life-history matrix survey. Village mobility was recorded during the eight months of research in Mae Sa (Table 6.1, Stage 4), as one means for resolving the problems of recall about short-term mobility. In combination with other data, this continuous
record made it possible to capture the full range of mobility from
daily travel to total displacement and to assess mobility changes
over time in relation to the socio-economic characteristics of an
individual, a household, or the entire village community.

A minimum time span of six hours was the working definition
of a move, so that not only could short-term moves be captured but
also an emic (inside) view of mobility could emerge. In such an
attempt, it was necessary to identify village mobility in terms of
local categories before examining its etic content—that is, the
time and space framework of social science conventions.

The historical perspective of village mobility was deter-
mined through informant interviews (Table 6.1 Stage 6), as well as
the life-history matrix survey (Table 6.1, Stage 9) originally
developed by Balán et al. (1969) and later used by Perlman (1976)
and Lauro (1979a). The latter method provides a means for collect-
ning a reliable chronology of an individual's mobility. Vivid memor-
ies regarding certain events in an individual's life recalled related
events, including mobility. Asking villagers about related events,
and not simply about movement, helped to recall short-term or short-
distance travels in the distant past. It also checked the reliabil-
ity of historical data obtained in other interviews and from the
accounts of travellers and missionaries to Chiang Mai in the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. This served to fulfil another
objective of this research: to examine continuity and changes in
mobility during the past three generations. Together with informa-
tion collected in Chiang Mai city and other field sites (Table 6.1,
Stages 1-3, 11-12), these sources formed the basis for the present
analysis of Mae Sa mobility.

Mae Sa mobility from the village standpoint

The vitality of Mae Sa village life, as reflected in the
mobility of its people, can be observed from an open bamboo liquor
stand in the compound of a Mae Sa residence next to the gravel
road connecting Mae Sa with the Chiang Mai highway. As early as
three or four in the morning, a village mini-bus passes, taking six
or seven Mae Sa traders, some with produce, to the Chiang Mai
markets. Not long afterwards, three or four women emerge from Mae
Sa carrying baskets suspended from shoulder poles. The baskets
contain eggs, vegetables or other produce, which they are going to
market in Mae Rim, the district seat. They will walk to the Chiang
Mai road and board a northbound mini-bus. At about 4.30 am, resi-
dents of surrounding villages begin to flow into Mae Sa to shop,
trade, and exchange goods in the Mae Sa market, which is open from
5.00 to 7.30 every morning.

1 Lauro (1979b) has further improved the computer analysis of the
life history matrix data, an area left undeveloped by Balán et al.
(1969) and Perlman (1976).
Table 6.1
Types of field data collected February 1976-April 1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Date administered</th>
<th>Type of instrument</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Information collected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Chiang Mai city</td>
<td>March 1976</td>
<td>Mini-bus survey</td>
<td>40 mini-bus drivers from 8 queues plying between Chiang Mai and 18 districts.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Chiang Mai city</td>
<td>April 1976</td>
<td>Employer survey</td>
<td>40 owner/managers representing major enterprises and industries in the city.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Chiang Mai city</td>
<td>May-June 1976</td>
<td>Employee survey</td>
<td>2% (161) of employees in formal establishments.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mae Sa village</td>
<td>September 1976 to April 1977</td>
<td>Mobility register (8 months longitudinal mobility data)</td>
<td>All 1039 Mae Sa de jure residents who move in or out of the village involving six hours or more. Any visitors who were present in Mae Sa six hours or more.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mae Sa village</td>
<td>October 1976</td>
<td>Household census, combination of de jure/de facto</td>
<td>226 household heads</td>
<td>Date present. sex, place of origin, distance from Mae Sa, objectives, duration of stay, means of transportation, relationship with Mae Sa people. Basic characteristics of all household members, including those temporarily away from the village (de jure), and visitors in the households at census date, 1 October 1976 (de facto). Information includes: name, age, sex, education, birthplace, marital status, occupation(s), present or not at date of census.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Survey Type</td>
<td>Survey Details</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mae Sa village</td>
<td>November 1976</td>
<td>Checklist</td>
<td>Selected group of informants from 3 different generations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Mae Sa village</td>
<td>December 1976</td>
<td>Agricultural survey</td>
<td>Agricultural household heads (150)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Mae Sa village</td>
<td>February 1976</td>
<td>Genealogical survey</td>
<td>Senior couples in each household</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Mae Sa village</td>
<td>March 1977</td>
<td>Life history matrix survey (retrospective-longitudinal mobility data)</td>
<td>Selected sample of three Mae Sa generations, 50 each</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Mae Sa village</td>
<td>April 1977</td>
<td>Land ownership survey</td>
<td>Household heads (226)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Chiang Mai city, miang villages, foothill settlements</td>
<td>April 1977</td>
<td>Places of destination survey</td>
<td>Mae Sa residents and migrants at destination places</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Districts bordering Chiang Mai city</td>
<td>April 1977</td>
<td>Circular mobility survey</td>
<td>60 kumnam (sub-district headman) for 6 districts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For those born outside: reason and date for move in to Mae Sa; for those absent: reasons for being away and date left for that particular reason.

Type of crops cultivated in what amount of land, land tenure status for each type of land operated: lowland rice-field river bars, foothill areas. Sources of family rice supply and cash income, livestock, housing conditions: materials, household material possessions, lighting, amount of donation for village temple reconstructions.

Change and mobility patterns in relation to the following activities: religion, trade and commerce, public affairs, education, and work.

For each major type of crop grown: amount of land, type of land, tenure status, yields. Agricultural calendar of each crop, number of labourers used for each stage in agricultural cycle, name and number of exchanged or hired labourers.

Number of marriage partners, their place of residence/origin. Number of children ever born, their place of residence and their marriage partner's place of origin.

Detailed information by year from birth till 1976 includes: life cycle and reproductive history, occupational history and mobility history, which focuses on where and when and how long each event took place.

Type and size of land owned, rented, shared. Method of acquiring them, from whom and since when.

Their objectives at destination places, when moved there, how. Type of economic, social, and cultural participation at destination and at Mae Sa. Their remittance, frequency of return, and attitude toward destination place.

Based on Mae Sa experiences, comparing circular mobility patterns in those districts for the three periods: pre-WW II, post-WW II, and contemporary.
About half an hour before the market closes, a large number of men and women, ranging in age from seven to forty, begin passing the bamboo stand. Most of them are walking as they leave the village, but some are riding bicycles or motor-scooters, while others are taking mini-buses or small vans. The youngest are school children off to school; the adults are teachers, construction workers, janitors and other workers travelling to their places of work. This flow begins to diminish about 8 am, but the road remains free of movers for only a few minutes. By 9 o'clock, another group are passing the vantage point. One member of this group is a family: husband, wife and teenage children, bearing bamboo baskets, machetes and other agricultural tools. The fact that they are dressed in old clothes and wear hats or turbans to protect them from the sun indicates they are going to foothill gardens, 6-10 km away at the base of Doi Suthep. Most of the group are walking but some are riding in buffalo carts. Instead of travelling down the gravel road, they follow a dirt track that winds through an adjacent village and emerges in front of an Army Husbandry Unit. After crossing army land, the villagers reach their gardens.

For the next few hours, the road in front of the stall is quiet. Occasional traders enter the village; Mae Sa residents, both singly and in groups, leave the village to visit friends, and some villagers go shopping or perhaps to a hospital in Chiang Mai.

In the afternoon, when all the people who left Mae Sa in the morning begin to return, the road in front of the stand is full once again. The first group, the market women who were the first to leave, return to Mae Sa about noon. Others appear from about 3.00 pm and, for the next two hours, most of the reverse flow moves past the lookout. School children pass and, later, tired-looking men of middle age return from work. Some of the men stop at the liquor stand for a shot or two of rice whisky before walking home the rest of the way. At about seven in the evening, the stream ends when all workers have returned home for dinner.

This pattern of mobility is typical for Mae Sa and can be seen, except for the school children and the few villagers with weekly jobs, on any day of the week apart from occasional holidays. On this day of observation, we have witnessed a cross-sectional view of Mae Sa mobility but have not in any way observed the total range of village mobility. Important moves that occur on a weekly or monthly basis would be missed and these would include meeting socio-cultural obligations, such as religious merit-making, and participating in life-cycle ceremonies like marriages and funerals. Circulatory moves which involve a long period of absence from Mae Sa, or those which are in the process of completion, would also remain undetected, as when Mae Sa residents work in factories, stores, or restaurants in Bangkok, as maids in Chiang Mai, as labourers in miang (tea) villages in upland areas, and as caretakers in lowland villages.
The meaning of absent residents

By themselves, a comparison of the *de jure* and *de facto* enumerations of Mae Sa, as of 1 October 1976, would lead to a conventional description in terms of the mover-stayer dichotomy. In this study, however, the local definition of village membership was adopted. Heads of all village households were asked to identify persons whom they regarded as members of both their households and of the Mae Sa community, but who were away and did not return on the night of the village census. By adopting this definition, local concepts of temporary mobility could be examined. Those absent at census night, according to Mae Sa villagers, consisted of those who *pái pái má má* (come and go, come and go). These absentees retain membership in the village, own or share ownership of its land, and keep their household registered in Mae Sa. These people maintain regular contacts with at least the rest of their household in Mae Sa and participate in major village social activities. According to heads of household, out of the 1,039 Mae Sa residents, 81 were absent at census time. The *de jure* census total for Mae Sa thus represented a 7.8 per cent decrease of the total village population. This group consisted of both males and females, ranging in age from 0-4 to 70-74, but the majority (76.3 per cent) were in the working ages between 15 and 49 (Table 6.2). Males outnumbered females by a ratio of 51:30. The large number of working-age absentees detected in the *de jure* count reflects the fact that permanent and semi-permanent employment are dominant reasons for movement (Table 6.3). Twenty-two men and eleven women, who were away for such reasons, were the better educated and engaged in government jobs as soldiers, police and teachers, or were children of poor or landless families and worked as housemaids, sales clerks and factory personnel.

Government workers were usually married and most left their families in Mae Sa, although some young wives accompanied their husbands and had their parents care for their infant children. Such movers often returned to the village to visit their families, from once a week for the workers in Chiang Mai to once a month for those in more distant provinces, such as Chiang Rai, Phitsanulok or Lampang.

It is clear that these absentees — who left their families behind in Mae Sa, owned or rented a house there, and had land — belonged to the village. Furthermore, most of these civil servants were transferred from one post to another every two to five years and usually their relationships with the people at their place of temporary destination was limited to the work place. The converse of this situation is exemplified by the Juvenile Court officials in Mae Sa who are at the Court's detention home. Villagers do not consider such workers to be fellow villagers and their only association resulted from aid in funding the renovation of the village *wat* (temple). All Mae Sa villagers who are serving the government and living outside Mae Sa maintain membership in Wat Mae Sa Luang.
(the village temple) and the village funeral association. In addition, their wives often act on their behalf in village meetings and activities. None of them has invested in houses or land at their destination places.

Table 6.2

| Age structure of Mae Sa population present or absent in the village and visitors present at time of census |
|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Number in given age group                        | Residents present (a) | Residents absent (b) | Visitors present (c) |
|                                                 | M | F | M | F | M | F |
| 0-4                                             | 33 | 37 | 3 | 1 | - | - |
| 5-9                                             | 47 | 65 | - | 1 | - | 3 |
| 10-14                                           | 74 | 59 | 6 | 5 | 2 | - |
| 15-19                                           | 68 | 58 | 9 | 1 | 3 | - |
| 20-24                                           | 42 | 36 | 10 | 5 | 1 | - |
| 25-29                                           | 34 | 45 | 6 | 4 | - | 1 |
| 30-34                                           | 27 | 24 | 3 | 1 | - | - |
| 35-39                                           | 32 | 22 | 3 | 1 | 1 | - |
| 40-44                                           | 33 | 27 | 4 | 2 | - | - |
| 45-49                                           | 21 | 23 | 4 | 1 | - | - |
| 50-54                                           | 19 | 20 | - | - | - | - |
| 55-59                                           | 14 | 11 | - | - | - | - |
| 60-64                                           | 11 | 12 | 1 | - | - | - |
| 65-69                                           | 12 | 11 | - | - | - | - |
| 70-74                                           | 13 | 11 | 2 | - | - | - |
| 75-79                                           | 5  | 8  | - | - | - | - |
| 80-84                                           | 2  | -  | - | - | - | - |
| 85-89                                           | 2  | -  | - | - | - | - |
| Total de jure population (a + b)                 | 489 | 469 | 51 | 30 | 5 | 7 |
| Total de facto population (a + c)                |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| Residents' absence results in 7.8% loss from de jure base. |
| Visitors' presence results in 1.2% gain from de jure base. |

Source: Household census, 1 October 1976.

Comparable to civil servants from the village are children of landless villagers, who also need to live elsewhere for employment. Teenagers dominate and they return to Mae Sa at the end of each month, bringing their salary or to participate in festivals and other social functions. They also maintain their membership in the village youth club. Though some live in Chiang Mai for three or four years, they maintain close contacts with others from Mae Sa and many have married fellow villagers.
Other groups of absentees consist of families of landless villagers, who own neither their residence compound nor agricultural land in the village. Their families have often moved to live temporarily on rented foothill gardens at the nearby army base or on lamyai (longan)\(^2\) gardens elsewhere in the district, for which they are caretakers. These families maintain membership in Wat Mae Sa Luang and their children attend the school in the neighbouring village of Mae Sa Noi, where they meet many children from Mae Sa. Teenage children of this group of landless villagers join the village youth club. All village families who live at the rented foothill gardens intend to stay there only temporarily. All hope to be able to accumulate enough money to buy a piece of land in Mae Sa where they can build a house. During the research period, one such family was able to return to Mae Sa. This family with five children had lived in the foothill gardens for six years. After returning to the village, they continued to work on their foothill gardens through daily commuting.

Table 6.3

**Reasons for absence, de jure population by sex, 1 October 1976**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Active movers</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foothill gardening</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caretakers of orchards</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>miang (tea) production</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schooling</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage work</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative business</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visit kinsmen</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Become a monk</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical care</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>46</strong></td>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
<td><strong>71</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Passive movers</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accompanying other persons</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born outside village</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Household census, 1 October 1976.

Most absentee Mae Sa residents lived near Mae Sa. Sixty-four per cent (52) of these movers were within 19 km of Mae Sa while only 21 per cent (15) lived more than 300 km away. As with the absent villagers working as housemaids in Chiang Mai city, most of them wanted to stay close to Mae Sa so they could maintain regular contacts with their families and friends.

\(^2\)Lamyai is *Nephelium longanum*, a lychee-like evergreen fruit tree.
Fig. 6.1 Age and sex structure of movers and stayers of Mae Sa, 1976–77. (Source: Mobility register, September, November 1976, January, March 1977.)
Movers versus stayers

Although there was a fair number of Mae Sa residents absent according to the de jure/de facto census, these eighty-one absent residents comprise only a tiny fraction of Mae Sa villagers who move daily past the village liquor stand. Data from the mobility register show that 64.3 per cent (668) of the 1,039 de jure residents made moves in the four months selected in this analysis (Fig. 6.1). A total of 3,975 moves were made. Table 6.4 shows that 96 per cent of these moves were daily, and were at least in part by mini-bus along the recently improved transportation network of Chiang Mai Province. Males were more mobile than females as 68.5 per cent of village males made moves, compared to 59.7 per cent of females. Among the village males, practically all age groups between 5-9 and 65-69 were highly mobile with more movers than stayers in each of these age groups. Men between 30 and 39 years of age were the principal labourers in village fields and, thus, slightly less mobile than other age groups. Most men reduced their mobility after marriage. Many young husbands who had worked in construction or other outside occupations gradually settled down to take up agricultural occupations, when possible, in Mae Sa. This was encouraged by the custom among northern Thai parents of giving married sons a share of the family's rice farming responsibilities to help him start his family. Village men of these age groups also usually stayed behind to tend their fields while village youth and the elderly moved for socio-cultural events. Among village women, the newlyweds were also less mobile. After marriage, young girls often quit outside jobs and begin trading or farming with their husbands. When the wives begin having children they grow even less mobile, being tied to the village to raise their family. As a result, only 48.8 per cent of village women aged 20-24 were movers compared to 80.6 per cent in the 15-19 age group. This latter group, the most mobile female age group, was eager to be free of traditional restraints, to see places outside Mae Sa, and to be free to find outside jobs and to participate in socio-cultural events outside Mae Sa. Teenage girls also enjoyed having extra cash to buy personal luxuries, such as fashionable clothing and cosmetics, although this was realizable only for children of rich parents. The money raised by teenage daughters of poor families contributed a significant part of the family income and little remained for these girls to use for personal luxuries. Young unmarried girls were also more mobile because they realized that after marriage their freedom of movement would be curtailed.

Women in the older age groups were less mobile compared to men of the same age. From the 55-59 group the percentage of female movers declined significantly and declined again past 74. Older village men remained active collecting forest products as well as participating in merit-making functions between villagers. Grandfathers were more active in visiting grandchildren in other villages or provinces than grandmothers. The older village women
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destinations of Mae Sa residents, by duration of moves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6-24 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiang Mai province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within tambon Mae Sa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Mae Rim district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiang Mai city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsewhere in Chiang Mai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Northern provinces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Central provinces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Central provinces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 7,619 | 197 | 62 | 22 | 1 | 7 | 1 | 26 | 7,935 | 100.0 |

| per cent | 96.0 | 2.5 | 0.8 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 100.0 |

Source: Mobility register, 1976-77.
usually preferred to stay home and enjoy having their children and grandchildren visit them.

Historical and cultural background of Mae Sa mobility

An investigation of Mae Sa mobility in the past has shown that as socio-economic changes have transformed Mae Sa village from traditional to contemporary society, village mobility has also changed in pattern, scope and intensity, but remained constant in form. For example, the most important circulatory moves for raising cash in traditional times, for wage work in *miang* (tea) gardens, for engaging in *miang* production, and for caravan trading, have disappeared or been greatly reduced in intensity. New types of circulatory moves for raising cash, for trading in Chiang Mai markets, for professional or government employment, or for wage work in the city have become popular and replaced the older patterns. Similarly, there have been circulatory moves for socio-cultural purposes from traditional to contemporary times that remained constant in form yet changed in scope. The availability of auto transport and a greatly improved road network have facilitated a wider field of contact. The predominance of male migration continued with the persistence of northern Thai matrilocal residence customs, although in some contemporary cases, economic necessity has forced female marriage migration. New patterns of movement have developed as northern Thai society has developed in the twentieth century, and there is now moderate movement to schools and hospitals outside of Mae Sa. One change partially attributable to movement for health care was increased population in the village.

When there was no additional land for utilization as rice fields in Mae Sa, some villagers in the mid-twentieth century moved permanently to find agricultural land outside the village. As the population in more remote areas of North Thailand increased, unoccupied areas for growing rice became unavailable and permanent moves for agricultural land ceased in the 1970s. Instead, in the one case where the movement form changed, villagers who could not find land on which to grow rice in Mae Sa resorted to circulatory moves for foothill gardening or taking care of orchards for absentee owners.

Contemporary Mae Sa mobility patterns thus show, in spite of many changes in pattern, a remarkable endurance of circular mobility (Table 6.5). Traditional Mae Sa mobility, which was very often circular, was part of the life of Mae Sa people as much as growing rice. It was through mobility that Mae Sa villagers earned cash for consumer goods and taxes, fulfilled socio-cultural commitments, became resourceful, found pleasure and established families.

As suggested above, these moves were predominately non-permanent. Freeman (1910:93) noted the same phenomenon when he wrote 'the longing for his own village, no less strong than a
Table 6.5

Relative importance of Mae Sa movement,\(^a\) 1870-1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Circulatory</td>
<td>1. <em>Miang</em> wage work</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. <em>Miang</em> production</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Caravan trading</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Chiang Mai market trade</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Socio-cultural</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent</td>
<td>6. Marriage</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circulatory</td>
<td>7. Chiang Mai wage work</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. School/hospital</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. Professional/Gov't employment</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent</td>
<td>10. Agricultural land</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circulatory</td>
<td>11. Foothill/lamyai orchard</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scale: 0 = Unimportant or non-existent
1 = Infrequent
2 = Moderate
3 = Extensive

\(^a\)As compared within the same group in different periods and between groups in the same period.

**Source:** Mae Sa mobility study, 1976-77.
desire to see the world, draws the Laos [northern Thai] back to his native hills'. Mae Sa villagers proved no different from Freeman's characterization. First, Mae Sa residents in the traditional period valued the experience of mobility. It was through mobility that a northern Thai became resourceful and learned about places and other people's ways of life. One standard of men's knowledge in traditional times was his knowledge of other places. As an old Mae Sa villager put it, 'koei pai ki ban ki muang' (how many villages and towns a person has been to) is an important factor in later life. Mobility also gave the movers the chance to know other people and make contacts on which they might be able to depend in later life. By participating in caravan travel, for example, a young man could show that he was skillful and courageous and Mae Sa villagers remember that parents wished their daughters would marry such a young man. Villagers regarded a man as ignorant and cowardly if he never went out of the village. Moerman (1975: 167) could very well have described Mae Sa villagers when he wrote 'that although caravan trading contributed some investment capital, a more important source was the adventures in trade when young men ... [travelled] into alien lands'.

While the villagers valued mobility experience, they also were attached to their territorial group. No matter how long a person was away from Mae Sa, he would alai ha ban (long for home) and hope eventually to return to the village. This sentiment was rooted in the village birth practice, in which the umbilical cord was buried beneath the parents' house steps, as a symbol of the individual's attachment to his or her village.

These contrasting values, of mobility experiences and attachment to territorial group, have shaped the mobility behaviour of the Mae Sa people. Non-permanent and circular forms of movement predominate and the Mae Sa people are a mobile population. This is not unlike the view of Bonnemaision (forthcoming) who noted for the Melanesians that their mobility behaviour was a compromise between territorial fixation and pressures and attractions of an external and economic social space.

Thus, whenever possible, the mobility behaviour of Mae Sa people operates from the village point of reference. Unless a villager establishes a new identity with another territorial group, such as through marriage, he will not risk abandoning this point of reference. It is for this reason that circular mobility and the bonds between Mae Sa village and its people endure despite transformations of village society. As a result, even changes in the scale and intensity of movement have not destroyed the traditional relationship between people and their home community.

The meaning of home place and outside places

For Mae Sa villagers the village is significant as the place where they belong and which belongs to them; it is more than simply
the location of their house. It is the centre of intimate social relationships rooted in kin and communal life. When the villagers call themselves *khon Mae Sa* (Mae Sa people) or *luk nam Mae Sa* (children of the Mae Sa River), they are saying more than that they are residents of the place. They are actually saying that this is where they belong because they were *koet ni* (born here), *pen ni* (grew up here), and *hok fang ni* (their umbilical cord is buried here). These villagers live in Mae Sa with their families, own a house and sometimes land, belong to the village *wat*, the funeral association, the irrigation association, the youth club perhaps, exchange labour groups, and through these enjoy social relationships and security and owe obligations and commitments.

Mae Sa people take pride in enhancing the reputation of Mae Sa. The village youth club enters dance competitions at various temple fairs in part to make Mae Sa famous. The effort to rebuild the village temple was also motivated by the villagers' desire to add to the prestige of Mae Sa. At other times, pride in the village was expressed in hostile terms, such as when fights broke out between Mae Sa boys and those from elsewhere over village girls. Village boys almost always defended their fighting because it sought to uphold the Mae Sa name. Potter (1976:35) rightly observed, 'Village identity is an important aspect of social identity in the countryside and to say that a person is from ... [a given village] is to say something important about him'.

The sense of village identity is rooted in Mae Sa kinship ties by which almost everyone is related by consanguineal and affinal ties of diverse variety. Out of 213 married couples in Mae Sa in 1976, only 24 had both the husband and wife from outside Mae Sa. The remaining 189 (88.7 per cent) either married within the village or brought their marriage partner to live in Mae Sa. Villagers, not surprisingly, consider Mae Sa as a greatly expended kin unit. They talk about all villagers as *phi nong kan* (consanguineal) or *dong kan* (affinal) or *phi dio kan* (of the same matri-lineal spirit group). It is a part of being so related for villagers to visit and help at marriages, funerals, ordinations and other such events. At times of illness, scandal or other unfortunate occurrences, one's uncles, aunts and cousins offer support.

Not all of the needs, wants and aspirations of the villagers, however, can be met in Mae Sa. Some villagers might be seeking a piece of agricultural land, while others are hoping for employment – wage labour, governmental or professional – and others might be needing medical or educational services. Other villagers might be wanting to find new experiences, marriageable men or women, entertainment, or to fulfil socio-cultural commitments.

In addition to security associated with territorial groups, access to land is the most important complementary aspect of Mae Sa village to its residents. One important cultural heritage of the people of Mae Sa is their attachment to land. Villagers are
willing to work a small piece of land and to harvest small amounts of rice rather than to adopt other occupations completely. Although many families own no rice land or not enough to be able to support themselves, rice farming is still the preferred primary occupation for all villagers except for those with professional training. Mae Sa villagers characterize rice farming as *aship itsata* (independent occupation) which enables them to be their own boss. Rice farmers also take pride in belonging to the tradition of *ban mi yu*, *khao mi kin* (a house to live in and rice to eat). Population pressure on land resources, though, has resulted in many Mae Sa villagers not having enough rice land. Although the practice of exchange labour and the choice of earning wage labour in kind has helped landless families to have rice to eat, Mae Sa families need to seek cash income available outside the village in order to buy the additional rice.

Regardless of the difficulty poorer village families are facing in earning a living, the village way life, is viewed as an asset by Mae Sa villagers, contrary to the 'bright lights' theory of rural-urban migration. They believe that village life is *mu'an* (pleasurable) and this is founded in security associated with kin relationships and communal activities. When everyone in the village is tied to each other by affinal and consanguineal links, the villagers are able to find great emotional comfort from their fellow villagers with whom they belong to *mu hao an diao kan* (one and the same group) or *mu hao chao ban Mae Sa* (we, the people of Mae Sa). Traditional North Thai sayings, like 'phik mi huan nua, kua mi huan tai' (chili from the north house, salt from the south house), illustrate the value placed on the interdependence and generosity the villagers can find in Mae Sa.

Communal activities such as merit-making occasions and agricultural exchange labour are other *mu'an* aspects of village life. These occasions also give villagers an opportunity to show off, to flirt and to be active members of the village. Villagers who have lived in cities also find the village environment an asset when compared to the 'noise' and 'hot weather' of 'busy' Bangkok. By contrast, the village environment is *mu'an hu*, *mu'an chat* (pleasing to the ear, pleasing to the heart) and *dak hu yen chat* (quiet to the ear and cool for the heart). To live in the village in their own home (*yu ban hao*) is also *mu'an chat* because the villagers can do what they wish without having to feel *keng chat*, the fear or feeling of diffidence that they would be offending someone else. Out of *keng chat*, villagers do not like to live in other people's houses, saying that *yu ban poen bo mu'an* (it's not fun to live in others' houses).

With all the advantages of Mae Sa, there are disadvantages, notably the lack of cash income opportunities and the shortage of agricultural land. Similarly, skilled workers in Mae Sa, carpenters, watch and radio repairmen and so on, cannot make enough money by catering only to fellow villagers. Governmental enterprises and
services, education and medical care, for example, tend to be centred in urban areas. All the villagers are disadvantaged by the lack of local opportunities and are quite apt to move to take up those in places outside the village.

Figure 6.2 shows the complementarity between Mae Sa and destination points. The recently developed cheap public transportation system has facilitated daily trips by Mae Sa residents to complementary places outside the village. Situation changes may, however, result in decreasing complementarity. For example, during the harvesting season in Mae Sa, the availability of rice or cash earning opportunities in the village make wage labour in Chiang Mai unattractive. In such cases, villagers stop their movement for employment outside Mae Sa because the same income can be earned in the village.

In the same way, Mae Sa village ceases to complement the destination place, and circular movement decreases as the mover gradually shifts to the destination place. This occurs when a male villager marries someone outside the village and, in that way, becomes involved in social relationships and obligations which replace those in Mae Sa in importance. As the mover becomes increasingly involved in activities at the destination, his visits to Mae Sa decline in frequency and he gradually withdraws from Mae Sa life.

The Mae Sa experience has shown that places complementary to the village are not limited to urban areas but include a wide variety of locales, ranging from foothill gardens, to upland miang villages, to Bangkok. However, reciprocal movement occurs only where transferability, which includes time, cost and distance, facilitates such movement. This is evident in the short distances of most Mae Sa moves. Still, new opportunities can stop or change the direction of existing reciprocal flows, as during the harvesting season.

Emic classification of spatial mobility

This examination of Mae Sa conceptualization of village movement owes much to Olofson's theories (1976, forthcoming a and b) of indigenous conceptualizations of movement as embedded in their language. In Mae Sa, it was found that the critical criterion of the villagers' conceptualization of movement is in the nature of relationships the movers have towards their home community and is expressed through social and economic commitments and involvements. This holds true no matter for what reasons the movers left, for whatever destinations, and for however long they stayed out of Mae Sa village, and applies to either sex.

The indigenous Mae Sa typology of mobility distinguishes three major forms of population movement: (1) when movers maintain
Complementary characteristics of Mae Sa
- territorial group
- family and kin
- house and/or land
- way of life
- natal village
- agricultural works
- security
- social obligations
- common values and beliefs

Complementary characteristics of destination place
- wage employment
- agricultural land
- professional employment
- service facilities, e.g. education, health care
- entertainment
- potential marriage partner
- forest products
- new experiences
- trade
- kinfolk
- freedom from traditional restrictions

Alternative opportunity

Within Mae Sa
No circulation

Outside Mae Sa
Alternative Destination

Transferability:
Time cost and/or distance

Circular mobility

Fig. 6.2 Complementarity and circular mobility
### Table 6.6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of move</th>
<th>Western terminology</th>
<th>Comparable local terminology</th>
<th>Level and type of commitment as defined by involvement with:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>a. Mae Sa community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Circular</td>
<td>- Commuting (Hugo 1975b, Mantra 1978)</td>
<td>No specific terms. Movers are said to simply 'go' to undertake some specific task e.g. pai aeo (go to have fun), pai aeo ha (go to visit), pai key miang (go to pick tea), pai key lamjat (go to pick longan fruit), pai kahm nyan (go to construction work). When the task is implicit in the destination, the place is instead specified e.g. pai hong hean (go to school), pai phae (go to the forest).</td>
<td>As any regular member of the community, with total and full commitment to the village. Maintain an on-going relationship with all fellow villagers. Belong to formal and informal village organizations e.g. the temple, funeral, irrigation, young people's, and exchange labour associations. Participate in all village socio-cultural activities e.g. merit-making ceremonies, funeral, marriage, house warming. Take part in village decision making, regularly attend monthly village meeting. Own house and/or land in the village. Family is in village.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. Destination community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not member of the community, and no commitment. Very limited interaction with people of the community and only for specific purposes. Belong to none of the community organizations. Own no house or land. Unaccompanied by family. Reference to time range in 1977 - regular: daily/weekly - periodic: daily - 3 months - seasonal: daily - 5 months Reference to area range in 1977 - neighbour village - Central provinces - lowland - upland areas - rural - Bangkok Metropolitan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Kinds of move:
- daily/weekly journey to work, school, trade
- periodic/seasonal wage work, collecting/gathering
- periodic religious, kin, hospital visits, entertainments

### B

- Circulation (Chapman 1970, Bedford 1973, Gould and Prothero 1974, Hugo 1975b, Mantra 1978) pai pai ma ma (come and go, come and go) is often used to describe the movement of village members who live outside the village but often return for visits. Some other phrases are also used to describe this type of move by referring to its objectives e.g. pai kah swam miang (go to think out miang garden production). An absent member of the community. Unable to maintain an ongoing relationship with all fellow villagers, except immediate family. Maintain links with the community by returning to participate in major merit-making ceremonies and familial rites. Destination place becomes temporary residence. Housing arrangement is usually provided: some rent, few own. Does not join the community organizations, though may participate casually. Socially and economically interact with people of the community,
Kinds of move: - governmental/professional employments
- professional training or schooling
- foothill settlement/longan orchard care-taking
- factory works, housemaids, salesclerks.

C
Linear
- Migration
  pai pen taharn (go to be a soldier),
  pai hean nang sue (go to study)
  pai pen luk jang (go to be a hired child nurse, housemaid),
  pai sau suan lamyai (go to care for the longan garden).
  pai pen khan wiang etc. (go to become city folk etc.).

Kinds of move: - marriage
- adopted into family
- run away

pai pen taharn (go to be a soldier),
pai hean nang sue (go to study)
pai pen luk jang (go to be a hired child nurse, housemaid),
pai sau suan lamyai (go to care for the longan garden).

Most movers keep families in the village, and maintain strong ties through exchange visits, remittances, goods.

Those who are accompanied by families continue to maintain household registration in the village.

Invest in land or house in the village.

Interest in improving social and economic status of family or self in the village community.

Inactive in village decision making, and organizations.

but mostly within the confines of work circles.

Reference to time range in 1977:
- one week - 16 years

Reference to area range in 1977:
- neighbour village - Central provinces
- foothills
- rural-urban centres

Kinds of move: - marriage
- adopted into family
- run away

pai pen taharn (go to be a soldier),
pai hean nang sue (go to study)
pai pen luk jang (go to be a hired child nurse, housemaid),
pai sau suan lamyai (go to care for the longan garden).

Most movers keep families in the village, and maintain strong ties through exchange visits, remittances, goods.

Those who are accompanied by families continue to maintain household registration in the village.

Invest in land or house in the village.

Interest in improving social and economic status of family or self in the village community.

Inactive in village decision making, and organizations.

but mostly within the confines of work circles.

Reference to time range in 1977:
- one week - 16 years

Reference to area range in 1977:
- neighbour village - Central provinces
- foothills
- rural-urban centres

Kinds of move: - marriage
- adopted into family
- run away

pai pen taharn (go to be a soldier),
pai hean nang sue (go to study)
pai pen luk jang (go to be a hired child nurse, housemaid),
pai sau suan lamyai (go to care for the longan garden).

Most movers keep families in the village, and maintain strong ties through exchange visits, remittances, goods.

Those who are accompanied by families continue to maintain household registration in the village.

Invest in land or house in the village.

Interest in improving social and economic status of family or self in the village community.

Inactive in village decision making, and organizations.

but mostly within the confines of work circles.

Reference to time range in 1977:
- one week - 16 years

Reference to area range in 1977:
- neighbour village - Central provinces
- foothills
- rural-urban centres
an on-going relationship with the rest of the village community, their social and economic obligations and commitments are totally with the village as that of any other village member; (2) when movers are unable to maintain on-going relationships with the rest of the community except their immediate families, their obligations and commitments are divided between the destination and home community; and (3) when the movers transfer their membership from the home village to their place of destination, their socio-economic relationships gradually decrease with the home community, shifting totally to the destination place.

Table 6.6 presents the Mae Sa classification of population mobility. The first two types are in the circular form of reciprocal moves between Mae Sa and places of destination. The third type is linear in form, involving a shift of not only residence from Mae Sa to a destination, but also a shift of membership and related obligations and commitments to the destination. Functional characteristics, words and expressions which denote each type of Mae Sa move are given.

**Mae Sa mobility type A (circular)**

Mae Sa villagers who participate in type A circular moves maintain total obligation and commitment to Mae Sa. They are active members of the village community. They participate in all village social and religious activities, know the gossip, and are aware of the major incidents in the lives of fellow villagers. Their village neighbours do not feel these movers 'move' but are merely temporarily absent to undertake some specific task at certain destinations. There is, thus, no specific term that refers to these kinds of moves. Mae Sa people generally explain these movers by referring to the specific task the person 'goes' to perform, for example "pai aeo (go to have fun), pai aeo ha (go to visit), pai kep miang (go to pick tea), pai kep lamyai (go to pick longan), and pai khao ngan (go to construction work). When the task is implicit in the destination, villagers sometimes refer to the place instead, such as pai hong hian (go to school) or pai phae (go to the forest).

Most moves of this type are daily, but it is not uncommon for some to last for days, weeks or even months, such as trips to pick lamyai, or to care for strawberry crops at the foothill gardens. Even though some stays outside the village are lengthy, the movers are able to maintain close relationships with Mae Sa, either by short regular visits to Mae Sa or by being visited regularly by members of their family or fellow villagers. Type A movers also return to participate in most village activities. Those who went to Sukhothai Province, over 300 km away, went for six weeks with their own group of over thirty people. They interacted with each other as if they had not left the network of social relationships of the home community. This coincides well with what Mitchell (1961:235) notes for wage earners in Africa:
'the town in which he works merely becomes a spatial extension of the tribal area'.

The most important characteristic of this kind of move is neither the length of time away from the village nor the distance and type of destination place but rather the on-going relationship of the movers to the home community. It is to this kind of move that Chapman's (1970:183-4) observation of Melanesian mobility refers: 'Physical displacement ... is never accompanied by social structural displacement, no matter whether the time away is a day or a year nor whether the destination is a neighbouring village or another island.'

There are three distinctive types of this kind of move which are the predominant form in Mae Sa: daily, periodic, and seasonal. Daily moves are the same as conventional commuting, that is the daily journey-to-work type, in which all movers return to Mae Sa the same day. This category also includes weekly journeys to work and to school which occur on a regular basis. Periodic moves are those occurring from time to time, such as trips to the hospital, occasional moves for wage work, social visits, or merit-making. Seasonal moves are the same as periodic but have a pronounced seasonal nature, such as moves to pick miang or lamyai. While daily and seasonal moves are usually related to work of various types (Table 6.7), periodic moves include movement for socio-cultural commitment, entertainment, village scouting or medical service.

**Mae Sa mobility type B (circular)**

When the absence of the movers affects relationships between them and the rest of the community because movers cannot maintain on-going relationships and related obligations on a day-to-day basis, Mae Sa villagers refer to this type of move as pai pai, ma ma (come and go, come and go). This type of move, thus, differs from the first in terms of relationship to the home place.

Most Mae Sa circulation is for schooling outside Chiang Mai Province, for wage work, for tending nearby fruit orchards, for government/professional jobs, or for socio-cultural commitment (Table 6.7). Destinations of Mae Sa circulators include both rural and urban places, very much overlapping with commuting and migration destinations. Mae Sa circulators move for school and for professional employment in Chiang Mai city while destinations for agricultural land are in the foothills. Mae Sa residents in the teaching profession, police and military are transferred elsewhere in the country. Some Mae Sa villagers attend schools in Phitsanulok, Nakhon Prathom, and Prachuab Khirikhan Provinces, with one exceptional young person attending a university in the United States. Other circulators have worked in factories, households or shops in Chiang Mai and Bangkok.
Table 6.7
Mae Sa kinds of moves by objectives, 1976-77

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commuting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>3,285</td>
<td>1,132</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>6,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periodic</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1,383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seasonal</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circulation</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|        | 3,651 | 1,226 | 713 | 673 | 653 | 572 | 178 | 158 | 37 | 32 | 19 | 18 | 5  | 7,935 | 100.0 |

\(^a\) Of both inward and outward moves of Mae Sa residents:

1. Wage labour  
2. Foothill/upland gardening  
3. Trade  
4. Governmental/professional employment  
5. Socio-cultural commitment  
6. Skilled labour  
7. Entertainment  
8. Agricultural wage labour  
9. Collecting/gathering  
10. Village scout  
11. Medical care  
12. Accompanying other persons  
13. Get married

Source: Mobility Register, 1976-77.
Villagers who circulate do so only after carefully consulting relatives and friends, examining the nature of their temporary residence, and studying the benefits of the move. Circulators usually receive the consent of their families before they move and the move is generally known among members of the Mae Sa community before the circulator departs. The come and go of circulators is of great concern to fellow villagers in the close-knit village of Mae Sa.

Circulators usually leave their families behind in the village to continue trading or farming rice. The circulators send money regularly, sometimes their entire salary if they have live-in jobs, to their families in Mae Sa and visit the village whenever there is an opportunity or when important occasions are being held in the village. Circulators who live near Mae Sa usually return every month and whenever there are major family or village events. Villagers who circulate to more distant points, such as to Bangkok, make an effort to return every year at Songkran (Traditional New Year). They return to make merit (tham bun), to visit friends and relations, and, most importantly, to dam hua their parents (the customary practice of paying respects to elders at Songkran. The link which the movers maintain by these return visits has given rise to the term, pai pai, ma ma. This phrase is also used in central Thailand to denote circulation (Lauro 1979b:248). Other phrases which Mae Sa people use to refer to circulation are pai kut suan miang (go to think out [or start] a miang garden), pai pen tahan (go to be a soldier), pai hian nangsu (go to study), and so on. These phrases, like pai pai, ma ma imply a long absence from the village and occasional visits home. These phrases are not usually used with migrants who moen moen ma (come once in a long while), because villagers who migrate out of Mae Sa are said to pai yu (go live) somewhere. Circulators, like commuters, maintain their household registration in Mae Sa no matter how long they are absent unless it is mandatory for them to make the registration change. A recent study by Chamratrithirong et al. (1979:88) reports similar findings as in Mae Sa. He writes that 'Most of these recent migrants in Bangkok Metropolis intended to stay only temporarily. Consequently the great majority of migrants did not register their moves to the city in the civil registration system. The place of residence on the identification card of most of the migrants was still at their original place of residence'. Mae Sa circulators want to keep their name in the village with their families and their families feel the same way. To them, registering their moves or changing their place of residence on the identification card to a place outside the village symbolizes a shift of membership which, in the case of circulators, is not their intention. Circulators also keep their membership in various village associations though they are usually inactive. They remain interested in improving their social and economic status in the village social structure, and do so by sending money home to upgrade their own or, if they are unmarried, their parents' house, and for donations to the village
wat. All keep their land or their share of land in the village and when possible buy rice land in Mae Sa.

The length of time the mover remains absent from the village depends on his or her objectives and sometimes changes to reflect varying conditions at the destination or in the village. For example, wives who became widows while at miang villages have often sold their orchard and returned to Mae Sa with their children. Also, if a circulator contracts a severe illness, the villagers believe it will help the person's health to leave the malevolent spirits at the destination which they believe has caused the disease. Sick circulators also feel returning to Mae Sa will enable them to be close to their family when ill. Some circulating couples have inherited land in the village after their parents died and the heirs returned to Mae Sa to stay. Mae Sa circulators have also sometimes married individuals at the destination and became members of that place without returning to Mae Sa as they had first planned. A Mae Sa villager, thus, who went to work in a plastic factory in Samut Prakan Province, married a fellow worker from that province and decided to move there permanently. Two friends who had accompanied him to Samut Prakan did not marry while there but returned to Mae Sa after two years as planned.

Mae Sa villagers do not have a specific time frame for the villagers who pai pai, ma ma. In the past, those who engaged in the miang industry in their thirties stayed away for 20-30 years before retiring to Mae Sa. Data from the mobility register captured the return of one move from the miang trade after fourteen years of pai pai, ma ma. Conversely the mobility register also recorded a case at the other extreme. A village girl went to be a household maid after receiving the approval of her family, but returned only one week later because she did not like the arrangements at the destination.

The crucial distinction between circulation which lasts a long time and the conventional concept of migration is that circulators maintain their village locus while migrants shift their locus.

**Mae Sa mobility type C (linear)**

This kind of Mae Sa movement is parallel to the concept of migration, and occurs when a person decides to shift his locus from Mae Sa to the place of destination. Marriage, for example, has been a longstanding form of Mae Sa migration. The custom of matrilocal residence imbedded in northern Thai matrilineal spirit beliefs required newlyweds in traditional times to move to the bride's home and village. Marriage has signified the change of obligations, socially and economically, of the man to his wife's family, her relatives and her community. In the twentieth century, though, changes in the Mae Sa economy have resulted in
many Mae Sa villagers becoming landless, making it sometimes highly inconvenient for the wife's family to support the newly-weds, and this custom has been relaxed.

Mae Sa villagers use the word pai yu (go to live) to denote this type of move, with the meaning that the mover shifts his membership and commitments and obligations to the destination place. Other phrases with much the same meaning are khai or yai (to move), yok ho yok huan (lift family and home), yai la kae khwaen (move upon informing the headman and kamnan [commune head], or pai pen khon wiang (go to become city folk).

Although migrants maintain strong ties with their parents in Mae Sa, they do not usually participate in village activities since they have similar obligations at their new place. They do visit their parents, almost certainly at Songkran, and at funerals and weddings of close relatives. Migrants buy rice land, if possible, in their new village and if they inherit land in Mae Sa, they sell it to their relatives and invest the profits in their new village.

Migrants' involvement in the place of destination also differs from that of circulators. Some villagers who have moved to Chaing Mai or Bangkok have changed their simple country names to the longer, more citified names with Pali and Sanskrit roots prevalent in the city. Migrants to urban areas also adopt city manners, dress, dialect and join a city wat.

There have been other cases where Mae Sa circulators decided to shift their ties to the destination place. One such Mae Sa mover was adopted by his employer's family in the Chiang Mai fabric store where he worked as a sales clerk. The man eventually came to identify with Chaing Mai and associate with city folk. He has changed his last name, joined a city wat, learned the fabric business, and taken up very citified ways. He still maintains links with the village and is an important liaison between Chiang Mai affairs and the people of the village. He has helped find jobs for Mae Sa young people as maids or errand boys with friends or associates of his employer, acts as patron to the village in its participation in city activities, and also arranged a money-raising, merit-making event for the temple in Mae Sa. This man, though he began his move as a circulator, is now a migrant and has changed his locus to Chiang Mai. The villagers say that he has become a khon wiang (city dweller). His involvement in Mae Sa is not out of responsibility, but as a patron to a client village.

Indigenous conceptualization and the conventions of social science

Mae Sa movement types are not mutually exclusive in terms of elapsed time, because involvement with and commitment to
specific places are not correlated with discrete amounts of time. Nor is there any correlation of these types with distance. To the people of Mae Sa, commuting can occur over great, and migration over very short distances. Length of absence from the village for commuting ranges from 6 hours to 4-5 months, and for circulation from one week to fourteen years. Absence for migration varies from one week to total displacement.

The value of understanding this Mae Sa typology becomes clear if it is compared with others based upon discrete amounts of both time and space, for different choices result in different statistical pictures of the same behaviour. The smaller the area unit and the shorter the duration involved, the greater the number of moves likely to be captured, as Tables 6.8 and 6.9 illustrate.

If the territory of Mae Sa was enlarged from the village to cross a district boundary, then 3,978 moves would have been recorded instead of 7,935 (Table 6.9). If a provincial boundary had been arbitrarily chosen, the definition in the Thai census, then only 69 (0.9 per cent) of the Mae Sa total would have been captured.

As the definition of a move is lengthened in time and space, so Mae Sa villagers become less and less mobile to the point of seeming almost to stand still. On the ground, by contrast (such as for the observer at that liquor stand) one would quickly notice the widespread proclivity of Mae Sa people to be mobile, and to sense that this behaviour is of fundamental social and economic importance. Arbitrary time and space definitions can thus seriously distort an understanding of complex reality.

The results of this research in northern Thailand have led to questioning of the utility of discrete time and space co-ordinates in the classification of population movement. A similar concern for devising classifications appropriate to the individuals under examination caused McArthur (1969:4) to question the applicability of international classifications of 'economic' behaviour, when she wrote: 'Though arguments might rage as to the merits of one classification against another ... the ultimate test is the utility of the information to the government responsible for the census .... Though this reasoning justifies the approach taken in Mae Sa, other scholars such as Goldstein (1978) and Ward (1980) are concerned that relaxed criteria of space and time preclude either cross-national or cross-cultural comparison. Years ago, Chapman (1971:28) suggested a solution to this dilemma by noting: 'this clamor would be silenced were fine-grained data collected so that both local and international needs could be met through multiple coding just as it is standard practice for age to be codes by both actual year and some broader time period'.


Table 6.8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definition of move based on length of absence</th>
<th>Number of moves resulting</th>
<th>Per cent of total Mae Sa moves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 hours or more</td>
<td>7,935</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 hours or more</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 week or more</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 month or more</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 year or more</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 years or more</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 years or more</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompleted moves</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mae Sa mobility register, 1976-77.

Table 6.9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definition of move based on boundary crossed</th>
<th>Number of moves resulting</th>
<th>Per cent of total Mae Sa moves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mae Sa village boundary</td>
<td>7,935</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mae Sa tambon boundary</td>
<td>5,978</td>
<td>75.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mae Rim district boundary</td>
<td>3,978</td>
<td>50.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiang Mai Province boundary</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Region boundary</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mae Sa mobility register, 1976-77.

Conclusions

One important implication from this study is the need to acknowledge the local viewpoint when measuring movement on planning for socio-economic change. A concern with development and mobility far too often denotes a city orientation, as reflected in the polarized discussions of the advantage of urban places and the disadvantage of the rural places, the emphasis on urban problems as being rooted in rural-urban movement, the view that village people move in a one-way direction, or the emphasis upon permanent forms of movement.

This research has shown that it would be preferable to look at movement in terms of the levels and types of commitment that
persons have towards their home and destination places, rather than in a permanent:impermanent dichotomy. In Mae Sa, the persistence of circular mobility and the contiguous nature of various forms of movement suggests that attention should be paid to the complementary aspects of places of destination and origin. Furthermore, conceptualizing territorial distinctions solely in terms of advantages or disadvantages helps little in understanding the complexity and ambiguity of movement behaviour. It is necessary that the intrinsic attachment of people to the home village be recognized and that the processes of changing one's total commitment from that territorial group to the destination place are not spontaneous, but rather constitute shifts of degree along a continuum.

Movement to Mae Sa villagers represents the way they solve problems of territorial distinction and division of activities. Consequently an attempt by Chiang Mai city planners, for example, to stop the flow of people into the city out of concern for urban problems would seriously affect those at the other end of the road. To preclude this eventuality, not only in Chiang Mai but elsewhere, the complementarity of origin and destination points ought to be studied. Following such an examination, a more balanced solution might be achieved and perhaps the reciprocal flow redirected to more advantageous destinations so as to enhance complementarity.

The role of transportation in redirecting existing flows, fostering involvement in the home place, and influencing shorter-distance movement needs greater investigation. The continually rising costs of public transportation will have a serious impact on commuting. If such research is neglected, landless villagers may be seriously affected, not only in northern Thailand but elsewhere in the third world where short-term repetitive moves are common. Such movers deserve particular attention, because of their temporary and invisible presence in the informal sector in the city or their concentration in slum areas. This attention is all the more urgent because, since they own no land, only rarely do they benefit from rural development programs.
Chapter 7

Circular mobility in Yogyakarta Special Region:
   a case study of two *dukuh*

I. Bagus Mantra

The 1971 Population Census of Indonesia provides detailed information on population migration. The data were obtained from the questions asked in the sample census, such as province of birth, province of former place of residence, and duration of residence in the present province. (These data are available in the population census publications series D and E, 1971, also Suharto and Abdulnadjid 1973:32-5.)

These data show the number of life-time migrants and out-migrants of each province in Indonesia. In 1971, 5.7 million people (4.8 per cent of the total population) lived outside their province of birth (Biro Pusat Statistik 1973:101-2). On the basis of these data we might conclude that Javanese people are rather immobile, if not static in the sense that most of them grow up and die in the province in which they are born. But Indonesian provinces are large, and the census data do not reveal the amount of migration within each province. In fact, the patterns of population movement revealed by the population census are only a small part of the complex pattern of population movement in Indonesia.

Recently several studies on population mobility have been conducted in Java (Hugo 1975b, Koentjaraningrat 1975, Mantra 1978). They showed that many people move seasonally as well as temporarily to the cities, towns, or other villages and revealed considerable intra-provincial movement.

The non-permanent flow of people between provinces can be judged from the census data on province of birth and last former residence. A person who is born in a certain province or town and moves to live in another place, and then returns to the place of origin, can be regarded as a return migrant. The number of return migrants in the 1971 population census is about one-fifth of the total number of inmigrants (Table 7.1). Since data measure only those migrants who cross a provincial boundary, both the
return migrants and the immigrants measured in this way are only a small part of the total movement.

The percentage of return migrants in the various provinces is not the same. Nearly half of immigrants in Java (excluding Jakarta) were return migrants (Table 7.1), or including this city 24 per cent. For the rest of Indonesia their share was 18 per cent. The great number of return migrants for Java may be explained by the strong Javanese attachment to their village and region of origin (Sundrum 1976:76). Lampung, which has been a destination area for transmigrants since before World War II, and is still a main destination area for transmigrants, has supplied many return migrants to Java; yet there are only a few return migrants to Lampung province (Table 7.1). Also, few of the out-migrants from Jakarta municipality returned to Jakarta, but many of those who came to live in Jakarta returned to their villages of origin.

In West Sumatra, more than two-thirds of the immigrants consist of return migrants. This is due to the concept of merantau (lit., to go abroad) adopted in that society where men are obliged to leave their villages (merantau) for several years to establish their adult status by demonstrating their ability to make a living in other areas, and then return to their place of origin (Naim 1974). A high percentage of return migrants is also found among the Acehnese of North Sumatra, the Menadonese of North Sulawesi, the Banjarese in South Kalimantan and among the Buginese and the Makassarese of South Sulawesi (Hugo 1977b:6).

Hitherto little has been known of the pattern and process of population movement, particularly of non-permanent movement in Indonesia. In fact, for the purpose of planning the distribution of the population of Indonesia in order to support regional development, knowledge of the patterns of population mobility and of the behaviour of migrants is badly needed. To help to overcome such deficiencies in knowledge, the aims of this paper are: first, to study the pattern and behaviour of population movement in Yogyakarta Special Region, particularly in the two dukuh – Kadirojo and Piring; second, to evaluate the role of circular mobility as a support to regional development in Indonesia (see Fig. 7.1, p.181).

The concept of population mobility

The term population mobility can be defined as a change of place of residence by crossing a territorial boundary for a minimum period of time. There are two kinds of population movement in Indonesia, that is, permanent movement or migration and non-permanent movement or circulation, including daily circulation or commuting.
Table 7.1

Estimation of life-time return migrants
(Numbers in '000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Total inmigrants</th>
<th>Born in other provinces</th>
<th>Return migrants</th>
<th>Per cent of immigrants who are return migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aceh</td>
<td>89.8</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Sumatera</td>
<td>586.9</td>
<td>530.0</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Sumatera</td>
<td>262.5</td>
<td>87.9</td>
<td>174.9</td>
<td>66.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riau</td>
<td>220.9</td>
<td>203.7</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jambi</td>
<td>165.1</td>
<td>155.9</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sumatera</td>
<td>373.9</td>
<td>327.3</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengkulu</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lampung</td>
<td>1018.8</td>
<td>1000.2</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>1837.6</td>
<td>1791.6</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Java</td>
<td>680.6</td>
<td>371.5</td>
<td>309.1</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Java</td>
<td>594.9</td>
<td>253.5</td>
<td>341.4</td>
<td>57.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td>144.2</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Java</td>
<td>406.5</td>
<td>273.3</td>
<td>133.2</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bali</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>51.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Kalimantan</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Kalimantan</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Kalimantan</td>
<td>95.4</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Kalimantan</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Sulawesi</td>
<td>119.4</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>59.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Sulawesi</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sulawesi</td>
<td>143.0</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>53.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Sulawesi</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Nusa Tenggara</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Nusa Tenggara</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>59.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maluku</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Irian</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>7219.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>5702.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>1516.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>21.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(a\) Excludes Jakarta.
\(b\) Excludes Yogyakarta.

**Source:** Speare (1975:77, Table 5).
Most non-migratory moves are termed circulation, which Zelinsky defines as:

a great variety of movements, usually short-term, repetitive, or cyclical in nature, but all having in common the lack of any declared intention of a permanent or long-lasting change of residence (1971:226).

Circulatory movements can be subdivided into several groups according to the length of the cycle; daily, periodic, seasonal, and long-term (Gould and Prothero 1975:42-3).

Movement may also be analysed according to boundary crossed. Usually this boundary is an administrative unit such as dukuh (hamlet), kelurahan (village), or kecamatan (subdistrict). In the present study in the two dukuh community, the smallest administrative unit (the dukuh) was chosen as the territorial unit, and the minimum time period was six hours. This minimum period was chosen so as to include the daily circulation (commuting) of the village people. It was also chosen because students, civil servants, workers and traders who left the dukuh in the morning and returned in the afternoon of the same day were usually away a minimum time of six hours. Therefore a movement occurs whenever a person crosses the dukuh boundary in either direction and stays inside or outside the dukuh for a minimum period of six hours.

In the two study dukuh, only two kinds of circular mobility are recognized, namely commuting or daily circulation, and circulation. In Javanese, commuting is known as nglaju. Such daily circulation can be divided again into three types: regular, non-regular, and seasonal. A regular commuter is one who regularly travels although not necessarily daily, to a place outside the dukuh to work, to trade or to go to school. A non-regular commuter is a person who travels occasionally to a place outside the dukuh as, for example, to buy clothes or agricultural tools, or to visit relatives. A seasonal commuter is someone who goes daily to other places at a particular time of the year, to work for example in the ricefields outside the dukuh boundary during the harvest season.

Circulation (excluding daily circulation) is any population movement in which the dukuh boundary is crossed for a period of more than one day but a return occurs in the same year. In Javanese there are two words for such circulation: nginep and mondok. Nginep is used for people who go to another place for several days to visit relatives or do business. Mondok is used for people who stay in a place for several months or years to study or work. Both movements are non-permanent; that is, the people plan to return to their dukuh after their work is completed.

Migration refers to the movement of people to a specific place with the intention of staying permanently. For the Javanese
community, it is inappropriate to assume that such long-term movement necessarily involves a permanent shift of residence. Most, if not all, migrants still maintain contact with their relatives or friends back home in the village or small town. Thus it is necessary to adopt a time limit to differentiate between migration that involves a rather permanent change of residence, and circular mobility. In the two dukuh study, a migration involves a minimum period of one year away from home (place of origin), on the assumption that this indicates an intention to stay there permanently or semi-permanently. Thus migration is defined here as an intentional shift of residence across the dukuh boundary for a period of one year or more. In Javanese, the term for such a migration is pindah.

The pattern of circular mobility

This paper will discuss only two patterns of population movement: commuting (nglaju), and circulation (nginep or mondok).

Very few surveys on circular mobility had been conducted in Indonesia. Three intensive works have been done in this field: the study of merantau of Minangkabau from West Sumatra (Nairn 1973), the study of the population movement in fourteen villages in West Java (Hugo 1975b), and my own study of the pattern and process of population movement in wet-rice communities in Yogyakarta Special Region (Mantra 1978).

In addition, there are several studies concerning the non-permanent movement of people, among others the study on rural-urban migration by Suharso et al. (1976), and the circular movement of people from the sub-urban areas to Yogyakarta by Koentjaraningrat (1975).

The discussion of circular mobility in this paper is primarily based on my work in the two dukuh areas in Yogyakarta Special Region.

Commuting (nglaju). With the decrease in job opportunities in the rural areas, many village people begin to find work in the towns, mainly in the big cities like Jakarta, Bandung, Surabaya, Ujung Pandarg and Medan. Those who live in the suburban areas but work in the city mostly commute to the city, as may be clearly seen if one stands on the side of a main road connecting the rural and the urban areas. One can see the flow of workers as well as job seekers, traders, labourers and also students heading for the city early in the morning and returning home on the same route in the afternoon.

In April 1979 some undergraduate students of the Faculty of Geography, Gadjah Mada University, checked the number and types of vehicles which entered and left the city of Yogyakarta from one
direction. The checking place was Kaliputih, a village about 8 km south of Yogyakarta. The checking time was between 4 am and 6 pm. From their observation (Table 7.2) we see that the frequency of vehicles entering Yogyakarta is highest from 6 to 8 am and from 2 to 5 pm; in the afternoon the same flow of vehicles returns in the opposite direction. Pedestrians start earlier in the day, nearly half leaving before daybreak.

Thus, in the morning, bicycles, mini-buses and buses transport people and their goods from the rural areas into the city of Yogyakarta. Along the main Bantul-Yogyakarta road one can see people waiting to catch the bus near every village border. The more daring will sit on the roof of the already packed buses, while some will try their luck by hanging out at the rear door. To any observer these village people could hardly be described as immobile, yet this is the impression given in published research by overseas scholars.

Most movers return home to the village in the afternoon although a few, such as students who are boarding in Yogyakarta or people visiting their relatives, may remain in town for several days or a certain period of time. Given the high frequency of daily journeys, it is understandable that the number of commuters is far bigger than the number of circulators.

Table 7.2 shows that more than half of the commuters used bicycles, and only around a quarter used motor cycles. Becak (pedicab) and dokar (pony-cart on two wheels) which were much used before 1970 have been increasingly pushed aside by buses and mini-buses.

Besides field checking, the students also interviewed adults aged 15-64 in Kaliputih village. The respondents were asked about their occupation, their place of work and their socio-economic conditions. Out of 140 respondents 56 persons (40 per cent) worked in Yogyakarta and commuted every day. Their types of occupations in per cent were:

- Small trader 11.5
- Unskilled labourer 8.5
- Student 8.5
- Civil servant 5.7
- Carpenter 5.7

Thus, more than a quarter of all respondents worked in the informal sector.

In his West Java study, Hugo (1977a:65) found that permanent migrants who lived in Jakarta and Bandung generally worked in the formal sector; on the other hand most of the circular migrants worked in the informal sector (Table 7.3).
Table 7.2

Frequency of movement of vehicles and pedestrians on Bantul-Yogyakarta road, 27 to 29 April 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of vehicle</th>
<th>4-&lt;6 a.m.</th>
<th>6-&lt;8 a.m.</th>
<th>8-&lt;10 a.m.</th>
<th>10-&lt;12 a.m.</th>
<th>12-&lt;2 p.m.</th>
<th>2-&lt;4 p.m.</th>
<th>4-&lt;6 p.m.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mini-bus</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(38)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(121)</td>
<td>(126)</td>
<td>(123)</td>
<td>(135)</td>
<td>(117)</td>
<td>(760)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(18)</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor cycle</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>2353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>(233)</td>
<td>(331)</td>
<td>(470)</td>
<td>(476)</td>
<td>(340)</td>
<td>(381)</td>
<td>(2265)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicycle</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>2414</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>4658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(207)</td>
<td>(408)</td>
<td>(429)</td>
<td>(719)</td>
<td>(654)</td>
<td>(1346)</td>
<td>(1176)</td>
<td>(4939)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedicab (becak)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>(21)</td>
<td>(58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ponycart (dokar)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedestrian</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(109)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(28)</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>(28)</td>
<td>(250)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>3185</td>
<td>1151</td>
<td>838</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>927</td>
<td>795</td>
<td>8378</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Unbracketed lines = vehicles entered Yogyakarta. Bracketed lines = vehicles left Yogyakarta.
Table 7.3
Permanent and non-permanent migrants by occupation in 14 villages in West Java, 1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Non-permanent migrants</th>
<th>Permanent migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Milan Titus (Kedaulatan Rakyat, Yogyakarta 16 Nov. 1979), who has conducted research on rural-urban movements in West Java, also found that about 60 per cent of migrants worked in the informal sector and only 35-40 per cent worked in the formal sector.

The study in Kadirojo and Piring showed that during the survey period (May 1975 to January 1976) in Kadirojo 20 per cent of adult villagers were involved in commuting, 17 per cent in circulation, and 46 per cent in both commuting and circulation. Only 16 per cent of adult villagers did not once leave their dukuh for six hours or more during the survey period. In Piring the percentages of adult villagers involved in commuting, circulation or both commuting and circulation were 57 per cent, 5 per cent and 26 per cent respectively, with the remaining 12 per cent being immobile.

A daily flow of people to and from the cities can also be found in other areas in Java. Hugo (1977a:60), for example, notes that in West Java a substantial daily flow of workers coming to and from Jakarta, Bandung, Tangerang, Bogor and Beckasi, has been recognized since the early 1950s. Since then the massive economic expansion in Jakarta and major improvements in public transport have greatly increased the number of commuters from these areas. There were considerable improvements after 1970 in transport facilities which connect Jakarta and Bandung with other cities or rural areas and the number of vehicles coming and going between these two cities increased substantially (Table 7.4).

In the two study dukuh there were several reasons why the people preferred commuting to circulation. These relate to the home community as the focus of peoples' lives, the basis of security and the control point of their entire world. Village people prefer to stay with or be among their families; they feel insecure and bewildered when separated from them. Consequently, if dukuh residents have to travel away from home they will
always try to return home on the same day. If they do have to stay away because of either the long distance or the necessity of helping some relatives in the ricefields, they will try to be away only for the shortest possible time.

Table 7.4
Daily public transport traffic flows by main roads into Jakarta and Bandung, August 1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cities</th>
<th>Buses</th>
<th>Cars and mini-buses</th>
<th>Three-wheeled vehicles (Bemo)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jakarta (total)</td>
<td>2,096</td>
<td>11,992</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jakarta (local)</td>
<td>1,065</td>
<td>6,626</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change 1971-73 (%)</td>
<td>+112</td>
<td>+107</td>
<td>+338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bandung (total)</td>
<td>1473</td>
<td>11,491</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bandung (local)</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>6,219</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change 1971-73 (%)</td>
<td>+39</td>
<td>+40</td>
<td>+927</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hugo (1977a:13, Table 4).

Since these working people mostly have a fairly small income, there is no extra money available to permit family members to stay with them in town. By staying in the village, where the cost of living is far lower, people who have either permanent or temporary jobs can still tend their ricefields after returning home, and thus can make additional income.

During the nine months of field work, 15,980 commuting movements outside Kadirojo and Piring were recorded (Table 7.5). This wealth of information reduces simply to eight sets of objectives, of which wage work, school and trading accounted for 13,710 or 86 per cent of the total. Five other objectives (including visiting, socio-cultural commitment, business or office work, farming and attending meetings) accounted for less than 15 per cent. The greater significance of commuting to earn money in Kadirojo is a simple function of distance from places of work. Since Kadirojo lies close to the offices and the white muslin factory of Medari, many workers commute every day. Piring, on the other hand, is situated about 12 km south of the regency of Bantul, and the nearest administrative offices are at Sanden, about 1.25 km away. Only one civil servant from Piring worked at Kantor kalurahan (the village office) in Sanden, and another three were employed in Bantul: one at the regency office (Kantor kabupaten) and two as senior high school teachers.
Table 7.5
Objectives of commuting for Kadirojo and Piring,
19 May 1975-31 January 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Kadirojo</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Piring</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of moves</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number of moves</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage work</td>
<td>3686</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>3348</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School</td>
<td>1005</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>2293</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trading</td>
<td>2051</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>1327</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visiting</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural commitment</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business of official duties</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attend meeting</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lost from record</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7405</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>8575</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mantra (1978:128, Table 4.5).

Circulation. It has been mentioned that most dukoh residents prefer to commute rather than to circulate. If a potential destination is beyond commuting distance while there are compelling reasons that force people from these areas to stay in that place, then they will stay only as briefly as possible. As a result, the frequency of circulation decreases as times of absence from the dukoh lengthen (Table 7.6).

Table 7.6
Number of circulations by period of absence from Kadirojo and Piring, May 1975-January 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period of absence</th>
<th>Kadirojo</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Piring</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of moves</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number of moves</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 day-&lt;1 week</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 week-&lt;1 month</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 month-&lt;1 year</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 year or more</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mantra (1978:146, Table 11).
Two-thirds of circulators go to other rural destinations, almost all of them within the Yogyakarta Special Region; of the remainder, the great majority go to the city of Yogyakarta. Circular mobility to the city can be divided into seasonal and regular. Seasonal mobility is closely related to the variation in agricultural sector activity. In Piring, for example, during the dry season people cannot tend their ricefields because of shortage of water. Many try their luck in Yogyakarta as beak drivers, carpenters, or as labourers in batik factories.

It is often found that a circular movement has more than one objective. During nine months of mobility registration, 1,370 objectives were recorded for circulators from Kadiojo and Piring (Table 7.7) and these can be divided into six groups: visiting, school, wage-work, socio-cultural commitment, business and traders involved in non-regular movement. Of the six objectives for circulators, the visiting of relatives and kinsmen group ranked the highest and accounted for almost two-fifths of the total.

Most of the circular migrants were young people: 35 per cent of the circular migrants in Kadiojo, and 53 per cent of those in Piring were between the ages of 15 and 24 years. They were mostly students, civil servants and workers. For those aged 40 years and over, the more common reasons for travelling were to visit relatives or for social or cultural purposes. Some of them travelled to Jakarta, Sumatra and Madura where their relatives live.

From the above examples, it is clear that circular mobility, excluding commuting, is an important component of population mobility in the Yogyakarta region. Before 1970, the pattern of circular mobility was not given serious attention by many scholars, so that efforts to solve the population problem in Java and Bali are still based on concepts of permanent movement.

Table 7.7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Kadiojo</th>
<th>Piring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of moves</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visiting</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage work</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trading</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>847</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some factors affecting circular mobility

Various forces have caused people to move rather than remain in the *dukuh* communities of Kadirojo and Piring. Mitchell (1961b: 263) distinguishes two types of causation: centrifugal and centripetal. The first type induces individuals or small groups of people to leave their home place, while the second leads people to resist such action. Whether mobility is present or absent in a certain place depends upon the balance between these two conflicting sets of forces.

Centrifugal forces identified in the two study *dukuh* reflect the agricultural economy, formal education opportunities and social obligations, of which dissatisfaction with the local economy is the most important. The average amount of land owned by one family is 0.187 hectares in Kadirojo and 0.197 hectares in Piring, and the average size of ricefields is even smaller: 0.126 (Kadirojo) and 0.086 hectare (Piring). The minute size of a family's ricefields means that not even the use of agricultural innovations enables a farmer to produce sufficient food to meet the basic needs of the household. In addition, job opportunities available outside the agricultural sector are scarce and, those available, very poorly paid.

Second, both *dukuh* lack educational facilities. Kadirojo and Piring each have an elementary school but those who wish to continue their studies must go to another village or town. Third, *dukuh* people have a certain moral obligation to visit relatives who live outside their birth place (and this is specially important during the *Lebaran* period\(^1\)) or to help prepare festive ceremonies concerned with weddings, births or circumcisions.

There are five sets of centripetal forces that discourage people from leaving their village. First, and paramount, is the close kinship and communal ties among village inhabitants. These are reflected in the popular Javanese proverb *Mangan ora mangan waton kompol*, 'as long as we are together, it does not matter whether we eat or not'. The proverb indicates the enduring links that bind families and relatives together. Ties are also maintained with wider kindred or group of relatives, among whom there exist reciprocal obligations.

Adult residents in Kadirojo and Piring were asked about the advantages and disadvantages of life in their *dukuh* community in order to identify which were the positive and negative aspects, and to establish their relationship with environment stress. The statement that Kadirojo and Piring residents made about the advantages of *dukuh* life reflected two main factors: close family ties and the relationship with birth place and the land. Together

---

\(^1\) Moslem festival signifying the end of the fasting month.
these accounted for more than 70 per cent of the replies in each community; the nature of the social structure in the local community added a further 25 per cent (Table 7.8).

Table 7.8
Advantages and disadvantages of dukuh life, Kadirojo and Piring, 1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantage</th>
<th>Kadirojo</th>
<th></th>
<th>Piring</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Close to family</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly tied to birth place and land</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social structure of the local community</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>159</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Disadvantages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disadvantage</th>
<th>Kadirojo</th>
<th></th>
<th>Piring</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural problems</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>50.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local economic problems</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>159</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mantra (1978:206, Table 6.1).

Second, a dukuh community is founded on the mutual self-help of gotong royong principle. Living together in such a community means forming a number of corporate families where bonds are close, where individuals must always help one another, and where everyone must collectively participate in community life and its various activities. Third, dukuh people depend almost entirely upon the land for their livelihood. They view it as intimately related to their local status, and have hardly any interest in matters other than agriculture. Fourth, the inhabitants of Kadirojo and Piring also regard the dukuh as their birth right, where ancestors' graves are located and where the families make offerings for them every Ruawah (the month before the fasting month) and on the Lebaran.

Thus the dukuh is a home to them, since it is where all their ancestors lived and died. Fifth, there are barriers which prevent the
people from moving away from Kadirojo and Piring, even if they wanted to do so. The cost of transport to the town and other villages is high compared with their available income, and there is no certainty of obtaining a job in another village or town. They have no savings to support the family while the household head seeks paying jobs, and generally dukuh people lack the experience of or have limited knowledge about the outside world.

If these centrifugal and centripetal circumstances are viewed from the standpoint of a dukuh community, then it can be seen that the situation is highly contradictory. Village people face a dilemma of whether to remain in the dukuh and endure both the hard economic life and the lack of educational facilities, or to move away leaving one's land and birth right, and to separate from family and kin. This dilemma is solved in Kadirojo and Piring by adopting an alternative strategy, by commuting or circulating, which is essentially a compromise between total immobility and permanent relocation.

Population mobility and regional development

Circular movement is a form of linkage between rural and urban areas and is important in achieving a closer interaction between rural and urban people. Through commuting and circulation, villagers become more familiar with different kinds of job and residential environments, and also with the different social environments that form a city. Thus circular forms of movement, far more than permanent migration, have the potential for spreading new ideas, attitudes and knowledge to rural areas and of contributing greatly to the processes of social change. Circular movement creates its own momentum, as more and more village people experience the benefits of a wider range of contacts and work experience but without the costs of permanent residence in towns and cities.

The effect of circular movement ought not to be viewed as a one-way flow of information and benefits from urban to rural areas. City people, through interaction with village movers, can learn much about rural areas as well as the attitudes, values and problems of their populations. Rural circulators and migrants may transport their communities to the cities and thereby create new social environments within them. Increases in low cost and efficient means of transportation between villages, towns and cities has resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of villages who commute to the city.

To avoid the concentration of movement circuits into a particular city, both urban as well as industrial development ought to be decentralized through the creation of new growth centres within commuting distance of village sources of labour supply. Such a policy also would help relieve the shortage of housing in urban centres.
In terms of inter-island movements, the creation of growth centres and resettlement areas throughout the outer islands would encourage more circular movements within them, rather than a heavy transmigration to Java and Bali, and eventually might attract more people to leave Java and Bali. For official migration programs to be successful, both resettlement projects and the encouragement of circular movements must go hand in hand. Properly executed, development programs could ensure that people move to improve their socio-economic position while the encouragement of circular forms of movement could relieve problems of both rural unemployment and urban overcrowding.

Fig. 7.1 Yogyakarta Special Region
Part C
Source and destination linkages: Papua New Guinea and the Pacific
Map 3  Papua New Guinea
The emphasis of these four papers is similar to that of the previous section, but with a focus on the Pacific. Curtain analyses migration in two Papua New Guinea villages in a broad theoretical framework, arguing that the results of the study bear out the general proposition that, in the transitional stages of development, the peasant household maintains a dual dependence on the subsistence and capitalistic production systems, straddling the two. Local socio-economic conditions do, however, strongly influence the degree of involvement of communities in migrating labour movement and the cash economy, as data from the two dissimilar villages demonstrate.

Morauta approaches the analysis of more permanent movement in Papua New Guinea from another perspective. She emphasizes the importance of differing family production systems, especially the sexual division of labour. At the same time she seeks to establish a family life cycle pattern to migration, in which family interest in the destination locality deepens over time.

Connell is primarily concerned with two issues: whether population mobility contributes to or ameliorates inequality of income and opportunity both for individuals and communities in the Pacific; and whether it promotes either the self-sufficiency or the dependence of Pacific societies in relation to their own communities in the outside world. His conclusions on both issues are largely negative.

Macpherson too seeks to judge costs and benefits of the various participants in his study of the guest-worker movement between Western Samoa and New Zealand. For the individual Samoan involved he judges the system to be beneficial, especially as guest-workers are selected by established Samoan migrants as hard-working, less privileged members of their natal society. The evidence on costs and benefits for the two countries involved is inconclusive.
Chapter 8

Migration in Papua New Guinea: the role of the peasant household in a strategy of survival

R.L. Curtain

There is a growing dissatisfaction with the narrow and, for some, misleading focus of most studies of migration in the third world (see van Binsbergen and Meilink 1978, Gerold-Scheepers and van Binsbergen 1978, Mitchell 1978, Standing 1979, Swindell 1979 and Curtain 1980b). The narrow focus is said to exist in the concentration on the act of migration itself to the virtual exclusion of the context within which the event takes place. Mitchell (1978), in an important paper, claims that migration itself is an epiphenomenon and that social scientists need to go beyond the descriptive facts of the phenomenon to a study of its underlying dispositions.

A feature of most analyses of migration is a concentration on the individual as rational decision-maker to the general neglect of the influence of the social structure. The decision to migrate is usually represented as the individual rural villager weighing the information available about his or her potential destination and deciding whether it is likely to offer a higher cash income compared with the home situation.

Such an approach leads to the simple conclusion that people move from areas of low economic opportunity to areas of greater opportunity. The proposition is most likely correct but it tells us little about the historical-structural setting within which migration takes place. Explanation at the level of the individual is unable to comprehend the role of migration in the transformation of the socio-economic structure of production and distribution (Standing 1979:2).

Swindell (1979:255) has suggested that labour migration be seen as a continuing dialectic between the individual, the family and the local community on the one hand and the larger political economy on the other. The community and the individual are influenced by external factors operating at the macro-level which may be quite unknown to the individual migrant. These political and economic factors operating at the state or global levels generate
mechanisms for migration which have to be accepted, avoided or resisted by the individual and that individual's community.

The historical background to migration in Papua New Guinea

The starting point for an adequate analysis of contemporary migration patterns should be an understanding of the particular types of linkages established by the introduced capitalist economy with the traditional subsistence-based economy. While the intrusion of the capitalist economic order resulted in profound changes in the traditional subsistence-based economies, the impact was not to destroy them. The major institution effecting the transformation but at the same time the preservation of most elements of the pre-capitalist society and economy was the migrant labour system (MLS) (Curtain 1980a). The MLS served to link the two economies to the benefit of the more powerful capitalist economy. The MLS provided a cheap and regular supply of unskilled labour, almost entirely male, to work in the plantation and mining sectors. Rowley (1972: 102-15) has described its operation in Papua New Guinea. But the MLS was not an institution unique to that country.

The provision of a low-cost, unskilled labour force was a major concern of the colonial plantation and mineral extractive economies of Queensland and those of West Indian sugar, Assam and Sri Lankan tea, Malayan rubber, Nigerian tin, Southern African minerals as well as New Guinean copra and gold. In an attempt to deal with the 'labor recruitment problem' and to ensure a continuing supply of workers, all of the tropical colonies of the European empires produced an elaborate set of regulations (Newbury 1975:235).

Burawoy (1976) has outlined a model of the MLS based on a comparative study of Southern African and Mexican-American labour migration. The state plays a crucial role in ensuring that the migrant labourer is not proletarianized but remains dependent on his home economy. This means that the costs of labour-force renewal are borne by the traditional subsistence-based economy while the migrant worker is only paid a basic wage to cover his own maintenance. In this way, the precapitalist economy is made to subsidize the expansion of production in the capitalist mode of production.

Under Capitalism, the binding of production and reproduction is achieved through economic necessity: for the laboring population, work is necessary for survival: under feudalism the unification is achieved through coercive regulation. A system of migrant labor contains elements of each. On the one hand, renewal processes are dependent on income left over from maintenance which is remitted home by the productive worker. On the other hand, productive workers require continued support from their families engaged in renewal at home,
because they have no permanent legal or political status at the place of work. In other words the state organizes the dependence of the productive worker on the reproductive worker, while the economy organizes the dependence of the reproductive worker on the productive worker (Burawoy 1976: 1052-3).

Consequently, a dual dependence between the two modes of production — the precapitalist and capitalist — is set up. Head tax and a desire for simple commodities creates a need for money for which migrant labour is the only source available. On the other side, the migrant labourer requires continued support from his family engaged in the processes of renewal at home because he has no permanent legal or political status at the place of work. To maintain this dual dependence the circulation of the migrant labour is regulated by the supervising authority — the colonial state.

The evidence

The dual dependence of the migrant on two economies is clearly manifest in the separation of the migrant worker from his family. This is graphically illustrated by reference to the age, sex and marital profiles of the migrant stream over time. Between 1922 and 1940 in the Territory of New Guinea, women never represented more than 2 per cent of the indentured workforce. After 1935, when wives were permitted to accompany their husbands without themselves being indentured, only a small proportion of the male workforce wanted to take advantage of this provision. In 1938, the peak year for the number of persons under indenture in the inter-war period, only 1,378 wives were with their husbands. This represented a mere 3.3 per cent of the male workforce in wage employment.

Thirty years later in 1965, only 2.2 per cent of the New Guinean wage labour force were women. The age structure at this time was heavily biased towards young males, despite a broadening across age groupings from 71 per cent under the age of 26 in 1956 to 54 per cent in the same age grouping in 1965. Eighty per cent of the New Guinean wage workforce in 1965 was still under 31 years of age. Over the same period, 1956-65, 66 per cent of the males over 15 years of age were classified as not married.

The existence of a dual dependence, as reflected in the physical separation of the migrant worker from his family, is demonstrated in Table 8.1, based on data from the 1966 census. The overwhelming proportion of men in the two migrant sectors were single or unaccompanied by wives. Only 20 and 31 per cent of the men in the rural non-village (plantations, government posts) and urban sectors were married and had their wives resident with them.

In 1966, 11.6 per cent of the total population of Papua New Guinea was classified as resident outside the rural village sector.
This figure is not much higher than a 1929 figure which showed 9 per cent of the then enumerated population of the territory of New Guinea in the wage labour force and hence resident outside the rural village sector. Although the absolute numbers of absentees had increased greatly since, so had the number of people enumerated. The relatively low proportion of people outside the traditional village sector in 1966, after some three generations of a colonial presence, may be a strong indication of how the whole MLS (including both agreement and casual labour) discouraged female migration and the permanent or even the long-term migration of men.

The conditions in Rabaul facing the urban employee of the mid-1960s is described by Polansky:

Since employers are legally required to provide accommodation for their workers, there has been some reluctance to employ married men. When an employee marries he has the choice of leaving his wife in her village, staying with relatives who have a house (in most cases already over-crowded) or of building a dwelling for himself in one of the shanty towns ... insufficient accommodation for married Papuan and New Guineans is the greatest social problem with which Rabaul has to cope (Polansky 1966:45-6).

Isaac (1970:46, 47) gave the following figures on the provision of accommodation for the Papua New Guinea urban workforce in 1968. Of the private sector employers, only 32 per cent provided combined married and single quarters (although the relative

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8.1</th>
<th>Marital status and proportion of males 15 years and over, with or without accompanying spouse, for the three residential sectors, 1966 (per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Married but not accompanied by wife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural non-village</td>
<td>65.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: PNG Census (1966) and Bathgate (1978: Tables 14 and 29).

proportions are not known), with as much as 40 per cent of employers providing single accommodation only and the remaining 28 per cent providing no accommodation. The Administration was more amenable to providing both married and single quarters although no indication is available on what proportion of facilities were for married couples.
Under these conditions, and given the considerable effort needed to build a house in a new migrant settlement, it is little wonder that men were still reluctant to see towns as places of long-term residence for themselves and their families. With 58 per cent of all accommodation provided by the employer (Isaac 1970:46) the worker was in an ambiguous and precarious position. Cheap, employer-provided accommodation was available (for 34 per cent of employees it was free) but it was mostly single quarters and provided only while he continued with the same employer. There were still only 26 per cent and 37 per cent in the two migrant sectors married and accompanied by a wife in 1971 (Table 8.2). The age dependency and child dependency ratios in 1966 and 1971 (see Tables 8.3 and 8.4) show that the two migrant sectors still basically catered for work-age (15-44) males, although by 1971 there was more evidence of nuclear families. But the proportion of people over 45 years of age was low in both census years.

Table 8.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Married but not accompanied by wife</th>
<th>Married and accompanied by wife</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural non-village</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: PNG Census (1971) and Bathgate (1978: Tables 14 and 29).

Table 8.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>0.494</td>
<td>0.496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural non-village</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Persons aged 45+ years
Age dependency ratio = Persons aged 15-44 years
Age dependency refers to the ratio of dependent 'old' people (45+) to those regarded as of 'work-age'.

Sources: PNG Census (1966 and 1971); Bathgate (1978: Table 14).
Table 8.4

Child dependency ratios for the three residential sectors, 1966 and 1971, total indigenous population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>0.811</td>
<td>0.846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural non-village</td>
<td>0.450</td>
<td>0.655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>0.520</td>
<td>0.600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 

\[
\text{Child dependency ratio} = \frac{\text{Persons aged 0-14 years}}{\text{Persons aged 15-64 years}}
\]

Child dependency refers to the ratio of dependents aged 0-14 years to the number of 'responsible' adults (15-64).

Sources: PNG Census (1966 and 1971); Bathgate (1978: Table 14).

Figure 8.1 shows the ratio of males to females for each 5-year cohort in 1966 and 1971. A balanced male to female ratio was still far from evident in either the urban or the rural non-village sectors in 1971, although the ratios are more balanced compared with 1966. In both years, women in the reproductive age groups, 15-44, were outnumbered by the work-age males in the migrant sectors.

Growth of the towns and a changing age:sex profile

Despite the continuing importance of a short-term dual dependence for most migrants, there were changes from the mid-1960s that reflected a shift away from high turnover, unskilled urban workforce. The colonial state began to provide greater access to education and at the same time, a number of restrictions on occupational mobility within the Public Service were lifted. The spread of migrant settlements which could provide cheap married accommodation was condoned by the Administration. These changes were the result of pressures from an expanding small industrial, commercial and public sector in the towns which required a more educated workforce with a substantial commitment to long-term employment and the acquisition of skills.

The most dramatic indication of the changes in the composition of the urban population was the increase in the ratio of women to men. Between 1966 and 1977 the masculinity ratio in Port Moresby fell from 185 to 139 and proportionately even more sharply in Rabaul and other towns (males per 100 females, Table 8.5). The
Fig. 8.1 Males per one hundred females for each age group for the indigenous population living in the rural, rural non-village and urban sectors, 1966 and 1971. (Source: L. Lewis and A. Elek, unpublished census tabulations. Reproduced in Table 5, Bathgate (1978:7).)
need for workers to maintain a short-term physical separation from their families was becoming less important.

Nevertheless, a number of qualifications need to be made. A tendency towards a more balanced sex ratio in the towns is not a clear-cut indicator of changes among all components of the urban population. The 15 years-and-over age cohorts in 1971 are more biased in favour of males, particularly in the 15-44 age groups. Although the proportion of young men in town had decreased significantly between 1966 and 1973, the 20-24-year-old males were still the largest adult cohort at the time of the Urban Household Survey (Garnaut, Wright and Curtain 1977:23). The urban population, while becoming less divergent from the age:sex distribution of the country as a whole, was still, nevertheless, quite different to the rural village population (see Figure 8.1).

Table 8.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex ratios of indigenous urban populations, 1966-77</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(males per 100 females)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966 1971 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Moresby 185 158 139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lae 202 174 152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabaul 338 214 149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madang 228 163 135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goroka 222 176 152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popondetta — 148 139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kavieng 226 158 152</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Skeldon (1978:13).

By 1977, there is evidence to suggest that this process of 'normalization' of the urban population was levelling off (Table 8.5). Since there is only slow growth in urban employment opportunities, we can expect to see a continuing male bias in migrant streams. The Urban Household Survey in 1973-74 showed that there was much less likelihood of an unemployed male being accompanied by a spouse, regardless of his length of residence in town (Garnaut et al. 1977:63).

A concentration on the changes in the demographic structure of the towns neglects a large proportion of migrants who have moved to the non-urban centres of employment. Therefore, to assess the extent of a continuing dependence being maintained by migrants on the two economies, it is necessary to look at the other side of the coin — the structure of the rural population.

The view from the rural economy

A study of two areas in the East Sepik shows two different patterns of outmigration and strategies of survival. One set of
study villages (Yangoru) presented a pattern of return-migration over the lifecycle with a pronounced male bias among the migrants. In another area (Pagwi) the tendency towards permanent outmigration of both males and females was much stronger.

These differences in migration patterns as strategies for survival can be traced partly to the resource endowment of the inland foothills area (Yangoru) compared with the very limited potential offered by the densely populated levees along the banks of the Sepik River (Pagwi) (see Map 3 and Morauta in following chapter). But another important factor which has greatly facilitated a strategy of return-migration in one area and of permanent out-migration in another is the nature of the traditional social structure and in particular its sexual division of labour.

Table 8.6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Yangoru foothills villages</th>
<th>Pagwi river villages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male (n)</td>
<td>Female (n)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>23.3 (210)</td>
<td>51.7 (89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>43.7 (171)</td>
<td>43.4 (83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>65.3 (144)</td>
<td>64.2 (53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>84.2 (120)</td>
<td>64.3 (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55+</td>
<td>92.0 (25)</td>
<td>71.4 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>51.6 (670)</td>
<td>52.8 (246)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data source: Rural Survey (1974-75).

The susceptibility of the traditional structure to outmigration

The villagers of the Prince Alexander foothills (where the Yangoru study villages are located) are horticulturalists practising shifting cultivation. The subsistence economy is based mainly on yam and taro, supplemented in the lean periods by sago. The Abelam, a linguistic grouping of some 40,000 people, practise an elaborate ritual focused on long yam and Tambaran cults. Through
the cultivation of ceremonial long yams sometimes as long as two to three metres in length) the men practised, as they still do, a fertility cult which demanded their complete involvement, and produced much competitive pressure. This was complemented by the *tambaran* cult which divided ritual groups of men into competing sets of partners who maintained a constant state of aggressive rivalry towards each other through a complicated system of gift exchanges. The yam cult seems to have existed to a lesser extent among the other two prominent linguistic groupings in the foothills, the Mountain Arapesh and the Boiken. Today only the Abelam and to a lesser extent the Boiken appear to have retained a vigorous ceremonial life.

The river villages (where the Pagwi study villages are located) each contain populations of over 300 people, but are restricted to narrow levees of raised ground which vary in size but rarely exceed 50 metres in width. The entire alluvial plain through which the Sepik River flows is subject to annual flooding, often to a depth of 4 metres although the levees supporting the villages are rarely under more than a metre of water. The people occupy large, solidly constructed houses, built on stilts about 2 metres above the ground. The major linguistic groupings are the Iatmul speakers (over 10,000 people), the Chambri (over 2,000) and the Manambu (over 2,000).

The river people are mostly sedentary hunter-gatherers, subsisting on a diet of sago and fish. The river and lakes provide ample quantities of fish and prawns, while sago can be collected in large quantities from the naturally regenerating sago palm. Probably about 90 per cent of the villagers' food is obtained through hunting and gathering. Other sources are coconuts, pigs, and a few yams or taros. The regularity of the floods, lasting for at least five months of the year and sometimes occurring in other parts of the year as well, means that the people have an extremely limited agricultural base.

The above characterization applies to the Iatmul-Chambri people, and only to a much lesser extent to the inhabitants of Avatip (Manambu speakers). An anthropologist resident in Avatip for 17 months has explained the different situation in that village:

The traditional economy of Avatip is a kind of half-way house between that of the Iatmul-Chambri and that of the Yangoru villages .... The area of land which Avatip acquired (through raiding) is not normally susceptible to flooding, and will more than suffice for the village's needs for the indefinite future. It contains sago, and it enables Avatip to cultivate all year round; the villagers make gardens on the levees on the bank of the Sepik which are harvested at the beginning of the wet season in December, and other [gardens] in the ... bush which are harvested around June, at the start of the dry season (Simon Harrison, pers. comm., 1978).
The case of Avatip is considered later.

The river villages existed in an almost constant state of war, with large raiding parties seeking heads from neighbouring villages as a basic means of initiating the young men into adulthood. The procurement of a head was considered essential by Iatmul tradition before a man was permitted to wear a genital covering and therefore to take a wife (J. McCarthy, pers. comm., 1976). Otherwise, inter-village relations were limited to the barter of fish for sago and the exchange of stone tools and plaited mosquito bags for shell valuables (Gewertz 1977a).

The sexual division of labour is very different in Yangoru. The tuber-dependent economies of the foothills require a high degree of interdependence and co-operation between males and females. In the gardens, the men do the initial clearing of the forest, tree lopping and fencing. The women do the planting, weeding and harvesting of such crops as taro, sugar cane and greens but, particularly among the Northern and Eastern Abelam and the Mountain Arapesh, the men have sole charge of the planting, weeding and harvesting of the yams. In addition, the men cut the sago palms and kill and cook the pigs. A family works together, spending much of its time in the garden. The men play a major role in organizing agricultural production. Lea (1964:89) noted that of the eighty gardening groups in the Abelam village he studied, fifty-nine of the gardening groups were led by adult male heads of family.

In distinct contrast is the river-dependent subsistence economy of the Chambri and Iatmul people. Here the economic division of labour between the sexes is much more definite. The work of subsistence production among the Chambri is entirely in the hands of the women, who alone fish and then barter their surplus catch with the 'bush' people (those from the grasslands or hills inland from the river) in return for sago, taro and other foods. In pre-colonial times, the women also earned wealth through making and trading the large-family-size mosquito bags as well as trading axes and cooking pots along the river. Although the men were entirely dependent for their subsistence upon the women's fishing and barter markets, the women were still subservient within a patrilineal organization which determined the ownership of land and water rights, assigned the women to productive roles and distributed the products of their labour (Gewertz 1977a:208). The marked differences between the two areas in the productive role played by men, particularly for married men over 30 years of age, suggests that some traditional economies may have been more susceptible than others to outside forces, tending to induce men to leave home.

1Today most Iatmul women still acquire their sago through the traditional barter markets. The Chambri women, however, although still engaging in barter, now prefer to travel to money markets to sell their fish and to buy other staples (Gewertz 1977a).
In yam-growing areas the more demanding methods of production (the labour input for yams is up to three times higher than that for sweet potatoes) probably exerted a strong hold on the men, demanding the regular presence of the older men in particular (M. Bathgate, pers. comm., 1978; see also Lea 1964). New ground has to be cleared more often because of the heavy demand yams make on trace elements in the soil, and the crop requires intensive preparation before planting and persistent attention to weeding while the yams are growing. In addition the ritual of the long-yam fertility cult allowed only the men to tend the yams. They observed strict food and sex taboos for up to seven months (Lea 1964:113). Women were seen as inimical to the growth of the yams and they were forbidden to enter either the yam gardens or the storehouses.

For those societies knit together by the need to co-operate over an extended gardening season, the introduction of iron tools meant merely that traditional methods could now be practised with greater efficiency. But for the Chambri villages in particular, the society was profoundly shaken by the introduction of steel tools, aluminium pots and mosquito netting which destroyed the indigenous industries that were a major source of shell money to the Chambris (Gewertz 1977a:118). Labour migration became a necessary outlet to earn money to acquire both steel axes and other valuables previously gained through trade.

The relationship between the mode of subsistence production and the propensity to migrate is well illustrated by the example of one of the river villages, Avatip. Access to an abundance of higher land above the flood level has led the men to play a more vital role in subsistence production than is the case among the Iatmul and Chambri people, a role which tends to discourage migration. The men do the heavier work of clearing and fencing gardens, while the planting of yams, an important part of the subsistence economy for Avatip, requires a co-ordinated series of tasks involving men and women equally. Although the women in Avatip are not regarded as quite so inimical to yams as are women among the Abelam, nevertheless the first fruits of the levee gardens, which are highly sacred, can only be harvested by men, which they do during an important annual ritual. Men also play a vital role in the production of sago in which Avatip is nearly self-sufficient. These differences may partly account for the fact that Avatip's level of outmigration is much closer to that of the Yangoru study hill villages than to other river villages. The lower level of male outmigration and higher level of return-migration is due partly to the important role played by men in the local subsistence economy.

The different forms of organization of the pre-colonial subsistence economies are, however, only one factor in explaining the differing propensities to migrate. The easy access for recruiters to large concentrations of population afforded by the Sepik River
was certainly another major factor in explaining the large number of men recruited from the river villages.

The extent of a continuing dependence on the rural economy

Many peasant households still maintain both a dependence on the rural economy and the capitalist wage economy by continuing the pattern of single or unaccompanied male migration while the women remain at home to maintain production. There are a number of indicators from the sex ratios, the marital status and position within the household of the resident and absentee population of the two sets of study villages in the East Sepik to illustrate this phenomenon.

Table 8.7 shows the low ratios of men to women among the resident villagers with correspondingly high ratios of men to women among the absentees. But note the lower male to female ratio among the Pagwi villages' absentees, reflecting the greater tendency towards a more family-oriented, permanent pattern of outmigration from the disadvantaged river villages.

Table 8.8 confirms the trends evident from Table 8.7. There is a substantially lower proportion of absentee men in the 25-44 age group who are married compared with the same age grouping among the male village residents. Although a number of migrants are now able to contemplate having a wife and family accompany them to town (roughly half of male absentees from both sets of villages are married), an equal number still migrate as single men.

Table 8.7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Migrant status</th>
<th></th>
<th>Migrant status</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resident</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Resident</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>366 (309)&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>205 (259)&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>202 (221)&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>206 (186)&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55+</td>
<td>135</td>
<td></td>
<td>131</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>An absentee is a person resident outside the rural village sector for more than a month. <sup>b</sup>Sex ratios for those not attending school in the year of the survey. <sup>c</sup>Too few observations.

Data source: Rural Survey (1974-75).
Table 8.8

Proportion of men married for each age group by migrant status in 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yangoru Age</th>
<th>Migrant status Resident (n)</th>
<th>Migrant status Absent^a (n)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>17.1 (105)</td>
<td>16.7 (102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>90.5 (105)</td>
<td>62.4 (93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>86.9 (122)</td>
<td>63.3 (49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>84.1 (145)</td>
<td>79.0^b (19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55+</td>
<td>69.7 (66)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>71.3 (543)</td>
<td>46.0 (265)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pagwi Age</th>
<th>Migrant status Resident (n)</th>
<th>Migrant status Absent^a (n)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>12.1 (33)</td>
<td>21.3 (75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>75.7 (37)</td>
<td>58.8 (68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>90.1 (66)</td>
<td>74.2 (62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>88.7 (62)</td>
<td>94.4 (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55+</td>
<td>69.1 (55)</td>
<td>80.0 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>73.1 (253)</td>
<td>54.0 (228)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^a Absent for more than a month. Those attending school in the year of the survey are excluded, so as to avoid a likely bias toward single migrants in the youngest age group, who can only obtain secondary schooling by migrating.

^b Too few observations.

Data source: Rural Survey (1974-75).

The 'straddled' peasant household

A final indicator of the tendency for a number of rural households to maintain a strategy of dual dependence is the residential composition of the households in the surveyed villages. The tendency is for the male head of household and his wife to be resident in the village maintaining rural production, while dependants within the household who hold less important positions in the rural relations of production show a greater tendency to be current migrants.

Mitchell (1959), in an article on circular labour migration in southern Africa, has commented that the probability of a man migrating depends partly on the positions he holds and the roles he plays in the rural social system. In particular, Mitchell noted evidence showing that the responsibilities of the head of a family militated against him migrating. The same tendency is evident in the study villages (see Table 8.9). Only 27 per cent of the household heads in the younger age group are currently absent while 57 per cent of those classified as dependants (mostly brothers,
sisters, sons or daughters) are absent. Only 12 per cent of household heads among the older age group are absent compared with 39 per cent of dependants absent in the same age group. Most household heads are returned migrants. The wife of the household head, however, is likely to have never migrated. She, of all members of the household, was the least likely to be currently absent.

From these data we can infer that men migrate while they have minimal responsibilities at home and return there to marry and set up a rural household. Wives are not likely to migrate or, if they do, to return home to become the lynchpin of the rural household. This strategy therefore encourages those dependants within the household to attempt to acquire a cash income to support the household through employment in the wage economy.

Table 8.9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household position</th>
<th>15-34 years</th>
<th>35-55+ years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-migrant</td>
<td>Returned-migrant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other dependants</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other dependants</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data source: Rural Survey (1974-75).

The data in Table 8.9 point to a likely strategy for a number of rural households, but not for all households. The resource differences between the foothill (Yangoru) and river (Pagwi) villages are likely to account for a number of degrees of involvement in this strategy of the 'straddled' peasant household. Other evidence suggests that the wealthier households within the village are more likely to participate in this strategy. As well, the level of educational attainment of the dependent members of the household will also increase the chances of becoming a straddled household. There is a stronger tendency for the older heads of household from the Pagwi villages to be absent. This is consistent with the more family-oriented permanent outmigration from the river villages, noted earlier.

Ross and Weisner (1977:361) have suggested six preconditions encouraging the strategy of a household straddling two economies
in a third world context. These are, first, the availability of rural resources to the migrant, especially access to land; second, control of these resources by patrilineal groups of males to ensure that the ownership of land is open to absentees; third, the availability of family members to reside and work on the rural holding; fourth, the level of agricultural technology must be relatively simple so that the men are willing to allow their wives to produce cash crops in their absence; fifth, there must be a common kinship, language and cultural unity within the area of rural origin to ensure both urban social support within the migrant population and the importance of norms of reciprocity; and finally, the travel time and cost from the rural home area to the major urban centre must be moderate. Most of the preconditions are applicable to the situation of East Sepik migrants.

The existence of these preconditions, where applicable, suggests strongly that the Papua New Guinean migrants' continuing dependence on the rural peasant economy is likely to remain important both as a strategy of survival for the rural household in the short term and as an ultimate refuge for semi-permanent urban migrants. Continued access to and clan ownership of rural land is the most important factor in explaining a peasant strategy of dual dependence.

Land has not become a commercial commodity bought and sold in the marketplace. Communal land rights remain although some access to land use, particularly for the production of cash crops, may become subject to individual control.2 Despite the extensive monetization of the rural economy, the ownership of the land remains within the traditional kinship structure. This is the distinguishing feature of a peasant economy with strong tribal traditions. Rural villagers' involvement with the monetary economy is not at the expense of the ownership and access to their livelihood. The kinship structure has so far been successful in resisting the transformation of land into an exchange commodity.

The colonial administration made a number of attempts to encourage the conversion of customary land ownership to individual titles. But there is little evidence, despite various informal arrangements and pressures (Ward 1979) that rural land has become available for unrestricted sale on the market. Rowley (1978:122), in a review of former Australian Minister Hasluck's A Time for Building (1977), assesses the attempt to convert land to individual tenure:

---

2 The individual control of customary land is often the result of the Development Bank's requirement of security for personal loans for rural projects. The security is usually provided by a 'Clan Land Use Agreement' whereby individuals gain sole rights to the use of a defined portion of the clan's land for a defined period (Ward 1979:9).
A great deal of effort went into creating 'native' individual tenures and into making land a commodity ... [but] the machinery set up in his [Hasluck's] and subsequent legislation had little real effect (as distinct from effect in law) in taking individual blocks out of group tenure. For the claims of relatives to use land in accordance with tradition were not to be frustrated by Australian laws. There were many innovators who used land for their profit, but generally within a definite range of obligations established in custom.

Where individuals had acquired registered titles to rural land before 1973 the obligations of traditional usage and succession still held sway (Ward 1979:4-5).

A recent survey of informal land arrangements (to 1977) in a number of rural and urban locations throughout Papua New Guinea, by Alan Ward and others, confirms the conclusion about the earlier practice where customary landowners retained 'absolute' ownership of the land:

My overall view was that as well as a powerful drive by some Papua New Guineans towards individual holdings in land, there was an equally powerful counter-current asserting residual group rights, and highly suspicious of an excess of individualisation (Ward 1979:24).

Conclusion

The major consequence of the operation of the MLS has been to inhibit the formation of a large proletariat by forcing migrants to maintain a dual dependence on two economies. Village land as part of a peasant economy is now only one of the factors of production. Labour migration became an integral part of the peasant household's survival. Thus the peasant household, as it functions in many cases today, straddles the village economy and the urban/plantation sectors. Women and the older male heads of household remain at or return home to maintain production, while those members of the household less essential to the rural production unit are absent as wage earners, eventually to return home themselves with capital to contribute to the household.

This conclusion does not mean necessarily that migration is therefore beneficial to the migrant or his or her community of origin. The weighing up of the costs and benefits is an empirical question related to the resource base and potential for cash cropping of the rural community. But here again, the focus on the individual is likely to neglect the broader economic and social repercussions of migration on the rural economy.

The impact of the absence of large numbers of the most innovative and educated young people at the most productive period
of their lives has been glossed over by labour surplus theories of economic growth such as Fisk's (1971). It was argued that the temporary absence of the male worker had little effect on rural production. But the assertion was not empirically tested and the only study (Boyd 1975) to look at the effect of the absence of men has found that the existence of surplus labour was more apparent than real. Later in this volume, Jones and Ward as well as Connell, point to the likely detrimental effect of male absenteeism, especially on the quality and quantity of rural food production.

The long-term impact of outmigration in the creation of labour reserve areas to the benefit of the export production enclaves has contributed significantly to the existence of substantial regional inequalities today. Recent provincial government attempts to draw back their educated migrants to work in their home province is one sign of the impoverishing effect long-term outmigration has had on regional economies.

The subsidization of growth in the capitalist wage economy provided by the peasant economy is becoming less necessary as the post-colonial state accepts responsibility for the cost of the process of renewal such as state-funded education, health services, workers' compensation and pension payments to some workers. But other costs of maintenance and renewal normally provided by the state in a metropolitan country are not met: unemployment benefits, family welfare payments, pensions for unskilled or semi-skilled workers, or superannuation payments geared towards the urban cost of living for more senior urban employees and, most importantly, a lack of secure tenure over urban housing and land.

These factors, together with the tenacity of the rural peasant economy with guaranteed access to land for almost all absentees and the limited capacity of the capitalist economy to provide wage employment, are likely to continue to hold back the emergence of a substantial permanent proletariat.
Chapter 9

Mobility patterns in Papua New Guinea: social factors as explanatory variables*

Louise Morauta

Many accounts of mobility patterns in Papua New Guinea have given a prominent role to certain types of economic factor (Garnaut, Wright and Curtain 1977, May and Skeldon 1977:15-18 and Ward 1980). However, some writers (Clunies Ross 1977b:21, Garnaut, Wright and Curtain 1977:184, Skeldon 1979:14-15 and Ward 1977:31 and 1980) have suggested that there is also a need to include other factors if a satisfactory level of understanding is to be achieved. In this paper I consider two sets of factors which may complement the more standard economic analysis in explaining differences in urban mobility patterns between ethnic groups in Papua New Guinean societies and the effects of the migration process itself on migrant decision-making. I look at three sets of factors in a detailed study of one group of urban migrants and in a tentative way in a comparison of six different groups. Finally I look at the policy implications of using this broader field of variables to understand mobility patterns in Papua New Guinea.

I am concerned with the understanding of overall rural-urban mobility patterns, not only with the more commonly considered question of why young adult males move to town. First, although there has long been discussion of stream and counter-stream, explanations of migration patterns have focused almost entirely on initial movements. Nevertheless an explanation of net migration must rely equally on understanding why people did or did not move to town and why they did or did not return to the village. In Papua New Guinea very little work has been done on the factors affecting the decision to return or not to return to the village.¹

* I wish to acknowledge helpful discussions of an earlier draft of this paper with James Carrier, John Conroy, Gavin Jones and Barry Shaw. I am grateful to James and Ascher Carrier for giving me access to their data on Ponam Island for comparative purposes.

¹Some discussion occurs in Conroy and Curtain 1978:28, Curtain 1977, Garnaut et al. 1977:9, 10, and Young 1978:33. However, Ward regards this as 'an underworked field' (1980).
Second, an explanation of mobility patterns must account for the decisions of different kinds of people, men, women, children and old people, and for the sequential decisions of an individual over his or her life-time.

Third, migration decisions are taken at a number of different stages in the migration histories of various groups. We need to be able to explain the movements not just of the first cohort of migrants from a particular rural area, but also the actions of subsequent cohorts.

In this paper I suggest three kinds of factors that taken together influence mobility patterns. They are:

1. Variations in socio-economic structures between societies.
2. The effect of the migration process itself on migration decisions.
3. More generalized economic conditions (see above).

Together these comprise a single configuration of conditions unique to particular societies or groups of migrants (Germani 1965:163) under which migration decisions are taken.

Variations in socio-economic structures

My first line of inquiry is to see how far differences between societies in Papua New Guinea in relation to socio-economic structures can contribute to an understanding of differences in mobility patterns between migrants from different areas (see Curtain, preceding chapter). The four variables considered are:

1. the organization of rural production; in particular the division of labour by sex (Curtain 1978:5) and age, and the nature of the productive unit;
2. the system of access to rural resources, be they land, sago palm or reef; and how rights of access may be affected by absence from the village;
3. the provision of care for the aged; on whom does responsibility rest and how far is it shared? and
4. the provision of care for children; on whom does responsibility rest and how far is it shared?

Of course each variable is most relevant to one or two particular forms of migration decision, and not to all decisions ever taken. For example, number three relates particularly to the actions of old people and their adult children. It is not intended that these variables describe some hypothetical traditional (pre-
colonial) social system of any one society, but rather the contemporary arrangements that influence an individual's decisions.

Social structure is also a variable relevant to the question of who makes migration decisions for whom, an issue which has recently attracted the attention of Ward (1980). Both the organization of corporate groups and the relationship between the interests of the individual and those of the family or other group are variable between and within societies.

The effect of the migration process itself on migration decisions

Factors falling within this field have been given some consideration already in the literature on Papua New Guinea (e.g. Garnaut et al. 1977:186). The underlying assumption is that no migration decision (whether to move or not to move) is taken in exactly the same environment as a previous decision. I want here to identify a number of specific mechanisms at work.

First, there are the effects of previous migration decisions on the rural community. High levels of outmigration from a rural village may have effects on:

1. dependence ratios, making rural life harder work;
2. expectations of an attitudes to migration behaviour (the 'snowballing effect' described by Clunies Ross 1977b:21);
3. the relative attractiveness of village life for all groups, size of community, absence of young, lack of esprit de corps;
4. the potential for chain migration, joining siblings etc. in town, reduced costs of migration, information flows (Connell et al. 1976:38-9, Ward 1980); and
5. the number of close relatives an individual has in a particular location, and thus the focus of his or her social life.

All these factors suggest that previous decisions to leave the village dispose other people to decide to leave as well. There are, however, some arguments that might suggest the opposite. It may be that the more people leave the rural area, the more attractive staying in the village becomes, because of an increase in resources per rural resident or because, as more members of a family or descent group leave, pressure mounts on one member to remain or return to secure rights to property (e.g. land) or to care for the elderly.
Second, there are the effects of long residence in town on decisions about leaving town. These effects apply both to people who originally lived in a rural area, for whom such a move is a return, and to those born and raised in town (Clunies Ross 1977b:21, Garnaut et al. 1977:86 and Morauta 1979c:3, 5) for whom it is an initial move. The mechanisms by which long urban residence may affect urban-rural migration include the following:

1. a diminution of or lack of opportunity to develop skills for rural life (particularly for those born or largely raised in town);

2. a change of tastes so that urban living is more highly valued than previously or a lack of familiarity with rural life and its advantages;

3. the effect of children born and raised in town on the migration decisions of their parents' generation; will older people without adult children in the village return? This is in turn related to systems of care for the aged;

4. access to rural resources after prolonged absence; in turn this depends on the system of access in a particular society (see above); can people lose rights to land or reef? and

5. access to other kinds of assistance (labour, food etc.) in the event of a return to the village; this may depend on social structure and/or on rural-urban contacts (Garnaut et al. 1977: ch. 5).

The three sets of factors suggested must be seen in conjunction with one another rather than in isolation or opposition. Thus the ability of a rural system of production to absorb additional dependants depends partly on the organization of rural production and partly on the proportion of active people absent from the rural sector. Nevertheless it is implicit in the argument about the effect of the migration process on migration decisions that people become less responsive to variables such as general wage and unemployment levels as these other factors become more important (see also on this point Clunies Ross 1977b:22 and Garnaut et al. 1977: 186).

I should also like to emphasize that the first two sets of factors I suggest are not themselves non-economic: they simply add to our understanding of the options facing an individual. Consider the position of an elderly man, all of whose adult children live in town. In this society let us say that his livelihood depends on these children and he cannot expect assistance from other relatives. In the rural sector his expected income (either from his own efforts or from assistance from others) is very low while in
the urban area, through the assistance of his adult children, his expected income is much higher.

The approach proposed here places micro-studies in close association with migration macro-theory (see Levine 1979:85). There are a number of reasons for thinking that this is a reasonable attempt in Papua New Guinea. Although anthropological and sociological studies are, in the field, almost entirely concerned with particular societies, their theoretical interests are essentially cross-cultural. Second, in Papua New Guinea there has been considerable emphasis on cultural and social differences between societies (Morauta 1979a:564), an emphasis that possibly understates both traditional elements in common between many societies, and emerging urban and national social forms. Third, a great number of micro-studies have already been completed in Papua New Guinea and new field research is not always needed to build up the kind of comparative theory I have suggested. Fourth, there are now a number of large-scale surveys in Papua New Guinea, which enable us, at least at the middle-level, to fit micro-studies into a wider framework. Fifth, if micro-processes are understood, they can be examined through macro-survey data. If we know what a macro-survey variable such as length of urban residence means from one micro-study, we can use it as an indicator of processes occurring for a much larger number of people in comparable circumstances.

Malalaua migration: a case study

I turn now to the rural-urban mobility patterns of people from the Malalaua District of Papua New Guinea (see also Morauta and Ryan 1980). The Malalaua district is the easternmost of the Gulf Province (see Map 3), with a total population (resident and absent) of 23,803. The great majority of the Malalaua people are members of one broad cultural and linguistic group known as Elema. The district has a history of contact with Europeans that dates from 1881 (Ryan 1978:7-8), but has not seen rapid or varied economic development.

There are very high levels of outmigration. In Papua New Guinea's capital, Port Moresby, the Malalauas are the largest group of migrants by district of origin. From their earliest postwar days in Port Moresby, Malalaua males were joined by women and their children. Many of those who came earlier have not returned to the

---

3 I refer to them as 'the Malalauas' to be consistent between publications and because large-scale survey data have been collected at the district level. Elema-speakers also live in the Kerema District of the Gulf Province. Ryan's 1963 survey in Port Moresby covered Elema-speakers from the Malalaua District only.
4 For detailed and quantitative material, see Morauta (1979d), Morauta and Ryan (1980:3-9) and Ryan (1977).
village. The ANU/UPNG Urban Household Survey of 1973-74 (Garnaut et al. 1977) shows that of all groups in Port Moresby, the Malalauas expressed the weakest definite intention to return to the village 'some time'. Significantly for my argument, children are being born to Malalaua migrants in town. In 1963 the majority of these children were under fifteen years of age. However, by 1980 the first large cohort were in the age range 27-31 years, and many of them have already borne a second generation of urban-born Malalauas. Over the entire period, 1940-1973/74, the most common pattern of migration has been the movement of young single adult males, and young female adults moving to town on marriage. There is also a moderate element of young family migration and a small number of much older migrants moving to town when they are aged 45 years and over.

Both the absolute numbers of migrants and the proportion of Malalauas absent have risen rapidly over the twenty years to 1972. For example, in 1953 10.8 per cent of the population of the Toaripi Census Division was absent,\(^5\) while in 1972 the proportion was 54.9 per cent. Over the same period, the absolute numbers of residents fell by more than a thousand, from 5,662 to 4,390 (Seiler 1974: appended but unnumbered pages). In 1970-72 Seiler reported 55.2 per cent absent for the Malalaua District as a whole.

Malalaua mobility patterns have been most commonly explained by reference to the imbalance of economic opportunities in rural and urban areas (Conroy and Curtain 1978:12, 13, Garnaut et al. 1977: 45, 182, Harris 1977a:7, 10 and Singh 1974:18). Cash crop incomes in the Malalaua District are relatively low by Papua New Guinean standards (see Table 9.2), while in Port Moresby, Malalauas earn higher-than-average wages per wage-earner (Morauta 1979c:10, 11, 14). A further factor that applies to the district generally is its easy access to Port Moresby.

Turning now to the Malalaua socio-economic structure and migration history in terms of the variables identified earlier in the paper, it must be seen that an outstanding feature of Malalaua social structure is the absence of strong corporate groups (Ryan 1978:26), such as the unilineal clans that are found in many parts of Papua New Guinea. A Malalaua is surrounded by a large number of cognatic kin with whom he can have active and supportive relationships, particularly those of material exchange. In practice he can only activate a limited number of these, and has to let others go by default.

The Malalaua rural economy depends primarily on sago, fish and shell-fish. Gardens are unimportant except in inland villages. In Malalaua the simplest sago-making team consists of an adult male and a female. Larger teams always break down into couples, the

\(^5\)This is an absence not a migration rate because it includes children born in town to Malalaua men.
man shredding the pith from the trunk and the woman washing the pith produced by her partner. The commonest team is husband and wife. On the other hand fishing can be done by either men or women (usually with different techniques), and gardening is primarily a woman's task, with a more seasonal input from men. Thus production of the main staple, sago, is focused on the nuclear family, while the other major form of production, fishing, can be although it is not necessarily conducted on an individual basis. A woman without a husband in the village is disadvantaged in relation to the primary activity of sago making. At least today there does not seem to be a wider pool of labour in the village on which a woman in this position can draw regularly. From time to time she may receive help, but she is thrown very much on her own resources. My own fieldwork suggests that the most common source of support would be her own parents if they were alive and active themselves. It is interesting to note that when large numbers of Malalaua men were absent as carriers during World War II, there were reports of food shortages (Robinson 1979:85).

There is a considerable difference between males and females in their late teens and early twenties in relation to production. Young single men contribute irregularly to sago or copra production, and give no assistance in domestic tasks, although they are a pool of reserve labour for large tasks such as house-building. They have large appetites, usually smoke, enjoy travel and like new clothes. Single women, on the other hand, have from girlhood played a major part in domestic work, and assisted in other productive tasks. They are usually active in fishing and collecting crabs and shell-fish.

Land and sago can be inherited from a number of sources. The underlying rule is not genealogical. The person or people who best 'look after' the current owner of the land are the heirs to the land. Thus a daughter who is close to her father can disinherit her absent brother who pays no attention to his parents. Inheritance of sago follows the same pattern. It is also possible to have access to other land and sago, and eventually perhaps inherit them, if they belong to people with whom one has active relationships of material exchange.

In Malalaua society, in the absence of corporate groups, responsibility for the care of children falls mainly on their own parents. Occasionally parents' siblings give assistance. The converse of this is that parents expect their children to assist them once they are adult and, in particular, to care for them when they are old.\(^6\) During a lifetime a person's position in this system changes, although the primary focus remains on the parent-

\(^6\) In this respect, putting children through school can be seen as an investment by parents, in expectation of future returns (J. Carrier 1980 and van der Veur and Richardson 1966).
child tie. It should also be noted that a couple can find themselves in different relationships to different children: while some children may be married adults, others may still be small. This also gives rise to relationships of assistance and indebtedness between younger and older siblings. Malalauas also build up relationships of assistance with other kin and neighbours. But parent-child or other relationships are not primarily materialistic. In Malalaua, as in many Papua New Guinea societies, relationships of material assistance are the way people express their feelings of love and compassion.\(^7\)

The process of migration itself has affected contemporary migrant decision-making among Malalauas. Heavy outmigration has affected the relative attraction of urban and rural locations for Malalauas. As the size of their peer group in the village dwindles,\(^8\) young men gravitate towards town. Rising dependency ratios in the rural population place greater pressures on active adults in the villages, and make life there even less easy. Villages are physically smaller than they used to be, and the most able are usually absent. Meanwhile, in Port Moresby, the Malalaua population is young and community life vigorous, especially in the migrant settlements where people from one particular village often settle. Furthermore Malalauas themselves emphasize that there has been a change in tastes among both urban and rural residents. Urban living standards are considered normal and desirable; living on a subsistence diet in a rural area is considered unattractive. Thus new factors have appeared that were not present when the first cohorts of Malalaua migrants left their villages for town.

It is also necessary to consider whether heavy outmigration may have made the village more rather than less attractive for some. Some families have more resources in terms of land, sago and coconuts than others. For members of such families, it is probably true that there is pressure for one member to remain in the village at all times, and that his economic situation will be improved by the absence of his siblings. Many others, however, have few valuable assets, at least near where they are resident, and I doubt if these factors would be an important consideration for the majority of potential migrants.

So far I have been considering factors that affect moves from village to town. However, it is clear that they are also elements in the explanation of decisions about whether or not to return to the village from town. In addition there are other factors that affect the size of the counter or urban-rural stream of migration that are not applicable to initial moves to town: the

\(^7\)Pidgin *sori*, Toaripi *maeafroe*.

\(^8\)In Kukipi, the site of my own fieldwork, in 1977 only 6 of the 63 males in the 20-24 age group were resident in the village.
geographical location of members of a person's natal and conjugal families and the changes that occur in his relationship with these families over time. A young man moves to town on his own, then marries and has children in town. At this stage his and his wife's parents and siblings may all be in the village. As time passes, however, it is increasingly likely that either their parents have died or they have moved to town. Simultaneously the couple's own children are growing up in town and in the course of time bearing their grandchildren there.

Two processes are taking place that mean over time the couple are less likely to return to the village. In the first place, their foothold in the rural economy becomes more tenuous. As their parents die and, to a lesser extent, as siblings also move to town, there is less likelihood of there being someone in the village who will give them access to land and sago. In the Malalaua case the major change is not that migrants fail to fulfil obligations to people in the village (Garnaut et al. 1977:9, 10 and ch. 5), but that they cease to have people in the village to whom they have obligations. The converse is also true: they cease to have people in the village who have obligations to them.

The second process that occurs is the focusing of the couple's expectations of mutual support and later assistance on other adults who are permanent urban residents. Once their children are adults, they are not likely to move to the village because, raised in town, they do not have the skills necessary for village life. If the parents' strongest ties are to the children, then it is very likely that the former will stay permanently too. The same process occurs over a shorter time period if the couple migrate initially to town when the children are too young to have learned village skills. It is not necessary for all the children to be adult before the influence of this process begins to be felt in relation to the eldest children.

The explanation of migration decisions can thus change for the individual over time. While the processes I describe refer in the first instance to individuals, they also refer cumulatively to cohorts of migrants and thence to the migration experience of Malalauas as a whole.

With this background it is now possible to try to understand the overall pattern of Malalaua mobility. For the movement of adult males from rural to urban areas, there can be little doubt that the great differences in economic opportunities between the two locations are important as explanations. During the postwar

---

9In one village (Lese Avihara) Avosa found 43.7 per cent of male absentees were said to claim land rights in the village, but these were challenged, while 17.5 per cent were said to have no land rights (Avosa 1977: Table 14).
period, rural cash-earning opportunities have not improved while real urban incomes have risen, and the Malalaua employment situation has not deteriorated over time (Morauta and Ryan 1980:9-15). Nevertheless later in the period other factors have become increasingly important for the decisions of adult males: the scarcity of peer group members in the village, a change in tastes affecting the relative attraction of rural life, and smaller and less vital rural village communities. The movement of single adults to town can also be understood in relation to the organization of production in Malalaua society. There is little pressure on them to stay in the village, since they are costly and not useful to their natal households and in fact they are not very amenable to parental influences of any kind during this time.

The movement of females to town mainly on marriage and their subsequent migration decisions have to be understood in the light of a number of different factors. First, urban economic conditions were probably important for early female migration. I refer here mainly to the access Malalauas had in Port Moresby to land on which from the earliest days they were able to build owner-occupied housing suitable for families while most other migrants only had access to single quarters. Second, there is the question of how women would have managed in the village without their husbands. Heavy outmigration would have further reduced the possibilities for assistance to married women, already limited by the social structure. Similar arguments apply to migration decisions about dependent children, since responsibility for their care rests almost solely with their own parents.

A final group of migrants to be considered is that of the elderly. The explanation lies not in geographically described economic opportunities, but in the economic provision for the aged inherent in the social system. There comes a time when older people need or want to receive immediate care and assistance from their children. If all or most of their children are in town, they have to move to town themselves in order to receive this assistance.

It has become clear that the types of explanation that are appropriate have diversified over time. In the first postwar years, economic motivation of adult males was important. However, other factors have become significant more recently. The migration patterns of children, females and old people have always needed explanation in a wider socio-economic framework. In addition the decision to remain or not to remain in town is increasingly influenced by family ties between urban residents, and a reduction in such ties with rural residents. Both in the lives of individuals and among Malalauas as a whole the balance of economic opportunities in rural and urban areas is increasingly less relevant to the decision about whether or not to remain in town (see also Garnaut et al. 1977:10).
The approach in comparative perspective

The approach I have suggested may be helpful in understanding differences in mobility patterns between groups in Papua New Guinea. This section is tentative, however, providing suggestions for further inquiry rather than definitive analysis. My main problem has been to find other groups on which there is sufficient information on all the features necessary: migration patterns, social structure and urban residence. The six locations selected are the Ambunti, Gumine, Madang, Malalaua and Mumeng Districts and Ponam Island in Manus Province (see Map 3).

Table 9.1 summarizes the mobility patterns for the six locations chosen in terms of some of the same variables used by earlier writers (Clunies Ross 1977a and Conroy and Curtain 1978). In this table I look first at the proportion of the home population that is absent at a particular point in time, although none of these absence rate figures are specific to a particular kind of destination. Second, I give the proportion of males from each location who have been resident ten years or more in their major urban destination, as an index of stability of urban migration. Third, I use the number of males per 100 females in the major urban destination as an indicator of family residence. I have taken this in preference to the Rural Survey's males per 100 females among all absentees, because it describes more specifically the urban situation with which I am concerned. Fourth, I wanted a measure of the circularity of migration, or of the rate of return to the village. The Rural Survey provided this in the form of a ratio of currently absent to now-or-ever migrant males. The figure is a useful measure but it does not distinguish urban migrants from others and it is affected by the absolute size of different cohorts of migrants and by the rates of return specific to them. Unfortunately parallel figures were not available for Madang and Mumeng, so I have included the 1966-71 inter-provincial attrition rate from the census as a second-best measure to give a rough indication for those areas.

Overall a number of differences appear between the six locations. Malalaua, Ambunti, Mumeng and Ponam have rather similar mobility patterns: high rates of outmigration, long urban residence (not available for Ponam), family residence in town and similar rates of return to the village (not available for Mumeng). Madang and Gumine are very different and are not exactly similar to each other. Both have much lower proportions of men absent. While Madang has fewer males per 100 females than the other four locations, it has many more than Gumine. Both have fewer men with long urban residence, although Madang has more than Gumine. Gumine has a very much higher rate of return than other locations.

---

10 This was chosen in preference to all urban destinations because Urban Household Survey (Garnaut et al. 1977) tables would require a great deal of work to produce aggregate figures across all towns.
Table 9.1
Available information on descriptive variables for six locations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location (district and province)</th>
<th>Ambunti, East Sepik</th>
<th>Gumein, Chimbu</th>
<th>Madang, Madang</th>
<th>Malaulau, Gulf</th>
<th>Mumeng, Morobe</th>
<th>[Ponam], Manus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent adult males absent</td>
<td>49(^b)</td>
<td>16(^b)</td>
<td>24(^c)</td>
<td>51(^b)</td>
<td>63(^d)</td>
<td>52(^e)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent males (aged 15-44)</td>
<td>23.2(^g)</td>
<td>2.7(^g)</td>
<td>8.4(^k)</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resident 10 years or more in major urban destination(^f)</td>
<td>(Madang)</td>
<td>(Pt Moresby)</td>
<td>(Mt Hagen)</td>
<td>(Pt Moresby)</td>
<td>(Pt Moresby)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males per 100 females (aged 15-44) in major urban destinations(^h)</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>140(^f)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned adult males as per cent of all now-or-ever migrant males</td>
<td>35(^b)</td>
<td>66(^b)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>30(^b)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>38.7(^j)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-71 provincial attrition rate of outmigrant population (all migrants)(^k)</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>66.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes and sources

\(^a\)Ponam Island has a population (both resident and absent) of 507 (A. Carrier 1980: Table C). All information refers only to this population in 1980. Manus Province has no districts.

\(^b\)Clunies Ross (1977a: Summary Table 1). Figures refer only to purposive samples of villages within these districts in 1974-75.

\(^c\)Morauta (1974: Table 3). Figure refers to 17 villages with a population of 2,579 in 1969 and includes those resident in neighbouring villages.

\(^d\)Zimmerman (1973:64, 66). Figure refers to Mapos village in 1971-72. This is not likely to be typical of the 23 Buang villages she discusses for which the overall absentee rate was 45.7 (ibid.:139).

\(^e\)A. Carrier (1980: Table F). Figure refers to males 20 years and over in 1980 since Carrier used ten-year age groups.

\(^f\)Garnaut et al. (1977: Tables 5.16, 5.18 and 5.24). Major urban destination determined from their table 3.6 Figures refer to 1973-74.

\(^g\)Figure refers to whole province; not available at district level.

\(^h\)Garnaut et al. (1977: Table 3.6), except for Ponam.

\(^i\)A. Carrier (1980: Table F). Figure refers to all absentees, not only those in Port Moresby.

\(^j\)J. and A. Carrier, unpublished table. The authors emphasize (pers. comm. 1980) that this figure is influenced by the larger size of more recent age cohorts and thus more recent cohorts of migrants. The same factor may apply to other areas too.

\(^k\)Skeldon (1979: Table 7.17). Figures only available at provincial level and for inter-provincial migration and refer to 1971 census.
Unfortunately a return figure is not available for Madang for comparative purposes.

A word of caution should be said here about the kinds of similarities indicated in Table 9.1, for example between Malalaua and Ambunti. The figures may mask differences between locations. In the Malalaua and Ambunti cases, the Rural Survey showed a large difference in the proportion of male absentees who were expected by villagers to return. In Ambunti almost all were expected to return, while the figure for Malalauaas was only a little over half (A. Clunies Ross, pers. comm., 1980). While villagers may be expected to be over-optimistic about rates of return, the difference between Malalaua and Ambunti is large and may reflect either differences in communication between absentees and rural residents, and/or real differences in the migrants' currently perceived likelihood of return.

I turn now to the three sets of factors that may be helpful in understanding mobility patterns: variations in socio-economic structures, the effect of the migration process itself on migration decisions and generalized economic conditions. Available data for the six locations are presented in a summary form in Table 9.2, the three sets of factors being represented by variables numbered 1-4, 5 and 6, and 7-10 respectively.

The variables summarized in Table 9.2 for features of contemporary socio-economic structures (numbers 1-4) are those identified earlier in the paper. The effects of the migration process on migration decisions are represented by two indicators: per cent of adult males absent from the rural area (5) and length of urban residence (6). It is in the nature of this argument that two variables that appear in the descriptive Table 9.1 reappear in the table that attempts to explain and understand Table 9.1. For generalized economic conditions, I take the measures used by Garnaut et al. (1977:182) in the Urban Household Survey, mean wages for males 15-44 (7) and level of formal employment (8) for urban areas, and Kent Wilson's aggregated district indicators (10). I also include Wilson's rural cash crop income per head indicator (9). Although this does not alter the rank order of the six locations very much, it does produce a different kind of differential between the poorest and the richest of the six. I have not included an index of migration costs. Garnaut et al. used a simple distance measure to represent this in their 1977 study. For the six rural groups discussed here this may not be a very satisfactory measure. While some can reach their destination by surface transport, it seems likely that the majority of the others have had to travel by air, if only for short distances. I should note that variables 7-10 are not available specifically for Ponam Island. The figures
refer to Manus residents in Port Moresby\textsuperscript{11} and the province as a whole.

There are a number of elements of socio-economic structure that vary between societies and may influence decisions about moving to town. The organization of rural production may affect the extent to which women and their children may be left behind in the village either in the shorter or longer term, while their husbands move to town. In Ambunti and to a lesser extent Gumine, the division of labour between the sexes may permit the migration of married men without their wives; while in Malalaua men are needed to make sago every fortnight or so if a household is to meet its own needs.\textsuperscript{12} Similarly, the disproportionate number of single males in migrant groups in town is related to the part they play in rural production. In several areas (Ambunti, Malalaua and perhaps Mumeng) they are not active, and there may be assumed to be an economic advantage to the village in their absence. In others they do play a part, but their marital status makes their absence less of a burden than that of married men who migrate without their wives.

Another structural variable is the extent to which males other than a woman's husband may assist her in agricultural or other tasks, in turn related to the strength of corporate groups. In Madang bush-clearing is done by groups of men, many but not all of whom come from within the small clans. Kuange (1977:137) writes for patrilineal Gumine 'the social structure spreads the costs and assists absenteeism'. On the other hand in Malalaua the requirements of sago-making are a minimum team of a man and a woman, the output of each man being processed by each woman. Nor in Malalaua are there clans within which there are strong relationships of mutual assistance between males; the household is the important productive unit. The proportion of people absent from the rural sector may also influence the degree to which others are prepared to assist an absentee's wife or children.

In all but one of the six locations, land was held by corporate groups. In such situations the clan may decide to divide itself locationally, some staying in the village and others moving to town. Stanek reports this strategy for the Iatmul of Ambunti, while Carrier reports that one Ponam son will return home to look after his elderly father or clan rights if no sibling is resident in the village (J. Carrier 1980: note 5).

\textsuperscript{11}Port Moresby was selected as the major urban destination because this was where the largest number of Ponam males (about 15) are to be found (J. and A. Carrier, pers. comm. 1980).

\textsuperscript{12}In Papua New Guinea there is not a great deal of evidence that the sexual division of labour changes in response to outmigration (compare Connell et al. 1976:142-8). In Ponam women have taken over some fishing tasks previously carried out by men, but elsewhere women have not taken to chopping sago or felling forest if they did not traditionally do so.
Table 9.2
Available information on explanatory variables for six locations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Ambunti, East Sepik</th>
<th>Gumine, Chimbu</th>
<th>Madang, Madang</th>
<th>Malalaua, Gulf</th>
<th>Mumeng, Morobe</th>
<th>[Ponamu] Manus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Organization of rural production:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>main activity</td>
<td>fishing</td>
<td>gardening</td>
<td>gardening</td>
<td>fishing and sago-making</td>
<td>gardening</td>
<td>fishing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>married males</td>
<td>no involvement_{a}^{b}</td>
<td>less than annual involvement_{d}^{e}</td>
<td>seasonal involvement</td>
<td>needed throughout year</td>
<td>seasonal involvement</td>
<td>active but not essential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>single males</td>
<td>no involvement_{a}^{b}</td>
<td>partly active, not essential</td>
<td>partly active, seasonal</td>
<td>inactive</td>
<td>'not enthusiastic', inactive</td>
<td>active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>productive unit</td>
<td>woman on own or in group_{a}^{b}</td>
<td>household with clan help</td>
<td>household with clan help</td>
<td>sago: man and woman, same household; fish: individual or groups</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>one person or single-sex groups, minimum – one woman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. System of access to subsistence resources (land, reef, sago, etc.)</td>
<td>patrilineal rights</td>
<td>inalienable patrilineal rights, but possibility of disputes over improvements</td>
<td>inalienable patrilineal rights</td>
<td>cognatic, access by active relationship with current owner</td>
<td>inalienable patrilineal rights</td>
<td>patrilineal, in practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Care of children</td>
<td>parents</td>
<td>parents with clan help</td>
<td>parents with clan help</td>
<td>parents only</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>mainly parents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[\text{Note: } a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, S, T, U, V, W, X, Y, Z, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9\]
### Table 9.2 continued

| Variable | | Location (district and province) |
|----------|---------------------------------|
| | | children, especially daughters in rural area | children or other clan member | children or other clan member | children only | n.a. | mainly children |
| 5. Per cent adult males absent | | 49 | 16 | 24 | 51 | 67 | 52 |
| 6. Per cent males (aged 15-44) resident 10 years or more in major urban destination | | 23.2 (Madang) | 2.7 (Pt Moresby) | 8.4 (Mt Hagen) | 35.6 (Pt Moresby) | 31.2 (Pt Moresby) | n.a. (Pt Moresby) |
| 7. Mean wages males (15-44) in major urban destination | | $33.5^r | $26.4^r | $36.6^r | $41.7 | $20.9 | $52.5^r |
| 8. Per cent males (15-44) without formal employment in major urban destination | | 25.8 | 40.5 | 15.0 | 25.2 | 15.6 | 14.3 |
| 9. Rural cash crop income per head | | $0.9 | $7.3 | $11.5 | $3.0 | $6.8 | $8.9 |
| 10. Aggregated district indicators score: range 0.4 (low) to 72.5 (high) | | 18.4 | 25.5 | 45.9 | 14.7 | 24.9 | 41.7 |
Notes and sources

a Gewertz (1977b:128-32; for Chambri in 1974-75). Note that the Rural Survey covered three Iatmul, one Chambri and one Manambu village. Avatip, the Manambu village differs somewhat from the others (see Curtain, preceding chapter, p.187).

b M. Stanek (pers. comm. 1980; for Iatmul in 1979-80).

c Bateson (1958:45).


e A. Goie and P. Wohlt (pers. comm. 1980). Their data are based on preliminary investigations only and rely largely on the expressed opinions of Gumine informants.

f Own fieldwork in 17 Madang villages in 1968-69.


h ibid.:75-6.

i ibid.:61-2.

j See previous section of this paper for details of Malalaua data.

k Zimmerman (1973:42-7); for Buang in 1971-72.

l ibid.:68.

m ibid.:36 and my own discussions with Buang in Port Moresby.


p See Table 9.1 for sources.


r Figures only available for males from whole province.

s Garnaut et al. (1977: Table 4.5).

t Wilson (1975: Table 1). Refers to data for years 1968-70 (ibid.:74).

u ibid.: Table 2. Refers to data collected in late 1960s and early 1970s.
Arrangements for the care of children and older people also vary between societies. In some, like Malalaua\textsuperscript{13} and Ambunti, most responsibility lies with parents and adult children respectively. However, in other societies such as Gumine and Madang it is quite possible that elderly persons can be cared for by another close relative within the clan, if no children are available to care for them. These differences could influence migration decisions by old people and their children. In the Malalaua case there are pressures for an old person to live where his or her adult children are and thus, in some cases, to move to town. In Ponam the effect of a similar system (as well as other factors discussed elsewhere) is to bring a son home to care for the elderly in the village. In other groups, however, with options for other kinds of care for the aged, the co-residence of the elderly and at least one adult child is not so essential.

Turning to the effects of the migration process itself on migration decisions, we find a number of differences between the six locations. The Malalaua material suggests that where a high proportion is absent, this will itself give rise to further migration. There is some corroborative evidence for the Buangs of the Mumeng District (Clunies Ross 1977b:21 and Zimmermann 1973:71, 72). Zimmermann also mentions changing tastes in Buang where tea and sugar and imported foods are highly valued. This parallels my argument for Malalaua where I see migration as one of the causes of a change in attitudes and values, a change which in turn influences the course of migration. This and my earlier discussion of the effect of the proportions absent on the capacity of rural residents to care for the wives, children or elderly parents of absentees, suggest that the migration process may be something like a see-saw. Up to a certain point it is uphill work, but then the balance changes and outmigration is all downhill. The argument is not that for Gumine or Madang these factors are also important, it is that the pattern of explanation must vary according to this variable.

A further factor is suggested by a comparison of Ponam on the one hand and Malalaua and Ambunti on the other. Although they have very similar proportions of males absent, the pattern of destinations is very different. Ponams are widely dispersed through the towns and outstations of Papua New Guinea (J. and A. Carrier, pers. comm., 1980). On the other hand Malalaua and Ambunti outmigrants are heavily concentrated in single towns, many of them in village settlements (Morauta and Hasu 1979: Table 3 and Stanek 1980). The different destination patterns may have different effects on the relative attraction of village and the world outside. For Ponams nowhere else is there Ponam society except on their home island.

\textsuperscript{13}I am not clear whether the Malalaua situation is a pre-colonial pattern, or whether it is itself a response to heavy outmigration, high dependency ratios in the rural area or the pressures of the cash economy.
However, for Malalauas and Ambuntis their home society has been recreated in other locations.

Finally, there are the generalized economic factors (variables 7-10) to be considered in explaining why migration to town occurs. Garnaut et al. (1977:181-4) have shown how rural and urban income differentials influence mobility patterns. Thus the relatively well-off Madang and Gumine provinces have low populations of males absent, while poorer Ambunti and Malalaua have high rates of absence. Less easy to understand is the case of Mumeng where expected urban incomes are relatively low, and coffee income is available at home. One modifying factor here perhaps is that Mumengs, largely in domestic service, have had easy access to married housing in town and subsidies of various kinds to their low formal wages. Many of the factors affecting decisions about a return or move to the village from town are the same as those affecting earlier decisions. The decision to stay in town or return to the village, however, is by definition taken later than the decision to move to town. Thus at the least factors arising from the migration process itself may have changed in the environment of decision-making. For instance, if many more people have left the rural area since an urban resident last lived there, his views about the attractions of the village may also have changed.

In Table 9.2, there are considerable variations in the length of time adult males have spent in town. In so far as the circumstances associated with long urban residence impede a move to the village, we can assume that these circumstances do not apply equally to people from all six locations, being more important for Malalauas and Mumengs, but less so for Gumines and Madangs.

Long periods of urban residence in Papua New Guinea are long periods of family residence in towns. Note here the high proportions of females shown in Table 9.1 for precisely those groups with longest residence, that is Ambunti, Malalaua and Mumeng. This means children are being born and raised in town. Deprived of village skills, these children if they reach adulthood in town are most unlikely to move to the village. This experience is not limited to Malalauas, but is also reported for Ambuntis (Iatmul) in Rabaul (M. Stanek, pers. comm., 1980) and for Buangs in Port Moresby (Zimmerman 1973:75). On the other hand it is likely to be of little significance for Gumines or Madangs.

Clunies Ross (1977b) explains planned return migration as part of a strategy to obtain a desired mix of two kinds of satisfaction: traditional and cash satisfactions. It seems to me that the same argument could help to explain a lack of circularity and the decision not to return to the village. To do this there has to be at least one of two possible changes that occur subsequent to the making of the original plan in terms of an original desired mix. Either the attitudes of the migrant may change so that the desired mix changes, and/or the environment changes such that the
desired mix is achieved by a different locational arrangement than in the original plan. For the Malalauas, Ambuntis and Memungs, over time their tastes and expectations have changed in favour of urban life-styles, and with high proportions of people resident in single towns, traditional social satisfactions (companionship, close contact with kinsmen etc.) are frequently as well found in town as in the rural area. For Gumines and Madangs on the other hand a vigorous home community is still likely to offer the same range of benefits as when the migrant first left it.

While other writers have noted urban-raised children reaching adulthood in town, they have not considered the effect of these on the return migration decisions of their parents. For Malalauas, Mumengs (Zimmerman 1973:75) and Ambuntis (Stanek, pers. comm., 1980), adult children raised in town impede the return of parents to the village.

Another factor that may affect the return to a village is the degree to which migrants retain access to rural resources. In part this must depend on the system of land tenure, etc. In this respect differences exist between the six locations. In Madang absentees do not lose rights to land even when absent for a generation, and are consulted in important land issues by letter and personal contact. For Malalaua I have already discussed how almost the opposite is true. Lack of an undisputed right to garden land, sago or house-sites may be an important element in low circularity among Malalauas. On the other hand I think it is unlikely that any Madang stays away because of a loss of access to rural resources. Similarly Goie and Wohlt report strong feelings among Gumine informants that an absentee could not lose his land rights, although disputes over improvements might occur if someone else had used the land in his absence (A. Goie and P. Wohlt, pers. comm., 1980).

A return to the village requires not only access to rural resources, but various forms of other assistance in the short term: a roof over one's head, food before one's own gardens bear in a gardening society, help to build a house, make a canoe, clear forest etc. In many societies these forms of assistance may not be automatically available. A returning migrant may depend on the goodwill created while absent, for example by remittances, gifts on visits to the village and hospitality and gifts to villagers who visit towns. However, a common pattern is for remittances to be concentrated almost entirely on parents (J. Carrier 1980: 9-15, Morauta 1979b and Oram 1977:142). As a result there may be a reduction over time in the number of rural residents with obligations to the migrant. While the migrant's parents are alive, they can act as the main sponsors of his return and facilitate his settling down through their own network of ties. Once they die (and this is more likely the longer he stays in town) his links with the village are much attenuated. The strength of this effect will vary both with contemporary social structure and length of urban residence.
The significance of factors arising from long residence in
town should not be underestimated. The Malalaua, Ambunti and
Mumeng situation is already quite widespread. The most recent
figures on Port Moresby show that 16.3 per cent of the population
over 10 years\textsuperscript{14} had never lived outside Port Moresby and 10.7 per
cent had left their home village ten or more years ago (PNG Bureau
of Statistics 1980: Table 46). But the implications for the future
must also be considered. Predictions of circularity in the future
cannot be based on past performance or present length of residence,
both because of the effect of the migration process on itself
through length of residence factors and because, as Conroy and
Curtain have pointed out (1978:12-13), different areas of Papua
New Guinea are at different stages of historical development.\textsuperscript{15}
Migration by Gumines to urban areas is a more recent phenomenon
than for Malalauas and Ambuntis. Over time length of residence
and the proportion absent may become important factors for the
migration decisions of more people than is the case today.

Policy implications

Simmons, Diaz-Briquets and Laquian (1977: Part iv) have sug­
gested a classification of urban migration policy approaches,
according to the goals of the policy. They look at policies that
stop urban migration at source, that redirect migrants to other
locations, that return migrants from towns to source and that
accommodate to migrant streams without trying to change them. Of
the four approaches, the first three aim to manipulate mobility
patterns while the fourth does not. Simmons and his colleagues
also look at possible mechanisms by which these policy goals may
be achieved.\textsuperscript{16} They consider improvements in economic opportu­
nities and services in rural areas, economic incentives in rural
'frontier' development or smaller towns and disincentives for
urban residents, including poor urban facilities, forcible removal
and pass laws.

Migration policies \textit{per se} have not emerged in Papua New
Guinea, apart from rural resettlement schemes. Rather other
policies have been thought to have implications for migration and
these have been considered as part of the total costs and benefits
likely to accrue to a particular policy or program. Although there
has been some discussion of the existing vagrancy laws and the

\textsuperscript{14}Citizen population in private dwellings and hostels excluding
students and defence force personnel.

\textsuperscript{15}Conroy and Curtain (1978:12) only consider this as a partial ex­
planation of different mobility patterns, noting, for example,
that the Malalauas moved to a position of lower circularity more
quickly than Ambuntis.

\textsuperscript{16}In fact they confuse goals with mechanisms in their description
of composite 'strategies' (Simmons \textit{et al.} 1977:103).
possibility of pass systems (i.e. legislative approaches), the major policy emphasis has been on rural development as a method of reducing migration to towns, and returning urban residents to villages (Central Planning Office 1976:10 and the report of the Ministerial Committee on Law and Order, Post Courier, 17 August 1979).

There is also interest in re-directing migration to smaller urban centres and away from the largest towns of Port Moresby and Lae (National Planning Office 1977:20 and 1979:82). It is argued that rural development supplemented by urban services available close at hand will also slow down the rate of migration to the larger towns (National Planning Office 1977:21). Again it is economic incentives that are expected to redirect migrants to smaller towns, for example more public sector employment (National Planning Office 1977:20). Thus a major strand in government thinking about migration is that migration patterns are manipulable.

Another common assumption in urban policy in Papua New Guinea is that urban residents are not only migrants in the sense that they have come from rural areas but also migrants in the sense that they will return to rural areas\(^\text{17}\) (Central Planning Office 1976:37). It follows from this assumption that many urban problems, such as overcrowding, unemployment or lawlessness, would be quite simply solved if the people creating the problems returned to their rural villages. For this reason there is concern to preserve rural-urban links so that urban residents retain their option to live in rural areas (Central Planning Office 1976:35, 37 and National Planning Office 1977:15).

Policies of economic development in rural areas and the growth of small towns have important implications for rural-urban migration in so far as migrant decision-making responds to this kind of variable. Similarly policies on rural development are appropriate solutions to urban problems only in so far as urban residents can be persuaded to move to rural areas. But the questions must be asked: how far will rural development stem outmigration or encourage a return to the village? How responsive are migration decisions to urban poverty or unemployment?

One of the main attractions of explaining migration in terms of general economic variables has been its practical application. Variables that are readily manipulable are identified for policy makers. For example Todaro (1978:5) has recently adapted Byerlee's figure of a flow-chart of the migrant's decision-making process. This figure is scattered with Ps to indicate the elements in the decision-making process that are amenable to policy manipulation. Ultimately Todaro sees nearly all major inputs to the process as in this category: expected urban incomes, rural incomes,

\(^{17}\)For a detailed discussion of this assumption see Morauta (1979c).
non-monetary returns to migration (urban amenities) and costs of migration (influenced by urban housing policies).

The implication of the approach that I have suggested in this paper, is that by no means so large a proportion of elements in migration decision-making processes are manipulable by government. While it is obviously important that policy makers should understand the processes that influence migration, the implications vary with the type of explanation offered. Some of the processes I have identified in this paper are not readily manipulable, if indeed they can or ought to be manipulated at all. Thus the desire of elderly people to remain with or join their adult children in town, the pressure of the peer group to migrate to the city, and the inability of people raised in town to live in villages, while being important variables affecting migrants' decisions, are not the kind of variables easily or properly adjusted by government.

In such cases (although it is clear from the comparative material I give and information on length of urban residence that there are by no means yet the majority of cases) it is a matter of knowing the facts in order to accommodate policy to them, rather than knowing the facts in order to manipulate them. Thus the implication of understanding Malalaua decisions to remain permanently in town is not that many of them could be persuaded to change their minds, but that more policies are needed that recognize the existence and needs of permanent urban residents. Similarly the policy on small towns assumes that all towns are the same to urban residents and that they will move to where the best opportunities are. This is true of some but not all. For some urban residents, however, the particular town where they live is more a home than a place to live. This is true both for residents who traditionally had land rights in towns and for migrants and their children in migrant settlements or in towns where a large number of their relatives also live.

Some may draw comfort from the thought that the proportion of urban residents whose decision-making does not respond to economic conditions is still small. However, I have suggested elsewhere (Morauta 1979c:5-7) that the numbers of people in this category are not insignificant, amounting perhaps to around 23,000 people in Port Moresby alone. Furthermore, it is in the nature of my argument about return migration that as time passes more and

\[18\] In the last year or two some new programs have been started that do exactly this. The Urban Areas Activities Scheme provides self-employment opportunities for urban residents. A National Provident Fund will soon supply pensions for a larger number of workers and a 'pilot' scheme for 700 middle-income owner-occupants of houses commenced operation in January 1981.
more people will be influenced by the kinds of factors already relevant to Malalauas in Port Moresby. The future will see more people in Papua New Guinea's towns who are unwilling to move to rural areas or to towns other than the one they regard as home. Recognition of this trend seems to me a prerequisite for coming to grips with urban planning and urban problems in Papua New Guinea.
Chapter 10

Migration remittances and rural development
in the South Pacific

J. Connell

Recent studies of migration in less developed countries (LDCs) have drawn attention to a considerable degree of controversy over the extent to which regions of outmigration (villages, districts or even countries) are or are not beneficiaries from outmigration, especially in terms of the impact of remittances. One global review concluded:

Generally the spending of remittances reflects the poverty and lack of investment opportunities from which the migrant came .... Only in rare cases is there sufficient surplus, and sufficient possibility of high returns to capital invested locally, to induce the use of remittances in improving agricultural production .... Remittances have little potential for generating change in rural areas. Most are consumed by everyday needs and any surplus goes into various forms of conspicuous consumption. Where a flow of cash does produce changes — say in raising a bride-price, or the price of land — it is still put to ends which reinforce the traditional structure of the village, mainly because if money is returned to the village it is to enhance the standing of the recipient family in that village .... Finally, the tendency of the richer village households to secure the highest remittances seriously increases household inequality in the village. Where these remittances are invested in schooling, or in urban areas rather than more productive agriculture, the consequent 'investment slump' in the village may further weaken the employment opportunities of the poorer, and usually labouring, sections of the village (Connell, Dasgupta, Laishley and Lipton 1976:209-10).

In almost complete contrast Griffin argues:

Internal migration is likely to improve the distribution of income in rural areas ... and accelerate capital formation and technical change on small peasant farms. Migration, in
effect, enables the peasantry to overcome the imperfection of the rural credit market by creating opportunities to amass finance capital in the cities for subsequent investment in agriculture. Migration to the cities, and the resulting greater access to educational facilities, also is a way for some members of the peasantry to accumulate 'human capital'. In the absence of improvements in the rural credit market and in the provision of education in rural areas, migration may be a second-best optimum (1976:359).

He therefore argues that the private benefits of migration are positive, involving higher incomes, probably no reduced output in rural areas and some reduction in income inequality in the countryside (Griffin 1976:359-60; cf. Stark 1980). Similarly Byers concludes that 'the evidence on rural-urban remittances ... suggests a steady, perceptible and productive flow of cash from the city to the countryside' (Byers 1979:232). Again, in general terms, Lipton has argued the opposite case:

It is widely believed that large sums of money are remitted by urban migrants to their families in the villages. If this were so, it could counteract much of the damage done to the village by urbanisation, and perhaps revive one's faith in its alleged power to reduce rural-urban inequalities (1977:236).

but this does not seem to be so, thus:

The myth of huge urban-rural remittances, even net of reverse flows may stem from false analogies, with work-seeking international migration. Turkish workers in Germany, Indians and Pakistanis in Britain, and Algerians in France indeed remit large sums to their families in the countries of origin — but mainly to urban areas (Byers 1977:230).

Finally, in a further general review, Rempel and Lobdell conclude that there is little evidence the urban-rural remittances have made a significant contribution to rural development, but rather that 'remittances should be seen as reflecting primarily the self-interest of the migrant' and 'that most of the money remitted is used for increased consumption, education and better housing' whilst 'it is not merely a matter of a failure to use the remittances for development purposes; they may be used for the opposite purpose of delaying the changes required for rural development' (Rempel and Lobdell 1978:336-7).

These general statements have tended to lump together a number of different issues involved in migration and hence have failed to clarify the processes involved. Although most observers have differentiated the private from the general or social benefits of remittances (and the whole migration process), the benefits and disbenefits that are non-financial have often been excluded,
whilst the existence of financial flows have sometimes been seen as necessarily indicative of a development or welfare gain. This paper attempts to re-examine some of these general issues in the context of the South Pacific area, whilst placing some emphasis on the differences between national and international migration, to ascertain the role of remittances in rural development.

A major consequence of migration is the transfer of cash or other resources between the migrant and family members remaining in the rural area. Although remittances usually refer to money transmitted to villages by migrants while they are away, the meaning has been extended here to include savings brought back by returning migrants, and any reverse flows of either remittances or savings in cash or kind (Connell et al. 1976:90). Financial flows do not necessarily represent the total gains or benefits to migration; thus gains may be made through the acquisition of skills, status and experience that may subsequently be beneficial following return migration to the rural area. The transmission of skills (technical, economic or political) and ideas may be continuous but unquantifiable. Losses too may be unquantifiable; migration may remove economic and political leaders (and therefore worsen the bargaining power of rural communities) and result in some kinds of social disruption (such as the decline of co-operative work groups) whilst return migration may precipitate other forms of social disruption. The transfer of resources therefore is no more than one part of the overall rural impact of migration. There are three main areas of interest here: first, the extent and scale of remittances, second, the determinants of these flows, and, third, the use that is made of the remittances (Rempel and Lobdell 1978:325). One note of caution is essential: there are major data limitations to the study of remittances. Many measures of flows are no better than crude estimates for restricted time periods, rural-urban flows are sometimes ignored and most data do not indicate either what proportion of the migrants' savings is remitted or what proportion of village household income this represents.

Although research on migration has amply demonstrated that migration decisions are invariably a result of a number of inter-related factors, to the extent that it is no longer possible to analyse migration in a manner that is 'marginalist and individualist in spirit, focusing on factors affecting a single decision by a single individual at a single point in time ... [or] as the aggregation of individual responses to marginal changes in narrowly defined signals rather than as part of a process of structural change' (Godfrey 1975:9) this paper is necessarily couched largely in this narrow neo-classical context, because of its dependence on secondary data. The bulk of these data is ahistorical and only partly concerned with the impact of migration on the wider economic and social system of which the migrant is part. Given these constraints it is possible to examine the extent to which remittances are self-interested (albeit perhaps as social
insurance), constitute little more than improved (sometimes temporarily) consumption levels or play some part in development, in terms of increased self-sufficiency, equality and so on.

The determinants of remittances

The scale and nature of remittance flows depend in part on the nature of the links between the migrant and his or her family, and on the needs of the migrant and the village kin. General migration studies have shown that it is not the poorest who are most likely to migrate, since there are basic costs to migration and their skills are often severely limited (Connell et al. 1976; Lipton 1980; Adepoju 1979). Increasingly the same phenomenon is being observed in the Pacific (e.g. Curtain 1980b), in part because of declining urban job opportunities. This is even more true of international migration, because of the costs involved and the bureaucratic procedures that must be fulfilled; for example, migration from Western Samoa to New Zealand has been predominantly from near the capital, Apia (Shankman 1976:33-4). There is at least one significant exception to this; for the sponsored migration of short-term informal 'guest-workers' from Western Samoa to New Zealand preference is given by the Samoan sponsors to rural Samoans who are relatively poor (Macpherson, in this volume). However, rural poverty may actually act as a brake on migration; thus it has been argued that in some parts of Chimbu in the Central Highlands of Papua New Guinea (PNG), pressure on land is so great that individuals are unwilling to leave Chimbu in case this weakens their claim on clan land. The same is true in Enga (Meggitt 1977:160-1), 'whilst, even in areas where outmigration is substantial such as Rotuma most families nevertheless attempt to ensure that at least one of their members lives on the island to maintain family rights to land' (Plant 1977:179) and on Tikopia, where population pressure is very great, the high level of remittances 'may be interpreted as part recognition of the safeguarding by those kin [on Tikopia] of the absentee's land rights while he has been away' (Firth 1971:68). In a number of areas outside the Pacific migrants from areas where there is considerable pressure on land have sent back or returned with significantly larger sums of money than migrants from otherwise comparable areas (Connell et al. 1976:93-4). The extent to which this may be generally true in the Pacific is uncertain and indeed there is still debate over the relationship between migration and population density. In the Pacific, as elsewhere, migration rates vary from area to area. This is well exemplified by migration from the Polynesian atoll of Niue. The first villages that contributed significantly to outmigration were those that first had schools established there; the larger villages were more migration-prone as were those with higher incomes both from wages and from the sale of agricultural and other produce and those with larger amounts of agricultural land (Walsh and Trlin 1973). Other studies have emphasized the relationship between population pressure, cash cropping, accessibility and migration rates.
Similarly, in the Pacific as elsewhere, increasingly it is the most educated who migrate first; this has been reported from a number of areas including Koro, Fiji (Bayliss-Smith 1977:29), the Southern Highlands of PNG (Harris 1972) and more generally in PNG (Harris and Clunies-Ross 1975:5; Conroy 1976). Furthermore, migrants have left many rural areas to take advantage of superior urban educational facilities, as in Rotuma (Irava 1977:154) and Kadavu in Fiji (Cook 1975:45), North Tabiteua, Kiribati (Geddes 1975), Tonga (Maude 1971:121), French Polynesia (Finney 1973:132), Palau (McGrath 1972:141) and more generally in Micronesia (Carroll 1975:386; Marshall 1979), in the Gulf Province of PNG (Siaoa 1977:168-9), the Eastern Highlands (Young 1977b:200) and Central Province (Oram 1968), whilst in the Mount Hagen area of the PNG Highlands there is even a general disapproval of migration except for the well-educated (Strathern 1972). As with most other forms of migration, movement away for education usually has a bias in favour of males, as on Etall Atoll, Truk (Nason 1975:140). These two facets of education and migration emphasize and reinforce each other, especially since some of the more highly educated migrants are teachers. The generality of this education-bias, especially in its ability to create distinctive migration streams, despite the relatively short history of formal education in much of the Pacific, suggests that the bias is likely to be maintained and, if new urban job opportunities decline, be exacerbated.

Invariably migration results in the loss of the most energetic, skilled and innovative individuals in rural areas and this loss may not be compensated by remittances. A brain-drain, in the sense that it is usually understood elsewhere as a movement of a tertiary educated group from one country to another (usually a metropolitan nation), is scarcely present in the Pacific, since there are few tertiary-educated people there. There is, however, a significant brain-drain from Fiji; between two and three thousand Fijians emigrate every year, most of the well-educated Indians, who also comprise most of the country's university students (Decornoy 1974:12). This is, as elsewhere, especially true of medical personnel. However, in many areas secondary school graduates are moving away, for example from Micronesia to USA (McGrath 1972:134; Urbanowicz 1978) and from Polynesia to New Zealand. This migration constitutes a loss of scarce skilled manpower, especially in Tonga, the Cook Islands, Niue and Western Samoa, that cannot be compensated for even by substantial remittances. In Niue, as elsewhere in Polynesia, migrants who are skilled teachers and nurses there become unskilled workers in New Zealand (Walsh and Trlin 1973:49). This has important implications both for the educational system and for the substitution of labour by capital (Connell 1980b). The relatively recent emergence of tertiary education in the South Pacific has already resulted in an internal brain-drain with concentrations of graduates in the two main urban centres, Suva and Port Moresby, and the incipient international brain-drain is likely to become more established. Throughout the Pacific there are biases in the social and economic
composition of migration flows. Migration thus proceeds out of inequality.

Over time the amount and regularity of remittances usually falls, as for example amongst the Orokaiva of the Northern Province of PNG (Baxter 1973:104) and more generally in PNG (Garnaut et al. 1977:73). This decline appears irrespective of any changes in village requirements. The decline is more rapid for rural-urban migration than for international migration, where the probability of return migration is considered to be higher (e.g. New Zealand Department of Labour 1979:107). Migrants whose return to the village was likely to be imminent, as in Western Samoa (Shankman 1976:59-60), remit significantly larger sums. This is not surprising; social links and urban perceptions of rural needs are likely to decline over time, successful migrants may be followed by others from their family, initial targets (where they existed) will have been met and urban investment may appear more rewarding. Although migrants face a life-cycle of obligations to their home areas, these obligations are likely to decline over time, to compete with new obligations and to be increasingly ignored. Thus the two groups least likely to send large sums to the rural areas are the young, who are not yet established, and the long-term urban residents (Rempel and Lobdell 1978:332). In the Pacific as elsewhere 'the conclusion can be drawn that the proportion of urban income remitted varies directly with the strength of social and economic ties to the rural area, and inversely with how well migrants are established in urban areas' (ibid.: 1978:333). However, both the amount remitted and the proportion of income remitted vary directly with the cost, risk and social dislocation associated with the move. Thus there is strong evidence that remittances can be seen as a means of cultivating those social ties that are important in facilitating a return to the home area.

In most circumstances, social pressures on the sending of remittances may be quite strong, as is true of Cook Island migrants in New Zealand (Curson 1979:191). The extent to which migrants send remittances, over long periods of time and even when they are earning low incomes, suggests that some sanctions may prevail in that nearly all Pacific migrants believe they will some day return to their rural 'homes' where access to land is crucial. In some cases access to wives (I.L. Frazer 1973:119) and other resources may also be threatened by failure to maintain a rural commitment through remittances. These are powerful constraints on economic behaviour and are likely to be stronger than mere expressions of social commitment.

Migration flows may be crudely generalized as being of two types: 'individual' where the migrant took his (or, less frequently in the Pacific, her) decision to leave independent of kinship needs and obligations, and 'linked', where the migration involved
specific obligatory ties, usually financial, with kin in the village. Although differentiation of two distinct migration streams is especially difficult in the Pacific where almost all migration is to some extent linked, the international migration streams from Polynesia especially, but also from parts of Micronesia, are typical of linked migration. Thus Allen observed on the Polynesian island of Mangaia that the responsibility for committing labour rested with the head of the nuclear family

If the family labour cannot be satisfactorily committed on Manaia, that is, if individual family members cannot be employed in a way which brings cash income into the home, the family head will commit his labour in the distant New Zealand economy from where the family members will send money back to the family on the island (1969a:83).

The same is true on the nearby island of Atiu (Bollard 1979:18-19) and, in similar forms, in Samoa and in Tikopia (Firth 1971:57-8). Such spreading of family income earning opportunities can develop into a well-organized and more permanent allocation of family resources, in terms of both time and finance, as in the 'share family' of South India (Epstein 1973:207-11). There is also some evidence of village-organized migration in the Pacific, at least in the Fijian islands of Kabara (Bedford 1978:45) and Batiki (Bayliss-Smith 1978:105). Migrants from the Tuvaluan atoll, Nanumea, are expected to contribute a fixed fraction of their annual income (which in 1974 was half a month's salary) to the island fund and social pressure is exerted to ensure that this is maintained (Chambers 1975:102). However, throughout the Pacific, greater ease of migration and a growing familiarity with external affairs have been amongst those factors contributing to an increase in individual, rather than family or lineage, decision-making.

Inherent in the issue of who decides on the act of migration is that of the motive for migration. An assumption of gain (not always financial) underlies most migration moves yet the sequential and linked nature of most Pacific migration indicates how specific choices are at best only open to individuals at certain times in their life or career cycles and, at least in the Pacific, there is so far little evidence of an unavoidable rural push, the migration of despair. The interdependence of urban and rural life, especially where migration from a particular rural area to a particular urban area (usually the capital city), presents problems in identifying precisely the migration decision or even sometimes the act of migration (Connell, forthcoming; Ross and Weisner 1977). Social theory must account for behaviour in both settings at the same time; in the Pacific context only Strathern (1977) comes close to understanding 'the disconcerting tie' that links rural and urban migrants although, in a peri-urban setting in the New Hebrides, Tonkinson (1977) observes the 'paradox of permanency' of Ambrym villagers resettling on the fringes of Vila. In this
context then the determinants of migration must always remain in part unknown.

Although it has been argued that most migrants in the Pacific are target migrants (Watters 1970:134) and in West Guadalcanal there was a form of target work such that when targets (which included council tax payments, clothing and tools) were reached jobs were terminated and migrants returned to their village (Bathgate 1973:63), the empirical data from the Pacific, as elsewhere (Connell et al. 1976:26-7) suggest that the phenomenon of target migration has been overstressed in the contemporary context, being more true of an earlier era of contract migration when the possible 'targets' were firmly established or, in contemporary times, with short-term and seasonal migration. Evidence from a number of areas indicates conclusively that economic factors are certainly not the only ones influencing migration decisions. A desire to minimize rural social obligations (Ward 1961:262; Connell, forthcoming) or to obtain urban education (discussed in the previous section) and other social factors may all be significant. Moreover, in southern Guadalcanal (and certainly elsewhere) it is argued that more local sources of cash would not necessarily significantly reduce labour migration to Honiara and elsewhere (Chapman 1969). However, economic factors are most often given by migrants as their rationale for migration and targets of some kind appear to be the most frequently cited reason, as in Western Samoa where the most common motives for migration were the accumulation of savings to build a home or establish and run a trading store (Fairbairn 1961:23). Targets provide the most straightforward readily comprehensible rationalization, both to the migrant and others, of what may well be a highly complex decision in which the individual may have a variety of options and a variable, but restricted, ability to take decisions.

The extent and distribution of remittances

International migration, involving higher costs but also higher incomes, records the highest rates of remittances in most LDC contexts (Connell et al. 1976:91; Lipton 1977:230). A number of estimates and calculations of the extent of international remittances have been made, but their comparability is restricted by different time periods and methods of calculation (Connell 1980b). Thus some examples must here suffice. Remittances since the 1950s have become the principal resource of many of the outer Cook Islands and now contribute about 35-40 per cent of the total Cook Islands' income. On the island of Mangaia in 1966 remittances averaged about $130 per household, a substantial amount since only 18 per cent of the Mangalan population received other cash incomes then (Curson 1979:188). On the island of Atiu, also in the Cook Islands, remittances in 1974 averaged $292 per household, some 22 per cent of average cash income (Bollard 1979:55). Surveys on five different islands in Kiribati and Tuvalu in the early 1970s
found that the contribution of remittances to cash incomes varied from 14 to 48 per cent (Geddes et al. 1979:61) whilst remittances to Niue in 1971 represented some 10 per cent of the island's income (Walsh and Trlin 1973:49). In Tonga remittances were the largest single foreign currency earner in 1973 and 1974 (de Bres and Campbell 1975:450) and presumably also in subsequent years. In Western Samoa remittances by 1973 were around the same level as the national agricultural income (Shankman 1976:36-8) and have subsequently increased; in seven villages surveyed at different times from the 1960s onwards remittances always represented more than 12 per cent of village income and by 1969 remittances in the South Upolu village of Sa'asi had reached some 58 per cent of total incomes (ibid.:58), although this village is exceptional in being the most dependent on remittances of any village in Western Samoa. By 1969 remittances to the Tokelau Islands outstripped income from copra production (Hooper and Huntsman 1973:368).

Remittances in the smaller Pacific islands and nations, where international migration is important, thus represent a very substantial component of cash incomes, much more than the contributions made by migrants within Europe (Castles and Kosack 1973:417) or in the larger Pacific nations such as Fiji and PNG where international migration is less common.

For international migration in the Pacific the inter-household incidence of remittances received is very high, as also is the extent of the contribution of remittances to household cash incomes (Connell 1980b). The general inadequacy of data on the distribution of remittances cannot disguise the implication that, in conditions where international migration is common, a high proportion of village households has become dependent on remittances for a large proportion of their income. Households with few working members are most likely to be dependent on remittances and in some cases this dependence is almost total.

Rural-urban migration may involve as high a proportion of migrants in sending back remittances but the sums involved, absolutely and as a proportion of income, reflect lower earnings and are therefore usually smaller (Connell et al. 1976:91). Of a sample of twenty-one Choiseul islanders in Honiara some nineteen remitted cash to their home villages (Kengava 1979:162). However, in two groups of villages in the East Sepik Province of PNG, some two-thirds of migrants never sent remittances, although they may have later returned with money; for the two groups of villages the contribution of remittances to village cash income amounted to 4 and 12 per cent although this may be a conservative estimate (Curtain 1980b) and this was also reciprocated by food sent from the villages to the workplaces. The ideology of remittances, where migration is less obviously 'linked' than in Polynesia, is quite different and attitudes partly depend on the relative affluence of town and country. Migrants from the Bogia area of PNG were not expected to be able to afford remittances since it
was assumed in the rural areas that urban wages were inadequate to enable a satisfactory urban standard of living as well as remittances (Connell 1979a:18). Hagen migrants in Port Moresby repeatedly claimed how little rural Hageners understood about their costs and the problems of saving money in town (Strathern 1977), yet rural poverty may readily be explained, as in Gulf Province, PNG, by ungrateful children failing to send remittances (Morauta 1979b:5). Overall, however, the situation on the north coast of Malaita in the Solomon Islands where 'people at home complained that they were not sent enough, people in town complained that they were always asked for too much' (I.L. Frazer 1973:118), seems much the most typical. A comparison of remittances in groups of villages in three PNG provinces, Madang, Milne Bay and the Eastern Highlands, showed that remittances comprised a relatively small proportion (between 1 and 6 per cent) of total cash income in all three areas (Moulik 1973:77). This proportion appears to be fairly typical both of the contribution of remittances in large parts of Melanesia, where cash cropping now provides alternative rural income opportunities, and of most rural areas in the third world (Lipton 1980:11).

However, in a few places urban-rural remittances are a very important component of the total revenue; thus in Rorini village, Guadalcanal, income remitted or brought back from all wage employment (which was nearly all from migrants) represented 76 per cent of the village's cash income, but in two neighbouring villages, which had cash crops and fewer gaps in the agricultural cycle in which migrants could leave for short-term work, the proportion was much less, representing only between 17 and 24 per cent of village cash income (Lasaqa 1972:269). Here, but particularly in other Melanesian villages from which migration had only recently begun, cash income was only a part of real income and cash cropping had not begun to provide income opportunities. Remittances to Rotuma island from Fiji in 1976-77 were estimated at some 12 per cent of the total cash income of the island (Plant 1977:181) and this also excludes gifts which may have been as great in value. On Bellona island, in 1965-66, money remitted or brought back by returned labourers constituted some 40 per cent of the total cash income of the atoll (Christiansen 1975:106-7). These examples appear somewhat exceptional, being from remote, culturally distinctive islands where only copra is marketed and might perhaps be better considered as aberrant cases of international migration.

As with international migration there is both an uneven distribution of remittances between households and variations in the degree of dependence on remittances. Thus in the Northern Province of PNG remittances from Yega migrants averaged 64 per cent of household cash incomes but this varied from 17 to 100 per cent (Dakeyne 1967:156-7). In the Gulf Province village of Lese Avihara in PNG, 61 per cent of adults received some income from remittances, and remittances were one of the principal sources of income in the village (Avosa 1977:145-6). In the nearby village of Lese Oalai,
where remittances were the main source of income to the extent 'that some households are wholly dependent on their absent relatives' (Siaoa 1977:167), some 73 per cent of adults received remittances. In another nearby village, Kukipi, there were wide variations in the amount of cash and goods brought in by different visitors on one particular occasion, although redistribution reduced this variation; nevertheless out of 28 households, 3 received nothing and 5 received over K200 ($250) while out of 64 adult visitors, 12 contributed nothing and 3 contributed over K200 (Morauta and Hasu 1979:18). The impact of this distribution and the resultant cash and goods transactions suggested that, within the 28 village households, some 13 were net losers whilst 11 gained and the rest broke about even (ibid.:22). Accessibility is often important in that there is evidence from a number of areas, including Bougainville and parts of Morobe Province, PNG (Townsend 1977:57-8) and more generally in PNG (Garnaut et al. 1977:68), that remittances are significantly higher in villages that are closer to town (and already richer) where there is regular contact with migrants who are also more easily able to benefit from food transfers from the villages. In Sivepe village (Northern Province, PNG) remittances were the single most important source of income in 1964 contributing some 28 per cent of village income, although, significantly, villagers who were already earning higher incomes from cash cropping also received much larger remittances (Waddell and Krinks 1968:203-6) so that remittances emphasized inter-household income inequalities. In North Malaita some young men contributed nothing whilst other migrants remitted up to half their wages. This was related to the extent to which migrants were involved in village-based economic activities; those with shares in such enterprises contributed more money (I.L. Frazer 1973:119). Again remittances are likely to contribute to inter-household inequalities. In the village of Kukipi in Gulf Province, PNG, 'impressionistically there seems to be a connection between the high rural incomes of certain parents and the relatively high urban income of their children. Thus it may be that the differentiating effects of cash serve to draw rather clear lines between narrowly defined families' (Morauta 1979b:8). The distribution of remittances appears to emphasize the nuclear family rather than any extended kinship unit, even in areas of linked migration, and usually remittances go no further than the migrant's parents. In a number of areas, including Tikopia (Firth 1959:123-4) and American Samoa (Holmes 1974:103) village or clan leaders especially benefited from the distribution of remittances yet, as the authority of traditional leaders is everywhere declining, whilst migration assumes a more individualistic basis, this is of declining significance. Overall the available data on the distribution of remittances point to its direct contribution to income inequalities within villages and, by extension, in wider rural areas.

In most parts of the Pacific and especially in the larger towns there are now significant numbers of independent female migrants; almost nothing is known of their use of cash incomes
and their distribution of remittances except in Mount Hagen where females both sent and received significantly larger remittances than male migrants (Wright 1979:121-2). It is probable that the distribution of remittances from females elsewhere would also be different from that of males and this would vary significantly between matrilineal and patrilineal societies.

Generally rural-rural migration results in much lower remittances, owing to the lower earning capacity of the migrants, although there is no evidence, at least from the Pacific (but cf. Lipton 1980:12) that intra-rural migrants are less likely to remit. Apart from marriage moves the majority of this migration in the Pacific consists of plantation labour, rather than more diversified rural migration (unlike in West Africa and India where climatic seasonality produces varied harvesting times and non-agricultural rural employment exists, and so on), and the amounts of money brought back (rather than sent back) by plantation workers have usually been quite small. However, a sample of four men from Duidui village in southern Guadalcanal took back an average of $23.90 in cash (some 25 per cent of their income after four months) plus some gifts (Chapman and Pirie 1974:6, 135), hence substantial savings were possible from casual rural employment in other parts of the island. In some areas there has also been independent rural-rural migration but remittances have always been small and relatively unimportant. Although rural-rural migration appears to be increasingly common in the larger Pacific countries, in part as a response to the decline in urban opportunities, it is improbable that remittances will increase.

Not all remittances are cash flows (or postal orders or cheques): almost all include valuable durables. Thus labour migrants from Tauna village in the Eastern Highlands of PNG brought back a range of goods including clothing, tobacco and 'luxury items' such as torches, kerosene lamps and portable radios (Hayano 1973). Although much of the cargo of the earliest Pacific labour migrants was decorative it is nevertheless clear that migrants were able to bring home directly useful goods (especially some tools and cooking utensils) that would otherwise have been almost unobtainable and hence were able to make a positive contribution to the rural economy. Increasingly the flow of goods has tended to be replaced by a flow of cash as communications between village and work place have improved, labour contract systems have disappeared and cash has become more useful in rural areas; thus on Tikopia very little cash reached the island since there were almost no opportunities for using money (Firth 1971:61) and on the rare occasions when vessels called prices were very high. Consequently in many parts of Melanesia cash was brought back only for use as taxes. Cargo of different kinds (but especially consumer durables) remains important in a number of areas, especially for returning migrants (Kaurasi 1977:171-2). Monetization reflects both the increased utility of cash, partly because of improved accessibility to urban centres, and the growing dependence on cash.
Remittances are invariably bi-directional; cash and goods flows from towns are reciprocated by food (and sometimes cash) flows from the villages. Although it is unusual in the Pacific for remittances from the rural areas to be in excess of those to the rural areas, as is sometimes true elsewhere (Lipton 1980:13), there are indications that in parts of the East Sepik at least, the market value of food sent to migrants elsewhere was almost equivalent to their cash remittances (Curtain 1980b). On Lae, and other Marshall Islands atolls in eastern Micronesia, there was a significant cash flow to Ebeye from copra production to the extent that 'what is "exported" probably is equalled or exceeded by the gifts of food which some of these alabs [lineage heads] send to Lae' (Alexander 1977:10). Even in Bougainville, where urban incomes are on average much the highest in PNG, and compare well with any in the Pacific, the poorest households depended on friends and kin for meeting emergencies (Mamak and Bedford 1977:445). For migrants from the Micronesian atoll of Nukuoro to Ponape it is argued that employment opportunities have been so few that more money probably leaves Nukuoro for the use of emigrants than is sent back by them (Chalkley, cited by Force and Force 1975:207). Thus rural-urban net flows may not be as exceptional in the Pacific as might have been expected. However, even when the bi-directional nature of remittances is considered (both in cash and in kind) and gifts are also included, the available evidence on the overall direction of net flows is far from clear. Moreover, this largely excludes a number of possible rural-urban transactions, such as payment of travel costs of urban or rural households, hospitality in village or town for visitors and the maintenance of dependants of urban or rural households in village or town (Morauta and Hasu 1979:4). Nevertheless, in many areas of the Pacific the rural-urban flows are sufficiently small to be no more than a symbolic reciprocation and the evidence suggests that there is an overall urban-rural resource transfer.

The distribution of remittances within villages is rarely evenly spread and what appears generally true, in contexts where data are available, is that, as in the East Sepik 'residents who were already better off were more likely to be receiving remittances or gifts from returning migrants' (Curtain 1980b). The scale of remittances is quite variable between different rural areas within the Pacific, although it is the international migrants who tend to remit the largest sums, apparently irrespective of the needs of the rural areas. Where international migration is common remittances are large and significant components of household incomes; thus in Sa'asi village, Western Samoa, 'remittances were the most important source of wealth differences within and between receiving and non-receiving groups' (Shankman 1976:63). It seems true not just of the Pacific, but elsewhere (Watson 1977), that villages and households with overseas migrants have become the most dependent on remittances.
The use of remittances

Globally the overwhelming weight of evidence suggests that the use of remittances reflects the poverty and lack of investment opportunities from which the migrant came (Connell et al. 1976:98) and 'it seems certain that very little is used directly as investment for rural development' (Rempel and Lobdell 1978:333). However, the extent to which these conclusions are generally valid in the Pacific has not been examined.

Migration can entail a heavy cost, and therefore an initial flow of money out of the rural economy, so that initial remittances are often used to repay debts that the migrant may have incurred in moving. If risk or indebtedness are involved the poorest may find migration (and especially international migration) difficult hence, after initial debt repayment, one general use of remittances is to finance migrant trips by family members remaining at home. Thus Niuean migrants in New Zealand finance the journeys of their kin remaining in Niue (Walsh and Trlin 1973:66); so do Rotumans in Fiji (Kaurasi 1977:171) and most Pacific islanders in New Zealand (New Zealand Department of Labour 1979:34-5; Graves and Graves 1976:451). Occasionally earnings also finance subsequent migration moves by the migrants themselves; thus in the postwar decade Cook Islanders working in the phosphate mines of Makatea used part of their earnings to pay their fares to New Zealand at the end of their contracts (Hooper 1961:12; Curson 1979:188). In some areas therefore Pacific migration can be seen as step migration but this is exceptional, even in PNG where there is a hierarchy of urban centres (Young 1977a). Remittances generally are more likely to contribute to further migration from the initial migrant's household or close kin.

The majority of remittances are used for everyday household needs or in conspicuous consumption; a variety of evidence from various parts of Africa, Indonesia and even China show how remittances are used to maintain the household, especially by food purchases or house construction (Connell et al. 1976:98; Hugo 1978a:273; Yu 1979:346). Almost all studies of the use of remittances in the Pacific document the same priorities (e.g. Chambers 1975; Geddes 1975; Waddell and Krinks 1968:207-8). This is so extensive that the cost of food imports has become very significant in the smaller countries, especially in Tuvalu (Thaman 1979) and Tonga (de Bres and Campbell 1975) where, respectively, 70 per cent and half the import bill is for tinned and other preserved foods and tobacco. In northern Kiribati, where remittances represent the largest portion of cash income, a situation typical of the smaller atolls: 'the people of Butaritari and Makin are becoming increasingly dependent on remittances to pay their taxes and their children's school fees, to buy corned beef and rice for feasts and to purchase even moderately expensive items at the store' (Lambert 1979:220). In a number of places there are often simply direct transfers of food rather than cash.
Although the construction of better housing normally constitutes improved welfare, in many Pacific circumstances, notably in south Bougainville, following migration to the Panguna copper mine, house construction is directed towards prestige rather than welfare. Moreover, Shankman argues that in Western Samoa house-building (along with small-scale luxury consumption and church donations) represents a security investment (Shankman 1976:63) in the absence of alternative economic opportunities, and housing may also be rented out to constitute an economic investment (C. Macpherson, pers. comm.). In this kind of context much depends on who the houses are built for. Lipton estimates that the purchase of consumption goods to meet everyday needs generally absorbs some 90 per cent of all remittances received (Lipton 1980:12). Although evidence on expenditure of remittances in the Pacific is generally inadequate to prove or disprove this conclusion (largely because the sources of cash are not differentiated), the available evidence certainly records the dominance of consumption expenditure. This dominance reflects in part the desire to demonstrate the 'good life' away from the rural area and 'money is needed to buy the cultural symbols of social importance sought by Islanders' (Watters 1970:135); food, housing and other consumer goods are visible cultural symbols.

A third general form of expenditure is investment in education through the payment of rural school fees (Rempel and Lobdell 1978:334; Hugo 1978a:273) and this is also reported from various parts of the Pacific, including the Marshall Islands (Alexander 1977:5) and Malaita (I.L. Frazer 1973:119). Thus in Bougainville, where Siwai migrants do not regularly send remittances to their rural kin (most of whom have substantial cash crop earnings) remittances are usually only sent in response to particular requests, of which the payment of school fees is most common (Connell 1981). The explicit assumption is that the migrant has obtained benefits from urban life and that a lack of education may deny these benefits to younger kin, and this also explains demands that migrants finance the movement of later migrants. Thus improved access to education, and hence selectivity in future migration, generally follows from remittances. As in Southeastern Nigeria remittances are 'associated significantly with spending on secondary schooling, a form of investment which is very closely related to rural youth out-migration and consequently continuing urban-rural disparity' (Odimuko and Riddell 1979:61). Finally, there is no record in the Pacific of remittances being used to contribute to savings.

The majority of the remittances that are not directed into conspicuous consumption (including food purchase), debt repayments, sponsoring of further migration or education are invested in the agricultural sector, hence it is necessary to examine critically the nature of that investment. However, many changes in the agricultural sector are not a result of remittances alone but arise from the contribution of remittances to the monetization of the rural economy, the use of cash crop incomes and other parallel
changes in the rural areas (such as demographic change). Hence the specific contribution of remittances is often impossible to distinguish (Stark 1980).

Land purchases, even in the Pacific where land is not traditionally individually owned, are coming into existence in some areas, including areas like Siawai, in Bougainville, where population pressure on land is not generally great, in the Wahgi valley of PNG (Ward 1979), parts of the New Hebrides (Land 1971:262) and certainly elsewhere. Throughout the Pacific there are pressures towards individual rather than collective ownership of land, and land purchases and individual ownership are occurring in some places, such as Etall atoll, Truk (Nason 1975:142), American and Western Samoa (Holmes 1971:101) and New Caledonia (Sausso 1971: 240). This trend is a function of the increasing value of land, via population pressure and monetization, and is influenced rather than caused by migration. Conflicts over land ownership have certainly followed outmigration and a combination of migration, increasing population pressure on land (despite migration) and changing administrative structures (loosely from traditional to modern, where the focus of power is sometimes uncertain) have increased the number of disputes. However, corporate ownership of land in the Pacific has largely served to prevent the kinds of individual investment in land, at the expense of entrepreneurial investment, that have had such a drastic effect on the generation of inequality in regions where individual ownership of land is usual, and where an absence of alternative rural investment opportunities has produced rapid inflation in land values (Connell 1980b).

There are complex and substantial variations in the impact of absent males on the agricultural system, depending principally on the extent to which the agricultural system is dependent on female labour, the length of absence of males and the extent of compensatory remittances that may be used to hire labour. Although it has been suggested that in Papua New Guinea, output per capita will not fall until over a third of the young men are absent, since women do a large part of the agricultural work (Harris 1972), this may not be so in areas where men play a greater role in clearing land and is unlikely to be true of areas of cash cropping. Output will certainly fall where family migration is more common, as in large parts of Polynesia. Thus in villages in the relatively poor Western and Gulf Provinces of PNG up to 70 per cent of adult men were absent and this had resulted in the fragmentation of large villages into small settlements concentrating on gathering wild sago rather than maintaining settled agriculture (Brookfield 1960). In the East Sepik Province of PNG there were considerable differences over small distances and male absences were specially significant in villages where hunting and gathering were important (Curtain 1980b). Siawai villages were almost unaffected, since there were relatively low absentee rates coupled with remittances (Connell, forthcoming) in contrast to Awa villages of the Eastern
Highlands where women's work changed in character and increased in duration (Boyd 1975:273-4). In terms of agricultural productivity the emigration of labour can (but may not) be beneficial only up to the point where it begins to draw upon the pool of productively employed, whose positions cannot readily be filled. In most parts of the Pacific this situation occurs early in the process of migration and overall agricultural production is likely to fall, although without necessarily affecting output per agricultural worker.

In large parts of the Pacific the agricultural system is neither sufficiently seasonal (especially for food crops) to result in very great differences in demands on labour (and these demands are more likely to be either met by hiring or ignored) nor does it generate the sort of seasonal (as opposed to short-term) migration that occurs elsewhere (Rempel 1978). However, in a number of areas (for example, most coffee growing areas of the Highlands of PNG and cocoa growing areas of south Bougainville) a shortage of labour, as a result, in part, of migration, appears to have contributed to a failure to harvest cash crops fully.

Migration reduces the availability of family labourers so that extra labour may be hired (and paid with remittances or cash crop income) to replace the migrant's labour. Thus in a number of places, including northern Guadalcanal (Lasaqa 1972:268) and Siwai, Bougainville, the only extra financial input into agriculture was wages. High levels of migration are likely to result in increased wages to agricultural labour although in a number of areas, where migration rates are high (as in Tonga) or there is a substantial rural affluence (as in South Bougainville), there are problems in hiring labour. As an alternative to the hiring of labour, investment (via remittances) may be directed into labour-saving technological changes. Although there are numerous examples of this elsewhere in the third world (Connell et al. 1976: 100, 145) there is almost no recorded evidence of this in the Pacific, except where remittances have contributed to the construction of drying (or other processing) facilities, tractors or transport vehicles. On the other hand, there is little evidence of the availability of labour-saving technology that could make a significant contribution to the production process itself in the predominantly root-crop and bush-cash-crop economies of the South Pacific. In a number of areas therefore there has been a substitution of less labour-intensive crops, notably of taro by sweet potato and more exceptionally by cassava (Bastin, forthcoming), and a concentration on cash crops, at the expense of more labour-intensive food crops as, for example, on the French Polynesian islands of Mal'ao (Finney 1973:134-5). This is often ultimately at the expense of rural nutrition (Lambert 1979; Thaman 1979) and emphasized by the expenditure of remittances on imported foodstuffs. Thus the diets of households with absent male migrants are usually less varied and adequate than those of other households, as in the Eastern Highlands of PNG (Hayano 1979:48).
A further result of the limited availability of labour has been a general decline in the use of marginal and distant land. In parts of Fijian migration had resulted in a declining area of cultivated land by the 1950s (Ward 1961:270). Similar declines have been recorded on the Cook Island of Aitutaki (Graves and Graves 1976:447) and on Niue (Pollard 1978:81). However, especially in the Cook Islands, the French colonies, Niue and most of Micronesia, it is also the movement into local wage labour that has resulted in these changes. Only in exceptional circumstances, such as in large parts of American Samoa, Micronesia, Nauru and Wallis and Futuna, has subsistence agriculture disappeared as a result of cash inflows of different kinds. In the larger Pacific countries too there are numerous examples of a decline of subsistence production, as, for example, in the PNG Gulf Province village of Kukipi where urban Kukipis are 'sending home part of the means of subsistence .... This is quite a different pressure on urban incomes from one where gifts to people at home are luxuries and the timing of them more or less immaterial to the recipients' (Morauta and Hasu 1979:31). Thus the processes of agricultural decline that have gone on earlier elsewhere are being replicated on the small islands of the Pacific and especially on those where international migration has been common. Migration and remittances have emphasized the trends towards the disintensification of the traditional agricultural system (Brookfield 1972; Lea 1972) that has essentially followed the expansion of cash cropping. These trends are being maintained, and even exacerbated, by rapid urbanization in the South Pacific whereas increased urban demand might have been expected to stimulate rural production. There is evidence that in the Pacific as elsewhere (Lipton 1977) the internal terms of trade are not moving in favour of the agricultural sector.

There are nonetheless some possibilities for investment in agriculture. Several studies record the sending of remittances, or the saving of cash, for specific agricultural projects that would generate cash incomes. Thus Choiseul island migrants in Honiara sent money for either establishing cattle projects or coconut plantations (Kengava 1979:162) and Siwai migrants were saving to establish cocoa plantations (Connell 1980a, 1981). Where such investments have been related to land purchases or, more generally, the permanent or semi-permanent use of large tracts of land by the establishment of cash crops, they have tended to contribute significantly to inequality (at household, lineage or village level) within the rural areas although they have usually contributed to increased agricultural incomes. In the Pacific only investment in land, principally through the establishment of long-term cash crops rather than direct purchase, stimulates the future generation of significant rural incomes.

In some parts of the Pacific, and especially on the smaller atolls, opportunities for productive investment in the agricultural economy range from severely restricted to virtually non-existent. Even on larger islands, including Western Samoa, it could be
argued that 'migration was a far more lucrative investment than anything available in the village' (Shankman 1976:71). In these conditions remittances can only be invested in increased, if not necessarily improved, consumption in the short term. Capital investment in agriculture is most appropriate to the larger islands, although there are examples of productive business investment in the smaller atolls. Thus the conservative use of remittances partially reflects the lack of productive investment opportunities.

The cultivation of food crops has conspicuously failed to benefit from migration or remittances; it has declined, or even disappeared, almost throughout the Pacific whilst the variety of food plants has sometimes decreased and the nutritional value of diets has declined. Tonga may prove to be an exception since mechanization of yam cultivation there has enabled the export of yams to New Zealand and probable increases in production (E. Hau'ofa, pers. comm.). In some circumstances cash cropping has benefited from remittances; increased incomes permit labour hiring, the purchase of extra land and the construction of drying (or other processing) facilities yet, even where only one of these occurs, the change tends to contribute to inequality within the village. Almost all the changes in the agricultural sector reflect a growing dependence on the world beyond the village, initially for remittances and then for the continued supply of the goods (especially foodstuffs, consumer durables and fuel) that have followed the initial use of these remittances. Moreover this dependence (paralleled in the dependence of cash crop incomes on world market prices) is scarcely compensated either by improved nutritional levels or by the production of a growing marketable surplus that might increase rural income levels; instead it inevitably results in imported inflation and the declining utility of remittances.

Remittances have often been invested in the purchase of trade stores or motor vehicles (primarily for use in rural business activity) and in some coastal areas (including the Gulf Province of PNG, and coastal Malaita in the Solomon Islands) have been used for the purchase of fishing boats or outboard motors. Although few of these business investments have been successful, even over a short time period, they demonstrate the extent to which money earned through migration has the capacity to generate local inequality. It is the families of migrants who are usually in the best position to become successful at business.

Although most remittances are directed towards the individual requirements of the migrant and his kin (or lineage or clan), migrants may also contribute to some village (or parish or council) attempts to improve infrastructure, such as through the construction of a school, clinic, church or water supply system. In Tonga (de Bres and Campbell 1975) and Western Samoa (Shankman 1976:68-70), and probably elsewhere in Polynesia, substantial sums were
remitted either directly or indirectly for church construction and related tasks. In some northern Malaita villages contributions have been organized on a regular basis amongst large groups of absentees for enterprises such as the building of a new church, the buying of an outboard motor or the financing of large-scale cash crop development. In such cases 'absentee wage labour assumes considerable importance for village development' (I.L. Frazer 1973: 119). However, more generally in Malaita, except for those who had joined co-operatives, absentees only contributed to family household projects (ibid.:120). In these communal contexts remittances may both improve welfare and contribute towards equality; they are, however, extremely rare in contrast to more individualistic uses of remittances.

For most absentee migrants the actual physical contribution and distribution of remittances is itself sufficient; productive investment (even where opportunities are available) is rarely the aim of remittances, especially since many migrants may have little control over their use, but is much more likely to be the aim of returned migrants. For the absentees the emphasis is on the maintenance of a rural alternative and the guarantee of a secure rural future even at a great distance. Consequently remittances, although superficially an economic phenomenon, involve complicated social perspectives; for the migrant they represent his or her continued stake in the village economy and social hierarchy. For the male and his extended family unit they are a means by which to enhance standing and prestige in the community. Almost all uses of remittances (especially house construction) serve this end whilst remittances are also used for specifically social ends (although these social ends, as in marriage ties, may disguise economic motives). Thus significant uses of remittances include payment of bride price and contributions to village ceremonies (Connell 1980b). The social significance of remittances is much more important than the majority of the economic literature recognizes through its concentration on the direct economic effects of migration. Material transactions are fundamental to the conduct of social relations.

Migration, development and inequality

Overall remittances can be seen principally both as 'repayment of social debt and as insurance premiums' (Rempel and Lobdell 1978); in the East Sepik, migrants view remittances as 'an insurance premium to safeguard and enhance their position at home' (Curtain 1980b). They reflect therefore the self-interest of the migrant and are conservative rather than innovatory being 'investments in their future security' (Watson 1977:350). Migration itself may also be viewed in this way. For the Siane, migration to Port Moresby is a 'rural-oriented strategy' (Salisbury and Salisbury 1972). There is a consistent argument that migration from rural areas is not intended to be permanent, that
remittances are an insurance against an uncertain future but, more than that, they may also strengthen the rural base.

Both for a part of the Eastern Highlands (Young 1977b) and the New Hebrides (Bedford 1973) it has been argued that cash crops are an added insurance for migrants rather than an alternative source of income that will prevent or minimize migration. In one sense therefore, cash cropping and migration represent dual development strategies; in another sense they are merely two forms of dependency, rural and urban. Paradoxically although migration diversifies economic opportunities, by combining the security of the rural base with the cash incomes of an alien system, this can only happen in a context where the security and viability of that rural base is being drastically eroded by the impact of that migration.

There is a growing argument that the wage rates obtainable by most migrants were, and to some extent still are, designed to maintain their dependence on wage labour (without security away from the rural area) in circumstances where rural development was impossible. Thus in the Solomon Islands there was a wage policy that 'is not designed to allow a man an income sufficient to establish a village or individual development project upon his return home' (Chapman and Pirie 1974:6, 132-3). Discussion of this kind of policy, which resulted in a situation defined as 'dual dependence', was most recently formulated by Burawoy (1976) and Cliffe (1978), and extended into a Melanesian context by Curtain (1980a and b).

The use of remittances, despite the significance of 'link migration', indicates a general drift towards individualism. Thus the contemporary earnings of Siwai migrants are intended to be for their own use rather than that of their kin (Connell, forthcoming); exactly the same is true in Tikopia (Firth 1971:71) and Tabiteuea North, Kiribati (Geddes 1975:84) and implicitly so elsewhere. This increasing individualism is becoming a disruptive force. In both Western Samoa and the Tokelau Islands the distribution of remittances has undermined the authority structure and economic unity of the extended kinship unit, the 'ai'iga, in relation to the immediate family and the remittance recipient, regardless of sex or status (Shankman 1976:83; Hooper and Huntsman 1973:406). Investment in education also contributes to individualism although the investment itself is not the sole reason; in large parts of the Pacific such trends are, as in the Cook Islands, a result of the 'rivalrous individualism being fostered by the schools' (Graves and Graves 1976:459). Increasingly migrants also move as individuals rather than the groups that were common in plantation and contract labour work. Thus, as in the analogous case of the Miskito Indians of Nicaragua, 'when a society based on generalised reciprocity (free exchange of labor, food and material between kin) becomes dependent on the sale of labor, food and materials to external markets, the internal means of production will be colonised by those of the external' (Nietschmann 1979:12).
The decline of subsistence agriculture and the substitution of imported food (purchased, in part, with remittances), especially in parts of Papua and the smaller atolls, attests to the growing use of remittances for subsistence necessities, even in situations of maintained relatively low people:land ratios. This has been contemporaneous with the emergence of cash cropping, increased pressure on particular areas of land and a parallel reliance on cash crop incomes. This has sometimes produced a 'dual dependence' as in Weasisi, a village on Tanna Island in the New Hebrides, where at least some villagers are dependent on cash remittances from migrants to the extent that they have been referred to as 'a growing class of proletarians' whilst, within the village, economic differentiation has increased (Bastin, forthcoming). In Tonga where alongside high rates of outmigration there is a rapidly increasing population, rapidly changing consumer habits (especially involving the consumption of imported foods) and a stagnant and increasingly dependent economy, it has been argued that 'possibly nowhere in the world has economic dependence been taken further than in this microcosm of underdevelopment' (de Bres and Campbell 1975:451).

Individualism and unequal access to migration opportunities inevitably mean that the costs and benefits of migration are also unevenly distributed. Migration proceeds out of inequality and serves to emphasize that inequality directly and indirectly through the cash flows that finance new migration and access to education, land purchase, cash cropping and business development. The role of remittances as social debt and insurance cannot mask the limited extent of ties of insurance. Individualism feeds inequality, and worsening inequality and relative deprivation are crucial variables in development (Seers 1969:3). Moreover the flow of remittances 'may have had the perverse effect of maintaining village options best for people who were well off in town' (Garnaut et al. 1977: 73). Historic social inequalities, reflected in the gifts of migrants to traditional leaders (Firth 1971; Holmes 1971) have given way to greater inequalities based on access to land, markets and cash; business investments are made by the young, although land may still be controlled by the old, and capital accumulation takes precedence over distribution. The size of remittances is not therefore correlated with the needs of rural households, as might have been expected and as appears to be the case in Indonesia (Hugo 1978a), but emphasizes need by contributing to inequality.

Migration is one of a complex of changes in the rural areas of the Pacific and it has often emphasized and assisted these changes. Generally production for use has moved towards production for sale, with a parallel decline in diversity and flexibility as diversified subsistence systems become specialized. This growing dependence on external markets has inevitably meant a loss in autonomy and self-sufficiency; village agriculture, and consumption expenditure, are increasingly influenced by distant rather than local decisions. The trend towards individualism in
agricultural production, and business enterprises, emphasizes an agricultural system in which economic risk has been added to subsistence risk (Nietschmann 1979:12). In an increasingly individualized and monetized society, the range of incomes is becoming much greater and societies that were traditionally marked by a considerable degree of equality, despite the existence of big men and exploitative chiefs (Connell 1979b) are increasingly unequal. These inequalities, emphasized rather than established by migration, have been documented both at local and regional levels in PNG (Connell 1979b; Jackson 1979; Treadgold 1978) and in Taveuni, Fiji (Nankivell 1978; Brookfield 1979) and are at the heart of development problems in the Pacific.

A decline in formal urban employment opportunities is apparent in the major urban centres in the Pacific, alongside declining opportunities for international migrants within the Pacific (such as Wallis and Futuna islanders in New Caledonia and Tuvaluans on Ocean Island) and in the major metropolitan destination, New Zealand (and, also, to a lesser extent USA). This has a ripple effect in the small islands and inevitably means that migrants with limited education and skills are less likely to find employment. In part as a result of this there is growing evidence from most parts of the Pacific that migration is becoming more permanent and that increasingly larger numbers and proportions of the present urban population will not return to their home areas. Evidence of this growing permanence comes from a wide variety of areas but especially from the smaller islands of the Pacific (Connell 1980b). This does suggest some correlation between limited rural economic opportunities and permanent outmigration.

As migrants become more settled in town remittances fall, hence all the evidence suggests, for both rural-urban migrations and international migration, that the flow of urban-rural remittances is likely to diminish in the future. At the same time the problems of inequality and dependence may be worsened as cash cropping becomes of greater importance in income generation. This may be further exacerbated by a population growth rate which, throughout the Pacific, has been maintained at very high levels so that 'one of the most important — and pernicious — effects of emigration is that it serves to hide from view a potential population problem' (Carroll 1975:390; Graves and Graves 1976; Douglas 1979). Continued rapid population growth, where urban job opportunities are scarce, will thus strengthen rural inequality.

Since the cost of living in Pacific towns is increasing faster than wage rates in a situation where job opportunities are declining, the potential size of remittances is also falling. Rigo migrants in Port Moresby are now therefore either obliged to (or at least choose to) spend more money in the city and relatively little is remitted; in a number of Rigo villages this has resulted in a movement away from dependence on remittances to renewed attempts to establish successful local businesses (McKillop 1979:
28). Similarly in West New Britain, PNG, the decline in remittances of cash and goods since the mid-1960s stimulated increased copra production (Grant and Zelenietz 1979). In these two contexts at least rural economic change has been stimulated by the inability or unwillingness of migrants to remit adequate supplies of cash. Similarly the high unemployment rate of Chimbu in Port Moresby may also reduce subsequent rural-urban migration from Chimbu, which may not therefore necessarily be a disadvantage, if rural development opportunities exist there. However, the extent to which areas like Chimbu, and especially the smaller Pacific atolls, have real rural development opportunities, and the extent to which these opportunities could compensate for possible urban income foregone, is debatable. Secondly, the extent to which business and cash crop developments of the kind now existing in West New Britain and Rigo are capable of generating genuine and sustained development is also unclear, especially if development is considered as 'greater independence with redistribution and growth' (Seers cited by Connell 1980b:63). The absence of urban, or other, employment opportunities in these circumstances to some extent thrusts upon rural areas a renewed emphasis on cash crops (as in West New Britain and Rigo), in the absence of alternative sources of income, which reinforces one particular mode of dependence. There is no evidence yet that isolation has resulted in any intensification of food production enabling greater self-sufficiency. Rigidity in land tenure, especially following the establishment of semi-permanent cash crops, prevent ready adjustments to external economic changes, whether declining employment opportunities or changing market prices. In terms of the impact of remittances, there is therefore an apparent paradox that declining migration levels, rather than fostering self-reliance, appear generally to sustain poverty and inequality.

For most of the small islands in the Pacific, movement towards the self-sufficiency that reduction of remittances implies would be difficult and painful. Moreover in many places aspirations are firmly directed towards the acquisition of European goods so that, as in Rotuma, 'it is doubtful, therefore, that Rotumans would want to be self-sufficient, even if that were a possibility' (Plant 1977:174) or, in Tikopia, 'from such a level it becomes difficult to retreat without unease and a sense of deprivation' (Firth 1971:69). Increasingly these kinds of statement are becoming true of almost all areas within the Pacific. Thus the self-sufficiency, especially in terms of food production, that continues to be recommended in a number of quarters as a solution to dependence within and beyond the Pacific (Connell 1980a), or the 'collective self-reliance' recommended in the third world are steadily being eroded. At the same time the alternative, a more adequate interdependence (for example through better terms of trade for third world produce or more employment opportunities in the rich world — including, for example, Australia — with greater security through some permanent migration and citizenship), is no more likely. The uneasy imbalance between these conflicting alternatives merely strengthens dependence.
Despite the failure of migration to contribute to rural development, 'it would be nonsense, and probably evil, to respond to the disappointing results of migration by restricting it' (Lipton 1980:15) since that response might worsen rural poverty and urban-rural inequalities. Moreover, development almost certainly implies steady labour transfers out of agriculture (ibid.:3) and there are benefits from urban-industrial development. Nevertheless policies are required that reduce excessive and premature labour migration by providing development and investment incentives throughout the rural sector. Any apparent conflict between the fact that migration usually occurs initially from the most favoured areas, often of an educated elite, and the negative rural impact of remittances, is a result of the lack of differentiation between individual and social gains and losses. But it is also an indication in some places (and especially the smaller islands), of a lack of productive rural opportunities. Important conclusions, first, that rural education needs re-orienting to the needs of rural employment and society and, second, that subsistence agriculture needs to be revalued and strengthened, are constrained by the necessities for rural work opportunities to complement appropriate education and for investment opportunities to re-direct remittances away from consumer expenditure without contributing to marked and sustained inequalities which thus contribute to further migration. Where the constraints outweigh the development possibilities then, as in the Goroka Valley (Howlett 1973) and most of the Pacific, there is 'terminal development' where further development is impossible under present conditions and future changes seem more likely to be retrograde.

A number of Pacific island governments have expressed concern over the nature and extent of migration, both internal and international. For example in Western Samoa the 1975 Development Plan observed that, 'The growing loss in productive workers through outmigration has also affected the economy's domestic productivity' (Western Samoa 1975:3) and hence 'Dependence on outmigration to solve the country's high population growth rates serves only to unbalance the remaining population away from the more productive to the less productive age groups. Therefore any project which may substantially increase employment opportunities in Western Samoa should have some extra benefit attributed to it' (ibid. 1975:7). Consequently a number of development plans have designed policies to control and reduce international migration and encourage decentralized development. Policies seeking to affect migration directly, however, of which few are in evidence, may well not be the most crucial policies affecting migration although in this context it may be possible to learn from a number of Asian countries with their greater experience of attempting to control and tax migration (Connell 1980b).
Conclusions

Overall the somewhat inconclusive nature of much of the available data (which are largely confined to case studies of particular small areas at particular times) creates some ambivalence over the exact role of remittances in rural development, although not over the transformation and disruption that is caused by migration. Migration tends to produce stagnation in the sending society and contributes to its impoverishment by dissolution of the productive unit resulting in a declining intensity of land use and reduced food production. Migration proceeds out of inequality and further establishes this inequality. The assumptions of Griffin (1976) and Byers (1979) that there is some productive use of remittances in rural areas cannot be disputed in the South Pacific yet relatively little of the income from remittances is actually used for productive investment, and then only by a fraction of the rural population, whilst much is used on non-productive expenditure which does not contribute either to growth or development but merely reinforces dependence. Thus it may be more appropriate to note that, for Griffin, migration was 'a way for some members of the peasantry to accumulate "human capital" ... and ... migration may be a second best optimum' (1976:359; my italics). The evidence suggests that within the rural areas of the Pacific (since this paper has not analysed the contribution of migration to urban development) migration and remittances have contributed to limited growth but not development essentially because of its impact on growing dependence (for jobs and food) beyond the rural areas and because of the resultant inequalities. Migration undeniably benefits a large number of individuals and households in the rural areas, and is certainly not irrational from the individual migrant's perspective, but it does little to contribute to rural development.

There is necessarily a significant difference between the small Polynesian and Micronesian atolls, and the largest countries such as Fiji and Papua New Guinea; in the smaller islands international migration is of a much greater proportion (especially compared with the two largest countries where it is largely confined to the most educated and skilled workers). The flow of remittances into the islands represents a significant share of cash income yet there are few opportunities for productive local investment. Following international migration the flow of overseas remittances not only increases scarce foreign exchange earnings, but also provides a potential source for additional savings and capital formation. In a number of countries, especially in the Middle East (Ecevit and Zachariah 1978:36) and in parts of the Pacific, this contribution may be very great indeed and the overall effect on the balance of payments has naturally been favourable. If the flow of remittances decreased, however, this would have a drastic negative effect on the balance of payments (Shankman 1978). In the smaller islands of the Pacific the bulk of remittances has not been channelled into productive investment
but has been spent on consumer goods (with a high import content) and on housing, whilst local production has generally been unable to meet the new demand and the resulting supply bottlenecks have fuelled inflationary pressures and increased import demand (Ecevit and Zachariah 1978; Sassen-Koob 1978). In the largest countries remittance flows are domestic and although some of these may be exported via conspicuous consumption there are opportunities for their diversion into productive local employment or investment. Hence, remittances on the smaller islands tend to foster dependence rather than inequality; on the largest islands they generate inequality rather than dependence. But both trends are ubiquitous.
Chapter 11

Guest-worker movements and their consequences for
donor and recipient countries: a case study

C. Macpherson

Guest-worker movements are responses to both general and
specific sets of circumstances. The general circumstances provide
the impetus for guest-worker movements and local conditions define
the form which the movements take. This paper describes guest-
worker movements between Western Samoa and New Zealand. These
arise from the same factors which have stimulated such movements
elsewhere: coincidental labour shortages in developed nations and
labour surpluses in developing nations. The form which these move-
ments have taken, however, reflects social and political factors
peculiar to both the country of source and destination.

Until 1977, regulations controlling migration between Western
Samoa and New Zealand did not formally recognize that a large
number of Western Samoans wished to work for short periods in New
Zealand. An informal guest-worker program for Western Samoans thus
grew up around visitors' visas. This is of particular interest
because it is operated by established migrants, alongside the
recently established 'formal' program, and provides opportunities
for selected Western Samoans to work in New Zealand for periods
varying from one to twelve months. Unlike formally constituted
guest-worker schemes, which are framed by donor and recipient
governments and related systematically to their national economic
policies and goals, the 'informal' schemes function independently
of such national interests. Their functioning is controlled largely
by established Western Samoan migrants, who thus determine the
costs and benefits of both donor and recipient countries.

The selection of 'candidates' for a particular work opportun-
ity reflects migrant sponsors' concepts of economic realities and
goals and may only coincide accidentally with the broader objec-
tives of the donor or recipient governments.

The analysis seeks to evaluate the role of the permanent
migrants in the organization of the guest-worker movement and the
costs and benefits to donor and recipient countries.

257
Background to development of an 'informal' guest-worker scheme

The post-contact political history leading up to the independence of Western Samoa has been discussed elsewhere (Gilson 1970; Davidson 1967), as have the patterns of outmigration from Samoa during that period (Fairbairn 1961; Pitt and Macpherson 1974). From 1914 to 1961 New Zealand was responsible for the administration of Western Samoa under a mandate of the League of Nations or, after 1945, under UN trusteeship. This provided the framework for a small but steady flow of migrants to New Zealand, mostly settlers. The volume was beginning to increase when Western Samoa obtained independence in 1962 and a new relationship was established. A bilateral 'Treaty of Friendship' was drawn up and included provision for the continued movement of people between the two on a basis which reflected the long, if sometimes difficult, relationship between them. It provided for two principal categories of migrant, visitors and settlers, and established quotas and criteria of selection.

The number of visitors which was to be allowed to enter New Zealand was unspecified. Visitors' visas were granted for up to three months, were non-renewable and explicitly precluded the taking up of employment. Applicants had to be able to name a 'sponsor' in New Zealand, provide evidence of return passage, and to make certain statutory declarations.

Intending settlers were subject to more restrictive criteria. Temporary permits were issued to those of 'good character' with not more than two dependent children, who could provide evidence of guaranteed employment in New Zealand, of suitable accommodation, of an acceptable degree of fluency in English, and could obtain medical and other clearances from Western Samoa authorities. An annual quota of up to 1,000 such permits was set until 1970 when it was raised to 1,500 and to 1,650 in 1973 (Marsh, Gear and McDonald 1979). Permits were issued initially for six months and were normally renewable for a further four and a half years. After five years, those able to satisfy certain criteria were offered a choice between permanent resident status and citizenship.

The informal guest-worker program was adapted to these regulations and thrived until the New Zealand economy began to contract in the mid-1970s and the government introduced further controls. It had evolved largely because in the first place many would-be migrants were ineligible for temporary settler permits, the only permits which would have allowed them work legally, and further because even those who were eligible were usually unwilling to wait for nine months to two years for their applications to be processed, by which time their job offer might have lapsed. And so, despite the risks involved, increasing numbers of Samoans obtained visitors' visas to enter New Zealand (Table 11.1), and later took employment.
By 1974 the New Zealand government became increasingly concerned with unemployment. An inept attempt was made to enforce immigration regulations by locating and repatriating those who had 'overstayed' their permits. Public opinion ran against the methods employed, if not against the intent of the program, and it was suspended. An 'Overstayers Campaign' drew public attention to the numbers of Pacific islanders in New Zealand. The National Party, then in opposition, capitalized on public concern in the 1975 election campaign, depicting immigrants of all nationalities as the causes of unemployment, and of pressure on housing, medical and other resources.

Table 11.1

New Zealand visitor and temporary residence permits
issued to Western Samoan citizens, 1963-73

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>March</th>
<th>3-month visitor visas (non-renewable)</th>
<th>6-month temporary residence permits (renewable)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1051</td>
<td>581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1136</td>
<td>868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1006</td>
<td>1308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1209</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1308</td>
<td>1497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>2600</td>
<td>1462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>2429</td>
<td>1429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>2364</td>
<td>1597</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NZ High Commission files, Apia, Western Samoa; collected by Mr G. Harrison and cited in Douglas (1975).

The National Party won the 1975 election and set about 'resolving' the immigration issue in two main ways. For longer term immigrants from the Pacific an overstayers' register was opened and an amnesty was offered to those who registered while their applications for permanent residence were considered. Improved methods of recording were introduced for arrivals and departures and within relevant departments. To control short-term movement the government sought approval from certain Pacific governments on the one hand to create a formal guest-worker program and on the other to provide in-country training and employment programs to improve skills in island countries. Aid for economic development was offered to enable them to provide more local employment opportunities. This resulted in the creation of the South Pacific Work Permit Scheme and the Pacific Islands Industrial Development Scheme.
The South Pacific Work Permit Scheme provided opportunities for workers from Western Samoa, Fiji and Tonga to take up specific job offers from New Zealand employers for up to eleven months if local labour was not available. The scheme also provided for increased financial commitment on the part of employers to the welfare of workers brought to New Zealand under such schemes (N.Z. Department of Statistics 1979:74). This scheme has not proved very practical, first, because the chances of such opportunities becoming available are remote in times of high unemployment and tend to be in areas in which New Zealand is committed to avoid recruiting skills from underdeveloped countries; second, because of general employer resistance to increased involvement in their workers' welfare in a period of labour over-supply.

The Pacific Islands Industrial Development Scheme was established in 1976 to provide 'financial assistance for New Zealand companies developing approved manufacturing operations in Fiji, Tonga, Western Samoa, the Cook Islands and Niue, with the objective of fostering economic development opportunities in those countries and furthering the growth of employment (N.Z. Department of Statistics 1979:436). The scheme started slowly and provided only a limited number of employment opportunities in Western Samoa; and virtually none for those in rural districts beyond commuting distance of the plants. The development of financial institutions in Western Samoa provided increased amounts of finance for certain types of development, but these were of limited value to rural villagers without regular incomes from which to meet repayments. There was a continuing demand for capital to finance projects for which loan finance was not readily available, to meet repayments of capital borrowed within Samoa, and in some cases to meet shortfalls between estimated and actual costs of projects.

Over and above these general measures were certain specific ones relating to migration from Western Samoa. The three-month visitor visa was withdrawn and replaced with a one-month visitor visa. The quota which had effectively guaranteed 1,650 Western Samoans permanent residence in any one year was withdrawn and Western Samoans were included in the general quota of 5,000 a year for residents from all source areas.¹ Such measures were designed to meet the needs of the New Zealand economy and did not take into account those of the Samoan economy nor the desire of many Samoans to work in New Zealand for short periods.

It was hardly surprising, then, that before long a smaller, but still significant, informal guest-worker scheme grew up around the 30-day visitor visa and continues to function today. To understand why Samoans are able to find employment during periods of relatively high local unemployment it is necessary to understand

¹At this time New Zealand was experiencing successive and significant net migration gains annually but since then has had net losses.
the process by which they are brought to New Zealand, and the attitudes of employers to such a temporary workforce.

The operation of 'informal' guest-worker schemes

Unlike formal guest-worker schemes which are operated either by a government acting for employers, or by employers themselves, Western Samoan informal guest-worker movements are controlled almost exclusively by already established Samoan migrants. Control of the operation of the scheme by the latter allows them a certain indirect control over the broader consequences of guest-worker movements for each country. Any attempt to understand the consequences of guest-worker movements must recognize the role played by migrants and understand the criteria they employ in the disposition of opportunities for guest-work. The location of employment, recruitment, placement and repatriation of Samoan migrant workers has been discussed elsewhere (Pitt and Macpherson 1974; Macpherson 1975; Graves and Graves 1974). Here a brief outline is given of the process of selection of guest-workers.

The established, permanent migrant population is influential both in locating job opportunities and in deciding who will fill them. Roles in this process are not formalized or rigidly structured. There is a certain operational flexibility, but most variants of the process tend to be on the following pattern. Established migrants in positions of responsibility in organizations become involved, either formally or informally, in the labour replacement and recruitment process. Their employers are generally willing to allow them to introduce new recruits. This willingness reflects a combination of factors including the low cost and high speed of this type of replacement, satisfaction with the resulting self-regulating and quiescent workforce and the generally high regard in which Samoan employees are held in the companies in which they work. As vacancies occur in such firms, established migrants either seek permission, or are invited, to located replacements to fill them. The migrant to whom the offer is made may consider the filling of the vacancy from within his or her own network, or may allow some other Samoan employee to do so. The person taking responsibility must then locate a person to fill the vacancy, which almost invariably involves someone in Samoa known to want to work in New Zealand.

2 Other factors are that where concentrations of Samoans develop it is often difficult to recruit non-Samoans to work in with them, the small size of many New Zealand companies and the fact that personnel work tends to fall to non-specialists who in turn pass it on to experienced Samoans.

3 As the migrant workforce matures there is a temptation to offer such vacancies to children of Samoans in New Zealand who would otherwise be unemployed. In cases which I followed, however, these children were considered to be better off than rural relatives in Samoa and better able to obtain employment.
The selection of candidates tends to focus on their personal circumstances, their plans for the use of earnings from guest-work, the availability of other sources of capital, their willingness to work and accept supervision and the consequences of their absence in New Zealand for their dependants. These factors are weighed and candidates assigned priorities on the basis of assessed need.

The most important considerations in the selection process are the personal circumstances and plans of 'candidates'. Higher priority is given to those who are considered poor despite their own efforts than to those who are already employed or who are poor because they are thought to have wasted opportunities. In these evaluations, candidates' past performances are critically reviewed. These evaluations often reveal snatches of the Calvinist moral philosophy which Pitt (1970) maintains underlies economic decision-making in Samoa. There is a tendency, where all other things are equal, to choose candidates from the rural sector whose responsibilities for immediate and other kinsmen limit their opportunities to accumulate capital.

The assignment of weightings to the proposed use of earnings is a far more complex process. Projects proposed tend to fall within a limited number of categories:

(i) Those which result in the creation of expansion of a productive asset, such as the development of plantations, including payment for labour for clearing and weeding, purchase of agricultural equipment and livestock and the acquisition of fishing equipment.

(ii) Projects which propose the replacement of existing personal assets. These include the replacement of traditional houses with houses in permanent materials, replacement of vehicles.

(iii) Projects which propose entrepreneurial activity of some sort. These include establishment of premises, purchase of stock and vehicles; wages, and running expenses during the early phases; or the expansion

4These are generally known because of the close contact maintained with non-migrant members of the kin group.

5This is important because an unreliable candidate may jeopardise further opportunities within the company. This criterion may also be applied to candidates' spouses whose control over the use of remittances is taken into account. One candidate who had migrated on a previous occasion was turned down on the grounds that his wife 'was as big as a lavatory, still ate all of the money and did stupid things with it, while poor old X ... went off to work on foot in the winter at 5.00 am'.
of existing entrepreneurial ventures.

(iv) Finally there is a group of proposals for cash investment in the creation of socio-political capital often through conspicuous consumption, as in the case of large-scale weddings (*fa'aipoipoga*); the attainment of political office and the celebration of that attainment (*soafa'i*); contributions to various village activities (*fa'alaravelave fa'a le mu'u*) and church activities (*fa'alaravelave fa'a le lotu*).

Several factors underlie sponsoring migrants' decisions to support particular projects. In the first place the effects of projects for the sponsors themselves are considered. Since many are themselves committed to a program of remittances the decision to sponsor a guest-worker may involve either further cost or the suspension of remittances. The sponsor has to decide whether the execution of a candidate's particular project will affect the level of support expected of him and whether the person proposing the favoured project is capable of executing it successfully. There is little benefit in 'investing' in a guest-worker movement if the proceeds are not made to produce some form of return be it socio-political or material. This may involve deciding whether the person finally chosen will have the strength of character to avoid using capital for purposes other than those for which it is intended, and will have the skill necessary to show a return on the capital outlaid. Those projects most likely to win support are those which, successfully executed, will allow a reduction in the level of support expected of him or her by non-migrant kinsmen.

The sponsoring migrant must then seek to identify the proposal which will produce greatest benefits for non-migrant kin of the applicant. This is a complex issue since benefits may be seen in material or socio-political terms, so that the development of a plantation and the financing of a title-conferring ceremony (*soafa'i*) may be seen to produce similar 'amounts' of benefit albeit of a different type. The choice is narrowed by the fact that those considered most likely to ensure the continued well-being of close kinsmen are other close kinsmen, as opposed to more distant kin, and so sponsors tend to favour siblings and first cousins in their decisions.

The sponsoring migrant may also consider the availability of alternative sources of capital for projects proposed. Candidates able to obtain funds in Western Samoa are less likely to be considered sympathetically for guest-worker opportunities. The

---

6 Sponsoring migrants are aware of the temptation to use large sums of money indiscriminately and to be unusually generous at weddings and similar public events. The main danger in such cases is that the proceeds are disbursed before the project is complete and sponsoring migrants asked to meet the shortfall.
relatively recent proliferation of financial institutions in Western Samoa has tended to favour commercial interests and the wealthier urban Samoan middle class. For example, the Public Trust Office, a major source of funds for building, has discouraged small loans to reduce administrative costs and has provided loans for the Samoan middle class because 'they offer good security and have a regular source of income which is viewed as a basic precondition of loan approvals' (Western Samoa 1973).

Some funds are available for small-scale agricultural and industrial projects through the Development Bank of Western Samoa (DBWS). By 1978 the DBWS had granted 3,015 loans valued at WS$3.54 million, of which 2,507 (83 per cent) were for less than WS$500 ('1979 Budget Statement', 1978), so that the Bank represents a ready source of small loans for the rural sector. The problems of security for larger loans, however, and price fluctuations in principal crops may discourage borrowers from taking risks on DBWS loans.

Another possible source, the Bank of Western Samoa, lends for most other purposes at interest rates in 1978 in the 7-10.5 per cent range. Here again the rural villager, without regular source of income, may have difficulty in obtaining a loan of the small size sought and have to pay higher interest rates for such capital as he can borrow.

The National Provident Fund is unable to lend amounts smaller than WS$20,000 which means that, 'Though the fund is empowered to engage in a whole spectrum of financial transactions, the restrictions on security and the limit imposed on investments prevent it from playing directly an important role in the financial development of the country' (Western Samoa 1973:34).

Sponsors thus sympathetically consider rural village candidates who are unlikely to be able to obtain domestic funds for project proposals on acceptable terms. Migrants do not, of course, necessarily review the possibilities as systematically as all this may suggest. For their purposes it is generally sufficient to know that someone has been unable to gain a loan from institutional sources or has been offered an inadequate loan. Since many have themselves experienced similar difficulties these are well known.

Choices between competing proposals may be complicated by the fact that sponsoring migrants may themselves have insufficient information on which to base an informed decision. Many have a somewhat rudimentary understanding of the rapidly changing economic context within which projects must survive. Decisions about investment in socio-political activities may be taken with more confidence because their context is more stable and better understood.
Decisions must, however, be taken quickly and tend therefore to be based on a particular sponsor's assessment of what sort of proposal will yield the best return under existing conditions, 'best return' being interpreted very broadly. The flexible concept of 'best return' may mean that in one case a proposal yielding significant long-term increases in agricultural productivity is considered 'best return' and in another case a proposal which results in significant but short-term increases in socio-political capital is considered 'best return'. Neither decision, however, takes into account the needs of the Western Samoan economy in any systematic way.

The permanent migrants' control of guest-worker movements is not confined to the initial decision about who will be offered the opportunity. Having made this decision the sponsor contacts the person chosen and extends the offer. If it is accepted the sponsor or a group pays the fare and arranges accommodation with the kin group (Macpherson 1975).

Sponsors' investment in and control continues after arrival. Normally the sponsor, with or without assistance from other kin, provides food and accommodation free for the guest-worker for the duration of his stay. Some clothing and entertainment is provided, and transport to and from work is generally provided or subsidized at least initially, and the repayment of the air fare may be forgone. These arrangements all aim to make a high rate of saving possible. The guest-worker for his part lives, works and saves under the supervision of his sponsor. This may involve surrendering control of all, or most, of his income to his sponsor who may determine the amounts allocated for personal expenses, savings and regular remittances respectively.\footnote{Guest-workers' wages are collected from employers and banked by sponsors who also hold the passbook where the guest-worker is young and is considered vulnerable to temptation to spend new-found wealth. Such a precaution is more difficult to arrange, for cultural reasons, where the guest-worker is older or senior to the sponsor.}

The rights and obligations of both parties are negotiable but since such arrangements are generally made by people who are committed to Samoan custom for others who are also committed to Samoan custom, agreement is not generally difficult. Checks and balances are built into the system (Macpherson 1975). The guest-worker is protected by the fact that if he suspects exploitation he can make his situation known among kinsmen and let public opinion take its course. The sponsor retains control because there is general agreement on the guest-worker's indebtedness to his sponsor and because he is able to reveal the guest-worker's presence which could lead to arrest and deportation.
Within the framework of such relationships the guest-worker saves from income toward some target at rates varying between $90 and $150 net per week. Typical outgoings based on detailed data from some forty cases suggest the ranges shown in Table 11.2.

Table 11.2

Patterns of guest-worker income disposition (NZ $)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net income per week</th>
<th>116</th>
<th>142</th>
<th>170</th>
<th>200</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal expenditure</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20a</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remitted (weekly)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly savings</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other expendituresc</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10d</td>
<td>15e</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a From which clothes were purchased and posted to Western Samoa.
b Repayments on loan already taken out in Samoa.
c Contributions to household expenses.
d Offered by guest-worker to sponsor voluntarily.
e Air fare repayments (token only).

Source: Macpherson 1975.

The proceeds of guest-worker movements

Barring discovery and deportation, the guest-worker may save between $4,700 and $7,600 a year plus service payments, such tax and other rebates as he or she may risk claiming, and interest accruing to savings. Part of this sum, between 10 and 18 per cent, is normally remitted regularly to dependents in Western Samoa for either saving or consumption. In addition to regular remittances requests for recurring expenses such as school fees, and for incidental expenses such as contributions to weddings, funerals and other fa'alavelave may be met. Before leaving New Zealand the guest-worker may buy gifts and clothing for kin in Western Samoa. A lot of the clothing is bought at 'flea markets' and school fetes. Even after these expenses are met, which amount on average to 15 per cent of net incomes, the guest-worker may still have $4,000–$6,500, or proportionately less where a period of less than 12 months is worked. When the target is reached the guest-worker and his sponsor may agree on a date for return and a means of returning funds not already repatriated.

8The average gross wage in 1979 in New Zealand was $160 per week. Female wages are generally lower because, despite equal pay legislation, women are prevented from working certain shifts by factory legislation.
The value of funds officially remitted under these informal guest-worker movements is shown in Table 11.3. The drop in 1978 and 1979 reflects the drop in job opportunities and changes in regulations and surveillance of movements of visitors. In recent years as the number of opportunities has contracted, earnings from guest-work have been significantly lower than in the early 1970s when jobs were available, wages were boosted by overtime payments, and comparatively low rates of inflation were recorded. However, there are good reasons to believe that recent figures under-estimate the extent of transfers throughout the period. First, some of the proceeds of guest-work are transferred in cash, since New Zealand currency can be easily converted in Western Samoa. Such cash transfers can be arranged quickly without formal application and without the same risk of detection that formal application to the Reserve Bank is believed to entail. In recent years as the number of opportunities has contracted, earnings from guest-work have been significantly lower than in the early 1970s when jobs were available, wages were boosted by overtime payments, and comparatively low rates of inflation were recorded. However, there are good reasons to believe that recent figures under-estimate the extent of transfers throughout the period. First, some of the proceeds of guest-work are transferred in cash, since New Zealand currency can be easily converted in Western Samoa. Such cash transfers can be arranged quickly without formal application and without the same risk of detection that formal application to the Reserve Bank is believed to entail. It has been suggested that the only way of establishing the volume of cash transfers would be to monitor repatriated New Zealand currency from Samoa (Research Section, NZ Reserve Bank 1974, pers. comm.) but these data are not available (Reserve Bank 1980, pers. comm.).

Table 11.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Value $NZ(000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1,191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NZ Reserve Bank (pers. comm.).

Second, part of the proceeds of guest-work is sent to Western Samoa by permanent migrants, and thus appears in the consolidated figure for personal remittances. What proportion of personal remittances guest-workers' funds constitute is not clear but various possibilities are suggested in Table 11.4. The most conservative estimate of the total value of guest-work transfers can be calculated by combining the totals for temporary residents' transfers and amounts based on the assumption that 5 per cent of personal remittances are generated by guest-workers. A still conservative but more likely value can be obtained by combining temporary residents' transfers and the figure based on the 10 per cent

---

9The Bank observes that it is not uncommon to see Samoans closing accounts and withdrawing the entire amount in NZ$5 notes which are converted a week later at the Bank of Western Samoa.
assumption (Table 11.5).  

**Table 11.4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total remittances (NZ$ 000)</th>
<th>Guest-worker transfers as share of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10%&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>5,212</td>
<td>521.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>3,914</td>
<td>391.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>3,688</td>
<td>368.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>3,367</td>
<td>336.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> On assumption they form 10 per cent of total.

<sup>b</sup> On assumption they form 5 per cent of total.


**Table 11.5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Temporary residents' transfers + 10% of personal remittances total (NZ$ 000)</th>
<th>Temporary residents' transfers + 5% of personal remittances total (NZ$ 000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1,712</td>
<td>1,451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>843</td>
<td>647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Costs and benefits of guest-worker movements

There is an increasing interest in the consequences of labour migration for countries both of source and destination. Paine (1974: 49) suggests that the export of labour can lay 'the foundations of sustained economic growth and provide a comparatively costless solution to the problem of reducing unemployment and acquiring

<sup>10</sup> It is my belief that both of these sets of figures are well below the 'real' amounts generated by guest-worker movements and that the latter may be as much as 40 per cent higher when the substantial numbers of illegal and unrecorded transfers, which are not presently monitored, are taken into account.
foreign exchange, or ... condemn the country to a permanent existence as an underdeveloped satellite of a prosperous metropolitan area'. Within the literature there is a growing consensus that labour migration tends generally to favour labour importers and to disadvantage labour exporters. A variety of models is available to those who set out to 'cost' these movements. These tend to reflect the conceptual and methodological biases of the disciplines within which they have been developed and measure a range of 'costs' with varying degrees of sophistication.

While a number of models for costing consequences of labour exporting are available, few are concerned specifically with guest-worker movements. Of those, the model developed by Paine (1974) to examine guest-workers' impact on the Turkish economy provided a comprehensive framework, and will be used as the basis for the analysis here. There are also several models analysing the impact of migrant workers on labour importing countries but these deal more adequately with costs of long-term migration which involve a somewhat different cost structure from short-term guest-worker movements. While the approach adopted by Marshall (1973) in her analysis of the consequences of labour importation for the Netherlands, takes a somewhat broader view than this paper, it is a useful framework and is drawn on in this analysis. The costs of these movements for Western Samoa and New Zealand will be considered separately below.

Consequences for Samoa

The consequences of guest-worker movements for Western Samoa cannot be clearly established for lack of data. Moreover available data do not, in many cases, distinguish between the effects of short-term guest-worker movements and longer term migration. Despite its obvious importance for development, the Western Samoan government has been unable to include migration as a systematic element in development policies. Where migration has been discussed it has generally been regarded as a palliative. The first Five Year Development Plan of 1966-70 observed that outmigration alleviates need for jobs (Western Samoa 1966:12) and cited Puerto Rican encouragement of outmigration as a means of relieving population pressures and of improving domestic per capita income and living standards (ibid.:12). The Economic Development Board noted that opportunities for continued outmigration depended largely on labour needs of New Zealand industry and forecast a rate of 2,000 per annum for the period 1966-70, which would act as a limited 'economic escape valve'. The role of migration in creating export markets for Samoan produce was noted in the Plan (ibid.:63), as was its importance in reducing the deficit in Western Samoan balance of payments (ibid.:69). The document recognized the 'willingness of Samoans living overseas to offer assistance to their relatives living in Western Samoa' but suggested that although the numbers overseas were growing there was 'a limit to the financial capacity
of these benefactors' (ibid.:69). The Plan stressed that while growth in agricultural productivity and internal restructuring was to be preferred to dependence on remittances, 'personal receipts from overseas are an indispensable element to balance the overseas accounts and failure to ensure this flow from New Zealand will have serious consequences' (ibid.:71).

The second Five Year Economic Development Plan of 1971-75 took a somewhat different view of migration. Outmigration between 1965 and 1969 had contributed to a fall (to 2.8 per cent per annum) in the population growth rate (Western Samoa 1970:5) and had to some extent alleviated the consequences of the continuing decline in real terms, despite growth in primary and tertiary sectors, of national and per capita incomes (ibid.:7). Interest was expressed in the increasing range of skills available among Samoans living abroad, and the possibility of inviting the migrants to apply for vacancies in Western Samoa (ibid.:13). The Plan notes the tendency of increasing numbers of young Samoans to migrate in their search for gainful employment and the need to create employment opportunities in the country (ibid.:14).

A more critical analysis of the consequences of migration was provided later by Paul Shankman, who contested Pitt's view that 'overseas migration does not usually have an adverse effect on the local economy' (1970:186). Shankman suggested that 'as migration and remittances have become a more integral part of the Western Samoan economy they have helped to aggravate under-development' (1976:86). Neither these studies nor others, however, examine specific consequences of guest-work for Samoa.

An interesting question is whether the source country is disadvantaged on balance by the loss of a particularly enterprising part of its workforce. Guest-worker movements generally result in some loss of production. This, however, is temporary and may be offset later if capital generated or skills acquired raise the level of productivity. The amount of production forgone will be determined by the occupational composition of the guest-worker stream and will be higher if those involved are highly skilled and productively employed, and lower if they are unskilled and either unemployed or under-employed. The official sources are of little assistance. Western Samoan figures provide data on occupations of Western Samoan citizens arriving and departing but these are of limited value as they do not distinguish between citizens normally domiciled in Western Samoa and New Zealand and those departing permanently and temporarily. Moreover a large proportion chose not to state an occupation (1976, 9,307 or 46 per cent; 1977, 11,905 or 50 per cent).

Another possible strategy to judge impact of lost manpower is to base calculations on the assumption that the distribution of occupations in the guest-worker stream will reflect the general distribution of the economically active population. On this
assumption, at its peak in 1971 67 per cent of the guest-worker stream would have been drawn from agriculture, forestry and fishing and 15 per cent from the industrial sector. By 1976 on the same assumption these sectors would have provided 61 and 18 per cent respectively. In fact the proportions drawn from agriculture, forestry and fishing may be higher and the amount of production lost to the Western Samoan economy is probably small. It has already been suggested that sponsors choosing guest-workers tend to select the disadvantaged from the rural sector, especially the unskilled and under-employed from subsistence sectors. This would limit losses to Samoa.

The value of agricultural production forgone will vary with the individuals' participation in agriculture. If guest-workers are not normally employed in cash-cropping their absence will have a limited impact. If a food crop has been planted before departure or other family members take over, no production will be forgone. In other cases income from guest-work will have to be used to buy foodstuffs which may include imports and so affect the balance of payments. Even in such cases, however, these costs must be weighed against any increased productivity from investment of guest-worker earnings. There are, however, no data to enable losses to the economy in general to be weighed against gains.

It is clear from the previous analysis that guest-workers' propensity to save is much higher than that of permanent migrants and that their funds are more likely to be spent in Western Samoa than abroad. This is a potentially valuable source of funds for domestic investment in productive activity. There is, however, no certainty that this potential is being realized. There are no estimates of the share of earnings from guest-work which is invested on return on domestic producer goods and services or on imported commodities for investment or consumption. In the Western Samoan case, with a limited manufacturing sector, many goods required for increased production must of necessity be imported (Western Samoa, Department of Economic Development 1978).

From observation of the disposition of guest-work opportunities, albeit over a very small sample, field research suggests that the income from guest-work will be used in about equal proportions in productive and entrepreneurial activities, the creation of capital assets (houses, vehicles), and socio-political activity rather than any one type of activity (Macpherson 1975). Thus, at any time, the income will almost certainly create a demand for imported commodities but the extent to which these are used to increase productivity will vary. It is likely also that the major obstacles to application of this income in agricultural production is not a lack of foresight on the part of the guest-worker or his sponsors, but rather a combination of the factors which have bedevilled Western Samoan agricultural development programs for some time. These factors have been discussed extensively elsewhere (Western Samoa 1966:26ff; 1970:4ff; 1975:20ff).
The labour exporting country also benefits from the contribution which repatriated earnings make to the balance of payments (Western Samoa 1966:71). Clearly guest-workers remit a much higher proportion of earnings than long-term migrants whose levels of remittance tend to decline over time as their major obligations to non-migrant kin are met (Macpherson 1975).

The exact contribution of guest-work earnings to the balance of payments is not known — indeed the level of total remittances is uncertain. To give some crude indication of the likely scale involved, the possible contribution of guest-work remittances to credits in the balance of payments is shown on various assumptions in Table 11.6. If guest-work remittances represent, say, 5, 10 or 30 per cent respectively of officially recorded remittance and pension inflows, then this would imply the percentage contribution to balance of payments credits shown in brackets in the table.

Table 11.6
Personal remittances, merchandise and travel as percentages of Western Samoa's balance of payments credits, 1965-75

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pensions &amp; personal remittances</th>
<th>of which from guest-workers</th>
<th>Merchandise exports f.o.b.</th>
<th>Travel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(c)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>(0.75)</td>
<td>(1.5)</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>(0.9)</td>
<td>(1.8)</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>(1.1)</td>
<td>(2.2)</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>(0.9)</td>
<td>(1.8)</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>(0.8)</td>
<td>(1.6)</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>(0.75)</td>
<td>(1.5)</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>(0.8)</td>
<td>(1.6)</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>(0.8)</td>
<td>(1.6)</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>(0.85)</td>
<td>(1.7)</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>(1.0)</td>
<td>(2.8)</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>(0.8)</td>
<td>(1.6)</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (a) Assumes guest-worker remittances form a constant 5 per cent of officially recorded inflows of pensions and personal remittances.
(b) Assumes they form 10 per cent.
(c) Assumes they form 30 per cent.

Source of main figure calculations: Western Samoa, Department of Economic Development, Economic Indicators, May 1978.

11The basis for calculation of remittances is not specified in Economic Indicators and may refer to official volume only. See also caveat in note 10 above.
A possible adverse effect of migration on labour exploiting countries may be the generation of inflation through domestic spending of remittances (Paine 1974:49). However, in Western Samoa such an inflationary impact has caused no official concern (Western Samoa 1974:28ff). During the period of strong guest-worker movements in the late 1960s and early 1970s Western Samoa's rate of inflation was modest. Whether there has been any impact more recently cannot be known until the respective contributions of remittances from permanent migrants, the growth of domestic wage employment, and various exogenous factors can be identified.

Paine discusses also the consequences for labour exporters of guest-workers deciding to remain abroad permanently. Such a development could adversely affect remittances, which decline as migrants establish themselves in the new country. Officially this prospect of settlement does not exist for Western Samoan guest-workers in New Zealand. In fact in 1977 some 1,800 Samoan guest-workers who had overstayed visitors' visas were offered the opportunity to regularize their status after they had registered during the amnesty, and now reside permanently abroad. This solution is unlikely to be repeated. Some other Samoans have established right of residence through marriage to New Zealand nationals, although the number is probably small. Such a shift to permanent migration thus seems unlikely to become significant.

A tentative hypothesis is that Western Samoa falls between the two extremes of advantage and disadvantage from migration outlined by Paine. On the one hand opportunities exist for short-term movements which cost the government little, and in fact produce a modest return to the national airline which shares a monopoly of the route with Air New Zealand. These movements are organized at no cost to the Western Samoan government by permanent migrants who also effectively subsidize the earnings of guest-workers and ensure high rates of savings. The repatriation of these savings provides Western Samoa with foreign exchange and a source of capital which may be employed in development. Because the movements are technically illegal they are temporary and unlike permanent migration need not result in a permanent loss of labour power. As long as these movements involve those who are unemployed or under-employed production forgone will be limited and may be offset if capital acquired is invested in activities which raise productivity.

Consequences for the recipient country

The presence of guest-workers in New Zealand is, as noted earlier, a response to the labour shortages which New Zealand experienced as a result of slow rates of population growth and manpower losses in World War II. The use of migrant labour was only

\[12\] Figures for intermarriages including Samoan spouses are available but make no distinction by migrant status.
one of a number of strategies available to New Zealand. These included increasing the level of local workforce participation, reducing the demand for labour by various means and adjusting internal distribution of labour to cover shortages. As Paine (1974: 10) observes, these options are not always open in practice because they require changes in social practices and traditions which in turn require long lead times. By comparison, the promotion of migration produces short-term solutions, for which pressure builds among those experiencing labour shortages and resultant bottlenecks in production. As Marshall writes:

The import of labour is not the only way that the advanced economies have for maintaining the growth rate, but it was historically the only rapid way, and besides, the 'best' and most convenient way: the most flexible and manipulable. Contrary to the acceleration of rationalization and concentration, there is less risk that the import of labour will disturb the 'co-operation between social partners' (workers and entrepreneurs). Furthermore if adequate measures are implemented ..., it gives rise to small infrastructural costs (1973:165).

These factors and the existence of Pacific states, with which New Zealand had various ties, and which had labour surpluses, made the decision to import labour as a short-term measure almost inevitable. It was against this background that guest-worker movements, both formal and informal, began to occur. Western Samoan guest-workers have constituted an important element of this stream and have provided New Zealand with short-term labour on extremely favourable terms.

The costs of Western Samoan guest-worker movements to New Zealand are low for much the same reasons as are all such movements and explain why Samoans have been able to work there informally for some fifteen years without any effective opposition. Almost all of the cost\(^\text{13}\) of producing, raising, and educating the Samoan guest-worker is borne by the Western Samoan economy which must also bear the costs of such maintenance as is necessary after employment ends and the guest-worker is repatriated.

Western Samoan guest-worker movements have had other advantages for the New Zealand economy. The workers' propensity to save and repatriate significant proportions of their income and to spend very little in New Zealand means that they have little if any direct effect on inflation. Their sponsors' encouragement for savings and the small amounts allotted them weekly as 'pocket money' result in a very low level of leakage into New Zealand's domestic

\(^{13}\) Some subsidies for labour preparation are provided in the form of aid by New Zealand but these have to be weighed against potential expenditure saved in preparing local labour units.
economy. Moreover such demand as is generated (e.g. for second-hand clothing) tends not to be for imported goods and so has no impact on the balance of payments.

The costs of these movements to the labour importing country are also reduced in other ways. Because guest-workers chosen are brought here by sponsors to earn rather than to settle they tend to travel alone. In the small sample I observed (Macpherson 1975) 96 per cent travelled alone and the remainder travelled with a dependant who was guaranteed employment. These movements thus involved very little expenditure on social infrastructural services for non-productive dependants and certainly do not generate the demands for major capital goods which are associated with permanent migration. Furthermore the fact that guest-workers are in New Zealand illegally may prevent them from drawing certain services which are available to other employees, either because they are ineligible or because they fear the possibility of detection and deportation. The fact that Samoan guest-workers generally live in established households means that they exert little, if any, demand on the housing market. In only one case observed did a sponsoring family consider renting a larger dwelling to accommodate a guest-worker but eventually arranged accommodation with another relation so that no movement was necessary.

The low level of demand for goods and services exerted by Samoan guest-workers on the New Zealand economy tends to mean that their presence, if not counter-inflationary, is not associated with the levels of demand generated by either permanent migrants or comparable local labour units. Furthermore their presence also reduces the demand which their sponsors may exert for goods and services. Sponsors subsidize guest-workers by providing food and accommodation and in doing so effectively reduce their own discretionary income.

The Samoan guest-workers' desire to maximize savings, heightened by the fact that they may at any time be discovered and deported, leads them to avoid industries in which industrial unrest is endemic, and activities which might result in loss of income. Samoan guest-workers argue that the best way for them to maximize earnings is to work more hours. A loss of wages in a strike may result in long-term gains in income, but, as they point out, that is of little consolation if they cannot depend on being around to enjoy it. The net effect of this strategy is that guest-workers represent a quiescent element in the labour force which is unlikely to generate demands for wage increases.14

14 Their presence is, however, probably not counter-inflationary because of the increasing tendency to central determination of wage levels, which preserves relativities, and because of the domination of certain powerful unions in the setting of general trends in national wage movements.
Because Samoan guest-workers are not entitled to unemployment and other forms of benefit the costs of their redundancy to the state are low. While they will receive such redundancy pay as they are entitled to from their employer, they are ineligible for unemployment benefits. Unless they can locate alternative employment, mainly through kin, they usually return to Western Samoa, because their sponsor may be unwilling to support them if no job is available.

These factors combine to make Samoan guest-workers an attractive prospect to the economy in general in times of full employment. The picture changes, however, if unemployment levels begin to rise. Where the employment of a guest-worker results in the unemployment of a local, the benefits from employment of low-cost guest-workers have to be set against the high cost, both direct and indirect, of maintaining an unemployed local worker. Unlike the guest-worker who, on becoming unemployed, simply leaves the country the local cannot or will not go away and continues to be a charge on the economy. Unemployment has thus led the New Zealand government to attempt to control guest-worker movements more deliberately.

Employers, however, may take a somewhat more pragmatic view of the situation. Despite the recent introduction of penalties for those employing visitors, employers continue to offer their Samoan staff opportunities to introduce new recruits, in the knowledge that the replacement will be of acceptable quality. Their view expressed succinctly by one major employer is that 'these chaps know what they're here for. They work all hours I offer them and keep their teams under good control. I would rather have one of them than five of the unemployables the Labour Department sends me.'

Moreover, establishment costs for the employer are usually considerably less than those involved in standard labour replacement, which are reckoned at around $1,700 per employee. Where the replacement is handled by Samoan employees the costs of advertising and interviewing are saved and little if any time is lost in the process. Induction and such training as is necessary is provided by sponsoring employees and the discipline of the trainee is assured.

It is probably therefore hardly surprising that Samoan guest-worker movements continue even in periods of high unemployment. But conflict between the pragmatism which informs some employers' approach and the long-term needs of the economy may well result in increasing pressure for the ending of these movements. When trade unions examine the consequences of this guest-worker presence for their members they too may exert more effective pressure than government is able, to halt the employment of guest-workers.
Conclusion

The 'real' costs of guest-worker movements, for both donor and recipient countries, are of course more complex than this analysis might lead one to suppose. The problem lies in the fact that certain 'costs' and 'benefits' are difficult to conceptualize, much less measure. The preceding discussion has attempted, albeit superficially, to document some of the consequences of guest-worker movements for both labour donor and recipient in one particular context. The overwhelming impression which this exercise has left is the need for more adequate 'tools' with which to measure these costs and for more attention to empirical material. Only with more such material from conscientious observation of large numbers of such movements will we begin to appreciate their real costs for both donor and recipient. Only when the real costs are fully appreciated will a model be devised which represents them accurately.
Part D
Urbanization and transport: policy issues
This part includes four papers dealing with urbanization, adjustment problems of migrants to urban areas, the role of intermediate towns and the influence of changing transport patterns in population mobility.

Gale, in a valuable study of Aboriginal movement in Australia, shows how successfully populations in transition can adapt traditional family and tribal patterns to changed circumstances, and at the same time how profound can be the inadvertent social impact of government policies, often introduced for quite different purposes.

Young discusses the role of medium-sized towns in mobility which is often seen by planners as stemming long distant movement through providing local employment opportunities and social services. Papua New Guinea has stressed this strategy, partly to stimulate growth centres which will create greater equality between regions. Young finds in the evidence that the medium-sized towns she studied are performing a significant role either as ultimate destinations of migrants or as staging posts to bigger centres. They do, however, function usefully in social interaction with their hinterlands. Alice Springs in central Australia serves the Aboriginal populations of its hinterland much less well, and most Aborigines coming there are visitors staying only briefly for specific purposes.

Chandra uses data not generally available from the Fiji census to analyse the country's rural-urban movements. He gives details of the origin of lifetime migrants by sector, province, sex, age and ethnic origin and some discussion of the motivation of the migrants. Such data provide the basis for policy formulation, particularly on regional growth centres, housing and employment.

Hugo stresses how comparatively little research there has been on the demographic, economic and social consequences of the recent expansion of Indonesia's transport network, in spite of its obvious importance for demographic and social policy, investment decisions and regional development. What research there has been shows that rapid transportation growth has promoted an unprecedented volume of short-term movement of people by road, using bicycles, 'colts' and other motor vehicles. He suggests many areas in which research is badly needed to help guide policy makers, and the need to place research on mobility-transportation linkages into its wider social context.
Chapter 12

Adjustment of migrants in cities: Aborigines in Adelaide, Australia*

Fay Gale

The migration of Australian Aborigines into State capital cities is a relatively recent phenomenon. It began in the late 1950s, rapidly gathered momentum during the 1960s, and continued throughout the 1970s but at a somewhat steadier rate. This pattern of urban migration is one aspect of the large-scale shifts in the Aboriginal population which have occurred over the last twenty to thirty years.

The apparently sudden and dramatic changes in the location of Aborigines need to be understood within the context of two significant but quite different models. One is the mobility of Aborigines as part of a whole cultural tradition and the other is the inevitability of migration resulting from rapid population explosion on small, confined and segregated reserves, missions and settlements.

This paper deals with migration to the capital cities, the rural-urban push, and in particular describes the pattern within South Australia in the last two decades. The other migrations such as the homelands or outstation movements may be rooted in similar causes, but involve quite different groups of people, and their whole rationale is too different for them to be compared with the migration of westernized Aborigines to the cities.

The patterns of movement

Mobility has deep historic roots in Aboriginal society and the recent migration to the cities may be yet another form of adjustment migration, which has been so essential to Aboriginal survival both before and after European settlement in this country. The actual patterns of migration to the cities cannot be interpreted

* I wish to thank Joy Wundersitz, research assistant at the University of Adelaide, and Muriel Van der Byl, Aboriginal Education Foundation of South Australia, who conducted the interviews during 1980.
in traditional cultural terms because the sites of our cities do not necessarily reflect Aboriginal locational choices. But mobility, as an essential tool to manage the Australian environment, was well established in pre-European times.

Scattered throughout the ethnographic literature are innumerable references to travel and trade. Only a few examples will be cited here. McCarthy's (1939) early work on trade highlighted the need for movement and exchange of items, so that essential goods, such as diorite axeheads or ochre, could be transferred to areas hundreds of miles away where there were no local sources. Tonkinson (1974:14) provides a map of migration patterns amongst Aborigines living in the Western Desert. The extensive nature of such movements is evident and it is clear that such migrations are essential features of the culture.

Tindale (1974) quotes various examples of migration paths which still remain in the landscape because of the long-term changes which such tracks made to the vegetation. Gilbert (1959) traces the migration tracks of Tasmanian Aborigines which are evident even after 100 years because of the different regrowth of eucalypts.

In my own fieldwork I have encountered many similar examples. For instance, Yorke Peninsula in South Australia has few sheltered areas where fire could be kept alight during the wet winter. The Narangga people of Yorke Peninsula say that their ancestors used to travel across to the River Murray to obtain fire sticks. In the rock shelters on the banks of the river, fire could be kept going all the year. Similarly, there is clear evidence of distinct seasonal patterns of movement along the southeast coast of South Australia. The Bunganditj people of this area lived largely on sea foods along the coast in summer but moved well inland to more sheltered areas each winter.

Even the quite sedentary people of the Lower River Murray, who could find permanent food and water without ever moving, made regular forays away from the river. In the winter, when the limestone mallee soils offered surface water, the people could move out in search of variations to their diet and for the purposes of social exchange.

Throughout the literature can be found mention of the 'big' meetings when large numbers gathered together from great distances away. When I was staying at Yalata in 1958, a family arrived in an apparently casual manner. It transpired that they had walked in from several hundred kilometres away, and had followed the well-known paths of kin movements.

Changes in mobility

During the European settlement period, which of course began in the east in 1788 and is still not completed in the centre and
north, Aborigines were increasingly confined to small missions and reserves. Their mobility was severely curtailed by both official measures and unofficial pressures. Even so they moved. But, increasingly, the migrations of post-settlement times were forced movements to unfamiliar territory and onto land which belonged to others.

During the pacification time, local Adelaide people had been put together with others brought over from the Murray. As Adelaide grew, many of them were taken to Port Lincoln and then, when it was expedient to close Poonindie mission, just out of Port Lincoln, they were shifted either to Point Pearce or Point McLeay. Some of these people were descendants of Tasmanians, taken by sealers and whalers to Kangaroo Island and then shifted to the mainland as those operations closed down. They had thus been forced to migrate many times to unknown areas, and had been forced into close living conditions with people whose language they did not speak and with whom they had little in common.

Thus, as settlement proceeded, the earlier traditional patterns of necessary and voluntary movement became translated into alternate periods of severe confinement, in small mission areas, and extensive forced transportation over great distances. Then, as the mission system became established in one place after another, a more permanent, sedentary life-style was enforced. The women and children stayed at the mission in houses provided and carefully controlled by the white superintendents. But the life-style expected of the males was quite different. Not only were they encouraged to leave home, they were virtually forced to do so for economic reasons. The social and family patterns of generations were broken. The women were almost stopped from movement and the men were forced to shift more often.

In many areas, Aboriginal men provided the backbone of the labour force for clearing and early European settlement. In different areas, the mission men operated away from home for long periods of time as shearing teams or drovers or later as fruit pickers. In many instances, a series of historic forces interacted with their environmental knowledge and experience to ensure that the paths they took for participation in the European economic system were, in spatial terms, similar to those of traditional migrations. It is not surprising that often, when forced out in search of work, they went to known areas far distant from the missions.

For example, the Yorke Peninsula people who had previously travelled to the River Murray for fire, diorite and other items of exchange, found a significant source of income, by coincidence or otherwise, by moving to the Murray for the grape- and fruit-picking seasons. The cattle drovers from Finniss Springs mission, to the northwest of Maree, were descendants of the Dieri people who lived to the east of Lake Eyre. These people had been gathered into Killalpaninna Mission in the 1860s from areas as far north as
Birdsville. The Birdsville Track was home territory to the drovers who regularly travelled this route with cattle until the road trains of recent years. The Finniss Springs drovers whom I met on the 'Track' were descendants of earlier Dieri to whom such seasonal movements were part of life. Similarly, shearing teams from Nepabunna, working in the Flinders Ranges, appeared to follow well-worn dreamtime paths of their forebears.

Indeed, there is every reason for the circulation theorists to find endless delight in Aboriginal migration patterns, both before and since European settlement. The paths followed frequently showed a distinct relationship between spatial movement and the distribution of kin networks. Beckett, in his study of Aborigines in western New South Wales, says, 'they like to travel where they are known, that is to say, where they have kin or close affines who, even though not personally acquainted, can be asked for hospitality' (1969:19). Beckett established what he called 'beats'; that is, routes which non-tribal, part-Aborigines travel: 'Each Aboriginal has a beat, an area which is defined by the situation of kinsfolk who will give him hospitality, within which he can travel as much or as little as he pleases' (Beckett 1965:20).

The extent to which the location of kin, known or unknown, determined the direction, distance and ultimate settlement of Aborigines in South Australia is shown in Gale (1972). Even the location chosen within Adelaide by seemingly assimilated, 'economically sound' people was largely influenced by the presence of kin.

It is not necessary to seek traditional values to interpret such patterns. Until the mid-1960s, Aborigines in most parts of Australia, and even later in some areas, were forbidden alcohol and were not able to stay at a hotel. Indeed, no matter what their financial situation, there was nowhere they could stay unless they found kin. If they camped out near a town or city they were arrested for vagrancy. To travel for work, medical attention or for whatever reason, meant following routes where kinsfolk could be located.

The urban migration

The patterns of short-term migrations away from the confined reserves were dramatically changed from the late 1950s onwards. Aborigines began to leave the reserves permanently. And throughout southern and eastern Australia, they moved first to the country towns and then, like so many white rural dwellers, they migrated to the capital cities.

The push factors which drove them off the reserves had little relation to the causes of white urban migration, but the forces which sent them on into the capitals were comparable. The population explosion of the reserves coincided with the decline in employment opportunities for casual labourers in the rural areas. Migration to the cities was clearly the only alternative.
In the postwar period, the baby boom of Australia at large was even more exaggerated on the reserves. Traditional methods of fertility control had been lost, the extremely high mortality rates current earlier in the century were being curtailed and, as a result, the reserve populations rose very rapidly. For example Point Pearce, which was set up on a meagre 240 hectares of land on Yorke Peninsula in 1868, and was later increased to 5,600 hectares had a population of over 400 in the late 1950s, in spite of the departure of 340 persons in the decade and a half after World War II. Clearly, no single farm of the size and quality of the Point Pearce mission could support such a population.

It is difficult to evaluate the nature and extent of the urban migration of Aborigines because there are few reliable data sources and the topic has received little attention from students. The information available from census material has limited use except in broad terms because of the inherent inaccuracies which are different for each census. Full counts of the Aboriginal population were not undertaken before the 1967 national referendum on the citizenship of Aborigines, so that the 1971 census is the first to attempt full cover.

In 1966 the only persons defined as Aboriginal were those said to have 50 per cent or more Aboriginal ancestry. The 1971 and 1976 censuses tried to enumerate all persons who wished to identify as Aboriginal but with varying degrees of success. There are two reasons for difficulties in assessing trends between censuses. The first has been the rapid growth in Aboriginal self-awareness and identity over the last fifteen years. The once hidden people have emerged and to a greater degree in the cities than elsewhere. The second is the complexity of the recording process. It is clear that there were many errors in recording the 1976 census. For example, in Sydney, some 15 per cent of persons claiming Aboriginal identity were either born overseas or had both parents born overseas and were therefore obviously not Australian Aborigines. The question has been misinterpreted. Such problems were not so obvious in the smaller centres or in the rural areas but the official metropolitan figures must be treated with caution.

There is no doubt that Aborigines were under-enumerated in 1966 and to a lesser extent in 1971. My own fieldwork gave an Aboriginal population in Adelaide of 2,039 in 1966, compared with the census number of 883. My study of 1966 was virtually a complete population count. This has not been repeated. But from a sample done in 1973, I estimated a total Aboriginal population in Adelaide then of the order of 2,430. The census for 1971 had given a figure of 1,910 Aborigines in the Adelaide Statistical Division.

It therefore seems probable that the Aboriginal population was under-enumerated at both censuses; and purposely, by definition, at the 1966 census. However, by 1976, the Adelaide Aboriginal
population had jumped to 4,356 persons according to the census result. This official figure for 1976 must represent a significant over-enumeration. It is true that migration to the city has continued but fieldwork suggests that the rate of urban migration has been much slower in recent years than it was in the 1960s. An estimate based on our present study suggests a population of about 2,900 Aborigines in Adelaide in 1980. All available evidence supports this lower figure.

Whatever the actual figures across Australia may be, the fact of Aboriginal urban migration has been an important phenomenon in all Australian cities for the past thirty years. The rural exodus began during the 1950s, slowly gathered momentum during the 1960s and levelled off during the 1970s.

In the following discussion the city of Adelaide will be taken as a case study because information has been compiled over the last fifteen years dealing with Aboriginal migration to that city.

The urban migration to Adelaide is not as selective, on the basis of age, as many migrations are, and it does not attract males more than females. But it is selective in terms of area and kin. It has a distinctive Aboriginal pattern. The Adelaide Aboriginal population does not comprise a random group of people representative of all areas of South Australia. Except for those sent south by mission and government agencies, the Adelaide population is made up of quite definite and related kin groups, whose movement to the city has been encouraged by the presence of kin already established in the urban setting. It is clear that, for those able to call upon them, the adoption, development and use of kin networks are very important in the whole process of adaptation to city living.

**Field survey findings**

Aborigines undergo numerous processes of adjustment as they become urbanized. Some of these are comparable to those faced by other rural migrants to whom the crowded city environment initially poses a number of problems. But for Aboriginal migrants, the pressures resulting from rural-urban migration are quite different from those encountered by whites, because the rural experiences of the two groups were quite distinct and separate. In addition, there are other factors which are in many ways unique and are closely related to both their cultural background and their experiences in post-settlement times.

Most Aborigines who move to the city have come either from government or church mission settlements or from small country towns where they have been 'fringe'-people. In either case, they have been reared in a very limited social system, within a small regulated network, based primarily on kin affiliations. When they move to the
city they depend heavily upon those restricted networks to support and provide for them, at least initially.

The city is larger both spatially and socially. It offers an entirely different environment from the small, confined areas from which the migrants have come. Apart from the extensive European system at work, there are many more government agencies to deal with and there are several separate Aboriginal kin networks operating in their different ways. It is clear that many techniques for adjustment to this vastly different environment are being worked out and not all of them are likely to be beneficial in the long term.

Spatial distribution. It is only by securing and maintaining close kin links that new arrivals in the city can safely establish themselves in the urban environment. Only the fortunate few, who have had education and employment opportunities well above those of the majority of their fellows, are in a position to set up separate households in the city without reference to their relatives. Usually, these comparatively independent people have already become established in the general community, either in a country town or in another state, before their migration to the city. It is rare for the majority, who come from the reserves, to have been able to establish such independence. For them, the whereabouts of others from their own area is absolutely essential for their settlement and survival in the city. And these make up the bulk of the migrants.

The distribution of Aborigines in Adelaide, like that of most cities, is not random. There are relatively few Aborigines living in the eastern or southern suburbs, which are the most favoured residential suburbs, inhabited primarily by people in the higher socio-economic groups. The greatest numbers of Aborigines are found either in the inner city areas or in the more distant suburbs in the western and northern sections of the metropolitan area. Their location is controlled primarily by the availability of relatively cheap rental housing. Within this general constraint, kin factors largely determine the actual location of any one group of families.

In fact, there are opposing forces at work, encouraging spatial agglomeration on the one hand, and dispersal on the other. The policies followed by the Aboriginal Housing Board (AHB) illustrate this. The Board offers relatively cheap, good quality housing and can do this on a wide scale only by locating housing in areas where real estate is less expensive. Within this constraint, it operates an ambivalent policy. On the one hand it attempts to disperse sites extensively through available suburbs, following a policy decision of those initiating the housing project in the early 1970s. The policy makers believed that full acceptance and integration would occur only if 'ghettos' were prevented and
Aborigines were scattered throughout the suburbs. On the other hand, the system of mutual transfers, which has been developed by the AHB enables families in Aboriginal houses to exchange with other families in similar houses. These mutual transfers thus allow a redistribution within the housing system. Thereby, certain families can negotiate with others to obtain houses nearer the homes of their relatives.

Some families who have few kinsmen in the city, or who are unable to obtain funded housing, are to be found quite widely distributed within the general community. Many of these people do not wish to live in an Aboriginal area. They say that their children do better at school and are more accepted in the community 'if there are no other Nungas around'. It is also becoming clear that some who do possess extensive kin networks in the city are deciding to retain their links by car or taxi rather than by living in actual proximity. As the rate of car ownership increases, this factor, encouraging dispersal, is becoming more apparent. But such opportunities are mainly limited to two-income households.

The forces encouraging congregation are quite strong. In any one suburb, a relatively large proportion of the residents will be from one area and from related families. Our recent survey in Adelaide has shown a close correlation between residential location and family relationship. In one case, for example, within two kilometres of one household could be found seven households of siblings and their offspring. Indeed, of the ninety three households surveyed to date, thirty three were located within one kilometre of immediate kin.

Thus, because we are not dealing with one Aboriginal community but a whole series of sub-communal groups who are kin-related, the adaptations are quite varied, and the patterns observed at the micro-scale are different from those evident at the macro-scale. The overall pattern appears to be one of dispersal across a large number of suburbs in the inner suburban areas and in the western and northern districts. However, related families are not so widely distributed and they try as much as possible to live close to their kin, at least until they are quite secure economically.

Mobility. One striking feature of the population distribution of Aborigines in Adelaide is its rate of change. Households alter in composition and families as well as individuals move quite frequently from one location to another. This is particularly true of the most recent immigrants. When they first come to the city they move from household to household, between known kin. Until they become stabilized in separate households, their place of residence is determined by the availability of accommodation provided by their relatives. When a family eventually acquires its own house, it will, as far as possible, be near those kinsmen with whom the members lived when they first arrived in the city.
A comparison of data found in earlier studies of Adelaide, made in 1966 (Gale 1972) and 1973 (Gale and Binnion 1975), with our present survey (1980) suggests that in spite of the increase in the number of houses specially provided for Aborigines, the amount of mobility within the city may not have declined significantly. The increase in the number of houses provided for them made it possible not only for more Aborigines to migrate to the city, but also for both those already there, and for new arrivals, to move around quite frequently from household to household. Occupancy of a house provided by the AHB commits persons to identify as Aboriginal and they are therefore less able to turn away relatives than they would be if they were living in the general community.

Apparently, as the number of Aboriginal houses increases in the city, there is less use made of the traditional accommodation agencies. Few Aborigines now use welfare hostels such as those provided by the Salvation Army and the Saint Vincent de Paul Society. A decade ago these were important centres for Aboriginal men. Now the homeless can depend more on relatives simply because more relatives possess houses. Those without their own homes spend a week or two with one family and then move on to another.

Some of the older Aboriginal residents in Adelaide actually see the increase in the provision of special housing as detrimental, since quite significant numbers can move from house to house, without any restriction on their behaviour or their mobility. Because kin cannot be refused accommodation, those who belong to the larger kin networks are assured of regular, if changing, accommodation, without responsibility.

Our present study of Aboriginal households in Adelaide has shown that a significant proportion of Aborigines moves quite regularly between their kinsfolk. Of the ninety three households visited so far, thirty had relatives staying the house at the time of the interview. Ten of these households had three or more visitors at the time. This is probably an under-estimation because visitors are hard to count and unless actually seen by the interviewer may be ignored and 'forgotten' by the householder.

It is not just the single male, or lone individual, who moves regularly. In fact, whole households move frequently and family units show considerable mobility. Our present study in Adelaide has shown more mobility at the household and family level than would be expected, in view of the significant provision of specially funded Aboriginal houses in the city.

A comparison of Aboriginal mobility with that of the general population shows that Aborigines, in the city, move more frequently than do their fellow Australians. The 1976 census showed significant differences in the mobility of Aborigines and non-Aborigines. Census returns suggested that 39 per cent of the Aboriginal population of Adelaide had moved from residences occupied a year earlier,
compared to 13 per cent of the white population of the city. Similarly, 69 per cent of the Aboriginal population of Adelaide had changed their residence within the past five years, compared to 46 per cent of the general population.

We do not have a comparison with the population in general for 1980, but the present survey of Aboriginal households in Adelaide is surprisingly similar to that given for individual Aboriginal mobility in Adelaide in 1976. Our present survey suggested that 34 per cent of Aboriginal households had moved within the previous year and that 71 per cent had changed their address since 1975.

Mobility is thus quite significant both at the individual and the household level. It appears to be an important factor in the initial adjustment of migrants to the city. From evidence available it would seem that mobility decreases with three related, but not necessarily dependent, variables. Mobility is assumed to be an adjustment mechanism because it decreases with the length of residence in the city. Quite simply Aborigines who have lived in Adelaide for several years are not as mobile as are the recent arrivals.

It is also apparent that mobility decreases as people become more secure in their housing situation. Mobility decreases significantly when people move into homes which they have bought or are currently purchasing. The present survey supports very closely the findings of the 1966 study in this respect. There was no Aboriginal Housing Board at that time and no special provisions existed to provide rental housing for Aborigines. In 1966 it was only possible to compare the mobility of those purchasing homes with those in private rental accommodation. AHB homes, now by far the largest housing provision, first became available in small numbers only in 1972. The present study (1980) has shown that Aboriginal tenants in the specially funded houses are more mobile than home owners, but considerably less mobile than those living in privately rented accommodation. The comparative figures available to date from the present survey suggest that 75 per cent of home owners occupied the same house five years previously, 30.7 per cent of tenants living in houses supplied by either the AHB or the South Australian Housing Trust had the same residence five years before but only 7.1 per cent of those in private rental accommodation could claim the same address five years earlier.

Age is the third variable which appears to influence mobility. Families containing very young children are more mobile than those with older children or those whose children have grown up and left home. The older people may have visitors frequently but they themselves rarely move. In one instance a young mother with preschool children moved five times within twelve months from one relative to another without moving outside a radius of five kilometres.
The traditional movements in pre-European times, and their translated patterns during the post-settlement period, can now be seen to be very important in the adjustment of Aborigines to the city. The presence of kin and the assured availability of accommodation are significant factors in bringing about both the decision to migrate and the location of residence upon arrival.

Migration of Aborigines to Adelaide has not been evenly representative of all areas of the state. Indeed it has been very selective. Once a few from one area moved, others followed. The more relatives from that area settled in the city, the easier it became for others from the same region to migrate. Those who do not possess kin already established in the city are strongly dissuaded from attempting the move into such a crowded and seemingly hostile environment. I have shown (Gale 1972) that, in fact, the pattern of Aboriginal migration to Adelaide exhibited a chain system much like that described for some European migrants to Australia.

Identity. The city offers rural Aborigines the opportunity to deny or accept their Aboriginal background. For most, this is the first time in their lives that they have been able to make such a choice. Their rural location on missions, reserves or fringe camps stereotyped them as Aboriginal, irrespective of their appearance or degree of westernization.

The city offers an environment quite different from any experienced in the country. Unlike the situation in the small rural communities from which they have come, they are not stereotyped as 'those Aborigines' in the city. White city dwellers have seldom met Aborigines previously and do not recognize them as members of a distinct and separate group. Aborigines frequently cite the lack of prejudice and labelling, in the city, as a prime reason for migrating.

Many of the earliest arrivals were glad to lose their Aboriginal identity and to be able to mingle on an equal footing with 'whites'. They were said by their relatives to have 'passed over'. But as new arrivals came in during the latter part of the 1960s and early 1970s, and sought out their kin, new identity concepts emerged.

Furthermore, with rapidly changing government policy and financing, following the 1967 referendum, many who had earlier renounced their Aboriginal background found it to their advantage to re-identify. There were increasing opportunities in housing, education and employment which were not available to members of the community at large.

The city has thus witnessed a very interesting phenomenon over the last two decades. First, people moved in so that they could be assimilated and forgotten as ethnically distinctive. Then, as circumstances changed, they began to re-identify as Aborigines.
and more migrated in because the city offered opportunities for Aboriginal people as members of a distinctive group. Such changing forces have made demographic studies very difficult. But the switching of identity has been one of the most interesting features in the adaptation of migrants to the city.

**Marriage patterns.** It is inevitable that marriage patterns will also change in the city. The much larger social environment of the city offers Aborigines quite new horizons in marriage. On the reserve or in the rural town, their choices were very limited. Such as the social ostracism there, that intermarriage between Aborigines and Europeans was rare.

In the rural areas, liaisons between Aboriginal women and white men were not uncommon, but legalized marriage was discouraged. Numerous social pressures in the white rural community operate to dissuade actual marriage between Aborigines and Europeans. The same situation does not apply in the city. The rate of increase in intermarriage is one of the clear factors in the process of urban adjustment.

Furthermore, intermarriage is increasing with length of residency in the city and with the growth in the number of young people who have spent most of their lives in the city. For many of them the prejudices of the rural areas are merely hearsay. If we compare the three surveys I have made in Adelaide (1966, 1973 and 1980) it becomes apparent that the increase in intermarriage rates between Aborigines and Europeans is quite significant. If intermarriage is taken as a measure of social acceptability and integration as is commonly the case, then it is evident that the city is definitely a catalyst for social change. In Adelaide there are clear trends suggesting an increase in the proportion of intermarriage to intramarriage. In 1966 mixed marriages accounted for 26.6 per cent of all Aboriginal marriages in Adelaide. By 1973 this proportion had increased to 43.6 per cent and by 1980 the sample study showed that 57.9 of all formal Aboriginal marriages in Adelaide contained a non-Aboriginal spouse. The corollary was evident in that marriage within the group had declined from 73.4 in 1966 to 42.1 per cent in 1980.

There are strong historic and social factors encouraging intermarriage between Aborigines and non-Aborigines in the city. Aboriginal women and men consider that they have greater freedom and security with white spouses. Relatives have no say in the choice, as they appear to do in the case of marriage within the community. The very strict rules governing 'right' and 'wrong' marriage in traditional times continued to operate, albeit in a changed form, on the reserves. The older people brought such concepts to the city with them. A marriage outside of the community became a great deal easier for young people to negotiate. So complex and extensive are the kin systems of those families who came from the older reserves, that young people in the city, who
often cannot comprehend the networks, try to avoid them. In this way, it seems that the extent and strength of the kinship bonds may in fact be militating against their continuance.

There are also definite economic factors encouraging intermarriage. White men and women, with Aboriginal spouses, receive financial benefits unavailable to other non-Aborigines in the community. The Aboriginal funded houses, at very attractive rents, and the special educational allowances for their children, along with other benefits, make marriage to an Aboriginal quite attractive for a white person.

For the Aboriginal partners in such marriages, the rewards in terms of security and authority are evident. If the marriage should break up, the Aboriginal partner is assured of the house and many other benefits. If a white husband should leave an Aboriginal wife she remains secure, with no splitting of the value of the house or other financial adjustments being necessary. Since the source of funds was an Aboriginal agency, the white husband could not take even a proportion of them with him. Thus it tends to be the white person who gains by the marriage but loses by any separation.

However, whilst the social and economic forces at work in the city encourage intermarriage between Aborigines and non-Aborigines, the institution of marriage itself is under considerable threat. The actual proportion of Aboriginal people entering into legal marriages is declining in the city. Whereas marriage was the norm on the reserve, or in the rural community, it is not now the most common form of household arrangement in the city. Thus at the same time as the rate of intermarriage is increasing, the relative number of Aborigines becoming and remaining married is declining quite rapidly.

Whilst marriage as an institution may be under threat in the community at large, there are much greater forces at work militating against its survival in the Aboriginal communities of our cities. And these are quite new factors, virtually unknown to Aborigines on the reserves. In both traditional and post-settlement mission times, marriage was the usual situation and families were based on contractual arrangements. But in the city, de facto, divorced, separated and single parent (never married) households are increasing in popularity.

The welfare system, upon which many Aborigines are dependent, actually discourages marriage. Special Aboriginal benefits, such as the funded houses, can be acquired with or without marriage, but general welfare assistance in the form of social security is considerably limited by marriage. Pensions such as age benefits are reduced and others, such as unemployment, supporting mother's and invalid pensions are lost altogether to one partner if marriage is entered into. Such economic considerations do not concern the
majority of people in the community at large, but they are of immediate importance to a significant proportion of the Aboriginal population. According to the 1976 census figures approximately 32 per cent of Aborigines and 23 per cent of the general Australian population over the age of 15 years were in receipt of a pension. However, the majority of pensions granted to Australians are those given automatically on account of age. If age and war service pensions are eliminated from the figures then we see that in 1976 some 25 per cent of adult Aborigines were receiving welfare pensions (widow, supporting parent, unemployment, invalid etc.). By contrast it is estimated that just over 9 per cent of non-Aborigines were receiving social security benefits other than age and war service pensions at census date. Since 1976, the overall economic situation has deteriorated and it is most likely that a much higher proportion of the Aboriginal population would now be receiving some kind of welfare benefit.

The end result is that marriage is on the decline. In 1966, married Aborigines accounted for 52.3 per cent of the Aborigines in Adelaide of the age of 20 years and over, compared to 74.1 per cent of the community at large. By 1980 it would appear that the proportion of married persons in the Aboriginal population of Adelaide, 20 years of age and over, had declined to 21.4 per cent.

The corollary, of course, is that the alternative forms of family structure have increased. The proportions of families headed by widowed, separated and divorced persons has not changed significantly but there has been a considerable increase in the relative number of families headed by de facto parents and single (never married) parents. The 1966 survey located relatively small numbers of households in which couples lived in a de facto relationship. Legalized marriage at that stage was still the most common form of union in the city. For this reason, de facto households were not tabled separately in the 1966 results. Households containing unmarried mothers were rare since the policy of adopting and fostering their children was very strong in the 1960s. In no cases could single fathers be found caring for their children.

By 1980 the situation had changed quite dramatically. The 1973 study suggested that patterns were changing and that marriage and household structures were not the same as they had been in 1966. The 1973 survey gave a count which estimated that, of Aborigines living in dual head households, 26.4 per cent were in de facto liaisons and 73.6 per cent in legal marriages. But by 1980 the proportion of de facto units had surpassed that of married units. The present survey has found that Aborigines living in a married partnership account for 48.6 per cent of the dual household heads whereas 51.4 per cent of Aborigines living with a partner are now in de facto relationships.

Marriage, for Aborigines in Adelaide, appears to be a declining institution, and without doubt the welfare system is largely
responsible for this important shift in the pattern of marriage structures.

An interesting change has also occurred in the ethnic nature of the *de facto* arrangements. On the settlement frontier and in the rural towns, a *de facto* household tended to be set up between an Aboriginal woman and a white man. Marriage occurred where both partners were Aboriginal. The reverse is now taking place in the city. The rate of marriage between Aborigines and whites is increasing and is now the most frequent kind of marriage. But the *de facto* household is now more likely to contain partners who are both Aboriginal, in contrast to the historic, rural situation of an Aboriginal woman living with a white man.

In 1966, there were relatively few *de facto* households in Adelaide, but those that did exist consisted of an Aboriginal woman and a white man. By 1973, when just over one-quarter of the liaisons were of the *de facto* variety, the actual ethnic distribution was significantly changed. That is, there were approximately the same number of *de facto* partnerships where both members were Aboriginal as where one partner was white (usually male).

By 1980, not only had the *de facto* household come to outnumber the traditional marriage arrangement but its ethnic composition had also been reversed. The present survey has shown that *de facto* partnerships, where both members are Aboriginal, are now twice as common as those situations where one partner is non-Aboriginal. The features are summarized in Tables 12.1 and 12.2. The total numbers in the three studies are different because in 1966 a count was made of the total Aboriginal population of Adelaide, whereas the studies done in 1973 and 1980 have both been sample surveys.

### Table 12.1
Comparative ethnicity of married and *de facto* partnerships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>1980</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marriage</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n=444</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aboriginal/Aboriginal</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aboriginal/White</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>De facto</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no. not known</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aboriginal/Aboriginal</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>64.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aboriginal/White</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources:* Gale (1972), Gale and Binnion (1975), Gale and Wundersitz, fieldwork in progress.
Table 12.2
Comparative ethnicity of all partnerships, 1973 and 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1973</th>
<th></th>
<th>1980</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marriage</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aboriginal/Aboriginal</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aboriginal/White</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(subtotal)</td>
<td>(53)</td>
<td>(73.6)</td>
<td>(35)</td>
<td>(48.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>De facto</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aboriginal/Aboriginal</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aboriginal/White</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(subtotal)</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>(26.4)</td>
<td>(37)</td>
<td>(51.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>72</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Gale (1972), Gale and Binnion (1975), Gale and Wundersitz, fieldwork in progress.

The lesson is now very clear. If one is able to marry a white person, then legal marriage offers the best security. But if marriage to a white person is not feasible, then it is better to remain in a *de facto* relationship with a member of the Aboriginal community than to enter into a legal marriage contract with the latter. The financial rewards of the *de facto* relationship are greater, for marriage to a member of one's own group does not increase economic or social security as intermarriage is perceived as providing.

This change in marriage patterns is probably the most dramatic social adjustment that has taken place amongst Aboriginal migrants to the city, and it appears to be virtually a direct response to changing circumstances. From the latest data, it would now appear that just over one-half of the family units containing dual heads are based on *de facto* liaisons. The changing pattern in white society is no doubt related to this change. I have not seen comparable figures for the relative proportions of married to *de facto* households in the community at large, but I doubt whether it has reached such a high ratio.

The Aboriginal community, being so close to the poverty line and so readily affected by welfare decisions, is an important yardstick for measuring policies in the community at large. In the Aboriginal population of Adelaide it would appear that a radical change in marriage patterns has occurred, probably as a result of welfare procedures.

The other variation which has taken place is the growth of the single parent—(never married) units. There were very few
supporting parents in 1966 who had not been married. Rarely were single girls allowed, let alone encouraged, to retain their babies. The advent of the supporting parent's benefit for unmarried women, and its extension to men caring for children, has led to important changes in the parenting situation. It is now much less common for women to give up their children and even if they are prepared to do so, fathers, aunts and grandmothers volunteer to care for them. Older Aboriginal women can relate so many horror stories of lost children that the pressure to keep babies is now very strong.

In 1973, single parent units accounted for 8.4 per cent of the study population in Adelaide aged 15 years and over. By 1980, these supporting parents living alone had increased to 12.4 per cent of the population aged 15 years and over.

Household structure. The city, through all of its social agencies, encourages the formation and retention of nuclear households. Almost all of the standard rental houses available through the Housing Trust have been built with three bedrooms. Recently some of the special funded houses for Aborigines have had a fourth bedroom added. But even so, the concept has been to cater for a nuclear, even if a somewhat large, single family unit.

Houses are allocated on nuclear guidelines. It is easier for single parents to obtain housing assistance than it is for multiple households. Indeed, such households are often described as multi-problem families, when in fact they may be just crowded and, inevitably, somewhat noisy. But for the Aboriginal family, especially the family recently arrived in the city, there are few alternatives to the multiple household style of living.

Two aspects of the Aboriginal household in the city make it different from that of the average European household. One is the size and multiple or extended nature of the family occupying the house, and the other is the high proportion of adult females in relation to adult males living in the household.

At the 1976 census, households in the general population containing three or more families accounted for only 0.2 per cent of all families in private dwellings. But a comparable situation amongst the Aboriginal population registered 3.8 per cent of families in households containing three or more families. At the dual household level there is a similar disparity. Some 4.7 per cent of families in the community at large lived in households containing two families, but amongst the Aboriginal population, 16.6 per cent of the families were to be found in dual households. Thus, proportionately, one could say that four times as many Aboriginal families lived in multiple family households as did Australians in general, since multiple households (two or more families in the one dwelling) accounted for 20.4 per cent of Aborigines and 4.9 per cent of other Australians in 1976.
There are in fact two forces at work upon Aborigines in the city environment. On the one hand, relatively recent arrivals and those who have not secured economic independence are encouraged to share households with their kin. On the other hand, those who have either lived in the city for some time or else were born in the city are seeking independence and living arrangements separate from their kin. Especially the younger adults, who were born or brought up in the city, are now tending to establish themselves in nuclear households. This is quite a different pattern from that observed in 1966 and to a lesser extent in 1973. Clearly, those reared in the city are preferring households similar to those of their white peers.

At the present time the household structure is thus affected by two quite opposite forces.

Of the ninety-three households surveyed to date in Adelaide, thirteen contained multiple families as defined by the 1976 census. But five households would not be defined as families since they contained single adults living alone. Thus the proportion of multiple to single family households registered 14.8 per cent, a figure somewhat less than that given for the Australian average of Aboriginal families in private dwellings at the 1976 census. In addition, all available evidence suggests that the city offers a more favourable economic and housing situation than that existing in the rural sector. Therefore one would expect the proportion of multiple families to be lower in the city.

But the family connotation is not adequate to depict the actual degree of kin clustering. Of the eighty-eight households containing more than one person, forty-eight were nuclear households inhabited only by members of the immediate family, that is, parent or parents and their children. The remaining forty households contained extra members beyond the immediate nuclear family. Only thirteen of them housed additional families, but twenty-seven accommodated one or more extra individuals. And of the nuclear households, only thirty contained dual-parent families. The remaining eighteen nuclear units were occupied by a single parent and his or her children. The true nuclear family thus accounted for only 32.3 per cent of the ninety-three households surveyed.

The 1973 poverty study organized throughout Australia was based on income units and not families. For comparison between the surveys it is necessary to use similar formulae. Although the two Adelaide surveys are not strictly comparable, the figures do suggest that the proportion of multiple income unit households increased between 1973 and 1980. Units which are not comparable with the 1973 study (for example, households without children) have been omitted in Table 12.3.

The poverty survey (Gale and Binnion 1975) showed that multiple income unit households were better off, on average, than
single income unit households and that there were significant economic as well as social reasons for Aborigines to live in combined households in the city.

By and large, it would appear that the economically sound young Aborigines who have lived in the city for some time are moving out of the extended household into individual or nuclear units. But at the same time, the worsening economic situation may be encouraging more of those living on social service payments to live in shared households. It appears that the fluid and flexible Aboriginal household is so structured that it is able to adapt and adjust quite rapidly to changes in the economic environment in which it finds itself.

Table 12.3
Changing proportions of single and multiple income unit households, 1973 and 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1973</th>
<th></th>
<th>1980</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single income unit</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>households</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple income unit</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>69.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>households</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total households</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Gale and Binnion (1975), Gale and Wundersitz, fieldwork in progress.

Thus, although social pressures from the community at large encourage the breakdown of multiple or extended households, economic factors operate in the reverse direction. It is not surprising that people, for whom crowded households on reserves or in fringe camps are a familiar experience, are reverting to these kinds of structures to combat economic problems in the city.

The other outstanding feature of the Aboriginal household in Adelaide is the absence of adult men. All three Adelaide studies (1966, 1973 and 1980) have shown a very high proportion of adult Aboriginal females to males in the households. The urban migration pattern has not been unduly selective of females, so where are the adult males in the city?

The fact is that a high proportion of adult Aboriginal males remain single and homeless. Their situation was described in Gale (1972) when all those in institutions, hostels and hospitals were counted. The surveys in 1973 and 1980 have been household studies and have merely noted the absence of adult men. In 1973, the
seventy households surveyed on a random sample basis counted forty-five Aboriginal males, twenty years of age and over and ninety-three Aboriginal females of comparable ages. On a percentage basis, these figures suggested that approximately 67 per cent of adults living in households were females. In 1980 we found a comparable situation. Males of 20 years of age and over numbered sixty in ninety-three households whereas in the same age bracket females numbered ninety-nine. Thus the relative percentage was 62.3 females to 37.7 males.

Where are the single, homeless males? It has evidently been much easier for females to adjust to life in the city than it has been for males. Females can marry white men but it is more difficult for Aboriginal men to attract white wives. Single parent females obtain pensions and housing assistance much more readily than do males in similar situations.

Conclusions

All of these changes indicate a very adjustable community, but nevertheless one under great stress. The available data suggest that Aborigines who migrate to the city make considerable adjustments. The environment offered by the city is very different from that in which most Aborigines have grown up, whether on reserves or in rural communities. The city is so different in so many respects that newcomers must alter their life-styles to quite a significant degree.

On the reserves and in the small rural towns Aborigines usually lived 'on the fringe'. Opportunities for social change or social mobility were very limited as the whole social environment was confined. Kin networks had become complex and entwined following several generations of marriage generally restricted to the members of each group. By and large, Aborigines in rural areas lived in social and economic segregation.

The city offered them quite different social and economic opportunities. Many, who were relatively light-skinned, could choose whether they wished to identify as Aboriginal or not. Such a choice had not been available to them whilst they lived in rural towns or on the reserves. The city also presented many other opportunities in terms of more favourable access to housing, education, medical facilities, legal aid and employment.

The considerable number who have migrated to our cities over the last two decades have altered their life-styles to suit the new environment. At the same time they have adapted and used those elements of their former situation which were of advantage to them in the city.
The most important attribute which they brought with them was their kin networks. These relationships became important social and spatial determinants in the city. They influenced who migrated, where they came from and where they took up residence on arrival.

By means of high levels of mobility, fluid and extended household arrangements and spatial ordering on a kin basis, Aborigines have been able to adjust quite rapidly to life in the city. Furthermore, the changes in marriage patterns and household structures which have taken place since their arrival in the city have shown the extent to which these people have been able and willing to adjust with the changing requirements of their new environment.
Chapter 13

The medium-sized town in the context of mobility: rural-urban linkages and decentralization policies

E.A. Young

Population mobility performs a vital role in the development process because it enhances the exchange and transfer of ideas and experiences which allow the successful implementation of programs and policies designed to equalize the distribution of national resources. However, in less-developed countries, movement from rural areas to the metropolitan centre has formed a major component of mobility, and the resultant high levels of urban primacy are a formidable barrier to evenly-spaced regional growth. In Thailand, Indonesia, Fiji and Papua New Guinea the capital cities contain 40, 25, 54 and 28 per cent respectively of the total urban populations.\(^1\) While such concentrations of people, and hence of economic resources, may result in considerable savings of limited national capital, they also cause severe social and economic problems. As the United Nations Monitoring Project of 1977 reveals, recognition of these difficulties has led many countries to adopt policies which are designed to influence the spatial distribution of their populations. In that study 70 out of 114 less-developed countries surveyed (61 per cent) considered that their present population distribution was unacceptable, and over three-quarters of these countries had taken steps to decelerate rural-metropolitan movement (United Nations 1977:70-8). Encouragement of the growth of small and medium-sized towns, as recommended in the World Population Plan of Action formulated at the Bucharest Conference of 1974, forms a major component of these policies. However, encouragement is not sufficient. Unless a government imposes strict control on mobility, a step which most are unwilling to adopt, changes in population distribution can only be achieved if existing streams of movement and the factors which have led to their formation are taken into account. Failure to comprehend these processes can undermine planning from the start. This paper, which draws mainly on examples from Papua New Guinea, examines population mobility and medium-sized towns and suggests some of the reasons why

\(^{1}\)Latest available figures from censuses and estimates made between 1971 and 1978.
decentralization policies adopted by less-developed countries have been less successful than expected.  

Population mobility and the urban structure in less-developed countries

Rural-urban migration inevitably plays a vital part in policies which aim to increase the growth rate of smaller and medium-sized towns and decrease the flow of population to larger centres. While, theoretically, the increased flow into smaller towns can consist of people moving from any part of the country, it has usually been assumed that most of the new migrants will be from the adjacent rural hinterland. In that case the smaller town must be able to offer attractions which rival those of the larger, more distant centre. Present indications are that this rarely happens. Smaller towns tend to be more limited in their employment opportunities than larger towns; they are either dominated by administrative and service activities, with government as the main employer, or they are single industry towns. They also offer fewer social attractions. These disadvantages might be offset by the fact that, for rural-dwellers from their hinterland, they provide the opportunity for migrants to adjust to an alien urban environment without cutting themselves off from family and friends. However, in less-developed countries, it appears that the processes which influence migration flows have encouraged long distance movement to larger centres and hence have prevented the establishment of links which would integrate smaller towns with their surrounding rural areas. In other words, less-developed countries seem to offer little potential for the growth of the process of 'step migration', in which medium-sized towns would play vital roles as staging points.

Several factors are likely to hinder the development of step migration in the third world. First, as Browning and Feindt (1971:323-4) note for Mexico, societies lack a fully developed urban hierarchy. In many parts of the world, for example east Africa (McMaster 1968), Oceania (Belshaw 1963; de Bruijn 1963), towns are essentially colonial foundations, relatively recently established and frequently located in positions from which they cannot provide effective administration and services for adjacent rural areas. As a result they form what Webb (1976:17) has called a 'super-

---

2 More detailed discussion on growth pole theory is omitted in this paper; see Friedmann (1972), Appalrajju and Safier (1976). Hansen (1979:33-44) provides a useful summary of the application of growth pole strategies in developing countries.

3 Evidence for step migration in less-developed countries is in conflict but, as I have discussed elsewhere (Young 1977a:6, 19-20), discrepancies can be attributed partly to differences in definition and partly to differences in research emphasis.
imposed' hierarchy, not strongly integrated with the rural settlement pattern. Under those circumstances the generation of development and change through regional urban centres will not be straightforward. Second, migration in many third world countries has been strongly influenced by external controls, for example organized labour movement, restrictions on free settlement and political and economic demands imposed by the colonial power. As Bedford, Forbes and Curtain have all stressed in this volume, these factors are of paramount importance. They have often resulted in the establishment of strong migration flows which would probably not have developed under free choice by individuals. These flows may take the form of circular movement or migration over long distances, and may often bypass the medium-sized towns. Finally, once sources and destinations are linked through population mobility, the connections between them are continually reinforced by chain movement within extensive kinship networks. If medium-sized towns have been omitted initially, it will not be easy to incorporate them into later streams of movement. Altogether, population mobility in less-developed countries appears to have hindered the growth of strong links between medium-sized towns and their hinterlands.

Papua New Guinea: the role of the medium-sized town in mobility

Papua New Guinea provides a useful case-study of some of the basic points already raised. Its government, recognizing inherent inequalities in the spatial distribution of the population, has officially adopted a policy of decentralization. Yet the indigenous rural settlement system is imperfectly integrated with an urban system introduced under colonial administration. Moreover, existing patterns of population mobility have developed under the influence of externally imposed controls as well as through the free choice of the individual. Under those circumstances encouragement of growth in small regional centres inevitably faces problems.

Decentralization. The need for decentralization has been frequently discussed in Papua New Guinea during the last decade. While much of the argument has centred on political issues associated with the promotion of regional interests and equalization of national resource allocation,\(^4\) attention has also focused on the spatial distribution of the population. An early report on development strategies (Faber et al. 1973:93) stresses that 'policies to promote the development of a number of regional centres, and aiming at a widely dispersed hierarchy of very much smaller towns ... offer the best prospects for a more equitable spread of opportunities and benefits in the future'. This recommendation was later incorporated into one of the Eight Aims.

\(^4\)See, for example, Premdas and Pokawin (1979).
which formed the basic planning policy of the Somare government—'Helpim ol kain kain bisnis i stap ausait long ol taun'—and led to the commissioning of several studies on provincial prospects for regional development. The suggestion put forward for the Eastern Highlands emphasized the necessity for a system of small mobile service centres which would provide some urban-type functions for rural dwellers (Ward et al. 1974a and 1974b). This plan was later implemented as a pilot project in the Western Highlands. The National Planning Office has since continued to urge the need for decentralization and encouragement of population growth in medium-sized towns (PNG: Central Planning Office 1976:35), and in 1977 the new Cabinet position of Minister for Decentralisation was created. It has further recognized that much growth depends on the formation of strong regional rural-urban linkages and, in acknowledgment of the vital role of population mobility in such a policy, stresses that short distance migration should be promoted and long distance movement opposed (PNG: National Planning Office 1977:1). Provincial governments, mostly established in 1977 and 1978, have also emphasized the problems created by long distance population mobility and in several cases have set up assistance schemes for the repatriation of migrants to their own regions.

While it must be admitted that meaningful analysis of the effects of Papua New Guinea's decentralization policy cannot be made at this early stage, present indications are that they have not markedly affected the spatial distribution of the population. This can be attributed partly to failure to implement stated policies and partly to the influence of other factors such as the structure of the urban hierarchy and the continuing persistence of externally induced migration patterns.

The urban system and its hierarchy. At the time of the 1971 census 11.1 per cent of the population of Papua New Guinea lived in forty-seven towns, and over 80 per cent of urban dwellers were classified as indigenous to the country. The urban hierarchy, as Jackson (1976a) has shown, can be split into three distinct segments, differentiated on the basis of rank-size relationships. The upper level, called Group A towns, consists of eight major centres (Port Moresby, Lae, Rabaul, Wewak, Madang, Goroka, Mount Hagen and Kieta-Arawa-Panguna) (see Map 3, p.184 and accounted for over three-quarters of the total urban population. Group B, which includes fifteen towns, accounted for a further 16 per cent of urban residents and the remainder (8 per cent) lived in twenty-four smaller centres. Populations of

---

5Give special encouragement to all types of activity associated with rural areas.

6Defined as settlements with a generally urban character, a minimum population of 500 persons and a minimum population density of 500 persons per square mile (PNG: Bureau of Statistics 1974:1).
Group A towns, all of which were provincial administrative centres, ranged from 10,621 (Mount Hagen) to 76,507 (Port Moresby); Group B towns, also important service centres, had populations from 1,878 (Vanimo) to 5,733 (Daru) and the smallest Group C town (Miak) contained only 586 people. In the context of Papua New Guinea, Group B towns are defined as medium-sized centres, and are therefore the main focus of attention in this paper. Nine of the eighteen provinces designated in 1971 were administered by towns in this category (West New Britain was the only province whose administrative centre belonged to Group C), and they therefore perform a significant role in distribution of services to their rural hinterlands.

In the absence of a more recent population census it is not possible to estimate urban population change in the 1970s with any accuracy. Inter-censal growth rates from 1966 to 1971 indicate that Group A towns were expanding faster than those in the other two categories, and must have contained 84 per cent of urban dwellers in 1980. Thus the degree of dominance by major towns in the hierarchy would have increased rather than, as the advocates for decentralization hope, decreased. However, surveys carried out during the 1970s throw some doubt on the validity of rates on 1966 and 1971 census figures. Population totals estimated from the Urban Household Survey of 1973-74 suggest that growth rates had decreased since 1971, and this is confirmed for Goroka in 1976 (Skeldon 1976) and for a group of seven centres included in an Urban Population Survey in 1977 and 1978 (PNG: Bureau of Statistics 1978). Skeldon (1978b) further suggests that, between 1971 and 1977, urban growth in some of the major towns (Lae, Madang, Kieta-Arawa-Panguna, Rabaul, Goroka) was below that of some medium-sized towns. Unfortunately only two medium-sized towns (Popondetta and Kavieng) were included in the 1977 surveys, and therefore these results cannot be applied to the whole of Group B. If the estimates are valid, then there may be some evidence that decentralization is achieving some measure of success.

The present urban system not only exhibits a high level of population concentration in a few centres but is also poorly integrated with the dominant rural settlement system of the country. Towns were established as administrative centres, located with reference to the way of life of the colonial powers rather than the indigenous population. Thus their sites were suitable

7Assuming that no other town has qualified for Group A in the interim.

8However, this is by no means the only factor. Urban growth rates have also been affected by the decline in the non-indigenous population following Independence, and the lack of growth in employment opportunities.
for the construction of airstrips and harbours rather than as central nodes within national and regional land communications systems. The lack of integrated road networks at both national and provincial levels is still one of the main hindrances to development. Other urban functions, such as provision of commercial and social facilities, were of secondary importance and, when introduced, were fixed firmly within a European rather than Papua New Guinean framework. Moreover, the towns were regarded as places of residence for expatriates and various measures, such as lack of provision of family housing, curfews and vagrancy laws were used to restrict the establishment of indigenous settlement. Curtin (see Ch.8) has already discussed in detail how some of these practices affected population mobility. The relaxation of these restrictions in the 1960s and 1970s has certainly encouraged more Papua New Guineans to move to towns, but many still regard them as 'foreign places'. This had inhibited rural-urban integration.

Controls on population mobility. Present patterns and processes within population mobility system in Papua New Guinea owe much to controls imposed by government and private agencies both now and in the past. Labour migration, organized under contracts transporting unskilled men from their rural homelands to work on plantations, in mining camps or on the construction of towns and communication networks, has been a major influence. Since many places of employment were far removed from labour sources, this type of movement has resulted in the establishment of long distance migration streams, for example, between the Central Highlands and New Ireland and Bougainville and between the Sepik and New Britain (Young 1977a: 26-9). Organized labour migration according to Curtin (Ch.8) may have created the pronounced circularity that is a feature of present day mobility, and certainly helped to perpetuate it. Rural resettlement schemes, under which the government has sponsored the resettlement of families from densely populated regions or areas with a limited resource base to areas of land surplus, have also affected population mobility. Their impact has been less marked because they are a recent introduction and because the numbers of people involved are small. As with indentured labour migration, they have led to long distance movement. Within recent years a third type of control has become an increasingly significant influence on population movement. As Papua New Guineans have, through education, become qualified for administrative posts in both the public and private sectors, they have come to occupy jobs in which they are transferred by their employers. Inevitably these transfers occur mainly within the urban sector, and may bear no relationship to the personal wishes of the individuals concerned. As Keown (1971) has described for New Zealand and McKay and Whitelaw (1977) have shown for Australia, these migrants have become 'career transients', moving within a national mobility network.
Chain migration. Although government-organized labour migration schemes no longer affect population mobility as they did in the past, the specific links which were previously established have been maintained through chain migration within kinship networks. Thus a Highland migrant who establishes himself in Port Moresby becomes the hub of a mobility system which may include not only immediate members of his family but also friends from the same tribal area. Long distance movement therefore persists.

All of the above factors are likely to influence the role of the medium-sized town in population mobility in Papua New Guinea. The lack of a strongly structured urban hierarchy, properly integrated with rural settlement systems, prevents the growth of efficient links between these towns and their hinterlands. Because of labour migration and other movement related to employment, many migrants bypass adjacent medium-sized towns and move long distances to places of which they have already heard or where their kin are living. Step migration is therefore unlikely. It remains to examine in greater detail the role that medium-sized towns currently play in population mobility and, in the light of that evidence, consider some of the implications for development.

Case studies: Kundiawa, Kavieng and Kainantu

Kundiawa, Kavieng and Kainantu are medium-sized towns which exhibit many of the general characteristics already mentioned. Kundiawa and Kainantu are inland centres, situated in the Central Highlands on the main highway which links that region to Lae, and Kavieng is a coastal town at the extreme northern end of New Ireland (Map 3). While Kundiawa and Kainantu are centrally located within the rural areas which they administer, Simbu Province and Kainantu District of Eastern Highlands Province respectively, Kavieng is eccentrically sited and is not readily accessible from all rural parts of New Ireland Province. As provincial headquarters, Kundiawa and Kavieng are more important administrative centres than Kainantu, but, since Kainantu District has a population of almost 50,000, only slightly less than the whole of New Ireland Province, the contrast is not marked. Kainantu Kaunsil is one of the largest rural local government bodies in the country.

In 1971 the populations of these three towns ranged from 2,133 to 3,301, in each case a very small proportion of the populations of the regions which they served (Table 13.1). Over 80 per cent of urban dwellers were indigenous, and more than half of the

---

9Much of the evidence discussed in this section is derived from analyses presented in Young (1973; 1976; 1977a; 1977b; 1979).
10Simbu, the name used by the Provincial Government, is used in place of the older term, Chimbu, in their paper.
indigenous residents had been born within the rural hinterland. Each town had a high masculinity ratio, but this characteristic was more apparent among indigenous people who had moved from beyond the adjacent region. The difference was particularly marked in Kavieng where the male-female ratio among New Ireland born residents approached unity but, among people from other provinces, males outnumbered females by a ratio of three to one. This is because Kavieng has become a migrant destination for men who formerly worked as indentured labourers on adjacent plantations and who therefore moved without their families. Dependency ratios show a similar contrast; urban residents from the nearby region, many of whom were wives and children of workers, had much higher dependency ratios than people from other regions. This suggests a greater stability among migrants who have moved from adjacent areas than among those from elsewhere.

Few residents in these towns had received any formal education at post-primary levels (Table 13.1). However, the towns do have a larger number of relatively well-educated residents than their rural hinterlands; for example, 85 per cent of males born and still resident in Simbu in 1971 had no formal education but in Kundiawa only 47 per cent came into this category. Educational levels of urban residents also vary by region or origin. In each town a high proportion of those with formal training belonged to more distant regions, although in Kavieng the difference was much less noticeable. This reflects the high level of education achieved by New Irelanders in general. Over three-quarters of adult men were wage-earners and over 40 per cent of these were in government jobs. Inevitably, since migrants from other regions had higher levels of education, many upper level government positions were held by these newcomers. This was a cause for concern in Kundiawa and Kainantu where the workforce was segregated into a highly educated group, mostly from coastal areas of Papua New Guinea, and an illiterate unskilled group from the rural hinterland. Government employment on the whole was most prominent in Kundiawa where the private sector was very poorly developed, mainly because of the lack of economic opportunity in the surrounding region. Both Kavieng and Kainantu provide services for commercial plantations in adjacent areas and Kavieng has developed into an important centre for transport and commerce (Miskaram 1976). More recently both fishing and timber industries have begun to make an impact on the town. Industrial development in both Kundiawa and Kainantu is largely concerned with the coffee industry. The higher level of female employment in Kavieng may be attributed to the existence of a considerable commercial sector.11

11Jackson (1976a:14-15) notes that, in general, the smaller the town the greater the dependency on government employment. Larger centres are able to generate a greater variety of employment opportunities.
Table 13.1  
Characteristics of Kunduwa, Kavieng and Kairantu

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population (1971)</th>
<th>Kunduwa</th>
<th>Kavieng</th>
<th>Kairantu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-indigenous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indigenous population only

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population of region</th>
<th>Kunduwa</th>
<th>Kavieng</th>
<th>Kairantu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pop. of town/Pop. of region (%)</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop. in town from region (%)</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>55.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Male/female ratios

(a) People from region | 1.23 | 1.07 | 1.16 |
(b) Others             | 1.71 | 3.14 | 2.24 |
(c) All indigenous     | 1.41 | 1.53 | 1.53 |

Dependency ratios

(a) People from region | 1.01 | 0.92 | 1.18 |
(b) Others             | 0.62 | 0.33 | 0.57 |
(c) All                | 0.87 | 0.61 | 0.87 |

Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>People from region (%)</th>
<th>Kunduwa</th>
<th>Kavieng</th>
<th>Kairantu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>64.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-primary</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>55.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-primary</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Employment (Pop. 16+)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment (Pop. 16+)</th>
<th>Kunduwa</th>
<th>Kavieng</th>
<th>Kairantu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pop. in monetary employment/total pop. (%)</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>85.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government workers/all workers (%)</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Children 0-15/adults 16+.

Source: All figures derived from special tabulations prepared from 1971 Census, at the Australian National University, Canberra (unpublished).
All three towns also provide a variety of services for their surrounding regions. Health facilities include hospitals in Kundiawa and Kavieng — with that in Kavieng being particularly comprehensive because the centre is isolated from other larger towns — and a rural health centre in Kainantu. All have primary schools and high schools within the vicinity and, in addition, Kainantu is close to Aiyura Senior High School. Additional courses available consist of nursing in Kundiawa, paramedical training in Kainantu and agricultural extension and fisheries training in Kavieng. Transport includes primary and secondary airstrips at Kavieng and Kundiawa respectively, vehicles ranging from public motor vehicles to, in New Ireland, an irregular bus service which joins Kavieng to Namatanai, the other main town in the province, and, also in Kavieng, coastal shipping.

Census data provide no further information with which to examine these centres and their roles in population mobility. However, additional evidence can be drawn from a variety of sources, all of which postdate 1971. In all three cases mobility data are available both for town residents and for a sample of rural dwellers in the surrounding region. Kundiawa and Kainantu were two of the seventeen towns included in the ANU/UPNG Urban Household Survey of 1973–74 (UHS),\(^\text{12}\) and brief migration histories from the whole survey (describing the experiences of approximately 5,000 people) provide a useful insight into the role of all three towns in national and regional migration streams. Rural surveys were of two types. Thirteen villages in the Kainantu region formed the basis for a socio-demographic survey sponsored by the Electricity Commission in 1971–72 to assess the social impact of the construction of the Upper Ramu Hydro-Electric Power Scheme. Between 1974 and 1976, five Simbu and four New Ireland villages formed the sample for an investigation into the migration processes followed by rural dwellers from these provinces. Although both surveys included migration histories, those collected in Simbu and New Ireland were much more comprehensive than those available from Kainantu. Moreover, although I was personally involved in both the urban and rural data collection, my chief role in the town surveys and in rural parts of Kainantu was as supervisor rather than interviewer. In Simbu and New Ireland villages I conducted all the interviews and therefore results are more consistent. Despite these variations, the longitudinal data from all these sources provide a useful insight into population movement.

Medium-sized towns can play three distinct roles in population mobility. First, they can act as migrant destinations in their own right — places which provide a socio-economic environment which is sufficiently attractive for people to settle at

\(^\text{12}\)See Garnaut et al. (1977). Young (1977a:145–8) gives a brief account of this survey.
least semi-permanently. Second, they can form staging points within a national mobility system which links them with other centres, and as such may experience high rates of population turnover. Third, they can act merely as service and social centres for temporary migrants, casual visitors and commuters. In all three roles the towns are melting-pots—places where socialization can occur without the restrictions often applied within the village; places where news is exchanged, and redistributed to the village environment; places where the learning processes necessary for fostering development can occur.

**Towns as migrant destinations.** As Table 13.1 shows, a high proportion of the indigenous population living in Kundiawa, Kavieng and Kainantu in 1971 came from the rural region served by the town. Other urban residents came mainly from the major region within which the town was situated (Table 13.2), although almost a quarter of the men who lived in Kavieng were from the north coast of mainland New Guinea. These people, mainly from Morobe and East Sepik Provinces, originally came to work on New Ireland plantations but later gravitated to the town. These findings are confirmed for Kundiawa and Kainantu by the results of the UHS, which show that in 1974 55 and 65 per cent of the adult populations of these towns belonged to Simbu and Eastern Highlands Provinces respectively (Garnaut et al. 1977: Table 3.6).

Although, since the census was conducted on a *de facto* basis, the total enumerated from the surrounding rural region certainly contains some casual visitors, these figures suggest that all of

| Table 13.2 |
|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| REGIONAL ORIGINS OF INDIGENOUS RESIDENTS, 1971 |
| % OF TOTAL |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kundiawa</th>
<th>Kaiveng</th>
<th>Kainantu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M F</td>
<td>M F</td>
<td>M F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua</td>
<td>7.6 7.9</td>
<td>3.2 2.7</td>
<td>7.5 4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highlands</td>
<td>75.6 82.5</td>
<td>3.8 1.8</td>
<td>80.5 88.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Guinea N. Coast</td>
<td>12.6 7.3</td>
<td>24.9 6.5</td>
<td>9.9 6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Guinea Islands</td>
<td>4.2 2.3</td>
<td>68.1 89.0</td>
<td>1.3 0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of people</td>
<td>1243 880</td>
<td>1711 1086</td>
<td>1175 769</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: As for Table 13.1.*

these towns were highly significant as migrant destinations. If some members of one’s family are located in town it is possible for strong links to be forged between that centre and the rural place of origin. Urban residents not only provide accommodation, and hence help newcomers to adjust to what may be a very unfamiliar environment, but also sometimes find jobs for them. Rural villagers in all three regions frequently commented on the advantages of
having urban contacts, if only to find somewhere to sleep after a casual trip to the market. One Kavieng family from an offshore island provided a particularly important service of this type because their relatives often had to spend some time in town, awaiting return transport by boat. Houses such as these are also important foci for exchange of gossip and news.

Although these towns are obviously significant migrant destinations for people from their hinterlands, they are not necessarily the major foci. In 1971 Port Moresby, Goroka and Lae all had larger communities of Simbu men than Kundiawa, and almost as many New Ireland men lived in Rabaul as in Kavieng. Women, who had not participated in long distance movement associated with indentured labour migration, focused far more strongly on their adjacent service centres, and in many cases had moved there with their husbands. While most had partners from their own tribal group, some had married men who had moved to the town from elsewhere. In 1974 25 per cent of married men living in Kundiawa were non-Simbu married to Simbu women. This feature was much less significant in Kainantu, where only 9 per cent of married men came into this category but, although there are no equivalent figures for Kavieng, it seems likely that a considerable number of men from Morobe and the Sepik were married to New Ireland women.

Towns were not the only types of destination to which rural migrants went. The rural non-village sector, principally the plantations, continued to attract many people even after the indentured labour system had virtually ceased. In 1971 almost 60 per cent of Simbu men living outside their province were in these types of settlement, mainly in the adjacent highlands provinces but also in considerable numbers in the New Guinea Islands and Central Province. New Irelanders, with their higher level of education, found such places less attractive and the only considerable colony was in neighbouring New Britain. Kainantus, like Simbu, had also moved to plantations. The rural surveys confirm that the adjacent medium-sized towns were not the main migrant destinations. Simbu absentees in Goroka, Mount Hagen, Lae and Port Moresby outnumbered those in Kundiawa while Rabaul and Port Moresby had larger colonies of New Irelanders than Kavieng. Half of those absent from Kainantu villages were outside the Eastern Highlands Province, mainly in Port Moresby or working on plantations in the islands (Young 1973:93). Although these results are biased by the small number of sample villages, and by the fact that each village has a highly specific 'migration space' reinforced by chain movement (one New Ireland village is very closely linked to Rabaul but excludes Kavieng while one Simbu village has especially strong connections with Port Moresby), they still show that none of these smaller towns play dominant roles as migrant destinations for people from their hinterlands. This can be partly explained by the limited economic opportunities available, especially for unskilled people. It is also due to chain migration which perpetuates previous long distance migration networks associated
with externally imposed controls. Other social factors are less obvious although recent work by Zuckerman (1979) has suggested that fear of sorcery may dissuade absentees from moving only short distances. He says that this is a major reason why Kamano people prefer to go to distant centres rather than Kainantu. Similar fears were expressed by people in eastern Simbu who, in time of sickness, tried to persuade health officials to send them to Goroka hospital instead of to Kundia. While such attitudes would always be common where ill-health, often attributed to sorcery, is concerned they also reflect the fear of being in a foreign place where people speak different languages and where one is continually in contact with groups who in tribal times would have been enemy aliens. Although highlanders in coastal towns are still apprehensive about these things, the groupings themselves become less specific and people band together in regional associations. The term wantok (literally one tongue) refers to the same language group at home but in Port Moresby can include different language speakers from approximately the same region.

Towns as staging points. The foregoing analysis reveals none of the previous experiences of either rural dwellers or migrants resident in towns. Migration histories from both rural and urban surveys provide evidence of the roles that these three towns have played in total mobility.

The UHS shows that many people born in provinces administered by large towns moved to these centres on first leaving their villages, but those from other provinces, the category which includes both Simbu and New Ireland, normally made their initial moves to larger centres in other regions. Subsequent moves, mostly still within the urban sector, included both larger and smaller towns but larger towns remained dominant over all. Kundia, Kavieng and Kainantu were initial destinations for less than 4 per cent of the men and 7 per cent of the women (Table 13.3), although 17 and 20 per cent of male and female respondents respectively came from their hinterlands.13 They became marginally more significant in subsequent moves, but it could scarcely be said that they were much more attractive to migrants with greater mobility experience. When one considers only those respondents born in the region adjacent to the towns, all three centres become more prominent. Almost one–tenth of all the men and almost a quarter of the women first moved there (Table 13.3(b)). Their importance did not change with later movement, although both Kundia and Kainantu became marginally more significant in the mobility processes of male Simbu and Eastern Highlanders.

While this pattern of change is unclear, it certainly does not demonstrate the existence of step migration. Further examination of the mobility patterns of individual Simbu and New Irelanders

13 The Kainantu 'region' in this case contains all Eastern Highlanders.
who initially moved to Kundia and Kavieng shows that only a small proportion subsequently moved on to larger towns (Young 1977a: 193-4, 201). Several returned to their home village, i.e. were circular migrants, while others made no subsequent moves. The main characteristic of population mobility apparent from this analysis of UHS data is that medium-sized towns have usually been bypassed by people from their rural hinterlands.

Since all respondents in this survey were urban dwellers, the sample includes a high percentage of relatively well-educated people whose mobility is markedly affected by decisions made by their employers, mostly government departments. Migrants in this category first move for tertiary training, which in Papua New Guinea is highly centralized in the larger towns. When they enter

Table 13.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kundia</th>
<th>Kavieng</th>
<th>Kainantu</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All movers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First moves</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Later moves</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movers from region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First moves</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Later moves</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No. of moves in sample</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All movers</td>
<td>3043 2090</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movers from region</td>
<td>9106 4283</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Per cent of all urban dwellers in UHS. Remainder moved elsewhere, mainly to larger towns.

Per cent of UHS urban dwellers from hinterland of each town: Kundiawa-Simbu; Kavieng-New Ireland; Kainantu-Kainantu district.


the workforce they often remain in these centres but as they qualify for promotion they may be transferred elsewhere, perhaps to medium-sized towns where they can gain experience and learn to take responsibility without having to deal with a large subordinate staff. This type of intra-urban movement embodies not step migration but what might be termed 'reverse stepping'; migrants move straight to the top of the hierarchy and thereafter disperse downwards. This process does not guarantee that educated Simbu or educated Kainantus later return to the towns of their home regions. However, with political decentralization to provincial governments and the reduction of the non-indigenous element in the public service, more openings have become available and young educated people from the
province have been encouraged to fill these. In New Ireland the number of highly educated New Irelanders exceeds the number of suitable positions available in Kavieng and thus there is no possibility of all being accommodated. Movement of local people into skilled jobs is welcome because it should help the development of rural-urban integration and prevent communication difficulties which might otherwise be considerable. I have witnessed young Papuan administrative officers, highly apprehensive about the physical dangers of living in Simbu, attempting to communicate with villagers who have come to Kundiawa to discuss highly complex and volatile situations likely to result in full-scale tribal fights. Since neither side speaks Pidgin fluently, and there is little mutual understanding of customs, the resultant frustrations can easily be imagined. An argument against employing local people in top administrative positions is that they will be subjected to too much pressure from their fellow clansmen. While this is undoubtedly a risk, it seems to be one that is worth taking in terms of the future development of the whole region.

Rural dwellers differed from UHS respondents in that many were illiterate and therefore qualified only for unskilled jobs. However, like urban dwellers, Simbu and New Irelanders in villages showed no obvious tendency to make initial moves to Kundiawa or Kavieng. Instead many Simbu had first gone to plantations, often in distant provinces, while New Irelanders had moved within the rural village sector of their own province, sometimes to their wives' villages in obedience to the matrilineal organization of their society. Kavieng attracted more initial migrants from New Ireland than Kundiawa did from Simbu, probably because of its greater isolation; while it is easy to travel via the Highlands Highway from Simbu to large towns such as Lae or Mount Hagen, most journeys from New Ireland must go through Kavieng, and people consider longer distance moves carefully because of high travel costs. The slightly higher level of economic and commercial development in Kavieng also helps to explain why the town is more attractive to local work-seekers. Subsequent moves made by Simbu and New Ireland villagers highlight the dominance of circular migration, and there is no evidence that either Kundiawa or Kavieng became more significant. Most people who first moved to Kavieng later returned to their home villages.

Although data from Kainantu District do not correspond to those from Simbu and New Ireland they still give some indication of the significance of employment and mobility within the immediate region and other parts of the country. Sixty per cent of the jobs which Kainantu villagers had held in the past had been located within the Kainantu District and over a quarter of the remainder were in either Port Moresby or the New Guinea Islands. Jobs in the adjacent area included work on road construction, gold mining, coffee plantations, mission stations and in Kainantu town. While it is not possible to analyse Kainantu's role as an employment centre in detail, it appears that it had only been
significant for people from villages close to the town, all of which were within an hour's walking distance. In 1972 some men from those settlements commuted to work. Kainantu is, in fact, on their land — a further reason why they feel at home in the centre while those from further afield feel like aliens. Unlike other employment centres within the Kainantu District, the town has offered a stable, if limited, number of jobs. Road work and mining have been spasmodic, as was the Upper Ramu Hydro-Electric Power Scheme which employed between 200 and 300 unskilled workers in 1972-73. In the earlier part of that period many had come from the Agarabi-speaking villages adjacent to the new construction town at Yonki but by late 1973 unskilled workers were being signed on in Simbu and further west. This illustrates a further difficulty in establishing close links between rural areas and the urban centres which serve them. Since workers from nearby villages are heavily involved in tribal society, and frequently absent themselves for meetings and ceremonies, employers have often shown a preference for workers whose homes are more distant.

An additional factor which hinders the growth of social integration between medium-sized towns and their hinterlands is that the towns have high rates of population turnover. The UHS shows that, without exception, the medium-sized towns had a higher percentage of recent arrivals than the larger towns. Forty-six per cent of men interviewed in Kundiawa had been there for less than a year while in the neighbouring town of Goroka only 28 per cent were recent residents. Under those circumstances medium-sized towns might be termed transitory rather than stable, and their role as staging points understood in this way.

Towns as service centres. Although medium-sized towns are not significant either as migrant destinations or as stages in a process of step migration, they do perform an important function as service and social centres for casual visitors from their hinterlands. This becomes obvious even to the most recent arrival — the continual coming and going of foot-walkers and village trucks laden with passengers and produce, the constant greetings exchanged in the street by friends and acquaintances, the stream of people visiting shops, offices, banks, health centres and hotels. The importance of this role can best be gauged by examining the visiting patterns of rural dwellers in the hinterland. As Table 13.4 shows, a very high proportion of villagers in each region had visited their respective towns at some time, more than half within the last year. Not surprisingly, most of those who had never been to town or who went only seldom belonged to the least accessible villages or to villages from which other towns could easily be reached. Thus people from the westernmost village in Simbu used Minj, Banz and Kerowagi as service centres rather than Kundiawa, and New Irelanders from the southwest coast preferred Namatanai and Rabaul to Kavieng. More women than men had never visited the town. While living in a remote village in the Chuave District of Simbu in 1974 I had the memorable experience of taking a group of
women on their first visit to Kundiawa, and had to provide moral support while they plucked up their courage to go into large retail stores. Women from nearer town have become much more accustomed to this unfamiliar trading environment. Town visiting is further differentiated by age. In general the very old, the young and those with family responsibilities visit less frequently than those in the most active age groups.

Towns are visited for a variety of reasons (Table 13.5). In both highlands towns casual visiting — meeting friends, travelling to town as a companion, passing through en route to another destination — is very important but this purely social reason for mobility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 13.4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time elapsed since visit to town</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(% of total respondents)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never visited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kainantu</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(age 10+) Males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kundiawa</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(age 15+) Males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kavieng</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(age 15+) Males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 13.5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reason for latest visit</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(% of total visitors)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kainantu</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(age 10+) Males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kundiawa</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(age 15+) Males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kavieng</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(age 15+) Males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: Fieldwork, Young 1972; 1974-75; 1976.*
is much less significant in Kavieng. This suggests that Simbu and Kainantu people now find their towns attractive as social centres, and have ceased to consider them as European enclaves. Kavieng, however, is different. Unlike Kainantu and Kundiawa it does not have a central meeting spot, such as the grass verge alongside Kainantu airstrip where people wait for transport, and when New Irelanders come to town they remain in close-knit tribal groups which congregate outside Chinese-owned trade stores which they specifically patronize. New Irelanders are also adamant that visiting town without a reason for doing so is not acceptable and they become extremely concerned when any of their young people disobey. Parents send requests to Radio New Ireland to relay messages telling their youngsters to return, but such a practice would be uncommon in Simbu. This difference in attitude is reflected in the use of public motor vehicles: Simbu or Kainantu people take casual lifts on the road but New Ireland people prefer to arrange their transport well in advance. Differences in the significance of town functions are probably quite specific. Allen (1976:128-31) confirms the role of Dreikikir Patrol Post as a meeting centre and goes on to suggest that this function may now have superseded that of administration.

Buying and selling produce at the market or, in Kavieng, at the Copra Marketing Board Depot, is another important reason for coming to town. Produce markets in Kainantu and Kundiawa operate similarly; they function on most days of the week, with peak periods on Wednesdays and Saturdays, and sellers pay a small gate fee. Traders, most of whom are women, walk from adjacent areas (72 per cent of those selling at Kundiawa market on one Saturday in March 1975 were from the two census divisions which border the town (Howlett et al. 1976:239-40), or, if they are from further away, come by truck. More distant traders often bring higher value produce such as betel nut. In the early afternoon, after trading is finished, buyers and sellers disperse within the town to do business, meet friends and gossip and usually do not return home until late. Kavieng market follows another pattern. Although New Irelanders dominate trade, a significant number of Tolai women travel from Rabaul specifically to sell betel nut and, in return, buy sago which can then be resold in New Britain at high profit. Most New Irelanders travel to the market by truck, sometimes from villages over 100 km away; they arrive in the middle of the night, trade during the early hours of the morning, and have dispersed by 8 am. Thereafter most remain in town for only a short time before travelling home. The reasons for these different characteristics are not clear. New Ireland women stress that selling food is a custom alien to their culture: it should be given freely to those in need.

Employment is not an important reason for visiting town (Table 13.5). This reflects both the limited opportunities available for unskilled workers and the fact that villagers, through informal communication systems, know whether there are any suitable positions. As all rural surveys showed, informal visits to larger
and more distant towns are much more likely to be undertaken primarily for the purpose of finding work.

Other reasons for visiting town include shopping, attending meetings, going to the hospital or to educational establishments or entertainment. Shopping trips are usually combined with other journeys with more specific purposes, such as attending meetings or selling copra. More women than men visit the hospital, principally because they have to attend for child-birth (Kavieng) or because their children are sick. Entertainment, also usually associated with multipurpose trips, can be the cause of huge influxes of villagers to town, for example when celebratory sing-sings are held in Kundiawa. On government pay-days large numbers of men come from surrounding villages to meet their friends and drink in the hotel. Meetings, either government (e.g. council) or non-government (e.g. mission), are less prominent than might be expected, partly because they often involve the same individuals. Villagers rarely initiate meetings with administrative officials but wait until they are summoned. Hence, in this analysis, this reason for visiting town is less significant than might have been expected.

This brief analysis shows that these towns are now intensively used by people who live in their hinterlands, but the use is confined to casual movement. All things being equal, it should be possible to build on this vital mobility link to foster more durable contacts between the two sectors.

Lessons for Australia: an Aboriginal view of Alice Springs

The urban systems of Australia and Papua New Guinea share some common elements. As Blainey (1966) has described, early Australian towns, many of which have subsequently become major urban centres, were ports, sited at points suitable for the maintenance of the essential maritime links with Britain. As the interior of the continent was occupied, towns, principally service centres for agricultural communities, grew as an integrated part of the European settlement system. They have never developed close links with rural Aboriginal communities, for which they still form a 'super-imposed' hierarchy. While much has now been written about Aboriginal groups which, forced to leave the land, have settled on the fringes and within the boundaries of these service centres (e.g. Reay 1945; Rowley 1970; Kamien 1978) little attention has so far been paid to the role of these settlements for Aboriginal people who still live in remote rural communities. A brief look at the place of Alice Springs in the context of Aboriginal population mobility reveals some interesting parallels with the situation already described for Papua New Guinea.

Alice Springs started as a communications centre, initially as a vital link on the overland telegraph between South Australia and Darwin and later as the rail-head, and consequently break-of-bulk point for the Northern Territory. Present road and air
networks ensure that this function remains important. Its growth as a service centre dates from the establishment of pastoral settlement in the hinterland and, later, the foundation of mission stations among Aboriginal tribes in the vicinity. Actual Aboriginal use of the town remained small. During World War II, the employment of Central Australian Aborigines on the construction of the bitumen road linking Alice Springs with Darwin caused widespread disruption in nomadic lifestyles, and led to the introduction of government administration and the movement of Aboriginal people to the town. Since then, the administrative role of Alice Springs has become increasingly important and the Aboriginal element within its population more significant. The 1976 population census enumerated 1,575 Aboriginal residents, 16 per cent of the total population of the town.\(^{14}\) As Drakakis-Smith (1980) has pointed out, although Aborigines account for a very small proportion of the town's workforce (2 per cent in 1978) they make a very substantial contribution to the urban economy both through their own spendings and demand for services, and because their very presence is the basis for much non-Aboriginal employment. Yet, for many European residents, they scarcely exist, and if they are in evidence their presence is unwelcome. The temporary camps, in which at least half of them live, are regarded as eye-sores, detrimental to the town's image in tourist eyes. Despite the considerable success recently achieved through the Housing Association and Tangatjira (the Aboriginal Camps Council), people still consider that attempts to provide Aborigines with conventional housing are doomed to failure and will result in falling values in adjacent non-Aboriginal-owned properties.\(^{15}\)

Aboriginal residents in Alice Springs belong to the tribal groups whose country extends in all directions from the town site, which lies in Aranda territory. In their town camps, which are located roughly according to the physical alignment of their homelands, they form relatively distinct units in which a permanent core of residents lives alongside a group of visitors whose numbers and personnel are continually changing. Contact between these groups enables the town dwellers to maintain their tribal links, and return to their families whenever necessary, and is also the main source of external information for those who remain in the tribal territory. Aboriginal visitors and residents on the whole see Alice Springs differently. For the one group it has become a second home; for the other it is a foreign place, sometimes frightening but always exciting. The remainder of this section considers Alice Springs from the point of view of a group of visitors, here the Warlpiri people from two of the five main

---

\(^{14}\)Because of poor coverage within the town camps, and inclusion of European tourists in the total, this is likely to be an underestimate.

\(^{15}\)Drakakis-Smith (1980) and Heppell and Wigley (1981) describe the Aboriginal housing situation in Alice Springs in great detail.
communities into which this tribe is now concentrated - Yuendumu and Willowra (Fig. 13.1).

Both Yuendumu and Willowra lie in Warlpiri territory approximately 300 to 350 km to the northwest of Alice Springs, to which they are linked by a combination of dirt and bitumen roads. In general Willowra, an Aboriginal-owned cattle station with a population of about 250, is the more isolated of the two and, while Warlpiri laws and customs are practised in both communities, they form a more prominent part of Willowra life. In Willowra eyes Yuendumu, a large community with over 1,200 people, is a dangerous place because many Warlpiri sub-groups live in close contact with one another and the resultant social conflict, sometimes associated with drinking alcohol, may at any time erupt into violence. That attitude expresses in a microcosm how many Yuendumu and Willowra people feel about Alice Springs.

![Fig. 13.1 Alice Springs region.](image)

Although many Warlpiri men have previously worked on neighbourhood cattle stations and mining camps and, as itinerant drovers, have travelled overland to Queensland and New South Wales, few have been absent from their own country for long. Alice Springs has played a very minor role as a migrant destination and, with the present limited employment opportunities in the town, this situation is unlikely to change. However, Warlpiri do visit Alice Springs, although, as Table 13.6 shows, most go only for specific reasons. Employment is unimportant; while some have worked there in the past, mainly on the separate settlements at the Bungalow (Old Telegraph Station) and, later, at Amoonguna, few have done so within recent times. Those who take up jobs often leave after a short time because they feel threatened by living in 'another'
(Aranda) country, and because they miss their own close-knit tribal community in which they know their relationship to everyone else and can remain in close contact with their land. More important reasons for visiting town are to go to the hospital, either as a patient, a visitor or as a parent (usually female) accompanying a sick child; to attend meetings, normally of Aboriginal organizations such as the Central Lands Council or Central Australian Aboriginal Congress (male); to visit children at Yirara High School or other urban-based institutions; for business, often associated with pastoral operations; and, in the case of men, for entertainment. This last category, which might be termed non-specific, includes mainly younger men who, when they have money available, make special drinking trips to Alice Springs. It is less significant for Willowra, a 'dry' community, than for Yuendumu. Almost one-third of the Willowra women had never been to town, a reflection of the basic isolation in which they still live.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 13.6</th>
<th>Warlpiri visits to Alice Springs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never visited ((% \text{ of total}))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuendumu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willowra</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork, Young, 1978-79.

Visits to Alice Springs depend entirely on access to transport which, for official reasons such as going to the hospital or to meetings, is provided by the relevant government department or by the community council, but which otherwise must be arranged by the individual. Casual visiting can therefore only take place if one has a friend with a car, and many trips of this type are the result of spur of the moment decisions. When travellers reach Alice Springs they have to decide where to stay. Yuendumu men who feel at home in the camp environment, that is who do not mind being involved in drinking and gambling sessions, join the Warlpiri camps located near the northern town boundary on land granted by the Aranda. Women rarely stay there unless they are accompanied by their husbands. They prefer more secure accommodation, such as the Mount Gillen hostel which is run by the Department of Health as part of the Child Health Unit. Alternatively, they camp out of town, often in a shady spot of mulga scrub where the Yuendumu road joins.
the Stuart Highway. This is also a favourite camping spot for Willowra people, most of whom prefer to remain outside the Warlpiri camp. Town business is usually transacted as soon as possible and the people then return home. However, although entertainment may not have been a prime reason for journeying to town, it often becomes important once people arrive. It would be uncommon for a truck load of men going to a Land Council meeting to return to Yuendumu with its full complement of passengers. Those who are left behind may remain for several days, or even weeks, before finding a suitable means of returning home.

The Warlpiri view of Alice Springs is essentially that of a fairly isolated group for whom the town is situated in alien country. Aranda people, with traditional claims to the site of the town and its surroundings, feel more at home and almost certainly make greater use of Alice Springs as a social meeting place. However, like the Warlpiri, their lack of education and skill prevents them from competing in the limited employment market, and comparatively few have moved there on a permanent basis. Their presence is also unwelcome. Thus Alice Springs performs its role as a service centre for Aborigines in a distinctly non-Aboriginal way; its functions for, and hence its links with the Aboriginal population of its hinterland, who form over half of the residents of that sparsely settled terrain, remain poorly developed. Much of this can be attributed, as in Papua New Guinea, to its essentially 'colonial' origins.

Conclusion

Policies aimed at equalizing urban population distribution and hence spread of resources in developing countries must place emphasis on the potential of medium-sized towns. However, as the case-studies described in this paper have shown, such towns may not play a prominent part in the processes of spontaneous population mobility followed by the inhabitants of their rural hinterlands. They thus lack true integration with these areas so that the communication links which are essential for the successful implementation of regional planning are very weak. Although the situation in Papua New Guinea is not necessarily typical of that in all developing countries, it provides a useful framework for those where the colonial influences on settlement and migration still operate. The effects of the imposed urban system, government organized migration schemes and, in recent times, the growth of the national mobility patterns of the educated elite have created a structure which separates town and countryside. This structure is reinforced by strong social customs based within traditional life,

---

16As Layton et al. (1979) point out, accommodation made available by Aboriginal Hostels Ltd has its limitations because none of the hostels are under Warlpiri control.
in particular the operation of chain migration following kinship networks.

Under free choice, Papua New Guineans still prefer to move to places where they are assured of a friendly reception and some degree of social and economic support than to places where they have no contacts. This, combined with the lack of economic opportunities in smaller centres, means that long distance migration is still the norm for many rural communities. Deliberate interference in this pattern, as, for example, forcing migrants to return home, will make little lasting impact unless the underlying causes of the process are also considered and modified. Warlipiri from Central Australia, on the other hand, have never developed these ties with distant places or with their nearby service centre of Alice Springs. However, kinship networks in Aboriginal society form bonds which are certainly as strong as those which exist in Papua New Guinea and migration would undoubtedly be followed by chains of movement.

Although medium-sized towns appear to offer little as migrant destinations they have become important centres for casual short-time mobility from adjacent rural areas. This linkage could form a basis for future development on a regional level. To be effective, it must contain both economic and social components. At present these are much more significant in Papua New Guinean towns than they are, in the Aboriginal context, in Alice Springs. Papua New Guinean towns have changed many of their former characteristics and now provide services which are more appropriate to the majority of their populations. Retailing, produce marketing and some elements of socialization could no longer be said to be based on European values and beliefs. Alice Springs, however, can still afford to operate primarily as a European settlement because Aboriginal people form only a minority of its population, and few facilities offered by the town could be described as Aboriginal in character. This reinforces the other deeply-ingrained fears held by Aboriginal visitors to the town, and it thus continues to be a foreign place. In terms of the future development of the Northern Territory, where Aborigines form 60 per cent of the rural dwelling population, it will surely be important for the town to improve its connections with the hinterland.

Case-studies such as these demonstrate the need for better understanding of all aspects of population mobility for the formulation of practical plans for future development. A policy which intends to change the spatial distribution of population can only be carried out if the processes which underlie that distribution are taken into account. Thus, if medium-sized towns are to become attractive destinations for migrants from rural areas which surround them, they must be allowed to develop more meaningful links with these regions. At present, as their limited role in the mobility context indicates, these links are too superficial to expect them to compete with other larger towns as migrant destinations.
By international standards, Fiji's rate of urbanization is modest, but it has accelerated in the last intercensal period and is causing widespread concern to the government. The total population of Fiji rose by 23 per cent from 47,600 in 1966 to 58,800 in 1976 according to the census. During the same period the urban, including the peri-urban population, increased by 37 per cent from 159,000 to 218,000. Thus urban population grew by an average annual rate of 3.2 per cent, compared to a country average of 2.1 per cent over the decade.

The chief source of this urbanization is rural to urban migration (Chandra 1979:1). Rural-urban migration is causing serious problems in both source and destination areas, although problems in destination areas are usually given greater publicity.

This paper examines the main features of rural and urban migration in the context of overall internal population mobility in Fiji. Lifetime migration and more recent movements are examined, paying attention to their magnitude and directions. The pattern of urban growth, resulting principally from rural to urban migration, motivation of migrants and consequences of urbanization are also treated. The conclusion attempts to identify some policy implications.

Date and method

Official data on population mobility in Fiji, provided by the last census in 1976, do not permit a complete or even substantially complete picture of the mobility of its population. The census deals merely with one component of the mobility spectrum - migration - and even in that context there are severe limitations. The census asks questions on place of birth, coded to province level,¹

¹A province is an administrative unit in Fiji, of which there are fifteen in the country.
place of residence in 1970 (when Fiji gained independence), coded to province level again, and the place of enumeration, coded to the locality of residence. These questions form the basis of most discussions on population mobility in Fiji.

The published census report contains tables on province of birth, usual residence in 1970, and of enumeration (1976). In their existing form, they do not reveal whether movement is from rural or urban parts of provinces or whether the destinations are rural or urban. However, for this paper, special tables were prepared from the 1976 census which specify the urban and rural nature of places of origin and destination, as well as identifying particular towns where movement is taking place. It becomes possible, therefore, to separate rural to rural, rural to urban, urban to rural and urban to urban movement. The paper focuses on rural to urban population movement. Although the analysis is based mainly on the special tables, other unpublished survey data from the government and published studies dealing with urbanization and population mobility are also utilized. Its chief aim is to establish the national pattern of rural-urban population mobility, as well as provide, for the first time in published form, data on rural to urban population movement in Fiji.

Circulation and migration

Much emphasis has recently been given to population circulation\(^2\) as a component of development, reflecting a general contemporary trend towards examination of non-permanent movement in population mobility research. Circulation is prevalent in Melanesia (Bedford, p.17-in this volume; May and Skeldon 1977:11; Ward 1977; Young 1977b). While the pattern of urbanization in Fiji is somewhat different from that in other Melanesian countries, in that Fiji has a much longer history of towns, circulation nevertheless occurs. The picture, however, is far from clear. Finlay, in his study of over-urbanization in Fiji, argued that few Indo-Fijians can return to rural areas once they are in town and that Fijians, although possessing a secure communal village structure to return to, seldom do (Finlay 1971:67). According to the 1976 census, among people aged six years and over, who stated their province of usual residence in 1970 and who had changed their province of residence, more than 90 per cent had not returned to their province of birth. This would not indicate a great deal of population circulation, and may reflect a high degree of commitment to initial destinations.

\(^{2}\)According to Chapman (1978:559), circulation refers to repetitive and perhaps cyclic population movement. Zelinski (1971:225) provides this elaboration: 'Circulation denotes a great variety of movement, usually short-term, repetitive, or cyclical in nature, but all having in common the lack of a permanent or long-lasting change in residence'.
This is confirmed by Bedford (1979a:2) who argues that 'Evidence in Fiji, where there is a comparatively long history of urban development for Melanesia, suggests many who work in towns do not return to live in their village homes, even in old age'. However, circulation does take place. In the same paper, Bedford notes that circular migration is an important component of the internal migration system and that 'Circular labour migration thus facilitates compromises between the traditional social and economic systems and the market exchange economy introduced by colonialism' (Bedford 1979a:10). In an earlier paper, too, Bedford (1979b:207) had argued that there is circulation of people from urban areas back to rural areas.

In a recent study, Nair examines circulation in Suva and finds that circulation and migration coexist, and that there are significant differences between Fijians and Indo-Fijians, with the former being more circulatory in movement that the latter (Nair 1980:5). Indo-Fijian movements seem according to Nair (1980:66) 'by almost all criteria, to be permanent'. The latest Household Income and Expenditure Survey conducted in 1977 reported that for every one and three-quarter people moving into urban areas from rural places, there was one person going to rural areas. This appears to suggest a circulation of population between rural and urban areas.3

General population mobility in Fiji

Census data on internal migration in Fiji suggest a high level of internal population mobility. In 1976, for instance, 27 per cent of all people were enumerated away from their province of birth, while the figure for people aged 15 years and over, the population among whom decisions to migrate are made, is just over a third. Moreover, despite the relatively long existence, by Melanesian standards, of towns in Fiji, almost half of the total current urban population aged 15 years and over is of rural origin.

Another indication of general population mobility is afforded by an examination of the province of birth of all people aged 6 years and over, their province of residence in 1970 and their province of enumeration in 1976.4 Generally, a fairly large proportion (68 per cent) of the population aged 6 years and over maintained the same province of birth, residence in 1970 and enumeration in 1976. Although this is indicative of population

3These figures are as yet unpublished tables supplied by the Bureau of Statistics from the latest Household Income and Expenditure Survey.

4Data relating to the total population are not available since only those 6 years and over were questioned as to their residence in 1970.
stability, the mobility of the remaining 32 per cent of the population creates significant socio-economic changes in the country. Of those who have changed their province of birth, only 9 per cent returned after an unknown interval to their province of birth, and the overwhelming proportion (87 per cent) have tried only one new province.

An overview of lifetime migration in Fiji is presented in Table 14.1, which summarizes the degree of outmigration and immigration in the fifteen provinces of Fiji. A few very clear patterns emerge. The first is that the heaviest outmigration occurs in provinces comprising outlying islands. In all of these provinces more than 54 per cent of all people aged 15 years and over who were born there have moved to other provinces.\(^5\) Secondly, the presence or absence of urban centres in provinces seems to influence outmigration strongly. Provinces with no urban centre have the highest rate of outmigration, and those with the highest urban population have the least outmigration.

In terms of migration of people into the fifteen provinces, similar patterns emerge, although these are not as clear-cut as in the case of outmigration. Outlying island provinces attract the least number of people from other provinces, and the second main island in Fiji, Vanua Levu, is almost as weak in attracting migrants. Provinces in Viti Levu clearly stand out as the main destination of migrants. Amongst these, Naitasiri and Rewa, the most urbanized provinces, exert particularly strong attractions.

**Rural to urban migration**

It is difficult to establish statistically the relative importance of the various categories of population movement in Fiji. However, rural to urban migration is probably the most significant of these movements, not only because it accounts for the largest number of migrants,\(^6\) but because rural to urban migration has the most far-reaching socio-economic impact on both source and destination areas.

The proportion of current urban population aged 15 years and over born in rural and urban areas is summarized in Table 14.2.

\(^5\)Following Walsh (1976), data throughout the paper relate to population aged 15 years and over because it is believed that migrants below this age do not make migration decisions themselves. It also overcomes the difficulties arising out of school children moving for short terms.

\(^6\)This is difficult to establish precisely. However, of the 112,239 people aged 15 years and over in 1976, not resident in their province of birth, there were 61,457 lifetime rural to urban migrants.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Net lifetime migration</th>
<th>Location: main islands (Viti Levu and Vanua Levu) or outlying islands</th>
<th>Urban population as % of province population</th>
<th>Population density in km²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ba</td>
<td>15,768</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>21,025</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>+5,257</td>
<td>Viti Levu</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bua</td>
<td>3,460</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>1,477</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>-1,983</td>
<td>Vanua Levu</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cakaudrove</td>
<td>8,388</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>3,807</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>-4,581</td>
<td>Vanua Levu</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kadavu</td>
<td>5,067</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>864</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>-4,203</td>
<td>Outlying island</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lau</td>
<td>9,936</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>-9,148</td>
<td>Outlying island</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lomaiviti</td>
<td>6,105</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>2,153</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>-3,952</td>
<td>Outlying island</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macuata</td>
<td>6,011</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>4,987</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>-1,024</td>
<td>Vanua Levu</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nadroga/Navosa</td>
<td>7,668</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>8,420</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>+752</td>
<td>Viti Levu</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naitasiri</td>
<td>6,103</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>23,699</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>+17,596</td>
<td>Viti Levu</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namosi</td>
<td>1,169</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>-719</td>
<td>Viti Levu</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ra</td>
<td>7,377</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>4,133</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>+3,244</td>
<td>Viti Levu</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rewa</td>
<td>16,530</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>30,171</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>+13,641</td>
<td>Viti Levu</td>
<td>89.8</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serua</td>
<td>3,377</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>2,943</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>-434</td>
<td>Viti Levu</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailevu</td>
<td>12,990</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>7,238</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>-5,752</td>
<td>Viti Levu</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotuma</td>
<td>2,290</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>-2,191</td>
<td>Outlying island</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji total</td>
<td>112,239</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>112,254</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*There is a discrepancy of 15 in the Census Report.*

Source: Computed from Ladhia (1977:263-4).
Overall, about half the current urban population so defined are of rural birth, bearing testimony to the large migrant component in Fiji's urban centres. Of the major urban areas, only Suva, Lautoka and Nausori had 50 per cent or more of its current population born in urban areas; the highest proportion in Lautoka, was 57 per cent. While the proportion of rural-born population in urban areas is high, the peri-urban areas have even higher proportions of their populations of rural birth, indicating that the thrust of rural to urban migration is to these areas, rather than to towns and cities per se. This is certainly borne out by the fact that most of the recent squatter settlements have appeared on the periphery of the urban centres.

Table 14.2
Urban and rural birth of urban residents, aged 15 and over, 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Urban born</th>
<th>Rural born</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% rural born</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cities and towns</td>
<td>36,755</td>
<td>29,809</td>
<td>66,564</td>
<td>44.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peri-urban areas</td>
<td>22,735</td>
<td>26,899</td>
<td>49,634</td>
<td>54.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unincorporated towns</td>
<td>2,719</td>
<td>4,747</td>
<td>7,466</td>
<td>63.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>62,209</td>
<td>61,455</td>
<td>123,664</td>
<td>49.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from Special Tables, 1976 Population Census.

Lifetime rural to urban migration

The pattern of lifetime rural to urban migration of population aged 15 years and over is summarized in Table 14.3 which clearly underscores the importance of Suva as the destination of rural migrants. It attracted almost 52 per cent of all lifetime rural to urban migrants. Lautoka, although not nearly so attractive as Suva for rural migrants, stands out as the second most important destination, while the others are almost unremarkable. The unincorporated towns are largely unattractive for rural migrants except for Vatukoula, where gold mining acts as a draw.

Walsh's (1977:3) observation on the population growth rate of suburbs of Suva, which grew by between 41 to 61 per cent between 1966 and 1976 as against 18 per cent in the inner city areas, reinforces this perception.
In terms of the source of these lifetime rural to urban migrants Ba, which contributed almost one-fifth, is clearly the main supplier, while Lau and Tailevu are important seconds. The other provinces, save for Rotuma, Serua, Namosi and Bua, are all of some importance.

In terms of the source of all rural to urban migrants, it is significant to note that Viti Levu provinces account for only 58 per cent and that outlying island provinces account for 26 per cent, although they contain only 6 per cent of the national population in this age category compared to 77 per cent in Viti Levu. The emigration from the four island provinces had not led to an absolute decline in their populations until the last intercensal period, during which Lau and Rotuma recorded net reductions in population and Kadavu and Lomaiviti maintained nearly stationary populations. Vanua Levu provinces' contribution to urban migration is around 16 per cent, equivalent to their share of the relevant population.

This brings us to another point — that most of the rural to urban migration is intra-province in the case of provinces with major urban centres, such as in Ba (urban areas of Lautoka, Nadi, Ba, Tavua and Vatukoula (Fig. 14.1)), Macuata (Labasa), Naitasiri (Suva and adjoining Nausori) and Rewa (Suva). Migrants in provinces without urban centres prefer the capital city (Table 14.4).

The outer provinces, Lomaiviti, Kadavu, Lau and Rotuma, all transmit an overwhelming majority of their migrants to Suva (60.9, 80.7, 83.5 and 71.6 per cent respectively). This is in spite of the fact that there are other urban areas much closer to these provinces — Levuka, Rakiraki, Tailevu and Nausori in the case of Lomaiviti; Labasa and Savusavu and Rakiraki, Ba, Tavua and Vatukoula in the case of Rotuma. Clearly in this instance, distant rural dwellers see Suva as the most desirable urban destination, and Suva's attractiveness may be enhanced by patterns of earlier migration as well as its being the focus of transportation networks.

Recent rural to urban migration, 1970-76

Since independence in 1970, rural to urban migration has accelerated considerably (see also Lasaqa (1978:2)). All urban residents aged 15 years and over in 1976 were asked their province of residence in 1970. Forty-nine per cent indicated that they had moved into urban areas from rural residences since that time. Rewa and Ba were the major sources of these migrants (57 per cent combined), while Naitasiri lagged as the third largest source of rural migrants to urban areas (Table 14.5). Combined with Macuata and

---

8 In their study of population change in Lakeba from 1946 to 1976 Bedford and Brookfield (1979:203) also report on the Suva orientation of Lakeba migrants.
Table 14.3

Lifetime rural to urban migration streams by provinces in Fiji, population aged 15 years and over, 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source province</th>
<th>Suva</th>
<th>Lautoka</th>
<th>Ba</th>
<th>Labasa</th>
<th>Levuka</th>
<th>Nadi</th>
<th>Savusavu</th>
<th>Sigatoka</th>
<th>Nausori</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ba</td>
<td>1,582</td>
<td>3,557</td>
<td>2,428</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2,357</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bua</td>
<td>857</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cakaudrove</td>
<td>2,751</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kadavu</td>
<td>2,890</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lau</td>
<td>5,719</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lomaiviti</td>
<td>2,271</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macuata</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2,757</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nadroga/Navosa</td>
<td>965</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,150</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naitasiri</td>
<td>3,023</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namosi</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ra</td>
<td>1,253</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rewa</td>
<td>2,795</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serua</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailevu</td>
<td>4,756</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotuma</td>
<td>1,421</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>31,742</td>
<td>7,162</td>
<td>3,264</td>
<td>3,809</td>
<td>1,236</td>
<td>4,288</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>1,616</td>
<td>2,861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 14.3 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source province</th>
<th>Korovou</th>
<th>Navua</th>
<th>Rakiraki</th>
<th>Tabua</th>
<th>Vatukoula</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% of total rural emigrants to urban areas</th>
<th>Share (%) of national population aged 15 years and over</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ba</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>11,612</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bua</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1,566</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caakaudrove</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>4,338</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kadavu</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>3,579</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lau</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>6,851</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lomaiviti</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>3,732</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macuata</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3,997</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nadroga/Navosa</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>3,847</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naitasiri</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>4,385</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namosi</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ra</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>3,638</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rewa</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>3,591</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serua</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>871</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailevu</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>7,109</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotuma</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>1,986</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>1,496</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>2,411</td>
<td>61,457</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Special Tables, 1976 Population Census.
Fig. 14.1 The location of urban centres in Fiji and their population (Source: Data from Lodhia 1977: 75).
Tailevu, these provinces accounted for nearly four-fifths of all rural to urban migrants. Except for Macuata, all of these provinces are on Viti Levu.

As with lifetime rural to urban migration, Suva is clearly the dominant destination, with over half of all migrants moving into the city. Lautoka is the second significant destination, but it absorbs only about a fifth of Suva's number. Although Ba, Labasa, Nadi and Nausori exert some attraction, other towns are not significant recipients of rural migrants.

Table 14.4
Lifetime rural to urban migration within provinces, 15 years and over, 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>No. of lifetime rural to urban migrants in urban area(s) within same province</th>
<th>Rural-urban migrants from province</th>
<th>Per cent of total migrants of province</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ba</td>
<td>9,281</td>
<td>11,612</td>
<td>79.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bua</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,566</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cakaudrove</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>4,338</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kadavu</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,579</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lau</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6,851</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lomaiviti</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>3,732</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macuata</td>
<td>2,757</td>
<td>3,997</td>
<td>69.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madroga/Navosa</td>
<td>1,150</td>
<td>3,847</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naitasiri</td>
<td>3,642</td>
<td>4,385</td>
<td>83.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namosi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ra</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>3,638</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rewa</td>
<td>2,795</td>
<td>3,591</td>
<td>77.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serua</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>871</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailevu</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>7,109</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotuma</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,986</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fiji total</strong></td>
<td><strong>22,505</strong></td>
<td><strong>61,457</strong></td>
<td><strong>47.8</strong>(^a)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Per cent of total migrants from provinces with urban areas only (47,120).

Source: Special Tables, 1976 Population Census.

There appear to be some noteworthy differences between lifetime rural to urban migration and more recent movements. In recent years over four-fifths of rural to urban migrants originated in Viti Levu, and the number originating in island provinces has fallen sharply (Table 14.5). The increased dominance of Viti Levu in the rural-urban migration flow is entirely due to sharp increases in migration from Rewa, and to a lesser extent, Ba and a small increase from Naitasiri; all other provinces recorded lower proportions, as did all provinces except Macuata in Vanua Levu (Tables 14.3, 14.6).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source province</th>
<th>Suva</th>
<th>Lautoka</th>
<th>Ba</th>
<th>Labasa</th>
<th>Levuka</th>
<th>Nadi</th>
<th>Savusavu</th>
<th>Nausori</th>
<th>Korovou</th>
<th>Navua</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ba</td>
<td>1,382</td>
<td>6,060</td>
<td>3,159</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3,737</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bua</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cakaudrove</td>
<td>1,145</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kadavu</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lau</td>
<td>1,718</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lomaiviti</td>
<td>1,092</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1,034</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macuata</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3,278</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nadroga/Navosa</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naitasiri</td>
<td>5,957</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namosi</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ra</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rewa</td>
<td>18,141</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serua</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailevu</td>
<td>1,727</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotuma</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fiji total</strong></td>
<td><strong>34,503</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,673</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,508</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,968</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,286</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,640</strong></td>
<td><strong>781</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,032</strong></td>
<td><strong>120</strong></td>
<td><strong>241</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Per cent</strong></td>
<td>52</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 14.5 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source province</th>
<th>Rakiraki</th>
<th>Tavua</th>
<th>Vatukoula</th>
<th>Sigatoka</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Per cent of total rural emigrants to urban areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ba</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>1,904</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>17,334</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bua</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cakaudrove</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2,262</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kadavu</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,064</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lau</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1,959</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lomaiviti</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,409</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macuata</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4,177</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nadroga/Navosa</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1,368</td>
<td>2,391</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naitasiri</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7,262</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namosi</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ra</td>
<td>1,274</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2,243</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rewa</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>20,170</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serua</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailevu</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3,156</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotuma</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji total</td>
<td>1,554</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>2,452</td>
<td>1,711</td>
<td>66,087</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Special Tables, 1976 Population Census.
The shift in emphasis is brought out in Table 14.6.

### Table 14.6

**Comparison of lifetime migrants and recent migrants, 15 years and over, 1976**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source area</th>
<th>Lifetime migrants</th>
<th>Recent migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Viti Levu</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanua Levu</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outer islands</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Special Tables, 1976 Population Census.*

These data also suggest the existence of cyclic movements, as it appears a large number of urban-born people were in rural residence in 1970 but enumerated in urban centres in 1976. This appears to be the case particularly in Rewa and Ba provinces. ⁹

**Ethnicity, sex and age in rural to urban migration**

Rural to urban migration differs in space, as we have seen so far. The incidence, direction and motivation of rural to urban migration also differ according to personal characteristics of the migrants, including their ethnic background. Data on rural to urban migration in Fiji enable an examination of the relationship of ethnicity, sex and age to migration, though unfortunately not that of education.

The rate of urbanization differed markedly among the different ethnic groups between 1966 and 1976, with Fijians recording a change in the proportion of population living in urban areas of 6.7 per cent (from 23.8 per cent to 30.5 per cent), Indo-Fijians of 2.6 per cent (from 36.9 per cent to 39.5 per cent) and 'Others' of 1.1 per cent (from 65.7 per cent to 66.8 per cent) (Chandra 1979:15).

The ethnic differentials in rural to urban migration are clearly illustrated in Table 14.7. The much larger number of Fijians moving into urban areas from rural areas, observed by Walsh

---

⁹Part of the explanation derives from the fact that Rewa contains the main hospital in Fiji and Ba contains the major hospital for the Western Division.
(1976, 1977) is confirmed. For Indo-Fijians, rural to urban migration is apparently stabilizing, while 'others', as they are already highly urbanized, are not moving into towns in large numbers.

The numbers for different ethnic groups moving into different towns vary, with Suva, Levuka, Sigatoka and Vatukoula being towns with distinct Fijian immigration. Lautoka, Ba, Labasa and Rakiraki have distinct Indo-Fijian immigration, while Nadi, Savusavu, Nausori, Navua, Korovou and Tavua have roughly the same number of Fijian and Indo-Fijian immigrants. It appears that ethnic groups have clear preferences for particular urban areas, and, should this trend continue, rural to urban migration could reinforce the distinct ethnicity of various urban areas.

Rural to urban migrants differ only marginally sex-wise. Between 1970 and 1976, for instance, males accounted for 49 per cent of all rural to urban migrants aged 15 years and over. There were no major sex differences among rural migrants in the different towns.

Migration into towns is generally highly selective of age, and this is the case in Fiji also (Table 14.8). Of all immigrants into towns between 1970 and 1976, primary school children comprised nearly a third (28 per cent), indicating a significant movement of very young people into towns; secondary school children (aged 13-17) are not major urban immigrants, and the working population clearly accounts for the bulk of the movements (55 per cent). Old people do not move into towns in large numbers from rural areas. Unfortunately, it is not possible to say whether significant movements of very young people into towns simply means their parents are moving in in large number and bringing them along, or that they are being sent to stay with relatives or board and go to school.

The motives for rural-urban migration

Various reasons for rural to urban migration in Fiji have been advanced by Watters (1969), Walsh (1978) and Chandra (1979). None of these are based on empirical studies of migrants themselves. Recently, however, the Fiji Bureau of Statistics conducted a Household Income and Expenditure Survey, in which they included a question on why people had moved from rural areas to urban areas. This, although crude, provides an account from the migrants themselves.

The survey found that of 9,237 people aged 14 years and over who were interviewed, 13 per cent moved from rural to urban or urban to rural areas. Of these, 63 per cent were rural to urban

---

10 This section, like the section on urban growth and consequences of urbanization, relies heavily on my earlier paper on urbanization (Chandra 1979).
movements. Those who had moved from rural to urban areas moved for family reasons in more than half the cases (Table 14.9), while only about a quarter went to look for a job. The attraction of social facilities is much more important than the 'bright lights' of urban areas.

Table 14.7
Rural to urban movements of population aged 15 years and over by ethnic groups, 1970-76

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban areas</th>
<th>Fijian</th>
<th>Indo-Fijian</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suva</td>
<td>21,110</td>
<td>8,923</td>
<td>4,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lautoka</td>
<td>3,167</td>
<td>4,062</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>2,678</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labasa</td>
<td>902</td>
<td>2,915</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levuka</td>
<td>795</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nadi</td>
<td>2,143</td>
<td>2,339</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savusavu</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sigatoka</td>
<td>1,005</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nausori</td>
<td>1,292</td>
<td>1,579</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korovou</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navua</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>-102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rakiraki</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>1,202</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tavua</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vatukoula</td>
<td>1,797</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34,081</td>
<td>25,790</td>
<td>6,216</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Per cent
52
39
9

Source: Special Tables, 1976 Population Census.

The findings of the sample are of some value when considering why people move to towns; however, it is important to note their limitations in that the questions appear to be poorly designed and pay attention only to the 'pull' factors, and say little of the conditions in the rural areas that may be equally powerful forces in rural to urban migration.

The findings emphasize the important influence (not always recognized) of relatives or parents on movement of others, but say little about why the parents and relatives were migrating. The literature on urbanization in the Pacific is replete with references to 'bright lights' as one of the main attractions to rural dwellers; but less than one per cent of the rural to urban migrants in this sample give this as the main reason for moving to urban centres.

If one were to speculate on broader reasons why rural to urban migration takes place, it is best to see it as a function of
the opportunity differentials between urban and rural sectors of the economy, and particularly the consciousness of the disadvantaged group of this inequality. Living standards in urban areas are very much higher than in rural areas in Fiji. The survey of urban household income and expenditure showed a per capita urban income in 1973 of $F520 (Fiji Bureau of Statistics 1974:19). A more general estimate indicates that the per capita income of a rural province in Fiji, Bua ($F341), is a quarter of that of urban Suva/Nausori area ($F1,368) (Savu 1978:2). A recent survey of household income and expenditure found that the average weekly real income in Suva ($F87.50) was about twice that of village households ($F46.30) (Fiji Central Planning Office 1980:317). Moreover, urban incomes are increasing much more rapidly than rural incomes. Between 1953 and 1970, for instance, average urban incomes grew more than six times faster than average rural incomes (McHarg n.d.:2). Added to this rural-urban income differential, incomes in the two largest islands of Fiji, Viti Levu and Vanua Levu, are much more than in the smaller islands (ibid.). Incomes in urban areas are not only higher, but they are clearly seen and demonstrated to be high, and this prompts the rural populace to relocate themselves to urban areas to avail themselves of the same advantages and opportunities enjoyed by the urban population.

Coupled with this are, of course, factors that lead people to leave rural areas even if they do not necessarily want to go to urban areas. This, as Walsh points out, is particularly applicable to Indo-Fijians who do not have access to more land for increasingly large families. A farm is normally sufficient for only one son. A rural Indo-Fijian family, however, consists of 6.4 persons (Lodhia 1977:585), of whom two can be expected to be sons. One of them is almost compelled to move to an urban area. Rural population growth, dwindling farming land through loss of land to Reserve, insecurity of tenure and generally falling standards of

\[\text{11} \quad \text{This is calculated by assessing the yearly household income, and dividing it by the average number of people in the household.}\]

\[\text{12} \quad \text{Bedford (1979a) also deals with this income inequality. He points out that in 1974 a Suva worker had an average income of around $F1,400, while including imputed monetary value of subsistence production, less than 30 per cent of Taveuni village households had this income in 1975 (Bedford 1979a:6).}\]

\[\text{13} \quad \text{McHarg employed a relatively crude computation of rural income per capita where it was taken to be gross value added in agriculture divided by the total rural population.}\]

\[\text{14} \quad \text{Walsh (1978:118) makes the point that 'It is probable that Indian movement is primarily prompted by actual population pressure and insecurity in rural areas'.}\]

\[\text{15} \quad \text{Under the Reserve system, land in certain areas in Fiji is reserved for Fijians. If currently leased, the land reverts to the Reserve for (future) use by Fijians at the expiry of the lease.}\]
Table 14.8
Urban migration by age, 1970-76

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Urban population 1970</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Immigration</th>
<th>Outmigration</th>
<th>Urban population 1976</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Net migration</th>
<th>Av. yearly migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-12</td>
<td>61,699</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>19,419</td>
<td>9,578</td>
<td>71,540</td>
<td>9,841</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>1,640</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-17</td>
<td>21,724</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>9,222</td>
<td>2,710</td>
<td>28,236</td>
<td>6,512</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>1,085</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-57</td>
<td>79,903</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>38,666</td>
<td>9,367</td>
<td>109,202</td>
<td>29,229</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>4,883</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58+</td>
<td>6,971</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2,907</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>9,136</td>
<td>2,165</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>361</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>170,297</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>70,214</td>
<td>22,397</td>
<td>218,114</td>
<td>47,817</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>7,969</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Special Tables, 1976 Population Census.

Table 14.9
Reasons for rural to urban migration in Fiji for people aged 14 years and over

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To live with relatives</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To accompany migrating parents or relatives</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To look for jobs</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To take advantage of social facilities</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Bright lights'</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

rural living, are forceful 'push factors' (Sahadeo 1977).

A section of the Fijian population is also driven to urban areas to escape the rural Fijian social structure, and to be able to accumulate wealth individually. In the village, the ethic is one of communalism. Most writers on Fijian society have commented on the stifling effects of Fijian social structure on individual enterprise,\(^{16}\) and migrating to urban areas is seen as a way of escaping these effects. But this is only one of the many explanations of increasing Fijian rural-urban migration. To it is allied the problem of increasing competition for rural Fijian resources, and increasing rural Fijian inequality (Bedford 1979a:4; Knapman and Walter 1979:4). Even for Fijians, emigration can be seen as a safety valve for land shortage (Bedford 1979a:6).

Encompassing all these are some psychological factors as well. During the pre-Independence era, indigenous people were apprehensive about life in the city; they were more than a little afraid, especially when they saw a large number of Europeans apparently in control of the urban areas. Independence, and increasing localization of the administration and of company staffs, have removed this fear, and the flow of migrants has increased.

While the motives for rural movement are important in themselves, the means of movement are also of importance. Improvements in transport systems, enduring kin networks spanning rural-urban areas and increasing awareness of the urban centres through the media, helped by improved educational standards, are equally important factors to be taken into account when dealing with rural-urban migration in Fiji.

Urban growth, 1966–76

Changes in urban populations in the fifteen provinces of Fiji are summarized in Table 14.10. Five provinces, or one-third of the total, have no urban places, and of the ten that have urban populations, Ba, Naitasiri and Rewa are by far the most important. They contained slightly over four-fifths of all urban population in 1966 and 1976, and as they accounted for 85 per cent of all increase in urban population between 1966 and 1976, their share of the national urban population increased slightly. It is pertinent to note here that these three provinces are in Viti Levu, which contains nearly three-quarters of the national population.

\(^{16}\)See, for instance, Ward's (1960:41) comment that 'For the younger Fijian in particular, the communal system offers few incentives and many disincentives'. Similar comments are to be found in Belshaw (1964); Burns (1963); R.M. Frazer (1973); Spate (1959); Walsh (1976, 1977) and Ward (1965).
### Table 14.10

**Change in urban population of provinces in Fiji, 1966-76**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>Per cent of urban population</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>Per cent of urban population</th>
<th>Change 1966-76</th>
<th>Rate of growth per annum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba</td>
<td>47,823</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>59,584</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>11,761</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bua</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cakaudrove</td>
<td>1,861</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2,295</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kadavu</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lau</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lomaiviti</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2,764</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>-236</td>
<td>-7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macuata</td>
<td>9,716</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>12,956</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>3,240</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nadroga/Navosa</td>
<td>2,339</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3,635</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1,296</td>
<td>55.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naitasiri</td>
<td>30,391</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>44,101</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>13,710</td>
<td>45.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namosi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ra</td>
<td>2,708</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3,755</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1,047</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rewa</td>
<td>53,379</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>78,395</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>25,016</td>
<td>46.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serua</td>
<td>1,595</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2,568</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>973</td>
<td>61.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailevu</td>
<td>6,447</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>8,442</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1,994</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotuma</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>159,259</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>218,495</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>59,236</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Computed from Zwart (1968:3) and Lodhia (1977:75).
Table 14.10 also shows that all provinces possessing urban centres save Lomaiviti had increased urban populations in 1976. In absolute terms, the provinces of Naitasiri and Rewa, containing the capital city Suva, experienced the greatest increase in urban population, increasing their share of national urban population to nearly 50 per cent, followed by the province of Ba, which contains Fiji's second city, Lautoka.

The course of urban growth between 1966 and 1976 within the provinces is summarized in Table 14.11 which examines growth trends in city populations, peri-urban populations, and the overall urban populations. It also attempts to identify growth trends in different types/sizes of urban places, vis-à-vis cities, incorporated towns and unincorporated towns.

Urban population increased by 3.2 per cent per annum between 1966 and 1976, and the figures for township population increase and peri-urban area population increase were 3.4 and 2.9 per cent respectively. Although the rate of population increase in urban areas is twice that in rural areas, urban growth in Fiji is relatively low by third world standards. The rate of urban population growth between 1966 and 1976 was higher than the 2.8 per cent recorded for the developed countries almost two decades ago, between 1950 and 1960 (Ominde 1975:88), but lower than that of the developing countries, where the rate is expected to 'fall slightly to 4 per cent in 2000' (ibid.).

The dominance of Suva in Fiji urbanization

Suva, by far the biggest and most important urban centre in Fiji, accounted for the bulk of the urban population increase. Its increase in population accounted for 63.4 per cent of the total intercensal urban population increase. Furthermore, combined with the 12.9 per cent increase in urban population accounted for by Fiji's second city, Lautoka, the two cities between them absorbed more than three-quarters of all increase in urban population.

The primacy of Suva observed by Walsh (1977:78) is borne out in this analysis and has become more marked as a result of the urban increase between 1966 and 1976. Suva city itself did not expand its population very much (Table 14.11), but its peri-urban area increased by over 100 per cent, which was particularly striking as the country's remaining peri-urban areas, taken as a group, lost population. Combined with neighbouring Nausori, the 'greater Suva' area accounted for nearly 70 per cent of all urban population.

---

17 In Papua New Guinea, in contrast to Fiji, indigenous urban population grew at the rate of 17 per cent per annum between 1966 and 1971 (Garnaut, Wright and Curtain 1977:3).
### Table 14.11
Urban population changes in Fiji, 1966 and 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban place</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>r%</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>r%</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>r%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suva</td>
<td>54157</td>
<td>63628</td>
<td>9471</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>26112</td>
<td>54199</td>
<td>28087</td>
<td>107.3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>80269</td>
<td>117827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lautoka</td>
<td>11287</td>
<td>22672</td>
<td>11385</td>
<td>100.9</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>9934</td>
<td>6175</td>
<td>-3759</td>
<td>-37.8</td>
<td>-4.8</td>
<td>21221</td>
<td>28847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Towns</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(incorporated)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nadi</td>
<td>2542</td>
<td>6938</td>
<td>4396</td>
<td>172.9</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>8809</td>
<td>6057</td>
<td>-2752</td>
<td>-31.2</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
<td>11351</td>
<td>12995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labasa</td>
<td>2182</td>
<td>4328</td>
<td>2146</td>
<td>98.4</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7534</td>
<td>8628</td>
<td>1094</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>9716</td>
<td>12956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nausori</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>5262</td>
<td>3318</td>
<td>170.7</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>7675</td>
<td>7559</td>
<td>-116</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>9619</td>
<td>12821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba</td>
<td>3849</td>
<td>5917</td>
<td>2068</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4460</td>
<td>3256</td>
<td>-1204</td>
<td>-27.0</td>
<td>-3.1</td>
<td>8309</td>
<td>9173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sigatoka</td>
<td>1059</td>
<td>1816</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1280</td>
<td>1819</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2339</td>
<td>3635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levuka</td>
<td>1685a</td>
<td>1397</td>
<td>-288</td>
<td>-17.1</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>1315</td>
<td>1367</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>2764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savusavu</td>
<td>1861a</td>
<td>1754</td>
<td>-107a</td>
<td>-5.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-541</td>
<td>-a</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-a</td>
<td>-a</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unincorporated towns</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vatukoula</td>
<td>4993</td>
<td>6425</td>
<td>1432</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4993</td>
<td>6425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rakiraki</td>
<td>2708</td>
<td>3755</td>
<td>1047</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2708</td>
<td>3755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navua</td>
<td>1595</td>
<td>2568</td>
<td>973</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1595</td>
<td>2568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tavua</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>2144</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>2144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korovou</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>-39</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>92140</td>
<td>128894</td>
<td>36754</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>67119</td>
<td>89601</td>
<td>22482</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>159259</td>
<td>218495</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Savusavu was an unincorporated town in 1966.

Sources: Zwart (1968:3) and Lodhia (1977:75). Changes and rates of annual growth have been computed by the author.
increase, and in 1976 represented nearly 60 per cent of all urban population, and approximately 22 per cent of the national population.\textsuperscript{18}

In absolute terms, the unincorporated towns are an almost negligible component of the total urban population, (6.9 per cent), and all of them together accounted for a paltry 6.1 per cent of all urban population increase. The incorporated towns are somewhat more important. Together, they represented 17.6 per cent of all urban increase in population, and comprised slightly more than a quarter of the national urban population in 1976. Of these towns, Labasa, Nausori and Sigatoka have been growing especially rapidly, while Fiji's old capital town, Levuka, has been declining in population.

Some consequences of urbanization in Fiji

Even though the rate of urbanization in Fiji is low by third world standards, an accelerated rate of urban growth, particularly during the 1966–76 intercensal period, is creating significant strain on urban and national resources, as well as possibly having deleterious effects on the rural areas which are losing their most educated and economically active manpower.

The most obvious problem of urbanization is the inadequacy of urban housing. In 1976, there were 38,073 urban households in Fiji (Lodhia 1977:585), representing an annual increment of 1,259 households between 1966 and 1976. However, between 1971 and 1974,\textsuperscript{19} there was an average yearly increment of 801 dwellings for all of Fiji. Thus the rate of supply of housing did not even keep pace with the minimum potential demand for housing in urban areas, let alone all of Fiji. The discrepancy between the supply and demand for houses is magnified in urban areas, since the increase in the number of households in urban areas is twice that in rural areas. Moreover, with a sizeable proportion of the existing urban houses being sub-standard, the discrepancy between supply and total demand for urban housing becomes even more marked. The strain on the housing stock can be gauged by the fact that at the end of 1976, 8,207 households, or 21.6 per cent of the total number of urban households in Fiji, were on the waiting list of the Housing Authority, the country's statutory body charged with

\textsuperscript{18}Greater Suva's share of the national population is estimated to have increased to almost 24 per cent by mid-1980 (Fiji Central Planning Office 1980:312).

\textsuperscript{19}There is, in the words of a Fiji Bureau of Statistics publication (1976:60) 'an almost complete lack of data about housing in Fiji, since, unlike many countries, this data has not been included in recent censuses'. Data are available for 1971–74 only.
providing housing for low income workers (Fiji Housing Authority 1978:6).

A much publicized result of the inability of the urban housing market to meet the demands of increasing urbanization in Fiji is the mushrooming of 'squatter' settlements, particularly in Suva where one person in eight in 1979 was a squatter (Fiji Times, 3 February 1979:1). According to Naiker (1978:5), squatting has already become an alternative form of housing to the formal housing sector in Fiji, and the major urban centres of Suva, Lautoka, Ba and Labasa had a combined squatter population exceeding 14,000 at the time of presenting his paper.

The second most glaring problem resulting from rapid urbanization in Fiji is that of employment. The growth in jobs in urban Fiji has not kept pace with the rate of urbanization and this has resulted in a high and increasing level of urban unemployment and underemployment. In 1976, 6.2 per cent of the national labour force in Fiji was unemployed. A higher proportion of females (12 per cent) than of males (5 per cent) were unemployed. In contrast, only 4 per cent of the labour force was unemployed in 1966. Most of those unemployed were in urban centres (66 per cent), and within this category, in the largest urban centres. For instance, Suva alone accounts for 43 per cent of all unemployed and, combined with Lautoka, the two cities account for nearly half of all national unemployment and three-quarters of all urban unemployment.

Urban unemployment and poverty give rise to much socially undesirable behaviour. Crime has been rising rapidly in Fiji, and urban areas are becoming increasingly dangerous places for living. Although crimes of all kinds have grown, those against property have showed a particularly marked increase recently (Fiji Bureau of Statistics (1976:44).

Conclusion

Urban growth in Fiji of 3.2 per cent per annum is by no means rapid, and compares with much higher rates of urban population growth in the third world of around 5 per cent per annum.

A recent survey by the Fiji Bureau of Statistics indicates that a proportion of the rural to urban migration is offset by counter-currents of urban to rural migration. In the sample covered, although 755 people aged 14 years and over had migrated to urban areas from rural areas over a ten-year period, 443 had moved from urban to rural areas, leaving a net migration of only 312. Special tables from the 1976 census show that between 1970 and 1976, there was a net rural to urban migration of 47,948 for the entire population, giving an average yearly net flow of just under 8,000 persons per year. These figures do not indicate
massive rural to urban population displacement; neither do they confirm the belief of many people in Fiji, including the government, that there are hordes of people migrating from rural areas to urban centres.

Rural-urban migration in Fiji is focused sharply on Suva and neighbouring areas. This both reflects and contributes to the warped national urban system, in which Suva displays clear characteristics of a primate city. The overall pattern of the urban system will need to be taken into account in any strategy of regional development designed to lessen migration to Suva and to diversify the flow of rural migrants.

Most of the migrants, at least between 1970 and 1976, originate in Viti Levu; the island provinces do not appear to supply a major flow of rural to urban migrants any more. This again runs counter to the general belief in Fiji that the islands are unleashing their rural population to urban centres. In fact, it appears that the flow of migrants from island provinces has decreased in recent years. However, although emigration from island provinces is not numerically significant from the point of view of the destination areas, it may have serious consequences for the islands themselves. As pointed out earlier in the paper, emigration has not led to any degree of depopulation in island provinces to date, but it does pose a development dilemma (Bedford 1979b).

The findings that a high proportion of rural-urban migrants in provinces with urban centres move into those centres, and that immigration is most intense in provinces with large urban centres, have far-reaching implications for development planning in Fiji. In particular, it appears that the government may be able to alter the pattern of migration, and to avoid migration into the capital city, by developing viable central places in provinces at present without them; and by ensuring that resources are allocated to develop the existing central places in areas outside Suva and Lautoka.

The data indicate marked ethnic differences in the rate of rural-urban migration. Although the rate of migration is not unduly high, increasing Fijian influx into urban areas, and the consequent squeeze on economic opportunities of urban Indo-Fijians, will present a potentially explosive situation. Indo-Fijians, who are already experiencing an acute shortage of rural land which is the only basis for rural Indo-Fijian living in Fiji, will feel the pressure even more as the urban outlet for rural land pressure is slowly narrowed. This would offer considerable potential for the rise of Indo-Fijian sectional leader, and thus harm the cause of political moderation on which the fragile Fiji plural society rests.

Rural outmigration is not necessarily bad, although it is generally viewed very negatively in Fiji. A dispassionate
examination may reveal that rural-urban migration can assist in the long-term rationalization of agriculture as well as relieving pressure on rural land. Remittances and cyclical migrants may also be helping rural areas considerably.

The policy implications of this paper need to be viewed in the context of two major beliefs prevalent in Fiji, which appear to guide development planning in the country — that there is a massive rural to urban displacement of people and that this movement is undesirable and should be curbed, if not reversed. In fact, there are frequent calls for repatriation of the former rural population (especially offenders) and for tightening of rural social organization to exercise a much greater control on rural population, including its mobility. In many instances, government actions appear to respond by attempting to lower the visibility of problems in urban areas by shifting the onus to rural areas, where the problems persist but are less noticeable. In other words, various short and medium term solutions reflect strategies of political survival and retentions of power rather than sound management of the development process. The dynamics of urbanization should be seen in the context of the society at large, and as long as urban areas have a vastly higher standard of living compared to rural areas, and as long as rural areas are deprived of some of the basics of comfortable living, people will migrate from rural areas to urban areas, and maintain the tempo of urbanization.

Planning for population mobility has to be situated in the context of the overall development orientation of the country. If development planners are committed to increased participation in international capitalism, as they apparently are, then they cannot fight rural-urban migration. The most positive approach is to understand the dynamics of population mobility and take it into account in the planning process — for example, by encouraging the shifting of surplus rural labour, either to regional rural or urban centres or to national urban centres. Furthermore, the government has to create opportunities for this surplus in these areas in terms of industrial and other activities — based as much as possible on indigenous resources.

Different conditions and circumstances apply in different geographic regions in Fiji — urban and rural areas in the main islands, villages in the main islands and the outlying islands — and in different components of the national population. This heterogeneity should be taken into account in policies geared towards dealing with population mobility. A prerequisite to better management and planning of rural-urban migration is adequate and good quality data on population mobility.
Chapter 15

Road transport, population mobility and development in Indonesia

Graeme Hugo

As recently as the early 1970s the term 'population mobility' meant two things to most social scientists working in Indonesia: transmigration and urbanization. A decade later we are confronted by a substantial and growing body of survey evidence that non-permanent forms of population mobility are important over much of Indonesia not only in terms of the huge numbers of persons involved but also in their social and economic impact on the areas of origin and destination. Since a 1973 survey based in West Java indicated the growing significance of non-permanent mobility from several rural areas of that province (Hugo 1975b, 1978a), evidence has emerged from many parts of Java and the Outer Islands testifying to the importance of temporary migration and commuting of various types (Hugo 1981a).

It would be wrong, however, to construe from this sudden burgeoning of evidence that circular mobility is purely a new or recent phenomenon in Indonesia. It has been demonstrated elsewhere (Hugo 1975b, 1980) that several non-permanent forms of mobility were significant in pre-colonial times and that exploitation of Indonesia's resources by the Dutch during the colonial period fostered and was indeed partially dependent upon the initiation of essentially circular migrations of Indonesian labour toward such foci of colonial activity as plantations, cities, oilfields, mines and sites of large-scale capital works. What is new and different about contemporary circular mobility in Indonesia is the substantial scale on which it is now occurring, its generally shortened periodicity and the longer distances involved. No precise estimates of the extent of non-permanent movement are available. But both general observation and field surveys have

1The current extent of non-permanent movement in Indonesia cannot be judged from census returns, since the census definition of a migrant excludes most circular migrants and there is no 'place of work' question included in the census which would allow long-distance commuters and working circular migrants to be identified (Hugo 1975b, 1978a).
shown a substantial upswing in recent years. In a 1973 West Java study (Hugo 1978a:142) it was found that more than half of the current stock of circular migrants had begun this pattern of movement since 1970 and Jellinek (1978:149) reports that most of the 200 circular migrants she surveyed in 1975-76 had been coming to Jakarta for five years or less. This upswing is duplicated in the findings of several studies in other countries of the South-east Asian region (e.g. Lightfoot et al. 1980:11).

One of the fundamental distinctions to be made between circular and more permanent forms of population mobility is in the relative significance of the journey between the places of origin and destination. In most permanent and semi-permanent moves travel costs, time taken and distance traversed between origin and destination have some influence on the decision of whether or not to move and where to move to, but they do not generally constitute, by themselves, major factors in the mover's overall calculus. Several writers have pointed to the relative unimportance of travel costs in internal migration (e.g. Herrick 1965:19), and the fact that the costs of the journey usually constitute a one-off outlay. This of course is not the case with temporary forms of population mobility where transport costs often constitute a significant and continuing element in the mover's budget. The journey then clearly occupies a much more central position among the elements influencing movers and non-movers.

Most writers concerned with circular migration and commuting have not attempted to clarify the precise nature of the inter-relationships between changes in transportation modes, costs and availability on the one hand and population mobility patterns and trends on the other or the implications of such inter-relationships for the social and economic well-being of the movers as well as non-movers at their places of origin and destination. This failure is partly due to the fact that social scientists studying population mobility have largely regarded transportation as an exogenous variable and concentrated their attention on the movers themselves. There has been an over-emphasis on behavioural types of variables, and too little attention has been given to important contextual and structural elements. On the other hand, transportation geographers studying changes in accessibility wrought by transport improvements have tended to ignore their impact on permanent and temporary migration. The emphasis has been on the local developmental effects of innovations and services which are now able to penetrate those areas, the enhanced ability to market crops and other products and the changes wrought upon shopping behaviour, visiting patterns, etc. There has perhaps been a reluctance to acknowledge that penetration of modern transportation into a relatively inaccessible area not only opens up that area to outside influences but facilitates movement out of it.

It is clearly no coincidence that the recent marked increase in the level of circular mobility has been contemporaneous with a
virtual revolution in the availability of both public and private transport, especially land transport, in Indonesia. This paper explores some aspects of the relationship between the recent great expansion in Indonesia's public and private transportation and the increased incidence of circular migration. An initial section outlines the nature of the expansion in transport, especially road transport, over the last few decades. Next comes a discussion on the impact of this development on population mobility. Finally, some research questions are put on the inter-relationships between increased circular mobility and improved transport provision in a broader context of development and change in Indonesia.

Land transport improvements in Indonesia during the 1970s

The city of Yogyakarta recorded one of the lowest population growth rates of any region in Indonesia during the 1970s (around 1.1 per cent per annum) according to the census. Yet there has clearly been a tremendous increase in the number of people and vehicles thronging the city's streets each day. The solution to this apparent paradox is readily apparent. Tens of thousands of people regularly (in many cases daily) leave their rural homes to walk, ride a motor cycle or bicycle or crowd on to a 'colt' (minibus), bus, or pony cart to work in Yogyakarta city. The 'daytime' population of Yogyakarta is much larger than that enumerated in the de jure-based census, an example of the phenomenon that Lewan (1969) calls 'hidden urbanization'. Much of this temporary movement is along recently upgraded roads and on relatively recently purchased vehicles, especially minibuses which form part of the 'colt revolution' which has seen the penetration by motorized transport of many previously isolated villages.

In Indonesia's three five-year development plans priority has been given to improving the land transport system and constructing roads and bridges. In Repelita I about 21 per cent of central development investment was devoted to the communications infrastructure, second only to agriculture and irrigation (30 per cent). Repelita II (1974/75-1978/79) maintained this stress on the communications infrastructure (19 per cent of planned expenditures). In the projected sectoral breakdown of the development budget for Repelita III (1978/79-1983/84) transport and tourism account for 15.5 per cent and their projected share is second only to industry, mining and energy (Booth and Tyabji 1979:34).

In spite of the fact that the communications infrastructure absorbs about a fifth of central government investment funds, the literature relating specifically to the development and impact of transport in Indonesia is limited. There are several general

---

2There is probably much purely factual information stowed away in the relatively inaccessible form of consultants' reports, regional development studies, International Agency Reports, unpublished and/or unanalysed data sets collected by government departments etc.
Fig. 15.1 Numbers of motor vehicles and population, Indonesia, 1938-78 (semi-logarithmic scale). (In semi-logarithmic graphs changes in slope indicate changes in rates of growth.)
surveys available (e.g. Pond 1968; Little et al. 1972-3) and some interesting studies relating to Outer Island areas (e.g. Rutz 1976; Ahmed et al. 1976). Perhaps most interesting and informative is Leinbach's recent work (1978, 1979a and b) based upon field surveys conducted in some thirty-six survey areas in Sumatra, Java, Bali and Sulawesi in 1978, which investigates the impact of construction of feeder roads in rural areas.

In order to establish the extent and nature of the expansion of road transportation in Indonesia, an analysis is made here of data relating to vehicle ownership. A variety of sources, many of them somewhat fugitive, has been consulted. The Central Bureau of Statistics has been collecting data relating to vehicle ownership and roads for many years since the late 1930s, some of which are presented here. But it was not until 1973 that the Bureau published the first volume of Motor Vehicles and Road Length Statistics which has since appeared annually.3

The data presented in Fig. 15.1 show the rates of growth in motor vehicle ownership broken down according to four basic types (Biro Pusat Statistik 1979:iii). In 1978 there were some 46 persons for each registered non-military vehicle in Indonesia if motor cycles are included and 144 persons if they are excluded. It is clear from the semi-logarithmic graph in Fig. 15.1 that rates of growth in the number of all types of motor vehicles in Indonesia have consistently outpaced population growth rates during the Independence period, especially in recent years. Table 15.1 confirms this, showing that the vehicle fleet has been increasing at more than 10-20 per cent per annum during the 1970s. This had led to a dramatic decrease in the number of persons per vehicle, as Table 15.2 indicates.

Table 15.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Motor vehicles (incl. motor cycles)</th>
<th>Motor vehicles (excl. motor cycles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940-50</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>-10.5</td>
<td>-10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-56</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>+12.5</td>
<td>+11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-61</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>+11.4</td>
<td>+11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-66</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>+ 9.2</td>
<td>+ 6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-71</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>+10.0</td>
<td>+ 6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-76</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>+17.8</td>
<td>+11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-78</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>+17.9</td>
<td>+16.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Biro Pusat Statistik.

3Registration data are of dubious accuracy and exclude military vehicles, which are thought to account for about 10 per cent of the operational vehicle fleet (Hansen 1971:39).
In the final years of colonial rule there were some 823 persons per motor vehicle. This, however, gives a somewhat misleading impression of overall population mobility since ownership, control and use of vehicles was strongly concentrated in the hands of Europeans. There were 7 Europeans per vehicle held by Europeans and 2,669 indigenous Indonesians per motor vehicle owned by them (figures include motor cycles). In the 'Other Asiatic' category recognized in colonial population statistics (more than 90 per cent of whom were Chinese) there were 77 persons per vehicle.

Table 15.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Persons/motor vehicle (incl. motor cycles)</th>
<th>Persons/motor vehicle (excl. motor cycles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1507</td>
<td>1691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Biro Pusat Statistik.

There was a decrease in the vehicle fleet during the disruption of the Japanese occupation and struggle for Independence. During the 1950s there was a very rapid build up in the vehicle fleet, slower growth during the 1960s and an accelerated expansion in the 1970s. The recent virtual explosion in the number of motor vehicles clearly represents a major improvement in the mobility of many Indonesians, although some of it has been at the expense of rail transport. The bulk of the growth in the motor vehicle fleet over the last three decades has been via imports (Fig. 15.2) although there has also been a substantial growth in local assembling of vehicles since the early 1970s, which, in the case of 'colts' and small buses, usually includes local manufacture of most body work.

The pattern of growth by major type of vehicle in use is shown in Table 15.3. The most substantial increases have been in motor cycles, which have increased at an average annual rate of 17 per cent. Although the major contribution of motor cycles is

---

4Local assembly of motor cycles rose from 31,000 in 1970-71 to a peak of 300,000 in 1975-76 and declined slightly over the next three years. Assembly of 4-wheeled vehicles of all types rose from 2,900 in 1970-71 to 83,900 in 1977-78 (Rancangan Anggara 1979-1980).
Fig. 15.2 Numbers of motor vehicles imported into Indonesia, 1931-78 (logarithmic scale).
to the private transport sector it should be mentioned that they are partly being used as a form of public transport. The practice of ojek, whereby people are ferried short distances (for a small charge) on the back of a motor cycle (or, in some cases, bicycles), is quite significant, especially within urban areas such as Jakarta where beoak have been banned and in rural communities where roads are too narrow for minibuses to enter. They are generally used to ferry people to the nearest mini-bus or bus route. The proliferation of motor cycles in Indonesia has been such that in 1978 the number of persons per motor cycle was only one-tenth that of 1961 and the number of motor cycles doubled from 1 to 2 millions in only four years in the mid-1970s.

Table 15.3
Growth of vehicle numbers by main types, 1961-78

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1978</th>
<th>Per cent growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Persons/vehicle</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passenger cars</td>
<td>129,262</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>535,442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buses</td>
<td>17,852</td>
<td>5,435</td>
<td>58,389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trucks</td>
<td>69,837</td>
<td>1,389</td>
<td>336,753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 4-wheeled</td>
<td>216,951</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>930,584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor cycles</td>
<td>152,228</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>1,990,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total vehicles</td>
<td>369,179</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>2,920,834</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Biro Pusat Statistik.

It is unfortunate that minibuses are not distinguished as a separate vehicle type in registration statistics, since it is the 'colt' type of vehicle which has had the major impact in increasing accessibility of previously remote villages in recent years. Minibuses are classified within the motor car category (sedans, jeeps, taxis, oplets and bemos) which accounts for 58 per cent of all four-wheeled vehicles. The non military motor car fleet has grown at an annual rate of 9 per cent over the last two decades and the fleet doubled in size between 1972 and 1978. A major proportion of this fleet consists of public transport vehicles. Writing in 1971, Hansen mentioned that at that time there was a severe shortage of buses for public transportation. The bus fleet has grown by 7 per cent per annum over the last two decades and doubled between 1973 and 1978.

The impact of these massive increases in numbers of vehicles on population mobility in Indonesia is greater than the raw figures would suggest because it is clear that a very substantial proportion of the four-wheeled vehicle growth has been in vehicles utilized for public transport. This means, as anyone who has
observed the crowded buses and minibuses plying Indonesian roads will testify, that the increased spatial mobility which a substantially increased vehicle fleet affords is being spread much more widely than vehicle ownership.

There are substantial variations in vehicle registrations between the various regions of Indonesia. Table 15.4 shows that in comparison with the last years of the colonial period there has been an increase in the percentage of vehicles registered within Java-Madura. The increasing concentration in Java-Madura is most marked with respect to four-wheeled vehicles. Java-Madura has 63 per cent of the national population, but it has 68 per cent of all vehicles and 71 per cent of four-wheeled vehicles.

Hansen (1971:44) observed that the geographical distribution of the motor vehicle market in Indonesia is heavily influenced by the relative levels of development in the various regions. There are marked differences between provinces in vehicle registrations, varying between Jakarta (8 persons per vehicle) and East Nusatenggara (253). These variations are clearly another reflection of the wide regional inequalities described by Titus (1978) in Indonesia. It is in the areas which Titus identifies as the regions of most substantial capitalist penetration that there are the most vehicles per head of population. This is reflected in the negative correlation between the real Gross Domestic Product per capita and persons per motor vehicle in provinces (−.66). The substantial degree of inequality in the spatial distribution of motor vehicles between provinces is indicated in the Gini coefficient between the proportion of the national population and the proportion of the motor vehicle fleet in provinces. This was 25.2 in 1978, or 28.2 if only four-wheeled vehicles are considered. Since the corresponding coefficients in 1961 were 27.8 and 33.8 this represents only a small improvement in equality in the overall spatial distribution of motor vehicles in relation to population over the last two decades.

The provinces to record higher proportions of the national four-wheeled vehicle fleet than their shares of the Indonesian population were Jakarta, North Sumatra, East Kalimantan, Yogyakarta and South Sumatra — regions of a high degree of urbanization and/or capitalist penetration. It is unlikely that the inclusion of other forms of transport would greatly alter the basic patterns of inequality in availability of transport revealed by these data.

Examination of disparities between the percentage distributions of population and vehicles in individual provinces indicates

---

5 Spearman's rank correlation coefficient. The source of the real GDP data was Esmara (1975:48).
### Table 15.4
Distribution of motor vehicles between Java-Madura and the Outer Islands, 1941-78

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Incl. motor cycles</th>
<th>Excl. motor cycles</th>
<th>Incl. motor cycles</th>
<th>Excl. motor cycles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>58,013</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>47,690</td>
<td>64.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>168,481</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>87,189</td>
<td>64.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>286,801</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>143,669</td>
<td>63.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>652,633</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>277,133</td>
<td>69.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1,990,704</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>664,520</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 15.5
Motor vehicles per person in Indonesian provinces, 1978

| Province Province | Persons/ Persons/ Persons/ Persons/ Persons/ Persons/ |
|-------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                   | Persons/ | Persons/ | Persons/ | Persons/ | Persons/ |
|                   | vehicle  | motor car | bus      | truck         | motor cycle |
| Jakarta           | 8        | 27        | 301      | 88            | 14            |
| East Kalimantan   | 25       | 140       | 734      | 150           | 41            |
| North Sumatra     | 31       | 201       | 1,260    | 254           | 45            |
| Bali              | 39       | 494       | 2,894    | 344           | 49            |
| South Kalimantan  | 42       | 402       | 5,323    | 706           | 50            |
| Aceh              | 42       | 673       | 1,686    | 349           | 53            |
| East Java         | 54       | 353       | 6,527    | 584           | 72            |
| West Sumatra      | 58       | 481       | 1,262    | 394           | 85            |
| West Java         | 58       | 247       | 3,722    | 398           | 97            |
| Jambi             | 59       | 552       | 2,061    | 419           | 81            |
| South Sumatra/    | 59       | 393       | 1,478    | 374           | 91            |
| Lampung/Bengkulu  | 59       | 714       | 4,001    | 453           | 77            |
| South Sulawesi    | 63       | 531       | 5,524    | 558           | 83            |
| Central Java/     | 65       | 522       | 4,979    | 420           | 92            |
| Yogyakarta        | 69       | 217       | 3,907    | 606           | 125           |
| Riau              | 70       | 538       | 1,116    | 462           | 107           |
| Irian Jaya        | 81       | 1,577     | 5,569    | 550           | 103           |
| North/Central Sulawesi | 83   | 1,473     | 144,356  | 785           | 99            |
| Southeast Sulawesi| 91       | 598       | 6,609    | 406           | 150           |
| Central Kalimantan| 96       | 1,124     | 4,037    | 1,245         | 118           |
| West Kalimantan   | 151      | 1,681     | 6,251    | 974           | 207           |
| West Nusatenggara| 253      | 1,079     | 3,385    | 1,831         | 400           |

Source: Biro Pusat Statistik.
that the most significant changes which occurred over the 1961-78 period were within Java. Table 15.6 shows that the predominance of Jakarta has been retained, and has been enhanced with respect to four-wheeled vehicles. More striking, however, is the reduction of disparities in all Javan provinces with respect to all vehicles and the major improvement in West Java with respect to four-wheeled vehicles.\(^6\)

### Table 15.6

Provinces of Java: differences between percentage of national population and national vehicle fleet, 1961 and 1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Difference between percent of population and all vehicles</th>
<th>Difference between percent of population and 4-wheel vehicles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>+23.1</td>
<td>+23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Java</td>
<td>-5.1</td>
<td>-6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Java/Yogyakarta</td>
<td>-6.5</td>
<td>-10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Java</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
<td>-6.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Sumatra, only North and South Sumatra provinces have a larger proportion of the vehicle fleet than of the national population and in Kalimantan only East Kalimantan recorded such a pattern. In the remaining regions only Bali recorded a greater share of the national vehicle fleet than of the population in 1978. This is almost entirely due to a very rapid proliferation in the number of motor cycles which is partly associated with the expansion of the Balinese tourist industry. Between 1972 and 1978 the number of registered motor cycles in Bali increased more than five times, from 8,925 to 48,538.

The bicycle is also a most important form of transport used in many work-related types of mobility, especially in commuting between villages and from rural to urban areas. It is clear that in many areas bicycle commuting has greatly increased following substantial investments in road construction and improvement. Data relating to import and manufacture of bicycles in Indonesia are very scattered and of highly dubious completeness, particularly at a national level. Table 15.7 presents the available data on imports and indicates that between 1931 and 1972 some 3.25 million

---

\(^6\)This change in the West Java figures may not reflect the actual situation accurately since there is a tendency for Jakarta residents to register vehicles (usually second vehicles) there to avoid the higher registration costs in Jakarta.
bicycles were imported, with an annual average of about 350,000 in the early 1970s. Manufacturing data show that between 1973 and 1978 some 135,151 bicycles were assembled in Indonesia, about one-eighth of the volume of 1970-72 inputs.

Table 15.7
Imports of bicycles into Indonesia, 1931-72

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>16,255</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>78,545</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>935</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>248,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>38,543</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>162,881</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>404,463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>23,282</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>268,548</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>11,513</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>36,720</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>79,751</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>2,091</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>23,081</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>16,650</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>16,832</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>18,637</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>38,410</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>15,319</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>13,890</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>1,399</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>113,017</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Biro Pusat Statistik.

One can get a more realistic picture of the importance of bicycles in increased population mobility from bicycle statistics for several individual provinces based on consolidation of statistics reported by village officials and published by the statistics offices of the various provincial governments. It is certain that such data (see Table 15.8) still severely underestimate ownership levels but they do give an indication of the significance of the bicycle. In Yogyakarta for example (Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, Kantor Statistik, 1979) nearly 228,000 bicycles were recorded for 1978 - this would mean that there was one bicycle for 11.7 persons in that region. These ratios varied widely between 7.3 persons per bicycle in Kabupaten Sleman (which adjoins Yogyakarta city and is a major source of commuters to the city) to 66 persons in the poorer, more distant kabupaten of Gunung Kidul. Mantra (1980b) in his study of two dukuh (villages) located 18 km and 23 km from Yogyakarta city found that the bicycle was the major means of commuting to the city. There had been a recent expansion in bicycle ownership in the villages such that in 1975 the dukuh with 71 households had 62 bicycles and the one with 99 households, 116 bicycles. Mantra (1980b:107) says that Bantul kabupaten in Yogyakarta has long been well known as a 'bicycle area'. The data for other provinces presented in Table 15.8 show clearly that bicycle ownership is at such high rates as to have an important impact on personal mobility - especially for local movements.

Before concluding this section, recent trends in modes of public transport other than by road should be mentioned. No attempt will be made to analyse these trends thoroughly, but they are
summarized for completeness and to present a more comprehensive picture of overall transportation development.

Table 15.8
Selected provinces of Indonesia: bicycle ownership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of bicycles</th>
<th>Persons/bicycle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aceh</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>339,501</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>227,614</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riau</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>107,176</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Java</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1,197,994</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sulawesi</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>262,277</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Sumatra</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>101,789</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Sulawesi</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>23,362</td>
<td>44.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Sulawesi</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>7,588</td>
<td>107.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Provincial Yearbooks.

The railways are clearly failing to compete nationally with the roads for passenger traffic, because of their limited coverage and inflexibility. According to official returns, the number of passengers buying tickets to travel on Indonesia's rail system has declined dramatically since the early 1960s, dropping from 158 million in 1960 to 23 million in 1977 (Fig. 15.3). While such a dramatic decline may partly reflect irregularities in data collection, it is clear that the railways can only compete for passenger traffic on particular routes (e.g. some commuting areas and intercity expresses such as the Bandung-Jakarta line). Railways are not as important a mode of transport in Indonesia as they are in China and India. Moreover there can be no doubt that some of the great expansion in the road transport industry has been at the expense of a decline in patronage of the railways.

The influence of railways on accessibility is restricted to the limited corridors they penetrate in Java and Sumatra. They do remain significant in facilitating circular migration and commuting in some areas. In a study of fourteen villages in West Java I found (Hugo 1978a:129) that 20 per cent of commuters and 10 per cent of circular migrants to urban areas travelled by train. Railways are an important mode of commuter transport to Jakarta and Bandung. Rail services for example facilitate commuting of groups who live in the cool, healthy climate of Bogor or in the cheaper housing area of Depok (located 10 km south of Jakarta's southern boundary) and at the same time work in Jakarta. An interesting account of rail commuting from Bogor in the early 1960s, which is also illustrative of the contemporary situation, is given by Masri (1963). He estimated the number of daily rail commuters from Bogor city at that time to be about 2,300 persons. Express train services to Jakarta from the south operate only from Bogor and the main centre in Depok (Pancoranmas). Other stations
Fig. 15.3 Numbers of passengers on railways and domestic airlines, 1930-78 (semi-logarithmic scale).
are served only by the *langsām* (slow) train which although cheaper takes twice as long to make the journey and is overcrowded, uncomfortable and unpunctual. It thus tends to be used not by commuters (except those close to Jakarta) but by persons who work in Jakarta for several days before returning to their villages.

Commuters from Tanggerang *kabupaten* to Jakarta are drawn from areas adjoining the Jakarta-Rangkasbitung-Merak railway line. A survey team in Serpong, some 45 km along this railway line, reported that the *kecamatan* population included, as well as commuters with permanent jobs in Jakarta, many petty traders who sell local products (fruits, vegetables, handicrafts) at Jakarta markets (Borkent-Niehof 1974:163). Rail commuting has declined in Bandung, the number of rail passengers arriving from its commuters' shed having fallen from 4.3 million in 1965 to 0.95 million in 1969 (Indonesia, Departemen Pekerjaan Umum dan Tenaga Listrik 1970:260). This was a result mainly of the great improvement in road transport. Nevertheless some lines, particularly that from Ciwidej to Bandung via Banjaran, remain important for commuters.

If the railways have lost patronage to road transport, they have also lost much of the long-distance intra-Java traffic to airlines. It is apparent from Fig. 15.3 that there has been a remarkable growth in numbers of domestic air passengers in recent years, as well as a proliferation of routes and flights. Domestic air passenger traffic doubled between 1974 and 1978 to more than 8 million passengers a year and it is clear from Fig. 15.3 that it is continuing to grow at a precipitous rate. Obviously the archipelagic nature of Indonesia favours the growth of the industry but it is equally obvious that this is a mode of transport whose use is dominated by a small elite group.

Upper class patronage is not a significant feature of inter-island shipping, but it is difficult to establish the pattern of growth in passenger traffic in inter-island shipping since passenger and cargo vessels are not differentiated in the published aggregate statistics.

Overall, it is apparent from the indirect evidence of improvements and expansion in transport that there has been a substantial increase in personal mobility in Indonesia in recent years. Despite the limited data on vehicle ownership, it is clear that the most ubiquitous and far-reaching of these changes have occurred in road transport. Rapid growth has not been restricted to the private vehicle sector: a major expansion has occurred in the public transport fleet. The transport situation in the Indonesia of the mid and late 1970s is very different from that of the late colonial

---

7From Pancoranmas the comparative prices in 1973 were Express Rp 75 per trip (monthly ticket Rp 1000), Langsam Rp 30 (monthly ticket Rp 400). From Bogor the prices were twice this much.
period or even from the early years of Independence. What has been its impact on circular population movements?

The impact of changes to transport on population mobility

There are two broad questions about the impact which improved transportation infrastructure and facilities have had on population mobility in third world countries. First, what is the extent of the impact and second, what form does this impact take?

There is a considerable body of evidence to indicate that transport improvements facilitate an increase in the level of mobility among people in the region affected. In their review of a large number of third world migration studies Connell et al. (1976), for example, found a strong relationship between migration and access to means of transportation. It would be surprising if such a relationship did not hold. On the one hand behaviourists would suggest that improvement in transport enhances mobility levels not only because it makes possible travel to a wider range of potential destinations but also because an increased flow of information about extra-village opportunities assists in decision-making. On the other hand, it would be argued by those who study migration in the wider context of structural change that spatially concentrated transport improvement is an element of capitalist penetration which acts to bring about social and economic change which also favours mobility.

The second set of effects has not been studied closely. It relates to changes in the form which mobility takes when facilitated by transportation developments. This involves changes in the degree of permanency of mobility, the distances travelled by movers, the relationships maintained with the home place etc. One aspect of change which may appear new is the extent of short-term movement, in which it is not intended to make a long-term change in the place of residence (circulation). An observer of the contemporary toing and froing of crowded 'colts', minibuses, bicycles, motorcycles and other vehicles from much of rural Indonesia would perhaps be excused for thinking that such patterns of circulation are a recent phenomenon, dependent entirely upon greatly improved transportation facilities. However, it is clear that population movements which are fundamentally circular in nature have a long history in Indonesia. Elsewhere I have demonstrated (Hugo 1980) that a range of temporary types of migration existed in pre-colonial times and that colonial rule encouraged the development and subsequent growth of many new forms of circular migration. Such movements occurred within a very different transport technology context. Walking was clearly a very important mode of migration in the colonial period.\(^8\) For example, the first Torajans to travel from

\(^8\)Niddrie (1954:37), in one of the few studies which explicitly (footnote 8 continued on next page)
their home region in South Sulawesi to the city of Makassar (now Ujung Pandang) began to migrate around 1910 and took a week to ten days to walk the distance. An elderly Torajan respondent who had migrated by foot to Makassar in 1919 reported, when interviewed in Ujung Pandang in 1978, that when a Torajan died in Ujung Pandang it was not unusual for his friends or relations to carry the body back to Toraja in order to perform the appropriate death rituals which are so important in Torajan adat.

The proliferation of road transport in the Independence period has virtually eliminated extremely long distance migration by foot. But it is clear that commuting by foot remains an important form of mobility. An example is the movement from villages such as Nanggela located some 12 km south of the regional centre of Cirebon in West Java (Hugo 1975b:312), where each day more than 100 men and women set out at 5 am, walk to Cirebon, work all day in mei (noodle) and housing materials factories and then walk the 12 km back to the village at night. Similar patterns of commuting by foot could be quoted from all over Java: the movement of women into East and Central Javan towns to work in kretek factories is one example (Castles 1967b:53).

It is almost self-evident that the type and level of transport provision and its relative cost will exert a major impact on the magnitude, structure and periodicity of population mobility in any society. This points to a fundamental problem, as has been pointed out elsewhere (Hugo 1975b), in formulations which attempt to ascribe a particular type and level of population mobility to a society's so-called stage of 'economic and social development'. The fact that particular modes of transport were associated with the early phases of the demographic transition in western countries need not mean that those particular forms should be used in third world countries. Such nations obviously can, and do, short-circuit the sequence of technological experimentation and development so that faster and cheaper forms of (contemporary western-developed) transport and infrastructure are often made widely available to populations in the early stages of the demographic transition, and inevitably their population mobility patterns will differ from those of nineteenth-century Europe and North America.

What has been the impact of upgrading the road system and of a greatly expanded motor vehicle fleet on population mobility patterns? There have been few studies which have focused directly on this issue. Most information in fact is derived from surveys

footnote 8 continued
examine the inter-relationships between transport, migration and labour migration, indicates that in Central Africa much colonial labour migration (perhaps more than half) was on foot. These walks 'from home to work' may have been from 100 to 1,500 miles in length, depending on the destination of the labour.
of movers and there have been virtually no studies of the structure of the transportation system itself, and how it impinges on temporary and permanent migration. Leinbach (1978, 1979a) has presented results based upon a household survey of areas influenced by new or improved rural feeder roads in Sumatra, Java, Bali and Sulawesi in 1978. The analysis deals mainly with movements to obtain goods or services and to visit relatives and not with the movements to seek employment or education with which students of circular migration and commuting are mainly concerned. His study found that upgrading of roads was almost always followed immediately by penetration of those roads by colts or mini-buses operated by private entrepreneurs (ibid. 1978:6). This pattern is repeated elsewhere - for example the construction of a 60 km road from Malili to Soroako in South Sulawesi saw the number of public vehicles plying it increase from 0 to 50 within three months. Leinbach (1978:19) found that 'a considerable number of families reported that someone in the household held employment outside the village of residence. A number of those individuals responded that the employment was in part related to the road improvement. Thus the road projects have enlarged employment opportunities in many areas.' In addition, Leinbach (1979a:5) noted a 'stronger than suspected role for four wheeled motorized transport in the traffic patterns of these low volume roads', although it was also clear that generally low income levels placed severe limits on the use of colts and mini-vans. Another finding was that the upgrading of transport resulted in an increase in trips covering longer distances.

With respect to the impact of improved land transport on the form that mobility takes Naim, in his study of the entrenched Minangkabau practice of merantau (which he argues is essentially circular), suggests that in this migration:

the pattern has changed greatly, especially since the War. As means of communication have improved, the distance of going merantau became greater, and the duration much longer. While forty or fifty years ago, going to a nearby town was already considered merantau, now the ranau areas encompass the whole of Indonesia, as far away as Menedo, Ternate, Ambon and Irian (Naim 1971:6).

Mantra's (1980b:52-7) study of population mobility out of two dukuh in Yogyakarta Special Region identifies improvements in road transport linkages since 1970 as the key factor stimulating movement (mainly commuting) out of those villages. (See also Chapter 7, this volume.) He reports that only one-eighth of adults in the survey villages did not engage in either commuting (an absence from the village of 6-24 hours), circulation (a continuous absence of one day to one year) or migration (departing but not returning during the survey). The short distances generally travelled by commuters meant that the bulk of them travelled by bicycle (59 per cent), foot (29 per cent) or motor cycle (8 per cent) and only 4 per cent by motorized public transport. The
average distance travelled by commuters varied greatly with the mode of transport used, ranging from around 2 km for walking to 7 km for bicycle and 12 km for motor vehicles. Circulation tends to take place over longer distances and the proportion travelling on bicycle and foot is lower (47 per cent and 15 per cent respectively), with more than one-third using some form of motorized transport.

The village studies which I conducted in 1973 also established that transportation improvements were a key facilitating element in the recent expansion of population mobility — much of it circular — in West Java province. In the fourteen villages studied, only movements associated with work or attending an educational institution were considered and shoppers and other casual, adventitious visitors were excluded from the analysis. In two villages commuters 9 were the dominant type of movers, whereas circular migration (involving a continuous absence of between one day and six months from the home village) was dominant in nine survey villages and moves involving more-or-less permanent re-location were dominant in the remaining three villages. The survey data showed that there had been a major increase in commuting and circular migration in the early 1970s due to the rapid growth of relatively cheap public transport.

The majority of commuters to rural areas moved over distances less than 10 km and walking (37 per cent) and bicycle (26 per cent) were the most important forms of transport, while commuters to urban areas travelled up to 50 km and more than 80 per cent travelled on minibuses, buses or railways. Average distances travelled varied between 19 and 303 km in the survey villages. More than two-thirds of circular migrants in the surveyed villages moved to urban centres, especially Jakarta and Bandung, almost all of them travelling on motorized public transport. The duration of absence of circular migrants varied between survey villages with means ranging from two weeks (standard deviation one week) to two months (standard deviation two months). It was shown that there is a strong but not completely consistent negative relationship between the average duration of absence and the level of accessibility to the destination. However, the periodicity of movement was regulated by the transport costs involved and the ability of the incomes earned at the destination to meet those costs.

It was found that improved transport had not only encouraged heavier rates of out-movement from the survey villages but in some cases had facilitated a shortening of the periodicity of movement (Hugo 1978a:144), and clearly had a role in increasing the amount and quality of information in the survey villages on

---

9 Defined as persons who regularly (though not necessarily every day) go to a place outside of their village of residence to work or attend an educational institution but return to the village most nights.
job opportunities at various possible destinations (Hugo 1978a: 188). It was further suggested that by expanding the area over which commuting and circular migration was possible, improved public transport widened the options open to many villagers confronted with lack of work in the village—migrate out of the village, stay in the village or circulate between the village and other places where work opportunities might be available.

Respondents engaging in rural-urban circular migration and commuting were asked to give reasons why they did not move permanently to the city in which they worked and their answers represented a blending of the strong social benefits of living in the village and the economic costs of settling a family permanently in the city. (But see also Mantra, Chapter 7 this volume.) The survey demonstrated that the motives of temporary movers who adopt a circulatory strategy is not an economically irrational response to the traditionally strong social attraction of the village. In all villages more than half of the movers mentioned that settlement in the city would involve separation from family, while many fewer saw the generally more pleasant life-style of the village to be the main factor stopping them migrating definitively. In most villages more than half the movers gave as a reason for not settling in the city the high urban cost of living and the expense of housing. Moreover, in several villages, respondents indicated that they could not support their family on their urban earnings alone and that they were thus forced to retain sources of income that required continued residence in the village. In fact circular migration and commuting constitute strategies which maximize the economic benefits which movers can get from the limited employment opportunities available to them in the involuted urban traditional sector. Rather than improve their economic position, permanent residence in the city would involve for the majority of temporary movers an economic loss. The fact that it enables most social benefits of village residence to be maintained is thus often not the cause of villagers adopting a temporary movement strategy but an incidental, though highly valued, benefit of it.

In West Java the vast majority of temporary movers studied relied upon public transport over distances which could not reasonably be traversed by foot or bicycle. In the survey villages data were collected on the use to which moneys earned by circular migrants in Jakarta were put. On average 57 per cent (range between village averages 49-64 per cent) was spent on living costs in Jakarta, 32 per cent (range 21-44 per cent) was remitted back to the village and 11 per cent (range 6-15 per cent) expended on travel to and from the village. Circular migrants seemed prepared to accept minimal living conditions in Jakarta in order to maximize the amount remitted and the frequency with which they could return to the more congenial village and family environment. There was considerable inter-village and intra-village consistency in the proportion of income spent on return travel. Discussion with migrants during fieldwork supports the evidence obtained in
questionnaires that circular migrants will 'tolerate' spending up to 15 per cent of their total destination earnings on travel to and from their home-place. This has become an important threshold in regulating the periodicity of circular movement between rural West Java and Jakarta.10

Several other studies have demonstrated the significance of upgrading road transport in encouraging circular movement. One of the most interesting is that of Rumbiak in Irian Jaya (1979). There has been a proliferation of minibuses, especially in and around Jayapura in recent years, and of regular commuting of villagers from the Nimboran-Kemtoek, Gresi and Dosai-Maribu areas to the city in order to sell agricultural produce in urban markets. A pattern of commuting (known locally as ra-mura-mura) has developed within a 50 km radius of Jayapura, especially along the Genyem-Jayapura road. The introduction of outboard motors has greatly encouraged temporary migration in coastal areas of Irian. Similar patterns have been observed in several other areas including Bali and South Sulawesi (see several chapters in Hugo and Mantra 1979). Improvement of roads and increasing bicycle ownership has also seen an extension of the zone around cities from which villagers bring produce into the city and market it themselves. For example, an ubiquitous sight early in the morning along the roads entering Ujung Pandang from the south and north are what has become known locally as the Pagandeng — villagers riding bicycles, the backs of which are piled high with vegetables, fruit etc. They return at night to the village, often with goods that have been bought in the city with proceeds from the sale of their produce. It has been estimated that 75–80 per cent of the vegetables, fruit and root crops such as cassava which are consumed in Ujung Pandang municipality are supplied from neighbouring kabupaten Gowa — most of it coming to the city via the Pagandeng (Yunus 1979: 1). Such patterns have been observed in Central Africa by Nidrie (1954:41) who stressed the growing importance of the bicycle in extending distances covered in the journey to work.

Zarkasi (in Hugo and Mantra 1979) reports that in Central Java the linking of all kabupaten capitals by asphalt roads, the major improvements in desa (village) roads and proliferation of minibuses have been major factors in the greatly increased commuting and other circulation from rural parts of the province to towns and cities such as Purwokerto and Semarang. Suandi (in Hugo and Mantra 1979) notes that in Bali the early 1970s saw a large increase in minibuses and other small motor vehicles and a related upswing

10This pattern appears to be duplicated in several other third world contexts. For example 15 per cent of total income expended on travel was found to be a significant threshold in Samoa (Dr Graham Harrison, pers. comm.) while in India circular movers will spend up to 20 per cent on travel costs (Dr Atiya Habeeb, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, pers. comm.).
in commuting to urban centres such as Singaraja and Den Pasar. In the same volume Johansyah has shown for South Kalimantan how the forms of mobility of the people of Alabio have changed with transport improvements. These have long been a highly mobile group engaging in various types of circulation often associated with trading. With motor transport replacing bicycles and perahu (boats) as the predominant form of transport in this area, long-term temporary migration has been replaced by commuting and very short-term circular migration.

In sum it is clear that in many parts of Indonesia circular migration and commuting have become very much more significant elements in recent years and that this change has been largely due to a major expansion and improvement of the road network and a rapid increase in the fleet of public and private vehicles.

Transport, mobility change: its broader social and economic significance

In this final section some questions are raised about the growth of circular mobility and transportation improvements in the broader context of social and economic change in Indonesia. There is little in the theoretical and empirical literature to guide us in investigating the nature of the inter-relationships between transport improvement, population mobility and development. The following observations and questions are therefore raised tentatively since they cannot yet be tested against research data. The aim here is to provoke further research rather than put forward an elaborate theoretical framework linking mobility, transport and development.

McCall (1977:56) has argued persuasively that constraints originating from methodological approaches employed and political restrictions on research have 'directed attention away from the serious long term structural impacts of transport investments, towards the mostly superficial, easily measurable, quantifiable measures of transport effects'. In Indonesia there is very little research that attempts to investigate systematically the long-term structural impacts of the major changes which are taking place in the transport system.

Some observers of the marked increase in circular mobility might seek to explain it in terms of expanded economic and social development in Indonesia during the 1970s and/or see it as evidence of a general improvement in levels of living. Overall increases in the level and complexity of population mobility in a society are frequently seen as being inextricably bound up with so-called 'modernization' within the society. The idea is explicitly spelt out in formulations such as those of Gibbs (1963) and Zelinsky (1971, 1979). The latter's influential essay put forward the hypothesis of the 'mobility transition', the essence of which is that there are
definite, patterned regularities in the growth of personal mobility through space-time during recent history, and these regularities comprise an essential component of the modernization process (Zelinsky 1971:221-2).

On the other hand, an interpretation of the Indonesian situation which assumes a simple direct relationship between increased spatial mobility and a general improvement in levels of living throughout the society would be attacked by other commentators who would argue that such causal links have yet to be established. Such critics would argue that accelerated circular mobility is yet another mechanism to preserve substantial income and spatial inequalities or even to exacerbate them. This general position is strongly presented by McCall (1977).

Considerable regional disparities have been demonstrated in land transport availability which generally reflect the spatial inequalities in Indonesia discussed by Titus (1978). Clearly this in part a reflection of unevenness in the distribution of development. A question of fundamental importance must be: how far are the improved land transport system and increased circular mobility described here serving to reinforce those regional, sectoral and social inequalities within Indonesia and how far are they working to ameliorate them? There are a number of sub-issues associated with this key question which would bear closer investigation in future research.

First, to what extent are mobility developments reinforcing a pattern of spatial concentration of investment in a few privileged areas like Jakarta? Who are the main beneficiaries of the existing transport/circular mobility system and what is the extent and nature of the benefit derived? Is it the destination areas which receive a plentiful supply of cheap labour but do not have to provide the overheads of permanent housing, utilities, schooling, services, etc., for the families of circular migrants who remain behind at the place of origin? Do employers in destination areas prefer circular migrants drawn from a distant area because they constitute a more docile and easily controlled labour force, as some evidence suggests? (Bremnan 1978).

Second, who is benefiting from investment in colts, buses and other vehicles which can earn substantial, quick profits, not least through the heavy rates of circular movement and commuting and the substantial proportion of the destination earnings of movers which goes into transport costs? It is clear that the owners of the vehicles aim to make substantial profits and that ownership of minibuses is seen as a prime form of investment in Indonesia at present. Are the investors rural and urban based elite groups or is a new group of indigenous, hardworking, innovative, self-made transport entrepreneurs emerging? Research is almost completely lacking on how much these profits are; what types of people, living
in what areas, receive those profits; how they are disbursed, to what extent they are reinvested in productive enterprises creating local employment or dissipated on luxury expenditure benefiting overseas interests; how much employment is being generated in the transport sector (mechanics, road maintenance workers, petrol sellers, drivers, conductors, procurers etc.); and how labour-intensive is the land transport industry.

Another set of questions concerns the local manufacture of transport equipment. How much of the wealth generated by the expansion of mobility is repatriated overseas to buy and maintain vehicles, owing to the lack of any indigenous manufacturing (as distinct from assembling) industry for motor vehicles? How much employment does the assembly industry generate within Indonesia? How does the situation in Indonesia compare to that in countries where there are tighter restrictions on import of motor vehicles, India for example? What potential is there for developing an indigenous in-country capacity for vehicle manufacture along the lines of some of the development in India? There is little or no information relating to most of this plethora of research questions — even though such considerations are of great importance in determining what the attitudes of policy makers to both mobility and investment patterns should be.

Fourth, there are questions of equity and social class. Are the poorest elements in village society prevented from earning outside the village as Lipton (1980:4) and Corner (Chapter 5, this volume) suggest, because they cannot raise the capital to travel substantial distances from the village or do not have connections outside it? What are the class differences between the users and non-users of the roads? What are the net benefits to the movers themselves? There can be little doubt that in the short term certain economic benefits accrue to the individual migrants. The remittance of significant amounts of money and goods by movers back to their home village has been established in several Indonesian situations (Hugo 1978a:264-76; Suharso et al. 1976:60-1; Hugo 1981b). However, it may be that this does not constitute a satisfactory long-term solution to village poverty and maldistribution of wealth. Is circular mobility, like agricultural involution, a mechanism whereby the poor are provided with enough to survive at a bare subsistence level but not to improve their level of living? Does circular mobility act as a medium whereby the involutionary struggle of individuals is spread over a wider spatial area? Is this mobility simply a stop-gap measure which will maintain, or perhaps exacerbate, current inequalities whereas only a more fundamental restructuring will really help the poor in the long term? Is it a mechanism which will allow attention to be directed away from other types of investment which would have a greater, longer term impact in assisting the poor?

Lastly, there is the more general point as to whether or not increased personal mobility is necessarily associated with economic
development. Transportation geographers have generally moved away from viewing transportation as a prerequisite for economic growth and now emphasize rather its permissive or facilitating role in the development process (e.g. Gauthier 1970). Spatial mobility, however, is still generally regarded as a surrogate of development in general (Leinbach 1979a:1). But it has not been established that increased spatial mobility in Indonesia has been contemporaneous with widespread improvement in the levels of living of the mass of the population. It is only if we clarify who is gaining from this mobility, and by how much, that we can establish the extent to which spatial mobility is or is not assisting in the amelioration of inequalities.

An interesting observation on the broader social and economic significance of circular migration in Indonesia was made more than sixty years ago by Ranneft (1916:72). Discussing the substantial amount of temporary migration in the Netherlands East Indies at that time, he said that the prevalence of such movement acted to prevent the formation of a local urban-based proletariat because, although most temporary migration was caused by the penetration of capitalism, temporary workers in cities and on plantations remained largely 'traditional men' maintaining a strong stake in their rural village of origin. This probably still applies in large measure (e.g. see Hugo 1978a:240-6).

An important consideration must be the impact of escalating fuel prices on circular migration and commuting, especially on the poor in rural Indonesia. It is clear that the 50 per cent rise in petrol prices in 1980 has been entirely passed on to travellers. There is no available study of the impact of this rise in travel costs but since there has been no equivalent increase in income for the majority of Indonesians, travelling costs will have become a larger item in the budgets of circular migrants and some commuters. Has this change caused movers to spend a greater proportion of their income on travel (perhaps extending the 15 per cent threshold mentioned earlier), will it lead to a lengthening of the periods that temporary movers are away from the village and reduce the frequency of their return visits or will it result in the poorer segment of village society no longer being able to afford to engage in circular migration? It may be that it will make circulation a less viable option to villagers in comparison to moving permanently or staying. Perhaps movers will substitute cheaper forms of transport, for example walking over greater distances.

All of these considerations have obvious significance for policy formulation. Elsewhere (Hugo 1975b) it was argued that the plethora of urban-based regulations during the 1970s which aimed to discourage migration to cities, especially Jakarta, were inequitable and should be discarded. The attitude of administrators in Jakarta appears to have softened in some ways in recent years although most of the regulations remain in force. Apparently the
Jakarta administration has initiated a study of the location of temporary migrants in the city and is even contemplating\(^\text{11}\) providing cheap barracks for them, although there is still concern that this would stimulate such migration to the city.

It has been suggested by some (Hugo 1978b; Goldstein 1978) that governments should consider encouraging commuting and circulation \textit{in lieu} of migration because of the absence of alternative opportunities for rural dwellers, the lower demands such movers place on the already strained infrastructure and services in places like Jakarta and the contribution that such movers make to the development of their home places. These suggestions were made at a time when the restrictive legislation in Jakarta was creating severe hardship in the areas of origin of movers and it appeared that in the short term alternative policies would help participating movers. Moreover the existing anti-mover regulations constituted the intervention of a relatively well-off urban-based elite who were seeking to deny a less well-off group of rural-based people access to income in locations absorbing disproportionately large shares of limited available investment. Taking a longer term perspective, however, alternative policies appear to provide only short-term 'band-aid' solutions to the problem of poverty in rural areas and perhaps only serve to direct attention away from the long-term solution of restructuring investment so as to initiate developments which would ameliorate spatial, sectoral and social inequalities.

Conclusions

Many studies of population movement have indicated that there is a strong relationship between population mobility and access to means of transportation, but almost without exception they have failed to clarify the precise nature of the relationship, place it in a coherent explanatory framework or elaborate its full social and economic implications. This most certainly is the case in Indonesia, where research focused specifically upon transport and population mobility and its developmental implications are almost totally lacking.

The aim of the present paper has been to attempt to summarize our existing empirical knowledge in respect to these relationships and to clarify the substantive and theoretical issues which in my opinion need to be addressed. The principal conclusion is that such issues should be an important research priority. This is

\(^{11}\) Source of this information: discussion with officers of BAPPEDA, DKI Jakarta, December 1979. It may be that this awareness among policy makers of the need to make some provisions for temporary migrants to Jakarta was influenced by the huge influx of such people in late 1977 from rural areas in which crops failed owing to drought and the \textit{wereng} (leaf hopper) plague, especially from nearby areas in Bekasi-Krawang kabupaten.
partly because Indonesia's internal transportation systems have undergone a veritable transformation during the past decade or so and consume a large proportion of scarce public and private investment resources. Conventionally it is argued that the resultant increases in personal mobility are associated with improvements in the generation and distribution of wealth. Yet the empirical evidence supporting or refuting such claims has yet to be presented or, in fact, collected.

A number of specific questions have been put forward which it is hoped will be taken up in future research. There is obviously inadequate understanding of the nature and direction of the relationships between population mobility, transport improvement and social and economic change in Indonesia and research directed toward their elucidation must be a major priority.
Part E
Employment and mobility: policy issues
Key issues for development planners are the need to optimize rural employment patterns at a time of rapid economic change, and to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs of the rural-urban flow of labour. A paradox to be resolved is the apparent juxtaposition of widespread underutilization of labour in rural areas and evidence of various kinds of rural labour shortages. There are few hard data on which to base judgment. Jones and Ward review the evidence for Southeast Asia and the Pacific, discussing the impact of technical change on the rural workforce, widening education in its broadest sense, changing aspirations of the young and, for many Pacific islanders, opportunities for long or short term international migration.

Another key issue for governments is what are the most effective policy instruments to lessen disparities between regions, of which internal migration is a symptom. Chan discusses Malaysian experiences in dealing with this problem, which has not only spatial political connotations but ethnic ones as well, since economically disadvantaged Malays tend to be spatially and sectionally concentrated in low productivity areas and occupations. The influence of government can be large, sometimes by intention, sometimes as a repercussion of measures not specifically directed at migration. Malaysian government action has proven fairly successful so far, and has ranged from land settlement schemes and integrated rural development, to the provision of industrial estates and establishment of guidelines for promotion of private industry.
Chapter 16

Rural labour shortages in Southeast Asia and the Pacific: a review of the evidence

G.W. Jones and R. Gerard Ward

This paper has its origin in rather vague, non-quantitative impressions held by the authors that rural labour shortages are quite widespread in their regions of interest, and that these shortages are closely related to population mobility. In both Southeast Asia and the Pacific islands national development plans and economic reports tend to stress shortages of skilled and surpluses of unskilled labour. Yet, with surprising frequency, references can be found to shortages of rural workers in a variety of development situations. Clearly, migration is not serving as the equilibrating mechanism which employment models would imply - at least not in any simple, clear-cut manner. This paper is an attempt to analyse the evidence for labour shortages more systematically than is usually the case and to draw together some of the links between mobility patterns and rural labour.

The countries of Southeast Asia and the Pacific have, on the whole, experienced fairly rapid rates of economic growth during the past two decades. While hardly to be compared with the spectacular growth of the Northeast Asian economies (Japan, Hong Kong, Republic of Korea and Taiwan), the ASEAN countries, with the sole exception of the Philippines, easily out-performed Australia, the United States and Britain in real growth rates of total GDP and GDP per capita. The other ASEAN and South Pacific countries are now middle-income developing countries, although Indonesia and some of the tinier South Pacific nations remain very poor. Just as Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea each became a 'second generation' Japan through strong specialization in the export of labour-intensive manufactures, it is sometimes argued that the ASEAN countries are set to become a 'third generation' Japan (Garnaut and Anderson 1979:25).

Growth rates of this order of magnitude have created many new job opportunities and sectoral shifts in the distribution of the workforce, with consequences for mobility arising both from geographic localization of new job opportunities and from new patterns of expectations. High levels of unemployment have not
become an entrenched problem as they have in countries such as Sri Lanka and India. Even so, there is no cause for complacency about levels of labour utilization. Measured rates of unemployment are merely the tip of the iceberg in economies characterized by a symbiotic relationship between rural peasants (both smallholders and the landless) and periodic migrants to informal sector activities in urban areas, and by the importance of family enterprise even among the settled urban proletariat. Much of Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines can be so categorized, as can parts of Malaysia (e.g. the Kelantan delta).

The evidence on labour supply and demand balances in the region, both aggregate and specialized, is contradictory. In the next section we will review evidence of labour surpluses and later take up contrasting evidence of shortages.

Evidence of labour surplus

Southeast Asia. In parts of Southeast Asia, measured rates of unemployment are very low. This is the case in Singapore where foreign labour was actively sought to redress labour shortages in the early 1970s and is still actively sought in certain categories of skilled workers (Pang 1979). Singapore is exceptional in many ways, but in Thailand, measured unemployment rates are also very low,¹ and there is not much evidence of a trend. In Malaysia, unemployment rates have fallen with successful land settlement programs and aggressive industrialization, but they remain at over 6 per cent overall (compared with 7.4 per cent in 1970) and are as high as 11 per cent among the Indian workforce (Malaysia 1979: ch. 4; Malaysia 1976:143). In the Philippines, measured rates of open unemployment during the 1960s and early 1970s fluctuated between 5 and 10 per cent, but on the whole they exhibited a stable or slightly declining trend (ILO 1974:5). In Indonesia, the data on unemployment are not good enough to detect trends (Jones 1980) but levels of unemployment in the cities are in the 7-15 per cent range and there is ongoing and massive underutilization of labour in the sense that a substantial section of the labour force struggles to find subsistence through activities yielding extremely low returns per hour worked (Jones and Supraptilah 1976; Moir et al. 1977). Equally, recent changes in the organization of rural labour may be seen as attempts by employers to escape established traditions of mass participation in key agricultural activities by the local workforce.²

¹Below 2 per cent – even in the Bangkok metropolitan area – when measured by censuses and surveys.

²An adaptation in Javanese agriculture is substitution of a contract labour system (tebasan) for the old bawon system where very large numbers of local workers harvested the crop. This change seems to be due to the need of farmers to deal with the problem of social control of a vast potential workforce (Hayami and Hafid 1979; Stoler 1977).
The economic and social planner is concerned as much with the structure of unemployment as with rates of unemployment *per se* — for example its incidence by age and sex, by education and by geographic region. Great diversity can be found within the region, but as a broad generalization it can be said that measured unemployment is much higher among young people of both sexes in age groups 15-24, among the high school and college educated and especially the young high school and college educated; and among particular ethnic groups (notably Indians in Malaysia) and geographic regions (e.g. West Java in Indonesia). More general studies of underutilization of labour in the region show that not only in respect of open unemployment but also in respect of short working hours and low returns per hour worked the young are the most affected.

Recent studies have focused on a variety of measures of underutilization of labour — involuntary short working hours, low income, and mismatch of education and occupation — as well as on open unemployment. The cut-off points for defining labour as 'underutilized' according to these measures are arbitrary, and the wide range in the proportion of the labour force shown to be underutilized in countries of Southeast and East Asia — from 12 per cent to above 50 per cent (Smith and Domingo 1976; Hauser 1977; Cheong and Kok 1979; Redmana et al. 1977) — derives mainly from short working hours where motivation to work longer is not closely investigated, or from incomes lying below the arbitrary cut-off point. If these studies are telling us merely that labour productivity is low and that many workers will trade off poor levels of work-obtained income for leisure or non-money earning activities, they are describing underdevelopment rather than presenting an analysis pregnant with policy implications.

Yet there is no doubting the need for studies which alert us to elements of the labour market which census- and survey-based measures of unemployment do not. The very low measured rates of unemployment in Thailand hardly prepare us for the situation portrayed by other kinds of evidence. Underutilization of labour in vast areas of the Central Plains, the Korat Plateau and the north is suggested by the persistent patterns of migration from these regions to the 'frontier' agricultural areas such as Udorn-Nong Khai, Petchabun-Loei and Kamphaeng Phet (see ESCAP 1976: ch.2; Ng 1969; Lauro 1979b:87-94, 191-208), patterns which appear also to be stimulated by the increasing level of tenancy and of landlessness in these regions. Off-season idleness is typical in mono-cropping villages in the north and northeast (Fuhs and Vingerhoets 1972:16). Stagnation of real wages of agricultural labour (and urban unskilled labour) since the 1960s (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 December 1978:43), despite impressive growth of per capita GNP,\(^3\) indicates that the Thai economy

\(^{3}\)4.5 per cent per annum in real terms, 1960-76 (World Bank 1978: 76).
has failed to draw enough of the rural poor into higher-productivity industries to deplete the pool of underutilized labour.

The Pacific. Few reliable data exist on unemployment in the Pacific islands region. Not only are there serious problems of defining unemployment in situations in which much economic activity takes place outside the monetary sector, but, even where some satisfactory definition can be devised, the statistics are rarely collected systematically.

Probably the most informative statistics on 'unemployment' available anywhere in the Pacific islands are those produced in the course of the 1973-74 urban household survey in Papua New Guinea (Garnaut, Wright and Curtain 1977:40-1). This survey categorized respondents not only in terms of those 'seeking wage employment' (a category analogous to that used to indicate 'unemployment' in the census) but also of those who would like a job but were not actively seeking one, and those who were voluntarily unemployed, for example as visitors. A key conclusion in this study was that the 'proportion of the population that appeared to be involuntarily unemployed and trapped in town was very low in most urban areas' (Garnaut et al. 1977:58). This seems to be a typical situation elsewhere in the Pacific where 'the vast majority of the labour force do not sell their labour to others on a regular basis' (Sevele 1979:13) and where, in theory at least, the majority still have ties which would enable them to return to a rural area and a basically subsistence life if they so wished. One of the key elements of the apparent paradox of rural labour shortages co-existing with a degree of (urban) unemployment and an outflow of job-seeking migrants from rural areas lies in this situation.

It is clear from a number of studies that Oceanic root-crop horticulture using simple tools, in combination with pig rearing and fishing, can provide a high level of dietary requirements (and other basic necessities) in return for relatively low labour inputs. The high return to labour of subsistence horticulture, an important contributor to the 'subsistence affluence' described by Fisk (1971), means that for many Pacific islanders the opportunity cost in total welfare terms of a shift into rural wage labour or cash cropping may be very high. That this has not always been recognized is a function of defects in the methods often used to value (or undervalue) subsistence output as much as a representation of reality. We suspect that this situation may also apply in parts of Southeast Asia to a greater extent than is sometimes recognized, particularly in well-favoured areas of lower population density where house-gardens (pekarangan in Indonesia; dusun in Malaysia) play an important role.

This brief survey of the evidence of labour utilization indicates that, on the whole, the Southeast Asian and Pacific region is not characterized by exceptionally high levels of overt
unemployment. It is, however, characterized by periods of enforced idleness for many, by long hours of work for meagre returns for others, by incomes vastly below the top 20 per cent of income earners for most, and by growing aspirations among the young, who are both better educated than their parents and more exposed to media-borne alternative role models.

Economic dualism and labour mobility

What does neo-classical economic theory lead us to expect of the labour supply and demand situation, and the role of migration as an equilibrating mechanism, in middle-income developing countries? The dualistic model of development of a labour-surplus economy popularized by Lewis (1954) and Fei and Ranis (1964) shows agricultural wage levels being held down, despite the absorption of growing numbers of workers by the 'industrial' sector at a marginally higher wage, until the point is reached at which the pool of surplus labour in the 'agricultural' sector begins to be depleted. After this, further absorption of labour into the 'industrial' sector can be achieved only at the expense (to the employer) of rising real wages which the workers, in their newfound position of strength as a scarce factor of production, can bargain. In Marxist terminology, this is the point at which the labour power of the industrial reserve army can no longer be as readily appropriated by the capitalists as 'surplus value' for further capital accumulation and profit.

Interpreted in the crudest way possible, this model implies, provided that the supply of labour is perfectly elastic at current wage rates, that labour shortages will not occur in economies whose markets for the factors of production are characterized by a general situation of labour surplus. The model notably lacked a spatial dimension, but given that 'industrial sector' developments were likely to be highly localized, it implicitly assigned migration a key role as the equilibrating mechanism. The real world, however, is not as simple as this, and institutional rigidities, imperfect knowledge, vulnerability of expatriate firms to various kinds of pressures, customary rigidities in the sexual division of labour, age, sex and educational selectivity in migration flows, reluctance of settled village people to leave their home area and other factors, may lead to rising real wages in certain firms or industries and to localized difficulties of recruiting labour in a situation of generalized labour surplus. The Todaro model of labour migration (Todaro 1969, 1976) developed in various ways by Fields (1975) and Steel and Takagi (1976) brings us somewhat closer to reality, in arguing that migration proceeds primarily in response to differences in 'expected' urban and rural real incomes, though it does not accommodate very well risk-minimization strategies of poor rural families or the spectrum of mobility options which do not involve permanent migration.
Evidence of labour shortages

As noted above, underutilization of labour remains a serious concern of planners in Southeast Asian and Pacific countries, who have found that respectable rates of overall economic growth do not eliminate unemployment and underemployment when faced with the twin problems of rapidly-growing labour force and labour-displacing technological change. Yet, paradoxically, it is widespread evidence of certain kinds of labour shortages in Southeast Asia and the Pacific that has stimulated us to write this paper. In this section we will present evidence from particular countries and situations, and in the following section we will attempt to find common features and possible explanations.

The Pacific. The evidence for rural labour shortages in the Pacific islands is fragmentary but widespread. In the general absence of explicit figures, indirect statistical evidence lies in data on age structure, sex ratios and dependency ratios. As a direct result of outmigration, which is usually age and sex specific, many communities in parts of the rural Pacific now have markedly distorted age structures.

For example, in the Northern Group of the Cook Islands in 1976, 30.2 per cent of the male population and 37.2 per cent of females were in the age range 15 to 54. In 1956 the comparable figures had been 48.8 and 47.1 per cent respectively (Cook Islands: Statistics Office n.d.:28). Dependency ratios for the Northern Group rose from 135.1 to 157.6 between 1966 and 1976.

In Western Samoa, net outmigration of Western Samoan citizens reached levels of 3,843, 4,090, 2,483 and 1,223 in the years 1973 to 1976 (Western Samoa, Dept. of Economic Development 1977: Table A-6). Given that the country's total population in 1976 was only 151,983, these figures represent very high rates of outmigration by world standards. The dependency ratio in predominantly rural Savai'i rose from 97 in 1951 to 115 in 1976 although in urban Asia the ratio in 1976 was only 80.

Structural changes of a similar type were also occurring in rural areas of Fiji in the two decades after the 1956 census. In the eastern provinces of Cakaudrove, Lomaiviti and Lau the proportion of population in the economically active age groups fell between 1956 and 1966 and, although falling birthrates after the mid-1960s tended to mask the impact on dependency ratios, the relative depletion of the working age groups has continued and is

4Though they are eclipsed by the case of the Cook Islands where net emigration over the years 1972-74 of 4,004 was equivalent to the loss of 19 per cent of the 1972 mid-year population (Cook Islands Statistics Office 1977:18).
marked (especially on the male side) in the population pyramids of many of the islands (UNESCO/UNFPA 1977:104-5).

In Papua New Guinea a similar situation exists in many rural areas. For many years the administration sought to limit the proportion of adult males between the ages of 15 and 44 who were absent from their villages on contract labour, the supposed limit usually being 30 per cent. Once engagement as a contract labourer ceased to be the principal form of outmigration from rural villages, this control could no longer be applied and, in the late 1960s, in many parts of the country, over 40 per cent of the adult males (aged 15-44) were absent from their 'home villages' (Ward 1971). We lack comparable data for the Solomon Islands and the New Hebrides but there is evidence that rather similar (if less extreme) trends are also evident there. In the French territories migration to the urban centres of Noumea and Papeete has been dramatic with similar impacts on rural age structures.

The unbalanced age and sex structures of the residual rural populations have led to pressures on the remaining workforce in the mixed subsistence-cash crop sector. For many decades these and other pressures have been met by strategies leading to a general disintensification of agriculture (Brookfield 1972). The crop range has been reduced, the more labour demanding crops abandoned, new less demanding crops adopted, and many techniques of cultivation and processing allowed to fall into disuse (Ward 1964:487-9). The often rigid sexual division of labour has exacerbated the situation (Hau'ofa and Ward 1980:53-4; Morauta in this volume).

Since the mid-1950s evidence that labour shortages have begun to affect cash crop production has mounted. On Mangaia (Cook Islands), 'twenty years of selective emigration ... has had many secondary effects ... [including] an obvious shortage of labour during peak agricultural production periods, such as the summer pineapple harvest, a subsequent inability to cultivate more than one major exportable cash crop, a difficulty in maintaining a balance between food cultivation and cash cropping ...' (Allen 1969b:43). Food shortages in Western Samoa in the late 1960s have been ascribed in part to the fact that 'the working population in the traditional economy (village agriculture) is declining absolutely and relative to the monetary economy' (Leung Wai 1975:4). Pirie (1970:503) also points to shortages of labour in village agriculture in Western Samoa, and the country's 1980 budget statement states that a fall in copra production in 1978 was partly due to labour shortage stemming from 'a shift of agriculture labour to infrastructure projects' (Western Samoa, Minister of Finance 1979:3). A similar situation is reported in Fiji in the area around the Namosi copper mine project. 'By taking men from the village, the gardens were neglected, so that not only was there no produce for market, but also a severe shortage for local consumption' (Pacific Islands Monthly, 51(1), January 1980:30).
Papua New Guinea provides a range of examples in which rather similar effects of outmigration on village agriculture can be documented. In addition the plantation sector has also experienced labour shortages over the last decade. A survey of coffee plantations in the Highlands in 1969 showed that 80 per cent of planters canvassed expected labour shortages 'for picking during the next few years' (PNG Dept. of Labour 1970:20). The Board of Inquiry which investigated rural minimum wages argued that shortage of labour was one of the 'good economic reasons for increasing the minimum wage paid to rural workers' (Cochrane et al. 1970:53) and reported that the three major plantation companies had 'in recent months' experienced 'shortages affecting all plantation areas' (ibid.:104) - though the companies did not advocate a rise in wages as a cure for the problem!

Southeast Asia: Malaysia. In Malaysia, growing employment opportunities in export-oriented and relatively labour-intensive manufacturing industries, as well as in Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) and other land settlement schemes, appear to be keeping ahead of the burgeoning labour force (despite the fact that many of the factory jobs are going to women who are entering the urban labour force in unprecedented numbers) and unemployment rates are therefore tending to decline. Nevertheless, there are areas where rather severe underutilization of labour is endemic — at least in the off-season — notably the densely-populated padi growing areas of Kelantan and Kedah-Perlis and east coast fishing villages affected by motorization of fishing boats and competition from foreign trawlers. Unemployment is also high among Indians owing not only to the tendency for many estates to convert from rubber to less labour-intensive oil palm, and to the laws introduced by the Malaysian Government in 1970 preventing non-citizens from finding wage employment, but also to the 'dead-end' nature of Tamil-language primary education which is all that is available on many of the estates.

Yet despite the existence of these pools of underutilized labour, problems of 'labour shortage' are frequently bemoaned in Malaysia. Tun Tan Siew Sin, Chairman of Sime Darby Plantations and former Minister of Finance, said recently that the plantation industry may be crippled if young people continue to migrate to town for white-collar jobs. 'We could be faced with large areas of oil palms which cannot be harvested and areas of rubber which cannot be tapped in the future', he said, suggesting as a partial solution that more machines be devised (including a mechanical tapping knife and a mechanical harvesting pole) for use in rubber and oil palm estates (Star, 3 December 1979; New Straits Times, 17 December 1979). In the poor east coast state of Trengganu, where idle youths spend their time in the coffee shops in the small coastal towns, officials of the Ketengah project (a large regional development project including land settlement and the creation of new towns in the interior of the state) have enormous difficulty
in recruiting and holding workers in land clearance and other operations. In Kelantan, massive outmigration to other states as well as to Singapore and Jeddah is said to be having adverse effects on agriculture and on development projects. The State Assemblyman for Machang recently stated that 'young people in the kampungs are no longer interested to work in padi fields and are more keen on factory jobs'. The exodus was affecting the $76 million Gua Musang development project. Even rubber estates were finding it difficult to hold on to labour, and estates had to offer better wages to keep workers (Business Times, May 1980).

Southeast Asia: Thailand. As noted earlier, Thailand has been characterized by movement of labour away from the densely settled Chao Phaya lowlands, the single-cropped northeastern uplands, and the densely-settled valleys of the north to frontier regions where land has still been available and demand for labour strong. In some of these areas, immigrants could not move into land ownership, so most became landless labourers. Patterns of off-season migration away from mono-cropped areas of the northeast have developed, which maintain the labour supply needed at times of peak demand.

In the fertile valleys of north Thailand, rather different patterns have developed, with dynamic agricultural development characterized by increased double- and triple-cropping and diversification of crops grown. Seasonal labour shortages, and rapidly-increasing work opportunities for women in tobacco processing and other industries, have led to the rapidly growing employment of women, aided by the sharply falling birthrate and the desire to raise household income. The falling birthrate, together with expansion of education and rising aspirations, could be leading to problems in attracting enough of the new generation into agriculture to avoid labour shortages. A sufficient pool of potential workers exists in other regions to fill anticipated labour needs, though this could lead to cultural conflicts if they moved to the north, even seasonally, in large numbers.\footnote{In neighbouring Burma, the colonial tradition of filling seasonal labour needs by teams of seasonal workers from India was halted by government policy after independence, and such labour needs must now be filled mainly by local casual labour, mainly young people and women.}

In general, such problems of rural labour shortage as exist in Thailand do not appear to match those in Malaysia, probably largely because the pace of agricultural and educational change is not as rapid and because the labour market is not as segmented by ethnic considerations as in Malaysia.

Southeast Asia: Indonesia. Indonesia, particularly Java, would appear to be the example \textit{par excellence} of labour-surplus,
and evidence of labour displacement in rural activities such as the cultivation, harvesting, pounding and hulling of rice, appears to strengthen the argument that labour is very much in surplus in rural Java. And yet Indonesian newspapers in 1977 ran many reports of 'shortages of labour' in Javanese agriculture. In one case it was reported that 700,000 ha of sawah in West Java had gone uncultivated because of labour shortage. 'One reason often cited for such labour shortage is that potential entrants into the agricultural labour force, particularly those who have gone beyond primary-school education, are unwilling to become agricultural labourers' (White 1977:2).

One suspects some exaggeration in these newspaper reports. Shortages of water, rather than of labour, may have been responsible for non-cultivation; the shortages noted may be largely seasonal; and at any time and in any place the judgment on whether labour is in shortage or in surplus depends mainly on the stake of the respondent in the labour market. White notes that the Agro-Economic Survey's Rural Dynamics Project found that in the Cimanuk River Basin in West Java 'farmers complain that it is getting harder to find labour, and labourers complain it is getting harder to find work' (1977:2). In general, the evidence for labour shortages in Javanese agriculture suggests only seasonal and localized shortages.

Introduction of padi tractors in many parts of Java and Bali would suggest a shortage of agricultural labour in the areas concerned, but it has been shown that sawah cultivation by rented tractor is cheaper than traditional methods of animal and human labour only because of indirect subsidies provided to tractor owners in forms such as very low interest bank loans, overvalued exchange rates and low import duties on tractors (Sinaga 1977, 1978). Sinaga disputes the claim in an earlier report (Indonesia, Departemen Pertanian 1976) that labour is short in sawah areas of Bali because workers are moving to nearby towns in search of higher-paid, easier and non-seasonal work, mainly in the services sector. More generally, growing labour shortage would, one would expect, result in a steady rise in real wages for agricultural labour, but this does not appear to have happened (World Bank 1979:42-7).

Nevertheless, it must be recognized that for double- and triple-cropping, timeliness of sequential operations is crucial, and a seasonal labour shortage can effectively block the growing of a crop which could have provided much-needed slack-season employment. In the densely populated Karawang-Indramayu area of West Java, labour for land tilling prior to planting the dry season padi crop is difficult to find as a result of overlapping demand for labour for harvesting the wet season crop, and this has been used to justify the need for power tillers (Rijk 1979:9-10). A similar case has been made by Judd (1973:164-6) for the use of portable threshing machines for processing the wet-season rice crop in the Central Plain of Thailand, and by Barlow (1980:15) for wet seeding planting practices and machine threshing in Iloilo, Philippines.
In both cases, the argument is that these labour-saving adaptations save time and increase the likelihood of success with the off-season rice crop. By institutionalizing double-cropping, they will in fact lead to greater total labour use, and a more even spread of labour requirements.

The varieties of 'labour shortage'

In a sense, three different 'worlds' emerge from this discussion – the worlds of Malaysia, Java and the Pacific – and it is foolhardy to discuss them all in the one paper. Yet some general points do emerge from these diverse case studies. A first, perhaps obvious, point is that there is no such thing as an absolute labour shortage. What is observed is that workers are not making themselves available for a particular job in a particular place at a certain wage rate and with certain working conditions. The fact that a 45-year-old Trengganu fisherman, displaced by modern trawlers which require a crew of eight as against the old payang team of twenty-five, is loath to move inland and learn to work as a rubber tapper should hardly surprise us. Nor should it surprise us if a young man of 17 or 18 in the same village, a year out of high school and (as is traditional for his age group) under little pressure from his parents to find a job, is loath to do hard and dirty work in land clearance, for an unattractively low wage, in a place where girls are few and wild animals reputed to be plenty. His neighbour, a 30-year-old man with a wife and two young children to support, has just left on the overnight bus for Singapore, where he will work for three months and accumulate savings that his fisherman father would be lucky to get together in three years.

Comparable points could be made with reference to Tonga or Samoa. Educational levels are high, jobs adequately rewarding high educational status are few, and the chance of earning good money and 'seeing the world' by moving to New Zealand for a time is a tempting alternative to the limited fare at the local job smorgasbord.

We might attempt to classify labour shortages into a variety of categories:

**Seasonal labour shortage.** Seasonal shortages of labour are endemic in padi growing areas such as Kedah (Purcal 1971). They arise from wide seasonal variations in labour requirements in padi cultivation and imperfect mobility of labour, even though seasonal movement of Kelantanese labour to Kedah via southern Thailand is a long-established pattern. In this situation, ready availability of labour at harvest time would imply a massive labour surplus in the slack season. The extent of the seasonal shortage depends on the efficiency of the mechanisms for bringing back absentees from the village and others (e.g. migratory labour gangs) when needed seasonally. In the highlands of Papua New Guinea, seasonal labour shortages may appear at the time of the peak coffee harvest.
Shortages as defined by the employer. Where employers cannot readily find labour at the wages they are accustomed to pay, they are likely to argue 'labour shortage', even though in inflationary times money wages must clearly rise to maintain a constant subsistence 'floor'.

Labour shortages due to institutional rigidities and inadequate information. For example, in new regional development schemes imperfect information is available to potential workers about job opportunities, public transport to the work site is not available and accommodation at the work site is inadequate.

Labour shortages due to uneven regional development. Where a backward region is bypassed by development, and other attractions are available elsewhere, including jobs at much higher wage rates, then people are induced to move to the area of perceived economic opportunity. The estimated 40,000 to 60,000 Kelantanese workers in Singapore, almost all of them males, are a case in point. This outflow can create labour shortages in the source area.

Labour shortages induced by education or changing aspirations. Where education and the media have instilled expectations and priorities which cannot be met by locally-available job opportunities, educated young people are likely to migrate out or choose idleness rather than take work perceived to be demeaning. The process is facilitated in cases where children must move to town for their high school education; such children rarely return permanently to their village.

A striking, though as yet unstudied example, is provided by American Samoa, where television has been extensively used as a principal means of instruction in schools, and is also ubiquitously available in villages, with its content almost entirely derived from mainland USA. Its role in inculcating aspirations which can only be fulfilled by migration would appear to be very important.

Labour shortages caused by self-justifying technological adaptations. Self-justifying technological adaptations based on a real or supposed labour shortage lower the demand for labour and lead to outmigration of labour which triggers further labour-saving adaptations in response to further evidence of labour shortage (Connell et al. 1976:146; Corner in this volume, p.136). They may be perfectly logical adaptations in cases where a small increase in wages (due to labour shortages or the strength of unions in the plantation sector) tips the balance toward mechanization of some formerly labour-intensive operations. Other adaptations may be in the form of a shift in cropping pattern, or less labour-intensive planting, cultivation and harvesting practices with traditional crops.

These six categories of labour shortage are not mutually exclusive, and any particular case of labour shortage is likely
to contain elements of two or more of them. Conventions regarding the sexual division of labour add further rigidities which do not yield readily to market forces.

We might look at it in a slightly different way, and attempt to categorize the major kinds of alternatives to engaging in rural wage labour:

1. **Family farming of the owned or tenanted smallholding** — growing rice or other food crops partly for subsistence, partly for the market. Some family members may engage in wage labour seasonally, others may produce handicrafts, engage in trade etc. Wage labour is optional unless family income is very low.

2. **Subsistence horticulture in Oceania, reliance on house gardens in parts of Southeast Asia**, using techniques yielding high returns/labour. Working hours probably low, but incentive to engage in wage labour also low unless 'consumerism' has taken hold.

3. **Doing nothing** — an option for educated young men and for men above middle age. In the Indonesian census (1971) 15 per cent of young Javanese men aged 15-19 were not in school, or housekeeping, or working, or looking for work. (The comparable proportion in Malaysia in 1970 was not shown in published tabulations but Jones found it to be high on fieldwork in the 1960s.) This is not just a reflection of poor interviewing. Many of these young men appear to be doing exactly what they claim — that is, nothing. In parts of the Pacific, young unmarried males customarily enjoy a similar period of limited responsibility and sanctioned idleness. Girls are not as indulged. They must help with the housework, and, in any case, they marry much younger.

4. **Seeking opportunities not available at 'home', such as urban employment**, lured by the substantial rural-urban differentials in wages and in opportunities to 'escape' from traditional social controls, obligations, or simply from the dullness of 'nothing to do' in the village.

5. **Seeking employment abroad where there is relatively open access to foreign labour markets**. Thus the Middle East lures workers from all Southeast Asian countries, Singapore from Malaysia and Indonesia, and New Zealand from the Cook Islands, Tonga and Western Samoa. The motivation is much as in (4).

6. **Seeking educational advancement in the town**, probably with a view to subsequent urban-based employment and, even if not, probably with that result.
Clearly, the wage needed to attract rural labour in rural areas will vary directly with the degree to which these six alternatives are viable and attractive options.

Discussion

If the processes portrayed in standard employment models were in fact operating, wage rates (or returns in general) in rural areas would rise to the point at which the outflow of working age people would be stemmed, and ultimately the flow reversed until equilibrium between urban and rural labour demand and wage levels approached a balance. This has not happened. A variety of reasons need to be embodied in any explanation, with their relative importance varying considerably from place to place.

We have already noted that one of the features of Pacific island non-monetary subsistence systems is their high return per unit of labour input, even with simple technology and low capital inputs. In this situation in rural areas, limited changes are offered through wage employment or greater income arising from labour devoted to cash cropping. Lack of ready access to services, including varied retail outlets, often reduces the utility of money to a significant degree. The rural lifestyle with a higher cash income may not differ greatly from that with a lower cash income, given the broad support provided by the non-monetary component of the economy. Factors other than simple wage rates appear to be behind the rural-urban drift (Strathern 1975).

In Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands (and elsewhere in the region at various times) plantation agriculture has depended primarily on contract labour. Wage rates have been kept relatively low as much of the cost of reproduction of the labour force has been carried by the village where dependants have remained (Rowley 1966:104). On the other hand urban wage rates have been less constrained so that urban-rural wage differentials have been marked. This disparity has been maintained. In Fiji in 1975, for example, plantation workers in Taveuni averaged $F2.92 per day, approximately half the rate earned by the urban industrial wage earner (UNESCO/UNFPA 1977:34). In Papua New Guinea in 1970, the minimum cash wage in Port Moresby was $A7 per week while the average value of cash and kind payments which made up the rural equivalent was $A4.45 (Isaac 1970:8-9). Given that only $A1 of this was in cash, the discretionary income of the rural agreement worker was far below that of the urban worker. Although the payment in kind has gone and the Papua New Guinea Government sought to reduce the differential through the 1970s, the urban-rural differential still remains significant in both monetary and utility terms. In the Solomon Islands it has been suggested that the 'average rural per capita cash income would be about one quarter or less of the average in
the urban wage sector' (Sevele 1979:29).6

When wage or income differentials of this order are combined with the relatively favourable non-monetary returns obtainable through subsistence cultivation where land resources are adequate, it cannot be surprising that we find rural labour shortages coexisting with steady outmigration from those same rural areas. Of a person's three alternatives, rural wage labour, local subsistence activity, or urban wage labour, the first does not compare in returns with either of the others, although there is no standard metric (or 'exchange rate') by which the differentials can be measured.

In the case of countries like the Cook Islands, Niue, Western Samoa, American Samoa, Tonga and Malaysia, a further dimension is added by the relatively free access which their citizens have had to employment in other countries. Cook Islanders and Niueans hold New Zealand citizenship and the right of access to that country; American Samoans have access as of right (and Western Samoans and Tongans relatively easy access) to the USA; and Malaysians have been able to move relatively freely to jobs in Singapore. For the villager in such countries seeking a cash income, the opportunities include not only local cash cropping or agricultural labour, but an urban job in his own or another country. Not only are wages higher in the latter two cases, but job and social security is usually much greater. Given the size of rural land holdings usually available, the uncertainty of agricultural commodity prices, and the downright hard labour of commercial farming (absolutely or relative to subsistence horticulture), the preference for non-agricultural employment, and the patterns of mobility and apparently anomalous labour shortages it produces, are quite understandable.

The problem remains, why have rural cash wages not risen sufficiently to create other forms of mobility to establish the expected equilibrium?

In a rapidly developing economy such as that of Malaysia, labour shortages in some rural areas can be considered a normal feature of the dynamics of development, reflecting the spatial dimensions of the process by which the economy's centre of gravity is shifted from low-productivity to high-productivity industries which are in a position to pay higher wages or yield higher returns to the workers engaged in them. But it would be an unjustifiably sanguine view to leave it at that. Outmigration may cause

6Similar differentials are observed in Southeast Asia. For example in Thailand, daily wage rates for unskilled labour in non-agriculture (mostly urban) employment in 1972 ranged from Bt.16.1 in construction to Bt.34.8 in services; by contrast, agricultural wage rates were Bt.11.5 in the central region, and Bt.9 in the north and northeast (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 December 1978:44).
considerable distress because (at the level of the industry or the district) structural adjustment is not easy and (at the level of the family and the neighbourhood) movement elsewhere of family members may lower the welfare of those who remain, even if it succeeds in raising the welfare of those who leave. The private costs borne by the migrant may not reflect the social costs to his place of origin.\(^7\) Not only in Kelantan, but also in West Coast areas with high outmigration rates, such as Perak and West Johore, it is argued, villages are left further behind by the loss of their young, educated and most dynamic residents (Lim 1980:15).

In Malaysia the problems are exacerbated by wide regional disparities in income levels but (owing partly to the ubiquitous TV?) probably narrower differences in desires and expectations; by an academically oriented educational system which produces school-leavers with job expectations sharply at variance with locally-available employment; by ethnic quotas in education and employment which distort allocation of resources and instil unrealistic expectations among the Malays;\(^8\) by the accessibility of Singapore with its high levels of living and well-paid jobs; and by the attitudes of parents to educated youths, which appear to be that they can certainly not be expected to work in blue collar or 'dirty' work or indeed in any work at all for a period after leaving school. No doubt largely as a result of these factors, there was a five-year period in the mid-1960s when the number of unemployed with ten or more years of education nearly trebled (Malaysia 1971:100) though the unemployment rate for secondary-educated youth appears to have declined somewhat since then (Malaysia 1976:26, 141).

Edwards and Todaro (1974) argue that education systems in many third world countries have been expanded beyond the appropriate level because of a number of rigidities. In brief, employment opportunities in the modern sector are artificially restricted,\(^9\)

---

\(^7\)After a review of available studies, Lipton (1980:15) claims that 'the migrant on average gains from migration, but the village he leaves behind loses'.

\(^8\)Malaysia's educational planners have been attempting to orient secondary and higher education away from the prevailing liberal arts emphasis (Malaysia 1976:70) but fee discrimination and ethnic quotas favouring Malays have worked in the opposite direction, since Malays have been more prone than the other races to seek liberal arts education (Rudner 1977:84-7).

\(^9\)These restrictions are caused by factor price distortions, borrowing of technologies from countries where labour is a scarce resource, inflation of educational requirements in job specifications, and lowered investment in employment-creating areas because of diversion of too much investment into education.
leading to a wide wage differential between the traditional sector and a limited number of modern-sector jobs. They argue that the demand for education does not, as it is often argued, contain a large consumption component, but is rather a demand 'derived' from high-income employment opportunities in the modern sector. Education is seen as a 'passport for entry into the modern, urban, industrialized economy with its disproportionately high-paying employment opportunities' (1974:316). This perception is justified, because education is the main screening device into most modern-sector jobs, and in fact job specifications exaggerate the amount of education required for particular jobs, partly in emulation of advanced-country standards and partly because setting high educational standards becomes a convenient rationing mechanism for scarce jobs when the education system is itself overproducing.10

Even though levels of educated unemployment are now high, continuing high private demand for education is not irrational, partly because there is a perception lag and decisions are still influenced by the success of predecessors in the system in finding well-paid jobs in the days when shortage of well-trained people was still acute, and partly because the absolute requirement of a certain education level for most reasonably-paying jobs, married to a certain dose of optimism, leaves no alternative to the ambitious to pursue education as far as possible. Moreover, private costs of education by no means reflect the full social cost, because there is a large element of government subsidy of education. Thus private cost-benefit calculus can diverge significantly from social cost-benefit calculus, implying substantial misallocation of public resources.

Despite our disagreement with some of the policy implications Edwards and Todaro draw from their analysis,11 we believe there is much relevance in this analysis for those countries of Southeast Asia and the Pacific (including Philippines, Malaysia, Tonga and Western Samoa) where most children receive at least some high school education. Certainly, it helps to explain the tolerance of lengthy periods of unemployment by the educated, who find it an extremely painful process to recognize that the job for which their education has qualified them is simply not there and that they must adjust their sights downwards. Both the motivation that drove them to extend their education through high school and perhaps

10The educational system has at least subjected students to a series of evaluations, even if they were not directly related to the jobs they were later recruited for. The great weight given to educational qualifications in recruitment is, among other things, a convenient device 'for avoiding the burden of evaluating people in the performance of ill-defined tasks' (Blaug, 1973:65; see also his Chapter 3).

11In particular, their complete neglect of some social benefits of education (e.g. its apparently important role in precipitating a decline in birthrate (Caldwell 1980)) which may justify higher levels of government investment in education than they are willing to support.
beyond, and the content of that education as well, predisposes them to see agricultural work and, indeed, any kind of work with their hands, as demeaning.\textsuperscript{12} Therefore they wait, and hope, and the more dynamic of them seek out the opportunities of the larger cities. In countries with an economic growth rate as high as Malaysia's, modern-sector employment is growing fast enough to keep hopes alive; indeed, the only solid study on rates of returns to education (Hoerr 1975) concluded that secondary education commanded high social, as well as private, returns compared to the opportunity cost of capital, despite the relatively high unemployment rate amongst non-specialized, lower secondary school-leavers (Malaysia 1971:99-100). Moreover, there is always Singapore (and, for the Tongans and Samoans, New Zealand and the US) where, if the streets are not exactly paved with gold, neither do the wages or conditions appear as unrewarding as those back in Tumpat or Upolu.

Among the poorer (sometimes near-destitute) groups in rural Java, somewhat different explanations of labour 'shortage' have to be sought. First, many of the jobs for which labour is scarce are seasonal, and are available at times when work is available locally and it is difficult for people to get away. Second, information systems are imperfect and those who need the work will not always know of the opportunities. Third, very poor rural families will tend to follow a 'survival' strategy of labour allocation, which favours less risky but potentially less remunerative activities except in the unlikely event that they accumulate some savings to fund more risky activities with potentially higher returns (e.g. moving in search of seasonal or city jobs: Hart 1976). Transport is difficult and relatively costly in rural Java, and the very poor simply do not have the savings available to travel to the job opportunities. They may see the risks of not finding work, or of finding well-paid work for only a few weeks, as too great to justify borrowing money to make the trip.

One lesson to emerge from these studies is that, with the possible exception of some parts of rural Java, the inability of employers in certain rural areas to attract labour is not due to geographical immobility of potential workers or to insufficient information. Indeed, it is the reverse. The very youths who are hard to attract into land clearing operations in Trengganu or into copra production in Samoa may think nothing of travelling to another country in search of work (to Singapore or Saudi Arabia and New Zealand or Hawaii, respectively). Corner (in Chapter 5 of this volume) notes the high degree of mobility and good

\textsuperscript{12}This is not to say that changing the content of the education would necessarily make much difference. As an earlier report on African education remarked, 'We feel on the whole that the monetary reward of farming rather than an emphasis in school curricula will determine the future of agriculture' (United Kingdom Colonial Office and Nuffield Foundation 1953:171).
information links between a *kampung* in Kedah and the economically attractive FELDA schemes in Pahang. It is this very geographical mobility and good (but directionally selective) information flow, along with the effect of schooling and the media on young people's attitudes towards different kinds of work, and the evolving attitudes of parents toward what should be expected of or demanded from their children, which constitute the problem for employers offering low-wage work carrying no prestige and involving strenuous physical effort.
Chapter 17

Migration-related policies in Peninsular Malaysia: an evaluation

Paul Chan

The study of migration-related policies as issues in policy analysis and their impact on migration and on the migrants involved is a neglected area of research. This paper examines the limited experiences of Peninsular Malaysia in this field. It focuses primarily on those policies consciously formulated by the government to influence migration or population redistribution, and also on policies designed for another purpose which have direct and indirect migration effects. These policies are evaluated as instruments to achieve population distribution objectives and other demographic or socio-economic goals of the government.

Three principal objectives recur in the Malaysian government's New Economic Policy, albeit given somewhat different stress in successive five-year development plans from 1965. These are the restructuring of the economy to correct imbalances between the rural and urban sectors, the reduction of inequality between the regions, especially by raising living standards in the poorer north, and the reduction and eventual elimination of identification of race with economic function. This last is to be achieved largely by drawing Malays and other indigenous people into modern commercial and industrial activities, through ownership, control or employment at all levels. The Third Malaysia Plan delineates in some detail the approaches and policy measures to be used: namely regional development programs, land development schemes, relocation of industries, urban development programs, integrated rural development projects and so on. All these have implications and influence on future migration trends and patterns in West Malaysia.

Given the multitude of policies and measures which have direct or indirect influence on migration, it is useful to classify them operationally for analysis. The following taxonomy is thus proposed. All policies relating to migration issues are classified into two broad categories: (i) migration-directed policies including those which are actively used to initiate the movement of people such as the sponsored movement of settlers into land
settlement schemes or which are implemented to discourage or to retain potential migrants—for instance, the use of incentives in integrated rural development programs to encourage rural residents not to move out; and (ii) non-migration directed policies which have migration effects. An example is the upgrading of squatter areas in the capital city of Kuala Lumpur, which indirectly stimulates landless urban immigrants who expect to be beneficiaries of such projects together with the original squatters.

It is obvious that this demarcation is not always clear-cut in practice. Indeed a mixture of such policies and effects is normal. However, the following scheme assists later analysis.

**Scheme of migration-related policies and programs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policies and Programs</th>
<th>Migration-directed Movement-oriented</th>
<th>Retention-oriented</th>
<th>Non-migration directed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Regional land development</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Regional industrial decentralization</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Regional growth centres</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Integrated rural development (or <em>in situ</em> development)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Urban redevelopment or restructuring</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Other general socio-economic development</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There has been substantial internal movement of population in Malaysia in the past two decades, partly influenced by migration directed or non-migration directed policies. Internal migration flows have recently been well documented by Pryor (1979). Census data showed that there were nearly a million lifetime interstage migrants in 1970, that is migrants who had moved from their state of birth. Total population at this date was 8.2 million. A lifetime interstate migration matrix is given in Table 17.1. Pryor's analysis of net interstate flows, given in brackets here, showed two large net gainers: Selangor (+199,761), a state which includes Kuala Lumpur and the nearby industrial estate of Petaling Jaya, and Pahang (+65,798), where the major land settlement schemes have been provided. States showing stability, in which outflows roughly balanced inflows, were Trengganu (+5,948)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State of birth (origin)</th>
<th>Joh</th>
<th>Ked</th>
<th>Kel</th>
<th>Mal</th>
<th>Neg</th>
<th>Pah</th>
<th>Pen</th>
<th>Prk</th>
<th>Pls</th>
<th>Sel</th>
<th>Tre</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Johore</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,747</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15,799</td>
<td>14,814</td>
<td>11,929</td>
<td>2,462</td>
<td>6,216</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>30,093</td>
<td>1,636</td>
<td>86,565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kedah</td>
<td>2,983</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,741</td>
<td>1,396</td>
<td>2,221</td>
<td>3,914</td>
<td>37,718</td>
<td>27,162</td>
<td>10,613</td>
<td>15,317</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>103,765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kelantan</td>
<td>2,912</td>
<td>2,735</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,159</td>
<td>1,877</td>
<td>19,876</td>
<td>1,575</td>
<td>3,495</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>9,427</td>
<td>24,118</td>
<td>67,497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malacca</td>
<td>21,895</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>979</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19,073</td>
<td>4,745</td>
<td>1,536</td>
<td>3,522</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>34,701</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>88,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negri S.</td>
<td>13,350</td>
<td>1,329</td>
<td>1,443</td>
<td>13,884</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10,782</td>
<td>1,917</td>
<td>5,621</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>47,347</td>
<td>937</td>
<td>96,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pahang</td>
<td>5,456</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>1,676</td>
<td>1,322</td>
<td>4,064</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,290</td>
<td>4,430</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>17,863</td>
<td>4,214</td>
<td>41,315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penang</td>
<td>4,368</td>
<td>36,302</td>
<td>1,981</td>
<td>1,726</td>
<td>2,738</td>
<td>5,135</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28,413</td>
<td>2,218</td>
<td>27,464</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>111,147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perak</td>
<td>12,977</td>
<td>24,551</td>
<td>3,762</td>
<td>4,790</td>
<td>8,824</td>
<td>19,045</td>
<td>35,788</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,189</td>
<td>106,033</td>
<td>2,031</td>
<td>219,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perlis</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>5,760</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>1,813</td>
<td>2,182</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,538</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>13,241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selangor</td>
<td>12,760</td>
<td>3,392</td>
<td>2,254</td>
<td>7,118</td>
<td>20,545</td>
<td>16,544</td>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>23,194</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,760</td>
<td>94,257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trengganu</td>
<td>4,567</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>3,939</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>14,266</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>1,443</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>4,145</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>31,011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>81,581</td>
<td>78,408</td>
<td>19,669</td>
<td>47,805</td>
<td>75,162</td>
<td>107,113</td>
<td>91,060</td>
<td>105,678</td>
<td>16,317</td>
<td>293,928</td>
<td>36,959</td>
<td>953,680</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 17.1 Lifetime net migration streams, Peninsular Malaysia, 1970.
and Perlis (+3,076). The other seven states were net losers. Two were relatively poor northern states: Kedah (-25,357) and Kelantan (-47,828), in which push factors probably explained net outflows. Push factors also partly explained outflows from Perak (-114,312), where there were problems of unemployment resulting from the closing of tin mines and the lack of viability in some of the 'new villages' established during the emergency of 1957. Pull factors also stimulated movement out of Perak and predominated in the other states, Malacca (-40,325), Negri Sembilan (-21,600), Penang (-20,087) and Johore (-4,984), as opportunities opened up to acquire land and jobs in industrial, commercial or administrative activities in other states.

The general direction of internal migration and the net interstate migration volumes are depicted in Fig. 17.1. One of the characteristics of the migration pattern in the country is the predominance of mobility to contiguous states, which is normally a short distance move. Figure 17.1 also illustrates the larger interaction of the population movement amongst the west coast states.

Pryor also analyses trends in urbanization in the 1957-70 intercensal period and demonstrates that, contrary to expectations of a 'modernizing' economy, there has been little significant change (1979:94-7). The apparent divergence between population growth rates in urban areas of 10,000+ of 3.2 per cent per annum between census dates and the 2.4 per cent established for the remaining 'rural' areas is illusory. He terms this 'statistical' urbanization, in that its main cause is the reclassification in 1970 of gazetted areas which crossed the size threshold utilized in 1957. In fact natural increase appeared to account for 61 per cent of this urban growth, and migration only 18 per cent. Re-classification accounted for the rest. Selangor was the most important state experiencing urban growth from immigration. The evidence suggested that in general urban growth in Peninsular Malaysia was slow. In 1957 about 73 per cent of the population was rural. It did not change much by 1970, partly because of the rural-rural bias of the migration trends which were undoubtedly influenced by the rural development programs.

**Migration-related effects of regional development policy**

Regional development planning influences internal migration and the patterns of population distribution within a country in several ways. For instance, such regional plans could aim to raise real incomes, reduce income differentials between rural-urban areas, promote the use of manpower and natural resources, provide social-economic amenities, modernize rural areas, and create or revitalize urban centres. Various socio-economic locational incentives or disincentives which are directed at the
firm or individual (or the household unit) in order to accomplish such objectives have redistribution impact on population.

Until the Second Malaysia Plan the inchoate ideas of regional development planning were framed in terms of rural development programs aimed at solving the problems of a dualistic economy. Since the Second Malaysia Plan, and particularly in the Third Malaysia Plan and the Mid-Term Review of the Third Malaysia Plan, the role of regional development planning has been better defined.

The pattern of regional disparities in growth and development is shown in Table 17.2. Selangor and Penang are the richest states in terms of per capita GDP. Perlis, Kedah, Trengganu and Kelantan are the poorest. The economic structures of these states also reflect imbalances in the distribution of industries and urban growth centres. Lastly, the poor states have high incidence of poverty. Thus, whereas Selangor has 29 per cent of its households within the poverty group, Kelantan has 76 per cent.

It is noteworthy that there is a relationship between ethnicity and poverty distribution. Thus there appears to be a correlation between the concentration of Malay population (94 per cent in Trengganu, 93 per cent in Kelantan) and the incidence of poverty in certain states. It is this ethnicity-poverty relationship which the New Economic Policy especially seeks to remedy, and which highlights the significant role of regional development planning.

Regional land development. Land development and settlement constitutes one of the most important instruments in the regional development program of Malaysia. There is no doubt that the land development program has successfully contributed to reducing the potential flow of surplus rural labour to the urban areas. The reduction in the rural-urban differentials in income and employment opportunities, and the provision of social-economic facilities in rural areas, have a positive incentive effect on the decision not to migrate. In addition, the generally labour absorptive capacity of smallholding agricultural production, the emotive need for ownership of land, and the availability of land for expansion have all influenced the spatial demographic scenario of the country.

I have dealt with land settlement schemes and their migration impact extensively elsewhere (in a study of West Johore at present in progress), so that only a summary of certain salient points is given here. The program of the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) is an exemplary illustration of the migration effects of land development programs. When FELDA was established in 1956 its principal objectives were to develop land for the landless and unemployed. By 1970 it had developed ninety schemes and resettled about 21,000 families. By 1978 nearly 36,000 settler families were involved. If the average settler household size is 6 (5 dependants and the settler) FELDA has thus moved more than 200,000 people.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector/State</th>
<th>Johore</th>
<th>Kedah/Perlis</th>
<th>Kelantan</th>
<th>Melaka</th>
<th>Negri Sembilan</th>
<th>Pahang</th>
<th>Perak</th>
<th>Pulau Pinang</th>
<th>Selangor</th>
<th>Trengganu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, forestry, livestock and fishing</td>
<td>903.1</td>
<td>581.0</td>
<td>206.8</td>
<td>143.4</td>
<td>337.7</td>
<td>458.2</td>
<td>658.3</td>
<td>168.2</td>
<td>544.3</td>
<td>223.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and quarrying</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>307.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>211.5</td>
<td>57.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>594.7</td>
<td>147.5</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>91.9</td>
<td>166.1</td>
<td>213.5</td>
<td>506.7</td>
<td>480.5</td>
<td>1,782.8</td>
<td>40.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>375.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>995.0</td>
<td>440.8</td>
<td>271.5</td>
<td>368.2</td>
<td>385.6</td>
<td>487.7</td>
<td>1,183.8</td>
<td>1,091.6</td>
<td>3,862.8</td>
<td>190.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Domestic Product (GDP)</td>
<td>2,587.0</td>
<td>1,197.6</td>
<td>531.3</td>
<td>620.0</td>
<td>911.7</td>
<td>1,239.1</td>
<td>2,725.0</td>
<td>1,817.0</td>
<td>6,776.4</td>
<td>528.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita GDP (M$)</td>
<td>1,572.6</td>
<td>900.5</td>
<td>629.5</td>
<td>1,218.1</td>
<td>1,482.4</td>
<td>1,740.3</td>
<td>1,414.1</td>
<td>1,900.6</td>
<td>3,083.0</td>
<td>1,005.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population ('000)</td>
<td>1,645</td>
<td>1,330</td>
<td>844</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>712</td>
<td>1,927</td>
<td>956</td>
<td>2,198</td>
<td>526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malays as % of 1970 population</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>92.8</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>93.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban residents (over 5,000) as % of 1970 population</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of households in poverty (1975)</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>68.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Malaysia (1979).
This does not include the additional labour needed during the initial period of establishing the land schemes, namely the use of migrant casual labour in land clearing, road construction, etc. It was estimated that FELDA was accountable for 6 to 8 per cent of the total migrants in Peninsular Malaysia during the intercensal period 1957-70 (MacAndrews n.d.). The figure must have been higher during 1970-75 period when seventy-seven new land schemes were set up. By 1978 over 260,000 hectares of land had been developed under various government schemes. Of this, FELDA was responsible for 127,000 hectares, having been particularly successful in fulfilling area targets set for it in the Third Malaysia Plan. Nearly 53,000 hectares of FELDA land were developed in Pahang, where two massive integrated schemes were implemented at Jengka Triangle and Pahang Tenggara. Other big projects were in Negri Sembilan and Johore, in each of which total FELDA schemes covered over 24,000 hectares. These three states, which accounted for 80 per cent of FELDA area up to 1978, are all in the medium income bracket. FELDA implemented a tiny 0.3 per cent of its area in high income Selangor, and the remainder roughly equally divided between low income Trengganu, Kedah/Perlis and Kelantan. It should be noted that Kedah and Perlis are in addition land-poor states.

The population redistribution impact of FELDA is not confined to actively sponsoring potential interstate migrants. It also helps to regulate and stabilize rural population movement within state boundaries. Except for the case of Pahang, which depends on migrants from other states and supplies only a third of its schemes' population, the settlers are predominantly from their own states, ranging from 79 per cent in Negri Sembilan to 96 per cent in Kedah. This is mainly explained by the criterion used to choose the settlers, most states requiring a minimum of 50 per cent to be from their own state. It is also due to the preference on the part of migrants to make short-distance moves at the intra-state line. In this manner the FELDA schemes could retain migrants from rural villages within the rural areas. Rural-rural migration is therefore encouraged, and this minimizes rural-urban movement.

FELDA land development schemes are not only an important intervening factor in spontaneous migration; they have also influenced the demographic characteristics of population distribution. In particular, FELDA's selection criteria which stress the young (80 per cent are between 25 and 39 years), the married, those with an agricultural background, landless or owning less than two acres (0.8 ha) of rural land only, and a strong preference for Malays (96 per cent), have chosen people with selected characteristics. At the same time, this implies that villages in rural areas have also lost their young and energetic labour (Chan 1979).

FELDA land development in fact stimulates Malay mobility because of the ethnic-biased selection criterion, and at the same time directs Malay movement back into the rural areas. In terms of spatial demographic distribution, land development strategy thus
creates pockets of Malay settlements and Malay movement within rural areas. The government is not unduly concerned over this. Land development in Malaysia is essentially a political issue, and as long as the land development strategy satisfies the long-term goal of reducing Malay poverty the government will support the policy and program.

It is quite obvious that new land development and settlement, though costly, is politically the most expedient approach to solve the rural employment-cum-land problem. Land reform and changes in the tenure system are rarely, if at all, discussed in official documents and definitely not considered as an effectual instrument for a long time to come. However, the sole dependence on the FELDA type model is inadequate. One of the weaknesses is its inability to solve the employment, income, and land ownership objectives over the life cycle of the settler family, which causes the so-called second generation problem with respect to employment in the land schemes.

The second-generation problem was not given much consideration during the early planning period of the FELDA land schemes. Leaving out the socio-demographic variables in the planning equation and focusing principally on the physical aspects of land development only means that the employment, income and land-ownership issues cannot be simultaneously solved by the utilization of a single holding of land (4 to 4.9 hectares in FELDA schemes) over the life cycle of the family. As the family grows the triple functions of land fail. One of the rigid principles of FELDA is that the land of the settler cannot be subdivided, for fragmentation creates uneconomic holdings and is a cause of rural poverty. At the same time this means that the dependants of the settler have to leave the land scheme to seek employment opportunities. A new cycle of outmigration begins.

Already, though still not acute, this new wave of outmigration is occurring, particularly amongst those who have received a higher level of education and who have developed some inclination for urban living (Chan 1979). An estimate of the second-generation employment problem facing FELDA is given by MacAndrews and Yamamoto (1977) in their study on unemployment and regional planning. By 1990 there would be a total of about 126,000 dependants in the labour force (Table 17.3) in the absence of outmigration.

The crux of the land development strategy problem is that land has limited absorptive capacity and it cannot satisfy the ownership, income and employment objectives for everyone. Unless accompanied by other commercial and industrial developments in rural growth centres, it only physically changes the location and postpones in time the rural population-poverty dynamic.

It was thought that the FELDA type model of land development could also stimulate urbanization, or at least semi-urbanization,
in the rural areas. This would tailor neatly with the goals of the New Economic Policy in urbanizing and modernizing the Malays. Somehow this has not been successful. A physical aggregation of agricultural settlers does not constitute an urban centre or perform urbanizing functions. Malays have in fact transplanted themselves to another rural and agricultural environment which is only physically more 'modernized'. If the FELDA type of land development is to function effectively as a modernizing agent than it must offer an environment which should be different from the kampung one. The social, economic and commercial structure must be different and it must offer opportunities for competitive endeavours as are usually found in the urban centres in the country.

Table 17.3
Labour force of dependants in FELDA schemes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working age population</td>
<td>16,631</td>
<td>53,129</td>
<td>124,281</td>
<td>205,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation rate (%)</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>61.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour force</td>
<td>10,411</td>
<td>33,312</td>
<td>77,179</td>
<td>126,386</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: (a) The working age population (15+) is calculated on the basis of an average figure of six children per family.

(b) Participation rate is taken from Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan 1971-75:66.

Partly as a response to this, FELDA has initiated a larger-scale type of integrated regional development. The prototypes of this more comprehensive approach are the Pahang Tenggara, Johore Tenggara, and Trengganu Tengah, where some half a million hectares of land are being developed by FELDA. By 1990 these schemes should involve well over 1.5 million settlers. At the same time, sixteen new towns are being built in Pahang Tenggara (DARA), five in Trengganu Tengah, and two in Johore Tenggara.

There are difficulties in attracting migrants on such a scale to these frontier development areas, especially during the initial period of establishment when basic social and economic amenities are poor. Large incentives must be offered to potential migrants from the other land-poor states in order to channel them to these three states. There are already labour shortages in some rural areas, both for government land development schemes and for private oil palm plantations, as is evidenced by the high private sector wages currently offered.

Regional industrial decentralization. Given that the labour absorptive capacity of the agricultural sector is limited and that
there are perceived benefits (at least for the potential migrants working and living in urban centres), it is inevitable that the rate and volume of rural-urban migration will increase in the future. Hence the government seeks to develop a more rational system of industrial centres and urban growth points to absorb such migrant workers. Current policy is to promote industrial decentralization and the development of a viable hierarchy of urban centres.

It is too early to assess the precise effects of regional industrial decentralization on the rate and volume of migration. Some description can, however, be given in spite of data limitations, and some probable effects evaluated.

The period spanning 1957 to 1970 (from Independence to the beginning of the New Economic Policy) witnessed a laissez-faire approach in industrialization. The objective was to attract foreign investment generally and to nurture new industries. This was to be achieved by using tax-exempting investment incentives within the Pioneer Status framework and by providing a 'conducive' environment through tariff protection for infant industries to mature. Policy sought to promote import-substitution (and later export expansion) and not to restructure the 'dualistic' traits of the political economy. No consideration was given to policy impact on various races or regions. Some have even claimed that this approach to national industrialization in fact contributed to the widening disparities between regions and among socio-economic groups. For instance, parallel to the existence of the export enclaves in primary products, new industrial enclaves developed in the large urban centres in the developed parts of the country. Such 'natural' growth points were further reinforced.

Recognizing that the national industrial development and structure was not interfacing with the national development ideology, a different emphasis was given to the industrialization program. To reduce regional growth differentials, and that of ethnic and socio-economic groups, a policy of industrial dispersion was adopted. This is to be instrumental in realizing the following: the dispersal of industries from existing growth centres, particularly potential investment from the Klang Valley industrial-commercial hub to the rest of the country; the direction of industries from the more developed to the less developed parts of each state; and the nurturing of rural industrialization.

The developed states of Selangor, Johore and Penang are the ones with above-average shares of manufacturing, which within each state tends to be concentrated in locality. In contrast, all the less developed states depend more on agriculture and have not established much manufacturing which might create spread effects.

In order to check these trends, two policy instruments are involved: the first is the more dynamic role of industrial estates
(which began in 1958) to spearhead the spread of industrialization: and the second is the introduction of locational incentives which aim to create 'subsidized' concentrated areas of industrial activities.

Locational incentives refer to the set of tax exemption incentives which companies enjoy if they comply with the conditions of the 1973 Investment Incentives (Amendment) Act. What is of relevance to our study is the definition of locational incentives areas. No clear guidelines are given regarding this so that policy must be inferred from areas chosen. By 1977 the following areas were designated Locational Incentives Areas: Johore Tenggara Area, Kedah (excluding Kuala Muda District, Kelantan, Pahang, Perlis, and Trengganu. Essentially these are (with the exception of Johore) the less developed states, though not necessarily all are land-poor ones (for instance, Pahang). Superficially, at the general level, this appears to accord with the National Economic Policy's desired goal of uplifting the less developed states.

To reinforce these locational incentives, the role of industrial estates within the context of the New Economic Policy has also changed substantially. Industrial estates are now explicitly incorporated into the rural industrialization program package. The expansion of their distribution in the less developed states has been quite fast (Table 17.4). In 1970, six out of the eight industrial estates (IEs) were located in the western states (accounting for 90 per cent of their total of 1,700 hectares) and there were none in the north. By 1977, their numbers had grown to fifty-three and their area to nearly 7,000 hectares. But the balance between states had shifted. The percentage of the number and of the area of IEs was then respectively northern states 15/10, southern 34/30 and western 51/60.

Policy has also shifted to divert industrial estates to smaller towns and semi-urban locations. During the early period of development, the IEs were all established in towns with over 50,000 residents (Table 17.5). During 1970-78 roughly a tenth and a fifth of the IEs were established in small and medium towns respectively. The latest plan is to locate 50 per cent of the twenty estates to be developed in towns of under 15,000 inhabitants, 40 per cent in those of 15-50,000 and only 10 per cent in large towns (Table 17.5). This follows the policy line of developing a hierarchy of small urban growth centres which would absorb the rural migrants, who would otherwise move to the metropolitan centres.

Industrial agglomerates and their resulting social infrastructure create external economies which attract other firms. Without policy direction, expansion would probably occur in the industrial-commercial complex of the Klang Valley in Selangor and Penang which are already receiving the main stream of the migration flow. Unless very strong disincentives are applied by the
government it is expected that both firms and migrant labour will continue to find the political and administrative capital an exciting place to move into.

Table 17.4
Industrial estates in Peninsular Malaysia, 1977
(hectares)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total planned</th>
<th>Developed to date</th>
<th>Dates initiated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trengganu</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>1974-75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kelantan</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perlis</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kedah</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>1972-77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern states</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>411</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pahang</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>1973-77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malacca</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>1972-74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johore</td>
<td>1,249</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>1962, 1972-77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern states</td>
<td>2,022</td>
<td>1,301</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perak</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>1968-71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selangor</td>
<td>1,850</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>1958, 1972-76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negri Sembilan</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>1966-74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penang</td>
<td>1,431</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>1962-74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western states</td>
<td>4,122</td>
<td>3,008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,850</td>
<td>4,720</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Malaysian Industrial Development Authority.

Inducements to firms to relocate or to settle elsewhere are provided in the growing number of IEs and designated Locational Incentive Areas, which may create employment opportunities and labour mobility in the poorer states. At the same time, in the case of the poor states of Kelantan, Perlis and Kedah, the objective of the Third Malaysia Plan is to move a sizeable amount of labour to other states. This appears quite inconsistent with the broad purpose of rural industrialization using Locational Incentives and industrial estates.

The type of migrant who will be affected by rural industrialization is quite predictable, tending to conform to the general characteristics of migrants indicated in the 1970 Population Census, that is clustered in the 15-34 age group, predominantly aged 20-24, especially amongst Malays, predominantly male and of smaller than average family size. However, there are two possible qualifications: first, the migrants will have more years of schooling; second, not only males but young unmarried females will join the labour flow. The first point is easily explained by the demand
for more education and the recent policy of the government to allow students to stay longer in the formal school system.

Female migration, the second issue, has in recent years become a noticeable social-economic phenomenon in Malaysia. Because of rapid structural changes both at the rural and urban levels, women have become active and mobile in the labour market of the monetized sector. Besides the social implications of geographical mobility, this has a chain effect on other demographic parameters such as age at marriage and fertility. In the sending areas, the supply of labour, farm and household activities are also affected. Little is known about these various demographic and economic repercussions.

Malay mobility, which is already the highest among the three ethnic groups, will thus be further boosted by employment opportunities, especially for females, from industrialization. This will help to realize the Malay urbanization objective of the New Economic Policy — though by how much the final social benefits will exceed the costs is difficult to judge.

It was mentioned earlier that one of the characteristics of migration in Peninsular Malaysia is short distance movement and moves between contiguous states. Such a pattern will be further enhanced by the location of industrial estates which, in spite of the stress on rural industrialization, are still predominantly close to major urban centres. This will intensify short distance mobility, including short distance inter-urban and intra-urban mobility, circular migration, and step-wise migration. With the improvement in the network of transport, workers are now willing to commute 100 kilometres to work instead of changing residential location. This is illustrated by the effect on labour mobility of the new highway between Kuala Lumpur and outlying towns with industrial estates. Circular migration, which is a common phenomenon in the northeastern agricultural states of Kedah and Perlis, will also be intensified among the network of growing small, intermediate and larger urban centres which have increasing employment opportunities.

The industrial estate-cum-town centre also serves to encourage step-wise migration from small towns to metropolitan centres. Jones (1965), in a survey of twenty-one small towns of size 1,000-5000 population, found that their percentage rate of growth in population during 1957-64 was below the national average because of outmigration. Such sizeable outmigration is confirmed by a more recent study (Lee 1977) of ten small towns which had an average of 1.53 outmigrants per household. Most (77 per cent) migrated to metropolitan centres like Kuala Lumpur, Seremban, Malacca and Klang. The role of small and intermediate towns as sources of population accretion for metropolitan centres will be further enhanced with the spread of industrial estates in such small places, which facilitates easy movement of rural migrants.
### Table 17.5

**Industrial estates and urban location in Peninsular Malaysia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions/States</th>
<th>15,000-&lt;15,000</th>
<th>&lt;15,000 50,000</th>
<th>&gt;50,000</th>
<th>15,000-&lt;15,000 50,000</th>
<th>&gt;50,000</th>
<th>15,000-&lt;15,000 50,000</th>
<th>&gt;50,000</th>
<th>&lt;15,000 50,000</th>
<th>&gt;50,000</th>
<th>Planned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern States</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trengganu</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kelantan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perlis</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kedah</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern States</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pahang</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malacca</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johore</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western States</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perak</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selangor</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negri Sembilan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penang</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Malaysian Industrial Development Authority.*
They, or the second generation, will not find it difficult to move from these intermediate points to the larger urban centres. Industrial decentralization should thus stimulate labour mobility, some circular but mostly pro-urban in direction.

**Regional growth centre strategy.** The strategy of growth centre development has also been adopted in the Third Malaysia Plan as part of policy to restructure the economy; some of the plans are already in the implementation stage. The aim is to establish a national system of growth poles which would diffuse the spread effects to the surrounding environments. Since the metropolitan urban centres are considered to be already well ensconced growth poles, they are not given priority for further development. A three-tier system is envisaged (Salih 1975) with the following structure:

(i) At the top level are the major growth centres in the Klang Valley, Penang, Ipoh, Johore Baru;
(ii) at the middle level are the intermediate cities like Kuantan, Muar, Kota Bharu, Alor Setar;
(iii) at the lower level are the network of new townships in the rural areas, for example, the new towns in Pahang Tenggara.

Henceforward, priority will be given to the intermediate cities like Kuantan. Kuantan is singled out to be developed as the growth pole for the eastern region of Peninsular Malaysia as part of the massive Pahang Tenggara development program, to serve as the future commercial-industrial hub and as the port outlet for the industrial estates around the region. There will be at least twelve industrial estates under the influence of Kuantan. The projected population of Kuantan and its urban periphery is scheduled to double in size by 1990 to about 250,000, which is regarded as the threshold size. Migrant labour will come from the contiguous states of Trengganu, Kelantan and Johore. A competition for labour between the demands of the new growth centre and the land development schemes is to be expected, so that land schemes in Pahang will face an aggravated labour shortage. Kuantan is already attracting substantial labour inflow from the surrounding villages, to the dismay of land development planners. If Kuantan succeeds as a growth pole area, the future migration pattern of the country will be changed quite substantially.

*In situ* Development. *In situ* development, as the term is used in the Third Malaysia Plan, refers to the developing or upgrading of depressed poverty areas, for instance, in the states of Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis and Trengganu. This is an implied form of integrated rural development and is meant to complement the land development and industrialization policies of the country.
Whilst differing in details, most integrated rural development programs would provide or promote some of the following components: physical infrastructure; land and tenancy reform; credit and subsidies; rural market towns and marketing networks for outputs and inputs; rural vocational education and employment opportunities; and labour-intensive agricultural activities. Projects incorporating various of these elements are the North Kelantan Rural Development Project (30,000 hectares), West Johore Agricultural Development Project (133,000 hectares in Phase I and 240,000 in Phase II), and the Krian/Sungai Manik Agricultural Project (30,500 hectares). The retention of rural population is mentioned as one of the auxiliary objectives of such schemes. Even in such projects, however, the major objectives are output and productivity, so that they focus on the capital-technocratic components. The physical aspects of rural development are given much attention, while little or no emphasis has been given to institutional reforms and agrarian change as part of the integrated rural development strategy. It is, however, these changes which would ultimately lead to more equity and employment opportunities for rural residents, deterring them from moving to urban areas. The stress on capital-intensive methods in rural production has been found to lead to more inequality in income and land ownership (Griffin 1973), which, in many cases, has become a major cause of outmigration.

Most of the in situ development programs in Malaysia are not very successful in retaining potential migrants because they are not specifically designed to cater to the differentiated needs, aspirations and motivations of rural residents. For example, the West Johore Agricultural Development Project, with massive capital injection in a package of programs including extension, credit, marketing, processing services, irrigation and drainage infrastructure, has not succeeded completely in curbing outmigration from this region (Cheong 1979, Chan 1979). Unfortunately rural development inputs, especially the lumpy investments are unstructured with respect to the type of impact on different subgroups of rural residents. 'Blanket' policies and programs implicitly assume a uniform response among the target groups.

In practice, it is difficult to determine the migration impact of in situ development policy in Malaysia. First, most of these programs have multiple objectives like raising productivity and increasing rural incomes besides the demographic ones, so that net effects on migration are difficult to separate. Second, the time-lag between the introduction of such projects and their effects in reversing migration trends may be quite substantial but difficult to 'capture'.

However, in light of the experiences of other countries, in situ development is unlikely to be effective in retaining population in rural Malaysia unless it is supported by land reform. While this may not stop outmigration completely, the higher
incomes, better employment opportunities, and enhanced security due to land reform programs should slow it down. But it must be pointed out that, unless there is continued improvement in integrated rural development, the slowing down would only be confined to the first generation reform beneficiaries. The subsequent generations would still move out.

It must also be noted that *in situ* development does not benefit all rural people equally or have uniform migration effects, so that its influence on population movement is uncertain. Besides, in designing the strategy the government has overlooked its contradiction with the counter-strategy of encouraging rural residents to leave the poor states (Kelantan, Perlis, Kedah). Thus, despite the huge injection of capital expenditure, *in situ* development is not a realistic policy instrument for the retention of rural people in the poorer regions. Perhaps it would be more appropriate to consider it as a strategy, albeit not necessarily intended, to increase individual potential migrants' options regarding their mobility rather than as one to regulate the general flow.

**Urban restructuring.** The historical development of urban centres in Peninsular Malaysia was principally influenced by European intervention, the establishment of mining towns, and other infrastructural developments associated with an immigrant population. Urban development did not evolve from an indigenous base; it was grafted on to a local Malay rural environment.

One may discern two phases in recent urban development. The first occurred during the Emergency Period when a policy of forced redistribution of half a million people into nearly 600 New Villages was implemented. This created small urban centres mainly in the western states. In a way this was a 'one shot' affair, and other than the original investment in establishing such 'villages' there has been no vigorous policy nor significant development programs to promote dynamism in these settlements. As a consequence a substantial number of these 'villages' have been stagnating and many have become important sources of outmigration to the larger urban centres. These outmigrants are mainly the second and third generation people.

The second phase is associated with the government's New Economic Policy to realign the numerical imbalance of the Malay-non-Malay distribution in urban areas, to 'modernize' the Malays by urbanization, and to commercialize them by reconstructing the functional relationship between ethnic and occupational specialization. This is to be accomplished by creating new urban centres in rural areas and restructuring existing major metropolitan urban centres socially and ethnically.

The lop-sided distribution of the Malays in the rural areas and other Malaysians, particularly the Chinese, in the urban
centres is shown in Table 17.6. Given the fact that all larger urban centres are predominantly non-Malay, with Malay concentration in the rural areas, it is to be expected that if urban growth is to depend on migration it will then be mainly the question of urbanizing Malay migrants. Although Malay urban involvement has been steadily increasing since 1931, it is regarded as inadequate compared to the national ethnic proportion (about 54 per cent Malays, 35 per cent Chinese, 10 per cent Indians, and 1 per cent others). Thus the government targeted a minimum Malay representation of at least 33 per cent in the urban centres by 1980 and beyond.

Since 1957 the growth of urbanization has been dependent mainly on natural population increase, although migration did have some influence on growth in the 50,000-100,000 and 10,000-25,000 town size categories (Table 17.7). Up to 1970, Malays constituted 38 per cent of the rural-urban migrants (Table 17.8). Taking the national aggregate, there appears little variation in the share of Malays in urban migration. However, this pattern is quite different at the regional level. This reflects mainly the spatial distribution of Malays in areas of rural outmigration where the towns are located.

Table 17.6
Urban population of Peninsular Malaysia, 1931-80
(urban areas 10,000+)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Urban Population</th>
<th>Urban %</th>
<th>Urban Malay</th>
<th>Urban Non-Malay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>3,788,000</td>
<td>570,513</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>82.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>4,908,000</td>
<td>929,928</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>81.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>6,268,000</td>
<td>1,666,969</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>79.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>8,819,000</td>
<td>2,530,433</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>72.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>10,385,000</td>
<td>3,341,000</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>70.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>11,822,000</td>
<td>4,148,000</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>67.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Percentage of urban population by race.
b Estimate, Mid-Term Review.
c Forecast, Mid-Term Review.

Sources: Third Malaysia Plan; Mid-Term Review of Third Malaysia Plan, 1976-1980; Census Data, Department of Statistics, Malaysia.

Amongst the major urban centres to which Malays migrate the capital city of Kuala Lumpur stands out, with the largest urban growth rate for Malays (9 per cent per annum). This is followed by Johor Baru (6.7 per cent). The attraction of Kuala Lumpur to potential migrants is not difficult to appreciate. It is not only the administrative and political centre; it is also the hub of the commercial-industrial complex in the Klang Valley which offers employment and other socio-economic opportunities to migrate.
Other general socio-economic development. The government has a number of policies which are non-migration directed, but which clearly have implications for migration. Amongst these the most important are those designed to alter the balance of advantage in socio-economic development towards the Malays as an ethnic group. These pro-Malay instruments include:

(i) the implementation of an employment quota in large industries and commercial houses of at least 30 per cent Malays, regardless of the population ratios in the areas, which are generally metropolitan urban centres;

(ii) the creation of job opportunities for Malays, especially in government departments;

(iii) the provision of liberal credit and loans to Malays for large commercial projects and small businesses, through quasi-government departments such as Majlis Amanah Ra'ayat (MARA) and Perbadanan Nasional (PERNAS);

(iv) the provision of low-cost loans by the private sector, as advised by the government, to Malays to buy houses;

(v) the establishment of new housing estates where a 30 per cent quota ownership for Malays has to be enforced;

(vi) the construction of new low-cost housing projects to cater for the Malay urban migrant;

(vii) the liberal attitude towards the establishment of squatters in urban areas and the upgrading of Malay squatter areas;

(viii) the provision of financial assistance for Malay education especially in secondary and tertiary education in the urban areas; and

(ix) the establishment of a good communication network (roads in particular) linking the rural-urban areas.

All these in one way or another increase the urban awareness of Malays, stimulate them to move out of rural areas and smaller towns, sponsor them explicitly or implicitly to migrate, and reinforce their desire to stay in the urban areas after their arrival. The net effect of government policy is to subsidize the private costs of urban immigration. One must not, however, neglect the larger issue of social costs and benefits to the urban centres in particular and to the country in general, although there is no precise estimate of these.

At another level these instruments have weaknesses. They are ad hoc and unco-ordinated and as such are rather diffuse in their impact. Since no specific programs (such as the FELDA model) are designed to establish criteria regarding, for instance, the rate and source of urban immigration, the target group of immigrants, and the 'resettlement' of such urban immigrants, the efficacy of
Table 17.7
Sources of urban growth: Peninsular Malaysia, 1957-70

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of urban centre</th>
<th>Population 1957</th>
<th>Population 1970</th>
<th>Av. annual increase</th>
<th>Natural increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban in 1957</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000+</td>
<td>716,952</td>
<td>969,026</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>+44,044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000-100,000</td>
<td>325,412</td>
<td>483,884</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>24,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25,000-50,000</td>
<td>304,822</td>
<td>426,614</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>-4,106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000-25,000</td>
<td>330,794</td>
<td>492,078</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>24,658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000-10,000</td>
<td>308,107</td>
<td>389,589</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>-45,171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,986,087</td>
<td>2,761,191</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>+43,494</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census Data, Statistics Department, Malaysia.

Table 17.8
Malay urban migration and growth of ethnic groups:
Peninsular Malaysia, 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region/City</th>
<th>Malay migrants a</th>
<th>Av. annual growth of population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Malay</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>migrants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>West</strong> b</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000+</td>
<td>(excluding K.L.)</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-100,000</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-50,000</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Southeast</strong> c</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000+</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000-100,000</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Northeast</strong> d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000-100,000</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000-50,000</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peninsular Malaysia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000+</td>
<td>(including K.L.)</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000-100,000</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000-50,000</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Av. per cent of all migrants.  b Selangor, Perak, Penang, Negri Sembilan and Malacca.  c Johore and Pahang.  d Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Trengganu.

the pro-urban migration instruments is affected. Unanticipated consequences could emerge in the future which could become socio-economic and political costs to the government. For instance, the divergence between the growth of employment opportunities and the number of urban immigrant job seekers not only leads to unemployment problems, but also has political implications in a multi-ethnic context where there is a strong drive towards wealth and employment redistribution along ethnic lines.

As another example, the policy to 'upgrade' some of the squatter settlements, such as those in Kuala Lumpur, has the planned effect of improving the standards of living of the beneficiaries, and it has also the unplanned effect of encouraging landless migrants to form such squatter settlements. In Kuala Lumpur it is estimated that about 25 per cent of its population is made up of squatters. In 1969, 67 per cent of the squatters were Chinese, 20 per cent Malays, and the rest Indians. After 1970, the proportion has changed to 45, 45 and 10 per cent respectively (Third Malaysia Plan). This change has been due to the large inflows of rural Malay migrants. The Chinese and Indian squatters were predominantly local-born. It must therefore be expected that upgrading Malay squatter settlements will encourage more Malay migrants to the city and the establishment of more squatter areas.

Conclusions

The increasing concern of the government with the population distribution dimension of development planning is influenced by two readily identifiable problems:

(a) the ethnicity valance in the equitable distribution of socio-economic returns; and

(b) the extension into the spatial context of the equitable ethnic balance in employment and incomes.

For the first time in Malaysia, development planners have directed attention and effort to integrating the spatial component with the socio-economic sectors of development planning. In this context population distribution assumes a significant role as a mechanism to help attain national goals and subnational objectives.

The number of policy options available specifically for these aims is really sizeable. It would be beyond the capacity of the government to implement them all consistently, so that its most recent positive contribution is in having some semblance of an articulated population distribution policy, however vague it may be.

The choice of a set of interrelated instruments and programs to implement policy options has been discussed above. These are not all explicitly directed at population distribution or movement
goals, although the ethnic-job-income balance equation permeates them all. Each policy instrument is burdened with multiple objective functions; and invariably population distribution goals appear auxiliary to the primary ones of economic growth and income distribution objectives.

In the case of land development, à la FELDA model, the government has succeeded admirably in stimulating and directing rural to rural migration. But FELDA land schemes can only serve demographic objectives during the early life cycle of the settler family. The unemployed, landless second generation must move out. This weakness of the FELDA model is a confirmation of the initial neglect to incorporate the demographic variables adequately into physical planning models.

The policies of in situ development, rural industrialization and 'propulsive' growth poles, strategically aligned throughout the country, were introduced to rectify the ineffectiveness of earlier attempts in rural development. It may be premature, and somewhat unfair, to comment on the 'soft spots' of the recent sets of strategies as they have yet to demonstrate their full impact. Nevertheless it is enlightening to have a perspective of the situation and a review of progress.

At the general level, all these policy instruments have multiple functions and objectives to fulfil. Population redistribution is one of the means and, at the same time, one of its objective functions. Consequently, besides competing claims for resources and insufficient co-ordination between planning authorities, a lack of clarity and consistency in the definition of objective functions and measures causes a substantial amount of planning effort and implementation time to be dissipated. Despite an awareness of population-development dynamics, planners have yet to design a consistent, co-ordinated approach to the problems. Strategies on migration are mostly ad hoc in origin, though seemingly 'integrated' in the Third Malaysia Plan, and in many cases subsidiary to other policies.

Malaysian migration-related policies do not work out as expected for several reasons: there are large and complex inter-relationships between the social-economic, political and spatial elements; too many objectives are imposed on too feeble policy instruments; there is goal conflict and competition for limited resources; and excessive strain is imposed on administrative, executive and monitoring capacity.

Research on migration-related policies is still confined to theoretical discussion (Pryor 1976b) and some macro-level studies (see M.L. Young, forthcoming; Chan 1979). Field observations of the experimentation and implementation of migration-related policies are almost nil. It should clearly move in the direction of developing policy evaluation techniques and empirical case
studies. Research will not be easy because of the inherent difficulty in evaluating the impact of policies which may involve a long time lag.

Pertinent questions have to be answered on the dynamics of population distribution (the migration-related issues) and socio-economic development before policies and policy instruments are designed. For Malaysia, given the political-economic goals of the New Economic Policy, the basic questions to be asked are: (i) at the national and sub-regional levels, what is the distribution of population which is practicably 'optimal' in achieving the goals? and (ii) what are the feasible policies that can be consistently implemented to produce such a population distribution? Answers to these queries require adequate data on the migrant types, the migration process, the linkages between demographic variables and development, the social and private costs and returns. Even with available data a constant monitoring is necessary to ensure the efficacy of population distribution-related policy tools.

Without an adequate comprehension of the nature of the development-migration nexus (or its obverse) there is no assurance of the success of a set of migration-related or population distribution-related policies. Given the significance of population distribution (and related demographic variables) in the context of the socio-economic development process, more research has to be conducted to clarify the issues.
References


———. n.d. The basic composition of the population of Papua New Guinea (MS.).


1977a. 'Système de migration et croissance urbaine à Port-Vila et Luganville (Nouvelles Hébrides)', Travaux et Documents de l'ORSTOM, no. 60, Paris.


1975. 'Gain and loss of system independence', paper prepared for the 13th Pacific Science Congress, Vancouver.


1979. 'Preliminary findings of a survey on outmigration in West Johore Region', Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Malaya (mimeo).


Christiansen, S., 1975. Subsistence on Bellona Island (Mungiki), Folia Geographica Damica no.13, Copenhagen.


1980a. 'Rural development: green, white, red or blue revolutions' in J. Friedmann et al., Development Strategies in the Eighties, Development Studies Colloquium, Monograph no.1, Sydney: 59-120.


(forthcoming). Copper, cocoa and cash: terminal, temporary and
circular mobility in Siwai, North Solomons' in M. Chapman and
R.M. Prothero (eds), Circulation in Population Movement: Subsistence
Paul.

Dasgupta, B., Laishley, R. and Lipton, M., 1976. Migration from
Rural Areas. The Evidence from Village Studies, Delhi, Oxford
University Press.

Guinea, Canberra, DSC Monograph no.3, Australian National University.

1977. 'A longitudinal study of school leaver migration' in R.J. May

and Curtain, R., 1978. 'Circular mobility of population in Papua
New Guinea: evidence from the urban and rural surveys of 1973-1975',
paper prepared for the International Seminar on the Cross-cultural
Study of Circulation, East-West Centre, Honolulu, 3-8 April.

and (forthcoming). 'Circular mobility of population in
Papua New Guinea: evidence from the urban and rural surveys of 1973-
1975' in M. Chapman and R.M. Prothero (eds), Circulation in Popula-
tion Movement: Subsistence and Concepts for the Melanesian Case,

Conroy, J.D. and Skeldon, G. (eds), 1977. The Rural Survey 1975 (supplement
to vol.4 of Yagi-Ambu).


Census, Raratonga, Central Planning Bureau.

1977. Cook Islands Census of Population and Housing 1976, Raratonga,
Central Planning Bureau.

Corner, L., 1979. The impact of rural outmigration: labour supply and
cultivation techniques in a double cropped padi area, West Malaysia.
Preliminary Report. Report prepared for the General Planning Unit
of the Prime Minister's Department, Kuala Lumpur, September (mimeo).

Critchfield, R., 1970. Hollow Mister, Where are you going? The Story of
Huaen, a Javanese Betjak Driver, New York, Alecia Patterson Fund.

Crystal, E., 1974. 'Cooking pot politics: a Toraja village study', Indonesia,
18:119-52.

Cunningham, C.E., 1958. The Postwar Migration of the Toba-Batak to East
Sumatra, Cultural Report Series, Yale, New Haven.

Curson, P.H., 1979. 'Migration remittances and social networks among Cook

leavers in the towns - present and future significance' in H.I.
Safa and B.M. du Toit (eds), Migration and Development, The Hague,
Mouton: 269-93.

1977. 'The structure of internal migration in Papua New Guinea',
paper prepared for 48th ANZAAS Congress, Melbourne, August.

1978. 'Pulim boi: from abduction to seduction in labour migration
from the Sepik', paper prepared for IASER Seminar, Port Moresby,
17 August.

1980a. 'The structure of internal migration in Papua New Guinea',

1980b. Dual Dependence and Sepik Labour Migration, Ph.D. thesis,
Dept of Geography, Australian National University.


1979. 'Rural development programs: planned vs. actual migration outcomes', paper prepared for the UN/UNFPA Workshop on Population Distribution Policies in Development Planning, Bangkok, 4-13 September (mimeo – IESA/P/AC. 15/16).


Firth, R., 1971. 'Economic aspects of modernization in Tikopia' in L.R. Hiatt and C. Jayawardena (eds), Anthropology in Oceania, Sydney, Angus and Robertson: 47-75.


1977b. 'From sago suppliers to entrepreneurs: marketing and migration in the Middle Sepik', *Oceania*, 48(2):126-40.


Gunawan, B. and von Liebenstein, G.W., n.d. 'Some recent socio-economic observations in four Malay villages in the Bachok District (Kelantan)', unpublished paper, Afdeling Zuid- en Zuidoost Azie, Antropologisch-Sociologisch Centrum, University of Amsterdam.


Hardjono, J.M., 1977. Transmigration in Indonesia, Kuala Lumpur, OUP.


1981. 'Factors influencing commitment to urban wage employment on Bougainville' in R.D. Bedford (ed.), Migration, Mining and Urbanisation in Southeast Bougainville, Bougainville Special Publication no.4, Christchurch.


— 1980. 'When is a peasant not a peasant: rural proletarianisation in Papua New Guinea' in J.N. Jennings and G.J.R. Linge (eds), Of Time and Place, Canberra, ANU Press.


1977b. 'Commuting, circulation, and migration in West Java: policy implications', paper prepared for a workshop on Circular Migration and Policy, East-West Population Institute, Honolulu (mimeo.).


1979a. 'Patterns of population movement to 1971'; 'Migration to and from Jakarta'; 'The impact of migration on villages in Java', all in R.J. Pryor (ed.), *Migration and Development in Southeast Asia. A Demographic Perspective*, Kuala Lumpur, OUP: 177-211.

1979b. 'Population movements in Indonesia during the colonial period', paper prepared for the Indonesian Connection Seminar Series, Canberra, Australian National University (see also 1980 below).

1979c. 'Village/community ties, village norms and village and ethnic social networks in migration decision-making and behaviour: a review', unpublished paper, Dept of Geography, Flinders University.

1980. 'Population movements in Indonesia during colonial period' in J.J. Fox (ed.), *The Indonesian Connection*, Canberra, ANU Press (see also 1979b above).

1981a. 'Impermanent mobility in Indonesia: what do we know about its contemporary scale, causes and consequences?' Paper prepared for Population Association of America, annual meeting, session on Forms of Impermanent Mobility, Washington DC, March.

1981b. 'Some observations on the role of migration and population mobility in wealth transfers between individuals and their families in third world societies, with special reference to Indonesia', paper prepared for IUSSP Seminar on Individuals and Income Distribution, Honolulu, April.


IBRD see World Bank.


1978a. 'The Pondok system and circular migration' in The Life of the Poor in Indonesian Cities, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University: 1-16.

1978b. 'Circular migration and the Pondok dwelling system: a case-study of ice-cream traders in Jakarta' in P.J. Rimmer et al., Food, Shelter and Transport in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, Department of Human Geography, HG/12, Australian National University: 135-34.


1980. 'The Indonesian labour force since 1961' in A. Booth and P. McAwley (eds), The Indonesian Economy in the New Order Period 1966-76, Kuala Lumpur, OUP.


Judd, P., 1973. 'Irrigated agriculture in the Central Plain of Thailand' in R. Ho and E.C. Chapman (eds), Studies of Contemporary Thailand, Canberra Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University.


Kruger, K., 1979. 'A study of growth centres in Peninsular Malaysia', University of Malaya (mimeo.).


1978. 'Some social issues in development', paper presented to a seminar on Physical Planning at the Fiji Ministry of Urban Development and Housing.


1978. 'The command over space: some aspects of human mobility', paper prepared for an international seminar on the Cross-Cultural Study of Circulation, East-West Center, Honolulu, 3-8 April (mimeo.).

Leinbach, T., 1978. 'Feeder road impact within the rural works program', Jakarta (mimeo.).

1979a. 'Rural transport, trip characteristics and information channels: some observations from the Indonesian rural works program', University of Kentucky (mimeo.).


Leung Wai, S., 1975. 'Food shortages in Western Samoa - towards a solution', Noumea, South Pacific Commission (mimeo.).


Lewis, W.A., 1954. 'Economic development with unlimited supplies of labour', Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies, 22(May):139-91.

Lightfoot, P., 1980. 'Circular migration and modernization in northeast Thailand', paper presented at the Thai-European Seminar on Social Change in Contemporary Thailand, Amsterdum, 28-30 May (mimeo.).

Fuller, T. and Kammuansilpa, P., 1980. 'Impact and image of the city in the northeast Thai countryside', University of Hull (mimeo.).
Lim, L.L., 1980. 'Population redistribution, urbanization and socio-economic development', paper prepared for Sixth Malaysian Economic Convention, Penang, Persatuan Ekonomi Malaysia (mimeo.).


Lipton, M., 1977. Why Poor People Stay Poor, Canberra, ANU Press.


——— 1977. 'Rural-urban mobility in South and Southeast Asia: different formulations ... different answers?' in J. Abu-Lughod and R. Hay (eds), Third World Urbanisation, Chicago: 257-70.

——— 1978. 'An invitation to the "ball": dress formal or informal?' in P.J. Rimmer et al., Food, Shelter and Transport in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, Canberra, Dept of Human Geography, HC/12, Australian National University.


McHarg, A., n.d. 'Inequality and poverty in Fiji (mimeo.).


(forthcoming). 'How circular is Minangkabau migration?', _Indonesian Journal of Geography_.


Mudijman, H., 1978. 'Consequences of recurrent movement on the family at the place of origin: a comparative case study of two villages around Surakarta', Universitas Sebelas Maret, Surakarta (mimeo.).


(forthcoming b). 'On "entering the mother world": kinship obligations, norms of behavior and the Hausa diaspora' in N.B. Winchester (ed.), *The Hausa Diaspora*, Lethbridge, University of Lethbridge.


Osborn, J., 1974. Area, Development Policy and the Middle City under the Indonesian Repelita as compared to the Malaysian case: a Preliminary Analysis, Santa Barbara, Center for the Study of Demographic Institutions.


1978. Rural Development in Western Samoa, first draft of a report to the World Bank, November.


1972a. 'The changing urbanisation space of West Malaysia', paper prepared for Urban Geography Section, 22nd International Geographical Congress, Montreal.


Rhoda, R.E., 1979. 'Development activities and rural-urban migration: is it possible to keep them down on the farm?', Washington D.C., Agency for International Development.


Rijk, A.G., 1979. 'Aspects of farm mechanization in Indonesia and priorities for development', draft report to Joint Committee on Agricultural Machinery, Bandung (mimeo).


—— 1978. 'The effects of migration and remittances on Western Samoa' in C. Macpherson et al. (eds), New Neighbour ... Islanders in Adaptation, Santa Cruz: 119-30.


—— 1979b. 'A review and evaluation of attempts to constrain migration to selected urban centres and regions', paper prepared for the UN/UNFPA Workshop on Population Distribution Policies in Development Planning, Bangkok, 4-13 Sept. (mimeo. IESA/AC.15/17).


Sinaga, R.S., 1977. 'Economic viability of hand-tractor leasing project and potential employment impact in Kabupaten Bandung, Glanyar and Tabanan, Bali', Survey Agro Ekonomi, Bogor (mimeo.).


Stanek, M., 1980. Notes on a seminar given in the Anthropology and Sociology Department, University of Papua New Guinea.


Steel, W.F. and Takagi, Y., 1976. 'The intermediate sector, unemployment and the employment-output conflict', Dept of Economics, Vanderbilt University, Nashville (mimeo.).


——— 1978. 'Independent foremen and the construction of formal sector housing in the Greater Manila area' in P.J. Rimmer et al. (eds), Food, Shelter and Transport in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, Canberra, Dept of Human Geography Publication HG/12, Australian National University: 155-69.


Participants and contributors

AUSTRALIA

Ms E. Brouwer,
Australian Development Assistance Bureau,
Canberra.

Mrs Muriel van der Byl,
Aboriginal Education Foundation,
Adelaide.

Dr John Connell,
Department of Geography,
University of Sydney.

Mrs Lorraine Corner,
Department of Economics,
Macquarie University.

Dr Richard Curtain,
Department of Sociology,
The Faculties,
Australian National University.

Dr Dean Forbes,
Department of Human Geography,
Research School of Pacific Studies,
Australian National University.

Professor Fay Gale,
Department of Geography,
University of Adelaide.

Mr Patrick Guinness,
Department of Anthropology,
Research School of Pacific Studies,
Australian National University.

Mr P. Holzknecht,
Australian Development Assistance Bureau,
Canberra.

Dr Graeme Hugo,
Department of Geography,
Flinders University of South Australia.
Dr T.H. Hull,
Department of Demography,
Research School of Social Sciences,
Australian National University.

Dr V.J. Hull,
Department of Demography,
Research School of Social Sciences,
Australian National University.

Dr Gavin W. Jones,
Development Studies Centre,
Australian National University.

Dr Ian Manning,
Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research,
University of Melbourne.

Dr Alaric Maude,
Department of Geography,
Flinders University of South Australia.

Mr B. McCombie,
Australian Development Assistance Bureau,
Canberra.

Dr Hazel Moir,
Bureau of Industry Economics,
Department of Commerce and Industry,
Canberra.

Mr John Moriarty,
Department of Aboriginal Affairs,
Melbourne.

Mr Ovio Nou-Taboro,
M.A. (Demography) Programme,
Development Studies Centre,
Australian National University.

Ms Mayling Oey,
Department of Demography,
Research School of Social Sciences,
Australian National University.

Ms S. Price,
Australian Development Assistance Bureau,
Canberra.
Ms Yawalaksana Rachapaetayakom,
Department of Demography,
Research School of Social Sciences,
Australian National University.

Mrs M. Rayner,
Australian Development Assistance Bureau,
Canberra.

Mrs H.V. Richter,
Development Studies Centre,
Australian National University.

Dr R.M. Sundrum,
Department of Economics,
Research School of Pacific Studies,
Australian National University.

Professor R. Gerard Ward,
Department of Human Geography,
Research School of Pacific Studies,
Australian National University.

Ms Diah Widarti,
M.A. (Demography) Programme,
Development Studies Centre,
Australian National University.

Dr Elspeth Young,
Development Studies Centre,
Australian National University.

FIJI

Ms Jyoti Amratlal,
United Nations Fund for Population Activities,
Suva.

Dr Rajesh Chandra,
Department of Geography,
University of the South Pacific,
Suva.

Mr John Samy,
Director, Economic Planning,
Prime Minister's Department,
Suva.
Mr Kalio Tavola,
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forests,
Suva.

INDONESIA

Mr Sarawudh Kongsiri,
Director, Bureau of Social and Cultural Affairs,
ASEAN Secretariat,
Jakarta.

Dr Colin Macandrews,
Pacific Architects and Engineers, Inc.,
Jakarta.

Dr Ida Bagus Mantra,
Population Studies Centre,
Gadjah Mada University,
Yogyakarta.

Dr Sediono Tjondwonegoro,
Department of Social Economic Sciences,
Faculty of Agriculture,
Bogor Agricultural University,
Bogor.

Drs Kartomo Wirosuhardjo,
Director, Demographic Institute,
Faculty of Economics,
University of Indonesia.

MALAYSIA

Mr Baharuddin Hashim,
Kejora,
Johor Bahru.

Dr Paul Chan,
Faculty of Economics and Administration,
University of Malaya,
Kuala Lumpur.

NEW CALEDONIA

Mr Ko Groenewegen,
South Pacific Commission,
Noumea.
NEW ZEALAND

Sir Colin Allan,
Glen Rowan,
17 Sale Street,
Howick, Auckland.

Dr Richard D. Bedford,
Department of Geography,
University of Canterbury,
Christchurch.

Dr Cluny Macpherson,
Department of Sociology,
University of Auckland,
Auckland.

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Mr Patrick Gaiyer,
Secretary,
Department of Urban Development,
Boroko.

Dr Louise Morauta,
Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research,
Port Moresby.

PHILIPPINES

Mr Rey Cristal,
Regional Director,
National Economic and Development Authority
Regional Office,
Cebu City.

SOLOMON ISLANDS

Mr Wilson Ifunaoa,
Permanent Secretary,
Ministry of Home Affairs,
Honiara.

THAILAND

Dr Suthiporn Chirapanda,
Division of Research and Planning,
Agricultural Land Reform Office,
Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives,
Bangkok.
Dr Badrud Hanna,
Division of Population and Social Affairs,
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific,
Bangkok.

Ms Anchalee Singhanetra-Renard,
Department of Geography,
University of Chiangmai,
Chiangmai.

**TONGA**

Dr Epeli Hau'ofa,
The Palace Office,
Nuku'alofa.

**UNITED STATES**

Dr George N. Appell,
Borneo Research Council,
Phillips, Maine.

Dr Murray Chapman,
East West Population Institute,
East West Center,
Honolulu.

**VANUATU**

Dr Joel Bonnemaison,
Office de la recherche scientifique et technique outre-mer,
Port Vila.

**WESTERN SAMOA**

Mr Salale Salale,
Department of Economic Development,
Apia.
Development Studies Centre Publications

Monographs


Occasional Papers


No 8 Public Housing in the City States of Hong Kong and Singapore, David Drakakis-Smith and Yeu-man Yeung, 1977. 17 pp. A$2.00.


No 11 The Structure of Rural Supply to the Honiara Market in the Solomon Islands, M.A. Bathgate, 1978. 65 pp. A$2.00.


No 16 Surveys of Free Resources: is there a role in planning and project implementation? Rodney C. Hills, 1980. 30 pp. A$2.00.

No 17 Replacing Imported Food Supplies to Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, Geoff T. Harris, 1980. 22 pp. A$2.00.


No 20 Economic Activities of Women in Rural Java: are the data adequate? Hazel Moir, 1980. 44 pp. A$2.00.


No 24 Energetics and subsistence affluence in traditional agriculture, Satish Chandra, 1981. 34 pp. A$2.00.


Postage on the above series is A50c, OS 60c.

MADE Research Series


No 4 The Intercropping of Smallholder Coconuts in Western Samoa: an analysis using multi-stage linear programming, R.J. Burgess, 1981. 259 + xiii. A$5.00.

No 5 The Australian Rice Industry in Relation to the International Rice Trade and its Implications for Southeast Asian Rice Exporting Countries, Khin San May, 1981. 144 + xii. A$5.00.

Postage on the above series is A90c, OS $1.10.

Thesis Abstracts

MA in Demography Research Series


No 2 The Value of Children Among Tea Estate Workers' Families: a case study in a village of West Java, Indonesia, Asep Djadja Saefullah, 1979. 128 + xiii pp. A$5.00.

Postage on the above series is A90c, OS $1.10.

Teaching Notes Series


No 3 Women, Demography and Development, Helen Ware, 1981. 242 + vii pp. A$5.00.

Postage on the above series is A90c, OS $1.10.

The Aboriginal Component in the Australian Economy

No 1 Tribal Communities in Rural Areas, Elspeth Young, 1981. 279 + xxiii. A$9.00. Postage A$2.40, OS $2.20.

Pacific Research Monographs


The prices listed are the recommended retail prices.

The Monographs and Occasional Papers can be obtained from ANU Press, PO Box 4, Canberra, ACT, 2600, Australia and the balance of the publications from the Development Studies Centre at the same address.