Nanshin

Japanese Settlers in Papua and New Guinea

1890–1949

HIROMITSU IWAMOTO
Preface

This book is a slightly modified version of my PhD thesis 'Nanshin: the case of Japanese settlers in Papua and New Guinea 1890-1949', which I wrote as a student in the Division of Pacific and Asian History, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, and submitted in September 1995. The content and ideas in this book do not differ much from the thesis. The book is shorter than the thesis, and the thesis has more detailed information on statistical data and quotations from Japanese material which I translated into English.

Japanese emigration to Papua and New Guinea began around the turn of the 19th century, as an offshoot from the settlement of Japanese pearl divers on Thursday Island. An adventurous Japanese skipper, Komine Isokichi, explored the waters of New Guinea in a schooner for new shell fishing grounds. He reached Rabaul in New Britain in 1901 where he met Governor Hahl. Komine managed to develop a good relationship with the German administration. In 1910 he acquired leases in Manus Island and Rabaul and began operating a copra plantation, and trochus shell fishing and boatbuilding businesses. More importantly, he began to bring in Japanese employees. However, after the outbreak of World War I, immigration policy and trade restriction by the Australian military administration and later by the civil administration blocked the expansion of the Japanese settlement. The Japanese population declined from 119 in 1914 to 36 in 1939. At the outbreak of the Pacific War, Japanese residents were all arrested and interned in Australia just before the landing of Japanese troops. Most internees were never allowed to return on security grounds. Thus the Japanese settlement vanished.

The national policies of both Japan and Australia determined their fate. Advocates of Japanese nanshin-ron (southward advancement theory) and Australian officials created the image of the settlers as pawns of nanshin (southward advancement). However, their perceptions, based on the national interest of each, are partial. In this book I aim to present a wider perception of the settlers in order to construct a more comprehensive history. I set my analysis in the contexts of Japanese social history and the colonial history of Papua and New Guinea, attempting to conceptualise the position of these migrants in a European colonial apparatus.
While writing the thesis, I was most grateful to my supervisor, Professor Donald Denoon, and adviser, Professor Hank Nelson, for instruction on how to conduct my research and how to write a thesis in English. I also thank Mr David Sissons for bringing to my attention some important archives. I thank many other people—staff in the Division of Pacific and Asian History, librarians, archivists, and those who agreed to be interviewed in Japan, Papua New Guinea and Australia. My fieldwork in the three countries was the most pleasurable and unforgettable part of my research. For publishing this work, I am deeply grateful to The Journal of Pacific History, particularly the Executive Editor Jennifer Terrell. Finally I acknowledge that I am responsible for all information and views in this book.
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# Abbreviations

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<td>JDR</td>
<td>Japanese Diplomatic Record</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Military Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNG</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POW</td>
<td>Prisoner of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.A.A.F</td>
<td>Royal Australian Air Force</td>
</tr>
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<td>US</td>
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Introduction

A MASSIVE EXODUS OF PEOPLE WAS A WORLD-WIDE phenomenon during the 19th century. About 50 million Europeans emigrated to the Americas and 47 million Chinese and Indians emigrated to the Asia-Pacific.\(^1\) However, the scale of Japanese emigration was small. Rough estimates of Japanese emigrants before the Pacific War are at least 1.6 million: from 1868 to 1941, 776,304 Japanese emigrated to areas other than Manchuria, Korea and Taiwan, and from 1936 to 1940 about 820,000 people emigrated to Manchuria.\(^2\) Comparative figures were 23.1 million from Britain, 4.3 million from France, seven million from Holland, 33.9 million from Germany and 22 million from Italy between 1851 and 1950.\(^3\) The number of Japanese emigrants to Papua and New Guinea was tiny: it was never above 200.

The smallness of Japanese emigration is attributed mainly to Japan's seclusion policy which prohibited overseas emigration until 1868 and its integration into world capitalism. Destinations for Japanese emigrants were limited, because by the time Japan began to modernise, most Pacific-Asian countries had been colonised by European powers. Although Japan's rapid modernisation from the late 19th century with colonisation of Korea, Taiwan, Manchuria and Micronesia created space for emigration, this was only possible in a short period of 50 years ending with the Pacific War.

Japanese emigration to Papua and New Guinea began around the turn of the 19th century. It was an offshoot from the settlement of Japanese pearl divers on Thursday Island where they were squeezed out by Australian restrictions on migration and by the exhaustion of pearl beds. The migration was also a result of a series of searches for new beds and a place to settle by an adventurous Japanese skipper, Komine Isokichi. From 1890 to 1894, Komine explored the waters of New Guinea in a schooner for a new shell-


fishing ground. In November 1894 he made a second voyage with Tsuji Ken'nosuke, an agent of the Yoshisa Emigration Company on Thursday Island. After this voyage, Tsuji showed a strong interest in New Guinea as a possible emigration destination and he approached the British New Guinea administration unsuccessfully. Komine's application for naturalisation in Queensland was also refused in 1898. Those events drove him to German New Guinea. He reached Rabaul in New Britain in October 1901 and met Governor Hahl. Their relationship developed based on mutual benefits—Komine's search for a place to settle and Hahl's need of a vessel. After that, Komine was able to acquire leases on Manus Island and in Rabaul and began operating a copra plantation, trochus shell-fishing and boatbuilding. More importantly, he was allowed to bring in Japanese employees.

Komine was successful in all his business ventures and their expansion contributed to the increase of the Japanese population. As a result, a Japanese settlement of about 100 emerged in the last years of German rule. Most migrants came from the rural areas of southwest Japan—Kumamoto, Nagasaki and Wakayama. Most were from coastal areas (Amakusa in Kumamoto, Shimabara in Nagasaki, southern Wakayama, and the Miura peninsula in Kanagawa). However, after the outbreak of World War I, immigration and trade restrictions imposed by the Australian military administration and later by the civil administration blocked the expansion of the settlement. The Japanese population declined from 119 in 1914 to 36 in 1939. At the outbreak of the Pacific War and just before the landing of Japanese troops Japanese residents were all arrested and interned in Australia. On security grounds, most internees were never allowed to return and the Japanese settlement vanished.

National policies of both Japan and Australia determined their fate. The Japanese government was indifferent to them until the late 1930s when nanshin-ron (southward advancement theory) advocates started beating the drum of nanshin (southward advancement), and portrayed the settlers as patriot pioneers. Again, the government was indifferent after the war. On the other hand, the Australians, including many in New Guinea, always perceived them as part of nanshin: the settlers were all spies. The Pacific War intensified these perceptions and the settlers were eliminated from New Guinea. Did those perceptions tell all about the settlers? How did the settlers identify themselves? Did they think they were pioneering the undeveloped land for empire building? What did those who actually interacted with them and observed them think about them? Were the Australians in Papua and New Guinea always suspicious about their activities? If not, why was that? How did Papuans and New Guineans perceive them? Vice-versa, how did the settlers perceive Papuans and New Guineans? Without attempting to answer those questions, the settlers' image remains that of the nanshin-ron advocates.
and of the Australian officials who had never been to Papua and New Guinea or seen the settlers, and as a result the public history of the settlers remains partial.

In this book I aim to present wider perceptions of the settlers in order to construct a more comprehensive history. In each chapter I analyse the Japanese interest in the South Seas in terms of policy, trade, emigration and ideology for two purposes: to set the migration to Papua and New Guinea in the context of overall Japanese involvement in the South Seas; and to examine the validity of the perceptions of both *nanshin-ron* advocates and the Australians in Melbourne. I devote the main part to empirical accounts of the settlers from both written materials and oral evidence. I analyse them in terms of demographic trends, diplomacy of both Japan and Australia, Australian colonial polices, settlers' economic activities and their relations with other races. To conclude, I focus on the implications of the Japanese presence for Japanese social history and the colonial history of Papua and New Guinea, conceptualising the position of the migrants in a European-Australian colonial apparatus.

There has been no interdisciplinary approach to explain international migration. Social geographers present demographic analyses; anthropologists and sociologists focus on ethnological aspects, mainly migrants' adaptation to their new environments; historians relate migration to diplomacy; economists are mainly concerned with the migrants' economic impacts on both their countries of origin and destinations; and scholars in political economy attempt to conceptualise the patterns of migration in colonisation. In this book, I test the political economy approach.

This approach is relatively new and its emphasis is on the role of migrants as labourers in the international labour market. In the case of Japan, her integration into world capitalism in the late 19th century caused the development of ambivalent migration; Japan had a position as a colonial power sending out emigrants or colonists like other European colonial powers, as well as a position as a 'peripheral' nation supplying labour to Western powers. An example of the former is the emigration to Korea, Taiwan, Manchuria and Micronesia, and of the latter is people leaving for Hawaii, North America, Australia and South America.

Tsunoyama also uses the notion of the 'peripheral' nature of Japanese emigration, adopting the world-system model presented by Wallerstein which divides the world into core, semi-periphery and periphery, in which the
economic development of the core is only possible by the exploitation of the periphery or semi-periphery. In this model, Asian emigration was the response to the reformation of the labour market in peripheries in the process of colonisation or semi-colonisation of Asian countries by European powers. Although Japan was not colonised like other Asian countries, its role as a supplier of labour to Hawaii, North America, Australia and South America put it in the category of periphery. At the same time, Japan began to play a role as 'core' with the beginning of its colonial control over Korea, Taiwan, Manchuria and Micronesia.

I test this model in the case of Japanese emigration to Papua and New Guinea, based on the hypothesis that the emigrants came from peripheral Japan to Papua and New Guinea as part of rural-urban migration that happened in the process of Japanese economic development; they came to the periphery of Australia to supply labour to the Australian core; but as Japan began to emerge as a core from the early 20th century, they began to serve the Japanese core by exploiting local labour. Incidentally, I note that the results will not provide a general model for Japanese emigration, because the number of emigrants is extremely small.

In the case of the Japanese settlers in Papua and New Guinea, most written sources are by officials (both Australian and Japanese) and nanshin-ron advocates, and scarcely any by the settlers themselves. The voices of the settlers or of those who actually interacted with them are unheard. In order to overcome the unevenness of these sources, I have used interviews and collected oral evidence. I consider interviewing to be as useful in collecting information as researching archives and literature, and I treat oral evidence as equally as valid as written evidence.

There are advantages and disadvantages in collecting and using oral evidence. The major advantage is that informants can provide information which is not recorded in written sources. The major disadvantage is that the information can be biased: it can be exaggerated; the informant may be telling only one side or part of the story deliberately. That is because, as Neumann argues, interviewing is a 'dialogue' between researchers and informants who

5Tsunoyama Sakae, op.cit., 5.
6I prefer using the term 'oral evidence' to 'oral tradition' for two reasons. First, 'oral tradition' generally indicates the information derived from an illiterate society. Papua New Guinea society was largely illiterate when the Japanese settlers were there, and historians and anthropologists generally acknowledge that Papua New Guineans did not have a tradition of writing down their history. But quite a few of my informants were literate and had ability to write down their history if they wanted to. Second, my Japanese informants were all literate.
7David Henige, Oral Historiography (London 1982), 1.
expect their stories to be written down. As a result, selection, omission or dramatisation can happen according to the interests of the researchers and informants. However, this can be an advantage, as Donald Denoon claims:

Where a real difference crops up, is that the writer does not know who will read the book a hundred years later: the oral informant does know his or her questioner, and will probably change the form (or the substance) of a story to meet the requirements of that questioner. Now, this is not always a disadvantage. An oral historian can, with great efforts, see how the informant is moulding the story, and can ask more questions: but you can’t ask questions of a book’s author, who has set the evidence out once and for all time. In other words, it is possible to understand some oral evidence better than some written evidence.

The arguments of both Neumann and Denoon suggest the importance of interaction between researchers and informants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE I-1. The number of informants by locations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>descendants</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milne Bay 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East New Britain 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Ireland 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West New Britain 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manus 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagoya 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyushu 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brisbane 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 35</td>
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I recorded most interviews on tapes and also took notes. Usually I brought a small gift (biscuits, cakes, green tea, etc.). I could not afford cash due to a small fieldwork budget. Apart from my native language, I am fluent in English but my Pidgin English is limited. Most interviews with Papua New Guineans were conducted in English, but when the informants could not speak English, I had an interpreter. I approached all informants with the utmost politeness, and all responded amicably. Quite a few wanted to offer a meal or accommodation or to keep in contact. Most interviews were conducted at informants' homes or cool places such as under shady trees in Papua New

8Klaus Neumann, *Not the way it really was: constructing the Tolai past* (Honolulu 1992), 249.
Guinea. In most cases of interviewing non-settler elders in Papua New Guinea, the interviews were public, and other villagers gathered and listened.

At the interviews I normally started by introducing myself and my research, and briefly outlined what I knew about the settlers from my research in written sources. In most cases, I knew more than the informants about biographical information on the settlers and events, so I could avoid collecting inaccurate information. However, I knew that the major problem would be that informants would tell me what they thought I would be pleased to hear, as two anthropologists, Zelenietz and Saito, experienced in interviewing Kilenge people about their wartime experiences: Zelenietz (American) got many stories about good Americans and Saito (Japanese) got many of good Japanese. The two found that:

The narrator sizes up his audience and then delivers an appropriate recital, secure in knowing that no other Kilenge will openly contradict the account . . . Story telling is a leisure activity, meant to entertain, and 'facts' are much less important than the sense of conveying a 'good story' . . . No one is openly insulted. No one publicly takes offence. Only when the stakes are high, only when 'facts' count (as in ownership of an important resource) is public disputation and resultant social tension deemed worth the cost. 10

To avoid this problem, I always challenged informants about the accuracy of the information and asked whether they knew bad stories about the Japanese settlers. I also tried to avoid intimidating them and to maintain a relaxed atmosphere. Occasionally I got negative stories, such as brutal Japanese masters or low wages, from New Guinean informants.

THE NUMBERS OF JAPANESE TRAVELLERS declined sharply after 1914 (see Table I-2). Most Japanese migrated in the late German period when no migration restrictions were applied, as in the Australian military and mandate periods.

Migrants to Papua and New Guinea were overwhelmingly males. Out of 172, only 31 were females (18.0 per cent). The distribution of age groups is shown in Table I-3. The average age of the migrants was 25.5 years: 26.7 for males and 25.8 for females. Young working people (15 to 29) made up the largest group (69.2 per cent), whereas the proportion of dependent children (0-14 years old) was significantly low (only 3.2 per cent). That indicates that most migrants came without their families or that they were single.

MAP 1: Japan
### TABLE 1-2. Japanese migrants and travellers to Papua New Guinea 1894-1939

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Japanese in PNG</th>
<th>No. of travellers to PNG from Kaigai ryoken kafu hyo</th>
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<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>1910</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>1914</td>
<td>119 (103)**</td>
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<td>1935</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Eastern Division only  
**From a different source, Australian Archives, A518/1-0918/2, 1939, 'Admission of Japanese'  
Source: Annual Report (Kokopo 1895), 42; (1896), 41; (1898), 51; 'a telegram to Vice-Admiral Takenaka', 8 July 1919, Japanese Diplomatic Record (hereafter JDR) 7.1.5.-10; Government Gazette IV(6) (Rabaul 1917). 69; AA, AWM33-57/5, 20 September 1920, 'memoandum for the secretary, Department of Defence, Melbourne'; A518/1-0918/2, 1939, 'Japanese population'; A816/1-19/304/188, 20 January 1939, 'Japanese activities: a report by H. Page, acting administrator to the secretary, Prime Minister's Department': 1906 British New Guinea Annual Report (Melbourne 1906), 30; (1907), 30; Papua Report (Melbourne 1908), 49; (1909), 26; (1910), 26; (1911), 41; (1912), 50; (1913), 57; Papua Annual Report (Melbourne 1914), 61; (1915), 111; (1916), 101; (1917), 11; (1919), 18; (1920), 13; (1921), 15; Territory of Papua Annual Report (Canberra 1949). 34: JDR, 3.8.5.8. : J2.2.0.J13-7.
TABLE I-3. Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>male</th>
<th>female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40+</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JDR, 3.8.5.8. (for 1901-25), J2.2.0.J13-7 (for 1926-40).

Social status is not so clear, for *Kaigai ryoken kafu hyō* [The list of overseas passport issues] does not always make this clear. The status of only 45 people is recorded. Of these, only four were *shizoku* (former samurai or descendants), while 42 were *heimin* (commoners) and there were no *kazoku* (peers). From the limited data, the majority of migrants may be assumed to be have been commoners.

TABLE I-4. Household status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household Status</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>household head</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>firstborn son</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wife accompanied by household head</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>second born son</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>brother to a household head</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>third born son</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fourth born son</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>firstborn daughter</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adopted child</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JDR, 3.8.5.8. (for 1901-25), J2.2.0.J13-7 (for 1926-40)

Most migrants were central members of a household.\(^{11}\) Three groups—household heads, firstborn sons and wives accompanied by a household head—make up almost half of the total; respectively 19.1 per cent, 17.4 per cent and 9.3 per cent (Table I-4). Although the number of second born sons is relatively high (12.7 per cent), the proportions of other family members like third born son, fourth born son and firstborn daughter are quite small (respectively 4.6 per cent, 3.4 per cent and 2.9 per cent). This pattern contradicts the general perception that migration occurred mainly due to poverty, and second born or third born sons, who became an economic burden in poor peasant families, migrated overseas to attempt to improve

\(^{11}\) The social status of some migrants changed when they revisited Papua or New Guinea. In such cases, the household status for the first visit is counted, ignoring the changes of status in later visits.
their economic situation. It is presumed that Papua and New Guinea provided a strong attraction even for central members of a household.

### TABLE I-5. Birth places of migrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>birth places</th>
<th>no. of migrants (%)</th>
<th>birth places</th>
<th>no. of migrants (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kumamoto-ken</td>
<td>40 (23.2)</td>
<td>Hiroshima-ken</td>
<td>9 (5.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amakusa-gun</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Aki-gun</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumamoto-shi</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hiroshima-shi</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nagasaki-ken</strong></td>
<td>39 (22.6)</td>
<td>Kurioka-gun</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kita-takaki-gun</strong></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Toyouchi-gun</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagasaki-shi</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Toyota-gun</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minami-takaki-gun</td>
<td>5</td>
<td><strong>Fukuoka-ken</strong></td>
<td>8 (4.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higashi-sonogi-gun</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mizuma-gun</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nishi-sonogi-gun</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Onga-gun</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nishi-takaki-gun</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Kurume-shi</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kita-matsuura-gun</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Miyako-gun</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minami-matsuura-gun</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Osaka-fu</td>
<td>6 (3.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wakayama-ken</strong></td>
<td>24 (13.9)</td>
<td>Osaka-shi</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higashi-muro-gun</td>
<td>13</td>
<td><strong>Kagoshima-ken</strong></td>
<td>5 (2.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nishi-muro-gun</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Aira-gun</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuchikata-gun</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kagoshima-shi</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiyoshi-gun</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Izumi-gun</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>unknown</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>Tokyo-fu</strong></td>
<td>5 (2.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Saga-ken</strong></td>
<td>9 (5.2)</td>
<td>Tokyo-shi</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naka-gun</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nijima-moto-mura</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saga-shi</td>
<td>2</td>
<td><strong>Chiba-ken</strong></td>
<td>3 (1.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higashi-matsuura-gun</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Kimitsu-gun</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miyaki-gun</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Awa-gun</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harumoto-gun</td>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>Okayama-ken</strong></td>
<td>3 (1.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Oda-gun</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kanagawa-ken</strong></td>
<td>9 (5.2)</td>
<td>Kojima-gun</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Miura-gun</strong></td>
<td>9</td>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td>12 (6.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>172 (100.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JDR. 3.8.5.8. (for 1901-25) and J2.2.0.J13-7 (for 1926-40).

A pattern of chain migration, which 'moves sets of related individuals or households from one place to another via a set of social arrangements in which people at the destination provide aid, information, and encouragement to new migrants',\(^{12}\) can be seen from birth places. Table I-5 shows that groups of migrants came from particular towns or villages.\(^{13}\) Kinship also indicates chain migration (Table I-6): 59 migrants are related to one another (34.3 per cent); they include a high proportion of married couples—31 persons.


\(^{13}\)Administrative zones of Japan consist of, from the largest, *ken* or *fu* (prefecture), *shi* (city), *gun* (county), *chō* (town) and *mura* (village).
TABLE I-6. Kinship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>no. of cases</th>
<th>no. of people</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>persons in couple (no children)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>couple (accompanied by children)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blood relations of other kinds</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JDR, 3.8.5.8. (for 1901-25) and J2.2.0.J13-7 (for 1926-40).

Most migrants were artisans. As Table I-7 shows, the largest occupational group was shipwrights, followed by carpenters, traders, fishermen and planters. This shows clearly that most migrants were recruited specifically for Komine's business—boatbuilding, shell-fishing, and plantation management.

TABLE I-7. Occupation of migrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>occupation</th>
<th>number</th>
<th>percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>shipwright</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>carpenter</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trader</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sawyer</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fisherman</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>planter</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maid</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clerk</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cook</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>labourer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>store assistant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>draftsman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>straw mat maker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dried bonito processor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>32*</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This group mostly includes people accompanying migrants, such as wives and children. Source: JDR, 3.8.5.8. (for 1901-25) and J2.2.0.J13-7 (for 1926-40).

Occupations are closely associated with birth places. Nearly half of the shipwrights came from Kumamoto-ken, almost all sawyers also came from Kumamoto-ken, most carpenters from Nagasaki-ken and Osaka-fu, and half of the planters from Wakayama-ken (see Table I-8). Furthermore, most migrants with the same occupation came from the same mura (village) or chō (town). For example, out of 23 shipwrights of Kumamoto-ken, 13 came from Goryō-mura. Out of six traders of Wakayama-ken, four came from Ōshima-mura. Out of four planters of Wakayama-ken, three came from Kushimoto-chō. All fishermen of Kanagawa-ken came from Misaki-chō. And out of five carpenters of Osaka-fu, four came from Imaki-chō.14

14JDR, 3.8.5.8. (for 1901-25) and J2.2.0.J13-7 (for 1926-40).
Table I-8. Relation between birth places and occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>birth places</th>
<th>shipwrights</th>
<th>carpenters</th>
<th>sawyers</th>
<th>traders</th>
<th>fishermen</th>
<th>planters</th>
<th>other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kumamoto-ken</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagasaki-ken</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wakayama-ken</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saga-ken</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanagawa-ken</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiroshima-ken</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukuoka-ken</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osaka-fu</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kagoshima-ken</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo-fu</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiba-ken</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JDR. 3.8.5.8. (for 1901-25) and J2.2.0.J13-7 (for 1926-40).

Table I-9. Japanese who married Papua New Guinean women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>name of Japanese</th>
<th>date of birth/migration/marriage</th>
<th>occupation*</th>
<th>birth place of wife</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arata Gunkichi</td>
<td>1877/1916/n.a.</td>
<td>plantation manager</td>
<td>Manus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asanuma Ichimatsu</td>
<td>1883/1917/1933</td>
<td>mechanic</td>
<td>Micronesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endo Shigetarō</td>
<td>1892/1913/1931</td>
<td>shipwright</td>
<td>New Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hagiwara Hikota</td>
<td>1892/1913/1934</td>
<td>plantation manager</td>
<td>Manus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ikesaki Tokuyoshi</td>
<td>1875/1913/1932</td>
<td>plantation manager</td>
<td>Manus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izumi Eikichi</td>
<td>1894/1914/1930</td>
<td>shipwright</td>
<td>New Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kawamura**</td>
<td>n.a./pre-1921/pre-1921</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Manus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kikuchi Ichisuke</td>
<td>1892/1918/1930</td>
<td>fisherman</td>
<td>West New Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimura Hideichirō</td>
<td>1897/1916/1939</td>
<td>fisherman</td>
<td>Micronesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koto Jimmy</td>
<td>n.a./pre-1900/pre-1900</td>
<td>fisherman, trader</td>
<td>Milne Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murakami Heijirō</td>
<td>1877/1901/1918</td>
<td>fisherman, trader</td>
<td>Milne Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakamura Sōshichi</td>
<td>1902/1917/1932</td>
<td>fisherman</td>
<td>West New Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakane**</td>
<td>n.a./pre-1924/pre-1924</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>New Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sasaki Hikokichi</td>
<td>1893/1917/1936</td>
<td>fisherman</td>
<td>Madang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tabuchi Yoshimitsu</td>
<td>1899/1917/1925</td>
<td>clerk</td>
<td>New Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamuya Mabe</td>
<td>n.a./pre-1910/pre-1910</td>
<td>fisherman, trader</td>
<td>Milne Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanaka Taichirō</td>
<td>1875/1902/pre-1906</td>
<td>fisherman, trader</td>
<td>Milne Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamashita Shichinosuke</td>
<td>1903/1913/1920</td>
<td>plantation manager</td>
<td>Manus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n.a.: no data available  *At the time of marriage  **First names unknown.

Source: JDR 3.8.5.8; AA, A367 C72533-C72588, A373/1 11505/48, MP1103/1 MJ18500-MJ18533; Admission 1901-63 (boys and girls), Vunapope Catholic Mission School; oral evidence collected by the author, December 1993 to March 1994, PNG

Intermarriages were common: 18 cases can be confirmed (Table I-9), in all of which Japanese males married local non-white females. There are about 200 mixed-race offspring, including second and third generation (Table I-10).
TABLE I-10. Mixed-race descendants (excluding deceased) by birth place

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birth Place</th>
<th>2nd generation</th>
<th>3rd generation</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Milne Bay</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East New Britain</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Ireland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West New Britain</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manus</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: oral evidence collected by the author, December 1993 to March 1994, PNG

MODERN JAPANESE PERCEPTIONS of the 'South' date back to the early 15th century when a new geographical term nanban (the South), which meant mainly the Southeast Asian region, was added to the traditional Japanese idea of the world hitherto restricted to Nippon, Kara (China), and Tenjiku (India).¹⁵ In the Meiji period (1868-1912), the Japanese perception of the South extended to the Southwest Pacific centred on Micronesia and a new term 'nan’yō' (the South Seas) was created. But the term 'nan’yō' is imprecise in Japanese literature. It can include all South Pacific islands but it can also include Southeast Asia. Also in English literature, as Peattie points out, it is ill-defined.¹⁶ In this book, I define nan’yō as a region that contains the islands of Micronesia, Melanesia, Polynesia and Southeast Asia, and I use it with flexibility according to the context.

¹⁵Henry Frei, Japan's Southward Advance and Australia (Melbourne 1991), 12.
¹⁶Mark Peattie, Nan’yō: The rise and fall of the Japanese in Micronesia 1885-1945 (Honolulu 1988), xvii-xviii.
Chapter 1

Exploration, 1890-1901

From the mid-1880s, European entrepreneurs operating mines and plantations 'tapped the long-established Asian labour market' to overcome the shortage of labour supplies from Melanesia.\(^1\) Among the Asian workers were Japanese, most of whom were brought to mines and plantations as labourers, and some recruited for shell-fishing in Torres Strait as skilled divers and tenders. The latter are generally known as pearl divers on Thursday Island. In the 1890s they began to dominate the pearl industry and provoked anti-Japanese feeling among their European counterparts.\(^2\) As a result, Australians restricted Japanese migration. In addition, the exhaustion of shell beds induced the Japanese to search for an alternative location for shell-fishing and settlement.

An adventurous and energetic Japanese skipper, Komine Isokichi, from a base in the Japanese settlement on Thursday Island, began to explore the waters of New Guinea in the 1890s. After a series of voyages, Komine eventually reached East New Britain in German New Guinea in 1901 and there he ushered in a period of Japanese migration.

**Japanese interest in the South Seas**

Until the late 19th century the Japanese government had no policies for the South Seas. The government was preoccupied with domestic affairs, while Germany, the United States, Australia, France, Spain, Netherlands, and Britain were involved in the acquisition and exchange of tropical islands. The Japanese government’s primary concern was to centralise governance in order to build a strong empire which could not be colonised. External affairs were secondary concerns in which the government was mainly preoccupied with the removal of unequal treaties imposed by Western nations and the promotion of national prestige. Although Japan’s expansionism was shown in the 1870s in Saigō Takamori’s claim to invade Korea, Ōkubo Toshimichi’s decision to send a military expedition to Taiwan and the government’s declaration that the Ryūkyū Islands and Sakhalin were parts of Japan.

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\(^1\)Margaret Willson et al., 'Asian Workers in the Pacific', in Margaret Willson et al. (eds), *Labour in the South Pacific* (Townsville 1990), 78.

expansion was limited to the adjacent region. The government's involvement in South Seas affairs was marginal and largely confined to matters of national prestige and the rights of citizens abroad.

Japan's first involvement in the South Seas was an embarrassing episode involving emigrants to Guam. In 1868 about 40 Japanese emigrated as contract labourers to work on a plantation, where a Spanish employer treated them harshly. The Japanese were treated no differently from locals and the employer did not pay their promised wages in full. Their complaint to a Spanish administrator was ignored. In 1871, after some had died due to harsh work conditions, three managed to return to Japan to report their plight. The government was astonished and the matter was discussed, but it is unknown whether it took any action to save these migrants or protested to the Spanish administration. In 1868, 153 contract labourers in Hawaii suffered a similar fate. These incidents embarrassed the Japanese government which was acutely sensitive about its national dignity, but probably the government, which was just managing to survive by pacifying rebels, chose not to protest in order to avoid conflicts that it could not handle confidently. The government could only ban emigration by enforcing tight regulations to avoid further national disgrace.

However, the issue of sovereignty over the Ogasawara (also known as Bonin) Islands provided an opportunity to stimulate Japanese interest in the South Seas. Although the Tokugawa government hardly resisted when Commodore Perry demanded the opening of Japan and proclaimed US possession of the Ogasawara Islands in 1853, some vocal Meiji officials in 1875 'emphasised the urgency of return of the islands that could connect Japanese interests to the South Seas'. The report of the Foreign Ministry to the Prime Minister explained that 'the islands were a strategic point in the Pacific sea route, which was extremely important in Japan's advancement in the South Sea'. Then negotiations began and the US compromised. The issue signalled the beginning of the government's awareness of its interests in the South Seas. It was also significant in that the government promoted national dignity by recovering territory.

As the incidents in Guam and Hawaii showed, the government was aware of its weak international position and tried not to provoke other Western nations in the South Seas until the 1880s. Such a naive posture was exemplified when a Japanese sailor was murdered by local people on Lae Island in the Marshalls in 1884. The government sent Suzuki Tsunenori and Gotô Taketarō (both prominent nanshin-ron advocates) to investigate. They

3Irie Toraji, Meiji nanshin shi kō [A short history of southward expansion in the Meiji Era] (Tokyo 1943), 10-16.
4Ibid., 32.
5Ibid., 34.
found the murderers and reached a settlement with a local chieftain on condition that the chieftain apologise and allow a Japanese flag to be raised on the island. However, Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru rebuked Suzuki and Gotô, explaining that raising a flag on the island would provoke the displeasure of other Western powers. Suzuki was sent back to the island to lower the flag.6

The government's prudent attitude began to change when Enomoto Buyō, a diplomat posted in Russia, advocated Japanese involvement in the South Seas. He was the first government official to draft a blueprint for Japan's territorial expansion and in 1877 proposed to colonise New Guinea. During his posting in Russia, he observed Western powers competing for colonies all over the world and proposed to the Prime Minister, Iwakura Tomomi, that the government purchase the Mariana and Caroline Islands from Spain. The Japanese government would send officials to those islands from an office at Guam which would be a branch office of an administration centre in the Izu Islands (about 100 kilometres south of Tokyo). The colonists would plant hāna (for quinine), tobacco and coffee, using convict labour. He then proposed to colonise Papua, New Guinea and the Solomons as a second step, and to acquire all small islands in the South Seas to make them bases for Japan's maritime enterprise that, he expected, would extend as far as India and Australia.7 He also proposed to purchase Borneo.8 However, his proposals were not accepted. The government could not address external affairs, being 'burdened with rising domestic problems'.9 The rebellions of peasants and anti-government former samurai were at their peak in the 1870s.

In 1889 the centralisation of governance was achieved with the enactment of the Meiji Constitution. The government began to probe for opportunities to expand its territory. The major concern was East Asia where Japan had to fend off Russian expansion for its own security and where the acquisition of territories looked possible. The government also pursued interests in the South Seas under Enomoto's initiatives when he was appointed Foreign Minister from May 1891 to August 1892. During his term of office, he established the Emigration Section in order 'to send Japanese to the South Seas to expand maritime enterprise and commercial interests and to solve Japan's overpopulation problem'.10 He also introduced the bill that enabled

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6 Yano Tōru, Nihon no nan'yō shi kan [Japanese historical view of the South Seas] (Tokyo 1979), 36.
7 Enomoto Buyō Monjo 6-13 shì 1877, Kensei-shiryō-shitsu, National Diet Library (Tokyo).
8 Ueno Hisashi, "Enomoto shokumin-chi no hikari to kage [The light and darkness of 'Enomoto Colony']", in Nakayama, Yukio (ed.), Gendai shiten sengoku bakumatsu no gunzō Enomoto Buyō [Contemporary view, protagonists in at the Civil Wars era and the end of Edo era] (Tokyo 1983), 129.
9 Irie., op.cit., 37.
10 Ueno, op.cit.
the government to send teams to investigate destinations for emigration.\textsuperscript{11} From 1891 to 1894 teams visited New Caledonia, New Hebrides, Fiji, the Philippines, Australia, Malaya and Thailand.\textsuperscript{12} At the same time Enomoto played a pioneering role in stimulating intellectuals. He established the Tokyo Geographic Society (Tokyo Chigaku Kyōkai) in 1879 and Colonisation Society (Shokumin Kyōkai) in 1893. Both Societies published journals and urged Japanese to take an interest in the region. The members of the Societies included leading nanshin-ron advocates such as Inagaki Manjirō, Taguchi Ukichi and Shiga Shigetaka.\textsuperscript{13} However, victory in the Sino-Japanese War distracted the government's attention from the South Seas, and Enomoto's initiatives did not develop into consistent policies.

\textbf{Trade}

Japanese trade with the South Seas was of course small compared with that with other areas such as China or North America. The trade figures for Micronesia were so minuscule that they did not appear in Japanese statistics. Those of Southeast Asia and Australia were similarly small, although they increased rapidly. Exports to Australia increased from 0.1 million yen in 1880 to 2.5 million in 1900 and imports from 0.03 million yen to 2.4 million. Although sufficient data on Southeast Asia are not available, exports to India and Thailand were 0.1 million yen in 1880 and imports were 1.7 million, while in 1900 exports to French Indochina, Thailand, the Philippines, and Dutch East Indies were 16.3 million yen and imports were 10.9 million. The proportion of trade with Southeast Asia and Australia in overall Japanese trade increased from 0.2 per cent in 1880 to 3.5 per cent in 1900.\textsuperscript{14}

The development of the South Seas trade owed much to individual traders, and little to government. Taguchi, a practical nanshin-ron advocate, initiated the trade with Micronesia. He established the Nantō Shōkai (South Islands Company) in 1890 and asserted that 'There are many people who insist on profits from trading with the South Seas. However, none of their opinions are convincing. The reason I established the Nantō Shōkai is that advocates of South Seas trade lack practice.' Taguchi's company was short-lived; it was

\textsuperscript{11}Tsunoyama Yukihiro, \textit{Enomoto Buyō to Mekishiko ijū} [Enomoto Buyō and immigration to Mexico] (Tokyo 1986), 59-60.

\textsuperscript{12}Irie, op.cit., 113.


\textsuperscript{14}Tōkei-in [the Statistical Bureau] (ed.), \textit{Nihon teikoku tōkei nenkan} [Statistical yearbook of Japan Empire], Vol.1 (Tokyo 1882), 193-295; Vol.33 (1914), 216.

\textsuperscript{15}Taguchi Ukichi, 'Nan'yō bōeki jimu hōkoku [Business report on South Seas trade]', Inoue, Hikosaburō and Suzuki, \textit{Nantō junkō ki} [Record of a cruise in the southern islands] (Tokyo 1893), 247.
Chapter 1: Exploration, 1890-1901

liquidated in 1892 upon his return from the first trip to Micronesia. But its impact was considerable. It initiated a rush to establish small trading companies by other nanshin-ron advocates in the 1890s.

Larger-scale trade relations developed with Southeast Asia and Australia. As in Micronesia, the development of the trade owed much to individuals. However, in contrast to the Japan-Micronesia trade, most traders in Southeast Asia were not nanshin-ron advocates but petty traders who worked in partnership with karayuki-san (Japanese prostitutes overseas). Their main business activity was to sell Japanese-made miscellaneous goods to karayuki-san who spearheaded the Japanese presence mainly at Singapore.

Similarly, Japan-Australia trade was not developed by nanshin-ron advocates. A trader of resolute will, Kanematsu Fusajirō, pioneered the Australian trade, foreseeing the potential in importing wool.

**Emigration**

Like trade, Japanese migration to the South Seas was small in scale. The number of migrants to South Pacific Islands, Australia and Southeast Asia, mainly as labourers, was much smaller than to Hawaii, Peru, Brazil and Mexico in the same period. The number going to the South Seas can be counted in hundreds whereas the numbers to other areas exceeded 10,000. The small scale can be attributed to the limited land size and economic activities in the South Pacific Islands, migration restriction in Australia, and the availability of a cheap local work force in Southeast Asia. Much migration was also short term due to unexpected harsh work conditions and the hostile tropical environment to which the migrants were not accustomed.

Systematic migration to the South Pacific and Australia started from the 1880s. The Japanese migrated to Thursday Island, sugar-cane fields in Queensland and Fiji, and to a mine in New Caledonia. Most migrants were keiyaku imin (contract emigrants) who were recruited by European brokers or by Japanese emigration companies to work for European employers. The only exceptions were the majority of Japanese on Thursday Island, who were jiyū imin (free emigrants) and engaged in shell-fishing.

Migration to Thursday Island began when an Englishman, John Miller, recruited 37 Japanese in 1883. They were the first migrants with endorsement from the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Meanwhile, in 1888, 100
Japanese peasants were recruited as labourers for work on a sugar-cane plantation in Queensland. In 1891, the first Japanese emigration company, the Yoshisa Imin Kaisha (Yoshisa Emigration Company), was established. The company played a central role in sending Japanese to the South Pacific Islands and Australia, but it neglected to investigate the work conditions adequately and this was one of the reasons for the discontinuance of South Seas migration. In 1892, the company sent 600 migrants to New Caledonia as labourers in a nickel mine. The migrants complained to the company that their work conditions were too harsh and their wages were lower than those of local labourers. A disaster occurred when the company sent 305 migrants to Fiji on the request of Burns, Philp in 1894. One hundred and eleven migrants died of beriberi, dysentery and tropical fever.

The end of migration was also attributable to restriction by the Queensland government in the late 1890s. By that time, the Japanese population on Thursday Island had grown rapidly. In 1891 only 12 arrived, but 100 arrived in 1892 and 264 in 1893, and the population reached 376 by the end of 1893 and increased to 1,500 by 1897. The Japanese worked diligently and dominated the shell-fishing industry. Inevitably, they threatened their European counterparts in the industry and this eventually led the Queensland government to legislate to restrict Japanese migration.

In response, the Japanese government protested but proved to be compliant; it spontaneously stopped emigration to Queensland in 1897. What the Japanese government was concerned about was national prestige; migration should not be restricted by race but by number. In the Japanese view, the spontaneous restriction meant a gentlemanly action—an admirable deed characteristic of an honourable nation. Nevertheless the Queensland government continued to tighten restrictions. In 1898 it banned Japanese ownership of fishing boats for pearl and *bêche-de-mer* fishing. Finally, the enforcement of the Immigration Restriction Act of 1902 by the Commonwealth of Australia virtually shut the door on further Japanese migration. It was the entrenchment of the White Australia Policy by which Australians aimed to establish their nation free from coloured races. The Act included a notorious dictation test which was devised to refuse entry to non-English speaking people, mainly Asians.

Meanwhile, sporadic migration proceeded to Southeast Asia but largely failed. *Nanshin-ron* advocates, Iwamoto Chitsuna and Ishibashi Usaburō,

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20Irte, op.cit. (1943), 127.
21Ibid., 130.
22Ibid., 135.
23Ibid., 399; Hattori Toru, *Nankyū no shin shokumin* [A new colony in the southern hemisphere] (Tokyo 1894), 18-19.
established the Shamu Shokumin Kaisha (Thailand Colonisation Company) and sent about 50 peasants there as agricultural labourers in 1895. Their venture failed because the company did not pay the promised wages and the migrants cancelled their contracts. Many of them went to work in a nearby mine, but most got sick and died there. In 1896, Ishihara Tetsunosuke, a wealthy landlord from Aichi, sent about 30 peasants to British Malaya as agricultural migrants, after reading promising reports about migration to the western coast of Malaya in Shokumin Kyōkai Hōkoku (Colonisation Society Report). This migration also failed due to harsh working conditions and a series of heavy floods.

The migration of karayuki-san shows a striking contrast. It is estimated that nearly 1,000 karayuki-san were engaged in prostitution in Singapore alone by 1900 and Japanese and Chinese entrepreneurs exploited them.

**Ideology**

Some intellectuals began to show an interest in the South Seas from the late 1880s, although the concept of nanshin was not new and goes back to Toyotomi Hideyoshi's plan to invade southern China in the 16th century. The major characteristic of modern nanshin was its non-militarist approach and the assertion of free trade, reflecting Japan's vulnerable international position. Japan wanted to remove unequal treaties, avoiding direct conflict with Western nations because it lacked economic and military strength.

Enomoto's plan to develop colonies in the South Seas was a typical example. Kamo argues that 'Enomoto's attempt to purchase South Seas islands from Spain did not come from imperialistic intention, but from the situation that Japan had to develop its international trade and maritime enterprise (in order to develop its economy). Similarly, Tsunoyama claims that Enomoto thought that territorial problems among colonial powers should be solved peacefully; Japan should seek colonies where there were few problems, and should assist the economic development of the colonies through development of natural resources and trade links with Japan. Territorial expansion in Enomoto's view did not mean colonisation by invading other countries but the purchase of undeveloped areas and the investment of capital for development.

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25Irie, op.cit. (1943), 137-56.
26A journal of Enomoto's Colonisation Society.
Enomoto’s idea of peaceful maritime-oriented colonisation was articulated in the prospectus of the Colonisation Society in 1893:

1. The way to prevent over-population in our nation is to promote emigration and colonisation today.
2. Japanese topography, which is surrounded by the sea on its four sides, makes sea transport so useful and it also helps to promote emigration and colonisation.
3. In order to gain our nation’s maritime right, we have to expand our sea routes.
4. If colonisation proceeds, the demand for our goods will increase from colonists as well as foreigners and thereby it will greatly promote our commerce.
5. The heart of our people has been dispirited because of the seclusion policy for many years . . . Colonisation will greatly uplift our spirits against the outside world, widen our view, and help import new knowledge, and thereby it is an urgent task for pursuing our open policy that should change the minds of our people.31

Largely coinciding with Enomoto’s term in the Foreign Ministry and the return of his investigation teams, other intellectuals also began to express an interest. The publications by leading nan shin-ron advocates were concentrated from the late 1880s to the early 1890s. Some were written by those who participated in the Imperial Navy’s training voyages which started in 1875. The voyages carried civilians, some of whom became nan shin-ron advocates such as Shiga and Yokoo.32

Like Enomoto, most nan shin-ron advocates asserted the need to promote Japanese mercantile activities in the South Seas. For example, Shiga, in Nan’yō jiji (Current Affairs in the South Seas), emphasised the promotion of trade, introducing Australia as a favourable trading partner and writing five chapters out of 18 about Japan-Australia trade and Australia.33 Similarly, Hattori Tōru concluded in Nihon no nan’yō (Japan’s South Seas) that ‘Japan can enjoy great benefit from the South Seas through developing an economic relationship’.34 Suzuki was more idealistic, stating that the purposes of Japan’s expansion were to assist the independence of the islands and to raise the national prestige of Japan.35 Taguchi, a prominent liberal economist, pointed out the benefits derived from Japanese migrants in Hawaii, and emphasised that the development of a mercantile fleet was a key to promoting trade and emigration.36 Suganuma Teifū was one of few advocates who introduced a militaristic aspect. In Shin nihon no tonan no yume (Dream of

31Shokumin kyokai [Colonisation Society], Shokumin jihō [Colonisation Times], Vol.85 (Tokyo 1901), 1-2.
32Yano, op.cit. (1979), 14.
33Shiga Shigetaka, ‘Nan’yō jiji’ [Current Affairs in the South Seas], in 1927, Shiga Shigetaka zenshū [the complete works of Shigetaka Shiga], Vol.3 (Tokyo 1887), 1-111.
34Hattori Tōru, Nihon no Nan’yō [Japan’s South Sea] (Tokyo 1888), 158.
35Inoue Hikosaburō and Suzuki Tsunenori, Nantō junkō ki [Record of a cruise in the southern islands] (Tokyo 1893), 253.
36Taguchi Ukichi, ‘Nan’yō keiryaku ron’ [How to expand into the South Seas], Tokyo keizai zasshi [Tokyo economic journal], 21(513) (Tokyo 1890), 351-3.
new Japan's expansion to southern lands) written in 1888 but published in 1940, he predicted an easy victory over Western colonial powers in the South Seas, comparing Japanese military strength with that of Western powers. He also argued that the seizure of the islands would demonstrate Japan's superior naval power.37

However, nanshin-ron in the late 19th century was never an influential ideology. None of the advocates were graduates of the Tokyo or Kyoto Imperial University and were hardly recognised in academic circles.38 Nor did they (except for Enomoto) hold positions in the government. The number of publications about the South Seas was small: only 17 books and articles were published from 1868 to 1901, compared to hundreds about East Asia.39 Moreover, the publications of the leading nanshin-ron advocates were mostly personal recollections like Shiga's short accounts, Taguchi's brief essay, Suzuki's three books on his trips, and Suganuma's draft which nobody heeded at the time of writing. These works were unjustly overvalued by nanshin-ron advocates of a later period, particularly from the late 1930s to the early 1940s, to justify Japanese aggression in the South Seas.40

Japanese perceptions of New Guinea

From the 1880s, intellectuals intermittently introduced Japanese readers to both German and British New Guinea and contributed to creating perceptions. Japanese ideas of New Guinea developed with a territorial desire in the 1880s and with practical assessments of commercial potential in the 1890s. However, New Guinea was always an appendix to their central interest in other places such as Micronesia and Australia. Descriptions of New Guinea were mostly brief and some were simply translated from Western sources. Probably few people except nanshin-ron advocates, the South Seas traders and agents of emigration companies could find it on a map. In general, New Guinea was described as a tropical land of cannibals colonised by Western nations.

In the 1880s nanshin-ron advocates described the nature and the people of New Guinea mainly to suggest Japanese colonisation. That indicates that New Guinea was already embraced in an overall framework of nanshin. For

37 Suganuma Teifū, 'Shin nihon no tonan to yume' [Dream of new Japan's expansion to southern lands], Dai nihon shōgyō shi [Commercial history of Great Japan] (Tokyo 1940), 657-9.
38 Yano, op.cit. (1979), 65.
40 Yano, op.cit. (1979), 57-8.
example, Sasaki Taketsuna, a member of Enomoto’s Tokyo Geographic Society, emphasised the necessity of acquiring New Guinea:

Life [in New Guinea] is not so difficult, as the climate is of the best kind and there is a sufficient supply of food. The only problem is sometimes we have attacks from natives. The islands [of New Guinea] are located at a distance of only a 10 day-voyage from Japan. It is to our advantage to gain these islands both from a strategic and a commercial point of view. Today is the opportunity to acquire these islands.41

Yokoo also urged Japanese colonisation of South Seas islands. After an exploration voyage on the *Meiji Maru*, he reported in 1887 that Germany and Spain had shrewdly acquired New Guinea and the Philippines respectively, and suggested that Japan should acquire other islands urgently.42

In the same year, Shiga mentioned German New Guinea, briefly describing the ‘extremely hot climate and violent natives in the Admiralty Islands, New Britain, New Ireland, and the Solomons’.43 Although Shiga did not refer to colonisation, he might have aroused public awareness of German New Guinea, as his description was in his best-selling book *Nant’yō jiji*, which sparked a boom in public interest in the South Seas.

The statement of Tsuneya Seifuku, a prominent economist and advocate of emigration, is a typical example showing a stereotyped image of New Guineans. Although he never visited New Guinea, he wrote in *Kaigai Shokumin-ron* (Overseas colonisation theory) in 1891: ‘Natives do not know the way to establish trade relationships and they have a ferocious nature. They like fighting and find the greatest pleasure in killing enemies and eating the enemy’s flesh.44 In the 1890s, the *nanshin-ron* advocates’ resentment that Japan had missed out on acquiring territories subsided, but a realistic assessment of the German monopoly of commerce emerged. Tomiyama Komakichi brought first-hand information about German rule in New Guinea. As a member of the Colonisation Society and of the investigation team to New Caledonia, he was on board a navy training ship, *Hiei*, that visited Kokopo in New Britain for a week in 1891 on the way to New Caledonia, and in 1892 on the way back.45 He reported on the colonial administration, the population, and how the New Guinea Company dominated commerce and sold coal to his ship for an extortionate price. He also reported that a German administrator had expressed his concern about the Japanese intention of colonising the

42Asano shimbun [Asano Newspaper], 23 Nov. 1887.
43Shiga, op.cit., 71.
45Irie, op.cit. (1943), 113; Tomiyama Komakichi, ‘Konan Nikki [The diary of the voyage to the South]’, *Shokumin kyōkai hōkoku* [The report of the Colonisation Society], No.3 (Tokyo 1893), 110.
South Seas. Interestingly, he also alluded to the possibility of Japanese migration to New Guinea in ancient days:

According to a scholar who wrote a book about the South Seas, he dug out Japanese swords, bows and arrows in some place in New Guinea and he suggested that the Japanese might have migrated there in ancient days. He also found native behaviour similar to that of Japanese.

The Japanese saw British New Guinea as more accessible than German New Guinea because of its proximity to a thriving Japanese community on Thursday Island. They assessed the possibility of migration and mounting a shell-fishing operation from Thursday Island. Nakayama Katsuki, a member of Enomoto's Tokyo Geographic Society, was the first writer to introduce Port Moresby and neighbouring areas in Nyū ginia no moresubi kō oyobi kīnbō no chisei oyobi dojin ni kansuru kiji (Report on topography and natives of Port Moresby and neighbouring areas in New Guinea). Although it was simply a translation into Japanese of Octavius Stone's A few months in New Guinea (1880), it was published in the Society's journal. Three years later, Hattori, a leading nanshin-ron advocate, wrote about the possibility of Japanese migration from Queensland to Papua, pointing out the convenience of the established sea route from Australia to Port Moresby and New Guinea.

Tsuji Ken'nosuke, an agent of the Yoshisa Emigration Company on Thursday Island and also a member of the Colonisation Society, brought up the economy of British New Guinea in Toresu kaikyo tanken nikki (Diary of exploration in Torres Strait), which was published in the Society's journal in 1895. Tsuji reported the promising shell-fishing in British New Guinea waters but warned of the danger of the operation due to rugged sea-beds which had already caused the deaths of some Japanese divers. He also pointed to the abundant bamboo and emphasised the potential for making huge profits in cane work.

46Tomiyama, ibid., 107-8; Tomiyama, 'Kōnan Nikki [The diary of the voyage to the South]', Shokumin kyō kai hō koku [The Colonisation Society Report], No.6 (Tokyo 1893), 90.
47Tomiyama, op.cit. (1893), 110. However, this statement has not been proved by any contemporary archaeologists.
48Nakayama Katsuki, ‘Nyū, ginia no moresubi kō oyobi kīnbō no chisei oyobi dojin ni kansuru kiji [the article about Port Moresby in New Guinea and the geography and natives nearby], translation from A few Months in New Guinea by Octavius C. Stone, 1880, Tokyo chigaku kyōkai hōkoku [The Report of Tokyo Geographic Society], Vol.3, No.7 (Tokyo 1881), 41-69.
49Hattori, op.cit., 47.
51Ibid., 18-19.
**Australian and German perceptions of Japanese**

Australians perceived Japanese with fear and racial prejudice. That was manifested in the eruption of strident statements about the 'Yellow Peril' in the late 19th century. Although the 'Yellow Peril' had originally referred to Chinese migration in the mid-19th century, it was extended to the Japanese after the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95). The Japanese victory proved that Japan now possessed sufficient military strength to expand in Asia. But the victory 'did not greatly influence Australian thought—Japan was added by some sections of thought to the list of possible threats and excluded by others ... [and] all Governments cut down the defence expenditures and the press in general concurred.' However, alarm about the 'Yellow Peril' was intensified in the 1890s when the trade union movement 'adopted economic racism' to defend the interests of white labourers from the competition of non-whites. In Queensland particularly, anti-Japanese feeling was predominant in public opinion. A local newspaper, *The Settler and South Queensland Pioneer*, reported: 'The Japanese are a menace to this colony . . . The Japanese is so patriotic that there is no room for European labourers, mechanics, or merchants; he ousts them all . . . The British Empire is not China; Thursday Island is not Port Arthur.'

There were some sympathetic and realistic views of the Japanese migrants, such as that of Noel Burton, an official of the South Australian government, who denied that the Japanese were a threat to Australian labourers in north Queensland. He insisted:

> There is needless alarm about the Japanese flooding the country. Their numbers are greatly over-estimated. Only about 1100 workers are on the sugar plantations and the Thursday Island Government Resident says that they do not increase . . . Most of them are doing work which Europeans would not do. Whether in pearl-fishing or sugar work, they are competing with other coloured labour.

But his view was overwhelmed by the opponents.

The fierce competition in the pearl industry due to the increased tempo of Japanese arrivals at Thursday Island and the exhaustion of sea beds provoked the Queensland government to pass laws which tightly restricted Japanese influence. The Pearl Shell and Bêche-de-Mer Fishery Act (1898) aimed at stopping Japanese domination of the industry by limiting licences to British subjects only. The Aborigines' Protection Act Amendment Act (1899) virtually prohibited Japanese fishing operators from employing local...
labourers. Moreover, the Sugar Works Guarantee Act Amendment Act (1900) which guaranteed the government's preferential treatment of sugar mills which employed only white labourers prevented the industry from employing non-white workers.\(^56\)

Those acts also reflected Australian attempts to set their 'white' boundary. North Queensland and Torres Strait was a melting pot of various races—Asians, Pacific Islanders, Torres Strait Islanders and Australian Aborigines—and was a periphery to the Australians who were attempting to establish a white nation in the Far South. As Denoon argues, the officials in Brisbane and Melbourne viewed this area 'in the light of the aspiration to achieve a "white Australia", devising fresh techniques of social control for problems quite unlike those of the rest of the continent'.\(^57\) Finally the Commonwealth of Australia enacted the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901, and placed its northern periphery under the 'White Australia'.

In contrast, it appears that German officials demonstrated little anxiety about Japanese as far as written materials can show. German accounts are mostly just statistics. The \textit{Annual Reports} recorded frequent appearances of Japanese boats in New Guinea. In 1893 seven Japanese sailing boats (three to Herbertshöhe, one to Matupi, and three to Nusa) were reported.\(^58\) The Germans were also aware of the presence of some Japanese in New Guinea. In the 1891-93 period, although exact numbers are not known, 'twenty-six of Chinese, Japanese or unknown origin with three women and six children' were identified in Kaiser Wilhelmsland.\(^59\) This indifference (compared to the Australians) was probably due to the smaller number and the much smaller scale of economic activity of the Japanese than of their counterparts in Queensland and the absence of a white working class. The Japanese presence in German territory was too inconspicuous for the Germans to form any perceptions.

\textit{From Thursday Island to New Guinea}

From the mid-1890s, over-exploitation of shell-fishing became a serious problem to Japanese operators on Thursday Island. A Japanese consul at Townsville reported pessimistically:

The pearl industry—the only industry to collect marine products on Thursday island—has so far lasted for twenty years. As a result, most beds around the


\(^{57}\)Donald Denoon, 'The Boundaries of Australian Cultural Studies', unpublished (Canberra, date unknown), 1.

\(^{58}\)Peter Sack and Dymphna Clark (eds and trans.), \textit{German New Guinea: The Annual Reports} (Canberra 1979), 84.

\(^{59}\)Ibid., 83.
Island were fished out and these days divers have to dive in difficult spots as deep as thirty to thirty five fathoms.60

Some enterprising Japanese began to search for an alternative location for shell-fishing and settlement in New Guinea. Among them was Komine Isokichi. Komine was born in Shimabara in Kyūshū in 1866, the ninth child of a peasant, Komine Hisazaemon.61 At the age of 16, Komine went to Korea to be employed by a trade company, Fukushima-ya (Fukushima Company), which sold goods to the Japanese navy stationed there. According to Captain Kamijō Fukashi, during his employment in Korea Komine revealed his stout hearted character and was liked by the navy officers.62 It is likely that Komine learned about the South Seas and the high wages of divers on Thursday Island from navy officers.

In September 1890, he arrived at Thursday Island. Initially he was employed by an Englishman and spent two years on his boat. During this period, he went fishing as far as German New Guinea and made a very good catch of shell. Probably the good catch brought him sufficient capital to stimulate his spirit of enterprise. In 1892, he discussed with other Japanese on the islands, Matsuoka Kōichi and Okamura Hyakutsuchi, a plan to establish a trading company to export marine products to Japan. They quickly agreed, and Matsuoka and Okamura returned to Japan to find associates in their venture—but in vain. The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War also caused them to give up the plan. According to Irie, although the plan was aborted, Komine's spirit did not subside: he learnt how to build a boat and built two shell-fishing boats with Taguchi Tastuzō.63 Then his search for a new paradise continued.

From 1890 to 1894 he was intermittently exploring the waters of New Guinea, occasionally returning to Thursday Island. Later he reported his explorations in *Shokumin Kyōkai hōkoku*.64 In November 1894 he went exploring again: he sailed 50 miles up the Fly River.65 Also this time he was with Tsuji, a member of the Colonisation Society and an agent of the Yoshisa

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60 Shokumin kyōkai [Colonisation Society], 'Gōshū mokuyō tō oyobi pōto dāwîn kō ni okeru honpôjin no jikkō [The actual conditions of the Japanese on Thursday Island and Port Darwin in Australia]', *Shokumin kyōkai hōkoku* [The Colonisation Society Report], No.63 (Tokyo 1898), 9.

61 The author's interview with Sato Yachiyo (daughter of a nephew of Komine Isokichi), 1 July 1993, Nagasaki, Japan.

62 Kamijō Fukashi, *Sensen ichi man kairi: Zen sekai taisen ji nan'yō no sen-shū* [War front in a thousand miles away: war history in the South Seas in the previous war] (Tokyo 1941), 182. Kamijō's statement should be treated with caution, as his book has a strong tone of nanshin propaganda and was written just before the outbreak of the Pacific War. In his book, Kamijō clearly attempted to portray Komine as a nanshin pioneer.

63 Irie, op.cit. (1943), 182. Irie is partly wrong. Komine did not build the boats but purchased them.


65 Ibid., 87.
Emigration Company on Thursday Island.\(^6\) Interestingly, Tsuji joined the Colonisation Society in 1894 with the introduction of Tsuneya who commented on New Guineans in his book (see p.24).\(^6\) Even more interestingly, just before he came to Thursday island he had met Matsuoka, who was in Japan to find associates for the company that Komine planned to establish. At his encounter with Matsuoka, Tsuji suggested that they establish a deep-sea fishery company together, but the plan was aborted due to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. Then Tsuji came to Thursday Island.\(^6\)

Tsuji met Komine on the island on 9 November 1894. Only six days later, they went exploring. They sailed first to Lebrun, a small island in the Engineer Group in British New Guinea, and camped there for a week, then returned to Thursday Island.\(^6\) The following year, they made another expedition to Torres Strait and British New Guinea.\(^7\) Tsuji was excited by these explorations and reported them in the journal of the Colonisation Society.

Komine's encounter with Tsuji was significant because it acquainted Komine with \textit{nanshin-ron} advocates. After the voyage, he joined the Association on Tsuji's introduction in 1895. More significantly, he was introduced to Enomoto. Tsuji wrote to Enomoto about Komine.

\begin{quote}
The owner of the shell-fishing boat \textit{Shishi} that I got on is from Nagasaki and one of the most competent divers. His name is Komine Isokichi. This person has a nationalistic ideology with a strong interest in fishery and agriculture. He is a promising person for the future.\(^7\)
\end{quote}

It was an unexpected but lucky turning point in Komine's life. A mere pearl diver from the poor countryside had the chance to be acquainted with Tokyo intellectuals and even with the Foreign Minister. Probably Komine was thrilled to realise that he was practising the ideas of the \textit{nanshin-ron} advocates. Although his piece in the journal was merely an account of the conditions of shell-fishing and his explorations (and had no \textit{nanshin-ron}-like statements such as Japan's need to develop economic links with the South Seas), most probably Komine became aware that his desire to make a fortune in the South Seas was compatible with the ideology of Tokyo intellectuals.

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\(^6\)Ibid., 69.
\(^6\)Komine, op.cit., 86.
\(^7\)Tsuji, op.cit., 15.
\(^7\)Irie, op.cit. (1943), 182-3.
After the exploration with Komine, Tsuji showed a strong interest in New Guinea as a possible migration destination and the two decided to establish the Nichi-gō Bōeki Kaisha (Japan-Australia Trade Company) to promote Japanese migration to British New Guinea. They planned to purchase land and to develop trade between Japan and Australia specialising in marine products from the Torres Strait. Tsuji approached the British New Guinea administration over the purchase of land. In December 1895 he managed a half day talk with Governor Sir William MacGregor on the possibility of transferring land to Japanese settlers. However, Tsuji’s request did not get a favourable response. MacGregor’s major concern in land policy was to protect the interests of Papuans from aliens and he adopted the same migration policy as in Queensland. Selling land to non-white aliens was out of the question. Consequently the company did not get off the ground, although Tsuji and Komine won Japanese investors.

There was another Japanese who planned a similar venture. Ogirima Gonzaemon, a general manager of the Kōsei Emigration Company, attempted to send Japanese to British New Guinea but also failed. On 11 May 1900, Ogirima asked the Japanese Foreign Ministry for permission to expand emigration to New Guinea, saying that the Company’s agent, Satō Torajirō, who was a leader of the Japanese community on Thursday Island, had discussed the possibility of a shell-fishing venture with a manager of Burns, Philp and got an encouraging impression. Satō also said that he met Lieutenant-Governor George Le Hunt of British New Guinea and elicited a favourable comment on Japanese emigration.

The matter was discussed between Iijima Kametaro, the consul at Townsville, and Eitaki Hisakichi, the consul-general at Sydney. Eitaki wrote to Iijima after some investigation that he found that Le Hunt opposed migration and Burns, Philp denied any possibility of involvement, although the premier of Queensland, Robert Philp, gave a rather favourable answer, saying that he was considering Japanese migration to British New Guinea but faced opposition from the Labor Party. According to Eitaki, Philp suggested that about 450 Japanese could be sent to Samarai. Nevertheless, Iijima supported Ogirima’s request and wrote a recommendation to Foreign Minister Aoki Shūzo. But at the same time Iijima was concerned about unfavourable aspects. He also wrote to Sugimura Fukashi, the director of the Commerce

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74 Iijima to Aoki, 5 May 1900, JDR, 6.1.5.6-32.
75 Ogirima to Aoki, 11 May 1900, JDR 3.8.2.67.
76 Eitaki to Iijima, 30 Aug. 1900, ibid.
77 Iijima to Aoki, 3 Sept. 1900, ibid.
Bureau, that the company's proposal was promoted mainly by Satō who was trying to retrieve his failure to introduce a batch of settlers to Thursday Island; that if emigration became possible the Japanese government should advise the company to warn migrants of the high cost of living in New Guinea; and that the government should be aware of a situation where migration would be prohibited due to European jealousy aroused by speculative Japanese migrants.78

In the event, Iijima's concerns soon became unnecessary as he found that Satō had made false statements about the responses from Le Hunt and Burns, Philp and that the Queensland government's refusal was based on the judgement that shell-fishing in New Guinea waters was too dangerous even for Japanese divers.79 The Japanese government did not approve the emigration. Thus, the Japanese who were being squeezed out of Queensland found no back-door to British New Guinea. In addition, Komine's application for naturalisation in Queensland was refused in 1898.80 Possibly those events led Komine to knock on the door of German New Guinea in 1901.

Relevance to Japanese social history

The modernisation of Japan started with the Meiji Restoration of 1868 under the banner of fukoku kyōhei (enrich the nation, strengthen the army) and the introduction of Western capitalism and ideas. It coincided with rapid population growth, from approximately 33 million people in 1872 to 45 million in 1900 at an average five-yearly rate of nearly 10 per cent.81 However, the government's economic policy impoverished the majority of the growing rural population. In 1873, the government executed the land tax reform (chiso kaisei) in order to remove feudalistic restrictions on the development of capitalism. Matsukata Masayoshi, who took the Finance Minister's office in 1881, rigorously carried out a deflation policy to counter the inflation that was caused by the over-supply of nonconvertible notes and public bonds issued to meet the expenses of the Seinan War of 1877. Those policies replaced the payment of taxation in kind with payment in cash, and substantially increased the tax burden on tenant farmers. Many small farmers sold their land to pay their tax. Combined with poor harvests caused by floods and droughts, the economic conditions of the farmers deteriorated and forced them to make further sales of their land. As a result, impoverished farmers, with ex-samurai who did not receive benefits from the new

78Iijima to Sugimura, 4 Sept. 1900, ibid.
79Iijima to Katō, 29 Oct. 1900, ibid.
80Queensland State Archives, Home Secretary's Department, Inwards Correspondence. 1898/11159.
81Toyo keizai shinpō sha, Meiji taishō kokusei sōran [Comprehensive bibliography of the state of Japan in Meiji and Taishō periods] (Tokyo 1929), 634.
government, revolted and initiated a period of social instability from the 1870s to the end of the 1880s. The revolts were strong in rural areas which were largely excluded from the benefits of rapid modernisation enjoyed by urban elites in Tokyo and some other major urban centres, and by landlords in rural areas.

In addition to this social instability, the economy was one of the major 'push' factors to encouraging many rural people to migrate to urban centres in Japan and even overseas. The birth places of the Japanese on Thursday Island confirm this pattern. In 1894, out of 346 Japanese, 254 came from Wakayama, 22 from Nagasaki and 15 from Hiroshima. Both Wakayama and Nagasaki lack flat land for rice cultivation, further limiting the opportunities of farmers to earn an income. A case study on Wakayama's emigration also shows that the rapid population increase, lack of arable land and low income from fishing were main causes of overseas emigration. Another but older case study based on intensive interviews with returned migrants reinforces the importance of the economic motivation: Iwasaki Kenkichi concludes the main motivations for emigration were stimulation by neighbours who made fortunes overseas and the tradition of emigration. The emigrants sought economic opportunities which would never have been attainable in their impoverished home villages.

Relevance to Australian colonial history

The development of a Japanese settlement on Thursday Island and the attempts of some Japanese to move to New Guinea illuminate the beginning of Japanese colonisation in the South Seas. The Japanese on Thursday Island in the 1890s essentially differed from those who worked for European entrepreneurs as labourers in sugar-cane fields or mines in Queensland and on South Seas Islands. Nor were they like traders who were scattered on the islands in Micronesia and Southeast Asia. Within limits they were allowed to have independent businesses. Some owned their own schooners and boats, employed local crews and remitted their profits to Japan. Some Japanese traders purchased marine products (pearl shell, trochus shell and sea cucumber) and exported them. A typically colonial relationship thus developed: the Japanese exploited the resources using cheap local labour.

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83 Hattori, op.cit., 20-1.
84 Wakayama ken [Wakayama prefecture], Wakayama ken imin shi [History of emigrants from Wakayama prefecture] (Wakayama 1957), 93.
85 Iwasaki Kenkichi, ‘Kii hantō nangan ni okeru kaigai dekasegi imin no kenkyû, dai 2 hō [Study on overseas emigrants from southern coastal areas of Kii peninsula, II]’, Chirigaku hyoron [Geographic review], 13(3) (Tokyo 1938), 183-200.
Such a Japanese presence provoked Australia's firm opposition. Australians could not allow Japanese masters to prosper in their territory. Racism based on ideas of Anglo-Saxon supremacy was one reason, and the rising union movement was another. Northern Australia had to be under strict white control, and Australians devised a mechanism of control by legislating. However, despite this Australian mechanism, the Japanese settlement continued to function as a Japanese colony, partly because the Japanese were successful in recruiting local crews by offering generous work conditions and partly because Australians needed Japanese expertise in developing marine resources. Australians could only limit the scale of the Japanese operation so that white operators could always make larger profits than the Japanese. Thus a unique dual colonial apparatus existed on Thursday Island. The Japanese masters prospered in the white masters' territory. This was, of course, acceptable under the strict racial hierarchy that Japanese masters were always subordinate to their white counterparts and that the white masters were richer than their Japanese counterparts.
In 1901 Komine, after being squeezed out of Thursday Island and rejected by the British New Guinea administration, knocked on the door of German New Guinea. The door was ajar. He found employment with the German administration and some years later established an independent business for which he recruited about a hundred workers from Japan. Consequently a sizeable Japanese community emerged and enjoyed a brief golden age in the last years of German rule. Meanwhile, in British New Guinea (later Papua), some Japanese traders and divers married Papuan women and settled down. Because of the small scale of their migration and businesses, the Japanese settlements in both British and German New Guinea attracted little attention from the Japanese government. The settlements show the unique pattern of Japanese involvement in the South Seas in the way that their presence was entrenched in European colonies.

**Japanese interest in the South Seas**

In the 1901-1914 period, the Japanese government’s attention was directed primarily to East Asia where Japan’s immediate security was at risk and the region’s economic potential—markets and sources of raw materials—was recognised. It was also in this period that Japan emerged as a colonial power. Following the Sino-Japanese War, Japan acquired Taiwan and established there a Governor-General’s Office in June 1895. After the Russo-Japanese War, Japan gained southern Sakhalin and the Kwantung Leased Territory in 1905. Western nations also acknowledged Japan as a colonial power in East Asia, recognising a Japanese protectorate over Korea in 1910. In the same year, the Japanese government established the Colonisation Bureau under the direct control of the Prime Minister and constructed the administration to function as a colonial nation.¹

Meanwhile, Japanese attention was distracted from the South Seas. This was made all the easier by Enomoto’s retirement from politics when he resigned the post of Minister of Agriculture and Commerce due to the Ashio

¹Gaimu shō ryōji jū bu [immigration section of the Consul of the Foreign Ministry], * Wagakuni no kaigai hatten jū hyakunen no ayumi (honpen) [Overseas development of Japan, the footprint of one hundred-year immigration], Vol. 1 (Tokyo 1971), 272.
Copper Mine incident in 1897. His enthusiasm for emigration also diminished when his private venture to promote emigration to Mexico failed in 1898. Thus the government lost one of those most concerned with directing Japan towards the South Seas. The government took no initiatives to promote South Seas involvement until the outbreak of World War I.

**Trade**

Despite the lack of government initiatives, Japanese trade with the South Seas expanded rapidly, particularly with Southeast Asia and Australia. Although complete data are not available, in 1900 exports to French Indochina, Thailand, the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies were 16.3 million yen and imports were 10.9 million, then in 1913, exports to those countries plus British Malaya increased to 23.4 million yen and imports to 80.9 million. Similarly, exports to Australia and New Zealand increased from 2.5 million yen in 1900 to 8.6 million in 1913 and imports from 2.4 million yen to 14.9 million. The trade figures for Micronesia were still too small to appear in statistics. But the proportion of the trade with Southeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand in the total Japanese external trade dramatically increased from 3.1 per cent in 1900 to 9.3 per cent in 1913.

Although minuscule, Japanese trade with Micronesia, pioneered by small traders, expanded during the Spanish period. By 1906, Japanese controlled more than 80 per cent of the total trade of Micronesia. Japanese commerce was so strong in the Western Carolines that their German counterpart, the Western Caroline Company, had to close its Koror branch. The only place where Japanese traders could not dominate was the Marshall Islands where the German administration firmly refused the establishment of branches of Japanese companies. As Peattie explains, 'the Japanese activities to expand their commercial presence in the South Seas and the German efforts to limit it became an episodic struggle of prohibitions and confiscations by local

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2The incident was one of the best known of modern Japan's environmental disasters. The Ashio Copper Mine in Tochigi prefecture discharged acidic pollutants into rivers and contaminated wide agricultural areas in the north of Tokyo. Local farmers, politicians, journalists, socialists and Christian humanists began large-scale protests and petitions. The dispute lasted almost a century. Enomoto, then the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, took responsibility and resigned. Enomoto died in 1908.

3Enomoto died in 1908.


6Ogimi Asanori, *Nantō guntó ar'nai* [Guide to the South Seas Islands], Kaigai kenkyū sho (Tokyo 1937), 9.
German colonial authorities and evasions by Japanese traders.\(^7\) The German administration strictly controlled Japanese trade. For example, Japanese traders were accused of supplying firearms to local people to assist their fighting and the administration closed their business and deported the staff to Japan.\(^8\) Nevertheless Japanese trade expanded, with the establishment of a new company. In 1906, the Hiki Company was amalgamated with the Murayama Shōkai (Murayama Company) to establish the Nani'yō Bōeki Kaisha (South Seas Trade Company), which soon dominated Japan-Micronesia trade. However, the lack of general interest in the business venture in Micronesia was reflected in the way the companies were established. They were initiated by small individual capitalists; none were related to leading industrial or financial capitalists.\(^9\)

In the Japanese trade with Southeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand a significant change was seen in the rapid increase in imports of raw materials—rubber mainly from British Malaya and wool and wheat from Australia and New Zealand. Exports of silk and ceramics to Australia also increased rapidly. As in Micronesia, the expansion was promoted by private enterprise.

**Emigration**

Small-scale emigration to the South Seas continued. The number of Japanese in Southeast Asia,\(^10\) Australia, New Zealand and other South Pacific Islands increased from 8,140 in 1904 to 20,219 in 1914, while the total number of Japanese residing overseas also rose from 138,591 in 1904 to 358,711 in 1914 with a rapid increase mainly in North America and Manchuria. As a result, the proportion of Japanese in the South Seas in the total of Japanese abroad decreased slightly from 5.8 per cent to 5.6 per cent.\(^11\)

In the South Pacific private emigration companies kept on sending Japanese emigrants. The Tōyō Imin Kaisha (East Seas Emigration Company, a new name for the Yoshisa Company) sent a few thousand labourers to New Caledonia. The company also sent 410 workers to Ocean Island (Banaba) from 1905 to 1909 and 350 to Makatea in 1910.\(^12\) Those labourers were employed

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\(^7\)Peattie, op.cit., 23.

\(^8\)Peter Sack and Dymphna Clark (eds and trans.), *Albert Hahl: Governor in New Guinea* (Canberra 1980), 79.

\(^9\)Yanaihara Tadao, *Nani'yō guntō no kenkyū* [Study on the South Seas Islands] (Tokyo 1937), 14.

\(^10\)It includes British Malaya and Borneo, Sarawak, India, Burma, Iriyan, Dutch East Indies, the Philippines and Guam.

\(^11\)Ishikawa Tomonori, 'Tōkei yori mita shatsu-imin-shi 3' [Emigration history in the view from statistics], *Chiri kagaku* [Geographic science], Vol.16 (Hiroshima 1972), 25-31.

\(^12\)Ishikawa Tomonori, 'Nihon shatsu-imin shi ni okeru imin kaisha to kēyaku imin ni tsuite [Emigration Company and contract emigrants in the history of Japanese emigration]', *Ryūkyū daigaku hô-bun gaku bu kiyō* [Bulletin of Law and Literature Department of Ryūkyū University], shakai 14 (Naha 1970), 19-46.
in European mines. The vice-president of the British Phosphate Company in Ocean Island visited Japan to recruit workers. Similarly the workers who went to Makatea were contracted to a French phosphate mining company. The emigrants to both islands were not labourers to dig phosphate but artisans such as carpenters, shipwrights, blacksmiths and cooks.\textsuperscript{13} In Micronesia, tens of traders settled and had control of most trade in the islands. In 1912, '73 of 122 foreigners living in the Marianas and the West Carolines were Japanese, and approximately one-third of the foreign trade was with Japan'.\textsuperscript{14}

Seventeen emigration companies sent 3,233 skilled and unskilled labourers to Benguet in the Philippines where the US administration increased demands for cheap labour 'to build roads, to construct railways, to erect barracks for the garrison and to improve harbour facilities'.\textsuperscript{15} They were soon followed by hundreds more Japanese workers sent to hemp plantations in Davao. Those workers were recruited by the Ōta Kogyō Kaisha (Ōta Development Company), established by Ōta Kyōzaburō, a Manila-based Japanese entrepreneur.\textsuperscript{16} In British Malaya, two enterprising Japanese began to operate a rubber plantation in 1902 and initiated a rush of Japanese investment in rubber plantations. The number of Japanese plantations increased to 79 by 1911.\textsuperscript{17} The plantation operators brought in Japanese labourers. That was followed by the opening of branches of banks and trade houses that also brought in Japanese staff. So the number of Japanese residents in Southeast Asia increased from 4,671 in 1904 to 13,558 in 1914.\textsuperscript{18} By contrast, in Australia, due to the 'White Australia Policy', the number declined slightly from 3,554 in 1901 to 3,489 in 1911.\textsuperscript{19}

\textit{Nanshin-ron}

After the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War, public attention was diverted from the South Seas and the \textit{nan'yō} fever of the 1890s cooled.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{13}Irie Toraji, \textit{Meiji nanshin shi kō} [Short history of southward expansion in the Meiji Era] (Tokyo 1943), 265-9.
\textsuperscript{16}Yano Tōru, \textit{Nihon no Nan'yō shi kan} [Japanese historical view of the South Seas] (Tokyo 1979), 140-1.
\textsuperscript{17}Imano Toshihiko and Fujisaki Yasuo, \textit{Imin shi II: ajia oceania hen} [History of emigration II: Asia and Oceania] (Tokyo 1985), 244-5.
\textsuperscript{18}Ishikawa, op.cit. (1972), 27.
\textsuperscript{19}A. T. Yarwood, \textit{Asian Migration to Australia: the background to exclusion 1896-1923} (London 1964), 163.
\textsuperscript{20}Yano Tōru, 'Nanshin' no keifu [The Genealogy of 'southward advance'] (Tokyo 1975), 68.
Nevertheless, the idea of nanshin was implanted in the minds of a few prominent scholars and politicians such as Inukai Tsuyoshi (who became the Prime Minister in 1931) and Nitobe Inazo (a scholar who took office as Vice-Director of the General Affairs Bureau of the League of Nations from 1920 to 1927). After the Russo-Japanese War, Inukai argued that 'there should be no further advance north . . . Japan should now shift her attention to the region of South China and Southeast Asia . . . [and Nitobe] showed a marked interest in the South'. 21 However, the Russo-Japanese War was a major drawback to nanshin-ron, for the army then took the initiative in deciding defence policy. The army’s tairiku seisaku (continental policy), which was often opposed to the navy’s kaiyō kokka ron (maritime nation theory), began to dominate Japan’s external policy. 22 Nanshin-ron declined, being supplanted by the army’s hokushin-ron (northward advance theory).

Japanese perceptions of Papua and New Guinea

Reflecting the decline of nanshin-ron, less public information about Papua and New Guinea was disseminated in the 1901-14 period than in the late 19th century. Japanese perceptions of Papuans and New Guineans did not change, but a more realistic interest such as the establishment of a trade-link was emphasised, while the reference to territorial ambition disappeared. Kawasaki Ryōzo and Maruba Shigeru, who travelled to Kaiser Wilhelmsland and the Bismarck Archipelago just before the outbreak of World War I, wrote Taiheiyo no hōko, Doku ryō nan’yō shotō (The treasury of the Pacific: German South Seas islands). 23 In the first section of the book, they described in diary-style the multi-ethnic milieu of Rabaul and the popularity of a Chinese hotel as a drinking spot. Like other early writers, their description maintained a stereotype of New Guineans: 'Although these natives have ugly and vicious appearances, they are very obedient, easy to get angry and easy to grieve. Their thinking is very simple as if they were eight to nine year-old Japanese children.' 24 They also reported on Komine’s boatbuilding and copra planting, and the presence of over 10 Japanese migrants as well as a few Japanese

21 Henry Frei, Japan’s Southward Advance and Australia (Melbourne 1991), 68.
23 Neither Kawasaki or Maruba were well-known writers, but the contents of the book and the name of the publisher ‘Nam’yo dōshi ka’ [The Society of South Seas Comrades] made them look nanshin-ron advocates. Kawasaki Ryōzo and Maruba Shigeru, Taiheiyo no hōko, doku-ryō nan’yō shotō [The treasury of the Pacific: German South Seas islands] (Tokyo 1913).
24 Ibid., 12.
prostitutes, commenting 'we were surprised by the intensity of the development of the Japanese prostitute population overseas'. The rest of their book covers a wide range of topics in German New Guinea and Micronesia including geography, climate, population, race, commerce, trade, imports and exports, transport, industry and politics. Characteristically, in the sections on German New Guinea most space is devoted to the economy. They pointed out that trading copra would bring huge profits and that turtle shell, trochus shell and pearl shell would also be important imports. They claimed that Kaiser Wilhelmsland and the Bismarck Archipelago had treasures of undeveloped natural resources such as fertile soil, thick forest with red sandalwood, ebony, parrots, birds of paradise, gold, silver and nickel. They also predicted conflict between Japan and Germany in the Pacific over their competing national interests, warning Japan that Germany was trying to achieve 'Pan-Germanism' in the Pacific.

At the official level, the Japanese government kept few records. Official indifference was seen in the ad hoc arrangements for jurisdiction over German New Guinea. In 1906 the Foreign Ministry let the Japanese Consulate at Townsville take charge of the affairs of German territories in the South Pacific. Then in 1909 the Consulate-General at Sydney took responsibility for German New Guinea affairs, probably because of the incident in which Komine was attacked by the people on Manus. Indifference was shown in the response to the attack. The report of the incident was pre-empted by a non-official source. The Kobe Herald reported wrongly that Komine was killed, prompting the Foreign Ministry at Tokyo to request all consuls in Southeast Asia and Australia to investigate the incident. Quick replies came from the consulates in Hong Kong, Singapore, Sydney and Batavia, who all confirmed that Komine had been attacked but had escaped and was alive.

Similarly, Japanese officials paid little attention to Papua. This was demonstrated well by the brevity of the report by Iwasaki Mitsuo, the Consul-General at Sydney, which was only four pages long. It was submitted to the Foreign Ministry, and gave directory-like information such as administrative divisions, the acreage of land, population, native languages,

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25Ibid., 3.
26Ibid., 71-99.
27Ibid., 157-9.
28Appointment of Consul Narita, 2 Mar. 1906, JDR 6.1.5.6-32.
29Kakkoku chūzai rōji ninmen zakken shidō ni no bu [Miscellaneous matters on the appointment and resignation of consuls in overseas countries, the section of Sydney] (1909), JDR 6.1.5.6-38.
30Kobe Herald, 28 April 1909.
31Komine Isokichi doku-ryo ni ni oite sono kan no ken [Report about the accident of Komine Isokichi on the Admiralty Islands in German New Guinea] (1909), JDR 4.2.5-240.
Papuan life-style, relations between Papuans and whites, agriculture, forestry and mining.\textsuperscript{32}

\textit{Japanese in British New Guinea}

\textit{Australian attitudes towards Japanese}

Some Japanese seamen on Thursday Island found no door closed to them in British New Guinea, despite the fact that the administration prohibited Japanese migration. Some traders and shellers were operating in the Milne Bay area and adjoining islands even before 1900. We can only speculate whether officials granted them permission, but it seems that the administration was not as concerned about Japanese as its Queensland counterpart. Although the Resident Magistrates of the Eastern Division and the South-Eastern Division occasionally presented reports about Japanese activities, they were about the conditions of local labourers employed by the Japanese for shell-fishing rather than the Japanese themselves. Probably the administration just acquiesced in the small-scale Japanese presence which never exceeded 10 in number.

The first record of Japanese activities appeared in a simple form in the correspondence of the Lands Department of 1902—it listed all trade stations in the South-Eastern and the Eastern Divisions. Five Japanese traders were named among other non-indigenous coloured traders (e.g. Manila men, Malays, South Sea Islanders and Chinese). The names and locations of their stations are shown in Table 2-1. Probably Australian officials wrote the names phonetically.\textsuperscript{33} The names in Table 2-1 may be corrected: Tanati to Tanaka, Kimostha to Kinoshita, Mirioka to Migioka, Nekshy to Negishi, and Siganiatu to Shigematsu. Among those traders, only Tanaka and Shigematsu can be identified as residents in Papua from Japanese archives and oral evidence. Probably other Japanese were trading there only temporarily. They probably came from Thursday Island, because such a movement is noted in the records of the Department of External Affairs which gave permission to 12 Japanese to land in British New Guinea from Queensland in 1902.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{32}Iwasaki Mitsuo, ‘Eiryo nyū gini Ḷji hōkoku’ [Report on conditions in British New Guinea], \textit{Imin chō sa hōkoku} [Report on investigation on emigration], Gaimu-shō tsūshō kyoku [the Foreign Ministry, the Commerce Bureau] (Tokyo 1909).

\textsuperscript{33}Also the Japanese may not have known the English spellings.

\textsuperscript{34}Department of External Affairs to the Collector of Customs at Brisbane, 13 May 1902, AA A8/1-02/116/194.
Chapter 2: Golden age, 1901-1914

Table 2-1. Japanese trading stations in the South-eastern Division and the Eastern Division in 1902

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanati</td>
<td>Hemenahei island near Joannet (South-Eastern Division)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimostha</td>
<td>Konaware, Basilaki island (Eastern Division)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirioka</td>
<td>Ritai island (Eastern Division)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nekshy</td>
<td>Boiadi island (Eastern Division)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siganiatu</td>
<td>Wart, Sanaroa (Eastern Division)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AA Territory, C.P.T.(T.), Set.38 General Correspondence of Lands Department 1889-1942

The administration's official record of the Japanese population was not available until 1905. As Table 2-2 shows, they never numbered above 10 and most lived in the Eastern Division which included Milne Bay, Samarai, Normanby Island, Fergusson Island, Goodenough Island and other small islands. The Japanese were a very small ethnic group among other non-indigenous coloured people; they hardly reached 10 per cent. In contrast to the European population, which increased gradually, the Japanese population remained static, like that of other non-European aliens (except a large inflow of Samoan mission workers in 1912) before World War I.

Table 2-2. Non-indigenous populations in British New Guinea (later Papua)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Eastern</th>
<th>East Central</th>
<th>South-Eastern</th>
<th>European</th>
<th>Other coloured*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1905*</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906*</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907*</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>902</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* includes Malays, Chinese, Filipinos, Solomon Islanders, Samoans, Fijians, West Indians, Javanese, South Sea Islanders, Rarotongans, and others

** Eastern Division only

n.a.: no data available


The administration included six brief reports on the Japanese in the Annual Report. Three were medical reports and the other three were related to conditions of native labourers. In 1907, Chief Medical Officer Noel Beaumont reported an insane Japanese, who was ultimately removed to
Thursday Island', in the section on 'The Native Population'. In 1910 the Resident Magistrate of the Western Division, Charles Higgison, reported that a Japanese suffered from dysentery, in the section on 'Native Labour'.

A medical officer, Charles Garrioch, happened to encounter a Japanese trader called 'Jimmy' during his visit to Sudest Island on 16 May 1909 and wrote a report about him:

When we cruised round the islands, Mrs. Mahoney kindly allowed one of her employees, a Japanese, to accompany us, as he knew the coast thoroughly and spoke the native language as well. He was also personally acquainted with most of the natives we met. His services were consequently invaluable, as his presence gave the natives more confidence in giving information and coming forward for treatment. I respectfully recommend some remuneration be allowed him in consequence.

As Garrioch was making a medical report he did not include much detail about Jimmy, but his knowledge of the waters and local languages show that he had lived there for a long period. His role as agent of Mrs Mahoney, a well-known trader and planter, also suggests an amicable relationship with Australians.

The administration's other accounts were in reports on the conditions of indigenous labourers. Lieutenant-Governor Hubert Murray was concerned about the condition of labourers employed by the Japanese from Thursday Island:

Since the appointment of a Protector, the condition of these natives has no doubt improved, but as Japanese are in charge of the boats in which Papuans are employed, it is impossible either for the white employer or for the Papuan Government to know exactly what takes place in these boats when they are at sea. For instance, the most ample and varied ration may be, and in fact, is supplied by the European employer, but the share which the Papuan gets of it depends upon the goodwill of the Japanese skipper.

Murray's concerns were repeated two years later, when he suggested preventing Japanese from employing local labourers, although he was informed that their conditions were satisfactory. As a result of these speculations, the employment of Papuans by Japanese was stopped. The Japanese vice-consul at Townsville, Miho Gornothingō, also reported to Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō that about 200 Papuans had been employed by the Japanese but such employment would discontinue due to the

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35Papua Annual Report (Melbourne 1907), 104.
36Papua Annual Report (Melbourne 1910), 56.
37Papua Annual Report (Melbourne 1909), 92.
38Ibid., 13.
prohibition. Those reports reflect the thoroughness of Murray's policy toward Papuans which extended to monitoring those employed by the Japanese.

As for the shell-fishing industry, the Papua administration's attitude towards the Japanese contrasts with that of their Australian counterparts in Queensland. Unlike the Queensland government, the Papua administration took hardly any notice of Japanese shell-fishing, probably because the Japanese operation was too small to pose a threat to Europeans. In Papua, the Japanese were an insignificant and marginal group.

**Japanese Settlers**

Five Japanese settled in Papua before World War I and led humble, quiet lives with Papuan wives, being almost unnoticed by either Australian or Japanese officials. Although the number is small, memories of these Japanese are still alive among their descendants and elders of villages and islands. At present there are at least 28 mixed-race people in Milne Bay Province who are descended from Japanese fathers—Jimmy Koto, Tamiya Mabe, Murakami Heijirō, Tanaka Shigematsu and Tanaka Taichirō, who all married Papuan women. Whether their marriages were official (registered by European authority) or de facto relationships is unknown, but oral evidence suggests that the villagers recognised them as marriages.

The intermarriages had significant implications, for the Japanese effectively evaded the administration's restrictions on migration and land sales. They were able to fulfil a dream which Tsuji and Komine had pursued unsuccessfully—finding a land to settle in. We can only speculate whether these Japanese married only to achieve such a dream, or formed romantic attachments, or both. But the effects of their marriages were that the local communities allowed them to live there; and they were able to own land in cases where the wife's clan followed a matrilineal tradition—common practice in the Eastern Division. Consequently, they did not have to go through formal procedures with the administration on land acquisition and they were able to evade controls over the sale of native land.

Another important factor for their successful settlement was their ability to adapt to local environments. They all learnt local languages, followed local customs and did not force any Japanese traditions or religions on their families. They kept their Japanese identity only in their names, but showed no interest in converting to Christianity. They all successfully engaged in trading, copra planting and boatbuilding. Probably their zeal to improve their life, most coming from poor rural areas in Japan, was the most fundamental factor in their successful adaptation. Moreover, oral evidence, which confirms their happy marriages and friendly relationships with Papuans, suggests that

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40 Miho to Komura, 2 March 1913, JDR 3.8.2.33.
the Japanese simply loved the people and the place, and thereby were accepted comfortably in their adoptive communities.

Jimmy Koto was the oldest Japanese resident. His first name in Japanese is unknown, and there is no Japanese record of him. According to Roe, his arrival dates to 1889: he came to the Louisiades as a diver employed on a pearl lugger, and later chose to be a trader. In 1913 he applied for naturalisation in Australia with no success. Presumably before 1900 Koto married a local woman called Maegar from Sabari Island, about 20 kilometres northwest of Sudest Island, and had two children named George and Florence. He became familiar with the local waters and some local languages, developed a relationship with islanders to ‘a much more intimate level than did his European counterparts’. He traded from his base at Sudest Island and frequently stopped at Samarai. He spoke English well and used to come to the hotel at Samarai for a drink. At the hotel he once had a fight with an Australian after an argument over the Russo-Japanese War.

He established good relations with Australians, especially with Elizabeth Mahoney, wife of John Mahoney (a successful businessman in gold mining and copra planting), and the employer of the ‘Jimmy’ reported on by Garrioch, although the development of the relationship might have owed much to Mrs Mahoney’s character as ‘a modern Lady Bountiful’. According to Nelson, some Japanese worked on Mahoney’s plantation on Sudest or served in the Cosmopolitan Hotel which Mrs Mahoney opened on Samarai about the end of 1900. Probably Koto was one of the Japanese in Mahoney’s employ.

Tamiya Mabe was probably the second Japanese to arrive. Although his descendants think Mabe is a family name, judging from the normal Japanese usage, Tamiya was most likely his family name, and Mabe (or Mabei) his first name. His grandchildren were told that Tamiya was from Tokyo or a part of Tokyo. He probably came from one of the Izu islands which are included in the Tokyo prefecture, as sporadic Japanese migration (mostly fishermen) took place from these islands to New Guinea. Before 1910 he came to Basilaki Island, near Samarai, and married a Basilaki woman, Kalele. His appearance

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43 Roe, op.cit.
44 Interview by the author with Murakami, Kalo (son of Murakami Heijirō), 4 Jan. 1994, Misima Island, Milne Bay, PNG.
45 Interview with Koto, op.cit.
46 Roe, op.cit., 486.
impressed locals, as he had one short arm.\textsuperscript{48} He was a trader and a boatbuilder. According to Billy Tetu, his grandson:

Tamiya was a trader operating both in Papua and New Guinea. He was not a boat builder initially, but Tom Tanaka (another Japanese who came to Milne Bay) taught him how to build a boat. He built luggers. He had 3 boats. First boat was named \textit{Maru}. He taught local people how to build boats and he employed local people. He was based at Gogolabia and operated trade business, buying shell and copra to sell them to other Japanese traders. He had no business partner.\textsuperscript{49}

Another grandson, Joseph Tetu, says Tamiya's shell-fishing operation was on a small scale.\textsuperscript{50} He did not operate like those on Thursday Island who had large crews and sophisticated equipment. Joseph explained that the marriage was the most important element that made Tamiya settle on Basilaki, because through it he was able to own land. All his descendants confirmed that Tamiya followed local customs and did not enforce any Japanese customs on his family.\textsuperscript{51} Some of his descendants followed his boatbuilding trade; Billy Tetu is a busy boatbuilder taking orders from all around Milne Bay.

Murakami Heijirō was one of the few Japanese migrants in Papua whose personal file is kept in the Australian Archives, as he was interned in Australia during the Pacific War. According to Murakami's dossier and the interview by the internment officer, he was born in Wakayama on 1 January 1874.\textsuperscript{52} He went to Thursday Island around 1894 and worked as a pump tender, then around 1900 came to Milne Bay.\textsuperscript{53} The curious internment officer observed that both his arms and chest were heavily tattooed.\textsuperscript{54} Murakami married a Papuan woman from Naiwara village (at the end of Milne Bay) and led a humble life with her, operating a small trading business in the Milne Bay area.\textsuperscript{55}

Tanaka Taichirō was known as Tom Tanaka among the locals. According to his nephew in Japan, Tanaka Noboru, he was born in a small fishing village, Obama, in Minami-takaki-gun in Nagasaki on 17 October 1875. His family had been merchants for generations. Around 1902 he went to New Guinea with Komine and Nagahama Taichi. He boarded a steamer from

\textsuperscript{48}Interview by the author with Joseph Tetu (grandson of Mabe Tamiya), 24 Dec. 1993, Kanadamada Village, Basilaki Island, Milne Bay, PNG.

\textsuperscript{49}Interview by the author with Billy Tetu (grandson of Mabe Tamiya), 25 Dec. 1993, Gogolabia Village, Basilaki Island, Milne Bay, PNG.

\textsuperscript{50}Interview with Joseph Tetu, op.cit.

\textsuperscript{51}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{52}'Dossier for MJ18500, internee, MURAKAMI, Heijiro' and 'Interview with Japanese internees at Camp No.4, Taura, On 22.7.46, Case No.67, MURAKAMI Heijiro', AA A367 C72588.

\textsuperscript{53}Interview with Murakami, op.cit.

\textsuperscript{54}He may have been an outlaw-type if he had been tattooed in Japan, as such a practice is common mainly among \textit{yakuza} (Japanese gangs).

\textsuperscript{55}Interview with Murakami, op.cit.
Nagasaki as a cook and took 80 days to arrive at New Guinea via Singapore.\textsuperscript{56} He probably separated from Komine and Nagahama in German New Guinea and came to Samarai, where he acted as a diver, boatbuilder and trader.\textsuperscript{57} A local Papuan elder recalls Tanaka as very friendly towards Papuans.\textsuperscript{58} Tanaka married a local woman, Didilololoi, from Mohiwa (a village near East Cape on the Goodenough Bay side), a daughter of an ordinary villager. In 1906 the couple had a daughter, Mary. The family lived in Mohiwa which became Tanaka's base for business. According to Mary, he also had a good relationship with Europeans and was respected by the local people.

Tanaka Shigematsu was called by his first name so that he could be distinguished from Tanaka Taichirô. The local pronunciation is 'Sigemata'. Both Tanakas were born in Minami-takaki-gun in Nagasaki. Shigematsu's daughter presumes they were related.\textsuperscript{59} According to \textit{kaigai ryoken kafu hyô} (list of overseas passport issues) of 1901 of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, Shigematsu was the eldest son of Jukichi from a small coastal village, Ariie, in Minami-takaki-gun in Nagasaki, the same village where Komine was born. He was 33 years old when he came to Samarai on business.\textsuperscript{60}

\textit{Japanese in German New Guinea}

\textbf{Population}

The Japanese population, which the German administration included in the European population, is shown in Table 2-3. Due to inconsistency in statistical computation by the administration (some statistics included the whole German territory including German Micronesia and New Guinea while some included only the Bismarck Archipelago, and some counted only non-officials), the statistics give only an approximate idea to around 1910. The Japanese population increased rapidly around 1910, but its proportion in the total non-indigenous population remained small. Whereas there were 578 Germans and 555 Chinese, there were only 20 Japanese in 1910 (Table 2-3).

The scanty information can be supplemented from Japanese sources. According to a naval officer who visited Rabaul in 1919, the number of Japanese in 1914 was 109.\textsuperscript{61} The Japanese Foreign Ministry’s records of

\textsuperscript{56}Interview by the author with Tanaka Noboru (nephew of Taichirô Tanaka), 1 July 1993, Tomitsu-cho, Shimabara, Nagasaki, Japan.
\textsuperscript{57}Interview by the author with Mary and Arthur Tanaka (daughter and grandson of Tanaka Taichiro), 22 Dec. 1993, Samarai, Milne Bay, PNG.
\textsuperscript{58}Interview by the author with Joseph Barn (elder), 6 Jan. 1994, Walalaia Village, Milne Bay, PNG.
\textsuperscript{59}Interview by the author with Honor and Fred Isikini (daughter and grandson of Tanaka Shigematsu), 21 Dec. 1993, Nigila Village, Milne Bay, PNG.
\textsuperscript{60}Jan. to Mar. 1901, JDR 3.8.5.8.
\textsuperscript{61}Telegram to Vice-Admiral Takenaka, 8 July 1919, JDR 7.1.5-10.
passports issued for migrants bound for German New Guinea indicate that in 1912 passports were issued to 50 Japanese, in 1913 to 22, and in 1914 to 33. The sum of the passports coincides with the naval officer's report. Thus it can be estimated that the Japanese population had increased to about 100 by 1914. Comparison with the total population in Rabaul including Namanula and Matupi shows that the Japanese had grown to a recognisable group: the total was 3,271 in 1914 (266 whites, 452 Chinese, 79 Malays, 27 Micronesians and 2,447 Melanesians). The Japanese population of German New Guinea overtook that of German Micronesia. The number of Japanese in all German territories reached 172, including about 100 in German New Guinea, thus Japanese in New Guinea exceeded those in Micronesia by about 30.

**Table 2-3. Non-indigenous populations of German New Guinea by nationality 1894-1913**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Germans</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>1,091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>1,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>21**</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Bismarck Archipelago only  
** Admiralty district only  
n.a.: no data available  


German attitudes towards Japanese  

Material related to Japanese in the German administration’s Annual Reports shows that the administration’s concern about them did not greatly differ from that of the Australians in Papua. German reports are also brief and do not extend beyond one paragraph. Judging from the amount and contents of those reports, the German administration was not greatly concerned.

The main characteristics of German attitudes to Japanese were leniency regarding legal status and caution in granting land rights. The Germans granted the Japanese European status around 1905. Until then they had no

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62 Kaigai ryoken kafu hyō, 1912-14, JDR 3.8.5.8.  
63 Peter Sack and Dymphna Clark (eds and trans.), German New Guinea, The Draft Annual Report for 1913-14 (Canberra 1980), 16.  
64 Ibid.
legal status.\textsuperscript{65} Granting European status was not confined to the Germans, as the Dutch granted the same status in the East Indies in 1899.\textsuperscript{66} Threlfall argues that Komine's usefulness to the administration as well as the effect of the emergence of Japan in international politics after its victory in the Russo-Japanese War facilitated the granting of European status.

Indeed the administration recognised Komine's usefulness when Albert Hahl, the Vice-Governor and Governor from 1896 to 1914, met him. According to Hahl's diary, in 1902 Komine reached Herbertshöhe from Torres Strait; around this time Hahl had been facing a serious shortage of government vessels to perform administrative tasks. The appearance of Komine solved this problem:

A chance incident helped to solve my dilemma. One fine morning there was a small schooner flying the Japanese flag to be seen riding at anchor in the Herbertshöhe Harbour. The skipper, Isokide [sic] Komine, told me that his water and provisions had run out on his voyage from Torres Strait, where he had been engaged in pearl-fishing. He had no money to purchase supplies and asked me to employ him. I inspected his little ship, found it suitable for my purpose, and chartered the vessel.\textsuperscript{67}

Hahl used Komine's schooner for later trips around the Bismarck Archipelago.\textsuperscript{68}

However, Komine gave a different account of the encounter. His story appears in his petition for financial assistance to the Consul-General in Sydney in 1916. According to Komine, he reached Rabaul in October 1901 and accidentally met Governor Hahl who had been under siege by 'little barbarians':

Nearly at the end of my exploration I anchored at Rabaul in October 1901. At that time the place was German territory and the natives were strongly resisting German rule. The punitive expeditions were suffering failures. When I arrived there, Governor Hahl and his staff had narrowly escaped the tight siege of the little barbarians and they were holding this small place. Their vessels, which were their only resort, were wrecked on the reef. They tried all measures unsuccessfully and were just waiting to be slaughtered. However, when they found my accidental arrival, they were overjoyed as if my arrival was God's will and begged me for the charter of my ship. My righteous heart was heating up, seeing their hopeless situation, and I willingly agreed to their request. At the same time I joined their punitive forces. Sharing uncountable hardships with them and applying various tactics all successfully, we finally conquered and pacified the little barbarians.\textsuperscript{69}

\textsuperscript{65}Neville Threlfall, 'From Mangroves to Frangipani: the story of Rabaul and East New Britain', unpublished, Division of Pacific and Asian History, Australian National University (Canberra 1988), 118.
\textsuperscript{68}Ibid., 92.
\textsuperscript{69}Komine to Shimizu, 19 May 1916, JDR 3.4.6.3.
Apparantly Komine dramatised the encounter to his advantage. German records indicate no such incident either at Herbertshöhe or at Rabaul. Nonetheless Komine's description verifies two facts: the administration was suffering from a lack of seaworthy vessels; and he accompanied Hahl on his trips to other places. There were mutual benefits: Hahl needed a vessel and Komine needed provisions for his voyage. This circumstance contributed to the development of the two men's relationship and later led to the emergence of the Japanese community in German New Guinea.

The men's characters may also have contributed to some extent. Komine's determined and adventurous nature which had been demonstrated on his arrival may have appealed to Hahl who was, Sack argues, 'by no means free of the racial prejudices of his time, but ... liked people, even if they were black or brown or yellow'.70 Similarly, Firth claims that Hahl 'had broader and more humane objectives, though still primarily economic ones ... unlike many German governors in Africa'.71

The European status given to the Japanese, however, shows German subtlety. Hahl pursued strict policies to maintain a racial hierarchy with whites always at the top. He never allowed his personal friendship to undermine this hierarchy. When court cases involving Japanese arose, they were not heard in the European courts but in a separate court constituted only for the Japanese.72 Similarly, the Germans were cautious about giving commercial advantage. The administration did not grant the right to purchase freehold to the Japanese. Indeed, the administration introduced a discriminatory law to restrict non-indigenous coloured people acquiring land: 'land could not be purchased from the government by natives or by persons who had not equal rights with Europeans; and land could neither be bought nor leased by persons unable to read and write a European language'.73 In addition, the Germans limited the land rights of the Japanese, and of the Chinese, to leases only for a term not exceeding 30 years.

This reluctance to concede equal land rights to Japanese was manifested in the timing and location of a lease granted to Komine. Not until 1910 did Komine acquire a 1,000 hectare lease on Pityilu Island, Papitelai, Sou, Kali Bay and Rambutyo Island in the Admiralty Islands.74 Eight years had passed since his arrival. It was a late acquisition, considering that the Japanese had enjoyed European status since 1905.

71Stewart Firth, *New Guinea under the Germans* (Melbourne 1982), 166.
72Threlfall, op.cit., 118.
73Report on Territory of New Guinea (Canberra 1922), 15.
74Komine to Shimizu, 19 May 1916, JDR 3.4.6.3.
The location of the lease also suggests the administration's unwillingness to transfer safe and profitable land. The Admiralty Islands were a frontier about 600 kilometres from Rabaul, where resistance to German rule was still strong and where few Germans were keen to settle. Indeed, Komine was attacked by islanders one year before he acquired the lease at Kali Bay, at the western end of Manus Island. The 1910-11 Annual Report reported the attack and unsuccessful punitive expeditions. Komine was after all acting for the benefit of the administration which was happy to send settlers to undeveloped frontiers.

But Komine was adept in expanding his business. In 1911 he won a concession for pearl-fishing. In the same year he expanded his business in Rabaul and in 1912 he established a trading company. From 1912 onwards he was able to get permission to bring in Japanese employees for his business in boatbuilding, trading, and coconut planting. Suddenly a relatively large number of Japanese began to arrive. The administration raised no objection as long as they were labourers or artisans. The administration may even have welcomed the Japanese because they alleviated the shortage of labour for its public works. Some Japanese were employed on road construction on mainland New Guinea, as the Australian sub-district naval officer at Thursday Island reported, probably referring to road construction in the Morobe District which bordered northeast Papua. The 1913-14 German Annual Report reported the acute shortage of local labour due to excessive recruitment in the area. Although no Japanese or Chinese labourers were mentioned in the German report, the location of the road construction is identical to that in the Australian report. It is very likely that the Japanese and Chinese were used to make up for the lack of local labour. Unlike their counterparts in Australia, the Germans evidently accepted the Japanese, due mainly to the administration's urgent need to ameliorate the 'unceasing demands for labour' to develop its territory.

Australian fear of Japanese in German New Guinea

In the early 1910s, the Australian government was nervously monitoring Komine's activity in the Admiralty Islands for fear of any Japanese expansion

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76 Ibid., 62.
77 Peter Sack and Dymphna Clark (eds and trans.), *German New Guinea: The Annual Reports* (Canberra 1979), 346.
79 Sub-district naval officer at Thursday Island to the Naval Secretary of Navy Office, 17 Nov. 1913, AA MP1049/1 1913/0326.
81 Peter J. Hempenstall, *Pacific Islanders under German Rule: a study in the meaning of colonial resistance* (Canberra 1978), 161.
in the South Pacific. The Australian fear was instigated by a newspaper article which warned about Japanese expansion in the central Pacific:

> It was from Hawaii that the Japanese first began to enter California in large numbers and it appears likely that they will use the same island as a starting point for their trade with South American ports and with the islands of the Pacific . . . Already a new steamship service has been started from Hilo to trade with the South America coast . . . and a Japanese syndicate obtained control of the Admiralty Islands. 82

Responding to the article, the Governor-General requested the Prime Minister to investigate the matter. The request was passed to the Defence Department and finally to the sub-district naval officer on Thursday Island. 83 The naval officer revealed Komine's presence in the Admiralty Islands in his third report.84 Faster than the naval officer, the British Ambassador in Tokyo carried out an investigation. His report confirmed the operation of a small Japanese enterprise, the Nanyō Kōgyō Kaisha (South Seas Industry Company) in the Admiralty Islands. He also noted the smallness of the company's operation and its weak connection to the Japanese government.85 However, the ambassador, quoting the newspaper article, also stressed the growing Japanese interests in the South Seas, and noted an ambitious statement by Naval Commander Hosaka, the captain of a cruiser, despatched to the South Pacific by the government in search of suitable places for emigration.86 As explained earlier, Hosaka did not represent the policy of the Japanese government, for no government officials or influential intellectuals showed much interest in the South Seas in this period. And Australian investigations hardly substantiated the existence of systematic Japanese expansion. However, the Australian government, having a traditional fear of invasion from the north, picked up every tiny matter which seemed to be connected to Japanese expansion. Australians, relieved by squeezing out the Japanese on Thursday Island, continued to be annoyed by the same Japanese in the German territory.

**Japanese settlers**

There are several episodes concerning Komine in both written and oral sources. Most recount his heroic feats fighting against New Guineans and reconciling tribal disputes to assist the administration's punitive expeditions. The report of Tatsue Yoshinobu, the directing manager of an emigration

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82 *Sydney Morning Herald*, 31 May 1913.
83 Memorandum from the Governor-General to the Prime Minister, 10 July 1913; Prime Minister to the Secretary of the Defence Department, 22 July 1913; Sub-district naval officer at Thursday Island to the Naval Secretary, 27 July 1913, AA, MP1049/1 1913/0326.
84 Sub-district naval officer at Thursday Island to the Naval Secretary, 10 Sept. 1913, ibid.
85 Report by Conyngham Greene, 8 July 1913, ibid.

companies, the Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha (Overseas Industrial Co. Ltd), indicates that Komine was actively involved in fighting rather than merely providing his vessel. Based on Komine's story as told to him, Tatsue wrote of Komine fighting against islanders at Tahara village near Namatanai in New Ireland in the early 1900s.87

Komine's actions on behalf of German punitive expeditions were also recorded by an anthropologist, Francis Bell. During his field research, Bell was told about Komine's peace-making among the people in Boieng, an island about 70 kilometres west-northwest of Namatanai.88 This probably owed much to Komine's competence in languages: according to his descendant, he could speak eight languages—English, German, Spanish, Pidgin and several indigenous languages.89 This ability, as well as his navigational skill, would have been useful to punitive expeditions, and encouraged the pragmatic Hahl to use him.

Not only his practical skills but also his strong character contributed to establishing relations with Germans. According to oral evidence, Komine was extremely disciplined and industrious: he used to sleep only three hours a night, studied, and checked all his premises before breakfast. His obsessiveness is shown by the following episode:

When my father, Mantoku [Komine Mantoku, Isokichi's nephew], went to Rabaul to help with Uncle Isokichi's business, my father was scolded because he went to the toilet before breakfast. To Uncle Isokichi from the time of getting out of bed, people should do something productive. Going to the toilet before doing something was a sign of laziness. My father told me Uncle Isokichi used to tell my father, 'If you remembered one word of a foreign language a day, you would be pretty fluent in one language in one year.'90

Hahl might have acquired some fondness for the Japanese after his holiday trip to Japan in 1910. He wrote in his diary: 'In Japan we spent our time in Nara and Kyoto, as these beautiful centres of ancient Japanese art and religion held far more appeal for us than the hurry and bustle in the port'.91 Coincidentally, Komine's acquisition of a lease in the Admiralty Islands occurred in the same year.

87Tatsue Yoshinobu, 'Nyiiginia bankai tanken kikō (3) [Accounts of exploration to barbarian world in New Guinea], Shokumin [The Colonial Review], 4(1) (Tokyo 1925), 112-19.
89Interview by the author with Sato Yachiyo (daughter of a nephew of Isokichi Komine), 1 July 1993, Nagasaki-shi, Nagasaki, Japan.
90Ibid.
Komine was also acting as an agent for a German company. Since 1907 he had acted for Hernsheim and Co., who were trying to start a plantation on Ponam Island, in the north of the Admiralty Groups.\(^{92}\)

In 1910, as we have seen, the administration granted Komine a 1,000 hectare lease on the Admiralty Islands, where he began operating a copra plantation. He brought in more than 10 Japanese as foremen to supervise several hundred native labourers. In the same year he set up a ship building yard on Manus and employed more than 10 Japanese shipwrights. In 1911, he expanded his ship-building business to Rabaul on a one hectare waterfront lease. This business prospered. He received many orders for building ships from the administration and recruited more Japanese shipwrights. His yard produced two large sailing ships with full fittings every three months and the annual profit exceeded 50,000 yen. In the same year he started trading. In 1912 he invested the profits from ship building and trade in copra plantations and completed tree planting on all his 1,000 hectares on Manus.\(^{93}\)

In 1912 he established the Nanyo Kōgyō Kaisha, after gaining further concessions from the administration—a 500 hectare lease (location unknown), rights to fish and collect marine products and the company's right to bring in Japanese employees on condition that he comply with the administration's law on labour contracts, living standards, health, payment of wages, return to home country, protection and so on.\(^{94}\) The company's headquarters were at Kobe in Japan where he bought materials for ship building, and sent his shell and copra from New Guinea.\(^{95}\) But Komine did not have sufficient funds to establish the company on his own. Sissons's research reveals that he borrowed funds from the (German) New Guinea Company—the largest private company in German New Guinea (the company was heavily subsidised by the administration).\(^{96}\) And a Japanese record shows that Komine's company gained its main profits from services (mainly repairing government vessels) to the administration.\(^{97}\) Thus actual operation of the company was dependent on the Germans.

The establishment of the company was a significant step in Komine's life. It elevated him to a higher social status. He recruited Samejima San'nosuke as a secretary: Samejima was a descendent of the samurai of Satsuma and

\(^{92}\)German Consul-General at Singapore, R. Kiliani to Japanese Consul at Singapore, E. Suzuki, 5 Aug. 1909, JDR 4.2.5-240.
\(^{93}\)Komine to Shimizu, 19 May 1916, JDR 3.4.6.3.
\(^{94}\)Concessions of the German administration with Japanese translation, 18 May 1913, JDR 3.5.2.201.
\(^{95}\)Kamijō Fukashi, Sensen ichi man kairi: Zen sekai taisen ji nan'yō no sen-shi [War front in a thousand miles away: war history in the South Seas in the previous war] (Tokyo 1941), 184.
\(^{96}\)David Sissons, 'I. Komine (1867-1934)' (1983), 1.
\(^{97}\)Samejima San'nosuke, date unknown, 'Senji zajū jōkyō hōkoku sho' [Report on the local situation during the war], Komine Shigenori's possession (Nagasaki), 1.
more importantly an acquaintance of Admiral Kamimura Hikonojō. According to Fujiki, Kamimura heard about Komine somehow and recommended Samejima to work for him. Like Enomoto, Kamimura was enthusiastic about Japan’s nanshin and inspired Samejima:

New Guinea is an important point in the Pacific. To establish a Japanese fort in New Guinea is a necessity for the defence of Japan. Your company is not merely a profit-seeking company. Your company is serving our nation.

It is quite conceivable that the words of encouragement from the Admiral, although indirect, stimulated Komine’s patriotism; it was probably around this time that this began to be manifested, as in the following episode:

One night Uncle Isokichi was invited to dinner with the German Governor. During the dinner, the Governor remarked, ‘the Japanese are poor, because you use wooden chopsticks to eat food, but Germans use silver cutlery’. After the dinner, Uncle Isokichi came home, indignant, and at once ordered thousands of chopsticks from Japan. Then at the next dinner with the Governor, Uncle Isokichi said, ‘Germans use the same cutlery every time, but we use chopsticks only once and throw them away to make sure we use new ones all the time.’

In the last year of German rule, Komine was on his way to becoming a business tycoon. In 1913 he returned to Japan to arrange for further expansion of his business. He successfully approached leading Japanese businessmen—Baron Tsuji Shinji, Lord Matsukata Kōshirō (the owner of Kawasaki Ship Building Company), Lord Shimura Gentarō, Murai Yoshibeı (the president of the Imperial Hotel), Ōkura Kihachirō (a member of the Japan Trade Association) and Fukushima Namizō (the auditor of the Asahi Life Insurance Company). Unfortunately, the outbreak of World War I wrecked the plan. During his visit he also met Admiral Kamimura. It was a memorable meeting for Komine, and a photograph was taken showing him in a smart Western coat standing with Kamimura in uniform with many medals. It was symbolic of Komine’s success. A former pearl diver was now standing with the Admiral like an equal partner.

New Guineans also remember Komine. Several stories have been handed down. The elders on Ponam Island tell the story of when Komine’s schooner Zabra was stranded on the reef of their island in 1907. The incident can also

98Fujiki Yoshihiro, Nyū ginia sono fukin tōsha no dozoku hin [Artefacts of New Guinean and adjacent islands] (Tokyo 1939), 5.
99Kamijō, op.cit., 184; Ōno Yoshiharu, Tōa kyōei-ken to nyū ginia [The East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and New Guinea] (Tokyo 1942), 169.
100Interview with Satō, op.cit.
101The photograph is possessed by Komine Shigenori, a grandson of Komine’s nephew, Nagasaki-shi, Nagasaki, Japan, and is reproduced as Photograph 1.
be confirmed in the correspondence from the German Consul-General. The islanders relate:

Komine’s boat was wrecked on the reef near the island, but he and his crew were frightened to land on the island because they thought we would kill him. They collected stones, laid them on the reef, built a hut and stayed there for two months. Finally the luluai of the island invited them to the island, then Komine agreed to settle on the island. After his boat was repaired, he went back to Pityilu where his plantation was. Komine was a big man and we thought he was an administrator at Rabaul. Komine was respected like a kiap. He was a hard man, too. When he got sick in Rabaul, he asked Ponam people to catch a turtle so that he could drink its blood. He told his employees to keep good relationships with the locals, otherwise they were dismissed and sent back to Japan.

The story tends to confirm that Komine was working for the administration or at least had some close association with it as he was thought to be an administrator. The story also suggests that he had a plantation on Pityilu Island (near Lorengau in the Admiralty Islands). It could be that the islanders’ memory about the time is incorrect, or that Komine was working for other planters on the island, because the administration had not yet given him a lease at this time. Komine’s footprint remains in the name of an island. In Kali Bay, Komine named a small island ‘Nihon Island’ (‘Nihon’ means Japan in Japanese) and the island still retains that name.

Komine’s Japanese wife, Chō, also assisted in his business. The first issue of her passport for New Guinea was recorded in 1908 and the second was in 1910 with the stated purpose of commerce. She was born in Jūzenji-chō in Nagasaki City in 1871. According to oral evidence, she was a beautiful and elegant lady and, like Komine, very diligent and particularly fussy about the way money was spent. The couple was exceptionally outgoing for Japanese. Their formal appearance at government functions, Chō in traditional kimono and obi, attracted the curious eyes of other white residents in Rabaul. Probably her presence made Isokichi more eminent in the social life of cosmopolitan Rabaul.

In the memories of New Guineans Komine overshadows other Japanese, as most were his employees and their activities were controlled by his business operations. As a result, oral information about other Japanese is relatively scarce. Similarly official records have little information except about

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102German Consul-General at Singapore, R. Kiliani to Japanese Consul at Singapore, E. Suzuki, 5 Aug. 1909, JDR 4.2.5-240.
103Interview by the author with Sohou, Alphonse Kawei and Mohak, Pious Pweleheu (elders), 11 Feb. 1994, Ponam Island, Manus, PNG.
104Interview by the author with Michael Posman (a local from Kali Bay), 12 Feb. 1994, Lorengau, Manus, PNG.
105Kaigai ryoken kafu hyō, July 1908 and Apr. 1910, JDR 3.8.5.8.
106Interview with Satō, op.cit.
107Threlfall, op.cit., 119.
four Japanese, Izumi Eikichi, Endō Shigetarō, Hagiwara Hikota, and Ikesaki Tokuyoshi, who remained in New Guinea until the outbreak of the Pacific War and were interned in Australia. Their personal files are in internment records. Significantly they all married local non-white women in a later period.

Relevance to Japanese social history

As the analyses in the previous chapter show, migration in this period reflected Japanese social history. Migrants kept on coming from the rural southwest where underdevelopment continued as industrialisation was entrenched in urban centres. Rural depression intensified, particularly after the Russo-Japanese War, when industrialisation gained momentum with the rapid growth of export-oriented industries such as silk and cotton. The major impact on rural areas was the loss of self-sufficiency as agricultural production was integrated into the development of export commodities. As a result, rural-urban inequality increased, accelerating the tempo of the emigration of the rural people to urban centres and overseas. The statistics verify this. In only 10 years from 1904 to 1914, the number of overseas emigrants increased nearly threefold—from 138,591 in 1904 to 358,711 in 1914. The same tendency was seen in migration to Papua and New Guinea. The number increased from a mere two in 1906 to 109 in 1914, and most came from Kyūshū; 33 from Kumamoto, 28 from Nagasaki, and eight from Saga.

Most migrants were dekasegi-sha (literally 'people leaving to earn money') on three year contracts, the same type of people seen in urban factories. The largest occupational group was artisans: 41 shipwrights, 18 carpenters and 13 sawyers. Many of them were from Goryō and Oniike villages in Amakusa. These villages were famous for boatbuilding from the Edo era, but in about 1907 many shipwrights lost their jobs due to the recession in the shipping industry. Eleven fishermen were another significant group. They came from fishing villages such as Isahaya-chō (Kita-takaki-gun, Nagasaki prefecture) and Jōgashima (Misaki-chō, Miura-gun, Kanagawa prefecture). Fishing villages in this period were also suffering a decline in jobs due to the development of a modern capital-intensive fishery and the resulting decline of small fishermen. Unemployment thus constituted a 'push' factor for

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110 Data from the information in Kaigai ryoken kafu hyō, 1912-1914, JDR 3.8.5.8.
emigration. It is highly probable that, like the migration to Thursday Island, the high wages in New Guinea became a major 'pull' factor.

Moreover the German administration's different treatment of the Japanese relative to other Asians possibly became a 'pull' factor. The granting of European status delighted the Japanese who had been rejected in Australia because they were Asians. The migrants probably felt that the Germans recognised their national identity as subjects of an emerging empire which, they may have thought, was distinctive from other Asian countries. Although in reality the migrants were the victims of empire-building which increased the poverty of rural Japan, the improvement of their status from poor rustics to 'Europeans' satisfied their pride. Of course, such pride was merely an illusion which would vanish as soon as they returned to their impoverished villages, but it was a sweet illusion that attracted the migrants to the land of 'dojin'. 114

Relevance to colonial history of New Guinea

Within the German colony where people's lives were strictly governed according to race, the Japanese presence was anomalous. The Japanese community developed into a colony. The Japanese were colonial masters in their relationships with New Guineans. Like their German counterparts, they were traders, boatbuilders, shell collectors and planters, recruiting and employing islanders as crew and labourers. Yet their economic activities were largely independent of their German counterparts. Mainly through Komine's Nan'yo Sangyō Kaisha, the Japanese exported copra, shell and marine products to Japan and imported miscellaneous goods from Japan. Thus the Japanese developed a colonial relationship between Japan and New Guinea in that Japan extracted primary products by means of a cheap indigenous labour force and provided light manufactured goods in exchange.

The development of the colony can be ascribed to the German acceptance of the Japanese as having a place among the rulers in their colonial apparatus. The Germans had two reasons. First, the Japanese alleviated the skilled labour shortage. Secondly, they assisted in maintaining and reinforcing the colonial structure. In helping contain New Guineans' challenges to the colonial structure, the Japanese were useful, particularly Komine who seemed to be willing to assist in punitive expeditions. It is even possible that the administration granted the Japanese European status partly to reinforce the colonial apparatus. That may also show how their national identity (as subjects of an expanding empire) facilitated the entry of migrants to the ruling group, whereas the Chinese were excluded and largely remained

114 The Japanese term which literally means indigenous people and is often used with contempt.
in an intermediate position between the whites and New Guineans. Thus the Japanese colony functioned to consolidate German rule, although that was, of course, on condition that the Japanese posed no threat to German interests.

The emergence of the Japanese community at Rabaul contributed to the development of its landscape. Rabaul expanded rapidly after the administration decided to shift its capital from Herbertshöhe in 1910. Buildings, roads and wharves were constructed for a well-planned township. New arrivals from Japan increased the demand for new dwellings. The 1912-13 Annual Report reported the extension of Komine's boatbuilding yard by the construction of a number of dwelling-houses for his new employees. However, as in the case of land rights, although Europeans in legal status, the Japanese were not accepted in the European residential areas. Some Japanese lived on Komine's waterfront lease while others lived in Malay Town and China Town—towns for non-Europeans. Evidently their European status was in reality nominal.

The emergence of a sizeable Japanese population was even accompanied by a Japanese brothel. Generally, as Yano argues from his analysis of the patterns of Japanese business expansion in Southeast Asia, particularly at Singapore, the presence of karayuki-san can be considered a barometer of Japanese prosperity. In Southeast Asia, karayuki-san spearheaded Japanese business expansion, and they were followed by traders who mainly sold sundries to them. In contrast, in New Guinea Komine was the first Japanese to arrive and to initiate business activity, and independent of Komine, the karayuki-san arrived. It was Ah Tam in 1904, a wealthy and successful Chinese businessman at Rabaul, who brought in the first karayuki-san, to make them serve 'the need of Chinese and European men'. Later Japanese migrants were also different from those traders in Southeast Asia: they came to work for Komine, not for karayuki-san. The presence of karayuki-san in New Guinea does not conform to the Southeast Asian pattern; it only demonstrates Ah Tam's entrepreneurship.

According to Threlfall the Japanese largely remained an isolated group in the social life of Rabaul, except for the formal appearance of Komine and his wife at administration functions. He also emphasises their religious alienation and secretiveness: 'unlike the Chinese, the Japanese remained totally unresponsive to Christianity, but the practice of their Shintō religion,
like their own forms of entertainment, was a private matter which outsiders were not invited to witness.\textsuperscript{122} This is probably correct but does not explain why the Japanese distanced themselves from the wider social life. Since most were from rural areas with little exposure to Western culture, Rabaul was the first place of contact with the West for most of them. It is likely that difficulties in language and manners, in addition to their transient nature, caused them to distance themselves and encouraged them to form their own 'alienated' group. As Threlfall observes, the white population saw this as a sign of Japanese secrecy, a view that was possibly reinforced by the contrast with the customary noisy Chinese New Year celebrations which were obvious to every resident of Rabaul.

\textsuperscript{122}\textit{Ibid.}
Chapter 3

Turning point, 1914-1918

World War I broke out in August 1914. The fighting in New Guinea was so limited that no Japanese were injured nor their property damaged, but the uncertainty about the future of the colony affected Komine’s business greatly. No new orders for ship building came and trading stopped. Under Australian military rule, the Japanese faced the challenge of creating good relations with them and abandoning their long-term relations with the Germans. Japan was allied to Britain, which meant fighting alongside Australia against Germany. Thus the war obliged the Japanese to switch their relations with white rulers from the Germans to the Australians.

World War I

The outbreak of World War I brought an unexpected blessing for Japan. Marquess Kaoru Inoue wrote to Prime Minister Ókuma Shigenobu and Prince Field Marshal Yamagata Aritomo that the war in Europe was tenyū (heaven-sent help) and the best opportunity to entrench Japanese interests in East Asia for the future.\(^1\) Foreign Minister Katō Takaaki also saw the war as a chance to ‘sweep away German bases in the East’.\(^2\) The inability of Western powers to engage in a war on two fronts—Europe and the Pacific-Asia region—also encouraged Japan to enter the conflict. Britain, being ‘unable to keep control of the Atlantic and the Pacific at the same time’, invited Japan to neutralise the German forces in China and the South Pacific that were threatening British interests in Hong Kong and Weihaiwei.\(^3\)

Although Britain suspected the Japanese of territorial ambitions and intended to limit Japanese activities, Japan refused to accept any restrictions and declared war on 23 August on the basis of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.\(^4\) Japan’s primary object was to acquire the Kiaochow Bay Leased Territory in Shantung Peninsula which Germany had taken after intervening in the Shimonoseki Treaty of 1895. Japan had acquired the area as spoil after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, but Russia, France and Germany, fearing


\(^{2}\)Ibid.

\(^{3}\)Glen Barclay, A History of the Pacific from the Stone Age to the present day (London 1978), 153.

Japanese expansion in East Asia, intervened and Germany took the area and developed it as a base for its East Asian interests.

The Germans in the Pacific islands were poorly prepared for the war. They had no forces capable of fighting in Samoa, the Marshalls or the Carolines. Their only garrison, at Rabaul, consisted of 240 native soldiers and 61 Europeans but had no fixed defences or field artillery, and there was only one machine gun in Madang in mainland New Guinea. The Germans were 'fully aware of their own military weakness' and attempted in vain through diplomacy to exclude China and the Pacific from the fighting zone.

On 27 August 1914, the Japanese navy blockaded Kiaochow Bay and the army sent in 29,000 soldiers. Combined with 2,800 British soldiers, the Allied forces attacked the German fortress at Tsingtao, defended by 7,000. Surrounded by overwhelming forces, the Germans capitulated on 7 November. Suffering very light military losses (about 500 dead), Japan took over the German interests in the Shantung Peninsula. Soon Japan entrenched its rule over southern Manchuria by acquiring the lease of the Kwantung Province and the Manchurian Railway, after forcing the infamous Twenty-One Demands on China in 1915.

The Japanese navy joined the British navy in chasing the German East Asian squadron that was destroyed off the Falkland Islands on 8 December. The navy also assisted the Allies in escort duties, helping guard the Australian and New Zealand convoys crossing the Indian Ocean. Later they were deployed in the Mediterranean.

The Japanese navy was then dominated by an aggressive group anticipating future war with the US in the Pacific. As a result, the navy acted swiftly in occupying German Micronesia, which would, the navy staff thought, provide bases to counter the US navy. The Japanese occupation was hardly publicised. That was because, as Hirama rightly argues, the navy knew that possession of Micronesia would be decided at the peace conference after the war, and tried to establish a *fait accompli* by the swift occupation.

In the decade prior to the war, Australian anxieties about its security against Japan were increasing, particularly after Britain withdrew its naval forces from the Pacific to the northern seas. As a result, the new Commonwealth government was resolved to improve its defence capacity by developing the navy, introducing compulsory military training and increasing

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6Barclay, op.cit., 150.
7ibid., 32.
defence expenditure 'which quadrupled in the five-year period prior to the outbreak of World War I'.

During World War I, Australia's main commitment was directed to Europe rather than the Pacific. That was largely due to the smallness of German forces in the Pacific, but it was also affected by the traditional Australian perception that the maintenance of British power was vital to its security. Australia's political, economic and racial ties with Britain promoted its imperial commitment, with the emergence of Australian nationalism which was 'strongly overlapped by an imperial spirit'. Australia's commitment in Europe increased in September 1914 when William (Billy) Hughes 'took the portfolio of Attorney-General and began to dominate cabinet and caucus by the force of his personality'. In October 1915 Hughes became Prime Minister and pursued his policy of assisting Britain by trying in vain to introduce conscription. Nevertheless, Australia kept sending troops to Egypt, Gallipoli and the Western Front in France. The cost was enormous: 59,342 were killed and 152,171 were wounded and £364 million was spent between 1914 and 1919.

In the Pacific, Australians were also swift in occupying the German territories. They occupied the territories south of the equator—Kaiser Wilhelmsland, the Bismarcks and Nauru. They fought a small battle in New Guinea more than two weeks before a Japanese warship anchored off Jaluit on 30 September. The Australian government dispatched the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force consisting of 'six companies of the Royal Australian Naval Reserve, a battalion of infantry at war strength (1,023 strong), two machine-gun sections, a signalling section and a detachment of the Australian Army Medical Corps'. The destruction of a German wireless station at Bitapaka near Kokopo and the occupation of German New Guinea were their major tasks. The Germans in New Britain surrendered shortly after the wireless station was taken. On 12 September the Australians occupied Rabaul, then Madang on the 26th. The actual fighting was in the battle for the Bitapaka station, which incurred casualties of only '2 officers and 4 men killed'.

Although the war was essentially a European event for both Japan and Australia, their occupation of the Pacific islands had important strategic significance—for Japan to counter the US naval force and for Australia to keep the Japanese from expanding further south. What is more important in

9J.A. Camilleri, An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy (Sydney 1975), 45.
10Nearly 400,000 Britons migrated to Australia between 1906 and 1914. T. B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War (Canberra 1991), 27-8.
11Manning Clark, A Short History of Australia (New York 1987), 205.
12Ibid., 213.
14Ibid., 73.
terms of colonial history in the Pacific was that the defeat of Germans ushered in a new era with a new colonial map. New colonial masters took over German interests with superior military strength: Japanese in Micronesia, Australians in New Guinea and Nauru, and New Zealanders in Samoa. The new map was finally endorsed in 1921 as a result of the Paris Peace Conference.

**Rise of nan'shin**

The Japanese occupation of German Micronesia revived nan'yō fever which had been cooling towards the end of the Meiji period (1868–1912). Nan'shin-ron advocates quickly expressed their enthusiasm in literature. As early as December 1914, the Nan'yō bōeki chōsa-kai (South Seas Trade Research Society) began to promote emigration to the islands:

> Among the South Seas islands, Japanese flags are raised high on the Mariana Islands, closest to Japan, on the Marshalls and Carolines. Is not today the time easiest to emigrate to those islands? ... Go, go, go and develop that heaven-sent treasure in the Pacific.\(^{15}\)

Their enthusiasm is shown by the number of publications. According to the bibliography of the Nihon Takushoku Kyōkai (Japan Colonisation Society), even the number of general references to the South Seas was phenomenal: in only three years from 1915 to 1918 28 pieces were published—a remarkable contrast to the 30 pieces published in the previous 46 years from 1868.\(^{16}\)

Ideas about nan' shin also changed. Shimizu argues that the outbreak of the war was a turning point in the evolution of nan' shin-ron, from the Meiji nan' shin-ron which emphasised peaceful economic expansion to the Taishō nan' shin-ron which was a blatantly expansionist ideology.\(^{17}\) Taishō advocates expressed their territorial desire and proposed to establish a Japanese block in the South Seas. They began to assert Japanese rights in the South Seas, emphasising the geographical proximity (compared to the Western powers) and to a lesser extent Japan's historical linkages. The Japanese occupation of Micronesia made this possible. Southeast Asia and Melanesia were now immediate neighbours. Japanese vessels could reach Singapore, Manila and Rabaul much quicker from Ponape than from Yokohama or Kobe.

Tokutomi Sohō\(^{18}\) and Inoue Masaji were the leading advocates of the ideological evolution. Tokutomi played a crucial role. His interpretation that

\(^{15}\) Nan'yō bōeki chōsa-kai (ed.), Nan'yō no hoko [Treasure in the South Seas] (Tokyo 1914), 8-9.


\(^{18}\) One of the most influential thinkers in modern Japan. He was a journalist, historian and nationalist. At the Tokyo Trial after the Pacific War, he was sentenced as a Class A war criminal.
Japanese Settlers in Papua and New Guinea

'nanshin-ron was an ideology to supplement nanboku heishin-ron [the theory of simultaneous advance to the south and the north] and hokushin-ron [the northward advance theory] reconciled the conflict between the navy-led nanshin-ron and the army-led hokushin-ron. Until then the army's hokushin-ron had been overwhelming the navy's nanshin-ron. The hokushin-ron meant advancement to the continent in East Asia: it had been a pillar of Japanese imperial strategy after its victories in the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War. Tokutomi also introduced Pan-Asianism, calling it Japan's 'moral imperialism', in which Asians had to be freed from white rule by Japanese. In this, he included the South Seas as a region from which white rule had to be removed. Thus he subtly combined nanshin with Pan-Asianism: his idea appealed to the nationalists who had been asserting Japan's stronger role to lead Asia. Tokutomi was also practical and influential. He virtually controlled nan'yō publications, supervising and publishing them through his publishing company Minyū-sha.

Inoue was more impressive. He advocated a stronger and simpler form of expansionism than Tokutomi, although he did not follow Tokutomi's argument on the combination of nanshin and hokushin or 'moral imperialism'. In 1915 Inoue published Nan'yō, one of the best known nanshin books. He emphasised that the South Seas were a natural sphere of Japanese territory, using the word 'dai nihon-shugi' (Great Japanism). The same argument was introduced by Nitobe Inazō, a well-known liberal. In 1915, he wrote an article titled 'Bunmei no nanshin' (The southward advancement of civilisation), in which he introduced a unique but baseless idea that the Japanese were attracted to the South Seas because they had Malay ancestry.

What was more characteristic about nanshin-ron in this period was that ideological evolution was followed by commercialism. The trend is obvious from the titles of mainstream publications, which had hardly been seen before the outbreak of World War I, such as Nan'yō kane-mō ke hyaku-ua (A hundred stories about how to make money in the South Seas), Nan'yō toko an'nai (Guide book to go to the South Seas), Nan'yō no yashi saibai ni tsuite (About planting coconut trees in the South Pacific), Nan'yō ni okeru honpō shōhin gaikyō (General situation of Japanese goods in the South Seas) and so on. In 1915, Jitsugyō no Nihon (Business Japan), one of the most widely

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19 Ibid., p.399.
20 Ibid.
21 Inoue Masaji, Nan'yō [The South Seas] (Tokyo 1915), 15.
22 Kamiya Tadataka, 'Nan'yō shinwa no keisei' [The formation of the South Seas myths], in Yano Toru (ed.), Tōnan ajia-gaku 10 Tōnan ajia to nihon [Southeast Asian Studies, vol.10, Southeast Asia and Japan] (Tokyo 1991), 56.
23 Ōmori Shinjirō, Nan'yō kane-mō ke hyaku-ua [A hundred stories about how to make money in the South Seas] (Tokyo 1914); Yoshida Harukichi, Nan'yō toko an'nai [Guide book to go to the South Seas] (Tokyo 1915); Arima Hikokichi, Nan'yō no yashi saibai ni tsuite [About planting
read business magazines, published a special issue, 'Nan'yō-gō' (Issue for the South Seas)\(^{24}\)—a 170-page issue, twice as thick as normal issues, was filled with information about the South Seas.\(^{25}\) The opening article was a landmark for the emergence of commercial nanshin:

In the South Seas, there are blessings from the sun in the sky and there are unexploited treasures on the land. The South Seas welcome us and do not deter us from exploiting their resources. They are nothing but the places which heaven has provided for us for the development of our race.\(^{26}\)

Thus, early Taishō nanshin-ron began to develop perceptions that the South Seas had a rich and accessible economic potential. That had an important impact on the Japanese interest in the South Seas, because the perceptions were widespread not only among intellectuals but also in business circles.

The establishment of private organisations and companies shows the rise of Japanese economic interest. On 30 January 1915, the Nan'yō Kyōkai (South Seas Society) was established. Although it was a private organisation, the Society's membership included leading nanshin-ron advocates, politicians and officials influential in making policies about the South Seas. The president was Earl Yoshikawa Akimasa, a prominent politician,\(^{27}\) and the Vice-President was Uchida Kakichi, the Governor of Taiwan. Inoue was also a foundation member. The Society had two main objectives—promotion of trade and popularisation of the South Seas. The Society exhibited Japanese goods in Southeast Asia, promoted language study, sent commercial trainees to the area and held public lectures. It also published countless writings about the South Seas. One of the best known of its publications was the journal Nan'yō Kyō kai Kaihō (The Report of the South Seas Society) (later changed to Nan'yō Kyō kai Zasshi (The Journal of the South Seas Society) in 1921 and Nan'yō (The South Seas) in 1937), which was widely read and became a major source of information.

Businessmen hurried to take advantage of the opportunities. From 1914 to 1918, 14 new companies were established, ushering in a new company rush that continued until the outbreak of the Pacific War.\(^{28}\) Their eyes were fixed on the rich natural resources in Southeast Asia, as shown in their coconut trees in the South Pacific] (Tokyo 1915); Nan'yō bōeki shinkō kai, Nan'yō niokeru honpō shō hin gaikyō [General situation of Japanese goods in the South Seas] (Tokyo 1917).

\(^{24}\)Jitsugyō no nihon-sha, No.7 (1915).
\(^{25}\)Yano Toru, Nihon no nan'yō shi kan [Japanese historical view of the South Seas] (Tokyo 1979), 100.
\(^{26}\)In ibid., 207.
\(^{27}\)He took office as the Governor of Tokyo in 1884, then took various ministerial positions in the Japanese government such as Minister for Education, Home Affairs, Law, and Communications.
\(^{28}\)Nan'yō dantai rengō kai [The Federation of South Seas Organisations] (ed.), Dai nan'yō nenkan [the Year book of the South Seas] (Tokyo 1942), 797-828.
investment. They mostly invested in plantations—eight companies were involved in rubber (reflecting the increased demand for rubber in Europe), and three each in hemp, jute and copra. The other companies engaged in trading. A giant commercial firm, Mitsubishi, was also established and expanded its interests into Southeast Asia.

The government was active in promoting economic activities. It financed the Kaigai Kōgyō Kaisha (Overseas Industrial Company) that amalgamated several other emigration companies in 1917. The company, cooperating with the Taiwan Ginkō (Bank of Taiwan), became a major financial institution for promoting emigration, industry, investment and education. 29 Although later the company's major interest turned to emigration to Brazil, it first established an extensive network in the South Seas. Agents were posted to Thursday Island, Darwin, Broome, Manila, Davao and Singapore. The company was equivalent to the Tōyō Takushoku Kaisha (Oriental Development Company) which was formed in 1908 with government funds in order to facilitate the colonisation of Korea and later Manchuria. As Irie argues, the establishment of the Kaigai Kōgyō was the first step towards the government's direct involvement in the South Seas. 30

**Japanese perceptions of Papua and New Guinea**

The Japanese officials did not show much interest in Papua or New Guinea, despite their proximity to Micronesia, because their main attention was directed to Micronesia and Southeast Asia. The number of publications clearly demonstrates this indifference. Only three books dealt with Papua and New Guinea, out of tens of new South Seas titles published from 1914 to 1918. Similarly, out of the 14 companies established in the war period, 13 were in Southeast Asia and one in Micronesia. 31 The government did not take much interest, either, except the officials in the Foreign Ministry who had to respond to Komine's financial petition.

Although there was no specific reference to Papua and New Guinea, the Nan'yō Bōeki Chōsa-kai (South Seas Trade Research Society) gave general information (geography, climate, people, culture, industry, economy and Japanese relations) about Micronesia, Southeast Asia, New Caledonia and New Guinea. According to the Society, the islanders in the former German territories had good feelings towards the Japanese.

29The Bank of Taiwan was a semiofficial bank established in 1899. Initially it served as a central bank in Taiwan (a Japanese colony) to assist resource exploitation and economic development. After World War I, it began to promote the economic development of Micronesia and the expansion of trade between Taiwan and South China and South Seas islands.


31Nan'yō dantai rengō kai, op.cit.
The islanders had been receiving cruel treatment under the oppressive German colonial policies and [had been exploited] by foreign traders who had enjoyed their privileges as colonisers. As a result, the islanders despise them and seem to be welcoming the Japanese. Our navy's occupation was greeted by extremely overjoyed islanders.\(^{32}\)

However, in the view of the Society, the islands had a low economic profile: the islanders had no industry except copra production and there were few benefits in trading.\(^{33}\)

Likewise the Japanese navy did not show much interest in Papua and New Guinea; its main attention was directed to Southeast Asia and Micronesia. Captain Hosaka Hikotarō wrote *Nan'yō tsūran* (The survey of the South Seas) in 1916; it was a huge volume (926 pages) that gave the most detailed information on the South Seas. But Hosaka wrote mostly about Dutch and British colonies in Southeast Asia, and devoted only one page to Papua and two pages to German New Guinea.\(^{34}\) He briefly mentioned Komine and his business and said that Rabaul would be a promising place for Japan's economic development, although he pointed out that the future of New Guinea was uncertain and would depend on the peace treaty.\(^{35}\)

The lack of interest was greatly regretted by Japanese residents in New Guinea. Fujikawa Masajirō,\(^{36}\) a manager of Komine's Nan'yō Kōgyō Kaisha, wrote:

> Recently studying the countries and people in the South Seas has become very popular. However, the region that the people call *Nan'yō* is usually Java, Sumatra, Celebes and Borneo. Some people even believe only the area around Singapore is *Nan'yō*, while some think that *Nan'yō* includes a wider region than those, but they widen it in the direction of Burma, Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines. Few people know about New Guinea, which lies massively to the north of Australia, and the thousands of small islands surrounding New Guinea.\(^{37}\)

Partly due to lack of information, the stereotyped perception of New Guineans remained unchanged. Shibata Tsune'e, an anthropologist at Tokyo University, wrote in the introduction to Fujikawa's book:

> German New Guinea, the northeast area of New Guinea, maintained its characteristics. The level of civilisation is extremely low. The natives are mostly at

\(^{32}\)Nan'yō Bōeki Chōsa-kai (ed.). *op.cit.* , 12-13.

\(^{33}\)Ibid., 14.

\(^{34}\)Hosaka made a tour to some of the South Seas islands in 1913; Hosaka Hikotarō, *Nan'yō tsūran* [The survey of the South Seas] (Tokyo 1916).

\(^{35}\)Hosaka, *op.cit.*, 906.

\(^{36}\)The date of Fujikawa's arrival at Rabaul was not clear. According to his book, it was either 1901 or 1903.

\(^{37}\)Fujikawa Masajirō and Maruba Tamotsu, *Nyu ginia papua zoku sakuhin shū* [Collections of works of New Guineans and Papuans] (Tokyo 1914), 1.
the stage of the Stone Age, using stone implements. Cannibalism is still prevalent.\textsuperscript{38}

\textbf{Japanese in Papua}

\textit{Australian perceptions of Japanese}

The impact of World War I was scarcely felt in Papua. Australian indifference to the small number of Japanese in Papua remained unchanged. \textit{The Papua Annual Report} from 1914 to 1918 had no comments on the Japanese, except for giving their total population figures. As Table 3-1 shows, the Japanese population stayed static. All still lived in the Milne Bay area. Similarly the number of other non-indigenous coloured population showed little change, indicating successful migration restriction. The number of the whites decreased, indicating that the stagnant economy was having an effect.

\textbf{TABLE 3-1. Non-indigenous populations in Papua, 1914-1918}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
year & \textbf{Eastern} & \textbf{Japanese} & \textbf{European} & \textbf{Other coloured}\textsuperscript{*} \\
 & & & & \\
1914 & 7 & 2 & 9 & 1,186 & 117 \\
1915 & 7 & 2 & 9 & 1,037 & 119 \\
1916 & 6 & 2 & 8 & 992 & 98 \\
1917 & 6 & 2 & 8 & 701 & 109 \\
1918 & 6 & 2 & 8 & 636 & 78 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{*}non-indigenous


There was a surprise visit of a team from the Japanese mining company, Fujita Gumi (Fujita Company), to Port Moresby in 1916 to investigate copper mining on the Astrolabe Field near Port Moresby.\textsuperscript{39} The five-man team arrived at Port Moresby without prior notice but managed to interview an Australian official, who immediately sent a report to Melbourne. According to his report, the Japanese seemed to have detailed information about the area and made concrete proposals to start operating a mine but in vain.\textsuperscript{40} However, the event indicates that there were some speculative Japanese industrialists who cast

\textsuperscript{38}Ibid., introduction (no page number).

\textsuperscript{39}Fujita Gumi was then one of the giant mining companies, competing with Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo. It operated the Kosaka copper mine in Akita— one of the largest copper mines then in Japan.

\textsuperscript{40}Government House, Port Moresby [the name of the sender unknown] to the Minister of State for External Affairs, Melbourne, 6 Mar. 1916, A1/1 16/26203.
their eyes on mineral resources in Papua, despite the fact that most industrialists showed stronger interest in Southeast Asia.

**Japanese settlers**

There are no written records of the Japanese from 1914 to 1918. Information is available from oral evidence only.\(^4\) A major characteristic of the oral sources is the lack of recollections related to the war. The Japanese carried on their business in trading, shell fishing, and copra planting as before. They raised their families and kept on entrenching their presence in the local communities.

**Japanese in New Guinea**

**Impact of Australian military operations**

The outbreak of war was an unexpected tribulation for the Japanese who had just begun to prosper under German rule. But their response showed their agility. The report of Samejima San'nosuke, a secretary of Komine's company,\(^4\) is the only Japanese detailed written account of the impact of World War I on the Japanese. It is titled 'Senji zaijū jōkyō hōkoku sho' (Report on the local situation during the war),\(^4\) and shows how the Japanese at Rabaul attempted to reconcile their relations with both Germans and Australians.

On 8 August, upon the German declaration of war, the Germans at Rabaul prepared hastily. On the same day, the Germans detained the British and French, and restricted the movement of Japanese residents. All townsfolk raised their own flags to show their nationality, not knowing which side was to invade Rabaul. At dawn on 11 August, three Australian destroyers, the *Yarra*, *Warrego* and *Parramatta*, appeared in Simpson Harbour. They panicked the German residents who were expecting the German squadron to rescue them.

\(^4\) The oral evidence provides information for only six Japanese—Koto, Mabe, Murakami, Matoba, Taichirō Tanaka and Shigematsu Tanaka, although the statistics in *Papua Annual Report* show the presence of eight to nine Japanese in this period. Possibly other Japanese were traders operating either from Thursday Island or Rabaul who regularly visited Papua and stayed temporarily.

\(^4\) According to the report, Komine's company was called 'Komine Shōkai' [Komine Company], although German and Australian records say its name was 'Nanjō Kōgyō Kaisha' [South Seas Industry Company]. 'Nanjō Kōgyō Kaisha', which was formed in 1912, was a new name for 'Komine Shōkai'. It seems that Komine was using the name 'Komine Shōkai' until 1915 in Japanese official documents.

\(^4\) The report is owned by Komine's descendant, Komine Shigenori in Nagasaki. The date of the writing of the report is unknown, but judging from the content, it seems to have been written and submitted in mid-1915. To whom it was submitted is not recorded, but most likely it was the Japanese Consul-General in Sydney, as official correspondence from German New Guinea was normally sent to Sydney, then to the Foreign Ministry at Tokyo.
At this stage Japan had not yet declared war against Germany. Komine co-operated with the Germans who assured the Japanese residents of their safety. But the anarchy in Rabaul was also felt among the European residents; a German postal official noted on 10 August that 'there were fears that the Chinese might be dangerous because of threatened food shortages and because of unemployment among them'. Then, according to Samejima, in order to cope with the dangerous situation, the acting-administrator, Eduard Haber, suggested that Komine form an armed Japanese militia.

On 16 August Komine sent a message, as a representative of the Japanese residents, expressing sympathy for the administrator [sic] in this difficult situation. The administrator sent his official to reply to Komine's message with deep gratitude, and requested, 'Our situation depends on the war in Europe and our home government did not acknowledge the need to send troops to its colonies. We are resigned to surrender our territories to the enemy without resisting if we are attacked. Therefore we are not worried. However, I am most concerned about two thousand Chinese most of whom became unemployed because of this war. They do not have enough food due to the stopping of sea transport and very likely they will become vagrants and steal things and may rebel. That will be a most grievous event but there are not many Germans left in Rabaul to prevent it from happening. But if you lead your employees [to form a militia], such an event can be prevented. The administration will supply weapons immediately if you need any. My worry will end if you cooperate.'

We can only speculate whether Haber really made such a request, as no German or Australian records mention it.

The following part of Samejima's report suggests that Komine saw the outbreak of the war as an excellent opportunity to 'wipe out' Chinese influence, since he regarded the Chinese as rivals of Japanese businessmen in the South Seas. However, the plan was wrecked when the Japanese government, using the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, declared war against Germany on 23 August. Hearing the news, Komine quickly notified Haber of his withdrawal of the proposal to form a militia. Unexpectedly, however, the Germans did not become hostile towards the Japanese. According to Samejima,

Komine quickly called upon the administrator [sic] and said, 'Although I promised [to form a militia] according to your request, I would like to inform you of the cancellation of my promise because today Japan declared war against Germany and I, being a Japanese subject, cannot serve an enemy country.' The administrator accepted Komine's cancellation and said, 'It is impossible to change our home country's foreign policies, but nations and individuals are different. Even if our nations are fighting each other, you can carry on your business as before. Our administration provides you with as much protection as possible.'

44Neville Threlfall, 'From Mangroves to Frangipani: the story of Rabaul and East New Britain', MS, Division of Pacific and Asian History, Australian National University (Canberra 1988), 139.
45Samejima, op.cit., 1.
Haber's words proved true. The administration did not keep Komine in custody (although the British were imprisoned) and provided food for the Japanese as promised.

Probably the Japanese declaration of war provided a dilemma for the Japanese in New Guinea. They would be disloyal if they maintained good relations with Germans, although the Germans continued to protect them. After all the Japanese decided to co-operate with the Australians probably for two reasons. The first is natural: they chose to be loyal to their home government. But the second one is compelling. They needed to rely on the Australian force for the supply of food, as they were suffering from extremely serious shortages and had nobody but Australians to rely on. The regular shipping service of the Norddeutscher Lloyd Company ceased at the outbreak of war; local produce was also short due to severe drought. The situation was so serious that Komine had to cut down rations for his employees to the extent that non-labourers had only one meal a day. Samejima noted that the food situation worsened around the time when the Australian expeditionary force arrived and occupied Rabaul on 12 September.

Therefore, in order to survive, Komine had to start establishing friendly relations with the Australians. In doing so, he was lucky. The pilot of the Australian fleet happened to be Komine's acquaintance who had worked in Rabaul about five years earlier, and on 13 September he came to Komine's shipyard without knowing whose it was to ask it to install wireless facilities for the Australian force. Komine accepted the job and started working for the Australians on 14 September. Samejima, on behalf of Komine, then asked the captain of the Australian warship, which was returning to Sydney, to deliver an urgent message about the serious food shortage to the Japanese Consul-General at Sydney. Considering the urgency of the problem, one would have expected Komine, as a leader of the Japanese community, to make the request, but he did not. This may reflect his long-established good relations with the Germans. Also the undisciplined behaviour of the Australian landing force may have made him hesitate to rely on them. Samejima continued:

The Australian soldiers had no military discipline. They frequently broke into the houses not only of the Germans but also of Chinese and natives and stole money and valuables. They came to Komine's shipyard and demanded drinks, and some soldiers even did so by threatening with their bayonets. As a result, the Australian commander put guards at our shipyard for about two months.

46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
49 Samejima, op.cit., 2.
50 Ibid.
Samejima's report is correct. The commander of the Australian force, William Holmes, also wrote to the Minister of Defence, Melbourne: 'I regret to have to report there has been a good deal of crime amongst the Troops since they settled down to routine Garrison duty here'.51

Nevertheless from late September to early October Komine acted swiftly for the Australians. He undertook to salvage the German steamer Kolonial Gesellschaft, which was stranded on the reefs at Cape Lambert. The Germans had set fire to the boat, but the Australians wanted to use it for military purposes and asked Komine to salvage it. On 4 October Komine headed for the wreck in his schooner Namanula with four Japanese and 50 natives.52

When he was about to salvage it, he took up a more important mission—piloting the Australian expedition force to capture the German steamer Komet.53 Although Lieutenant-Colonel J. Paton, the commander, only wrote that Komine 'volunteered' his services,54 Samejima explains that there was a profound reason for that.

The harbour-master Jackson called upon Komine and asked him about where the Komet could be hiding. He also mentioned that recently the Komet captured a Japanese sailing boat in the East Caroline Islands and stole goods. Having heard this, Komine was very angry... and said that Lulu was the only possible port that the Komet could enter on the north coast of New Britain. He also said that the Australians would be able to capture the Komet without using many soldiers because of the topography where it was hiding. Then he said he would volunteer to assist the expedition. And he jumped on the Nusa.55

Samejima's accounts may not be reliable. There is no official report on the Komet's attack on a Japanese ship in either Japanese or Australian sources, although it was possible because the Komet sailed between Angaur in the Palau Group and New Britain from 14 August to early October.56 Again, it is most unlikely that Jackson knew of any attack, because he did not know the movements of the Komet until he got information that it was hiding on the north coast of New Britain on 4 October.57

Samejima's explanation suggests two possible scenarios. Either Jackson lied to Komine because he needed his knowledge of local waters and people; or Samejima fabricated the story. The Japanese at Rabaul needed a pretext to assist the Australians, because overt assistance would anger the Germans who had protected them even after the outbreak of war. The Japanese had to

51Colonel Administrator William Holmes to the Minister of Defence at Melbourne, 13 Nov. 1914, AA, AWM33 11.
52Samejima, op.cit.
53Although the Komet was not a battleship, the Australians feared that its wireless facilities could be used to coordinate the operation of the German Pacific fleet.
55Samejima, op.cit., 2; the Nusa was an Australian boat with the expedition.
57Ibid., 129.
maintain good relations with the Germans in order to continue their businesses, because the Germans still controlled most commerce in New Guinea: the Australian forces were inexperienced in colonial administration and left most economic operations in their hands.

The following is Samejima's account of the capture of the Komet.

The South Seas rarely get misty, but the mist was so thick that the Komet neglected to set a watch and none of their crew noticed the Nusa's approach. The Nusa's crew waited until daybreak, preparing to launch a small boat in case that they found the enemy boat. The harbour-master persistently cautioned Komine to capture the Komet [not to destroy], and Komine repeated confidently, 'All right, sir.' On 9 October, the sky in the east became bright. At half past four, the Nusa entered the bay. When she passed the projecting point, the hiding Komet was sighted. The Komet, which used to have a white body, was now painted grey. Quickly the Nusa's crew lowered a boat, and Komine led three British [sic: they should be Australian] sailors and approached the Komet, raising a white flag in case of being attacked. The boat reached the stern and Komine and others climbed onto the deck. A Chinese boy noticed them and rushed to alert the German commander. Although the commander immediately came out on the deck, still wearing pyjamas, it was too late. The British sailors were already standing by the Komet's cannon. The German crew and native fighters were too frightened to resist. The commander looked resigned, although reluctant. Komine told him, 'We have been good friends for a long time, but my action today is not a personal action. I acted so because Japan and Britain are at war against Germany. Please surrender immediately.' Komine led the commander into his bedroom and locked the room from the outside and placed a guard. Then he ordered the German crew to prepare for sailing and commanded the ship on its way to Rabaul. The Komet arrived in Simpson Harbour on the morning on 11 October. The [Australian] governor and other people were rejoiced to hear of the unexpected feat and admired Komine's bravery. Komine went home, but the governor sent a car to pick him up to hear his full report. I accompanied him, carrying souvenirs—captured documents from the Komet, her flag and a painting of the German emperor. The British governor and his staff officers celebrated the capture of the Komet, welcoming Komine as the main guest. They held a big banquet and cheered Britain and Japan. Komine cheered banzai three times. On the same day, the Japanese squadron radioed to the administration to inquire after the safety of Komine and other Japanese. I hurried to the administration headquarters and replied by radio, saying, 'We and our properties are all safe but we are suffering from a shortage of food. We request supplies of rice and soya sauce urgently.' On the following day, the governor granted the title of captain to Komine with a letter of appreciation for his assistance and declared that Komine was no longer required to take off his hat to salute except for saluting the governor.58

Jackson's report to Holmes on the capture of the Komet also verifies Komine's bravery and Australian appreciation.

58Samejima, op.cit., 2.
I would point out the following additional points for your consideration:—

(1) Mr. Komine (Japanese) of Rabaul was on board Komet [sic; it should be Nusa], and thanks to his help and knowledge of natives Komet was exactly located. Mr. Komine showed great enterprise and an absolute indifference to the probability of Nusa receiving Komet's fire; he also showed his great anxiety to help us by abandoning his occupation of saving a wreck off the Talele Islands in order to accompany the expedition.59

The Australian records show the invitation to Komine to the official dinner.60

However, there are no records to confirm Samejima's accounts of Komine's persuasion of the German commander, the granting of the title of captain and his privilege not to have to take off his hat—except for several letters that referred to 'Captain' Komine.61 Probably Komine's persuasion was Samejima's exaggeration and the granting of the title of captain and the privilege was unofficial.

Komine also assisted the Australians by providing them with the information that a German trader (Heninrich Wahlen) in Rabaul was communicating to Germans in America information regarding the movements of the Australian naval and military forces in and around Rabaul, by means of documents concealed in bales of merchandise shipped by him to America.62 Due to this service, Komine was granted Wahlen's fishing rights in the western Islands.

The capture of the Komet provided Komine with an excellent opportunity to initiate friendly relations with the Australians. And his assistance continued. He piloted the expedition to the Admiralty and Hermit Islands from 19 to 30 November.63 But this participation was also motivated by his self-interest. Komine was anxious about his wife and employees and plantations in the Admiralty Islands, as communications with the islands had been cut since the outbreak of war. The expedition satisfied Komine's self-interest. The first destination was Rambutju Island (21 November) where Komine owned a plantation. On the following day, having made the Germans capitulate at Lorengau, the force reached Pityilu Island where Komine had another plantation. The following morning Captain Travers breakfasted with Mrs Komine. And just before returning to Rabaul, the expedition force

62 Acting Prime Minister of the Commonwealth to Japanese consul-general, 13 July 1921, A457/1 690/3.
1 Komine Isokichi (left) and Admiral Kamimura Hikonojō (right) in 1913 (photograph provided by Komine Shigenori)
2 Japanese naval officers and New Guineans (date unknown) (photograph provided by Nagahama Tome)

3 Imaizumi Masao and New Guineans around 1920 (photograph provided by Imaizumi Kotarō)
4 Japanese shipwrights and New Guinean labourers in Rabaul in the 1930s (photograph provided by Izumi Mitsuru)

5 The schooner Ebisu Maru, owned by Kikuchi Ichisuke in the 1930s (photograph provided by Izumi Mitsuru)
Blocks lived in by Japanese in Malay Town, Rabaul, in the 1930s (photograph provided by Nagahama Tome)
salvaged Komine's auxiliary schooner wrecked on Korat Reef three months previously.  

Komine was successful in establishing good relations with the Australians. Consequently, the shortage of food was temporarily alleviated by the help of Burns, Philp. Soon the Japanese residents rejoiced to see the arrival of the Japanese squadron at Rabaul on 28 December. Komine and Samejima explained the shortage of food to the Japanese captains and received ample rice and soya sauce. Samejima's account then concludes with a business report for the 1914 financial year and notes that the outbreak of war did not greatly affect business that year, as most orders for ship building had been contracted in the previous year. New contracts were made with the Australians—the repair of the Madang, Samoa and Kolonial Gesellschaft.  

**Australian attitudes**  

Japan's participation in the war as an ally of Britain encouraged the Australians to be friendly. The Australians showed genuine hospitality when two cruisers (Chikuma and Yahagi) and two destroyers (Yamakaze and Umikaze) visited Rabaul on 28 December 1914. The Administrator, Brigadier William Holmes, entertained the Japanese captains at dinner at Government House and the Japanese reciprocated. On 5 April 1915, the cruiser Nisshin arrived at Rabaul and S. A. Pethebridge (second administrator) took the Japanese captain Kanahara sightseeing around Rabaul and held an official dinner. Mutual respect seems to have developed, according to the report of the Australian district officer at Madang, when the Nisshin visited on 11 April. Furthermore, when an official dinner was held to celebrate the King's Birthday on 3 June, the Japanese captain and officers of the warship Manshu, which arrived on the same day, were invited. Similarly, when the Japanese Training Squadron visited Rabaul in the end of July 1915, the acting administrator 'made their stay here [at Rabaul] as enjoyable as possible under the circumstances'. The administrator's hospitality was greatly appreciated: the Japanese Rear Admiral commented that 'I cannot be too much grateful for your hospitality and warmth you have extended to the officers and men under my command and I am sure they will carry about the
most delightful remembrance of their visit to this fair territory'. Indeed, the Training squadron had received a warm welcome also in Australia before coming to New Guinea. The Japanese Consul-General Shimizu Seizaburō at Sydney reported it to the Foreign Ministry at Tokyo, and later the Foreign Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu sent an official letter of appreciation to the British Ambassador at Tokyo.

Australian friendliness was also directed to the Japanese residents. Pethebridge reinforced the European status of the Japanese by introducing regulations for the burial of Europeans and Japanese in the European cemetery at Rabaul. This shows a clear contrast to the Australian attitudes towards the Chinese, who were to be buried in an area in the Botanic Gardens separate from the European and Japanese cemetery.

Japanese relations with the Australian administration continued to develop, and the way they developed resembles that of their relations with the German administration. Just as Komine's relations with the Germans had been established by the administration's need of Komine's vessel for administrative purposes, his relations with the Australians developed due to their lack of vessels to patrol the out-stations. First, the Australian force assigned Komine to repair the former German steamer Nusa and hired Komine's launch Banzai for general naval purposes. Komine exploited the situation to improve his business which had been badly affected by the war. Upon Komine's request, Holmes urged Melbourne to pay for the repair work. The Australians also gave exceptional protection for Komine's trading. Komine was allowed to export a small shipment of copra and marine produce directly to Japan in Japanese ships, although after the Australian occupation all products from New Guinea were to be sent to Sydney by Burns, Philp.

Despite this protection, however, by the end of 1915 Komine's business suffered acutely from the war, and in November he had to assign 'all right, title, estate, interest, claim and demand in his Leasehold Lands in the Admiralty Group (Manus) to the New Guinea Company by way of security for

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72 Rear Admiral Chisaka's letter quoted in ibid.
73 Shimizu to Kato, 16 July 1915, JDR, 5.1.3.4.
74 Ōkuma to the British Ambassador, 1 Sept. 1915, in ibid.
76 Ibid. However, later the administration also gave European status to the Chinese and repealed the discriminatory regulation on the locations of the burial in 1918.
78 Holmes to the Minister of State for Defence, 2 Jan. 1915, ibid.
79 Memorandum for the Ministry of State for Defence by Pethebridge, 14 Dec. 1915, AA, AWM33 12/11; List of Japanese vessels and cargoes for and out of Rabaul, date unknown, AA, CP661/15/1 BOX 1.
Chapter 3: Turning point, 1914-1918

Kominated asked the Australians for help, and the Administrator advanced money to Komine to protect him against foreclosure by his mortgagee, the Neu Guinea Compagnie. At the same time, Komine petitioned the Japanese Consul-General in Sydney for financial support from the Japanese government. His letter was a long one extending over nine pages, in which the first half explained how he came to New Guinea and established good relations with the German administration, and the latter part related how the war affected his relations with the Germans and his business operations. He wrote that he had lost all German trust after he assisted the Australians to capture the Komet, and that the Germans now hated him so much that he could no longer conduct business with the New Guinea Company and Hernsheim & Co. Surprisingly Komine’s petition was accompanied by two letters from Pethebridge. The first shows that the Australian administration attempted to save Komine’s business operations from being taken over by the Germans. His second letter explains why the administration was so generous: ‘since the War started and during British Occupation of the Colony, Komine [sic] has on all occasions, given us valuable assistance in many ways, and I regard his presence in the Colony as an important factor during the future development’.

Having received these letters, Consul-General Shimizu wrote to the Foreign Ministry at Tokyo. Shimizu sympathised with Komine and urged the government to assist him, introducing him as ‘a rare entrepreneur in the South Sea Islands’. However, the Foreign Ministry declined to assist because of the delicate international situation, pointing out that the disposal of former German territories was still uncertain. The reply was relayed to Komine, who then wrote a second petition in which he expressed his deep dismay and emphasised the Australian administrators’ friendly attitude. Shimizu also wrote to Tokyo again but had no success.

Help came through Komine’s relatives. They managed to persuade Minamikata Tsunekusu, a millionaire in Wakayama prefecture and the

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82Komine to Shimizu, 19 May 1916, JDR, 3.4.6.3.
83Both companies dominated commerce in German New Guinea. Komine had been doing business with both.
84Pethebridge to Shimizu, 22 May 1916, ibid.
85Pethebridge to Shimizu, date unknown but marked No. 2 in Japanese, ibid.
86Shimizu to Ishii, 10 June 1916, ibid.
87The Foreign Ministry, date unknown, ibid.
88Komine to Shimizu, 24 Oct. 1916, ibid.
89Shimizu to Terauchi, 9 Nov. 1916, ibid.
president of the Nanyō Sangyō Kabushiki Kaisha (South Seas Industrial Company), to purchase and re-structure Komine's company. Minamikata agreed to buy the company for 800,000 yen, retaining Komine as a managing director. The official re-structuring was endorsed by the acting administrator Seaforth MacKenzie on condition that: the company pay all its debt to the administration, pay outstanding wages immediately to all employees, and guarantee the payment of the former company's promissory notes to the administration and appoint a manager (or representative) proficient in English and British commercial regulations. MacKenzie's endorsement was based on his consideration of the 'international policy' that Japan was the ally of the British and the risk that 'Mr. Komine should be in danger of being absorbed by a German company'. On 10 October 1917 the Company officially took over all Komine's business interests and registered his company as a branch at Rabaul.

There is another example of international politics working favourably for Komine, when Komine and his employees were suspected of 'wrongly removing certain articles from German steamer MORWE'. No evidence was found and no action was taken against Komine because Pethebridge thought that the conviction would cause a diplomatic problem and 'considered that unless conviction absolutely certain unwise at that time proceed further'.

**Australian government attitudes**

From 1917, in contrast to the administration's friendly attitude towards the Japanese, Australian officials in Melbourne, then the Australian capital, began to take restrictive measures. Australian government policy reflected international politics over the disposal of German territories in the South Pacific. Australia's main concern was to secure New Guinea as its spoils, just as Tokyo was determined to take over Micronesia.

Tokyo acted first. The Japanese government restricted the entry and trading of non-Japanese in Micronesia. In retaliation the Australian government restricted Japanese migration and trading in New Guinea. On 31 March 1917 the Australian Defence Minister, George Pearce, informed the Japanese Consul-General at Sydney that 'the number of Japanese employees in New Guinea should not at any time exceed the number at the commencement of the military occupation'. In the same year, the Australian

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90Report by Arata Gunkichi, Mar. 1921, Komine shōkai baishū shimatsu [Settlement of the purchase of the Komine Company], JDR, 3.5.12.12.
91MacKenzie to the Minister for State of Defence, 8 Mar. 1918, AA, AWM33 55/2.
92Pethebridge to Defence, Melbourne, 24 July 1917; Trumble to the administrator, 20 July 1917, AA, AWM33 45/2.
93Pethebridge to Defence, 25 July 1917. ibid.
94Ibid.
95Prime Minister's Department, op.cit., p.11; The military administration in New Guinea was placed under the Defence Minister at Melbourne.
government restricted direct copra trade between Rabaul and Japan. The restriction was maintained despite repeated protests by the Japanese Consul-General Shimizu. Komine also attempted to open trade unsuccessfully. He offered to purchase the government ship *Samoa* when it was for sale, provided that trade with Japan was permitted, but it was refused.

Shimizu pointed out in his letter to the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo that one of the reasons for the trade restriction was the Australian fear that the Australians would lose their monopoly of the copra trade, because the Germans, who hated the Australians, would sell all copra to Komine if the trade was permitted. Similar fear was shown in Pearce's letter to the Prime Minister. He feared the Japanese monopoly because Australians traders had fewer vessels than their Japanese counterparts.

Melbourne's policies reflected public feeling in Australia. Edmund Piesse, the Director of Military Intelligence (1916-1919), and the Director of the Pacific Branch of the Prime Minister's Department (1919-1921), reported:

> The instant participation of Japan in the war, and the assistance given in escort for the first convoy of Australian troops, brought about during the first few months of the war, a much warmer feeling towards Japan than had existed for many years previously. But the Japanese occupation of the islands north of the equator in September and October 1914 caused anxiety as soon as it became known to the public. It was not seen that these islands were required by Japan for her own defence, and their commercial value was trifling; their occupation seemed then to point to some aggressive purpose.

Thus the 'warm' feelings towards the Japanese changed to suspicion causing restrictive measures to be applied.

*Japanese settlers*

The Japanese population in New Guinea began to decline, mainly because the outbreak of the war had caused uncertainty about the future of New Guinea. Although complete yearly statistics are not available either in Japanese or Australian sources, according to a telegram from the Japanese navy there were 119 Japanese (98 males and 21 females) in 1914, but this total was reduced to 77 (55 males and 22 females) in 1916. However, there was still

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96 Shimizu to Defence Department, Melbourne, 4 Dec. 1918, AA, AWM33 46/6.
97 Johnstone to Defence, Melbourne, 8 May 1918, AA, AWM33 46/3.
98 Shimizu to Uchida, 9 December 1918, JDR, 3.4.2.50-13-2.
99 Pearce to Prime Minister, 20 Apr. 1918, AA, MP1049 1918/073.
100 'Australia & Japan, note of statements made by Major E. L. Piesse in a conversation with Mr. Hanihara, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Mr. S. Shimidzu, Consul-General for Japan at Sydney, Gwamusho, 25th December 1919', MS882, Piesse Papers, Series 5. Japan, Folders 1, Manuscript Room, National Library of Australia, Canberra.
a steady, although decreasing, inflow of Japanese from 1914 to 1918. The number of passports issued by the Japanese Foreign Ministry to the Japanese bound for New Guinea was 33 in 1914: 32 before August and one on 4 August. No passports for New Guinea were issued in 1915, but in 1916 the number was 16. In 1917 and 1918, only three were issued each year. Those figures indicate that the decline in the Japanese population in New Guinea was due to the increase in the Japanese departing. The bad management of Komine’s business encouraged his employees to return after their contracts and he attracted few migrants.

According to Australian statistics, the Japanese were still the second largest civilian ‘white’ population. In 1917 there were 680 Germans, 92 Japanese and 66 British. The Japanese population mainly consisted of professional migrants such as artisans (boat builders and sawyers), fishermen, traders, planters and prostitutes. In 1917, the largest occupational group was 33 male ‘artisans, labourers and etc.’, followed by 13 female ‘others’, 12 male ‘settlers and planters’, 10 male ‘sailors and fishermen’, eight male ‘business and traders’ and eight female ‘private’. The 13 female ‘others’ were very likely prostitutes working in the brothel owned by Ah Tam and the eight female ‘private’ would have been wives who accompanied their husbands.

The Japanese community
The Japanese were developing from a mere group of artisans to a self-contained community with amenities such as stores, restaurant, barber, brothel and cinema. The community had now grown into the type seen in major towns in Southeast Asia. The development was accompanied by internal changes. The monolithic community under Komine’s leadership began to crack, as other Japanese established businesses and started competing with him. The largest competitor was Okaji Santaro’s Okaji Shokai (Okaji Company). The company was established in May 1914 on Buka
Island adjacent to Bougainville, and operated a general store and copra plantation and exported marine products.\textsuperscript{107} Its scale was much smaller than Komine's. In 1917 the Okaji Company's capital was 15,000 yen, its annual profits were 30,000 yen, the number of Japanese employees was five and there were 40 local labourers, while Komine's company's corresponding figures were 300,000 yen, 700,000 yen, 45 and 500.\textsuperscript{108} Another company was established on 15 May 1915. Three Japanese ship builders (Mori Seizaemon, Hamasaki Tomoshiro and Nishikawa Zen'ichi) set up S. Mori and Co. after acquiring a leasehold from the administration.\textsuperscript{109} The scale of S. Mori and Co. is unknown.

Possibly the establishment of new companies stimulated the trade between Japan and New Guinea. Imports from Japan tripled from £10,650 in 1915 to £31,064 in 1918, and exports to Japan increased almost fourfold from £12,188 in 1915 to £48,546 in 1918 (still a negligible amount in the total external trade of Japan).\textsuperscript{110}

In 1918 the Japanese community received the addition of a unique Japanese, Imaizumi Masao. He acquired half an acre leasehold in Rabaul and opened a picture theatre, New Britain Pictures.\textsuperscript{111} Before coming to Rabaul, he was in the Dutch East Indies where he had been hunting birds of paradise and exporting them to London.\textsuperscript{112} His cinema screened both Japanese and Western pictures for Japanese and white residents, and employed Australian technicians.\textsuperscript{113} More interestingly, the way he had gone to the Dutch East Indies shows his distant connection to Enomoto Buyō, the first Japanese official who advocated colonising New Guinea. Imaizumi came to the Dutch East Indies with Jūtarō Hosoya—a close friend of Imaizumi and a son of Jūdayū Hosoya (a samurai of Sendai-han).\textsuperscript{114} Jūdayū had fought alongside Enomoto in the Boshin War of 1868. Jūtarō admired Enomoto and supported his idea of southward advancement. Then he came to Dutch New Guinea full

\textsuperscript{107}Suzuki Eisaku (Japanese consul general at Sydney) to Uchida Yasunari, JDR, 3.4.6.8.
\textsuperscript{110}Prime Minister's Department, Territory of New Guinea. Treatment of Foreigners and Foreign Interests, A Summary to 31st March, 1923, Melbourne, p. 9, in 'Plesse Paper, Series 6', MS882, Manuscript, National Library of Australia, Canberra.
\textsuperscript{111}Ibid., 8.
\textsuperscript{112}Dutch document on admission of travel, 29 Aug. 1913; Invoice of Australian Films Ltd. to Imaizumi's New Britain Pictures, 13 Nov. 1924, manuscripts owned by Imaizumi Kōtarō, Nagoya, Japan.
\textsuperscript{113}Imaizumi Kōtarō's letter to the author, 3 July 1993.
\textsuperscript{114}Sendai-han was located in the north of Honshū, the main island of Japan. It is now called Miyagi prefecture and its capital is Sendai city. Samurai of Sendai were retainers of the Shogunate government and resisted the establishment of the new government of 1868.
of enthusiasm to develop the South Seas for Japan. As Jūtarō and Imaizumi were close friends, Imaizumi may have been influenced by Jūtarō's enthusiasm. The rumour of Komine's bravery in New Guinea as well as the chance of success in starting a new business may have motivated Imaizumi.

**Race relations**

Generally the Australians at Rabaul, apart from the administrative staff, did not pay much attention to the Japanese. Other than official reports related to Komine, there are few Australian accounts of the Japanese and those are all brief and none mention any individual (not even Komine). Captain Jens Lyng, one of the administrative staff, was the only Australian to observe the Japanese relatively closely and publish his impressions. He wrote about the Japanese women in the section describing Rabaul's China town, introducing them as part of the landscape that added an oriental flavour.\(^{115}\)

The articles in the newspaper *The Rabaul Record* also show Australian indifference. There were only three on the Japanese from 1914 to 1918. Interestingly, unlike the public in Australia who were anxious about the Japanese influence in the South Pacific, the articles show that local Australians did not relate local Japanese to the general fear of Japanese aggression. The first article described how the Japanese fishermen removed the live fish from inside the trochus shell, the second was about the poor quality of Japanese matches, and the third gave a lively account of a Japanese wrestling tournament between visiting sailors and the local Japanese.\(^{116}\) It seems that most Australians at Rabaul saw the Japanese merely as part of local scenery in an exotic territory.

There are few records showing Japanese relations with New Guineans. No intermarriages took place, and oral evidence is generally not sufficiently specific to identify the period between 1914 and 1918. However, one event, recorded by the administration, may indicate one aspect of Japanese attitudes to New Guineans. Nakayama Bukachi, an employee of Komine, was murdered by a young local man, Sapo, at Kali Bay in Manus in late November 1916. The Australian District Officer found that the murder took place because of the brutality of Nakayama's treatment of the man. He reported,

> I am also convinced that the boy was cruelly beaten by the Japanese [Nakayama] who not only beat him but tried to throttle him, he also beat his head on the hatch. The marks on the boy's body plainly show the rough treatment that he received and there was no doubt that the boy was thoroughly frightened, so picking up the bamboo struck the Japanese the one fatal blow.\(^{117}\)

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\(^{115}\) Jens Lyng, *Our new possession (later German New Guinea)* (Melbourne 1919), 126.

\(^{116}\) *Rabaul Record*, 1 Mar. 1916, 1 Oct. 1916, 1 Sept. 1917, Rabaul.

\(^{117}\) Captain Webster to the Administrator, 25 Nov. 1916, AA, A2/1 17/3714.
At the court Sapo's act was regarded as 'self-defence' but he received a sentence of 'six months imprisonment to be served in Rabaul'.\textsuperscript{118} Although the cause of Nakayama's brutality was not reported, the event shows that some Japanese accepted the use of violence towards New Guinean employees, as the murder happened on a schooner with other Japanese crew on board.

\textsuperscript{118}Memorandum for the Administrator, 4 Dec. 1916, ibid.
Chapter 4

Decline, 1919-1940

The Australian civil administration was established in 1921 and inherited policies established during the military period. The administration continued to restrict Japanese migration to New Guinea and also trading for several years. Consequently Japanese influence became marginal: by 1940 their population had shrunk to about 40. Komine died in 1934. The nature of the community changed. The Japanese were mostly businessmen, unlike the earlier period when most were artisans or labourers.

Japan, Australia and New Guinea in international politics

The Paris Peace Conference

The international situation changed rapidly in the inter-war period. Bargaining and appeasement were evident in the process of constructing and de-constructing the international collective security systems. Imperial powers continued to struggle to secure their colonies. Australia recognised the increasing strategic value of New Guinea, while Japan was Japanising Micronesia.

At the Paris Peace Conference (1919-1921), the victors of World War I bargained to divide German colonies, and tried to secure their spoils through the League of Nations. A new colonial map was drawn in the Pacific-Asia region—German colonies vanished but more colonies accrued to Japan and Australia.

To Japan, the Conference was a milestone, in that the Western powers accepted her as a major colonial power: she was counted as one of the Five Powers (with Britain, France, the US and Italy). In Japan newspapers reported daily discussions of Japanese delegates with their Western counterparts and excited the public. Similarly, the Conference was significant to Australia: her representation as a Dominion represented the acknowledgment of nationhood. As a result, discussions concerning Japan and Australia were affected by their pride and prestige as young modern nations. This reinforced their mutual perceptions: the image of racist Australians was imprinted on Japanese minds, while Australians were increasingly suspicious that

1 John Latham, The significance of the Peace Conference from an Australian point of view (Melbourne 1920), 3.
expansionist Japanese were looking at every opportunity to take white men’s lands.

Although silent on European affairs, the Japanese were vocal on Pacific-Asia matters: especially the cession of German rights in Shantung Province, their claim to German Micronesia and the abolition of racial discrimination. Of those three, the Shantung Province was the issue on which they were most determined not to compromise. The province was a gateway to Japanese expansion in East Asia and a shield against Russian southward expansion. The government instructed its delegates not to sign the treaty if their claim was rejected. The Japanese also had a strong claim to German colonies north of the equator, reinforced by a secret treaty made with Britain during the war. The Japanese insistence on the insertion of a racial equality clause in the charter of the League of Nations was weaker than those two claims. It was a matter of prestige: they saw the discriminatory treatment of Japanese in the US, Canada and Australia as a disgrace, and believed that they should be treated as equal to their Western counterparts, as citizens of a modern independent nation, not like other Asians colonised by Western powers.

The leading Australian delegate, William (Billy) Hughes, strongly opposed the last two claims, because both challenged the essence of Australian defence and foreign policy—the White Australia Policy. However, his main opponent in the German territory issue was not the Japanese but the US President, Woodrow Wilson, who proposed the mandatory system in which all countries should have the same right of access. Wilson’s proposal was based on his idealistic Fourteen Points, but in effect it was also aimed at countering other colonial powers’ expansion in the Pacific. Hughes thought that this proposal would threaten Australia’s exclusive right to German New Guinea, as it would allow Japanese access. To Hughes, New Guinea was a buffer against Japan’s southward expansion: ‘The ring of these South Pacific islands encompasses Australia like a chain of fortresses . . . and any Power which controls New Guinea, controls Australia.’ He vigorously resisted Wilson’s proposal. The Japanese also objected, although less vigorously, being concerned about their commercial rights in New Guinea. After lengthy discussions and compromise, agreement was reached finally; Class ‘C’ Mandates—virtually exclusive colonies—were applied to all German Pacific territories.

4Frank Owen, Tempestuous Journey: Lloyd George His Life and Times (London 1954), 550.
In Hughes's eyes, the Japanese proposal of racial equality was closely associated with the mandate issue. He thought that the Japanese were trying to manipulate the treaty in order to send migrants to New Guinea as well as to Australia.\(^5\) Hughes frantically opposed it, because he thought that 'to allow coloured immigration was to risk social suicide, to jeopardise a society'.\(^6\) Although the Japanese 'had no wish to dispatch immigrants' to Australia and their proposal was 'essentially a matter of prestige',\(^7\) Hughes was relentless despite the objection of Edmund Piesse, the Director of the Pacific Branch in the Prime Minister's Department. Piesse suggested that:

But even if there are reasons for maintaining racial discriminations against Asiatics, we must face the facts that these discriminations give great offence in Japan, and to a less extent in other Asiatic countries, that they contribute to the maintenance of strained relations between Japan and the white races, and they are used in Japan as a justification for armaments—the existence of which contribute in turn to the maintenance of armaments in Australia and other white countries. Are racial discriminations so vital to us that it is worthwhile to maintain them when they produce these results? Surely the answer is that they are not.\(^8\)

However, the White Australia Policy was a sacred cow which most Australians would not sacrifice for anything. John Latham, one of the delegates, wrote:

The principle of White Australia is almost a religion in Australia. Upon it depends the possibility of the continuance of white democracy—indeed, of any democracy, in a real sense—in this continent. Any surrender of the policy is inconceivable—it rests upon the right of every self-governing community to determine the ingredients of its own population. If that right is surrendered, the essence of self-government disappears.\(^9\)

It was a 'moral imperative' for Hughes to scrap the Japanese proposal, even if it was watered down eliminating any reference to migration.\(^10\) Finally, the Japanese gave up their proposal, and used it only as a bargaining chip for Western acknowledgment of Japanese rights in Shantung.\(^11\) Thus the Australian objection facilitated the Japanese expansion in China. Similarly, the Australian objection consolidated Japanese exclusive control of Micronesia, as the Japanese could use the same argument to prevent


\(^7\) David Sissons, 'The Immigration question in Australian diplomatic relations with Japan 1875-1919,' paper presented to the 43rd Congress of the Australia and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science (Brisbane 1971), 38.

\(^8\) Piesse, Edmund, 9 Jan. 1920, draft for 'V. Future Policy, 19. The racial discrimination should be reduced to the utmost possible extent,' 12, in AA, A5954 1203/2.


non-Japanese from entering. As Nelson rightly argues, it was a dilemma for Australians that 'every time they asserted the right to keep what they held and to impose their unfettered right on their new possessions, they were by implication strengthening the case of the Japanese to have their way in Micronesia.'

The Washington System
The Paris Conference led to the establishment of the so-called 'Washington System' in which major Western powers and Japan concluded several treaties at Washington in 1921 and 1922. It reinforced the 'Pax Anglo-Saxonica', establishing a collective security system to maintain the status quo set at the Paris Conference. Limitations on naval armaments were agreed, although they in reality gave Japan naval superiority against the US in the Pacific. And the Four-Power Pact was concluded between the US, Britain, France and Japan, replacing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which had been antagonising the US.

In concluding the treaties, Japan was obliged to co-operate with the Western powers because of the 'dual' nature of the development of her imperialism: militarily Japan was catching up with the West but economically she was still heavily dependent on the US and Britain for raw materials and markets. At this stage Japan needed to avoid conflict with the Western powers in order to develop its economy.

On the abolition of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Australia (although not represented at the Conference) initially objected, fearing that Britain would not be able to restrain the Japanese from expanding in the Pacific. However, seeing the collective security system established, Hughes (then the Prime Minister) ratified the treaties, saying 'This Treaty establishes an equilibrium in the Pacific. As far as any action of man can do so, it insures peace for the next ten years for Australia'.

Hughes's optimism proved right. In the 1920s Japan and Australia enjoyed relatively relaxed relations. Their trade steadily grew and the shift of the destination of Japanese emigration to South America mitigated the Australian fear of the 'Yellow Peril'. Piesse observed that 'the danger to Australia from an increase of population in Japan seems remote, and should not affect

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Australia's attitude toward her'. Indeed the mid-1920s was a temporary 'golden period' in Japan-Australia relations.

**Collapse of the Washington System**

The Great Depression of 1929 initiated the collapse of the Washington System. 'Have not' nations such as Japan, Germany and Italy began to challenge the System set up by 'have' nations such as Britain, the US and France. Those 'have not' nations sought opportunities to expand their colonies in order to overcome their economic stagnation. In the 1930s, Japan sent troops to Manchuria. So did Germany to the Rhineland. And Italy invaded Ethiopia. But until the end of the decade, Britain, the US and France exercised 'appeasement' policies against those aggressive actions, attempting to maintain the colonial map drawn in Paris.

The London Naval Treaty of 1930, which aimed at balancing the naval strength of major powers (including Japan), resulted in a vain attempt to keep international peace. In the following year, Japan began to invade Manchuria and set up a puppet government. The League of Nations, which was supposed to assure collective security, was useless to stop Japanese aggression: it did not take any concrete measures except condemning the action and recommending withdrawal from China. In Japan, some navy and army staff and right wingers expressed their indignation against the Western objection to Japanese rule in Manchuria. They began to gain public support and gradually influenced foreign policy. Consequently Japan left the League of Nations in 1933 and the London Naval Treaty in 1936, demonstrating her apparent denial of the Pax Anglo-Saxonica.

In Australia, fear of Japan increased and was manifested in her foreign policies. First, Australians followed Britain's appeasement policy toward German aggression in Europe, presuming that open hostility, which might result in a British pact with Russia against German aggression in Poland, would make Japan co-operate closely with Germany, because Japan had been perceiving Russia as her most likely enemy in northeast Asia. In the Australian view, appeasement would prevent 'a war in the Pacific simultaneously with one in Europe—a situation in which Britain could not send sufficient strength to Singapore, and Australia would be left to defend itself'.

Australians applied a similar appeasement policy against Japanese aggression in China, based on the optimistic assumption that so long as Japan was occupied in China, she would not advance south and would not

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Chapter 4: Decline, 1919-1940

threaten Australian security. But the situation changed when the Washington System collapsed in 1936 with the Japanese abrogation of the London Naval Treaty. Then Australians attempted to neutralise the Japanese threat by establishing a collective security pact in the Pacific. They proposed the 'Pacific Pact' in 1937 and lobbied Russian, Chinese, French, Dutch, American and Japanese ambassadors in London and their governments to no avail.

In the late 1930s, the Australians desperately began to pressure Britain to reinforce the garrison at Singapore, seeing her defence capability as insufficient against possible Japanese invasion in the South Pacific. The government also adopted the 'trade diversion policy' which favoured British textile manufacturers and impeded Australia-Japan trade in wool and textiles, in an attempt to cajole Britain into diverting its military strength to the Pacific. But the policy was an 'irrational exercise in economic nationalism', as Australia-Japan trade was growing and was substantially in Australia's favour. More significantly, the policy undermined Japanese goodwill towards Australia and 'revived anti-Australian sentiment in Japan where feelings bred of hostility to Hughes had apparently been softening'.

In 1938 the Japanese government declared the Toa shin chitsujo (New Order in East Asia) to find a solution to the prolonged war in China, but the declaration failed to reduce Chinese resistance and invited US economic sanctions. And Japanese isolation intensified. Then the government concluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in 1940. The pact was aimed at facilitating southward aggression in Southeast Asia, presuming that the US would diminish her desire to be involved in Asian affairs and so Japan could avoid a head-on collision with the US. The Japanese military also predicted that German victories in Europe would prevent Britain, France and the Netherlands from being involved in conflicts in Pacific-Asia if Japan invaded their colonies.

Micronesia was another reason for Japan to conclude the Tripartite Pact. Germany in the late 1930s, under Hitler's dictatorship, began to reclaim territorial rights in former colonies. At that time the strategic importance of Micronesia to Japan was increasing because of the possibility of naval operations in the southwest Pacific: Japan was building bases on the islands. The Japanese secretly negotiated with the Germans on a 'scheme for a public Japanese acknowledgment of the right of Germany to her former colonies

19Frei, op.cit., 127.  
22Ibid., 25.  
23Hosoya Chihiro, *Nihon gaikō no zahyō* [Coordinates of Japanese diplomacy] (Tokyo 1979), 75.
accompanied by an agreement on Germany's part to sell her former Pacific islands mandated to Japan to the latter power. In later negotiations, the Japanese insisted upon their exclusive control of the South Seas and even proposed the division of Australian territories—Papua to Japan and New Guinea to Germany. In the end, although excluded from the clauses of the Pact, verbal agreement was made: Japan would retain Micronesia; other former German Pacific territories would be returned to Germany after the war; and then Germany would sell some territories to Japan. Meanwhile the Australians rebuffed the German claim. The Australians faithfully kept to the non-militarisation clause in the mandate for the territory.

By contrast, the Japanese military was planning operations from Southeast Asia to the South Pacific. At the same time the government was making last ditch efforts to get concessions from the US over China. However, the Tripartite Pact hardened US attitudes contrary to Japanese expectation, and the US reinforced its embargo on oil and froze Japanese assets. That was a severe blow to Japan which was heavily dependent on the US for oil supplies—essential fuel for naval operations. Thus, Japan had to find alternative sources of oil and other raw materials. Resource-rich Southeast Asia became a primary target. Consequently, shortly after the declaration of the Dai tōa kyōei ken (Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere), Japan launched her attack against Pearl Harbor.

*Muturation of nanshin*

The acquisition of German Micronesia made nanshin no longer a mere theory and it gave a new concept to intellectuals, policy makers and businessmen: 'Micronesia and Taiwan would function as bases for the advance to Southeast Asia'. A new geographical concept—'Southeast'—also appeared in a school text book in 1919, reflecting increased attention to Southeast Asia. Similarly


26Japanese Foreign Minister to German ambassador at Tokyo, 27 Sept. 1940, German ambassador at Tokyo to Japanese Foreign Minister, 27 Sept. 1940, in Nihon kokusai seiji gakkai [Japanese Association of International Politics], *Taiheiyō sensō eno michi, dai 5 kan, sangoku dōmei, nisso chūritsu jöyaku* [The road to the Pacific War, Vol.5, Tripartite Pact, USSR-Japan Non-Agression Pact] (Tokyo 1963), 224-5.


28Shimizu Hajime, 'Nihon shihon shugi to nan'yō [Japanese capitalism and the South Seas], in Yano Tōru (ed.), *Kōza tōnan ajia gakku dai 10 kan tōnan ajia to nihon* [Southeast Asia Studies, Vol.10, Southeast Asia and Japan] (Tokyo 1991), 92.

29'Tōnan ajia' in Japanese. It literally means 'east-south Asia'.
new terms—*uchi* or *ura-nan’yō* (inner or back south Seas: Taiwan and Micronesia) and *soto* or *omote-nan’yō* (outer or front South Seas: India, Southeast Asia, Australia, Melanesia and Polynesia)—emerged around this time, showing the development of the Japanese conception of the South Seas that placed Japan in the centre of the southwest Pacific.

Numerous intellectuals advocated Japan’s southward advance and the military joined their advocacy in the late 1930s. The military had to gain natural resources in Southeast Asia (particularly oil in Dutch East Indies) in order to continue the war in China, as the US and Britain imposed embargoes, responding to the Japanese aggression in China. At the same time the government introduced policies to facilitate Japanese trade with Southeast Asia, and included *nanshin* in the national policy in the late 1930s. Private companies and migrants followed this southward tide. The public was agitated by the bombardment of *naniyō* literature, which increased quickly: even for general references, the number increased fourfold from 99 in 1920-29 to 405 in 1930-39.30

**Ideology, government policy and organisation**

The main reason for the upsurge of Japanese interest in *nan’yō*, particularly Southeast Asia, was economic: new sources of raw materials and markets were needed for the development of heavy industry in order to catch up with Western economies, and to diversify export markets to rectify heavy dependence on US and Chinese markets.31 The government led the commercial promotion, which was demonstrated in the number of government publications. Taiwan *sōtoku kanbō chōsa ka* (Research Section of the Chief Secretary of Taiwan Governor-General), the leading government research institution of the South Seas, published about a hundred reports (*Minami-shina oyobi nan’yō chōsa* [Survey of South China and the South Seas] series) on trading, investment, management of plantations, fishing, mining and so on.

In the mid-1920s the Department of Foreign Affairs took an initiative. In 1926 the Department held the *Nan’yō Bōeki Kaigi* (South Seas Trade Conference), inviting officials of other departments and representatives of various industries, to promote South Seas trade. The main items on the agenda at the Conference were investment, trade, transport, customs and commercial treaties. It was a significant milestone showing the beginning of the government’s involvement in that it was the Department of Foreign

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31Shimizu, op.cit.
Affairs, not private organisations such as the South Seas Society or the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, that took the lead.\textsuperscript{32}

In 1928 the Department of Foreign Affairs presented a report entitled \textit{Böeki, kigyō oyobi imin yori mitaru nan’yō} (The South Seas in view of trade, companies and emigration), in which the Department proposed policies to promote trade, establish organisations to facilitate export and investment, and a special fund to assist emigration. Although none of the proposals were put into practice, the report was significant.\textsuperscript{33} The necessity for national commitment was acknowledged, as the Department used the term ‘\textit{nan’yō kokusakу}’ (national policy towards the South Seas) for the first time in official reports.\textsuperscript{34}

\textit{Nanshin-ron} advocates raised their voices in the early 1930s, responding to the collapse of the Washington System. They began to focus on the strategic argument, that \textit{nan’yō} was Japan’s life line, although carefully emphasising the necessity to avoid conflict with Western colonial powers.\textsuperscript{35}

The mid-1930s was the most significant period for the development of \textit{nanshin-ron}. It began to turn militaristic, as the navy set out with a concrete \textit{nanshin} plan. In 1935 the aggressive group, ‘\textit{han’joyaku ha}’ (anti-[London] Treaty faction), set up the Tai Nan’yō Hōsaku Kenkyū-kai (Study Committee for Policies towards the South Seas). The Committee studied both economic and military expansion; it advocated the promotion of trade and emigration through the Takumu Shō (Department of Colonial Affairs) and the Nan’yō Kōhatsu Kaisha (South Seas Development Company) and emphasised the military role of Taiwan and Micronesia as advance bases.\textsuperscript{36}

The navy was already militarising Micronesia. In the early 1930s, after the Western powers restricted Japanese naval capability at the London Treaty of 1930, the navy secretly started building bases in Palau, Tinian and Saipan. In order to evade the Western powers’ monitoring, they were camouflaged as places to dry fishing nets or farms, and the South Seas Development Company assumed responsibility for construction.\textsuperscript{37} Although the Study

\textsuperscript{32}\textit{Shimizu Hajime}, ‘1920 nendai ni okeru \textit{\textprime{nanshin ron}’ no kisū to nano’yō bōeki kaigi no shusō} [The trend of southward advancement theory in the 1920s and the ideology of the South Seas Trade Conference], in Shimizu Hajime (ed.), \textit{Ryo taisen kan ki nihon tōnan aiga kankei no shosō} [Various aspects of Japan-Southeast Asia relations between the two wars] (Tokyo 1986), 24-5.

\textsuperscript{33}\textit{Gaimushō tsushō-kyoku} [Commerce Bureau of the Department of Foreign Affairs], \textit{Böeki, kigyō oyobi imin yori mitaru nan’yō} [The South Seas in view of trade, companies and emigration] (Tokyo 1928).

\textsuperscript{34}\textit{Ibid.}, 1.

\textsuperscript{35}\textit{Fujiyama Raita}, ‘Umi no seimei sen to waga nano’yō hatten [Sea life line and our South Seas development], \textit{Shokumin} [The Colonial Review], 12(9) (1933), 7-8.

\textsuperscript{36}\textit{Hatano Sumio}, ‘Shōwa kaigun no nanshin ron [The southward advancement theory of the navy in the Showa period], \textit{Zōkan rekishi to jinbutsu} [Special issue, History and People] (Tokyo 1984), 279.

\textsuperscript{37}\textit{Ibid.}, 282.
Committee at this stage avoided expressing outright hostility against Western powers, it strongly argued for the opening of markets and natural resources in Southeast Asia, particularly in the oil-rich Netherlands East Indies.\textsuperscript{38}

In 1936 the government took a crucial step. It integrated nanshin in the national policy. After abrogating the London Naval Treaty in January, the government held the Five Ministers Conference (attended by the ministers of the departments of Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Navy and Army) in August and announced 'the Guidelines for National Policy' that included a resolution to advance south 'peacefully'.\textsuperscript{39} In November the policy was executed. The Nan'yo Takushoku Kabushiki Kaisha (South Seas Colonisation Company), a giant national company comparable to the Taiwan Colonisation Company, was established. The company's main venture was the development of phosphate mining on Angaur and Fais.

Coinciding with the government declaration, some intellectuals began to focus on Japan's long historical connection with nan'yō, starting from the 17th century trading, called Goshuinsen bōki,\textsuperscript{40} to the Meiji explorer-traders. Iwao Seiichi, a historian and professor of the Taipei University (the leading academic institution in South Seas studies), played a central role. In 1936 he wrote Kinsei shoki nihonjin nan'yō hatten no rekishi (History of Japanese development in the South Seas in early modern times).\textsuperscript{41} In 1939 he published an article 'Nan'yō ni okeru nichī-ō kankei no suii' (The change of Japan-European relations in the South Seas) in which he contrasted Western colonisation, which was strongly backed up by governments, with Japanese emigration which had no government support.\textsuperscript{42} Then in 1940, Iwao published the best-known book in the study of Japan-South Seas relations, Nan'yō nihon machi no kenkyū (Study on Japanese towns in the South Seas). Other historian-writers are Irie Toraji and Kakei Kiyosumi. Irie, a former archivist of the Foreign Ministry, wrote two volumes of Hōjin kaigai hatten shi (History of Japanese overseas development) on Japanese emigration since 1868, in

\textsuperscript{38}Gotō Ken'ichi, Shōwa ki nihon to indoneshia [Showa Japan and Indonesia] (Tokyo 1986), 35-6.

\textsuperscript{39}Appendix No.16, in Yano Toru, Nihon no nan'yō machi no kenkyū [Japanese historical view of the South Seas] (Tokyo 1979), 212.

\textsuperscript{40}The first shogun of the Edo Era, Tokugawa Ieyasu, encouraged the South Seas trade, before the shogunate government adopted the sakoku [seclusion] policy. In order to protect trading ships, he instituted the system to issue shuinjō [red-seal permits] which were the letters of official endorsement of trade to the countries that the Japanese traders were dealing with. The trading was so active in the early 16th century that approximately 100,000 Japanese settled in Southeast Asia mainly for business purpose and created Nihon machi [Japanese town].

\textsuperscript{41}Iwao Seiichi, Kinsei shoki nihonjin nan'yō hatten no rekishi [History of Japanese development in the South Seas in the early modern times] (Taipei 1936).

\textsuperscript{42}Iwao Seiichi, 'Nanyō ni okeru nichī-ō kankei no suii' [The change of Japan-European relations in the South Seas], in Tōzai kōshō shi ron [Theory on the history of East-West contact] (Tokyo 1939), 509-56.
which he devoted a considerable section to the South Seas. Kakei, although not a well-known writer, wrote *Nanpō shōhō ni okeru ősekī nihon jin no katsuyaku* (Japanese activities in the southern area in the old times). Although all these works are purely academic and have few references to government policies, the timing of their publication precisely coincides with the beginning of Japanese military actions in the late 1930s.

The navy initiated the military *nanshin*. In February 1939, naval forces occupied Hainan Island, an iron ore-rich island, on the pretext of cutting off the southern support route to Chiang Kai-shek, then in March the Spratly Islands. Both were strategic bases for the advance to Southeast Asia. The navy's actions were quickly followed by the cabinet's policy statement: the Konoe cabinet expressed 'the Outline of the Basic National Policy', declaring 'the construction of the New Order in Greater East Asia based on the solid consolidation of Japan, Manchuria and China' on 26 July in 1940. This 'New Order', being modified from the 'New Order in East Asia' of 1938, included the South Seas.

Shortly after the cabinet decision, the Imperial Headquarters announced *nanshin* by force. On 27 July, it produced 'the outline of measures taken in response to changing international situation'. Under the clause of 'the use of force against southern area', it stipulated that 'in case China problem cannot be solved ... the use of force is possible in order to solve the problem in the southern area'. The outline was the unambiguous endorsement of the military invasion of Southeast Asia.

The army saw its best opportunity when Germany defeated France and the Netherlands in Europe in mid-1940. In September the army quickly sent forces to occupy northern French Indochina in order to secure the naval base in Camranh Bay and the airfield at Pnompenh. Thus the army, the traditional advocate of the northward advance, finally joined *nanshin*.

In the last year before the outbreak of the war, intellectuals completed the justification for *nanshin* on three main grounds: independence from the Western economies, national defence and nationalism. However, it was a different form of *nanshin-ron* from the one that Enomoto and other Meiji *nanshin-ron* advocates asserted about half a century earlier: they were fundamentally non-militaristic free trade advocates. But those Meiji *nanshin-ron* advocates were exploited by their later counterparts. The new

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44 Kakei Kiyosumi, *Nanpō shōhō ni okeru ősekī nihon jin no katsuyaku* [Japanese activities in the southern area in old times] (Tokyo 1938), 1.
45 Quoted in Boei-chō bōei kenshū sho senshi shitsu [War History Office, Defence Training Institute, Defence Agency] (ed.), *Dai horie rikugun bu (2) shōwa 16 nen 12 gatsu made* [The Army Section of the Imperial Headquarters (2) until December 1940] (Tokyo 1968), 55.
46 Ibid., 56.
47 Quoted in ibid., 59.
nanshin-ron advocates 'deformed' the Meiji nanshin-ron, by exalting the Meiji advocates as national heroes despite the fact that the nanshin-ron had attracted far less attention in the Meiji period, and created the impression that the Japanese had had long-term interaction with the South Seas.\textsuperscript{48}

**Investment and trade**

Japan’s economic relations with the South Seas developed steadily. The growth of the overall Japanese economy, government promotion of South Seas trade and the international situation facilitated Japanese investment in the South Seas. As Table 4-1 shows, between 1919 and 1941, 78 companies were established. It was a remarkable increase, compared to only 32 companies established between 1870 and 1918. Most companies were in Southeast Asia and directed toward resource-development such as minerals, oil, rubber, lumber, jute, cotton, copra and fishery, reflecting the general focus of interest of nanshin-ron advocates and the government.

The timing of the investment, which concentrated in the 1930s, shows the association with the international situation: the US and Britain raised tariffs against Japanese products in the early 1930s; China, the second largest trading partner after the US, began to boycott Japanese products after the Japanese invasion in 1931; and the prolonged war in China forced Japan to find alternative sources of raw materials to meet increasing military demands.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Micronesia</th>
<th>Southeast Asia</th>
<th>South Pacific</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>unknown</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-39</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-41</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Consequently Japan-South Seas trade increased dramatically. As Table 4-2 shows, total exports increased from 252.5 million yen in 1920 to 474.2 million yen in 1937 and imports from 188.3 million to 540.4 million. Southeast Asia was the largest trading area, followed by Australia and New Zealand, while Micronesia remained marginal. However, the proportion of the South Seas trade in the total Japanese trade remained small; it only increased from 10.2 per cent in 1920 to 14.5 per cent in 1937.\textsuperscript{49}

Similarly, the position of Japan in the total South Seas economy remained marginal. In 1939, the proportion of the trade with Japan was only 6.7 per

\textsuperscript{48}Yano, op. cit., 187.

\textsuperscript{49}The same source as Table 4-2.
cent, while the US, Britain, China, and Netherlands occupied about 90 per cent.\textsuperscript{50} The Mitsubishi Research Institute of Economics admitted: 'the fundamental reason [for the low profile in South Seas economy] is . . . the result of our [underdeveloped] industrial strength' compared to Western economies.\textsuperscript{51}

### Table 4-2. Japanese trade with the South Seas from 1920 to 1937 (million yen)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Micronesia</th>
<th>Southeast Asia*</th>
<th>Australia &amp; New Zealand</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>export</td>
<td>import</td>
<td>export</td>
<td>import</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>184.8</td>
<td>125.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>133.0</td>
<td>130.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>382.6</td>
<td>325.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\*The countries of Southeast Asia varied by year due to the availability of statistics:
1920: British Malaya, Dutch East Indies, French Indochina, the Philippines and Thailand
1930, 1937: British Malaya and Borneo, Dutch East Indies, French Indochina, the Philippines and Thailand.


### Emigration

Emigration to the South Seas increased more than threefold from 31,811 in 1919 to 95,528 in 1936 (Table 4-3), although the proportion in the total Japanese emigration remained marginal: it was only eight per cent in 1936.\textsuperscript{52} The increase was mainly due to emigration to Micronesia that drastically increased in the 1930s. The government assisted the emigration: the Nan'yō chō (South Seas Government), the Japanese colonial administration in Micronesia, leased land and the Nan'yō Kōhatsu Kaisha (South Seas Development Company), the private company part-funded by the government, recruited thousands of labourers for its sugar plantations. Emigration increased especially after Japan resigned from the League of Nations in 1933.

Emigration to Southeast Asia remained largely static in the 1920s, because the government adopted a foreign policy to co-operate with other powers in the framework of the Washington System and discouraged emigration to Southeast Asia, which might cause friction with the Western powers. This attitude was articulated in the statement of the Foreign Minister, Shidehara Kijūrō, at the South Seas Trade Conference of 1926. He stated, 'the agenda of this conference does not include immigration issues.'\textsuperscript{53} Although emigration began to increase in the 1930s, the increase was far less dramatic than in

\textsuperscript{50}Imoto Nobuyuki and Satō Hiroshi (ed.), Nan'yō chiri taiketsu dai 1 kan nan'yō soron [Outline of the geography of the South Seas, Vol.1. Introduction to the South Seas] (Tokyo 1942), 137-8.

\textsuperscript{51}Mitsubishi keizai kenkyū sho [Mitsubishi Research Institute of Economy] (ed.), Toyo oyobi nan'yō shokoku no kokusai bōeki to nihon no chū [International trade of Oriental and South Seas countries and the position of Japan] (Tokyo 1933), 1.

\textsuperscript{52}Data from Ishikawa Tomonori, Tōkei yori mita shutsu-imin-shi 3' [Emigration history in the view from statistics], Chiri kagaku [Geographic science], Vol.16 (1972), 27-8.

\textsuperscript{53}Quoted in Shimizu, op.cit. (1986), 28.
Chapter 4: Decline, 1919-1940

Micronesia. The main reason was that there was little demand for Japanese labourers, unlike in Micronesia, as cheap labour was locally available. As a result, migrants were mainly company employees and their numbers were subject to fluctuations in the economy. Also the Dutch administration applied restrictions on foreign labourers from 1935. The Japanese population in Australia, New Zealand and the South Pacific islands declined, as Australia continued to restrict Asian migration and this affected most Japanese in this region.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 4-3. Japanese population in the South Seas, 1919 to 1941</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Southeast Asia</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Southeast Asia includes British Malaya, Borneo, Sarawak, India, Burma, Sri Lanka, Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines, and Guam


**Japanese perceptions of Papua and New Guinea**

Corresponding to the rise of the militaristic nanshin-ron, Japanese interest in Papua and New Guinea increased in the late 1930s. The number of publications demonstrates this. As Table 4-4 shows, most publications appeared in the same period. Only one book was published before 1923, according to Zōdo nanpō bunken mokuroku [Bibliography of the South Literature, revised edition]. However, interest in Papua and New Guinea was slight compared to Southeast Asia. In Zōdo nanpō bunken mokuroku, the list of publications on Southeast Asia occupies 144 pages, while that of Papua and New Guinea occupies only three.

Although marginal, the increase of the information on Papua and New Guinea was dramatic. The government was the initiator. In 1938 the Department of Foreign Affairs published Eiryō papua [British Territory of Papua] and Gōshū inin tōchi ryō nyū ginia [Australian Mandated Territory New Guinea], and the Department of Colonisation published a book with the same title. Then in 1939 the administration in Micronesia published two massive volumes—400 pages long Nyū ginia, jijō (gōshū inin tōchi ryō) [The situation in New Guinea (Australian Mandated Territory)] and 145 pages long Nyū ginia, jijō (papua ryō hen) [The situation in New

55Gaimu shō dō kyoku [Section of Europe, Department of Foreign Affairs], Eiryō papua [British territory of Papua] (Tokyo 1938); Gaimu shō dō kyoku [Section of Europe, Department of Foreign Affairs], Gōshū inin tōchi ryō nyū ginia [Australian Mandated Territory New Guinea] (Tokyo 1938); Takumu sho takumu kyoku [Section of Colonisation, Department of Colonisation], Gōshū inin tōchi ryō nyū ginia [Australian Mandated Territory New Guinea] (Tokyo 1938).
Those books introduced history, population, religion, education, climate, hygiene, geography, politics, etc. And they were based on information from English sources such as *New Guinea Handbook*, *Pacific Island Year Book*, *Pacific Islands Monthly*, *Rabaul Times*, *Gazette of Papua*, *Annual Report of Papua*, *Papuan Courier* and the ordinances of the Australian administrations.

A sharp contrast to Japanese interests in Southeast Asia can be seen in the contents of the publications. The Japanese were not so interested in the economy of Papua and New Guinea. Table 4-5 shows that almost half of the publications were about the general situation and travel, and only eight out of 42 were on industry and natural resources.

Until the early 1930s, Japanese perceptions of Papuans and New Guineans remained the same. Tatsue Yoshinobu, who travelled with Komine in the early 1900s, wrote that 'fierce natives' were impeding development, and Miyoshi Hoju called New Guinean women the ugliest in the world. However, in the late 1930s perceptions sharpened. The government publications showed the 'tribal' diversity (e.g. coastal people were peaceful but inland people were still rebellious), and the effectiveness of Australian rule through administration and missions which produced some educated Christian natives.

### Table 4-4. The number of South Seas publications, 1923 to 1941

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


56 Nan'yōchō chōkan kanbō chōsa ka [Research Section of the Secretary-General of the South Seas Government], *Nyū gënia jïjô (gōshû inûn tôchi ryô*) [The situation in New Guinea (Australian Mandated Territory)] (Koror 1939); Nan'yō chō chōkan kanbō chōsa ka [Research Section of the Secretary-General of the South Seas Government], *Nyū gënia jïjô (papua ryô hen)* [The situation in New Guinea (Territory of Papua)] (Koror 1939).


58 Miyoshi Hoju, 'Nan'yō no on'na samazama' [Variety of the South Seas women], *Shokumin* [The Colonial Review], 12(12) (1933), 100.

59 Nan'yōchō chōkan kanbō chōsa ka [Research Section of the Secretary-General of the South Seas Government], *Nyū gënia jïjô (papua ryô hen)* [The situation in New Guinea (Territory of Papua)] (Koror 1939), 18.

60 Nan'yōchō chōkan kanbō chōsa ka [Research Section of the Secretary-General of the South Seas Government], *Nyū gënia jïjô (gōshû inûn tôchi ryô*) [The situation in New Guinea (Australian Mandated Territory)] (Koror 1939), 40.
### Table 4-5. Classification of publications on Papua and New Guinea, 1923 to 1941

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>number</th>
<th>Biography</th>
<th>General situation and travel accounts</th>
<th>Geography</th>
<th>Race and culture</th>
<th>Politics and foreign relations</th>
<th>Industry and economy</th>
<th>Fishing</th>
<th>Mining</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: same as Table 4-4.

The introduction of New Guinean artefacts also modified stereotyped perceptions. The Minami no kai (Society of the South) published *Nyü gïni a dozoku hin zushū* (Illustrated New Guinean artefacts) which introduced collections of artefacts and their relations with native religions and customs. Interestingly Matsue Haruji, the Directing-Manager of the South Seas Developing Company, was the owner of the collections, which he had bought from Komine. A similar book was written by Fujiki Yoshihiro, an anthropologist. His book, *Nyü gïni a sono fükin tôsho no dozoku hin* (Artefacts of New Guinea and adjacent islands), had introductory sections by artists and anthropologists who appreciated the high quality of the artefacts and commented favourably, in terms such as 'New Guinean artefacts are excellent' or 'New Guineans are artists'.

Although slight, there was some government interest in the economy. Muramatsu Kaoru, an official of the Research Section of the Department of Foreign Affairs, compared the economic potential of Australian New Guinea with Dutch New Guinea, and pointed out that 'Australian New Guinea was superior to Dutch New Guinea in various points' such as in copra planting and coastal shipping. The Nan’yō Keizai Kenkyū Sho (Research Institute of the South Seas Economy), a government research organ specialising in the economy of the South Seas, reported the oil search in Papua. The Institute also noted the shortage of labour, industries and the Australian exploration

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61 Minami no kai [Society of the South], *Nyü gïni a dozoku hin zushū* [Illustration of New Guinean artefacts]. Vol. 1 and 2 (Koror 1937).
64 Nan’yō Keizai Kenkyū Sho [Research Institute of the South Seas Economy], 'Kaitaku jïdai no niugïnya sekïyu jïjô [Situation of oil in New Guinea: development stage]', *Kenkyū shiryû [Research Materials]*, 2(11) (1939c), 49-51.
in the highlands. But all those publications seem to be mere translations from English sources.

The government was also aware that Australians placed great strategic importance on Papua and New Guinea. Nagatsuka Jirō argued that Australians had always regarded Papua and New Guinea as an important defence line, pointing out that their attempt to annex Papua and New Guinea was the manifestation of this recognition.

The increase in references to Japanese migrants was an important trend from the mid-1930s. It stressed the fact that Japanese had had a long linkage with New Guinea. It was a significant change because until then nobody had demonstrated much interest. Government publications, such as the ones of the Department of Colonisation and the South Seas Government, devoted many pages to the history of Japanese migration (mainly about Komine) and commercial activities. Although this was a plain description of events and accounts of the migrants, it was the first time that the migrants were taken up by officials with such intensity.

*Nanshin-ron* advocates played a more important role. They exalted Komine as a national hero. In 1935 *Sandō mainichi* (Sunday Everyday), a popular weekly magazine, published an article titled 'Shōwa no Yamada Nagamasa, Nihon-tō o sasagete tandakukan o ikedoru: Nan'yō no kaitaku-sha Komine Isokichi' [Yamada Nagamasa of the Showa period captured a German ship alone with a Japanese sword: a pioneer of the South Seas, Komine Isokichi]. The article began with a comment: 'This is the story that impressed Debuchi Gen, a special envoy to Australia, who said "This is the most appropriate episode to promote Japan-Australia relations"'. The article emphasised Komine's relations with Germans and Australians dramatically. It described how bravely he rescued the German governor who was being attacked.

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65Nan'yō Keizai Kenkyū Sho [Research Institute of the South Seas Economy], 'Nyūginia ni okeru rödōryoku ketsubō mondai: aji jin o irerubeki ka [Labour shortage problem in New Guinea: should we import Asian labour?]', *Kenkyū shiryō* [Research Materials], 2(8) (1939); 'Gōshū nyūginia sangyō gaikan [Outlook of industries in New Guinea]', *Kenkyū shiryō* [Research Materials], 2(12) (1939); 'Eiryō nyūginia tanken hōkoku [Report of the exploration of British New Guinea]', (1)-(4), *Kenkyū shiryō* [Research Materials], 3(6-9) (1939).

66Nagatsuka Jirō, 'Niuginia (gōshū inin tōchi ryō) papua gappei mondai no ichi shinentai [Development of the issue of the annexation of New Guinea (Australian mandate) and Papua]', *Kenkyū shiryō* [Research Materials], 2(7) (1939), 10-11.

67Takumu-shō takumu-kyoku [Section of Colonisation, Department of Colonisation], op.cit., 83-93; Nan'yōcho chōkan kanbō chōsa ka [Research Section of the Secretary-General of the South Seas Government], op.cit., 314-18.

68Mainichi shinbun-sha [Mainichi Newspaper Co.], *Sandō mainichi* [Sunday Everyday], 8 July 1935, 'Shōwa no Yamada Nagamasa, Nihon-tō o sasagete tandakukan o ikedoru: Nan'yō no kaitaku-sha Komine Isokichi' [Yamada Nagamasa of the Showa period captured a German ship alone with a Japanese sword: a pioneer of the South Seas, Komine Isokichi]. Yamada is a popular legendary figure believed to have served the Ayutaya dynasty in Thailand as a military commander in the 17th century. *Nanshin-ron* advocates from the late 1930s to the early 1940s regarded him as a symbol of Japanese pioneers in the South Seas.
attacked by natives on a jungle track: 'Mr Komine jumped off a seven-meter high cliff like a bird into the fighting and saved the life of the governor by a close shave'. The article said that the capture of the Komet was proposed by frustrated Komine who saw the Australians unable to do anything because they were unfamiliar with the local geography, and that Komine organised the expedition and when he found the Komet, he climbed onto the deck by himself just carrying a Japanese sword and successfully persuaded the German commander to surrender. Because of this feat, he was given the chronometer of the Komet and the title of both naval and army captain. The article also emphasised that Komine was a good friend of the German captain and looked after his family at Rabaul while the captain was imprisoned by Australians, and later the captain thanked Komine, saying 'Now I have learnt the greatness of the Japanese'. Most accounts in the article are exaggerated (see Chapter 3, Section 1, World War I). No other written records and oral evidence can confirm that Komine carried a sword or the German captain thanked him (generally the Germans resented Komine's action). At the time of writing the article, Komine was already dead and nobody (except for those who actually knew him) could challenge the accuracy of the accounts, so the writer could say almost anything to dramatise the events.

More significantly, the article was re-introduced in April 1941. Captain Kamijō Fukashi wrote Sensen ichi-man kairi: zen taisen ji nan'yō no rekishi (The war front of ten thousand miles: the history of the South Seas during World War I) and inserted it in full.⁶⁹ Kamijō added a detailed account of the capture of the Komet, although the addition seems to be his translation from MacKenzie's The Australians at Rabaul which had been published in 1927. Similarly, in August 1941 the Nanpō sangyō chōsa kai (Society of the South Seas Industry Research) published Nyū ginia, a book giving general information on Papua, Australian New Guinea and Dutch New Guinea, and repeated the story about Komine's feat, although briefly.⁷⁰ Thus just before the outbreak of the Pacific War, the government and nanshin-ron advocates began to popularise the Japanese in New Guinea, obviously intending to propagate and justify the nanshin. The Japanese in New Guinea, who had attracted little public attention in Japan, were suddenly and comprehensively integrated into the vast scheme of Japanese expansionism.

⁶⁹Kamijō Fukashi, Sensen ichi-man kairi: zen taisen ji nan'yō no rekishi (The war front of ten thousand miles: the history of the South Seas during World War I) (Tokyo 1941), 182-93.
Japanese in Papua

Australian attitudes

Australians scarcely noticed the small number of Japanese. An official report in the late 1930s stated that 'with regard to the Territory of Papua, there are no Japanese'.\(^{71}\) The smallness of the Japanese population was one reason. The limited activities of the Japanese was another. Japanese business operations were too minor to threaten Australian interests, and they were confined in Milne Bay and had little interaction with the Japanese in New Guinea.\(^{72}\) Consequently no reports about the Japanese appeared in the *Papua Annual Report* or the *Government Gazette* between the two wars.

However, Australians were concerned about the Japanese who attempted to enter the territory. In 1939 Nan'yō Bōeki Kaisha (South Seas Company) sent trade envoys to Samarai and Port Moresby and entertained the residents with films of Japanese industries and tourist attractions. The *Pacific Islands Monthly* reported the visit uneasily: 'in spite of wars and the echoes of wars, and the manifest distrust of all British communities in the Central and South Pacific, the Japanese continue with their program of commercial penetration—part of their campaign to secure economic domination of the Pacific'.\(^{73}\)

There was another incident involving Nan'yō Bōeki. The company purchased the steamer *Papuan Chief*, wrecked and lying on a reef near Port Moresby, and sent a Japanese crew to salvage it. The entry of the crew to Port Moresby was granted in July 1940, but the Department of Defence Co-Ordination had strongly objected, insisting that: 'the view of the Department of the Army is that it is undesirable for Japanese at Port Moresby, particularly having regard to movement of troops and other defence measures now taking place'.\(^{74}\) However, the Department of Foreign Affairs supported admission provided that the crew stayed at Port Moresby for a limited period. Finally the Prime Minister decided to grant entry and advised Lieutenant Governor Murray: 'No doubt you will be able to restrict movement of crew at Port Moresby to a minimum, without this being obvious to the crew'.\(^{75}\)

It was a delicate time just before the outbreak of the war. Prior to that, there was an incident which embarrassed the Australian government and

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\(^{71}\)Territories of New Guinea and Papua', Date unknown (possibly around 1939), AA, A518/1 O918/2.

\(^{72}\)Interview by the author with Tanaka, Mary [daughter of Tanaka Taichirō], 22 Dec. 1994, Samarai, Milne Bay, PNG.


\(^{74}\)Telegram quoted in 'Memorandum for the Secretary, Department of External Affairs', 8 July 1940, AA, A981/1 PAPUA 3.

\(^{75}\)Prime Minister to the Lieutenant-Governor, 9 July 1940, ibid.
could have worsened its relations with Japan. In June 1937, the Australian patrol boat *Larrakia* 'wrongfully and without lawful authority, and by force of arms seized and took possession' of the Japanese fishing vessel *New Guinea Maru* on the high seas in the Arafura Sea and imprisoned the captain and the crew. The Japanese appealed to the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, which ordered the Australian government to pay compensation. Possibly the incident affected the attitude of the Department of Foreign Affairs and made it more diffident in the case of the *Papuan Chief*.

 Australians were concerned about the possible effect of the war on Papuans. They feared that their authority would be undermined by war against a non-white race. Just one month before the war, the government anthropologist, F.E. Williams, wrote explicitly anti-Japanese articles in his newspaper *The Papuan Villager* which circulated among Australian-educated Papuans. The article introduced the Japanese as 'not white men . . . [and] very warlike people . . . [who] have made a number of cruel wars against their neighbour, China,' and concluded that:

> Japan is like a very snappy little dog, barking at three big dogs that just lie down and look at her. The three big dogs are Great Britain, America and Russia. If this little dog ever begins to bite, then the three big dogs will jump at her and tear her to pieces.

**Japanese settlers**

The pre-war Japanese population was last recorded by the administration in 1920: six lived in the Eastern Division and one in the South-Eastern Division. From 1921 to 1948, the administration did not record the non-Papuan coloured population. Although the 1947-48 *Annual Report* (published in 1949) listed the coloured population, statistics were only for 1921 and 1933 and no Japanese were recorded in either year. The only available data are the 1933 census by the Australian government that listed two Japanese in the category of 'not able to read and write English, but able to read and write a foreign language' and 14 Japanese 'classified according to race.'

The two Japanese are undoubtedly Tanaka and Murakami. The 14 Japanese were most likely mixed-race Japanese.

Information about the Japanese in this period can also be derived from oral evidence. According to this, most early Japanese settlers died between the two

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76 Statement of claim in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory of Australia, 18 June 1938, AA. A1/1 1938/20320.
77 Japanese lugger actions in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory of Australia, 8 Nov. 1938, ibid.
80 *Papua Annual Report* (Melbourne 1949), 34.
wars, and their mixed-race children took over their trade. The children continued to keep Japanese names and their businesses and mostly prospered.

All informants (including local elders who are not related to the Japanese) say that the Japanese maintained amicable relations with Australians, Papuans and other Asians. Kalo Murakami recalls that Charley Wisdel (an Australian), who also worked for Whitten brothers in Samarai, was a good friend of his father. Also a Chinese cook called Maxim, and some Filipinos, were good friends of Japanese. But no informants suggest that the Japanese had a high profile in the community.

**Japanese in New Guinea**

**Australian government attitudes**

Officials in Melbourne perceived the Japanese in New Guinea very explicitly as part of Japanese expansionism. Atlee Hunt, a member of the Royal Commission on Late German New Guinea (and the Secretary of the Department of Territories), regarded the development of Japanese commercial activities in Taiwan, India, Dutch East Indies and the Philippines as 'no doubt part of a vast system'. At this time there was a diplomatic dispute about the Australian restriction on direct trade between Rabaul and Japan. The Australian government stopped the Japanese trading in New Guinea from 1919 to 1920 on two grounds—to retaliate against Japanese restriction on Burns, Philp's trade in Micronesia and to monopolise trade in New Guinea. In 1919, the government refused to grant permission to the Japanese vessel Nanking Maru to ship copra, discharge and load cargo at Rabaul. Similarly in 1920 the government refused the application of the Madras Maru to discharge cargo at Rabaul. The Japanese government protested and the Japanese press condemned the Australian actions.

As a result, diplomatic relations were strained, and rude behaviour by the Australian military staff at Rabaul who received the Japanese crew of Madras Maru added to the tension. It was alleged that Australian soldiers, under the influence of alcohol, abused and used violence against the Japanese returning to the ship. Hearing of the incident, the administrator immediately reported to the Prime Minister, who quickly expressed regret to the Japanese Consul-General in Sydney, saying 'I shall be obliged if you will be good enough to inform the Japanese Government of the regret of the

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82 Activities of Japanese and Germans in Rabaul', date unknown (definitely after 1919; Hunt was appointed the Commissioner of the Royal Commission on Late German New Guinea in 1919), AA, CP661/15/1 BOX 1.
83 Japan Advertiser, 23 May 1920; Japan Weekly Chronicle, 27 May 1920.
84 Prime Minister, S.S. 'Madras Maru' Incident at Rabaul, 7 December 1920, AA, A3932/1 SC397.
Commonwealth Government at this occurrence'. The soldiers were punished and the Japanese government did not take the matter up publicly.

Nevertheless the Australian government kept a firm attitude on the trade issue, in spite of Piesse's suggestion that hard-line policies would affect diplomatic relations. Hughes bluntly rejected the Japanese official protest. And Hunt thought Japanese activities were 'calculated to bring about one result i.e. grave embarrassment to Australia . . . [by] making Australia's position as difficult as possible'.

Japanese traders sought in vain for a loophole. The Osaka Shōsen Kaisha (Osaka Merchant Ship Company) applied for permission to open trade with the Solomons. Probably the company planned to purchase copra from a Japanese trader, Okaji, in Bougainville, thinking that he would act as a middle man between Rabaul and Japan. But the application was refused, for Australian officials thought that 'it seems obvious that Japanese frequentation of ports in the British Solomons is as dangerous to Australian interests as Japanese trade with Rabaul'.

Regarding the Japanese residents in New Guinea, the Royal Commission recognised 'the desirability of adopting any policy which would free the Territory from Japanese influence', and considered MacKenzie's proposal to purchase all Japanese properties. However, the Commission turned it down being sceptical of its likelihood of success.

From the late 1920s, officials in Canberra began to consolidate their perceptions of the danger of Japanese attack. They suspected that Japanese migrants in the South Pacific and Southeast Asia were part of government-organised Japanese expansion. The Australian Navy was monitoring the activities of the Japanese in New Guinea, Netherlands East Indies and Thursday Island intensively. Similarly, Australian officials thought that Japanese fishing vessels operating illegally in waters north of Australia had some connection with espionage. Naval Intelligence collected detailed reports of Japanese poaching in the Gulf of Carpentaria, Ninigo

85Prime Minister to Tamaki, 22 July 1920, ibid.
86Memorandum for the Secretary, Prime Minister's Department, 16 Apr. 1920, ibid.
88Activities of Japanese and Germans in Rabaul', op.cit.
89The Secretary, Prime Minister's Department, 24 Jan.1920, AA, MP1049 1920/047.
90Royal Commission on (late) German New Guinea', 6 December 1919, AA, B197/0 2022/1/3. It is doubtful whether MacKenzie really attempted to free New Guinea from Japanese influence, as his relations with Komine were cordial and good during the war. His proposal to purchase Japanese properties, which were indeed all Komine's properties, seemed to be aimed at assisting Komine who was short of funds to run his business.
91Ibid.
92Correspondence to Director of Naval Intelligence are in AA, MP1049/5 1877/13/66.
Group, Solomon Islands, and so on. The Commander of the Royal Australian Navy predicted 'the landing of the [Japanese] armed force somewhere on Cape York Peninsula' in the event of war. And a naval expert pointed out the significance of the islands of Micronesia as Japanese advanced bases and emphasised the vulnerability of Rabaul.

Australian fear increased towards the end of the 1930s. The Prime Minister's Department studied Japan's southward advancement policy. The Department monitored the entry of every agent of Japanese companies in New Guinea, when the giant Nippon Mining Co. sent a geologist to investigate the copper ore deposit in the Nakanai District on northwest coast of New Britain in 1937 and the Nanyo Boeki Kaisha sent four Japanese to investigate the goldfields at Wau in 1939. Their activities were reported in detail to the Department by the administration at Rabaul, although none of those activities could be substantiated as spying. The acting administrator reported: 'It is believed that every Japanese is a potential intelligence officer for Japan, but unfortunately it is not practicable to substantiate that belief by quoting incidents in support'.

**Rabaul's view**

The Australians at Rabaul were also alarmed by the development of Japanese Micronesia. The secrecy of the Japanese administration aroused their suspicion. The seriousness of their concerns was illustrated by a long report in the *Rabaul Times* by Gordon Green, an Australian traveller who made a trip to Japan via Micronesia in 1929. He reported in detail high tariffs imposed on imported goods and strict restrictions on his travel by the police.

The Australian concerns turned to fear in the 1930s, when they learnt that the Japanese population in Micronesia was increasing rapidly, and when militarisation was rumoured. Numerous articles about Japanese Micronesia in the *Rabaul Times*, which were mostly long and detailed, indicate this fear. In 1932, the newspaper reported:

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93Commander (Ret.) R.A.N.R. to Director of Naval Intelligence, 25 Oct. 1929; S.C. Thompson to Mr. Solomons, 29 Oct. 1933; Admiralty Reporting Officer to Director of Naval Intelligence, 8 Nov. 1932, AA, MP1049/5/0 1877/13/152.

94Commander (Ret.) R.A.N.R. to Director of Naval Intelligence, 28 Apr. 1936, ibid.


96'Southward advancement policy' received by the Prime Minister's Department, 6 Dec. 1938, AA, A1606/1 SCBS12/1.

97Administrator to the Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department, 21 Oct. 1937, AA, A518/1 W834/1; Acting administrator to the Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department, 20 Jan. 1939, AA, A816/1 19/304/188.

98Acting administrator to the Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department, 20 Jan. 1939, ibid.

Japanese had fortified the more strategic points in the Carolines, and was also Japan-ing the natives of her mandated territory in a wholesale manner by inter-marriage with the women of the islands. In 1920 there were some 3,600 Japanese; when the 1930 census was taken the number increased to nearly 20,000!\(^{100}\)

When another Australian traveller reported Japanese naval exercises in Micronesian waters,\(^ {101}\) the editor immediately wrote an alarming article.\(^ {102}\) A month later, the editor repeated the alarm: 'Japan is endeavouring to present an amicably-inclined face to the nations of the world', and criticised the inability of the League of Nations to keep Japan and Germany in the League.\(^ {103}\) Rabaul's anxiety increased when a well-known German journalist, Herbert Rittlinger, stopped at Rabaul after his trip to Micronesia but declined to comment about the fortifications. The *Rabaul Times* reported, 'Perhaps he has seen things, and has given his word not to divulge the information which he has collected'.\(^ {104}\) Their anti-Japanese feelings were heightened by anger against the frequent appearances of Japanese poachers in New Guinea waters. At the same time the Australians in Rabaul felt that Canberra was neglecting to protect them, and condemned the Federal Government.\(^ {105}\)

However, Rabaul's fear seems to have been directed mainly towards Japanese in Micronesia and Japanese poachers, not to the local Japanese residents. Economically the local Japanese hardly threatened Australian interests, as the Administrator Brigadier-General Thomas Griffiths reported to Melbourne.\(^ {106}\) The *Rabaul Times* did not express any hostility towards the local Japanese except for one article about the death of a Japanese suspected of spying. The article was very brief (one paragraph) compared to the articles about Japanese Micronesia or poachers. The whole article says:

> A prominent Japanese merchant by the name of Y. Nishimura, died here suddenly whilst in a detective's office undergoing questioning. Other prominent Japanese have been questioned and later deported. Many documents have been seized and it is rumoured that a gigantic espionage system has been discovered.\(^ {107}\)

But it is doubtful that Nishimura was a spy. If any gigantic espionage system had existed, the incident would have attracted the attention of Canberra or

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\(^{100}\) *Rabaul Times*, 22 Apr. 1932.

\(^{101}\) Ibid., 15 Sept. 1933.

\(^{102}\) Ibid., 22 Sept. 1933.

\(^{103}\) Ibid., 27 Oct. 1933.

\(^{104}\) Ibid., 22 Dec. 1933.

\(^{105}\) Ibid., 19 Jan. 1934 and 17 May 1935.

\(^{106}\) Memorandum for the Secretary, Department of Defence, Melbourne, 20 Sept. 1920, AA, AWM33 57/5.

\(^{107}\) *Rabaul Times*, 14 Dec. 1934.
Naval Intelligence, but there is no official record in Australian sources.\textsuperscript{108} The name of Nishimura cannot be found in the list of passports issued for travellers bound for New Guinea in the Japanese Foreign Ministry record or Japanese literature. There is no oral evidence, either. This suggests that he was a merchant based outside New Guinea. Possibly he acted somehow suspiciously in the eyes of some Australians and was caught by the police, then his sudden death provoked a rumour that he was a spy. The incident may simply show the nervousness of Australians in Rabaul against non-local Japanese.

Despite its anxiety about Japanese expansion, the \textit{Rabaul Times} wrote about the local Japanese in a respectful and friendly way. The editor praised Komine's carpenters' 'very clever piece of work' to shift Burns, Philp's bungalow without causing much disturbance.\textsuperscript{109} When the arrest of a New Guinean called 'Komini' for stealing was in the news, the editor noted 'not our esteemed Japanese fellow townsman'.\textsuperscript{110} At the death of Komine in 1934 he was written about as one held in high esteem: he was 'one of the oldest and best-known identities in the Territory' and 'the whole [Rabaul] community extends its deep sympathy' to his widow.\textsuperscript{111}

The \textit{Rabaul Times}'s warm comments on the film show held by the Rabaul branch of Nan'yō Bōeki suggest that personally Australians remained friendly to the local Japanese even after the outbreak of war in Europe. The branch was run by Tashiro Tsunesuke, a long time resident. The show was held twice in October and December 1939. The newspaper reported that the 'films showing the industrial and agricultural life [of Japan] were exceedingly interesting' and that 'a crowded house fully appreciated the interesting portrayal of Japanese social and industrial life'. The second show was even combined with fund raising by local white women (Ethel Smith and Tootsie Hamilton) for the Red Cross.\textsuperscript{112} The absence of hostility was probably due to the smallness of the local Japanese population and their long personal acquaintance with white residents.

\textbf{The Japanese population}

The Japanese population declined gradually under Australian migration regulations, particularly due to the clause that unless Japanese men were married when they first came to New Guinea, they could not bring their

\textsuperscript{108} All intelligence files (including secret files) related to Japanese activities in New Guinea, Micronesia and waters north of Australia in this period seem to be open to the public, but the author could not find a record related to Nishimura's death.

\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Rabaul Times}, 8 July 1927.

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., 26 Apr. 1929.

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 5 Oct. 1934.

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., 20 Oct. 1939 and 15 Dec. 1939.
This regulation effectively reduced the number of Japanese who were mostly single males on two-to-three year contracts. Also the restriction not to allow the population to increase higher than the number in 1914 stopped new Japanese from migrating. Some left New Guinea and even fewer came in. As Table 4-6 shows, the number decreased by about half from 87 in 1921 to 38 in 1940. The decline of the female population was high, suggesting that quite a few married couples left New Guinea.

Consequently, in terms of numbers, the Japanese became an extremely marginal group. As Table 4-7 shows, they were far fewer than other non-indigenous groups and their proportion among these groups declined from 2.7 per cent in 1921 to 0.5 per cent in 1940.

### Table 4-6. Population of Japanese by gender in New Guinea, 1921-1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4-7. Population of Japanese and other non-indigenous groups in New Guinea, 1921-1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>British</th>
<th>German</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>1,402</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>3,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>1,365</td>
<td>765</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>2,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>1,330</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>2,994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1,303</td>
<td>944</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>3,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1,279</td>
<td>1,086</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>3,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1,254</td>
<td>1,341</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>3,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1,259</td>
<td>1,629</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>3,751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1,253</td>
<td>1,808</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>3,928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1,238</td>
<td>1,992</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>4,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1,179</td>
<td>1,992</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>4,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1,215</td>
<td>2,140</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>4,366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1,353</td>
<td>2,594</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>5,215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1,399</td>
<td>2,847</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>5,216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1,424</td>
<td>3,026</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>5,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1,448</td>
<td>3,288</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>5,688</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[113^{\text{Territories of New Guinea and Papua}}, \text{Date unknown (possibly around 1939)}, \text{AA, A518/1 O918/2.}\]
Table 4-7 contd

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1,525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1,737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2,061</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: same as Table 4-6

The occupational composition also changed. As Table 4-8 shows, by 1938 artisans (carpenters and sawyers) and labourers disappeared, whereas the number of traders and trading company agents and fishermen increased. The increase of those two occupations is important when the total population decreased by more than half. As a result, the proportions of traders and trading company agents and fishermen increased respectively from 3.8 per cent in 1921 to 13.9 per cent in 1938 and from 7.7 per cent to 23.2 per cent.

Table 4-8. Occupations of the Japanese in New Guinea, 1921 and 1938 (no. and %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>1921</th>
<th>1938</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trader &amp; Planter</td>
<td>no. 4</td>
<td>no. 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co.'s Agent</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planter &amp; Plantation Manager</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boat Builder</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenter</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sawyer</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisherman</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barber</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory</td>
<td>25<strong>103</strong>*</td>
<td>43***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This seems to be labourers in boat building yard.
**This includes 13 accompanying family members (mostly wives and children).
***These figures from the Japanese source contradict those from the Australian source in Table 4-6. The Japanese figures seem to be more accurate, because they are more detailed about the occupational classification than the Australian ones.
Source: Nan'yō chō chōkan kanbō chōsa ka [Research Section of the Secretary-General of the South Seas Government], Nyūgūnia jījō (gōshū inin tōchi ryō) [The situation in New Guinea (Australian mandated territory)] [Koror 1939], 318-19.

Japanese economic activities

The change in the occupational structure was caused by the emergence of new small businessmen. The largest company, Komine's Nan'yō Sangyō, was liquidated in 1931 and some of his business was bought by Nagahama. At the same time, small fishing companies and a new branch of a trading company were established. Consequently, as Table 4-9 and 4-10 show, the number of businesses increased from two in 1919 to 12 in 1940. Those new companies did not require many employees, except for Nagahama's plantations, because they were mostly run by family members. Simultaneously the scale of ship building was reduced, so the demands for artisans declined, and the costly Japanese employees were replaced with cheap New Guineans.

114JDR, E.4.0.0.11.
Although the population had declined and a large company disappeared, Japanese trade with New Guinea increased. After the restriction on trade was lifted, exports increased rapidly from £458 in 1923 to £34,921 in 1939 and imports from £525 in 1925 to £7,266 in 1939 (Table 4-11). The total trade (exports and imports) increased from £3,373 in 1925 to £42,187 in 1939, at a rate of 1,000 per cent. However, this increase is not so astonishing, as the total New Guinean trade increased by 820 per cent in the same period. The proportion of Japanese trade remained extremely marginal in the total New Guinea trade, although it increased very slightly from 0.6 per cent in 1925 to 0.9 per cent in 1939 (even at its peak in 1937 the proportion was only 2.3 per cent).

Table 4-9. Japanese businesses in New Guinea in 1919

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>name of businessman</th>
<th>company name</th>
<th>type of business</th>
<th>capital (yen)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Komine Isokichi</td>
<td>Nan'yō Sangyō</td>
<td>general store, boatbuilding, fishery, copra planting</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Okaji Santarō</td>
<td>Okaji Company</td>
<td>general store, copra planting</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 4-10. Japanese businesses in New Guinea in 1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>name of businessman</th>
<th>company name</th>
<th>type of business</th>
<th>capital (yen)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Nakamura Sōshichi</td>
<td>Nakamura Company</td>
<td>fishery</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Kimura Hideichiro</td>
<td>Kimura Company</td>
<td>fishery</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Kikuchi Ichisuke</td>
<td>Kikuchi Company</td>
<td>fishery</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Tsujii Shigeru</td>
<td>Tsujii Mano Company</td>
<td>fishery</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mano Kisaburō</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Ikeda Kunizō</td>
<td>Ikeda Company</td>
<td>fishery</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Ishibashi Umakichi</td>
<td>Ishibashi Company</td>
<td>fishery</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Tsurushima Sōkichi</td>
<td>Tsurushima Company</td>
<td>general store, retailer</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>wholesaler, trader of marine products and trochus shell</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Ishimoto Terunari</td>
<td>South Seas Trading Company, Rabaul branch</td>
<td>trading</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(representative)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Asanuma Ichimatsu</td>
<td>Asanuma Factory</td>
<td>mechanical repairs</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Izumi Eikichi</td>
<td>Izumi shipyard</td>
<td>ship building</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Nagahama Taichi (with Ah Tam)</td>
<td>Kali plantation</td>
<td>copra planting</td>
<td>180,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sau plantation</td>
<td>copra planting</td>
<td>39,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rambutjo plantation</td>
<td>copra planting</td>
<td>85,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pitelu plantation</td>
<td>copra planting</td>
<td>65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Papitelai plantation</td>
<td>copra planting</td>
<td>140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Nagahama Taichi (with Shin Loon)</td>
<td>Uraputor plantation</td>
<td>copra planting</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kabil plantation</td>
<td>copra planting</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Tashiro Tsunesuke was a local agent. Source: JDR, E.4.0.0.11.

Data from the same source as Table 4-11.

Ibid.
TABLE 4-11. Japanese trade with New Guinea, 1919-1939 (£)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Export</th>
<th>Import</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>458</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>194</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>2,848</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>3,373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>10,303</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>18,805</td>
<td></td>
<td>18,805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>23,103</td>
<td></td>
<td>23,103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>27,050</td>
<td>4,065</td>
<td>31,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>13,947</td>
<td>3,633</td>
<td>17,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>22,046</td>
<td>4,243</td>
<td>26,289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>25,369</td>
<td>7,783</td>
<td>33,152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>42,757</td>
<td>9,839</td>
<td>52,596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>76,030</td>
<td>12,035</td>
<td>88,065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>73,747</td>
<td>10,027</td>
<td>83,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>98,585</td>
<td>8,620</td>
<td>107,205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>46,627</td>
<td>7,445</td>
<td>54,072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>34,921</td>
<td>7,266</td>
<td>42,187</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Report to the League of Nations on the Administration of the Territory of New Guinea (1926), 60-1; (1927), 47-8; (1927), 54-6; (1928), 39-40; (1929), 53-62; (1930), 63-73; (1931), 60-70; (1932), 59-68; (1933), 77-86; (1934), 69-79; (1935), 66-75; (1936), 67-77; (1937), 91-100; (1938), 94-103; (1939), 93-102; (1940), 85-101.

Although the total trade was slight, it was lucrative and the balance always greatly favoured Japan. A typical Japanese trade pattern developed—export of light manufactured goods and import of raw materials. The major exports were tinned fish, clothes and textiles (Table 4-12)—common Japanese exports in the pre-war period. Tsurushima and Nan'yō Bōeki, retailers of Japanese goods at Rabaul, used to advertise the sale of kimono, silk underwear and even Sapporo beer.\(^{117}\) The major Japanese imports were shell (mainly trochus), followed by copra and bêche-de-mer (Table 4-13), reflecting the increase in the businesses engaged in those industries (Table 4-9 and 4-10). The demand for those products was, however, slight in Japan: even copra, one of the major exports from the South Seas, occupied less than one per cent in 1937 in the total imports of Japan.\(^{118}\)

The trade and investment show a classic pattern of colonial trade. The Japanese invested capital in primary industries and used New Guinean labour for production, while expanding the local market for their manufactured goods. In the plantations and shipyards, the Japanese used New Guinean labourers. As Table 4-14 shows, all fishermen employed New Guinean crews; all plantations had New Guinean labourers; and the shipyard and even general store had New Guinean employees. In total 324 New Guineans were employed by about 40 Japanese. The Japanese recruited New

\(^{117}\)Rabaul T\(\text{v}\)nes, 16 Nov. 1934 and 31 Dec. 1937.
\(^{118}\)Naikaku tokei-kyoku [the Statistical Bureau of the Cabinet] (ed.), Dai Nihon teikoku tokei renkan [Statistical yearbook of the Great Japan Empire], Vol.57 (Tokyo 1938), 214.
Guineans widely from Manus, New Ireland, New Britain and Bougainville. Like white settlers, the Japanese suffered from the shortage of labour and even went to the area along the Ramu River in mainland New Guinea to recruit.

**TABLE 4-12. Major items of Japanese exports to New Guinea, 1928-1939 (£)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tinned Fish</th>
<th>Apparel &amp; Attire</th>
<th>Textiles</th>
<th>Cement</th>
<th>Matches</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>2,606</td>
<td>3,475</td>
<td>9,196</td>
<td>1,199</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>1,850</td>
<td>18,805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>1,915</td>
<td>5,045</td>
<td>2,473</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>12,415</td>
<td>23,103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>2,807</td>
<td>818</td>
<td>8,772</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>13,939</td>
<td>27,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>8,505</td>
<td>1,284</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3,336</td>
<td>13,947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>2,307</td>
<td>1,047</td>
<td>14,418</td>
<td>1,456</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2,785</td>
<td>22,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>2,789</td>
<td>3,082</td>
<td>11,379</td>
<td>1,090</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>6,725</td>
<td>25,369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>2,935</td>
<td>4,150</td>
<td>21,791</td>
<td>1,569</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>11,781</td>
<td>42,757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>7,325</td>
<td>6,580</td>
<td>39,083</td>
<td>2,704</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>19,470</td>
<td>76,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>11,426</td>
<td>5,487</td>
<td>26,641</td>
<td>2,962</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>26,610</td>
<td>73,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>12,008</td>
<td>6,959</td>
<td>50,526</td>
<td>1,370</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>26,821</td>
<td>98,585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>7,002</td>
<td>3,370</td>
<td>22,024</td>
<td>1,563</td>
<td>1,160</td>
<td>11,508</td>
<td>46,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>13,256</td>
<td>3,659</td>
<td>3,352</td>
<td>995</td>
<td>3,018</td>
<td>10,641</td>
<td>34,921</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the same as Table 4-11.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Copra</th>
<th>Shell</th>
<th>Bêche-de-mer</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,620</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3,633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4,215</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4,243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,595</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>7,783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9,816</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9,839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>11,340</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>12,035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>9,520</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>10,027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>4,232</td>
<td>4,340</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>8,620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>2,690</td>
<td>2,880</td>
<td>1,875</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,040</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>7,266</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the same as Table 4-11.

**TABLE 4-14. New Guinean labourers in Japanese businesses, 1940**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company Name</th>
<th>No. of New Guinean Employees</th>
<th>No. of Other Non-Japanese Employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nakamura Company</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimura Company</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kikuchi Company</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsujii Mano Company</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ikeda Company</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ishihashi Company</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsurushima Company</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2 (Malays)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Seas Trading Company</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1 (Filipino)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asanuma Factory</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izumi Shipyard</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4 (Chinese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kali plantation</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[119]\text{Various oral evidence collected by the author (from Nov. 1993 to Mar. 1994 in PNG) confirms this.}

\[120]\text{Fujiki, op.cit., p.6.}
Japanese settlers were, as the Australians in Rabaul perceived, no menace to the security of New Guinea. They lived their day to day life like other ordinary townsfolk. Unlike in Micronesia or Southeast Asia, they formed no political organisations or religious groups. They formed the Japanese Society in 1932, but it was a social club used only by the Japanese. They were aware of the Australian fear of Japanese development in Micronesia, as it was often rumoured and reported in the newspaper. And they knew about developments in Micronesia because Nan'yō Bōeki’s liner came regularly to Rabaul from Ponape bringing news. Probably they felt neglected by their own government, knowing of the ‘Japanisation’ of Micronesia: the establishment of schools, shrines, temples and even education of Micronesians. However, they also knew that any public expression of admiration for development in Micronesia was detrimental to good relations with the Australians. All they could do was hide their patriotism and concentrate on their daily business, hoping that one day their government would praise their development of New Guinea.  

The Japanese divided into three groups—businessmen at Rabaul, mobile fishermen, and plantation managers and planters on Manus, New Ireland and Bougainville. Most lived in Rabaul and others often visited there. Rabaul was a meeting place for business transactions, socialisation and gathering precious information about Japan. In Rabaul, the Japanese community, although small, was well known. They had stores, a garage, shipyard and barber’s shop, most of which advertised in the local newspaper. Although the precise number of the Japanese in Rabaul throughout the period is unknown because of the lack of a local population census except for 1933 and 1937.

Table 4.14 contd

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plantation</th>
<th>Japanese settlers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sau plantation</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rambutjo plantation</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pitelu plantation</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papitelai plantation</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urapotur plantation</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabil plantation</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>324</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JDR, E.4.0.0.11.

Japanese settlers

Japanese settlers were, as the Australians in Rabaul perceived, no menace to the security of New Guinea. They lived their day to day life like other ordinary townsfolk. Unlike in Micronesia or Southeast Asia, they formed no political organisations or religious groups. They formed the Japanese Society in 1932, but it was a social club used only by the Japanese. They were aware of the Australian fear of Japanese development in Micronesia, as it was often rumoured and reported in the newspaper. And they knew about developments in Micronesia because Nan’yō Bōeki’s liner came regularly to Rabaul from Ponape bringing news. Probably they felt neglected by their own government, knowing of the ‘Japanisation’ of Micronesia: the establishment of schools, shrines, temples and even education of Micronesians. However, they also knew that any public expression of admiration for development in Micronesia was detrimental to good relations with the Australians. All they could do was hide their patriotism and concentrate on their daily business, hoping that one day their government would praise their development of New Guinea.  

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121Interview by the author with Hatamoto Otosaku (ex-Rabaul shipwright 1937-1940), 3 July 1993, Nagasaki, Japan. Hatamoto was interned in Australia during the Pacific War. He proudly told the author that the Japanese at Rabaul were sangyō kaihatsu-in (industrial development staff) and therefore Australian treatment in the internment camp was good. That indicates they thought that they were contributing to the development of New Guinea, even though it was for Australia.


1940, on average about 20 Japanese seem to have resided in the town. In 1933 the Commonwealth census recorded 17 according to nationality (i.e., allegiance) and 29 according to race. The first figure is very likely the actual number of the Japanese and the latter seems to be mixed-race Japanese. In 1941 when all Japanese were interned, 16 out of total 29 internees were arrested in Rabaul.

Their material possessions made them visible, out of proportion to their numbers. They had nine motor vessels, three motor cars (two latest model Plymouth sedans and one Ford V-8 sedan 1938 model), two trucks and one motor cycle, and most owned houses. However, their social status did not equal that of white residents. They were still not accepted in European quarters as in the German period. Most Japanese lived in the area now called Malaytown and Malaguna, and Japanese stores and Imaizumi’s cinema were in Chinatown. The Japanese quarters in Malaytown were sometimes called ‘Japantown’.

Komine remained a leader of the community. He acted as a lobbyist when Australia restricted Japan-New Guinea trade. In 1920 he visited Sydney to petition the Australian government to lift trade restrictions. He also unsuccessfully sought permission from the Prime Minister to raise £10,000 to £15,000 by mortgaging his plantations to a Sydney company, George Morgan & Co. Ltd. In Sydney he was interviewed by the Daily Telegraph. A short article appeared with a photograph. Probably Komine exaggerated his experiences in New Guinea deliberately in order to impress Australians. The article said that he was a ‘Pacific Pioneer’ and ‘built a row-boat . . . to navigate 360 miles of the Fly River . . . by permission of Sir William MacGregor’. His assistance to the Australian forces at World War I was admiringly reported and the article concluded that ‘he did a heap of service generally, for which the [British] Empire stands in his debt’.

As on his visit to Sydney, Komine sometimes acted like an official representative of the Japanese in New Guinea. Some Australians in fact thought that he was an official. An Australian traveller, Lilian Overell, mistakenly thought him a consul. Similarly, Manus people thought he was a Japanese kiap.

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125 AA, MP1103/1 MJ18500-MJ18533.
126 Ibid.
127 Various oral evidence collected by the author, Jan. 1994, Rabaul, PNG.
129 Komine to Prime Minister, 12 July 1920, AA, A3932/1 SC397.
130 Piesse’s report, 26 May 1921, AA, A457/1 673/8.
131 Daily Telegraph, 9 July 1920, Sydney.
132 Lilian Overell, A Woman’s impression of German New Guinea (London 1923), 9. There was no Japanese consulate at Rabaul.
133 Various oral evidence collected by the author, Mar. 1994, Manus, PNG.
Komine led the Japanese economic activities until just before the Great Depression. In 1929, his company made £26,000 profit and employed 14 Japanese and 362 New Guineans, while Nagahama, who had the second largest business among the Japanese, made only £3,000 and employed one Japanese and 10 New Guineans. 134

However, Komine's status began to decline when the Great Depression savaged all planters in New Guinea. 135 Komine was no exception. His businesses made large losses and his debt to Burns, Philp increased to the extent that he could not pay wages to his employees. In this crisis he asked the Consul-General, Inoue Kōjirō, in Sydney for financial assistance. Inoue wrote to the Foreign Minister, Shidehara Kijūrō, regarding Komine's request to borrow funds at low interest. 136 Shortly afterwards Hanaoka Masaichi, the directing manager of the headquarters of the Nan'yō Sangyō Kaisha in Japan, sent a formal petition to Shidehara. 137 Prominent white residents in Rabaul also radioed to Tokyo to ask for assistance for Komine. They included the administrator Colonel Wisdom, the Catholic Missionary Society, the Methodist Church and the Anglican Bishop. 138

However, Tokyo was reluctant to respond. Inoue pressed Shidehara again saying, 'unless the Japanese government took some measures or gave credible guarantee on the payment of his debts, it would be very conceivable that Japanese businesses, which had been firmly built on the islands, would be overturned from the foundation'. 139 Komine was frustrated and wrote a long letter to Inoue, emphasising that he started his business because he was encouraged by the admirals of the Imperial Navy, and appealed to national prestige. More importantly Komine clearly indicated his imperial ambition:

My purpose [in starting the business] was not to make profits but to lay a foundation for the development of the Empire in future. Therefore I kept good relations with German administrators and, of course, with Australian administrators. As imperial subjects, I and other Japanese have endured difficulties until today so that we should not disgrace the Empire. 140

In response, Inoue appealed to Tokyo more strongly but in vain. 141 Even the Bank of New South Wales recommended 'favourable consideration of his [Komine's] application' to Tokyo, but the government declined any


135 Heather Radi, 'New Guinea under Mandate 1921-41', in W. J. Hudson (ed.), Australia and Papua New Guinea (Sydney 1971), 120.

136 Inoue to Shidehara, 10 July 1930, JDR, E.2.2.1.3-1.

137 Hanaoka to Shidehara, 22 July 1930, ibid.

138 Administrator Wisdom, 14 July 1930; Catholic Missionary Society, 22 July 1930; Methodist Church, 23 July 1930; Anglican Bishop, 25 July 1930, ibid.

139 Inoue to Shidehara, 5 Aug. 1930, ibid.

140 Komine to Inoue, 12 Aug. 1930, ibid.

141 Telegram, Inoue to Shidehara, 16 Sept., ibid.
assistance.\textsuperscript{142} Japan could not intervene in the affairs of the Australian mandate, because it would have caused a diplomatic problem with Australia; Japan had been excluding non-Japanese economic activities, particularly the operations of Burns, Philp, in Micronesia. Consequently, although Frederick Ewen Loxton (a director of Burns, Philp and sympathetic honorary consul in Brisbane) intervened and succeeded in postponing the foreclosure for two months,\textsuperscript{143} Komine's business (including properties) was auctioned on 30 December 1930.\textsuperscript{144} At this time he was 64 years old, probably too old to run a business, as Inoue wrote in his letter to Shidehara that Komine needed able advisers.\textsuperscript{145}

After he lost his business, he returned to his old trade—shell fishing—despite his age. One day in October 1934 he took a schooner to sea and died. He was then 68 years old. It was an ironic end to his dramatic life. He died like a careless fisherman, not like a once successful businessman. He was poisoned by a lobster which he caught and ate.\textsuperscript{146} But his funeral revived his past glory. Hundreds of New Guineans from Manus, New Ireland, and Bougainville, Chinese and Europeans, including the Acting-Administrator Wanliss and other officials attended.\textsuperscript{147} Tatsue Yoshinobu, Komine's old friend since his exploration days, erected a monument in the European cemetery.\textsuperscript{148} His body was cremated and his wife went back to Nagasaki with his bones.

However, Komine's death did not end Japanese business activities. At the time of liquidation, Komine persuaded Nagahama Taichi, a shipwright from Goryô village in Amakusa, to take over his business. Komine recruited Nagahama in the 1910s because Nagahama's family in Amakusa were well-known as master shipwrights for generations. In Rabaul, Nagahama worked for Komine for some years, but soon became independent and set up his own shipyard and coastal shipping business.\textsuperscript{149} Fortunately Nagahama's business was not much affected by the fall of copra prices because he was not a planter. Komine told Nagahama that successors of Ah Tam, a wealthy Chinese resident in Rabaul and Komine's long-time friend, would provide as much assistance as possible for the purchase of Komine's businesses. According to Nagahama's daughter, what Komine most feared was that his

\textsuperscript{142}Telegram from the Bank of New South Wales to the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo, 6 Sept. 1930, ibid.
\textsuperscript{143}Inoue to Shidehara, 30 Oct. 1930, ibid.
\textsuperscript{144}Rabaul Times, 18 July 1930; Managing Director of Burns, Philp to Inoue, 30 Oct. 1930, ibid.
\textsuperscript{145}Inoue to Shidehara, 5 Aug. 1930, op.cit.
\textsuperscript{146}Interview by the author with Sato Yachiyo (Komine's nephew's daughter), 1 July 1993, Nagasaki, Japan.
\textsuperscript{147}Various oral evidence collected by the author, Jan.-Mar. 1994, Rabaul, Kavieng, Manus, PNG; Pacific Island Monthly, 22 Nov. 1934, Sydney, p.16.
\textsuperscript{148}Nanpô sangyô chôsa-kai, 1941, Nyôgjinû [New Guinea], Nanshin-sha, Tokyo, p.149.
\textsuperscript{149}Interview by the author with Nagahama Tome (a wife of Nagahama Yoshiyuki, a Rabaul shipwright and a nephew of Taichi Nagahama), 30 June 1993, Amakusa, Japan.
assets would be taken over by Burns, Philp, extinguishing Japanese influence in New Guinea.\textsuperscript{150} Nagahama bought all of Komine’s plantations with Ah Tam’s successors (Lee Tam Tuck, Tee Chee Wee, Tse Dong, See To Fat Whye).\textsuperscript{151} Naturally Nagahama, now the wealthiest Japanese in New Guinea, took over the leadership of the community. In 1932 he became the founder and first president of the Rabaul Japanese Society.\textsuperscript{152} His nephew, Yukiyoshi, also worked in his shipyard. Although Nagahama did not have a history of bravery like Komine, probably he had an air of dignity cultivated by his upbringing in his master shipwright’s family where the master-apprentice relationship was strictly maintained. Like Komine, he lived in Malaguna.

The fishermen operated widely from the Ninigo Group to Bougainville and fished mainly for trochus shell. They worked for Komine until the liquidation of his business. After that, most formed companies and sold their catch to Tsurushima and Nan’yō Bōeki. They all owned at least one schooner and employed many Manus people.\textsuperscript{153} Most lived in Rabaul, except for Kikuchi Ichisuke and Nakamura Sōshichi because of their marriages to New Guinean women. Both lived in Talasea.

Plantation managers and planters were the last major group. Most worked in Manus either for Komine or Nagahama. Originally they came to New Guinea as fishermen or boatbuilders. Probably they were hard workers and won credit from Komine or Nagahama (both well-known for their strictness towards their employees). Their ability to form good relations with New Guineans probably helped them to be appointed managers. Most married local women, which indicates that they were liked and accepted by the local communities.\textsuperscript{154} That was an important factor in managing plantations where hundreds of New Guineans had to be employed.

\textit{Race relations}

The Japanese managed to form amicable relations with members of the main races in New Guinea. In the colonial structure which was strictly hierarchical by race, the Japanese precariously secured a position almost equal to the Australians in formal terms; in reality they did not enjoy the full privileges which Australians had. The Japanese held the position of business partners to the Chinese, and masters to New Guineans. Their peaceful relationship

\textsuperscript{150}A letter to the author from Saijō Setsuko (a daughter of Nagahama Taichi), 13 July 1993.
\textsuperscript{151}‘Agreement’, date unknown, AA, A1379 EP/J/851 SECTION E.
\textsuperscript{152}Gaimu-shô tsuishô-kyoku, Zaigai nihon-jin-kai narabi jitsugyô dantai shirabe [Report on Japanese societies and businessmen overseas] (Tokyo 1939), 180, in JDR, Tsii-210; In the 1930s, the Japanese government encouraged the Japanese in the South Pacific to establish local clubs, reflecting the rise of Japanese interest in the South Seas. The Japanese societies were established in Rabaul, Noumea, Suva and New Hebrides in 1932 and in Tonga in 1935.
\textsuperscript{153}Manus people were renowned for their seamanship and navigation.
\textsuperscript{154}Generally inter-racial marriages take place with acknowledgment of the community. They rarely take place based on individual decision.
with the Australians was partly attributable to their numerical and economic marginality.\footnote{Official trade restriction was lifted in 1923, but the migration restriction, which stopped the coming of new Japanese, virtually blocked Japanese business expansion.} The Australians could maintain their friendliness, because the Japanese hardly affected their interests. This contrasts with Australian uneasiness with the Chinese when their number increased and their business expanded.\footnote{Various articles in the \textit{Rabaul Times} verify this: 14 Mar. 1930; 5 Aug. 1932; 2 June 1933; 19 Mar. 1937; 23 Apr. 1937.} If the Australians had not restricted Japanese migration and trading, the Japanese could have experienced the same fate as they did on Thursday Island from the 1890s and eventually been driven out of New Guinea. The amicable Japanese-Australian relations developed in this artificial situation.

At a personal level, however, the administrators always respected Komine. That was demonstrated at the times of Komine's financial difficulties and funeral. Other Japanese also made personal friends. Nozaki Tsunejirō, the boatbuilder, and his wife had been friends of John Thurston, a prominent planter, 'for many years'.\footnote{Administrator to the Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department, 21 Oct. 1937, AA, A518/1 W834/1.} In fact, the childless couple adopted Josephine, a daughter of Thurston.\footnote{Interview with Oehlerich Cecil (grand-daughter of Izumi Eikichi), 23 Mar. 1994, Brisbane.} Asanuma Ichimatsu and Izumi Eikichi were 'great friends' of Gordon Ehret, a Rabaul trader, and did much repair work for him.\footnote{Interview by the author with Gordon Ehret (ex-Rabaul trader), 22 Mar. 1994, Brisbane, Australia.} Similarly ex-Rabaul shipwright Hatamoto Otosaku recalls good relations with his Australian counterparts.\footnote{Interview by the author with Hatamoto Otosaku (ex-Rabaul shipwright from 1937-1940), 3 July 1993, Nagasaki, Japan.} He was building boats for the administration with Australian boatbuilders and they used to go to the beach in Kokopo together.

The Japanese knew that their presence was at the mercy of the Australians. This made it almost impossible for them to show their patriotism or Japanese-ness. Unlike in Micronesia, they built no Japanese shrines or temples. There was no New Year celebration in a Japanese style, unlike the Chinese. Nor was there the Bon Festival in mid-August.\footnote{The New Year day celebration and the Bon Festival (day for remembering ancestors' souls) were most common annual events in Japan. They are equivalent to Christmas and Easter.} Probably these Japanese events were celebrated privately among themselves in Izumi's house which was unofficially called the 'Japan Club'.\footnote{Interview by the author with Asanuma, Michael (son of Asanuma Ichimatsu), 21 Mar. 1994, Brisbane, Australia.} The Club was their only sanctuary in New Guinea; most Japanese used to meet there. They probably thought it wise to confine their activities to themselves in order not to offend any Australians, even though that in itself might have invited suspicion.
In order to keep friendly relations with the white settlers, the Japanese followed Western customs. They celebrated Coronation Day, putting their own entry in the procession.\textsuperscript{163} Similarly, most inter-racial marriages were celebrated in Christian churches, although the Japanese did not accept the Christian faith. They hardly taught the Japanese language or Japanese customs or religions to their mixed-race children.\textsuperscript{164} And most mixed-race children were sent to Vunapope Mission School run by German Catholics.\textsuperscript{165}

Japanese relations with New Guineans had two aspects. The Japanese were masters. Like their white counterparts, most Japanese maintained master-servant relations. They were well aware of the racial hierarchy and considered themselves equal to white masters.\textsuperscript{166} Some regarded New Guineans as mere labour and treated them cruelly. For example, there was a violent master, called Narumi, who always ill-treated his New Guinean crew.\textsuperscript{167} However, what distinguished the Japanese masters from their European counterparts was their cordial efforts to cultivate good relations, because good relations, which assured a supply of cheap labour, were essential to their economic survival. They had little capital (none were large capitalists and all were artisans or fishermen when they arrived); they could not attract investment from large Japanese capitalists who were far more interested in Southeast Asia; and the Japanese government never provided assistance due to the delicate diplomatic relations with Australia.

Komine set an example in forming such cordial relations. All oral evidence confirms that Komine brought many gifts and the islanders were happy to provide their labour in exchange.\textsuperscript{168} He also instructed other Japanese, particularly plantation managers, to treat the islanders well, otherwise they were brought back to Rabaul. More importantly, Komine faithfully fulfilled reciprocal obligations with the islanders. That was extremely important in Melanesian tradition and was often neglected by white settlers. The following episode recounted by the elders of Ponam Island, where Komine’s schooner was wrecked and he was helped by the islanders in 1907,\textsuperscript{169} is a good example. When the \textit{luluai} of the island died in 1925, Komine came from

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{163} \textit{Rabaul Times}, 16 Apr. 1937; 14 May 1937.
\textsuperscript{164} Various oral evidence collected by the author, Nov. 1993 to Mar. 1994, PNG and Australia.
\textsuperscript{165} 'Admission 1901-63 (boys and girls)', Vunapope Catholic Mission School; the book was shown to the author by courtesy of Sister Bernadette. According to the registration, 14 boys and four girls attended the school from 1901 to 1963.
\textsuperscript{166} Interview with Hatamoto, op.cit.
\textsuperscript{167} Interview by the author with Kolomat, Korup and Pokomo, Poloat (elders who worked on Japanese schooners in young days), 6 Feb. 1994, Lou Island, Manus, PNG.
\textsuperscript{168} Various oral evidence collected by the author, Jan.-Mar.1994, Rabaul, Kavieng, Manus, PNG.
\textsuperscript{169} See the section on Komine Isokichi, Japanese settlers, Japanese in German New Guinea, in Chapter 2.
\end{footnotes}
Rabaul bringing a concrete grave and buried him. The grave, which has Komine's name on its lower part, is still in the island's cemetery and the story of friendship between their luluai and Komine has been handed down from generation to generation.\textsuperscript{170}

Forming family relationships through marriages and the adoption of children was another important tradition in Melanesian society, which Komine also followed. He adopted a New Guinean boy and sent him to Tokyo for education in the 1920s. The boy attended a private junior high school but got sick and died after a year.\textsuperscript{171} A shipwright from Amakusa also adopted a boy and brought him back.\textsuperscript{172} As seen in the previous section, some Japanese, who came young to New Guinea, married local women. The marriages of course reinforced relationships with the islanders.

The Japanese also formed good relationships with the Chinese. It was another requirement for their survival. Komine once regarded the Chinese as formidable rivals. But the Japanese, since their migration and trading had been restricted, could not compete with the Chinese who were far more numerous and had a more extensive trading network extending to Southeast Asia. To make the Chinese their rivals in business would have been unwise. As a result, the Japanese had many business deals with the Chinese. Tsujii Shigeru sold his engineering business to Wong Fat in 1929.\textsuperscript{173} Komine's business was bought by Nagahama and the successors of Ah Tam in 1930. Nagahama also bought a Chinese plantation in Namatanai when the planter, Lum Fook, died in 1928.\textsuperscript{174} Indeed, Bernard Chan, a prominent ex-Rabaul Chinese businessman, recalls his good relations with the Japanese, despite the fact that the Chinese generally disliked the Japanese due to their invasion in China:

After the Japanese invasion into China, some Chinese started to boycott the Japanese goods, but this was in a small way, because without Japanese goods, these shops were unable to operate. The second reason of the Chinese not against the local Japanese, because Nagahama and the other Japanese national are friendly people.\textsuperscript{175}

Some oral evidence confirms Chan's memory. Tsurushima had many Chinese friends and used to play mahjong with his best Chinese friends—members of

\begin{footnote}{170}{Interview by the author with Sohou, Alphonse and Mohak, Pious (elders), 11 Feb. 1994, Ponam island, Manus, PNG (see photograph 7).}
\end{footnote}

\begin{footnote}{171}{Telephone interview by the author with Imaizumi Kōtarō (son of Imaizumi Masao), 23 June 1993, Japan. The boy had a Japanese name, Tarō or Ichirō.}
\end{footnote}

\begin{footnote}{172}{The author has decided not to reveal detailed information about the boy in order to protect his privacy. The boy grew up in Japan, served in the Pacific War, married a Japanese woman.}
\end{footnote}

\begin{footnote}{173}{Rabaul Times, 19 Apr. 1929.}
\end{footnote}

\begin{footnote}{174}{New Guinea Gazette, 1929, No.221, p.1815.}
\end{footnote}

\begin{footnote}{175}{A letter to the author from Chan, Bernard, 8 Aug. 1994.}
\end{footnote}
the prominent Seeto family.\textsuperscript{176} According to some informants, the Japanese were always on the side of the Chinese when Australian racism against Asians was strong: for instance, Nakamura used to stand up to the Australians when they harassed the Chinese.\textsuperscript{177}

\textsuperscript{176}Telephone interview with Barbara Croydon, 24 Jan. 1994, Rabaul, PNG.
\textsuperscript{177}Interview with Kai Chew (old Chinese resident), 25 Jan. 1994, Rabaul, PNG; interview with Nakamura Andrew (son of Nakamura Sōshichi), 23 Jan. 1994, Rabaul, PNG.
7 Concrete grave brought by Komine from Rabaul to Ponan Island in Manus when the luluai of the island died in 1924 (photograph by Hiromitsu Iwamoto)

8 Nan'yo Bōeki Rabaul Branch in the 1930s (photo Nagahama Tome)
9 Nagahama Taichi (left) at Rabaul, a hill called the Mother in the background (photograph provided by Nagahama Tome)

10 Tanaka Taichirō in the 1920s (photograph provided by Tanaka Noboru)
Mary Tanaka, a daughter of Tanaka Taichirō, in the 1920s (photograph provided by Tanaka Noboru)
Mary Tanaka in December 1993 at her home on Samarai Island in Milne Bay (photograph by Hiromitsu Iwamoto)
Chapter 5

Elimination, 1941-1949

The Pacific War enabled both Japanese and Australians to consolidate their perceptions of the Japanese settlers in Papua and New Guinea. To the Japanese, they were patriots who pioneered the development of the tropical islands for the Empire. To the Australians, they were spies subtly mingling with the natives in order to prepare the way for the Japanese invasion. The settlers were caught between those perceptions and experienced one of the greatest tragedies during and after the war.

Internment

Internment policy

The Australians promptly interned some Germans and Italians upon the outbreak of war in Europe and later Japanese and others. It was the reiteration of the exercise at the time of World War I when Germans ‘were arrested, often at gunpoint in their homes or at work, and immediately imprisoned without knowing what offence they were supposed to have committed’. At this time the wide concept of ‘enemy aliens’ developed, which included naturalised or even Australian-born people who were of ‘enemy origin’ one or two generations back. In the late 1930s, the internment policy was developed further with a wider concept of enemy aliens and stronger government power. Internment was one of the ‘Special Internal Security Measures’ and was executed not under the National Security Regulations but at the prerogative of the Minister.

Probably Japanese nanshin in French Indochina greatly affected the internment policy. The Australians regarded the Japanese as the most dangerous enemy aliens and set a policy different from those for Germans and Italians. The Japanese did not receive consideration on account of old age, although the

1Ian Harmstorf and Michael Cigler, The Germans in Australia (Melbourne 1985), 129.
3Department of Defence, War Book of the Commonwealth of Australia (Chapter II) (Canberra 1939), 2.
government 'had previously decided not to intern enemy aliens over 70 years old or those who had resided in Australia more than 20 years'.\(^4\) This strict policy was based on the War Cabinet's view on Japanese that 'their well-known fanaticism and devotion to their country would probably lead to attempts at sabotage on the part of any Japanese here in a position to do this'.\(^5\) Consequently, the rate of Japanese internment was the highest among enemy aliens in Australia and its territories: the Japanese 97 per cent, Italians 31 per cent and Germans 32 per cent.\(^6\)

**Internment in New Guinea**

In the last two months before the Japanese invasion, 'leaders of the Rabaul community tried to maintain an appearance of normality'.\(^7\) But the coming of the war was obvious to all townsfolk. From early December, Japanese reconnaissance planes appeared, which forced the War Cabinet to order compulsory evacuation of civilians from Papua and New Guinea. At the evacuation, the colonisers revealed their ugliness. They left some New Guinean servants and labourers without any instructions and rejected the evacuation of about several thousand Chinese 'regardless of their request'.\(^8\) They also distrusted New Guinean policemen and disarmed them.

As in Australia, the administration interned some enemy aliens promptly in Papua and New Guinea. Germans were the first. They were interned no matter how long their residence was, as John McCarthy, a patrol officer, recollected: 'Now suddenly their nationality was important. Whether they supported Hitler didn't matter; they were different from other men.'\(^9\) The same principle was applied to the Japanese, although some Japanese had already left New Guinea, because they knew that war was about to break out. The Japanese government secretly informed them of the likelihood of war in the near future.\(^10\) They were told that the arrival of Nan'yō Bōeki's liner *Takachiho Maru* in March 1941 was

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\(^5\) Memorandum for the War Cabinet, 9 May 1941, AA, MP729/6 65/401/135, 'Internment of Japanese—Policy'.


\(^7\) Neville Threlfall, 'From Mangroves to Frangipani: the story of Rabaul and East New Britain', unpub., Australia National University (Canberra 1988), 361.


\(^9\) John McCarthy, *Patrol into yesterday: my New Guinea years* (Sydney 1963), 179. Some German Catholic and Lutheran missionaries were not interned.

\(^10\) Interview by the author with Tabuchi, Philip (son of Tabuchi Yoshimatsu), 4 Feb. 1994, Kavieng, PNG.
the last chance for evacuation. Just before the war, the Japanese government set up an Evacuation Committee in the Department of Foreign Affairs and began to advise Japanese in the South Seas to return to Japan. The government kept the actions top secret in order to prevent leaks about preparation for war. Despite that, most Japanese (33 people) remained in New Guinea. Most were long time residents of more than 30 years and had established businesses. Above all, 10 of them had New Guinean or local wives and had children.

Early in the morning on 8 December 1941, as soon as the news of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and Malaya reached Rabaul, the internment of the Japanese, who were scattered around New Guinea, began. At 11 o’clock, all 22 Japanese in Rabaul were arrested and interned in the Rabaul jail. On the following day, two plantation managers in Manus, Ikesaki Tokuyoshi and Hagiwara Hikota, were arrested. On the same day, Kikuchi Matsukichi, a fisherman, was captured in Buka Island adjacent to Bougainville. On 10 December, 10 Japanese (Ikeda and Ishibashi families) were arrested on the same island. On 12 December, Nakamura was arrested in Talasea. The last Japanese was Sasaki Hikokichi, a fisherman and a plantation hand and the only Christian Japanese (Anglican), who was arrested at Madang on 7 May 1942.

The internment was a dreadful event, particularly for the 10 Japanese who had local wives. They were separated from their families. The administration imprisoned the husbands in the Rabaul jail with other Japanese, while keeping their wives and children in a separate compound. Then the administration sent the Japanese husbands with other Japanese to Australia for internment. It also tried to take some young mixed-race Japanese, following the policy decided by the

11Interview by the author with Hatamoto Otosaku, 3 July 1993, Nagasaki, Japan.
12Gotō Ken’ichi, Shōwa ki nihon to indoneshia [Japan in theShowa period and Indonesia] (Tokyo 1986), 317.
13Australian archives present inconsistent figures on the Japanese; the Commonwealth Investigation Branch in Queensland recorded 29 Japanese (27 from New Guinea and 2 from Papua) (Japanese internments, 9 Dec. 41, AA, BP242/1 Q39362, while the Prisoners of War Information Bureau recorded 34 Japanese (33 can be confirmed coming from Papua and New Guinea but one file is misplaced) (AA, MP1103/1 MJ18500-MJ18533). The author uses 33 as most accurate figure.
14Diary kept by Nagahama Taichi, 8 Dec. 1941; Nagahama’s figure of the Japanese contradicts with that of Australian record. It was 16, according to AA, MP1103/1 MJ18500-MJ18533.
15AA, MP1103/1 MJ18508 and MJ18511.
16Ibid., MJ18514.
18Ibid., MJ18519.
19Ibid., MJ18533; Dossier, AA, A367 C72587.
20Interview by the author with Andrew Nakamura (son of Nakamura Sōshichi), 23 Jan. 1994, Rabaul, PNG.
War cabinet in June 1940 to intern 'all Japanese males over 16 years within Australia and its territories, except those with diplomatic or consular privileges'.

But this attempt failed, because their mothers resisted desperately. Mapole Nakamura was one of the brave mothers. She threatened to kill herself if they took her son away.

The internment agonised Nagahama who had just married in Japan and whose wife was due to join him in New Guinea soon. He had married Fusae, a woman of his home village Goryō, whom he met when he was back home on a holiday from May 1938 to December 1939. But he alone came back to New Guinea because Fusae was pregnant. She delivered a baby girl in April 1940. But while she was preparing to come to New Guinea, the international situation deteriorated and finally war broke out and she could not come to her husband.

The internment caused complicated feelings to the Japanese. Although they felt that they were betrayed by the Australians with whom they had been on good terms for a long time, they still had a deep attachment to New Guinea where they had lived for over 30 years. Probably those who had experienced World War I expected that the battle would be small in scale and soon over and they would resume their civilian life. At the same time, their patriotism may have been aroused, hearing air-raid sirens and actual bombing. Some hoped in vain that Japanese troops might come to rescue them, then New Guinea would be a Japanese territory and they would enjoy all privileges that their white counterparts had. Some wrote on the wall of the jail in Japanese that they would help the troops as interpreters so that the troops would try to free them from the internment. However, without seeing the Japanese troops, they were loaded in the Malaita with other white evacuees at 5:30 p.m. on 8 January 1942. The ship sailed during the night to avoid Japanese planes and reached Sydney on 11 January via Kieta, Samarai, Cairns and Brisbane.

In Papua, Tanaka and Murakami were interned on 9 December. The recollection of J. Gill, an Australian intelligence officer, exemplifies the internment policy. He recalled that 'I had met both Tom Tanaka and Murakama [sic] and whilst I do not think they were part of the Japanese war machine I suppose it was necessary in the interests of national security to intern them,'

22Ibid.
23A letter from Nagahama Fusae to Kosaka Zentarō (Foreign Minister), Sept. 1960, possession of Nagahama Fusae, Amakusa, Kumamoto, Japan.
24Interview with Hatamoto, op. cit.
25Diary of Nagahama Taichi, 8 to 26 Jan. 1942, op. cit.
especially as the Japanese had begun bombing Nauru and Ocean Island. Both were sent to Australia by R.A.A.F. aeroplane.

The Pacific War

Battles in New Guinea

On 23 January 1942 the Japanese South Seas Force, led by Major-General Horii Tomitarō, crushed a small Australian force at Rabaul 'in a matter of hours'. The landing force was more than 5,000 men strong. And their landing was supported by about 100 planes from four aircraft carriers. The Australians did not have the resources to counter such an overwhelming force, mainly because they had not militarised New Guinea abiding by the non-military clause that applied to the mandated territory. The defence line was 'so thin that it was stretched to invisibility'. No major military forces had existed, apart from the New Guinea Volunteer Rifles, comprising about 80 militiamen trained from the outbreak of the war in Europe, until March 1941 when the 2/22 Battalion and small numbers of other units arrived. Although in September the 17th Anti-Tank Battery was added, the total defence capability (other than infantrymen) remained only two six-inch guns, searchlights and three out-dated three-inch anti-aircraft guns. Then the War Cabinet, seeing the loss of *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*, decided to reinforce Port Moresby but deserted Rabaul, arguing that 'it was important to retain the garrison at Rabaul as 'an advanced observation line', but its reinforcement was not possible because of the hazard of transporting a force from the mainland and of maintaining it.

The Japanese occupation of Rabaul was followed by occupation of other New Guinea islands. Their main aim in New Guinea and the Solomons campaigns was 'to cut the US-Australia line' in the southwest Pacific in order to defend Japanese positions in Micronesia and the Philippines. Ideologically the operation was

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27 'Memorandum for the Director of Prisoners of War and Internees, Department of the Army,' 26 May 1947, AA, A518/1 BM836/1.
28 McCarthy, op.cit., 197.
29 McCarthy, op.cit., 188.
31 Ibid., 396.
32 Bōei chō bōei kenshū sho senshi shitsu [Defence Agency, Defence Training Institute, War History Office], *Minami taiheiyo rikugun sakusen* [The army's operations in the South Pacific], vol. 1 (Tokyo 1967a), 56.
performed under the scheme to construct the Dai Tōa Kyōei Ken (Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere).

However, the Japanese forces were 'entirely unprepared for the geography' of New Guinea, because the army had had little interest in the area until the outbreak of war.\(^3^3\) Most troops were transferred from China and were equipped for continental warfare. Like their counterparts, they knew little about jungle warfare and a tropical climate.

The Japanese victory did not last long. From mid-1942, the Japanese began to lose; the Allied forces defeated the Japanese at Milne Bay and pushed back their advance on the Kokoda Trail. Then the Allied forces started mopping up retreating Japanese from Morobe to West Sepik, while re-taking Manus and air-raiding Rabaul. The Japanese could not make an effective counter-attack due to their lack of logistic planning. Although the Japanese constructed a strong fortress at Rabaul and occupied some other parts, most of Papua and New Guinea remained under Allied control. Japanese losses were enormous: about 60,000 were killed in battle and 110,000 died of sickness and starvation, whereas the Australians lost about 14,500.\(^3^4\)

Some Japanese troops committed atrocities and intensified the Australian image of evil Japanese. The best-known case was the Tol Massacre in which about 160 Australian soldiers were slaughtered after their surrender; there were also cases of cannibalism and rape. The sinking of the Montevideo Maru that carried Australian internees, although it was sunk by a US submarine, also deeply affected the post-war Australian perceptions of the Japanese in New Guinea, because most internees were local residents.

However, it was undoubtedly Papuans and New Guineans who experienced the most difficult and horrifying times. They were killed by bombing and forced to work for the troops (both Japanese and the Allied) and their gardens were ravaged by starving soldiers. Their suffering was immeasurable, but the decline of their population in the early post-war period shows the tremendous scale of the impact of the war.\(^3^5\)


\(^{34}\)Peter Ryan, 'World War II' in Peter Ryan (ed.), Encyclopedia of Papua and New Guinea, Vol.2 (Melbourne 1972), 1223. This is high relative to other estimates and higher than the total number of graves and names of those with no known graves recorded in the war cemeteries.

Climax of nanshin-ron

The Japanese waged a propaganda war. Nanshin-ron advocates reinforced the justification for Japanese southward invasion, while the Australians were busy presenting an evil image of barbarous and brutal ‘Japs’. As a result, the images of patriotic Japanese residents in New Guinea and the cruel Japanese military (accurate in some cases) were created and both became the basis of post-war perceptions.

In Japan, publication of nanshin literature reached a climax. Although there is no data to cover the period from 1941 to 1945, according to the bibliography published by the Nihon Takushoku Kyōkai (Japan Colonisation Society) in 1944, the number of pieces (books and articles) for general reference on the South Seas published in 1942 alone is 37.9 per cent of those published from the Meiji period. Similarly, the literature about Papua and New Guinea increased. The Society listed 40 books and articles for 1942 and 1943, against 84 from the Meiji period.

Nanshin-ron advocates continued to emphasise historical linkages. Irie wrote Meiji nanshin shi kō (History of southward advancement in the Meiji period) in 1943, in which he re-introduced Enomoto’s plan to colonise South Pacific islands, as well as introducing Meiji nanshin-ron advocates and the stories of Japanese who migrated to Southeast Asia, South Pacific islands and Australia. He concluded that ‘we have to express our sincere gratitude to our pioneers who devoted their lives to the South Seas and left their footprints after suffering from many hardships’. Similarly, Sawada Ken wrote Yamada Nagamasa to nanshin senku sha (Yamada Nagamasa and pioneers of southward advancement) in 1942 and mentioned Japanese traders and entrepreneurs who were successful in the South Seas since the 15th century. He argued that ‘the Great Asia War is the expression of our national strength that our ancestors have built in the last two

36Bill Hornadge, The Yellow Peril: A squint at some Australian attitude towards Orientals (Dubbo 1971), 52.
37Nihon takushoku kyōkai [Japan Colonisation Society] (ed.), Zōho nanpō bunken mokuroku [Bibliography of the South Literature, revised edition] (Tokyo 1944). The total number of books and articles for general reference published since the Meiji period to the early 1943 was 2,104, and the figure for 1942 was 798.
38Ibid., 233-235, 318-319. The author found about 50 more books and articles published from 1942 to 1945, but uses the listing of the Japan Colonisation Society because it indicates the general interest of the Japanese during wartime.
39Irie Toraji, Meiji nanshin-shi kō [History of southward advancement in the Meiji period] (Tokyo 1943), 300.
thousand and six hundred years since the foundation of the Empire. Suganuma Teifu, one of the few militaristic Meiji nanshin-ron advocates who had been almost unknown until then, suddenly became popular. In 1942 two books were written about him: Eguchi Reishirō's Nanshin no senku sha Suganuma Teifu den [Autobiography of Suganuma Teifu, a pioneer of southward advancement] and Hanazono Kanesada's Sugaruma Teifu. Ōta Kyōzaburō, a successful entrepreneur who owned a large Manila hemp plantation in Davao in the Philippines, was also admired; Nomura Aimasa wrote Dabao no chichi Ōta kyōzaburō [Father of Davao, Ōta kyōzaburō].

The Japanese in New Guinea were no exception. Five books and one journal article devoted the whole or some part to Komine and other Japanese. Ōno and Nagakura highlighted Komine’s bravery in assisting both German and Australian pacification of New Guineans and the Australian navy at the capture of the Komet.

Even a mixed-race Japanese was highlighted. Okada Seizō, a special correspondent of the Asahi newspaper, devoted a chapter to mixed-race boys. He described how Yamashita Wakao (son of Yamashita Shichinosuke, one of the plantation managers in Manus) paddled from Rabaul to Manus to tell the islanders to help the Japanese, and the islanders came to Rabaul in 500 canoes full of provisions and surprised the Japanese. Okada also wrote about Kai Chew, a Chinese boy. According to Okada, he had been waiting for a chance to take revenge on the British because his father was killed brutally by a British official. After the Japanese occupation, Kai Chew joined the Japanese troops and served on the Kokoda Trail and was killed. Oral evidence as well as common sense denies these stories. Wakao never went back to Manus during the war and the islanders never paddled 500 canoes. Kai Chew was forced to work for the Japanese but he never went to Kokoda and he is still alive.

40Sawada Ken, Yamada Nagamasa to nanshin senku sha [Yamada Nagamasa and pioneers of southward advancement] (Tokyo 1942), 2.
42Nomura Aimasa, Dabao no chichi Ōta kyōzaburō [Father of Davao, Ōta kyōzaburō] (Tokyo 1942).
45Oral evidence collected by the author, Jan.-Mar. 1994, Rabaul, Kimbe, Manus, PNG.
Chapter 5. Elimination, 1941-1949

New Guineans were also used as propaganda. The writers emphasised that they were grateful to the Japanese who liberated them from Anglo-Saxon rule. Umino Jūzō, a naval correspondent, described New Guineans as ‘shin kōmin (new Imperial subjects)’.\(^{46}\) *Asahi gurafu* [Asahi Photograph], a photographic magazine, conveyed a visual image of co-operative New Guineans. It showed smiling faces of local children learning Japanese in a school established by the navy at Kavieng, and of adults constructing roads: some of those New Guineans were wearing caps with the emblem of the rising sun.\(^ {47}\)

All this *narashin* propaganda was to reinforce one of the ideological backbones of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere—*hakkō-ichiu* (the eight corners of the world under one roof). The ‘one roof’ is of course Japan.

**The lives of families of Japanese settlers**

Contrary to the propaganda, the mixed-race Japanese were not always loyal to the Japanese forces. In Rabaul the Japanese occupation caused mixed feelings in the remaining families, particularly in the mixed-race children. They saw their fathers’ country’s army defeat and ill-treat the Australians who were their fathers’ long time friends. Perhaps some older ones rejoiced to see some friendly and kind Japanese soldiers and willingly helped them.\(^ {48}\) But most children feared the Japanese, seeing or hearing about public beheadings or other punishments, and obeyed them. Phillip, a son of Tabuchi Yoshimatsu, recollects: ‘we were told to work for the Japanese, or see the consequence’.\(^ {49}\) Small ones did not understand what was happening and just did what they were told by the Japanese or white missionaries. In contrast, New Guinean wives had a different view. They simply did not want to be involved in the war, and kept away from the Japanese or went into the bush to hide like other New Guineans.\(^ {50}\)

The sons of Yamashita, Sakane and Ikesaki, were staying at Nagahama’s residence at the time of the internment. They were the oldest group of the mixed-race children. Nagahama was caring for Yamashita Wakao, after his father (Shichinosuke) committed suicide in Manus. Wakao attended the Mission School in Rabaul. Nagahama also looked after Phillip Sakane after his father died in 1934. Phillip went to the same Mission School and took a carpentry class but was

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46Umino Jūzō and Yoshioka Senzō, *Papua* (Tokyo 1944), 118.
47Minami no hate no nippon kyōiku [Japanese education in the far South], *Asahi gurafu* [Asahi Photograph], 2 Sept. 1942, in Asahi shinbunsha [Asahi Newspaper Co.], *Asahi gurafu ni miru shōwa no sesō* [Social aspects seen in Asahi gurafu in the Showa period] (Tokyo 1975), 68-9.
48All oral evidence confirms that the Japanese soldiers treated well the mixed-race Japanese children.
49Interview with Tabuchi, op.cit.
50Interview with Nakamura, Andrew (son of Nakamura Šōshichi), 23 Jan. 1994, Rabaul, PNG.
dismissed from the class because of misbehaviour. After that, he learnt boatbuilding at Izumi’s yard. Nagahama told the two boys to take care of his five houses when he was taken to Australia. After the Japanese landed at Rabaul, Wakao and a son of Ikesaki collaborated with the Japanese. They went to Wide Bay with the Japanese troops and worked as clerks to record particulars of Australian soldiers and civilians who escaped from Rabaul. In March 1942, Wakao was ordered to work as a driver. Probably he was working reluctantly and disobeyed the order. He was imprisoned with the Allied prisoners from January to May in 1944. During his imprisonment, he often witnessed the Japanese beating prisoners.

Eleven mixed-race Japanese children stayed in the Vunapope Catholic Mission. Soon the Kempei (Military Police) found them and demanded that the Mission give them better treatment. The Bishop reluctantly agreed. Later the Japanese removed the five boys, telling the Father that they would educate them in the Japanese language and way of life with a qualified teacher. But they left six girls.

Pius Yukio Kikuchi, the third child of Kikuchi Ichisuke, was among the five boys. At the Japanese camp he did not receive much education but spent most of his time working for the Japanese. But Kikuchi relates that it was not a hard life for him; the Japanese were kind and taught him many things about Japan. The new life was an exciting time for a young boy. He recalls:

From 1943 to 1945, I worked for the Japanese force. All mixed-race Japanese children were told to work for the Japanese force. I looked after horses and pigs and dug tunnels. I worked for the gunshuku-han butai [Accommodation Unit] in Toma. Bonny Shigeru Nakamura, Jo Kisaburo Nakamura, Paul Izumi and Endo were there, too. Bonny was a cook and once ran away, but was caught, and beaten by the back edge of katana [Japanese sword] as punishment. I worked for Sergeant Kanai and Watanabe. Watanabe was higher than Kanai. Kanai is the one who beat up Bonny Nakamura, but usually he was a very kind gentleman. He beat Bonny to show the
seriousness of disobeying the order. I also worked for Major Sakakibara. Japanese soldiers treated children well and were never cruel. 58

Three sons of Asanuma Ichimatsu (Michael, Felix and Anthony) worked in the MP headquarters. They were put in a school and were taught Japanese language and songs, but they spent most of their time fixing boots for the soldiers. 59 It was alleged that the MP used the boys to punish others. At the Rabaul War Trial a white civilian witness stated that 'a [New Guinean] boy was flogged insensible by Felix Asanuma, a half-caste resident of Rabaul, then in Japanese uniform working for the Ramale Kempei'. 60 However, no oral evidence from either New Guineans or mixed-race Japanese can confirm the flogging.

Louise Asanuma, a wife of Ichimatsu, was in Rabaul when the Japanese landed, but she fled to her Filipino father's plantation at Wide Bay to avoid the battle. Louise's sister Josephine, who married Kimura Hideichirō, was also with them. However, soon the Japanese forces advanced to Wide Bay, chasing retreating Australians. The family was caught in an awkward situation. The Japanese commander asked them about the Australians. The family probably knew where the Australians went, but they said they did not. The Japanese believed them because they considered the family pro-Japanese after finding out that the two women were married to Japanese. The Japanese treated the family well and provided food. 61

In Manus, the remaining families went to the bush to hide and local people looked after them. The Ikesaki family was looked after by the Dipon family (a large clan in Momote). 62 The Yamashita family left Pityilu Plantation for the bush in mainland Manus. 63

In Papua, the remaining families were ill-treated by the Australians who feared the possibility of their assistance to the Japanese. Adults were taken to a compound at Gili Gili and were forced to construct the airfield or to do other

58 Interview by the author with Pius Kikuchi (son of Kikuchi Ichisuke), 18 Mar. 1994, Brisbane, Australia.
59 Interview by the author with Michael Asanuma (son of Asanuma Ichimatsu), 21 Mar. 1994, Brisbane, Australia.
60 'Full statement of atrocity or crime by Alfred Creswick,' 12 Oct. 1945, AWM54 1010/4/172.
61 Interview by the author with Anthony Asanuma (son of Asanuma Ichimatsu), 19 Mar. 1994, Brisbane, Australia; the same episode was introduced by Mizuki Shigeru (a Japanese veteran who became one of the best-known comic artists, in his factual comic), 'Lémón kahan [By River Lemon], in Yōret Kanchō [Ghost Captain] (Tokyo 1993), 55-102.
62 Interview by the author with Lopar, John; Churuwas, Agnes; Chokoni, Lucas; Nabraposiu, Joseph and Lopra, Matilda (elders), 28 Feb. 1994, Papitelai, Manus, PNG.
63 Interview by the author with Keksan, Kamui; Pokupeal, Sotil; Ngapen, Amos; Pombuai, Hendry; Kahu, Kaspar and Sandrel, Simon (elders), 14 Feb. 1994, Pityilu Island, Manus, PNG.
manual labour. Children were kept in a compound at Baraga throughout the war. Mary Tanaka was probably the worst treated. Some villagers alleged that she looked after a wounded Japanese. The Australians believed this without investigating and locked her up in a cell until the end of the war despite her plea that it was other Papuans who helped the Japanese.

Return of Tashiro
Tashiro Tsunesuke was one of the Japanese residents to come back to Rabaul during the war and experience the war in Papua and New Guinea. Probably he had the same dilemma as Komine had at the outbreak of World War I, caught between patriotism and relations with local people. Although it is hard to know how strong his patriotism was, both written and oral evidence show that he cherished his good pre-war relations and saved lives of New Guineans, white missionaries, Chinese planters and Australians.

In March 1941 he went back to Japan in the last Nan’yō Bōeki liner. As soon as the war broke out, he was called up to serve the navy as a gunzoku (civilian). At that time the navy was recruiting Japanese civilians who had experience in the South Seas. On 26 December he was posted to the 2nd Nazuru Naval Special Landing Party at Saipan. On 1 February 1942 he was transferred to the 8th Base Force which was commanding the operations in New Guinea. Then on 10 April he was back in Rabaul, being assigned an additional post under the command of the minsei-bu (civil administration department) in New Britain. Until the end of the war he worked mainly as an interpreter, because he spoke fluent English and Pidgin and had local knowledge. He was extremely useful for the navy which knew little about New Guinea. He was dispatched to Milne Bay, Bougainville, Nakanai, Talasea and Manus.

Tashiro impressed Vice-Admiral Kusaka Jin’ichi, supreme commander of the naval forces in New Guinea. Kusaka wrote about Tashiro’s service in his memoir. He praised his service which saved the naval land unit in Milne Bay and quoted

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64 Interview by the author with Namari, Kesaya (grand daughter of Tamiya Mabei), 30 Dec. 1993, Biwa village; Tetu, Billy (grandson of Tamiya Mabei), 25 Dec. 1993, Basilaki Island, Milne Bay, PNG.
65 Interview by the author with Tanaka, Mary (daughter of Tanaka Taichirō), 22 Dec. 1993, Samarai, Milne Bay, PNG.
66 Curriculum vitae, date unknown, AA, A471/1 81211.
68 Curriculum vitae, op.cit.
Tashiro's diary fully over three pages. Later, Tashiro engaged in tasks such as investigating construction sites for airstrips, recruiting and placating New Guineans mainly at Rabaul and Bougainville. According to Kusaka, once he was successful in recruiting a thousand New Guineans, and Kusaka expresses deep gratitude for Tashiro's hard work.

However, Tashiro did not betray his local friends. In Bougainville, he acquiesced in the presence of Lieutenant Mason, an Australian coast-watcher, and the leaking of information by Wong You, a Chinese planter at Kieta. According to oral evidence, Tashiro did not harm the locals. Lest other Japanese officers should understand, he instructed the islanders in Pidgin to take a neutral stand for their own safety. Similarly, in Rabaul he protected the interests of the mixed-race people and Chinese and visited the Vunapope Mission to see that children were well-treated.

**Life in internment in Australia**

Australians treated the internees well, abiding by the letter and spirit of the Geneva Convention; the internees received the same amount of rations as the camp guards and were similarly housed. Most Japanese internees had no bitterness about their treatment by the camp authorities and conditions in the camps. Australian camp authorities hoped that if they treated prisoners of war and internees humanely then the Axis powers would reciprocate and treat any Australian prisoners with equal care.

Upon their arrival at Sydney, the Japanese from Rabaul were entrained to Hay Camp in a grazing area about 750 kilometres inland. They arrived at the camp on 27 January and met Tanaka and Murakami from Samarai and the Japanese from the New Hebrides. There were already about 900 Japanese in the camp, mainly from Australia and New Caledonia. On the following day, the camp officers body-searched the new Japanese and confiscated all cash and other belongings.
Mixing with other Japanese was a new experience for those from New Guinea. A small group, whose main social contact had been with non-Japanese, was suddenly swallowed up in a large group of the same race. Naturally that gave them a new and clear sense of their national identity. The news of Japanese victories stimulated their patriotism; they need no longer hide their practice of Shintō or Buddhism nor their admiration for the Japanese Empire.

Nagahama's diary shows the rise of patriotism in the camp.\(^{80}\) Hearing about the fall of Singapore, the Japanese in the camp gathered and worshipped in the direction of Japan and prayed silently for the souls of the Japanese soldiers who perished in the battle. They also heard that the Allied bombers raided Tokyo and other cities, but presumed the news was propaganda. They celebrated the Emperor's Birthday on 29 April, singing a national anthem and praying for Japanese soldiers. They had a feast and enjoyed a sumo tournament. In the camp the Japanese considered the Battle of Coral Sea a Japanese victory and held a celebration with a gorgeous dinner. The news of the Japanese abortive midget submarine attack against Sydney and Newcastle was solemnly conveyed. And from time to time, they organised lecture series, entitled *kokusei taikai* (Conference on National Situation), delivered by academic internees in the camp. The lectures were designed to keep their morale high.

On 12 April 1943, the Australian government made a new decision on the status of Japanese internees. It classified merchant seamen as prisoners of war (POWs) and distinguished them from 'internees'. After this, the government decided that Hay Camp would hold only POWs and Loveday Camp in South Australia only internees.\(^{81}\) The new status was inconsistent in the case of the Japanese from Papua and New Guinea. Technically all were engaged in the maritime industry, because even planters or plantation managers had to operate vessels to transport copra. But at this stage only Izumi, a boatbuilder, was considered a merchant seaman and thereby a POW, while other boatbuilders or fishermen were considered civilians.\(^{82}\)

On 10 May 1943, 350 Japanese were transferred from Hay to Loveday Camp in South Australia. All the Japanese from Papua and New Guinea except Izumi were among them.\(^{83}\) The Australians thought that Loveday was 'one of the best locations chosen for the purpose of internment camps' with 'its temperate climate

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\(^{80}\)Ibid., 11 Feb. to 20 July 1942.

\(^{81}\)Nagata, op.cit., 164.

\(^{82}\)Diary of Nagahama, 10 May to 4 July 1943, op.cit.

\(^{83}\)Ibid., 12 May 1943.
and its abundance of reticulated water'.  
84 On the contrary, Loveday did not impress the Japanese. When they arrived, a sand storm was raging. Their first impression of the camp site was that they had been brought to the middle of the desert.  
85 About two months later, the camp authority rechecked the occupations of the Japanese and re-classified Endō, Onoue, Hatamoto, Nakamura and Kimura as POWs and sent them back to Hay Camp with about 100 other Japanese.  
86 The Japanese found camp life satisfactory. Nagahama recalled no complaints about the treatment and Hatamoto spoke of the good treatment. Although they were forced to do various work (farming, carpentry, wood cutting, etc), this was not too hard. They were fed well. They could receive medical treatment in the camp hospitals. And they had time for their own pastimes such as sports or organising other entertainments. For instance, Hatamoto used to enjoy making toys for the children in the camp in his spare time.  
87 The Australian guards observed that the Japanese were the most placid prisoners and many were not security risks. A Loveday camp official described them: 'The Japanese: Subservient, were model prisoners. Their fanatical desire to maintain "face" made them easy to handle in their eagerness to obey all orders and instructions to the letter.' But the camp authorities were concerned about Nagahama who had managed to keep a lot of cash and was lending it to others.  
88 The camp authority banned transfers of money among internees, although admitting that Nagahama's lending was a bona fide action and did 'not appear to represent an attempt on his part to gain for himself "political" influence in the Compound'. Similarly, the authorities did not approve of his lending £40 to Tsurushima, which Nagahama attempted to send in exchange for three rings. He also tried in vain to send money to Onoue at Hay Camp. The authorities kept watching out for Nagahama's money lending with deep suspicion; they even refused his offer to pay for the poultry for New Year's Day on the ground that 'this

84Advertiser, South Australia, Internment in South Australia (Adelaide 1946), 21.
85Interview with Hatamoto, op.cit.
86Diary of Nagahama, 4 July 1943, op.cit.
87Interview with Hatamoto, op.cit.
88Bevege, op.cit., 150. One exception was the uprising at Cowra Camp in Aug. 1944. But the incident did not affect the Japanese in other camps: the Japanese in Loveday Camp indeed assured the camp authority that they would not follow suit.
89Advertiser, South Australia, op.cit., 10.
91Ibid.
92'Ref these HQ memo 8267 of 21 Aug 43,' 10 Nov. 1943, AA, D1901 N2781.
93Nagahama to Onoue, 16 Nov. 1943, ibid.
apparent generosity is really intended to extend Nagahama's influence in the compound. 94

Many Japanese died at Loveday, as quite a few were interned in spite of their old age: 108 Japanese died compared to 18 Italians and seven Germans. 95 Tanaka Taichirō was among them. He got sick and was hospitalised. In the Barmera Base Hospital his name was placed on the 'dangerously ill' list on 30 May 1945. 96 Then he recovered for some time and his name was moved to the 'seriously ill' list on 10 July. 97 However, his condition deteriorated once again and his name was placed on the 'dangerously ill' list on 20 November: the cause was unresolved pneumonia. 98 Then he finally succumbed to the illness. He developed a cerebral vascular condition and passed away on New Year's Eve in the 64 Camp Hospital. His burial was held at 11 o'clock in the morning on New Year's Day in 1946. 99 He was 68 years old. 100

Those who had been separated from their families in New Guinea were anxious about their safety, hearing the news of the Allied bombing of Rabaul and other areas and the battle in Manus. Bad communication increased their anxiety, except Kikuchi and Asanuma who were lucky enough to receive letters from New Guinea. 101 Others could not hear anything from their families despite writing many times. Nakamura's letters never got through, and a sympathetic official of the International Red Cross Committee sought advice from the Minister of State for External Affairs on Nakamura's communication with his family. 102 Similarly Hagiwara and Sasaki got no replies from their families. 103

In 1943 negotiations on exchanging internees began between Japan and Australia. The Japanese government nominated 678 Japanese including four from New Guinea (Hatamoto, Mano, Nagahama and Tsurushima). 104 The Australian government refused to exchange the four for the obvious reason that

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94 'Ref. this HQ memo 10044 of 10 Nov 43', 28 Jan. 1944, ibid.
95 'Advertiser, South Australia, op. cit., 25.
96 'War Diary of Intelligence Summary, 14CD Loveday camp', 30 May 1945, AA, AWM52, 8/7/42.
97 10 July 1945, ibid.
98 20 Nov. 1945, ibid.
100 Coroners ACT, 1935, South Australia, 'date unknown, AA, A518/1 BM836/1.
101 Interviews with Japanese internees at no.4 camp, Tatura', 23 July 1946, AA., A367 C72533.
102 Morel to Evatt, 5 Feb. 1945, AA, A1066 IC45/16/2/2.
103 Interviews with Japanese internees at no.4 camp, Tatura', 22 July 1946, AA., A367 C72534; A367 C72587.
104 'The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, London to Prime Minister's Department, Canberra, 22 July 1943, AA, A1608/1 AF20/1/1 Part 2.'
they were very likely to pass their knowledge of New Guinea to the Japanese military.

Deportation

Australian policy

The end of the war was good news to the internees. They expected to be freed from the confinement of three and half years and go home to see their families. However, through newspapers and correspondence with their families, they knew of the devastation of Rabaul. Probably they knew about a huge number of Japanese POWs and their trials: they could imagine the ill-feeling of the local white residents against themselves. They also knew about the devastation of Japan—the atomic bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima and the occupation by Allied forces.

The Australians were determined to make New Guinea a Japanese-free area for the defence and governance of New Guineans. The Australians regarded the pre-war Japanese presence as part of nanshin: the Japanese were all associated with espionage activities. They also thought that the Japanese occupation undermined Australian authority. Therefore the Australians decided that any Japanese influence had to be eliminated in order to restore their pre-war colonial rule.

The repatriation of Japanese internees began in late February 1946. According to Australian sources, at least seven Japanese from Papua and New Guinea (Murakami, Asanuma, Hagiwara, Ikesaki, Kikuchi [Matsukichi], Kikuchi [Ichisuke] and Sasaki) formally applied for release in Australia.105 Then six out of the seven (leaving Kikuchi Matsukichi) were transferred to Tatura Camp.106 On 21 February 1946, 18 Japanese internees from New Guinea were deported to Japan with over 2,000 other Japanese, according to Regulation 20C of the National Security (Aliens Control) Regulations. It is not known whether they wished to return to Japan. They included the families of Ikeda and Ishibashi, Arata, Kikuchi (Matsukichi), Mano, Mori, Nagahama, Segawa, Tashiro, Tsujii and Tsurushima.107 The rest of the 10 Japanese applied to return to Papua and New

105 Memorandum for the camp commandant, S.A. Loveday, 8 Feb. 1946, AA, A1066/4 IC45/1/11/5. Some petitions of ex-residents in Australia to release in Australia are kept in the same file.
106 Nominal roll: internees marched out to Tatura Internment Group', 28 Feb. 1946, AA, AWM52, 8/7/42.
Guinea. The Australian government could not deport the 10, because they had local wives in Papua and New Guinea who were technically British subjects, and their release had to be negotiated with the Attorney-General.

Roland Browne, the Acting Director-General of Security, interviewed the 10 who were then moved to Rushworth Camp, following the instructions of the Attorney-General. At the interviews they all expressed their strong desire to go back to live with their families. Browne found that 'in all of these cases there is no objection to release' and reported no objection to their return provided that approval be granted by the Department of External Territories. The only exception was Kimura who, Browne thought, 'is an intelligent type and has a very good knowledge of New Guinea waters and it may be thought desirable that he should be required to return to his own country'.

However, the Department of External Territories objected, supporting the view of the administrator Murray who was firmly against their return because of the possible 'ill-effect' on the natives. The administration's first task after the war was restoration of the pre-war relationship between white masters and black servants. Any Japanese influence that undermined the authority of white masters had to be removed. White planters also feared the destruction of pre-war colonial relations and petitioned the Minister for External Affairs against their return.

Murray was aware of the ethical issue that the rejection of the return of the 10 Japanese meant separation from their families. But he argued that:

In considering the separation from their families that the long war separation will act as a shock absorber and moreover it must be recollected that in some instances the bonds of affection are no greater than would be expected of the general run of irregular unions as no doubt many are.

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108 Minister for Immigration to Attorney-General, Mar. 1946, ibid.
109 Col. Lloyd to Attorney-General, 24 Jan. 1946, ibid.
110 Interview with Japanese internees, 22 July 1946, AA, A367 C72533, C72534, C72537, C72538, C72539, C72540, C72546, C72587 and C72588.
111 Browne to the Secretary of the Department of External Territories, 23 Aug. 1946, AA, A373/1 11505/48.
112 Case No. 1. KIMURA Hideichiro, date unknown, ibid.
113 Secretary of the Department of External Territories to the Director-General of Security, 25 Sept. 1946, ibid.
114 Secretary of the Pacific Territory Association to Minister of External Affairs, 18 Aug. 1945, AA, A518/1 BB836/2.
115 Secretary of the Department of External Territories to the Director-General of Security, 25 Sept. 1946, op.cit.
Oral evidence denies Murray's argument. Their wives and children were all longing to see the return of their husbands and fathers.\footnote{Interview by the author with the descendants of Ikesaki, Kikuchi, Asanuma, Izumi, Endo, Nakamura, Murakami and Tanaka families, December 1993 to March 1994, PNG and Australia.}

Browne objected to Murray's view and emphasised the point that 'they have been away from Japan for many years, ranging from 29 to 45, and to separate them permanently from their wives and families now in my opinion would be wrong', and recommended that 'to return them to their home surroundings, from which they were taken into custody, is the only reasonable solution to the problem'.\footnote{Browne to Secretary of Attorney-General's Department, 2 Oct. 1946, AA, A373/1 11505/48.}

Browne and Murray kept on pressing their arguments to the Attorney-General's Department.\footnote{Ibid.; Murray to Secretary of Attorney-General's Department, 20 Feb. 1947, ibid.} However, Browne's view met overwhelming opposition from the Director-General of Security, Murray, Deputy Administrator Phillips and the Assistant Secretary of the Department of External Territories. The Director-General of Security reiterated a traditional Australian fear of Japan's *nanshin*:

> Japanese who were in the islands pre-war, can only be regarded as having been part of the Japanese system of infiltration and espionage related to their so-called 'southward expansion movement' . . . The South West Pacific area is a vital strategic region in which unremitting vigilance is a constant requisite. Clearly, no Japanese should again be allowed anywhere within such strategic zone . . . Upon all material counts the re-entrance of any Japanese would be of ill-effect and it is strongly advised that none be allowed to proceed to any of the areas referred to.\footnote{Japanese Internees Ex-islands', 5 Sept. 1947, AA A472 W32123.}

When Browne argued that the Japanese never exhibited anti-British sentiments before the war,\footnote{Browne to Secretary of Attorney-General's Department, 5 Mar. 1947; Murray to Secretary of Attorney-General's Department, 20 Feb. 1947, AA, A373/1 11505/48.} Phillips countered saying that they simply had no chance to express such sentiments and emphasised that 'the loyalty of Japanese to their Emperor and country is so notorious that I find it hard to imagine that these Japanese would not have immediately rallied to Nippon had they still been in the Territory when the Japanese forces arrived'.\footnote{Re Return to the Territory of Japanese Internees' by Phillips, 12 Jan. 1948, ibid.} Phillips also scored a point by arguing that 'their return may constitute an extreme provocation to European, Asiatic and native residents who suffered terribly at enemy hands during the occupation'.\footnote{Ibid.}
The Assistant Secretary of the Department of External Territories was more aggressive. He firmly denied the ethical case, regarding the intermarriages as 'all part of the espionage and infiltration plan' and presented a blatant racist view that 'Japanese have amongst other many undesirable characteristics, a complete lack of any sense of gratitude and certainly no sense of affection or even liking for any others than their own people'. More importantly, he made a point, which was quite persuasive then, that their return would be a betrayal to the Australians killed in war in Papua and New Guinea.

Finally, and remembering the actions in New Guinea itself, of the Japanese forces before they were ejected, any permitted entrance or re-entrance of any Japanese to the Islands would be likely to be regarded by every Australian in the territory (and in Australia as well) as an affront—particularly to those bereaved as a result of Japanese aggression.123

Meanwhile the Department of the Army was eager to close the camp due to the cost of maintaining it. As a result, the issue was left to the jurisdiction of the administration, and the Japanese were to be returned to Papua and New Guinea, although their release was yet to be decided.124

The Department of the Army prepared transport for their repatriation. At the last moment, Murakami changed his mind and applied for repatriation to Japan.125 Probably he knew that he would not live long due to his age (he was 75 years old) and wished to see his home country again before his death. But his application was rejected. All 10 were sent back to Papua and New Guinea. Cynically, only Murakami was released at Samarai upon his return, while the other nine were kept in custody in Rabaul.

Murray still resisted the release of the nine. They were held in a compound next to the one for the Japanese war criminals who were waiting for trial or serving their sentences in Rabaul. It was an illegal detention, and the Australian officials were aware of that. Cyril Chambers, Acting Minister of External Territories, wrote to the Cabinet:

The six civilian internees were held in pursuance of the National Security (Aliens Control) Regulations and orders for their release were signed on 27th November, 1946, and the Regulation in question expired on 31/12/1947, five of these appeared to be

123Notes taken from telephone conversation with the Assistant Secretary of the Department of External Territories for inclusion in a Minute to the Minister for External Territories, 29 Sept. 1947, ibid.

124Browne to Colonel Griffin, 15 Apr. 1947, ibid.

held illegally . . . It is not clear whether the three who are regarded technically as prisoners of war who are still held . . . are legally held.126

While they were in the compound, Izumi, aged 54, died of sickness and was buried in the cemetery near Talwat where Japanese war criminals were buried. He was not allowed to be buried in the European cemetery like other pre-war Japanese, because anti-Japanese feelings were so strong among residents, particularly among those who had suffered under the Japanese occupation. Some greatly resented the pre-war presence of the Japanese in the town and pulled out all Japanese graves (including Komine's memorial erected by Tatsue) in the European cemetery and threw them into the sea.127

Most families of the Japanese visited the compound, but the Japanese were never allowed to return to their homes even temporarily. In order to justify this illegal detention, the Australians fabricated a story. The District Officer in Rabaul reported that 'only one wife of the Japanese internees wished for their husband's return, the native wives of their internees having re-married'.128 Oral evidence contradicts this. Most families were anxious to see the Japanese back home, and the re-marriages took place some years after the Japanese were deported to Japan.129

However, some Australians were sympathetic. Gordon Ehret, a long time friend of Asanuma, was back in Rabaul from his military service in the Middle East. He asked the administration to release the Japanese, explaining that they had nothing to do with the Japanese forces. His request was not accepted. In fact, Ehret was given 'the most unpleasant job'.130 He was appointed as a guard for the compound, as he was one of the few civilians who had military experience. Over the fence, Asanuma begged Ehret for his release. Asanuma's voice still lingers in Ehret's ears: 'We are mates, aren't we? Why do you do this to me?'131 Also in Manus, some Australians tried unsuccessfully to release the

126 Chambers to the cabinet, 6 Jan. 1949, AA, A6006/1 2nd CHIFLEY NOV.46-DEC.49.
127 Interview by the author with Uradok (elder from Matupi, a tour guide for Japanese veterans), 17 Jan. 1994, Rabaul, PNG; only two graves were not thrown into the sea and are now kept in the Kokopo Museum.
128 Chambers to the cabinet, 6 Jan. 1949, op.cit.
129 Interview by the author with the descendants of Ikesaki, Kikuchi, Asanuma, Nakamura, Endô and Izumi, Jan. to Mar. 1994, PNG and Australia.
130 Interview by the author with Ehret, Gordon, 22 Mar. 1994, Brisbane, Australia.
131 Ibid. Ehret was sobbing when he was telling this to the author. He now has very good relations with Asanuma's sons in Brisbane who migrated to Australia.
Japanese. Whitely and Edison, planters in Momote, requested the administration to return Ikesaki and Hagiwara to their plantations in Manus.  

The administration officials knew that they had no statutory right to deport the Japanese: 'the eight still held cannot be deported as prohibited immigrants owing to their long residence in New Guinea and in regard to the five civilians there is no war-time legislation under which they could be removed from the Territory'.  

But finally the officials managed to find a loophole. Under the Expulsion of Undesirable Aliens Ordinance 1935 of New Guinea, they could be deported at the discretion of the administrator. Section 2 reads:

Where the Administrator is satisfied that any person who was not born in the Territory—

(a) has since the commencement of the Laws Reprisal and Adopting Ordinance 1921 been convicted in the Territory of a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment for one year or longer: or

(b) is a person whose presence in the Territory is injurious to the peace, order, or good Government of the Territory, or whose presence in the Territory is prejudicial to the well-being of the natives of the Territory,

the Administrator may make an order for the deportation of that person.

The eight Japanese were deported in 1949, after the longest internment suffered by any of the Japanese. They had been interned for seven years in total.

In contrast, Murray did not object to the release of Murakami in Samarai. Probably his age (75 years) was considered, but the main reason is obvious: Milne Bay did not suffer Japanese occupation and the damage to Australian authority was minimal. The Australians rebuffed the Japanese landing, and in Buna-Kokoda the Australians eventually pushed back the Japanese advance. The post-war administration saw little physical damage or need for rehabilitation. And within only two years 'almost complete rehabilitation to pre-war standard' was achieved. Thus by the time Murakami was back, pre-war conditions were restored and his return would have hardly affected Australian authority.

Murakami rejoiced to meet his wife and son, but he had to bring bad news to Mary Tanaka: her father Taichirō had died in Loveday. He also brought a bunch of Taichirō's hair and gave it to Mary. It was his only legacy to her. Tanaka's pre-war assets (schooners, stores, boatbuilding yards, etc.) were all destroyed or

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132 Interview by the author with Pearse, Dick (ex-administration official and now an agent of customs in Manus), 14 Feb. 1994, Lorengau, Manus, PNG.
133 Chambers to the cabinet, 6 Jan. 1949, op.cit.
confiscated during the war.\footnote{Interview with Tanaka, Mary, op.cit.} Murakami was fortunate to enjoy his last moments with his family and also to have support from Allan Timperly, a sympathetic Australian official, who was helping him by providing food. Murakami died in Kuyaro in the same year that he returned.\footnote{Interview by the author with Murakami, Kalo (son of Murakami Heijirō), 4 Jan. 1994, Misima, Milne Bay, PNG.}

\textit{Life after deportation}

A hard life was waiting for those deported from Australia and New Guinea. They went back to poor villages and islands where their future had not been bright, and which they had left decades before. Most had not returned for a long time. They had no means of making a living because all their assets and properties and even petty belongings were confiscated by the Australians on internment and after the war. Moreover, chaotic social conditions in early post-war Japan made it difficult for them to adapt to the new life. Even more depressing, the loss of their assets in New Guinea was never compensated.

Nagahama suffered the worst financially. He lost all the wealth he had accumulated by hard work during almost 40 years in New Guinea. The administration seized, liquidated and distributed his assets, which amounted to £21,602, for the benefit of former Australian POWs of the Japanese, according to Article 14 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and to Section 13F of the Trading with the Enemy Act 1939-1957.\footnote{"War damage to property regulations: claims of Taichi Nagahama," D.J. Hill, Delegate of the Controller of Enemy Property, 11 Sept. 1961, AA A1379 EP/J/851 Sect O.} He passed away at his home village Goryō in September 1960 while his wife was watching. His family suffered severe financial difficulties because Nagahama came back without any money and he was often sick. After his death, his wife and daughter sent a petition to the Japanese Foreign Ministry to inquire about the possibility of compensation for the loss of his assets in New Guinea.\footnote{A letter from Nagahama Fusae to Kosaka Zentarō (Foreign Minister), Sept. 1960, possession of Nagahama Fusae, Amakusa, Kumamoto, Japan.} But the government did not reply.

Some were fortunate enough to resume their occupations, although it took many years because they had to start again from scratch. Tsurushima opened a new store in Shanghai.\footnote{Letter to the author from Sato Sadako (grand daughter of Tsurushima), 4 June 1993.} Ishibashi found a job as captain of a sightseeing boat in his home Misaki in Kanagawa, and Hatamoto managed to start a boatbuilding business in his island in Gotō in Nagasaki.\footnote{Letter to the author from Hatamoto Otosaku, 26 May 1993.} Very likely most others sought support from their relatives and suffered hardships. Some of those who were
separated from their families in New Guinea kept on writing for some years, but later some re-married in Japan.\textsuperscript{142}

In New Guinea, most wives of the Japanese went back to their home villages. In some cases, their mixed-race children were looked after by the Vunapope Catholic Mission in Kokopo. Oral evidence indicates that the local population showed little bitterness against them. Most were treated as before the war. New Guineans knew that those wives and mixed-race children were different from the Japanese forces. This is manifested well in the oral evidence of New Guinean elders who distinguish the Japanese before the war from the ones during the war and relate their cordial relations with the former.\textsuperscript{143} For, example, villagers of Momote remained loyal to their former plantation manager, Ikesaki, and kept the plantation intact until his son, Peter, told them that the land was no longer Ikesaki's and would be returned to the villagers.\textsuperscript{144}

Like those in Japan, generally those left in New Guinea suffered from severe financial hardship. Their breadwinners were taken away and never came back and their pre-war assets and property had all been destroyed or confiscated by the Japanese and the Australians since the outbreak of the war. Some years after the war, when some local residents began to receive war compensation, some descendants of the Japanese settlers asked about compensation for the losses of their fathers' assets. Andrew Nakamura inquired of the officials at Rabaul, then the Australian High Commission at Port Moresby, but received a blunt reply that he should ask the Japanese government because he was part-Japanese. He then asked an official from the Japanese Embassy, who visited Rabaul after the independence of Papua New Guinea. The official promised to consider the matter but never contacted Peter again.\textsuperscript{145}

\textsuperscript{142}Asanuma, Ikesaki and Nakamura re-married in Japan.
\textsuperscript{143}Oral evidence collected by the author, Dec. 1993 to Mar. 1994, PNG and Australia.
\textsuperscript{144}Interview by the author with Peter Ikesaki (son from the third wife of Ikesaki Tokuyoshi), 26 Jan. 1994, Rabaul, PNG.
\textsuperscript{145}Interview with Nakamura, op.cit. The author also inquired at the Japanese Embassy at Port Moresby about the compensation but has not received a reply either.
Chapter 6

Conclusions

Both Japanese Nanshin-ron advocates and Australian officials in Canberra perceived the migrants as an intrinsic part of an expanding empire. As a result, both developed perceptions in a mythical world where the migrants never lived. Most migrants actually left Japan to escape poverty and they were hardly a menace to the Australians in Papua and New Guinea economically or militarily. However, stuck between those perceptions, the migrants were obliged to play contradictory roles. Their presence gave moral support to Japanese expansionism through Shōwa nanshin-ron, and it was wrongly connected with the Japanese invasion during the Pacific War and provided Canberra with grounds to eliminate them. It is ironic that the migrants developed friendly relationships with individual Papuans, New Guineans, Chinese, Australians and Germans. Their only enemy was a mythical monster called nanshin, created by the nations against which powerless individuals had no weapons to fight, and even if they did the migrants scarcely knew of the distorted perceptions of them created in nations to their north and south.

Theoretical analyses suggest that the application of a conceptualisation based on the world-system to the migrants is also possible. Firstly Japanese migrants were pearl divers from Thursday Island in the 1890s: they were professional divers paid high wages by white employers and they remitted their money to their homes. At this stage they were simply a labour force for white masters, not different from Chinese or Indian coolies in European plantations or mines. Although they were paid well and engaged of their own free will, pearls were sent to European markets as a result of non-white labour used by white masters. So their presence reflects Japan’s peripheral role as labour within a Europe-centred world system. Biskup and Willson also largely take this view in their analyses of Japanese migrants in New Guinea and other South Pacific islands.¹

However, a conceptualisation based on the world-system model becomes complicated when some Japanese pearl divers moved to German New Guinea and set up their own businesses (trade, ship building, copra plantations and

shell fishing), bringing in Japanese employees and using native labourers. Consequently they formed an almost self-contained Japanese settlement in the early 1910s. The complication arises from the fact that they served two cores—the European metropole and Japanese metropole. They built ships for the German administration and later for the Australian administration, which means they still functioned as a labour force to maintain European colonial structures, however professional or well paid. Meanwhile, they invested the profits from ship building in copra plantations where they employed hundreds of local labourers, and exported copra to Japan. Thus the Japanese settlement began to function as an ultra-periphery to Japan. The reason why it is an ultra-periphery is that its economic importance is negligible and its location was within the political and economic sphere of Germany or Australia where Japanese influence was almost nil. It is comparable to Amarshi’s conception of the ultra-peripheral role of Papua in relation to Australia.  

However, this concept is derived only from economic factors such as labour market and labour mobility. Therefore its analysis is simplistic, as Simmons and Guengant argue: the world-system model is only valid in its analyses of the political economy with its major focus on global market competition and its interaction with international labour mobility. Its major weakness is the lack of analysis of cultural and ideological forces. The same argument can be applied to the case of the Japanese in Papua and New Guinea. The model hardly explains the cultural factor of their birth places—coastal areas (Shimabara, Amakusa, and southern coastal Wakayama) where people were maritime-oriented. Nor does the model explain an ideological factor that is identified with *nanshin-ron* that promoted emigration to the South Pacific.

The term 'culture' is vague. I define it as the sum of characteristics of localities of emigrants' birth places that make them distinctive from people in other areas. The common economic and demographic conditions from the late 19th century to the early 20th century of those coastal areas were the low productivity of agriculture and rapid population increase. Local historians agree that these conditions stimulated overseas migration. This indicates that if the economic and demographic conditions had been the only factors, the world-system model based on the assumption of reformation of the labour market and international labour mobility could fit nicely.

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4Kitano Norio, *Amakusa kaigai hatten shi* [History of overseas development of Amakusa], Vol. 1 (Fukuoka 1985a), 313. Wakayama ken [Wakayama prefecture], *Wakayama ken iimin shi* [History of emigrants from Wakayama prefecture] (Wakayama 1957), 125.
However, local historians also stress other factors. Hamana attributes emigration from Amakusa to ‘Amakusa’s proximity to Nagasaki, one of the few international ports of Japan for hundreds of years, that made Amakusa people feel that overseas countries were close’. Kitano acknowledges the same factor, and suggests that their characteristically strong affection for their parents, that was partly affected by their Catholic beliefs, caused Amakusa youths to emigrate to help them.

In the case of emigration from southern coastal Wakayama, Iwasaki concluded that ‘the cause for overseas emigration cannot be found in the poverty of the local economy but in factors such as stimulation by neighbours [who made fortunes overseas] and tradition’. A later study of the emigration from Wakayama adds the ‘development-oriented character (hattten-sei) of Wakayama people’ to the economic factors and other motives pointed to by Iwasaki.

Some of these explanations make sense in each case and are to some extent common to all the birth localities of emigrants to Papua and New Guinea. However, what typifies the emigrants is that they are maritime people. This is clearly indicated by their occupational background; shipwrights, traders, fishermen and so on. Goto also points out the nature of the maritime race (kaiyo minzoku sei) as one cause for their emigration in his study of Okinawans. This outward looking maritime nature can be one stimulus for people to emigrate from coastal places where their attachment to land-based economic activities, such as agriculture, is weak or restricted due to the lack of land.

The transformation of their social status was another ‘pull’ factor to New Guinea. In their home villages they were impoverished artisans or farmers or fishermen severely affected by the development of capitalism. In New Guinea, like Germans and Australians, they were treated as Europeans and as masters (although nominal), and most migrants were generally prejudiced against the people in New Guinea, like their European counterparts. Such status was a dream to most migrants in their home villages. Moreover their

7Iwasaki, Kenkichi, ‘Kii hantō nangan ni okeru kaigai dekasegi imin no kenkyū, dai 2 hō [Study on overseas emigrants from southern coastal areas of Kii peninsula, II]’, Chirigaku hyōron [Geographic review], 13(3) (1938), 16.
8Wakayama-ken, op.cit., 125.
10Based on the interviews with Hatamoto, Satō and Nishikawa.
national identity as Japanese, whom the Europeans in New Guinea perceived as people of a rapidly expanding empire, possibly made them proud that they were *ittō kokumin* (No.1 nation). Although this was an illusion which would vanish instantly back in their impoverished villages, it was a sweet illusion that kept migrants in the land of ‘*dojin*’ (this literally means aborigines but is often used with some contempt).

The ideological factor is identical with *nanshin-ron*, as the ideology specifically encouraged Japan’s economic and territorial expansion by trade and emigration to the South Seas (*nan’yō*), although, as Hara points out, Japanese scholarship has hardly focused on the interaction between *nanshin-ron* and emigration.\(^{11}\) There was certainly interaction in the case of Papua and New Guinea. This dates back to Enomoto’s unrealised plan of 1877 to colonise New Guinea.\(^ {12}\) Reference to emigration to New Guinea was made in other *nan’yō* literature, although the amount of material was extremely small.

However, close study of individual emigrants suggests weak interaction with *nanshin-ron*. Komine in the late 1890s showed little of the character of a *nanshin-ron* protagonist. Although he was a member of Enomoto’s Colonisation Society, the Society became inactive in 1902 and seems to have been dissolved. Six years later Enomoto passed away. Thus by the time Komine became an established businessman in German New Guinea in the early 1910s, his links with *nanshin* were clearly slight. It was in his petition letter of 1916 for financial assistance to the Japanese Consul-General at Sydney that Komine first made a statement in terms of *nanshin-ron*. Fourteen years later, when the Great Depression hit his business severely, Komine again sent a petition and made a similar statement. However, the fact that Komine’s primary motive in making those statements was to gain assistance from the Japanese government leaves room for doubt about his commitment.

What made Komine a full-fledged *nanshin-ron* protagonist was not Komine himself but *nanshin-ron* literature published from the late 1930s to the end of the Pacific War. It was the period when numerous pieces were published as propaganda to support Japan’s invasion of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Komine was lifted to the level of Yamada Nagamasa (a legendary Japanese who was believed to have served the Ayutaya Dynasty as a military adviser in the mid-17th century). This was of course a response to a national demand to justify the Japanese invasion of New Guinea under the banner of ‘the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere’.

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\(^{12}\) Yamauchi Teiun ate Enomoto Buyō shokan [A letter from Enomoto Buyō to Yamauchi Teiun]. Enomoto Buyō Monjo 6-13 shi [Enomoto Buyō Archives 6-13 end], 1877, Kensei-shiryō-shitsu, National Diet Library, Tokyo.
As for other Japanese, the possibility of their links with *nanshin-ron* is even smaller. By the time sizeable emigration began in 1912, the *nari'yō* fever was cooling. Even if such links had existed, most of the emigrants were Komine's employees on two-to-three year contracts, which would have made it difficult to develop a special attachment to New Guinea as an extended territory of Japan, or a sense of being part of a national mission. In addition, as *nanshin-ron* was a Tokyo-based ideology limited to intellectual elites, it is doubtful that most migrants from the poor rural southwest of Japan were exposed to it. An analogy can be found in Hayase's study of Japanese emigration to Benget in the Philippines in the late 1890s, and in Amano's study of Japanese emigration to Davao in the Philippines. As in these cases, the ideological factor existed mainly where actual emigrants were not directly involved.

The settlers had little link of any kind with their government. Unlike their Japanese counterparts in Micronesia after World War I, they received no governmental assistance or government-backed investment. The lack of interest was illustrated well in that the government never assisted Komine's business in spite of his petitions of 1916 and 1930. Similarly, in stark contrast to the migration issue in Queensland, the Japanese government did not protest when the Australian government enforced restrictive migration and trade policies in New Guinea. Two reasons can explain the disinterest. The first is economic. Papua and New Guinea were unimportant; their negligible trade with Japan was too small even to appear in the statistics. The second is political. Japan was prudent not to cause any unnecessary dispute with Australia that was determined to retain New Guinea. Japan's major concern was to secure German Micronesia without provoking interference from Australia. Similarly, the migrants had no linkage with large capitalists. The most successful businessman, Komine, attempted to gain financial backers in Japan but failed.

It is more difficult to validate Canberra's connection of the migrants with Japanese military operations. First, those who determined to stay and consequently were interned were either long-time residents (20 to 40 years) with entrenched business interests or had married local women and had children. Oral evidence suggest that their determination was motivated by their business interests and loyalty to their families rather than by desire to assist the military operation.

Similarly the case of the Rabaul Military Tribunal hearing of Tsunesuke Tashiro shows an uncommitted attitude to the military. He was one of the

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13Hayase Shin'zō, *'Bengetto imin' no kyozō to jitsuzō: kindai nihon tōnan qjia kanketsu shi no ichi kōsatsu* [Image and reality of 'Benget migrants': thought on modern Japan's relations with Southeast Asia] (Tokyo 1989), 115.

14Amano Yōichi, *Dabao kuro no matsuei tachi* [Descendants of Davao] (Tokyo 1990), 95.
ex-Rabaul residents who worked for the minsei-bu (the civil administration department) of the Japanese navy as a civilian during the Pacific War. At the trial, he was first found guilty of beating a New Guinean to death and sentenced to be imprisoned for 10 years. Tashiro lodged a petition and white missionaries also wrote letters to support his defence, claiming that he had acted to protect the missionaries and other indigenous people who were put in camps during the war. The defence showed that Tashiro had an alibi (he was not on the scene when the death happened), and that the allegation against him had been made by a New Guinean who worked for a European trade company which had been a rival of Tashiro's. Significantly, an Australian acting-district officer of Bougainville, W.J. Read, also defended him, writing that Tashiro saved a Chinese planter and ordered the indigenes to be neutral for their own safety. Although the petition was dismissed, his sentence was mitigated to five years. Oral evidence confirms Tashiro's good reputation both in the pre-war and war period; he was always on the side of the non-whites (especially the Chinese) and helped them during the war. Although Tashiro's attitude may not represent that of all Japanese settlers, it proves that there was at least one Japanese who was more loyal to local residents than to the military.

The establishment of the Japanese colony owed much to the settlers' success in building amicable relations with other races. This is a significant aspect in terms of the colonial history of Papua and New Guinea, because the European (German and Australian) colonial apparatus was strictly governed according to race. Firstly, the settlers were required to keep amicable relations with their white counterparts to maintain their presence in the colony. And they were successful, as Komine's friendly relations with both the German and Australian administrations demonstrated. As a result, the Japanese could expect minimum rivalry from their European counterparts. That was manifested in the selling of their goods through European stores and by the growth of Japan-New Guinea trade despite the restrictions.

Similarly, the development of Japanese relations with Papuans and New Guineans shows their capability to adapt to the local environment. The Japanese could not enjoy utilising local labour to the extent that their European counterparts could because the colonial administrations restricted the right to recruit labourers through a licence system. However, this obstacle

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15Record of Military Court (Japanese War Criminals) of Tsunesuke Tashiro, promulgated 25 Jan. 1948, AA A471/1 81211.
17Read to Commander, H.Q. 8 M.D., 19 Sept. 1946, ibid.
18There are many books written about colonial rule of Papua and New Guinea. For the racial aspect, see Edward Wolfers, Race relations and colonial rule in Papua New Guinea (Sydney 1975).
was removed to some extent by forming cordial relations with New Guineans by means of fulfilling traditional reciprocal obligations in gift exchanges. By exchanging not only goods but also people through intermarriages and the adoption of children, the Japanese were able to meet traditional requirements. Europeans largely failed to do that. Presumably the Japanese were able to win New Guineans’ favour and were thereby able to enjoy their co-operation in recruiting labourers and collecting copra and marine products to the extent that their European counterparts could not.

The last factor contributing to the development of the Japanese colony was that the European colonisers accepted and to some extent welcomed the Japanese presence as masters. What Germans and Australians feared was a challenge to their colonial structure by the indigenous population. In this respect, the Japanese were useful because they could assist in maintaining and reinforcing the colonial structure. For example, Komine assisted the German pacification of hostile islanders. Another typical example is the tale of an elder on Lou Island in Manus, who worked for Narumi (a Japanese skipper) with other islanders. The skipper treated the local crew so badly, often with violence, that the elder (then a young man) ran away, but he was caught by an Australian *kiap* and returned to the Japanese. The *kiap* warned him that he would be taken to court if he ran away again.\(^{19}\) Although such a brutal Japanese master was rare according to oral evidence, the episode can verify that the Australians assisted the Japanese in maintaining their master-servant relationship with islanders. The Japanese national identity (being from a nation with an expanding empire) also seems to have facilitated their entry to the colonial ruling group, considering that the Chinese were not allowed to join the rulers and largely remained in an intermediate position between the whites and the indigenes. In this way, the Japanese presence functioned to consolidate white rule, although that was, of course, so long as the Japanese posed no threat to European interests. The Japanese were masters, but they were subordinate to the white masters.

Thus the Japanese presence reflected both Japanese social history and the colonial history of Papua and New Guinea. Their migration was closely associated with the modernisation process of Japan in that rural-to-urban (or rural-to-overseas) emigration increased due to the greater inequality between rural areas and urban centres as the economy developed. In the context of the colonial history of Papua and New Guinea, the community developed into a colony through the capability of its members to adapt to the local environment and to cultivate friendly relationships with other races. Their presence facilitated the maintenance of the European structure.

\(^{19}\)Interview by the author with Kolomat, Korup and Pikeman, Poloat (elders who worked for the Japanese captain), 26 Feb. 1994, Lou Island, Manus, PNG.
The development of the Japanese colony also contributed to the peaceful expansion of Japanese trade. It was this type of colony that Enomoto and other nanshin-ron advocates of the Meiji period had dreamed of. But when Enomoto advocated colonisation, he did not have in mind these pioneers who were too poor, too few, too weak politically to achieve either conquest or massive colonies of settlers or even large profits. Even though their hard work, patience and diplomacy enabled them to establish such a colony on a small scale, nanshin-ron advocates, the Japanese military and Australian perceptions destroyed the possibility of their prosperity.

This was the tragedy of the minority peoples who were always powerless against the great nations. Indeed, this was the tragedy of the people who were caught between nanshin and Australian reactions against it.
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The Japanese who went to Papua and New Guinea from the 1890s were on the frontier of Japanese settlement in the South Seas. In Nanshin, Hiromitsu Iwamoto tells the stories of those adventurous individuals, such as Komine, a trader and pearl diver, who flourished as a boatbuilder and planter in German and Australian New Guinea until the 1929 depression, and Tashiro, who was caught between his loyalty to his nation and to people in New Guinea. When war came in 1942, the Australians regarded all Japanese in Papua New Guinea as enemy aliens, and even those who avoided internment had assets destroyed and families dispersed. During the war and the immediate post-war period the Australian and Japanese governments could not, or would not, protect their interests.

With his command of languages, his pursuit of documents, and his conversations with survivors and family members in Australia, Japan and Papua New Guinea, Hiromitsu Iwamoto has traced the accounts of individuals, and through them illuminated the histories of migrants, colonies and nations.

Dr Iwamoto, a tertiary student in both Australia and Japan, completed his doctorate at the Australian National University in 1995. He is currently working on a broader study of World War II in Papua New Guinea.