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PAPERS ON THE PAPUA-NEW GUINEA HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY

by

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with a paper on the Henganofi elections
by Edward P. Wolfers

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Foreword

Professor Meller's extensive personal experience of legislative behaviour in the developing countries of the Pacific uniquely fitted him to undertake a study of the legislature of Papua-New Guinea. Professionally qualified in both law and political science, he has conducted field research during the last decade into the legislatures of Guam, American and Western Samoa, Hawaii and Fiji. Previous to that he was in charge of Hawaii's legislative reference service. Since 1955 he has been Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii. In 1960, he was consultant for a U.S. Senate study mission to American Samoa, and in 1965 was involved in the establishment of the Congress of Micronesia for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.


As this Bulletin was about to go to press, Mr Edward Wolfers completed his paper on the House of Assembly elections for the Henganofi electorate. As it seemed particularly appropriate to the subject of this Bulletin, it has been included as Chapter 7. Mr Wolfers is a Fellow of the Institute of Current World Affairs in New York.

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Preface

The papers which comprise this Bulletin were researched and written while the author was in Papua-New Guinea for seven months under an award from the Australian-American Educational Foundation. The impediments under which he laboured were wholly personal, including limited knowledge of the local political scene and extremely restricted ability to converse in Pidgin. As a result, these papers should be treated as tentative, exploratory, provocative, but not definitive. When suggestions have been made for refining present forms and procedures of the House of Assembly, references to American practices have been avoided where possible in favour of illustrations drawn from Westminster-style legislatures of other island areas in the South Pacific.

Only sources of governmental information available to the public have been relied upon, although permission for access to classified governmental files was considerately offered. These data were supplemented by extensive interviews and observation of the House in action. All opinions are solely those of the author, and are in no way to be attributed to the New Guinea Research Unit of the Australian National University or to the Australian-American Educational Foundation.

Papua-New Guinea is potentially beset with many hazards along the path to self-government. While there is no magic in any particular set of legislative forms and processes, which will ensure success, the author is convinced that their appropriateness for the emerging polity will aid in the overcoming of such obstacles. To the extent these papers have an objective, it is to facilitate the involvement of indigenous Members in the work of the House of Assembly and broaden the political horizons of indigenous constituents, rather than to enable the European legislator and voter to transfer to Papua-New Guinea political skills and attitudes from Australia. At this stage, if a choice has to be made, attention must be turned to processes accommodating indigenous political action, for it is the author's belief that the future viability of the country is dependent upon increasing indigenous political participation. These papers are dedicated to that end.
Chapter 1

A problem of split objectives

The House of Assembly of Papua-New Guinea was established in 1964 to give the people of the country experience in the conduct of their own government in preparation for further constitutional change. It was intended that the new institution would be fitted into the existing political system and would serve, under proper safeguards, as the vehicle for determining the course of administration. There was no necessary concurrence between these two aims. Indeed there was an inherent conflict between them. Three years and twelve meetings after first convening, an appraisal of the House of Assembly's process and product would record reasonable technical success in running the government, but at the expense of the companion goal of training the indigenous membership.

By fixing the size of the House's official component at less than one-sixth of the total membership (10 out of 64 seats), the Administration was required to secure a favourable majority by means of logic, persuasion, pressure, and compromise. Achieving this majority on all crucial issues remained the Administration's prime objective, and though the lower proportion of Official Members compared with the Legislative Council was intended to encourage indigenous participation in government, the preparation of the indigenous Members for that role was relegated to secondary importance. It is ironic that, if it had an official majority, the Administration might have been able to reverse the emphasis.

To those suspicious of the Administration's motives, the appointment of ten Under-Secretaries\(^1\) represented a strategem to bolster its strength and thereby lighten its burden in the House: 'obviously the Administration hoped in the House of Assembly to get the support of...such appointees, and so reduce the great gap in numbers between the elected and Official Members' (Gunther 1966:2). As not all

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\(^1\) All Parliamentary Under-Secretaries are elected indigenous Members designated by the Administration to serve in an understudy capacity.
Members are normally present, and if it is able to rely upon the votes of the Under-Secretaries, the Administration's position ought to prevail on divisions without much difficulty. Suffice it to note that the naming of Under-Secretaries did not appreciably reduce the Administration's task. A majority of the Under-Secretaries voted with the Administration in 26 of the 37 divisions, against in 8, and their numbers were tied in 3. Since the Administration was in the majority (or the majority was on the side of the Administration, depending upon the issue) in all but 10 division counts, the attitude of the Under-Secretaries as a group towards the Administration's position does not differ much from the average. Only on 11 occasions could the Under-Secretaries' voting agree unanimously with the Administration, less than one-third of the times they were required to declare their stand. With regard to 11 issues where the Administration was in the minority, on only 5 did a majority of the Under-Secretaries support the official position. When to this are added the 3 close counts on which the casting-vote favoured the Administration, then in only 6 of these 14 significant divisions did more than half of the Under-Secretaries vote with the Administration. In view of this, the Administration had to use considerable effort to develop a favourable majority among the elected Members on all important issues, and this detracted from concern for the educational purpose of the House.

If the Under-Secretaries did not prove to be a bulwark of the Administration in the House, neither did they succeed as an institution for preparing the indigenous Members to run their own

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1 The median attendance was only 54 Members in the thirty-seven divisions recorded during the first three years of the House of Assembly. For the division data of Meetings 1 to 11, acknowledgement is made of the use of a tabulation prepared by Edward P. Wolfers.

2 In twenty-two divisions at least 9 Official Members were present and all voted with the senior Official Member, in another nine - 8, and in another five - 7. In two divisions, 2 Official Members voted against their colleagues.

3 One of these was the division on the motion to adopt the Second Interim Report of the Select Committee on Constitutional Development for which there were 59 ayes and no negative votes registered. House of Assembly Debates, Vol.1, No.10, pp.1612-13 (hereafter referred to in the form: H.A.D., 1:10:1612-13).

4 On issues in which the technical element of 'no confidence' predominates, the Administration has been more successful in obtaining the support of the Under-Secretaries, e.g. the amendment to reduce the Public Service appropriation, H.A.D., 1:10:1827.
government. At the time of its passage, the Under-Secretaries' bill was referred to as 'one of the most delightfully vague pieces of legislation that this Council has ever been asked to approve'.

The former Minister, the Administrator, and the Assistant Administrator (Services) made a number of disconnected statements on different occasions about the intended role of these Under-Secretaries: they would represent a stage in the development of responsible executive government; they would be trainees, getting an understanding of parliamentary procedure, administrative methods, departmental organization, and the formulation of policy; they would be attached to each of the 'main' departments 'to understudy those official members who act in the legislature in a role resembling Ministers'; they would be associated with departments not represented in the House, to supplement the official representation reduced from sixteen to ten by the latest constitutional reform; they would be consulted in policy-making, conveying public opinion to the Administration and portraying Administration thinking to the electorates. (Parker 1966:257.)

Prior to their appointment there was a whispering campaign 'that anybody who became an Under-Secretary would be a "stooge" of the government and would completely lose the respect of his electorate' (Gunther 1966:2) and at least one M.H.A. declined to be an Under-Secretary because of this fear. To counter this, Under-Secretaries were not obliged to vote with the Official Members, but nonetheless some felt it necessary when debating in the House to reaffirm they were speaking as independent Members. Neither the Under-Secretaries nor the ordinary Members understood the scope of the new post, and by June 1965 in the Trusteeship Council it was being 'regretted that the system of parliamentary Under-Secretaries had not produced satisfactory results'. Primarily, they were being trained in administration, when what they badly needed was grounding in their political roles. Only belatedly was this mistake realised, and steps taken to rectify it. The Under-Secretaries never became a nucleus of leadership coalescing the elected membership, either for or against them. The appointment of Under-Secretaries in effect sliced off 'the whole educated echelon of Papuans and New Guineans' (van der Veur 1965:453) and further contributed to the disorganised state of the unofficial Members.

5 Emphasis in original.
The Westminster system presupposes the Administration will sponsor the vast bulk of legislation considered by the parliament. It is not self-evident why this should apply to Papua-New Guinea, where the Official Members comprise only a minority and cannot purport to be acting in compliance with popular mandate. It is only because the Administration is charged with running the government, and possesses an absolute veto over all legislation, that in practice it will introduce most bills. The post-war Legislative Council had presented to it fully half as many private member's bills (6) as both houses of the Commonwealth Parliament during the same period (Lynch 1964:7, 8), and it was likely that private member's bills would be used even more in the new House.¹ This indeed happened, but of particular interest here is the identity of the authors as it gives some indication of the Members' understanding of the legislative process and their ability to cope with the intricacies of the Standing Orders in shepherding their bills through the required three readings.

In all 250 bills were presented to the House of Assembly during its first three years, a heavier workload than for a comparable time span of the Legislative Council.² Thirty-nine of these (or 15.6 per cent) were private member's bills.³ Over 90 per cent of all bills were enacted; as was to be expected the ratio of adoption for private member's bills was lower (60.5 per cent) than the Administration component (97.1 per cent, excluding three bills still pending).

European Members, despite their smaller number, sponsored three times as many bills as indigenous Members. Only 7 of the 38 indigenous Members have presented bills which they originated to the House, and if the Under-Secretaries are excluded, this further

¹ Indeed, the continuation of the pattern was assured by the presence of some of the same unofficial Members in both legislative bodies. To Donald Barrett went the honour of introducing the first 3 private member's bills in the Legislative Council (Lynch 1964:7) and of sponsoring the first private member's measure in the House of Assembly.
³ It cannot be known how many of the Administration bills were originally prepared for private Members, but introduced at their request by an Official Member to obtain the benefit of Administration sponsorship. If weighting were assigned for this, it would most likely increase the European Member contribution.
Table 1

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Introduced</th>
<th>Passed immediately</th>
<th>Passed same session</th>
<th>Passed next session</th>
<th>Passed other sessions</th>
<th>New bill substituted</th>
<th>Withdrawn, died, etc.</th>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others (3)**</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>147</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
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* Includes 4 bills introduced by Under-Secretaries at the Twelfth Meeting.

** Figure in parentheses equals number of different elected Members introducing private member's bills.
narrow to only 3 out of 28.\(^1\) Granted that the Westminster system does not favour non-Administration measures, for Papua-New Guinea this might more aptly be phrased as discouraging indigenous Members from introducing private member's bills. Without positive training to assist them in this component of the legislative process, they could be expected to, and in fact did, abstain.

Hansard reveals that the indigenous Members also played little part in proposing amendments to bills in Committee. Official Members submitted 62 such amendments\(^2\) and European unofficial Members proposed 36 changes.\(^3\) Indigenous Members were conspicuous by their silence. Only 5 amendments were proposed by Under-Secretaries, and except for Mr John Guise (also 5 times), no other indigenous Member authored a single amendment. Another illustration that the Committee stage is outside the sense of competence of these unofficial Members is that on only 17 bills did any indigenous Member even speak on amendments. This self-exclusion from the technical side of the bill adoption is best epitomised by the Appropriation Bill debates: indigenous Members engage with alacrity during the general discussion, but retire when the money bills go to Committee.

The same trend is apparent in the whole bill-adoption process. Upon adjournment of the Twelfth Meeting, of the 246 bills introduced and not still pending, there were no queries or debate on 111 (or 45 per cent). Given the communication problems,\(^4\) it is doubtful that all indigenous Members understood these measures so well that they had no need to ask a question. Indigenous Members spoke on only 70 of the remaining 135 bills for which comment or debate is recorded, and of these 8 are tallied only because of John Guise.

A great deal of discussion takes place which is away and above the heads of the Members of this House. I think that the Administration is blind to this. It does not

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\(^1\) One of these 3 is Mr John Guise, whose distinctive behaviour, which also distinguished him from other indigenous Members in the Legislative Council (see Grosart 1966:159-60) might more properly exclude him from tallies measuring the performance of less experienced indigenous Members.

\(^2\) A Member presenting a series of amendments was counted only once, and not the number of amendments proposed.

\(^3\) Of course, official amendments may well have been influenced by unofficial Members, just as in the old Legislative Council (Lynch 1963:7). Again, weighting would tend toward European unofficial Member influence.

\(^4\) See p.11.
realize that many Members do not speak on the various bills because they do not understand them. These men are intelligent men, but unless they can read and write how can they fully understand?¹

These figures show that the indigenous members remained spectators to most of the work involved in the enactment of bills, the most salient function of the House of Assembly.

Experience with the Legislative Council foretold that 'interventions' of indigenous Members in the House would be concentrated on the question period, Adjournment speeches, and the debate on the annual Appropriation Bill (Grosart 1966:158). This was well illustrated at the Twelfth Meeting of the House of Assembly, when they asked 66 of the 128 questions printed on the Notice Paper, 35 of the 77 questions raised by leave without notice, and accounted for half of the Adjournment speeches (19 out of 38) recorded in Hansard. The indigenous Member displays a greater sense of self-assurance in these three components of the House proceedings, using them to bring forward a miscellany of items of interest to constituents. But careful scrutiny of the indigenous Member's contribution raises serious doubt over whether he distinguishes between their respective purposes or even understands their mechanics.² There is evidence to believe that debate on the Appropriation Bill is considered just another version of a single function:

I have nothing new to say, just my usual request. I am constantly standing here making this request.... Now I am asking: How much will it cost to build this road to Buang? Let us see if we can find this money. I asked this question in 1966 and I am still waiting for a reply. Let me hear it now.⁴

Indigenous Members not infrequently pose simple questions which could be easily answered by informal contact outside the legislature; no matter of political moment, preparation of ground work

¹ Barry Holloway, H.A.D., 1:3:376-7.
² The period allotted prior to Adjournment does not provide opportunity for all Members to speak, and as questions ruled out of order do not appear in Hansard, the indigenous Member total would be even greater if the former were unlimited and the latter included.
³ Hansard does not record the Speaker's admonition, in Pidgin, 'You have asked this question before; do not ruin our work here', to Momei Pangial's question on the Mendi airstrip (H.A.D., 1:12:2125), or not to make a speech on a noticed question he had raised (H.A.D., 1:12:2131).
⁴ Singin Pasom, H.A.D., 1:12:2153.
for later political ploy, or even governmental commitment is achieved. There is a failure, too, to follow up unanswered questions asked without notice, when the respondent counters by requesting that they be placed upon the Notice Paper. One-quarter (11) of European Members' queries fell into this category and of these, notice was later given on all but 4; by contrast, half (18) of the questions asked by the indigenous Members met a similar reception and most of them (13) were thereafter dropped and did not appear upon the Notice Paper.

From all this arises the suspicion that the mere act of asking a question or making a speech constitutes the alpha and omega of much of the indigenous Members' participation in the House of Assembly. They see their sole role as conduit in a two-way communication channel between constituency and government, one of the recognised functions of a legislator, but hardly the full measure of preparation for self-government. The increasing number of indigenous Member 'interventions' since the days of the Legislative Council is misleading.

Had the immediate concern of the Administration been the training of indigenous legislators and not the business of running the government, what differences might have been expected in the processes of the House? At the outset, three-fifths of all bills would not have been adopted in one day without any delay between their first reading and final passage, nor would four-fifths of all bills have been enacted at the same meeting in which they were first introduced. The Administration would not have opposed the request of an indigenous Member for the postponement of debate and, instead, pushed a measure through three readings on a single day.1

...our people always ask us...to talk about matters which have taken place in this House when we return to our electorates. We have to tell them that we do not know much about what the Official Members think and feel. The Official Members have so much of the power of discussion and debate that they seem to put the elected members down.2

The complaint that the unofficial Members rarely receive draft legislation in time for adequate study was voiced as early as the post-war Legislative Council (Hughes 1959:209). It still continues. During the three-year life of the House, the 21-day rule for the introduction of bills has been abandoned, and the system of advance

1 See H.A.D., 1:9:1482; also H.A.D., 1:11:2009. In defence of the Administration, it must be admitted that a majority of the unofficial Members also voted to oppose the delay.
2 Tei Abal, H.A.D., 1:4:575.
distribution of bills has been breaking down.\textsuperscript{1} Although it is traditional to present financial legislation without notice, even this might require re-examination in the light of Members' need for time to consult on legislative proposals prior to the convening of the House.

Moreover, if preparation of the indigenous Members for self-government had been the prime objective, the problems posed by their restricted English speaking and Pidgin reading competence would have been met by more positive efforts than have been adopted, well-meaning as the limited interpreting services of the House are. Interviews with a number of indigenous Members emphasised their inability to follow the course of action on the floor through the simultaneous interpretation service. This is not to criticise the interpreters, but to stress the impossibility of their present task. Given the circumlocutions of Pidgin, direct interpretation of rapidly spoken English is extremely difficult, and when it is of a complicated budget speech, replete with comparative figures, well-nigh impossible. At the very least, copies of all materials in English from which Members intend to read in the House could have been given to the interpreters in advance to assist them in following its gist. Reduction in the speed of floor discourse ought to have been encouraged\textsuperscript{2} rather than proceeding on the premise that everything will be translated, or that it is immaterial if it is not. Possibly a mechanism could have been added for Members relying upon the interpreters' services to interrupt a speaker until the interpreters catch up, or amplify on what is being interpreted in a garbled fashion.

'Native Members often ask each other outside the House: "What were they talking about? What was going on?"'\textsuperscript{3} Brief, simplified precis in Pidgin and Motu could have been appended to all English publications distributed to Members, at least enabling them to know their general subject and more important highlights. Befitting an oral culture, a staff would have been specially employed to summarise verbally the contents and significance of all such materials, and for major matters, conduct informal seminars outside the meeting hours of the House. The indigenous Members would not have to be admonished, as they were after a number had complained of inability to read the World Bank Report, 'It is your job, as members, to take these papers and reports and have them explained to you.... It is up to the

\textsuperscript{1} This breakdown probably reached its peak at the Twelfth Meeting, when the second reading of a private member's bill had to be postponed as none of the Members had a copy. \textit{H.A.D.}, 1:12:2181.

\textsuperscript{2} See comments of Pita Simogen, \textit{H.A.D.}, 1:2:316.

\textsuperscript{3} Paul Lapun, \textit{H.A.D.}, 1:2:271.
native members themselves to find Europeans and other educated people to assist you [sic] in this work. ¹ This staff could have been the nucleus of a reference service having a close personal rapport with all legislators wanting to discuss with them in Pidgin or Motu the workings of government, possible solutions to problems faced by Members, and the contents of a bill or an amendment they wished to sponsor. ²

With regard to the mechanics of the House, 'as a matter of Ministerial policy, [they would not have been] so shaped as to perpetuate the complex and often anachronistic forms and procedures of traditional British parliaments' (Parker 1966:265). ³ It was no solution to name a Standing Orders Committee of which a majority of Members had long experience on the Legislative Council and were familiar with the workings of these rules. If the House 'really belongs to Papua and New Guinea, then its procedures must be simplified so that they are understood by the Papuan and New Guinean members'. ⁴ Even Dr John Gunther, in defending the Standing Orders, added that 'it would be a great pity if they were not amended to suit this Territory's needs'. ⁵

One of the 'major themes' since the first years of the post-war Legislative Council has been the lack of a system of standing committees. ⁶ In 1965, the U.N. Visiting Mission was still pointing out that 'other committees could with profit be set up and a more systematic use made of the [committee] system' in the House of Assembly. ⁷ Greater dependence upon committee services would have afforded each Member an opportunity to study intensively a segment of the legislation and substantive motions presented, and to gain

¹ Speaker H.L.R. Niall, H.A.D., 1:5:756.
² The need for a reference staff is noted by van der Veur 1965:457. Or see Ian Downs: 'I ask quite humbly that something be done to increase the resources of private members in the preparation of, and advice on, Bills.' H.A.D., 1:5:675.
³ See exchange over Standing Orders in South Pacific Post, 23 June 1964, p.18; 26 June 1964, p.2; 30 June 1964, p.2.
⁵ John Gunther, H.A.D., 1:8:1329.
⁶ Hughes 1959:209. For example, see 'Report of Select Committee on "Composition of the Legislative Council and the appointment of Standing Committees"', L.C.D., 1:6:7-12.
⁷ T.C.O.R., 32nd Session, 1255th Meeting, 14 June 1965, par.42.
an understanding of at least that area of government. Instead, there has been limited use of committees, and 'the poor representation of indigenous Members' on them was early noted (van der Veur 1965:503-4). For the 6 standing and 4 select committees which have served the House of Assembly, 17 different indigenous Members have held the 24 posts assigned to them. (At the same time there have been 29 committee appointments of European elected Members, and 20 seats allocated to Official Members.) Excluding the 10 Under-Secretaries, all of whom have been named to at least one committee, only one-quarter (7) of the remaining 28 indigenous Members have had any committee posts.\(^1\) With limited committee experience, and given the existing obstacles to comprehension of House procedures, the indigenous Member could be expected to remain confused by the sum total of legislative action, and generally to play his part on the periphery, responding to such cues as 'economic development' and 'education' as indications for him to talk on his own electorate's need for cash cropping, schools, roads, bridges and sundry other local improvements.

Just as Parker (1966:251) censured the inadequacy of local government councils as 'instruments of political education\(^2\) so might the House of Assembly be criticised. Government in Papua-New Guinea has been 'executive' government, and dependence upon the kiap (district administrative officer) has now merely been transferred to the legislative scene. The indigenous Member comes to Port Moresby 'to tell the kiap', and when he returns home informs his people what the government said. The Administration has succeeded in integrating the House of Assembly into the country's other institutions for governance, but the processes of government remain alien or in comprehensible to the indigenous Member. The Administration has failed to involve him as an integral part of the governmental structure of the country. To this extent the objective of the 'instant Parliament' (White 1965:186) to train Papuans and New Guineans for self-government has not been realised.

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\(^1\) This does not include the additional 2 indigenous 'deputies' who have never been called to attend their committees' meetings.

\(^2\) Emphasis in original.
Chapter 2

Some observations on basic assumptions and procedures

The casual visitor from America is immediately aware of the contrasts between his own legislature and the Westminster-style parliament in Papua-New Guinea with its panoply of pomp and its processes premised upon the importance of floor discussion. The more studiously inclined spectator will dismiss the seeming anachronisms of wigs,\(^1\) robes, Clerk's minute glass, obeisance to the chair, and other marks of yesteryear, if some purpose is served by their continuance. The same sympathetic attitude applies initially to any procedures, for it is appreciated that from the mother of parliaments has sprung a number of variants, each designed to adapt the institution to new political climes, and that the American-style legislature is but one such historical example.\(^2\) However, the observer will look askance at blind copying of ancient usages, knowing that unless formative forces in the new polity are similar to those which helped shape the institutions of the mother country, there will be replication only for its own sake, and the entire enterprise becomes suspect. All this suggests the value of examining the basic assumptions upon which the Papua-New Guinea House of Assembly is being erected, and analysing the appropriateness of the House and its procedures for the country as it moves towards self-government.

A national legislative institution is being structured for Papua-New Guinea on the assumption that a parliamentary, as distinct from a presidential, system best satisfies the country's needs. It is to be expected that as mentors, Australians would train their wards in the system with which they are most familiar. The Select Committee on Constitutional Development has implicitly concurred in this decision, as has the House of Assembly in adopting the Committee's report at its June 1967 Meeting. Now, when political parties

\(^1\) Although he may concur with the observations of M.H.A. Zurecnuoc that 'a plume of a bird of paradise and the dress of our ancestors' might be more appropriate with independence'. H.A.D., 1:11:2029.

\(^2\) For a study of the progressive diversion of American colonial practice from that followed in the House of Commons see Harlow 1917.
are just forming and the vast majority of the electorate are uninvolved in political activity beyond their own narrow horizons, it is somewhat difficult to envisage the emergence within the near future of a fully viable, parliamentary government along conventional lines in Papua-New Guinea. The same holds true for one built to fit the classical American presidential model. On the other hand, at this stage of political development, it cannot be demonstrated that a modified parliamentary system, one pragmatically adapted to the situation in Papua-New Guinea, just as in Western Samoa, would not adequately serve.1 This, of course, gives little support for the transference in toto of all parliamentary forms observed in Australia.

Allied to the fundamental question of the appropriate political system for Papua-New Guinea is that of the parliamentary procedures which the present House of Assembly should follow. Presently, they adhere closely to those of Australia, upon the assumption that the country will benefit from the protections which have over centuries been built into these Standing Orders. What is ignored is that, at the very least, this carries over a great deal of legislative deadwood which today serves no protective or facilitative purpose. In addition, it requires the indigenous Members to master unfamiliar political processes which may prove to be dysfunctional for Papua-New Guinea.

An illustration may exemplify this inappropriateness. The requirement of 'readings' for bills under the Standing Orders now followed both in Australia and Papua-New Guinea derives from a period in English history when legislators were illiterate, so that measures had to be read aloud to inform the membership upon what they were taking action. Today, the original function has become obsolete, and the purpose of 'reading' is to mark three stages in the course of enacting a measure. To speed the process, only the title is 'read'. However, the present literacy level of the House is more akin to that of early English parliaments than today's Australian bodies, and there would be more reason to return to the reading of bills in their entirety during their progress through the House than the rote adoption from Australia of 'title reading'. Nevertheless, under the House of Assembly Standing Order 195, only the title may be read, and under Standing Order 76, a Member is denied the ability to require the reading at length of any circulated materials.

1 This is already in progress, as evidenced by the advance budgetary commitment of $150,000 for the South Pacific Games made at the Eleventh Meeting. H.A.D., 1:11:1987. Logically extended, by convention positive budgetary authority may be transferred to the House to supplement its present negating powers.
For the foreseeable future, one of the greatest services which may be furnished by the House of Assembly - the only country-wide political institution in which the indigenous inhabitants have a majority - is the fostering of a sense of national as distinct from tribal or regional identification, and the related growth of a public opinion which transcends narrow, parochial boundaries. All this makes it imperative that the unsophisticated electorate be educated to the business of government and the role of the House in its furtherance. The practices of the House, however, suggest that its business is confidential, and as a consequence, the educative function is poorly discharged. The explanation for this, too, lies in history, and further evidences the inadequacy of merely copying Australian Standing Orders.

Parliamentary power developed in England at the expense of the king, and steps had to be taken to protect legislators and the parliamentary process against executive interference. The significance of the sham resistance put up by a new Speaker when he is conducted to the Chair of the House is rooted in a true reluctance to accept a post which might lead to the occupant losing his head. The Speaker's withdrawal, when the House goes into Committee of the Whole, symbolised that he could not report on these discussions to the executive and thus could not be held accountable. All this has contributed to the House of Assembly's tendency to treat its actions as private until it deigns to make them public. It is carried to such extremes as denying a spectator the right to make any written note during the House's sitting, which incidentally so clashes with the modern day's dependence upon the mass media as to be winked at by supplying vantage points to representatives of the press and radio, although nominally they are in the press box outside the chamber.

As further illustration of this 'private' character of the House, most of its collective actions are taken without recording how Members align themselves. Unless a division is called, a voice vote is sufficient for enacting any bill or reaching any decision. During the first three years of the House, on only thirty-seven occasions were Members required to be publicly accountable for their actions by the recording of their stands in Hansard. Nowhere else does Hansard carry any entry which would enable a constituent, or a potential rival at the next election, to ascertain how an M.H.A. voted on a specific proposal irrespective of what he may have said in debate, or even if he were present at all during the legislative day. Thus it is not communicated to the public through Hansard that in 1966, 140 of the elected M.H.As did not attend on at least one of the twenty-seven days that the

1 Attendance data from Minutes of Proceedings.
House of Assembly met, that 8 of them were absent without leave on at least one-quarter of the legislative days (seven or more), and that one M.H.A. thought so lightly of his legislative responsibilities that he attended only ten days of session throughout the entire year. Constituents in the New Guinea coastal area are entitled to know that during 1966 more of their representatives missed one or more daily sessions, and on the average had longer absences, than those from any of the other three regions of Papua-New Guinea. However, with the climate of the House favouring privacy, there is little incentive for revising House procedures or the contents of Hansard to ensure that all acts of an M.H.A. within the House are publicly of record.

It would be far more effective to revamp the House's practices to encourage the widest dissemination of information about what it is doing, even before its actions have been finalised. There is no bill room where a member of the public may consult or obtain copies of bills, committee reports, and papers or documents delivered to the House. The only place where all bills are to be found, both as introduced into the House and as thereafter amended, is in the records of the Clerk. 1 During the period between passage and final approval - which for the usual measure sent to the Administrator technically has no limit and for ordinances reserved for the Governor-General's pleasure may extend as long as six months after they are presented to the Administrator - a veil of silence descends. Rather than encouraging the public to make their views known to Members during legislative deliberations, and to the Executive prior to assent being granted, the exact opposite is achieved.

Broadcasting of the proceedings of the House has been proposed, but disapproved. Understandable is the reluctance of the House to place the editing of its floor debates in the hands of persons not accountable to it. This, however, does not condone its failure to attempt the same end under its own aegis, and at the very least, making arrangements with the local broadcasting facilities for individual members to address their constituents periodically over the local stations regarding their work in the House. 2 Tapes sent to local government councils, and played over their recorders, would

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1 Bills prepared by the Legislative Draftsman are duplicated by the Department of Law, and copies may be requested of him.
2 To preclude abuse of this privilege, probably a House committee would have to be appointed to which the frequency and content of Members' talks may be reported. The committee would then be in a position to determine whether all Members were receiving equal opportunity and also, if misleading information is being broadcast, that the experiment be discontinued.
also help disseminate information about the House and further the objective of educating the public.

In a country where English is understood by relatively few people, the House's dependence upon it as almost the sole medium for legislative publications narrowly restricts the spread of knowledge about the House. Even if it is considered as each Member's personal obligation to apprise his electorate about the House, he is hardly helped by material written in English which neither he nor his constituents can read. However, so long as the House conducts business as though legislative affairs were private except to the extent that it wishes to inform the public, there is little incentive to overcome the disabilities of English through the use of one or both of the lingua franca employed to bridge the country's many local languages.1

Another premise upon which the political institutions are being structured is that everything ought to be done 'right' so as to leave Papua-New Guinea with an efficient government when present ties with Australia are severed. As this again is measured by Australian standards, it entails high levels of specialisation and differentiation, as well as a body of citizens capable of controlling the attendant bureaucracy. World pressures point toward self-government most likely being granted before the country's manpower has mastered all the technical skills, and its voters the political abilities requisite for maintaining such a government. Europeans retained in the public service may help fill the gaps in the administrative area, but the political hiatus will remain. It would appear more realistic to de-specialise government to bring it more within the range of its peoples' probable competence. This would include simplifying the technicalities associated with running the House of Assembly.

Indigenous participation in local government above the tribal level is a relatively recent innovation. In the local government council, politicians are being trained in the rudiments of parliamentary manoeuvre and the enactment of local laws (called 'rules'). The districting of the House of Assembly for 1968, which goes far to approximate Open Electorates with the areas under council jurisdiction, promises the emergence of a ladder of political advancement, with many prominent individuals in the councils seeking the higher posts in the House of Assembly which command much larger emoluments and a greater scope of power. Already in the first House, one-third of the indigenous Members had local government council experience.2

1 On 7 March 1966, the House adopted a resolution calling for a feasibility study on the translation of written materials into Pidgin and Motu. H.A.D., 1:8:1288. No report has yet been issued.
2 Almost two-fifths of the indigenous candidates had local government council experience.
Under these circumstances, the flow of work in the House could be modified to ease the transition from service in the council to sitting in the House. A neophyte M.H.A. would then have to master only an expanded range of work, rather than an entirely new set of Standing Orders. In turn, the business of the House would be more intelligible to the members of the various councils, and through them information could be disseminated to the public.

At the outset, it would be recognised that local government councils do not presume the existence of structured majority and minority factions within their membership. The odds are great that the same absence of majority organisation will hold true for at least the next House, and probably its successor. The procedures for both collegial bodies would thus not be those which contemplate that there will be a majority running them, and a minority seeking to revise the former's position to its own political advantage. Rather, more in keeping with indigenous mores, they could be pointed toward reaching agreement by a relatively free-wheeling membership. They would permit leadership to be supplied from a number of sources. Presumably in the House of Assembly, this will come mainly from the Official Members and the elected Members chosen to serve as Ministerial and Assistant Ministerial Members. But even in the House, the initiative of the individual Member, possibly expressed in the form of the private member's bill or motion to instruct the Government, will continue to exert increasing influence, and the Standing Orders must be revised to cope with this.

In revamping the Orders, consideration would be given to the fact that the indigenous Members apparently have been conditioned to participate in collective decision-making through non-adversary processes, and are offended and irritated by the sharp public confrontation and raucous heckling on the floor that is typical of Australian parliamentary debate. 'We should not try, by contrary speeches, to get the better of one another....'2 'If they [Members] want to talk harshly, it is better for them to do it privately and not here [in the House].'3 Also weighed in the review of House

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1 Similarly, the flow of work in the local government councils would tend more toward paralleling that of the House. As an example, informants advised that an informal question period was beginning to be included in the councils' order of business.


3 Pita Simogen, H.A.D., 1:8:1258. Or see Nicholas Brokam: European Members can get angry with the Official Members in the House, but outside they can talk about it 'and drink tea quite happily together. Papuans and New Guineans, however, cannot do this'. H.A.D., 1:8:1265.
procedures would be their general complexity, which finds no record in Hansard of the Speaker's motioning a confused Member to sit down when he tries to speak at an inappropriate time, or the latter's inability to grasp the nuances of meaning contained in the technical requirements for the phrasing of a Question, or indigenous Members' failure to take part in House activities because of uncertainty over when prior notice must be given before moving action.

A first step toward simplification might be to boldly attack the confusing body of law on the statute books. It is arduous for even a trained lawyer to wend his way among the two compiled sets, one for Papua and the other for New Guinea, and the many ordinances adopted since their publication. Since indigenous law-makers at all levels must work within a frame of legislative enactments, the existing law should be compiled into subject-matter categories, with simplified language and adequate indexes to facilitate their use. This would aid the preparation of bills in less complicated phraseology, and the explanations of the local government advisor to councillors on rules they are debating. Thus, from the beginnings of law-making in the local government council, the prospective M.H.A. would be exposed to one set of laws with which he can gradually become familiar.

Another example of simplification concerns House procedures. If the handling of a bill to the Clerk and his reading of the title were all that were necessary to set the introductory process in motion, if passage were not possible until the lapse of a requisite minimum period to permit everyone time to familiarise himself with its contents, and if study and refinement were normally conducted in subject-matter committees, this would help reduce the mystery now surrounding the proposal and passage of a bill through the House. Complex motions, such as those setting up select committees or directing the government to take specific action, might follow a similar course, with variations only to fit their content. Here, a uniform, unsophisticated series of stages would aid the indigenous Member's mastery of House action.

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1 It is here instructive to compare the relative simplicity of the New Hebrides Condemnium Joint Rule No. 39 with Papua-New Guinea Standing Order No. 132.

2 This is written with full knowledge of the Secretary for Law's eloquent defence of the language incorporated in legislation and of the existing legal system. See H.A.D., 1:2:195 ff.

3 See p. 27 ff., where subject-matter committees are treated at length.
Mention has already been made of the need to augment the interpretation and translation services of the House, and to establish a legislative reference service whose staff would meet with illiterate Members at a time set aside each day to explain and amplify bills and other material. If the suggestion previously made be adopted that the work of the House be slowed so as to give Members more time to study proposed legislation, this would nicely dovetail with the oral interpretive service. With more extensive translation services and more inclusive interpretation, indigenous Members should be greatly aided in taking part in the work of the House. A reference service would make that participation more meaningful.

One of the disadvantages under which indigenous Members labour is their limited understanding of the intricacies of government and of the alternatives available in any particular situation. Advice received from the government is suspect as to impartiality, and too great a reliance upon colleagues reduces each Member's independence. Until a majority government evolves, or at least strong minority parties emerge, each elected Member starts uncommitted in reaching his own conclusions. The experience of American legislatures with legislative reference services for over half a century is relevant. A staff dedicated to serving the legislature, backed by a reference library of legal and public administration materials, and mindful of the limitations inherent in its role so that it is careful not to overstep the boundary of supplanting the Members' decision-making processes with its own, could materially bolster the quality of indigenous Member performance as well as be of considerable aid to European Members. With such a staff providing summaries of existing laws, furnishing comparative material from other countries both as background information and as alternatives for further action, and supplying expert advice on parliamentary procedures, the Member is equipped to tackle problems otherwise beyond his individual ability. During the course of a Meeting of the House, the demands on the time of the legislative reference staff would preclude any extensive studies, which could only be undertaken during the legislative interim. The addition of such a service would appreciably assist in supplying the subject-matter competence lacking in today's House of Assembly.

The implementation of these modifications in some cases would require massive revampings of the Standing Orders to bring the operations of the House within the understanding of the indigenous Members and to structure a legislative body which would be but part of an integrated set of political institutions for the whole country. Their objective would be to educate the Members and their constituents to the role and practices of the House, and to encourage the

1 See p.11.
growth of leadership within the House, with the ultimate aim of creating a viable polity. The following comments are pitched on a much lower key, and are fully compatible with the existing Orders of the House of Assembly. The minor amendments proposed would facilitate the workings of the House as presently composed, and as it will probably be after the elections in 1968.

Questions. The purpose of the Question Period are multiple, and in Papua-New Guinea, it fulfils the non-manipulative function of providing solely factual information to indigenous Members who do not know how to make, or who are intimidated by the bureaucracy of 'big' government from posing, unofficial inquiries to the Administration. There is good reason to believe that many indigenous Members do not sharply differentiate the Question Period from Adjournment Speech time: both are regarded simply as communication periods for bringing the needs of their constituents to the attention of the Administration.

The advantage of the Question Period must be weighed against its costs, both in time subtracted from other business of the House, and the loss of governmental efficiency in responding to an inordinate number of 'fly-speck counting' demands.

For the first twelve Meetings of the House, there has been no great rise in the number of Noticed Questions:

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<th>Meeting</th>
<th>Noticed Questions</th>
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<td>657</td>
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However, Questions Without Notice are increasing, and even more significant is the greater part being played by the indigenous Members. The limitation of Questions Without Notice to a maximum of fifteen minutes a legislative day, adopted as an amendment to the Standing Orders at the June 1967 Meeting of the House, does not settle the Question Period problem, as the impact of indigenous Members' Noticed Questions has yet to be felt. When all indigenous Members come to understand the full mechanics of the Question Period and receive greater assistance in the preparation of written inquiries, there will be a marked increase in their number and the

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1 At the Twelfth Meeting of the House, an average (median) of only 11\(\frac{1}{2}\) minutes a day was given to this form of Questions, and at the Thirteenth Meeting it was but 13 minutes. On only 2 of the 13 days on which Questions were asked in these two Meetings did Questions Without Notice run over 15 minutes (3 March 1967 - 16 minutes; 9 June 1967 - 21 minutes).
time demands on the House. Already at the Twelfth Meeting, five hours and forty minutes (over one-ninth) of the period the House was sitting was devoted just to Questions.

Four forms of limitation on Questions might be proposed. One may be referred to, only to be dismissed: the encouragement of written instead of oral Replies. By the Standing Orders of both the Cook Islands and Fiji, an oral Reply must be requested, otherwise a written Reply suffices. Because of the literacy problem in the House of Assembly, and the emphasis on oral communications in the cultures of Papua-New Guinea, it would not appear warranted to abandon oral Replies for most Questions, despite the possible saving of time.

A maximum number of Questions per Member or a maximum length of time each day for the Question Period could well be prescribed. The choice between these two corrective devices will depend upon whether a few Members tend to monopolise the Question Period or the bulk of the Membership becomes active in this form of parliamentary gamesmanship. Should there be too great an objection to a guillotine rule, a compromise may be found in adapting the Cook Islands Standing Order No.80 wherein a Member is held to four Questions demanding oral answers per Meeting but an unlimited number of Questions with written Replies. In Papua-New Guinea, written replies may eventually have to be resorted to for those Members raising an unduly large number of queries.

A third form of limitation is that which might be imposed on Questions Without Notice. Rather than fixing an arbitrary time period, which places a premium upon the alacrity with which a Member springs to his feet, his gymnastics to attract the Speaker's attention, or his reaching a prior understanding with the Speaker, much can be said for restricting these Questions to those of urgent character which relate to matters of public importance or to the arrangement of public business (see Standing Orders of Cook Islands, No.78; of Fiji, No.19; of Western Samoa, No.32). It then becomes the responsibility of the Presiding Officer to determine if the public interest warrants the waiver of the normal time interval required for Written Notices.

Finally, there is grave doubt whether the Papua-New Guinea Standing Orders allow enough time for an answer to be prepared. The failure to reply to a Noticed Question casts a shadow upon the competency of the department involved. In addition, lack of time ought not be allowed as an excuse to cloak an inadequate Reply. Current practice is for a Question to be delivered to the Clerk by noon on the day before it is placed on the Notice Paper. In comparison, in Western Samoa at least three days', and in the Cook Islands and Fiji, four days' written notice, excluding Sundays and holidays, must be afforded. It would not appear in any way too onerous to prescribe at least twenty-four hours from the delivery
of a Question to its addressee before its being asked upon the floor of the House of Assembly. As a practical matter this would usually require only one extra day in the placing of a Question on the Notice Paper.

It is possible for a Question not to be answered and to be held unreasonably beyond the adjournment of a Meeting. It was observed that in the House of Assembly, Official Members promised to communicate Replies after the adjournment of the Meeting when they were not able to provide answers during the House's sitting. This practice might well be incorporated into the Standing Orders as an express requirement. (No.22 of the Fiji Standing Orders illustrates this.)

Consideration might also be given to the appropriateness of setting aside time for debating Replies on important Questions. In the Cook Islands, Replies are published on a 'Supplementary Order Paper', and can be taken up and debated at a special sitting not exceeding two hours. This permits a greater degree of flexibility than does the use of the 'Matter of Public Importance' device, and overcomes the impossibility of mounting a debate on an issue involved in a Question and its Reply during the Adjournment Speech period. Given the average indigenous Member's lack of skill at posing Supplementary Questions, setting aside a special time to debate a number of Replies has much to commend it.

**Matters of public importance.** The use of this ploy for debating a subject of crucial importance affords a valuable opportunity to shape public opinion. The fact that the consent of the House of Assembly need not be obtained assures a minority the ability to present a matter publicly which the majority might wish to conceal. This, however, can be pursued to its own disadvantage by disrupting the orderly routine of the House and by inordinantly consuming time which could more properly be allocated to items on the legislative calendar. With two hours allotted for each such discussion (Standing Order No.84), and the total House work-day running from three to seven hours, it becomes readily apparent that a sizeable share of each legislative day may be consumed by a single debate. At the Twelfth Meeting of the House of Assembly, matters of public importance were raised on 3 of the 9 legislative days, and covered five hours and twenty-three minutes, or one-ninth of the period the House was in session.

Surrounding a matter of public importance with more difficult hurdles, and assigning it a fixed time toward the end of the legislative work-day both commend themselves. Three amendments might be considered:

(i) adding the descriptive 'urgent', so that the rules convey the intent that not just any issue is to be given such special treatment, but only subjects of truly urgent public importance. A strong Speaker can then hold them to manageable proportions.
(ii) increasing the number of Members to 9 who must support having the discussion, or approximately one-tenth of the House membership projected for 1968. The increase in the requisite number of supporters from 3 to 5 Members by amendment to the Standing Orders at the June 1967 Meeting will not accomplish anything more than producing a show of nominal support.

(iii) placing the discussion of a matter of public importance at the end of the day's sitting, with a fixed starting time so essential legislative business can first be tended to in an orderly manner.

Reference may be made to the following provisions in the Standing Orders of the Cook Islands, Fiji, and Western Samoa:

Cook Islands (No.53). Must be urgent, and of public importance. An extra meeting time of two hours is provided. Requires either unanimous consent or 10 Members supporting (out of 22-member Assembly).

Fiji (No.78). Must be of urgent public importance. Matter stands over to date and time fixed by presiding officer. Requires either leave of Council or 4 Members supporting (out of 40-member Council).

Western Samoa (No.12). Must be of urgent public importance. Stands over to 11 o'clock or until conclusion of business, whichever is earlier (session normally runs from 9 a.m. to 1 p.m.). Requires not less than 5 Members supporting (out of 47-member Assembly).

Adjournment speeches. Given the present state of political competence in Papua-New Guinea, adjournment speeches allow some Members their only opportunity to express the needs of their constituents in a way that is both psychologically satisfying to themselves and politically beneficial. These Members are not skilled in the use of the Question, and are confused by the technicalities surrounding both the passage of legislation and the adoption of motions instructing the Government, thus leaving the adjournment speech as an avenue to be most easily mastered. However, as the House's level of political sophistication rises, and the need for reliance upon adjournment speeches correspondingly decreases, the time devoted to this phase of House activity might be limited. At the Twelfth Meeting, one-ninth of the time was consumed by adjournment speeches alone, and this expanded to one-seventh at the Thirteenth Meeting. Added to the other periods available for expressing views unstructured by House leadership, such as Questions, the total begins assuming appreciable proportions. At some not too distant date, the Standing Orders might be amended so that adjournment speeches are scheduled for only certain days of each Meeting, a maximum number of Members or a time maximum
fixed, and mechanisms added for assuring to every Member an equal chance of being recognised. (Here see the Standing Orders of the Cook Islands, Nos 47, 48, and 50, and of Fiji, No.77.)

The provision in the Papua-New Guinea Standing Orders which allows only an Official Member to move Adjournment (No.45) might also be reconsidered. The rationale for so limiting the Membership's freedom of parliamentary manoeuvre is not readily apparent, since Official Members do not constitute a majority of the House.

**Duplication and distribution of bills.** The House of Assembly has been remiss in providing for the duplication, explanation, and distribution of bills prior to enactment, especially when compared with other Pacific legislatures. Both the Cook Islands (No.155) and Western Samoa (No.64) Standing Orders require an explanatory memorandum to accompany each bill stating fully the objects of and reasons for the bill. This terminology is broad enough to encompass both the Explanatory Note and Mover's Note sometimes, but not always, appended to the drafts of bills in Papua-New Guinea.

Although Papua-New Guinea Standing Order No.196 anticipates a time lag between first and second reading, during which the bill will be duplicated and distributed to Members, Standing Order No.197 allows second reading to be moved forthwith if copies of the bill have already been circulated. Standing Order No.199 then contemplates that except for Appropriation and Supply Bills, the debate on the question that a bill be read a second time will 'be adjourned to the next meeting', but this is followed more in the breach.\(^1\) To accommodate the indigenous Members, the House at the very least ought to observe a requirement comparable to the Western Samoan Standing Order No.74 that third reading cannot occur on the same day a bill is reported from the Committee of the Whole or a report of a Select Committee is approved (excepting only bills with certificates of urgency, Imprest Supply, and Appropriation Bills).

The system for advance distribution of bills to Members in Papua-New Guinea has broken down. Granted that the lack of trained drafting staff has made observance of the '21-day rule' for prior circulation of bills impossible, until something like this can again be instituted, as a working minimum at least Fiji's mandated three-day advance delivery of all bills (excepting fiscal measures) before first reading (No.35) should be possible. Of course, if the spirit of Papua-New Guinea's Standing Orders is adhered to so that practically all bills are carried over two Meetings, the necessity for previous circulation is mitigated.

Other jurisdictions in the Pacific also direct in their Standing Orders the gazetting of the short titles of bills (Western Samoa,

\(^1\) See p.10.
of the long titles of bills (Cook Islands, No.156), or even of entire bills (Fiji, No.34) before first reading. The sole apparent advantage to Members of these provisions is to guard against the element of surprise, and this can be achieved by the mandatory prior distribution of bills or enforcing delay between introduction and final passage. However, they do alert the public to matters before the legislature, and might commend themselves should the press not furnish this service.

As an allied matter, the procedures of the House of Assembly make no provision for the special treatment of private bills, those which are intended to affect some particular person, association, or corporate body, e.g. the Evangelical Lutheran Church of New Guinea Property Trust Bill 1965, Ordinance 55 of 1965. If the number of bills introduced by elected Members continues to grow, and this is likely until there is a majority government in the House of Assembly, the sponsoring of more private bills by elected Members may also be expected. To protect the parties concerned, adequate notice and the right to be heard should be directed by the Standing Orders.

Committees. Interviews have confirmed tentative conclusions reached from a reading of Hansard and personal observation of two Meetings of the House of Assembly that most indigenous Members are thoroughly confused by technical discussions on bills during Committee of the Whole deliberations. At the outset, the range of subjects which comes before the House makes it impossible for a Member to become versed in them all. During the Committee of the Whole stage, the interpretive service cannot keep pace with the complicated discourse, and the size of the House discourages questions from the floor to obtain clarification, even if a Member had the temerity publicly to display his own ignorance. The enlargement of the Membership in 1968 will only exacerbate such reluctance. Although the Standing Orders have been amended to permit questions to be asked of a Member moving the second reading, this does not meet the same need. It is therefore proposed that subject-matter committees be used to review bills which come before the House.

Whether these committees should be called Standing Committees or Select Committees depends upon whether the House wishes to reserve the latter title for committees whose life terminates upon the completion of a specific assignment. It is not foreign to the Westminster system to use the title 'select' for committees standing 'indefinitely at the pleasure of the Assembly in the name of one or more Departments of Government (such as "Agriculture") or in the name of a particular function of government (such as "Finance"), to receive from the Assembly, from time to time, orders to consider matters falling within the terms of reference of such Committees and to report back to the Assembly upon such matters when considered' (Cook Islands Standing Order No.226(c)). As another example, in Fiji the committees referred to in the Papua-New
Guinea Standing Orders as 'standing committees' are all called 'select committees' (Fiji Standing Orders Nos 63-5). To differentiate the character of committees, there is logic in reserving the designation 'select' for temporary committees, and in referring to all others as 'standing'.

To further the understanding of indigenous Members, so that each may have the opportunity to become skilled in at least one subject-matter area, it would appear best to create subject committees corresponding to the major governmental functions. Initially, at least, their total number should not be greater than will accommodate elected Members each serving on no more than one. After a trial period, this can be reconsidered. What is not recommended is the creation of a single 'Bill Committee' or the establishment of 'Lettered' Committees to which bills are referred seriatim without regard to their contents, as either would vitiate the educational benefits sought by this innovation, and would not be conducive to reassuring incipient leadership capabilities.

In the American legislature, subject-matter committees have both screening and refining responsibilities. The former runs contrary to the normal practices of the Westminster system, which reserves to the whole body the right of first determining whether a bill is to be perfected for enactment, and after deciding in the affirmative, then may delegate this duty to one of its committees. As a consequence, the committee has no alternative but to report the bill back to the parent body after review, possibly with suggested amendments. In perfecting a bill, a subject-matter committee would thus have the same role as the Committee of the Whole, and though its procedures need not copy those now followed in that Committee, all referred measures would ultimately come back to the House for enactment or rejection.

To these subject-matter committees from time to time could also be assigned responsibility for studying relevant reports by the government and for preparing proposals for action by the parent body. For a very complicated bill, or one of major importance upon which the House may desire the benefit of committee analysis prior to a second reading, it may refer the measure to committee for a report on policy and content, before the full House debates and approves its general purpose. A report on a bill under these circumstances might recommend further referral of the bill to committee to prepare amendments after second reading.

The addition of subject-matter committees will slow the present rapid rate at which bills are being passed by the House of Assembly. It is also anticipated that representatives of the public, both of organised groups and those speaking as individuals for the public weal, will gradually begin appearing before such committees seeking refinements, which may cause further delay in the enactment of measures. All this will be the necessary cost of educating the
Members to the technicalities of law-making and the substantive concerns of government. For a committee system to work most efficiently, and to keep such delays to a minimum, bills will have to be drafted in advance of each Meeting so that the committees' workloads may be efficiently planned. In cases of urgency, the entire process may be speeded by giving priority to specific bills, or even by completely by-passing reference to a subject-matter committee.

Subject-matter committees could also be used to determine the nature of needed legislation and to give instructions to the legislative draftsman in preparing a bill for introduction. So long as most bills are sponsored by the government, and plans progress towards a ministerial system, this service would be called into use only under unusual circumstances. However, if before the advent of cabinet government the number of private member's bills continues to grow, or if even with a majority government a sizeable share of the legislation introduced consists of private member's bills, these committees might be profitably employed to reduce the drafting chore and to bring into the House a sense of greater collective responsibility.

The structuring of subject-matter committees into the House of Assembly will necessitate a series of minor adjunctive amendments to the Papua-New Guinea Standing Orders. For illustration, Standing Order No.204 now declares that a bill reported by select committee goes to the Committee of the Whole. Once reviewed by a subject-matter committee, and even if amendments are proposed, acceptance of the committee report and enactment of the measure should be possible without the House having first to convert itself into a Committee of the Whole. (See Western Samoan Standing Order No.73.) Another example where amendment may be required is Standing Order No.274, which allows select committees to meet during sittings of the House. To prevent disruption of the House's work, such meetings would have to be foreclosed, unless the House otherwise directs. (See Cook Islands Standing Order No.237, Western Samoan Standing Order No.115.)

Also related to the subject of select committees is Standing Order No.283 of the House of Assembly. Although not expressly prohibited, the intent of the Order appears to preclude minority reports. Standing Orders in some Pacific Island area prohibit the filing of dissenting views (Cook Islands, No.258; Western Samoa, No.129); others authorise them (Fiji, No.74). Since it has been suggested that the full membership of the House of Assembly be assigned to subject-matter committees, a Member should have the right of recording his objection to any report of the committee's majority. Otherwise, knowing the stand of their colleagues, Members may deliberately absent themselves to prevent any suspicion that they share in the position of the majority. With the development
of political parties in Papua-New Guinea, it would seem all the more necessary to amend the Standing Orders to allow dissents to be recorded. The tendency to work towards a consensus which all Members can support will normally mitigate against any capricious appendage of minority reports.
Chapter 3

Informal interaction on the floor of the House

The Papua-New Guinea House of Assembly, a Westminster-style legislature without parties or any internal organisation for facilitating decision-making other than that supplied by its minority Official Member component, provides a promising site for the study of legislator interaction. One aspect of this takes the form of personal contacts on the floor of the House during the time the House is in session. While admittedly only a fraction of the totality of communication which occurs at the twice-daily tea breaks, in House corridors and Members' offices, and on various social occasions, such contacts have the advantage of being highly visible and, if measured discretely, unaffected by the presence of a researcher.\(^1\) To the extent they are spontaneous, as in response to the turn of debate or to sheer boredom, they furnish a momentary window on the inner process of the legislature in action, suggest the general tone of legislative esprit de corps, and offer another dimension on groupings within the Membership.

For ideal measurement, each Member ought to be spatially equidistant from all others, so that the same expenditure of effort would be required in communicating with any of them. This condition exists in no legislature. In the House of Assembly, Members are arranged along three sides of a rectangular chamber, the Speaker completing the fourth. Interaction is further channelled by 8 Official Members and 6 Under-Secretaries sitting to the right of the Speaker, 7 elected European and an equal number of elected indigenous Members to his left, and the balance of the Official Members (2) and elected European Members (8) facing the Speaker, interspersed among the remaining 5 Under-Secretaries and 20 elected indigenous Members. Two of the 6 European Members from Open Electorates are included within the 7 Europeans on the Speaker's left.

Except for the Senior Official Member and another Official Member third in line who occupy individual desks immediately to

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\(^1\) The use of this type of 'fugitive data' was first suggested in Routt 1938:129.
the Speaker's right, and two Members from Special Electorates balancing them on the opposite side of the chamber, all Members sit two to a desk, irrespective of ethnicity, without any official assignment having been made in such pairing. To offset the factor of physical contiguity of seat-mates encouraging their communication, interaction between each pair was not counted in the tally of contacts. At the Thirteenth (June 1967) Meeting, one of the Under-Secretaries with a desk among the Official Members and another facing the Speaker were attending the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations. A third seat from one of the Open electorates in the highlands was vacant due to the death of an indigenous Member, and on each of two days, two elected Members were not present at any time during the sitting. All this reduced the size of the groups within and between which informal floor interactions could take place, but it is believed not unduly, when measured against the total number of theoretical contacts possible. In all, 544 interactions between 197 different pairs of Members were observed during the twenty-eight hours that the House of Assembly was in session in June 1967.

In the most obvious compartmentation of Members in the House of Assembly, the European-indigenous dichotomy, Europeans grossly predominated both in the total number of contacts and the total number of different pairs of Member contacts. Informal communication on the floor of the House is mainly a European-shared phenomenon. This variance between European and indigenous Member performance is echoed in other forms of legislative action in the House of Assembly and lends weight to the thesis that indigenous Member participation is peripheral compared to that of the European.

The second set of groupings encompassing all Members is that which distinguishes Official from elected Members. Here, taking the relative size of the two into account, Official Members paired six times more frequently among themselves than did Elected Members within their 51-Member group, and this disparity increases markedly when total contacts are compared. However, the divergence is due to the indigenous Member component, and when they are excluded from the elected Member grouping, the preponderance of intra-group Official Membership contacts narrows considerably. It is also probable that the minor variance between the two reflects the

1 A larger number of Members was absent on 5 June 1967, when the House met only to adjourn as a mark of respect for the deceased Member. No informal contacts were recorded on this day.
2 The formula for maximum intra-group pairing is \( I = \frac{G(G-1)}{2} \) where \( G \) equals the number of units in the group. For this study, I must be reduced by the total number of seat mates, as for example in the case of elected European Members, by one.
greater physical dispersion of the elected Members on the floor of the House, so that engaging in informal interaction may be regarded as fairly uniform within both European Member segments.

An analysis of cross-group contacts between Official Members and elected European Members indicates that each of these groups informally interacts more internally than across Official-elected group lines. The disparity becomes even greater when the total number of unstructured contacts, and not just pairing of Members, is contrasted. Looking at Members individually, 6 of the 10 Official Members paired more with colleagues than with elected European Members, another 3 showed no preference, while 1 Official Member stands out in sharp contradistinction in having more interaction with elected European Members. No elected European Member communicated with more persons in the Official group than with his fellow elected Members.

Within the elected European Membership, as 6 come from Open Electorates and the remaining 10 from Special Electorates, it might be presupposed that distinctive patterns of interaction would be found. This was not substantiated, as each of these sub-groups recorded relatively no different number of contacts with their fellows than with those of the other sub-group. Informal communication on the floor does not support any basis for setting them apart.

Two groupings have been delineated among the indigenous Members because some serve as Under-Secretaries. The 9 Under-Secretaries present at the Thirteenth Meeting were found to interact at about the same relative rate with Official Members as among themselves, and this was almost three times more frequent than with either the other 26 elected indigenous Members or the 16 elected European Members. Informal contact with Members of each of these two groups was almost identical when weighted for their relative sizes. As intra-group communication among the Under-Secretaries was over four times greater than for the other 26 indigenous Members among themselves, the Under-Secretaries stand out distinctively. Contributing to this differential interaction pattern is the physical seating of some Under-Secretaries adjacent to Official Members, the closer ties of the Under-Secretaries with the government, and their higher education and greater English-speaking skills.

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1 The formula for maximum cross-group pairings is \( I = G_1 \times G_2 \), where \( G_1 \) equals number of units in one group and \( G_2 \) the number in the second group. For this study, I must be reduced by the total number of cross-group seat mates.

2 By this time the number of Under-Secretaries had been increased to 11; as mentioned, 2 were then away at the United Nations.
There was no evidence that elected European Members from the four major geographical areas – Papua, New Guinea islands, New Guinea coastal, and highlands – communicated more on the floor of the House with the indigenous Members from their own respective region than with those from other geographical areas. The existence of regional groupings among Members was thus not demonstrated by such unstructured contacts.

A hypothesis which a priori appeared fruitful to pursue was that leadership in the House would be disclosed by circles of interaction, with Members considered leaders having the largest number of contacts. In one instance this was confirmed, in that the Senior Official Member's number of interactions, both paired and total, exceeded those of all but one elected European Member. Probably as significant, the Senior Official Member informally consulted with the Speaker more often than any other Member. Beyond this, the findings do not support the hypothesis, possibly bearing out the acknowledged lack of leadership lines within the elected membership. Some elected Members named by informants as enjoying varying degrees of leadership status and others referred to as leaders in the mass media were found for the most part to record lower interaction scores than those not identified as exercising any particular influence in the House. In no case was informal communication between Under-Secretaries and other indigenous Members such as to suggest that Under-Secretaries provided direction for the latter.

The week-long observation of interpersonal relations on the floor of the House opened up a number of promising leads for further investigation. It was noted that the Senior Official Member on no occasion had informal communication with one of the Official Members, while this latter Member interacted more with elected Members, both European and indigenous, than did even the Senior Official Member. Whether this conduct identified an atypical Official Member, the existence of friction within the official delegation, or was a coincidence was not determinable from mere measurement of floor contact, but is a matter calling for additional research.

The relating of contacts with the concurrent flow of debate supplied another potential springboard for inquiry. For example, a visit of the Senior Official Member to an elected European Member was followed by the latter's being recognised by the Speaker and moving adjournment of debate on an Administration bill. Interview disclosed that the contact was made to corroborate the elected Member's intention to postpone debate, which was then communicated by the Senior Official Member to the Speaker. The presiding officer

1 This elected European Member had three times fewer total contacts, but during the course of the session paired in informal communication with several more Members than did the Senior Official Member.
was thus alerted to the nature of forthcoming action, and that the Official Members would not oppose a delay in the measure's enactment.

When length of individual contact was also taken into account, and only those which lasted five minutes or longer collated, several patterns appeared which were then checked against recorded divisions. For the most part this proved non-productive, except in the case of the elected Member with the largest number of these long, informal contacts. His voting on the thirty-seven divisions in Hansard for the first three years of the Assembly was paired with the three elected Members with whom he most interacted at the June 1967 Meeting, and was found to have a 76 per cent concurrence in two cases, and 73 per cent for the third, higher percentages than with any other elected European Member. Extensive informal fraternisation on the floor here coincided with relatively close concert on recorded legislative decisions.

As another illustration of suggestive avenues for further research, Official Members were listed in descending order of their total number of informal contacts with both Official and elected Members. When this was ranged against their order of seniority, a Spearman's rank correlation coefficient of +.863 was obtained, sufficiently large to encourage additional study of the informal communications of Official Members.¹

Admittedly the physical location of Members' seats and the indigenous Members' limited language skills narrow the utility of measuring informal floor contacts in Papua-New Guinea. Nevertheless, study of a single meeting of the House of Assembly tended to indicate differential activity on the part of identifiable groups among the House Membership as well as other patterns of interaction promising enough to suggest their being followed up through the use of complementary research techniques. As one of the means for quantifying legislative behaviour, findings on informal floor communication furnish a partial insight into interpersonal relationships among legislators and hold the potential for aiding understanding of the process by which Members starting from relatively unstructured premises coalesce to majority concurrence.

¹ Similarly, the probability of a significant correlation is demonstrated by $X^2 = 16.7$. With 9 degrees of freedom, the 5 per cent level of $X^2$ is 16.9.
Table 2

Informal interaction among Members on the floor of the House,
June 1967 Meeting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Official Members (10)</th>
<th>European Members (16)</th>
<th>Under-Secretaries (9)</th>
<th>Indigenous Members (excluding Under-Secretaries) (26)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Separate pairs</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Separate pairs</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official Members</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Members</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under-Secretaries</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous Members</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows the number of separate pairs and the total interaction among members of different categories during the June 1967 meeting.
Chapter 4

Student views on aspects of the House of Assembly

The Members of the House of Assembly may play their lines in the spotlight of the mass media, but it is on a stage whose wings are obscured and before an audience of unknown size and interest with whom there is relatively little contact. The Members appreciate that neither newspapers nor radio reach a sizeable segment of the population and that their coverage cannot be relied upon to express a cross-section of public opinion. Lacking means for systematic sampling of factual and opinion responses in their constituencies, these politicians have little alternative but to be guided by their own preconceptions about the body politic, revised from time to time mainly by the reactions of local opinion leaders. Ultimately, the accuracy of these prejudgments may be assessed at the polls, but even re-election hardly constitutes an accurate measure, as success or defeat may depend on many factors.

As a test of a very limited public, an hour-long questionnaire was administered to students of the Administrative College at Port Moresby. The criteria by which these students were originally chosen to attend the College ensured that this group would not be a cross-section of the population at large. On the other hand, their educational achievements were such that their factual knowledge and opinions on introduced political forms and processes probably marked the upper limit of people of their areas. Thus, though they are unrepresentative, their responses can be examined to ascertain if they may aid Members of the House of Assembly in the latters' assessment of their own preconceptions.

Reference might first be made to the Select Committee on Constitutional Development which during the first part of 1967 solicited the views of local government councillors and others throughout the country regarding 'change in the present system of Parliamentary Under-Secretaries' and 'alteration in the composition and role of the Administrator's Council'. Recommendations on possible changes in their number and functions were requested from witnesses if they were not satisfied with the existing structure. This presupposed a degree of knowledge about the suitability of these two institutions for Papua-New Guinea's political development, but replies to the questionnaire were hardly so impressive as to support the soundness of the Committee's approach.
To the question 'How many Under-Secretaries are there?' asked of 81 students the answers were:

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 or more</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 or 11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5 or less</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>'don't know'**</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>left blank</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>9*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Including 1, 'more than 6'
** Volunteered

The number of Under-Secretaries had been increased from 10 to 11 a few days before the distribution of the questionnaires, so both figures were scored as accurate. A correct response of less than 25 per cent was hardly reassuring for assumptions about the general electorate.

The listing of 'duties and responsibilities' of Under-Secretaries was also not very satisfactory (15 multiple answers were given):

- learn departmental affairs; learn to run government
- (generally) assist in departmental matters
- advise/assist department heads
- represent particular departments
- be responsible for departmental works
- serve as heads of departments
- introduce bills
- present views of government to the House
- vote with government in the House
- answer so general as to be meaningless
- 'no responsibilities'
- 'don't know' (volunteered)
- left blank

Forty per cent of the replies showed no knowledge of the duties and responsibilities of Under-Secretaries, unless 'no responsibilities' is accepted as correct.

No question was put to the students on the size and composition of the Administrator's Council as preliminary inquiry confirmed this would have produced an uninformed response. Answers to the question directed to the duties and responsibilities of the Administrator's Council provided a proliferation which does not as easily categorise, but similarly suggested a lack of wide understanding of its functions:

- advise and help the Administrator
- assist in/make rules/regulations
- advise on/consider matters to discuss in House
- advise Administrator on bills passed by House
- review matter discussed in House
- deal with matters not in House
policy initiating/making body 9
lawmaking body 2
support Administrator/vote with government 2
present matters/bills to House 5
advise House 2
provide safeguards against House/to M.H.As 2
provide link with House 4
answer so general as to be meaningless 8
'don't know' (volunteered); 'council abolished' 2
left blank 9

Forewarned by these replies, the Select Committee might have more realistically assumed that the representations to it about the Under-Secretaries and the Administrator's Council would mostly be superficial at best, and based upon incomplete knowledge. It might with profit have adopted other means for sounding out community reaction, possibly by posing a number of specific proposals for change, and focusing attention upon their terms.¹

A reading of Hansard reveals that indigenous Members repeatedly refer to their constituents' instructions as the reason for bringing a matter to the attention of the House. Interviews with a number of these Members confirmed that many feel duty-bound to carry out the wishes of their constituents, irrespective of whether they concur with the wisdom of their desires. Phrased in another way, this is the classic dilemma of representation: is the legislator merely the spokesman for his people, or is his role one of doing what he believes is in their best interests?²

One hundred and seven students at the Administrative College were presented with a hypothetical example of a constituency majority telling their Member of a governmental action they desired (free motion pictures), and were asked to reply to:

¹ For the record it ought to be added that the Select Committee in advance of its meetings did send out information on the Under-Secretaries and the Administrator's Council, and also, at the meetings not infrequently one of the Committee members would briefly describe their activities. To this observer, these efforts were insufficient to overcome the lack of knowledge which examination of the witnesses quickly disclosed.

² Research on legislative roles has indicated that in fact there is a trichotomy: between the 'Trustee' and the 'Delegate' is the 'Politico' who vacillates between the two. See Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson 1962:267 ff. Also see Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson 1959, and Meller 1967.
(i) Must the Member present this to the House?
(ii) Suppose he thinks it is a foolish idea, must he still present it?
(iii) If the Member had run for election on the promise of getting that governmental action, would he have to present it to the House?
(iv) Does the average voter in your election district think the same way you do?

The response revealed a wide range of views

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Must he present?</th>
<th>Suppose he disagrees?</th>
<th>Suppose he promised?</th>
<th>Same as average voter?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equivocal</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not responsive</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left blank</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Normally when the student said that a Member must present a matter to the House even when he thought it foolish, he had already indicated that he considered the Member to be a delegate, that is, it was the Member's duty to voice his constituents' views. Conversely, a reply absolving the Member of such responsibility when he disagreed with his constituents' views was usually tied with a 'No' answer to the original question. About half the students of the opinion that a promise binds a Member had previously replied that a Member ought follow his voters' dictates.

The Member seeking guidance on his appropriate representative role could look at this response as confirming that it is safer to serve as a delegate, presenting his constituents' requests in the House. He would discount the willingness of the questionnaire's respondents to permit him to disagree when he believes the constituents' objectives foolish, attributing this to their higher education. In this he would be supported by the finding that though the latter might not expect their Member to voice their views in the House, about three-tenths implied that the average voter expected his representative to do his bidding as a delegate (32) even when the Member thought it foolish (31); however, fewer indicated that the average voter expected a contrary role for his Member (need not present - 18; need not when he thinks it is foolish - 22).

Relatively few voters are knowledgeable about the manner in which the day-to-day business of the House of Assembly is conducted. As a consequence, the Member has little means for ascertaining which actions he takes in the House will be regarded as most important by his constituents, this apart from the subject of such action or its
success. Hansard indicates that indigenous Members spend relatively little time on the introduction of bills but concentrate more on adjournment speeches, and increasingly on raising questions. Most Members also participate in the budget debates. The response of 100 students at the Administrative College to the request to rank these four forms of legislative action in order of importance implies that the Members' attention to adjournment speeches may be misplaced:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
<th>4th</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Questions</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjournment speeches</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bills</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget debate</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The usefulness of sampling limited publics is also illustrated by the range of replies of students to the inquiry: 'How does the average voter in your district find out about what the House of Assembly does? (Please number in order of importance, 1, 2, etc.)':

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Most important</th>
<th>1st and 2nd named</th>
<th>Number of mentions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of House of Assembly</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government council</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government officers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government publications</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here verbal media clearly predominated over written, even allowing for some unconscious puffing of the students' reading skills at the expense of the average voter. In answer to another probe, they had indicated voters know relatively little about what is going on in the House. More emphasis upon radio, possibly by addressing constituents directly, visiting areas not served by radio, and contact with constituents via local government councils would all assist the Member interested in reducing this knowledge gap.
Chapter 5

Apportionment for the House of Assembly -
Some are more equal than others

Apportioning a legislature constitutes a singular combination of political - that is, policy-laden - decisions, administrative acts of a ministerial nature juxtaposing people with geography, and a degree of non-rationality which can creep into all complex human determinations. Although the apportionment process appears to commence with the fixing of boundaries for legislative constituencies, it has its roots in earlier conclusions on the number of legislators, whether they are to be from single or multiple-member districts, and the nature and priority of the principles which are to guide the delineation of these districts. In some jurisdictions, the political element extends to the setting of the very metes and bounds of each individual electorate, and the process is highly partisan throughout. The Administration of Papua-New Guinea, however, in the apportionment of the House of Assembly for the 1968 elections, sought to eschew the personally partisan, and its five-man Distribution Committee the politically partisan, but policy, ministerial and non-rational components can be identified in the apportionment proposal which was approved by the House of Assembly at its August 1967 Meeting.1

The first House was composed of elected Members from 44 Open and 10 Special Electorates, and 10 Official Members; the second consists of Members from 69 Open Electorates, 15 Regional (replacing the Special) Electorates, and the number of Official Members remains unmodified. Both the Select Committee of the Legislative Council in 19622 and its successor from the House of Assembly in 19663

1 H.A.D., 1:14:2575.
reported that the people desired to increase the size of the then existing legislative body to facilitate contact between Member and constituent. But what should be the total number? The Foot Mission from the United Nations Trusteeship Council in 1962 recommended a representative parliament 'of about a hundred members' elected from single member constituencies. The Select Committee of the Legislative Council reported that there was a 'definite feeling against' so large an elected membership. With a maximum thus determined through negation, and with the Opposition Australian Labor Party favouring a membership approximating that of the Foot Report (Hughes 1965a:47), some figure had to be agreed upon which was distinctive, as well as based upon a defensible rationale. At first a membership of 65, and then 64 upon the elimination of a presiding officer as a separate Member, was fixed, with the major element of 44 Open Electorates premised upon a ratio of one Member to about 46,000 constituents. But why was this particular ratio chosen, especially when only four years later it was found to be excessive by over 50 per cent and a new formula of one Member to 30,000 people recommended? Why were 10 Official Members retained, and not a smaller figure - 'say 5' - as suggested by the Foot Mission? And why was the number of Special Electorates pegged at 10? It is at this juncture, when the problem becomes one of 'picking a number' that the element of non-rationality enters.

What patterns of thought unconsciously precondition men's actions are not always expressed in the reasons they give for taking them. This particularly applies to numbers, such as the mustering of arguments in a sequence of three, the dichotomising of alternatives so that one course is favoured and the other opposed, or the avoidance of 'unlucky' numbers. It is suggested that this has contributed to the fixing of the Assembly's size, and more specifically, through the process of doubling and by use of powers of ten.

It appears too great a coincidence that the size of the Open Electorate component for the first House of Assembly was exactly

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1. U.N.T.C., T/1597, 22 June 1962, par.133.
double that of the unofficial Membership of the preceding Legislative Council.\(^1\) Similarly, the reduction of the Official Members in the House to 10 may possibly be attributed to the same process of doubling, this time of the figure mentioned in the Foot Report. However, the number of Official Members also accords with the penchant for the use of the number 10, its multiples and halves, and can more likely be traced to that.

Between the first Legislative Council and the second which met in 1961, the total unofficial membership was enlarged by 10 and the nominated membership increased to 10. When Special Electorates were proposed for the 1964 House, their number was set at 10. 'How the Committee decided on the number of "Special" Electorates is anybody's guess. Possibly it was felt this was the minimum which would be acceptable to Australian interests in the Territory.' (van der Veur 1964:991). Although the elected Members of the last Legislative Council did not vote as a party in opposition to government measures (Lynch 1962:1), there was a tendency for the elected expatriates to line themselves against the government (Parker 1966:266). In the first House, the ten Europeans to be elected\(^2\) could be balanced by the Official component, and the indigenous Members would then constitute the deciding force.

Repeatedly, the reference to the figure 10 and its variants appears. In the debate in the Legislative Council on Parliamentary Under-Secretaries, Dr John Gunther stated 'in all our considerations and discussions up to date, the number we have thought about was 10'.\(^3\) An amendment adopted to the Under-Secretaries bill set a maximum of 15, until the House by resolution otherwise approved, and the first group of Under-Secretaries appointed numbered 10. Similarly, the size of the Administrator's Council was fixed at 10

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\(^1\) As though to emphasise this, the Labor Opposition proposed doubling the Open Electorates from 44 to 88 when the Papua and New Guinea Act amendments were debated in the House of Representatives. See Hughes 1965a:47.

\(^2\) It should not be forgotten that the Select Committee's Interim Report referred to 'the very strong probability that no non-indigenes would be returned from a normal common roll election'. Interim Report 1962:5. It is immaterial that 'a glance at the 1961 election results in neighbouring West New Guinea would have indicated that "European" candidates (including ex-patrol officers) had a good chance in politically unsophisticated or tribally splintered electorates or electorates where several candidates split the local vote'. 'New Guinea Assembly', Current Affairs Bulletin, 34:7:106.

\(^3\) L.C.D., 6:9:936.
members. More recently, when the Select Committee of the House of Assembly received recommendations for altering the number of Under-Secretaries and members of the Administrator's Council, the size of 15 for the latter was frequently advocated by witnesses. This same variation of 10 was the number agreed upon by the Select Committee for the new Regional Electorates of the 1968 House, despite the fact that there were then 18 and not 15 administrative districts in Papua-New Guinea. When an amendment to this was proposed in the House, the decision of the Committee was defended by Mr Ian Downs:

If one is working in terms of, say ten special electorates, or if one is working in terms of twenty, I think that one would see.... One has to balance out population; one has to balance out areas of common interests; and one has to balance out natural boundaries and accepted boundaries.

...if we accept this amendment, then we will have to accept the proposition that there should be many other amendments. Thus we would have 30, 40, or 50 regional electorates....¹

And to conclude this reference to the importance of numbers qua numbers, there will be 25 more Open Electorates in the 1968 House of Assembly than in the first House, another variant of 10. The two Select Committees which recommended the reconstitution of the legislature each chose to designate specific numbers,² and in doing so appear to have unconsciously followed a pattern which introduced a non-rational factor into determining the final size of the House.

For both the 1964 and the 1968 House of Assembly, the boundaries of the Open Electorates were delineated by reference to pre-existing administrative units. Reported the Legislative Council's Select Committee: 'The great majority of the witnesses desired representation on a Sub-district basis, with some allowance for population and geography....'³

Taking the Territory's fifty-four Sub-districts as a start and by combining the smaller and dividing the larger, the Electoral Boundaries Committee arrived at forty-four Open Electorates [for the 1964 House]. Equality of population was the main criterion, but quite understandably it could not always be observed exactly. Islands presented the greatest difficulty...and provided the smallest electorate, Manus...and the largest, Bougainville....(Hughes and van der Veur 1965:388).

¹ H.A.D., 1:10:1609 (emphasis added).
² There is an alternative, see p.53.
³ Interim Report 1962:4. It was also the view of the Foot Mission that the sub-districts should be the basic building blocks for the Open Electorates. U.N.T.C., T/1597, 22 June 1962, par.211.
The House's Select Committee implicitly recommended abandonment of the sub-district criterion for Open Electorates in 1968 by its reference to the larger Administrative District. 'A major complaint voiced in some areas was that some existing electorates were split by District boundaries. As most of these boundaries have been fixed for many years, especially in the areas concerned, the people tend to regard themselves as being part of a particular District.'\(^1\)

'Considering the people's unanimous opinion...your Committee strongly recommends that electorates be contained wholly within District boundaries.'\(^2\) The Committee also adopted the Administrative District as principal referent for the new Regional Electorates.

While the 10 Special Electorates of the first House appear to have been drawn primarily to contain approximately equal populations of non-indigenes (Hughes 1965a:51), it was decided to both increase and reorganise them on a District basis for the 1968 House. In the process, 6 of the 8 smallest Administrative Districts were combined, the Committee 'taking into account not only population figures, but also geographic considerations, communications and the difficulties of transportation'.\(^3\)

When the Distribution Committee undertook to translate the Select Committee's general directions into specific designations, it discovered that except for Manus, Bougainville, and New Ireland, each of the remaining 15 Administrative Districts had at least one part of its area administered from an adjoining District. Observing the spirit if not the letter of the Committee's recommendations,\(^4\) the boundaries of the Open Electorates announced by the Distribution Committee thus do not necessarily coincide with the gazetted descriptions of the Administrative Districts, but rather, each constituency encompasses an area actually administered through a single District. Regional Electorates, correspondingly, are combinations of these 69 Open Electorates. As the process of apportionment got under way, the boundaries of sub-districts were frequently breached, and all that remained inviolate were the census divisions, the smallest units of area and population considered for the new House's electorates.\(^5\)

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4. The Select Committee was informally polled by the Distribution Committee to obtain its concurrence with the Distribution Committee's interpretation.  
5. This was also one of the principles for delimiting the Open Electorates for the 1964 House. See Second Interim Report from the Select Committee of the Legislative Council for Territory of Papua and New Guinea, 20 February 1963:3.
Since the Administrative District was treated as the keystone for the apportionment of the 1968 House, it is of interest to ascertain whether it fared more adequately than in 1964. This is a rather difficult problem to resolve, as a segment from one Administrative District might have been joined with a major part from another to form an Open Electorate for the 1964 elections. However, utilising for rough comparisons either the population statistics for Administrative Districts upon which the legislative committees initially relied, or the populations of Open Electorates grouped by Administrative Districts as reported when the boundaries of the Open Electorates were announced, it would appear that the range of representation from the median Administrative District was narrower for 1968 than in 1964. Upon the premise that equal ratios of representation are most equitable—a proposition over which reasonable men may argue, but which currently occupies the centre of judicial concern in the United States—the Administrative Districts' sharing of Open Electorates for the 1968 House of Assembly measures as superior to the 1964 House.

An allied question is whether the Open Electorates as apportioned for the 1968 House more equitably represent the populations of the various electorates than did the apportionment for the 1964 House. Using the same technique of comparing ranges of representation from the average (median) Open Electorate, there has been a reduction between 1968 (range of extremes: 77.9) as compared with the 1964 House (range: 90.4). However, when taking every Open Electorate into account, and not just the smallest and largest, Open Electorates on the average will be less equally represented on a population basis in 1968 than in 1964. Computing the percentage variation of each Open Electorate from the average (mean) constituency, totalling these percentages while ignoring their plus and minus values, and then dividing the sum by the full number of Open Electorates demonstrates that the 44 Open Electorates of the 1964 House on the average had a 10.7 per cent variation from the 46,052 population of the mean Open Electorate. This was a smaller percentage variation than will be true for the 1968 House, when the 69 Open Electorates on the average will have a 15.4 per cent variation from the 31,638 population of the new mean Open Electorate. The

See Second Interim Report 1966:Appendix III.

Range of representation from median Administrative District: -37.7 per cent to +36.1 per cent (or 73.8) for 1964 House, compared with -32.8 per cent to +8.6 per cent (or 41.4) for 1968. See Table 3.

Range of representation from 'adjusted' median Administrative District: -36.0 per cent to +27.5 per cent (or 63.5) for 1964, compared with -24.1 per cent to +16.6 per cent (or 40.7) for 1968. See Table 4.
### Table 3
Population of Open Electorates, by District,
Select Committee Reports*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative Districts</th>
<th>1964 House</th>
<th>1968 House</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Open</td>
<td>Total Open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>population</td>
<td>population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>elections</td>
<td>elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>population</td>
<td>population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>53,277</td>
<td>53,277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf</td>
<td>56,281</td>
<td>28,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>122,868</td>
<td>61,434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milne Bay</td>
<td>87,179</td>
<td>43,589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>49,049</td>
<td>49,049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Highlands</td>
<td>166,299</td>
<td>41,575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Highlands</td>
<td>269,329</td>
<td>53,866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Highlands</td>
<td>180,608</td>
<td>45,152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chimbu</td>
<td>164,598</td>
<td>41,149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sepik</td>
<td>258,197</td>
<td>43,033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madang</td>
<td>139,158</td>
<td>46,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morobe</td>
<td>196,941</td>
<td>49,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manus and N.I.</td>
<td>57,388</td>
<td>28,694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Britain</td>
<td>109,961</td>
<td>36,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bougainville</td>
<td>56,330</td>
<td>56,330</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4
Population of Open Electorates, by District, reported on publishing boundaries*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative Districts</th>
<th>1964 House Total</th>
<th>1964 House Average</th>
<th>1968 House Total</th>
<th>1968 House Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>population</td>
<td>Open elections</td>
<td>population</td>
<td>Open elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>42,263</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42,263</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf</td>
<td>92,358</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>46,179</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>92,759</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>46,379</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milne Bay</td>
<td>88,509</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>44,254</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>49,393</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>49,393</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Highlands</td>
<td>196,806</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>49,201</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Highlands</td>
<td>239,990</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>47,998</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Highlands</td>
<td>192,021</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>48,005</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chimbu</td>
<td>189,946</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>47,486</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sepik</td>
<td>260,579</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>43,430</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madang</td>
<td>155,016</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>51,672</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morobe</td>
<td>188,374</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>47,093</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manus and N.I.</td>
<td>60,300</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30,150</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Britain</td>
<td>119,998</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>39,999</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bougainville</td>
<td>60,057</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>60,057</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

explanation for this disparity partially lies in the fact that for 1968 each electorate will have markedly fewer people; as a consequence, the population differences between electorates has to be correspondingly smaller if the percentage variation is not to register an increase. But the smaller the electorates, the harder it is to reduce population differences between them when factors beside number of people are being taken into account - and this is exactly what happened in drawing the boundaries for 1968.

Table 5

Population by Open Electorates, 1964 and 1968*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Small electorate</th>
<th>Median electorate</th>
<th>Large electorate</th>
<th>Range from median</th>
<th>Total range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964 House</td>
<td>Manus 18,835</td>
<td>45,603</td>
<td>Bougainville 60,057</td>
<td>-58.7% to +31.7%</td>
<td>90.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed 1968</td>
<td>Manus 20,647</td>
<td>Sina Sina 31,766</td>
<td>Hiri 47,306</td>
<td>-35.0% to +48.9%</td>
<td>83.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 House</td>
<td>Manus 20,647</td>
<td>W. Sepik 31,664</td>
<td>Kainantu 45,327</td>
<td>-34.8% to +43.1%</td>
<td>77.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Select Committee originally decided on the number of Open Electorates for the 1968 House as well as their initial apportionment among Administrative Districts with the aid of estimated population statistics whose accuracy was later found to be questionable. For one thing, the recommended ratio of one Member to approximately 30,000 people should have been one to over 31,600 for each of the 69 Open Electorates. Because of this, and solely on the basis of the Select Committee's ratio, provision ought to have been made for 3 additional Open Electorates. When the Select Committee on Constitutional Development visited Goroka early in 1967, it was met with the objection that as the Eastern Highlands Administrative District had almost 210,000 people (and not the 192,000 on which the Committee had apparently allocated six Open Electorates), it was entitled to another Member. This permitted the Committee to re-emphasise what it had already briefly stated in its Second Interim Report, that 'the geography of the various areas, linguistic groupings, and the difficulties of travel a Member might encounter...[had all] been taken into account'.¹ When the Distribution Committee began drawing up the boundaries of each Open Electorate, it became even clearer that equality of population was not the prime desideratum, but rather the identification of an internal unity within an area. In de-emphasising population, the Committee appears to have been

acting in accordance with popular attitudes, for in Papua-New Guinea the 'relative value of the right to vote' seems to be heavily conditioned upon being represented by one's own and not upon the niceties of statistical evaluation.¹

With the commissioner for local government, the surveyor-general, and the chief electoral officer as members, the Distribution Committee had ready access to all prime sources of information. The two additional members, one from Papua and the other from New Guinea, ensured that the viewpoints of private citizens would be included,² but as to be expected, the government members played the major role in committee deliberations.

Beside population, which was not the dominant factor in setting boundaries, the Distribution Committee took cognizance of '(a) community or diversity of interests; (b) local government council boundaries; (c) proposed future movement of people into existing local government councils; (d) means of communication; (e) physical features; (f) census divisions; and (g) existing electoral boundaries'.³

Where it was necessary to split the population within the jurisdiction of a single local government council because of its excessive size, the history of the council's growth was studied, and the attempt made to drop off the most recently added units, upon the assumption that their identification with the council would be weakest. Probably in an effort to counter criticism made against the apportionment of the Moresby Open Electorate for the 1964 House,⁴ the Committee not only separated off the Goilalas into their own Open Electorate, but joined eleven villages physically within the Moresby Urban Electorate with the mainly Motu-speaking Hiri Open Electorate. This decision most likely will engender a comparable spate of fault-finding in the 1968 elections' post mortems.

One the Distribution Committee established the tentative boundaries of the Open Electorates, maps were drawn and sent to the

¹ As, for example, measured by the David and Eisenberg Index for which the quoted phrase is a verbal equivalent. See David and Eisenberg 1961 and 1962.
² The size of the Distribution Committee was increased from 3 to 5 in 1966, with a quorum of 4, which would necessitate the presence of at least one of the non-public servants at all meetings. See H.A.D., 1:9:1436.
³ Report to His Honour, the Administrator, by the Distribution Committee Appointed for the purpose of Redistributing the Territory of Papua and New Guinea into Electorates, 23 August 1967:3.
⁴ See Hughes 1965b:341 ff.
District Commissioners for review. Later, the Committee travelled to the various district headquarters, and there considered the objections raised by the personnel of the Department of District Administration. Suggestions would be evaluated on the spot, and where they had merit, the maps would be revised accordingly. Even some of the names proposed by the Committee for the 69 Open Electorates were challenged, and more fitting designations substituted. No effort was made to clear committee decisions formally or informally with anyone who would be personally affected by the demarcation of electorate boundaries; rather, the committee worked at 'arm's length' from all present and potential office holders. For three months after the new Electorate maps were published, the politicians could lodge protests, and even thereafter, through action by the House of Assembly, could refuse to approve the report of the Distribution Committee.

In all, 20 objections were registered with the committee: 9 were upheld and 11 rejected. Some of the reasons for rejection were: (i) additional electorates were requested when the total of each Administrative District was now fixed by law; (ii) alternative would have cut across Administrative District boundaries; (iii) alternative would have split local government council area; (iv) objection was based on tribal enmities; and (v) the alternative was an effort to change an electorate boundary for personal benefit. Tribal animosities were not treated as sufficient reason for varying boundaries, on the ground that the purpose of the apportionment was to further national and not parochial interests. However, as the Committee was seeking to delineate electorates so that each enjoyed a sense of internal identity, the objection would

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1 Consultation with some local government councillors and others also occurred, but this was not central to the 'field review' of the Committee's tentative delineation of boundaries. Failure systematically to consult the voters and ascertain their views on boundaries was scored on the floor of the House. H.A.D., 1:4:2570 ff.

2 The Committee had a choice between numbers, letters, or appropriate names to distinguish the 69 Open Electorates, and adopted the last. Geographical sub-designations of District names would have produced such anomalies as 'East' Eastern Highlands, 'West' Eastern Highlands, etc., and had to be ruled out. The employment of names was consonant with the Committee's search for electorate identity.

3 As a consequence, some Members did meet with the Distribution Committee while to others it appeared that districting in their electorates 'was run like a secret society'. H.A.D., 1:14:2572, 2574.
appear to be particularly pertinent and in logic, should have been taken into account in the final apportionment.

Technically the Distribution Committee had no statutory authority to fix the boundaries of the Regional Electorates; it powers ran solely to the Open Electorates. As a consequence, its actions relative to Regional districting only constituted recommendations, and required implementation by some formal action of the House. On the other hand, the delineation of the 69 Open Electorates could be made effective by proclamation of the Administrator, once the approval of the House was expressed. The House considered the Committee's report under the disadvantage that a postponement of the 1968 elections caused by its failure to concur could leave the country without a legislature for a number of months. After a scattering of objections - to under-representation, to the drawing of specific boundaries, and to the procedural failure of the Committee to submit for review by the electorate concerned of the nine changes made to its original report - as to be expected, the House approved of the proposed districting.¹

From the vantage point of hindsight, the entire apportionment process and reconsideration of the composition of the House, conscientiously as they were undertaken, might have been conducted to better advantage. When the exhibits for the area electorates were submitted by the Distribution Committee in May 1967, barely enough time was left to confirm them and complete the necessary preparations for filing nominations and holding the elections the following February.² In reaching its decisions, the Select Committee dismissed with little or no comment some of the basic elements of representation upon which the entire apportionment turned, and if it had arrived at other conclusions, they might have produced a more equitably apportioned House in 1968. It failed to re-evaluate the preferential voting system in Papua-New Guinea and the possible substitution of first-past-the-post voting; ignored the absurdity of preparing three, and possibly four (when there is a by-election) separate rolls; and did not anticipate the institution of political parties and the nature of their impact on electoral practices. The Select Committee completely overlooked considerations of multi-member electorates for the House, despite the fact that about two-thirds of the local

¹ H.A.D., 1:14:2570-5.
² Originally the Electoral Officer had submitted a time-table to the Select Committee, which proposed that the latter complete its work well enough in advance as to permit the Distribution Committee to have its maps, for the proposed new electorates, ready by September 1966.
government councils make use of the multi-member device.\(^1\) Its judicious employment for the Open Electorates would have accommodated the large local government councils, instead of having to split them between two electorates. Another alternative would have been for the Select Committee to limit its role to setting standards for the identification of the Open Electorates, and allowing the Distribution Committee to fix the exact size of the House within these limits. At this stage of the country's political development, it is not too important whether there are 68 or 72 Open Electorates, so relatively greater attention may be turned to the perfecting of representation than will be possible later when political alignments become more rigid.

The Select Committee was too ready to seize upon the Administrative District as the basic unit for representation without thinking through all of the consequences. This was tantamount to a decision to have each existing Administrative District, whose boundaries were originally drawn for administrative convenience, become a political unit. People now in one Administrative District may wish to be joined to another for purposes of political participation before the boundaries of electorates are drawn.\(^2\) In addition, there is a strong tendency for the Administrative Districts along the backbone of the country to be gazetted so that their common line is coterminous with the boundary between Papua and New Guinea; the legal cleavage between the Territory and the Trusteeship is thus perpetuated by the new electorates, both Open and Regional. With a minimum of effort, and while maintaining the other principles it set for delineation of boundaries, the committee could have once and for all laid this contentious matter to rest by encouraging the electorate boundaries wherever appropriate to zigzag across the technical line now separating the two areas.

This limited view of the ramifications of adopting the Administrative District as the basic apportionment unit is also reflected in the Select Committee's treatment of the functions of Members elected to seats from Regional Electorates. 'Your Committee believes that the role of the...member is primarily in the House and that he should be in a position to bring broader experience to the

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\(^1\) Based on figures on local government councils released by the Department of District Administration, 16 January 1967.

\(^2\) For example, see presentation of Sinake Giregire about a small group in one Administrative District, 'racially, linguistically, and culturally' the same as those in an adjoining District, who wish to join the latter as part of a single electorate. H.A.D., 1:12:2092.
In fact, he will be elected from a District-wide constituency and as spokesman for its people will be able to challenge the District Commissioner and his subordinates. As a result, it is more likely that the Regional Member will be catapulted into a political role, only a small portion of which will constitute House participation. Depending, of course, upon the person elected, the Member will be in position to offer countervailing leadership to that of the District Commissioner, thereby further politicising the Administrative District.

In the past there has been no truly organic link between the local government councils and the House of Assembly. 'There was no attempt, for example, to create a tiered system with the present Council structure at the base and the House at the apex, and the 1960-61 device of using councils for purposes of Central Government elections was abandoned in 1963-64....' (Lynch 1965:19.) However, with the areas of local government councils figuring prominently in the structuring of Open Electorates, the realities of political life will encourage partisan support by councillors for candidates to the House, which in turn will further systemise post-election contacts between Members and councillors. None of this is alluded to in the reports of the Select Committee, for just as it apparently did not appreciate how it was proposing the potential politicising of the Administrative District, so it failed to recognise that its apportionment decisions contained the seed for an integrated structure of personal political advancement. The not too distant future may see the aspiring politician distinguishing himself through council office, all the while aiming at the post of House Member, and this facilitated by the apportionment scheme for the 1968 House.

The Distribution Committee approached its tasks as though divorced from all matters of political moment, both in the setting of policy and in relation to organised partisan activity. In fact, many of the decisions it reached in apportioning the 1968 House were policy impregnated, so that it was not reduced to the routinely administrative. Because of its composition, it sometimes proceeded a bit naively, such as discouraging Members of the House from personally registering objections to the tentative boundaries, but implying that a request for change by constituents would give the objections validity. This, of course, only encouraged the Members

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1 This quote refers to 'special electorate', but from the context applies to new Regional Electorates. Second Interim Report 1966 in H.A.D., 1:10:1584.

2 Just as the realities of political life saw some prominent Hanuabadans return to their local government council when it was indicated that councils were to have a part in electing members to the Legislative Council. See Healy 1961:486.
to activate constituents on their behalf. But it would have been expected that the Select Committee, mainly made up of elected M.H.As, would have been peculiarly sensitive to the political significance of its decisions, and that this would have been reflected in the details of its reports. Their silence in this regard thus cloaks the apportionment of the 1968 House, both as originally proposed by the Select Committee and as finally drawn by the Distribution Committee, with an aseptically non-political character more appropriate to the handiwork of public servants.
Chapter 6

Two Pacific legislatures compared

The last two Trusteeships in the world\(^1\) lie in the Western Pacific, one north of the equator in Micronesia and the other to the south in Melanesia. Within the span of a year, each established representative territory-wide legislatures by universal adult suffrage. Given current interest in political forms and processes facilitating political development, they offer the opportunity for theorising on the relative efficacy of the American and Australian legislative models in aiding their respective wards to self-government, and possibly independence.

The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands under American administration is dwarfed in size, population, and magnitude of problems by Australia's Papua-New Guinea,\(^2\) but many of their differences are more variances in degree than disparities in kind. Continuous Western contact with both New Guinea and Micronesia\(^3\) dates from about the same period, and as German possessions\(^4\) and then as mandates under the League of Nations, they were subjected to a

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1 The third remaining Trusteeship, Nauru, becomes independent early in 1968.
2 Technically, the Trusteeship of New Guinea is a distinct legal entity from the Territory of Papua, but since the enactment of the Papua and New Guinea Act 1949, as amended, they have been governed in an administrative union. They are here treated as a single unit whenever the designation 'Papua-New Guinea' is employed.
3 Again to be accurate, Guam at the westernmost reaches of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is a possession of the United States, and the Gilbert Islands which also fall within the geographical area cartographers call 'Micronesia' are part of the Gilbert and Ellice Island Colony of Great Britain.
4 Here 'New Guinea' is used advisedly, as Papua had been administered by Australia in accordance with the Papua Act 1905-1940 as a Territory placed by His Majesty the King under the authority of the Commonwealth.
parallel history of external rule. While mandated, there was little concern with furthering self-government for the indigenous inhabitants; rather a system of governance by nationals of the mandate country was imposed. Both areas were primarily viewed as bases of economic exploitation for the benefit of the ministering nation. In each, World War II marks a break with the past, and shortly after its end, as Trusteeships under the United Nations, their development was redirected in line with the Trusteeship objectives of promoting internal political, social, economic, and educational advancement.¹ Thereafter, indigenous political involvement proceeded somewhat faster in the American zone, although neither the United States nor Australia has been spared censure from some nations on the Trusteeship Council for the rate at which this has occurred. In both Micronesia and Papua-New Guinea when their legislatures first convened, Europeans still held all the key administrative and judicial offices and participation by indigenes was limited to subordinate posts and mainly to local government.

It is customary to refer to the tremendous difficulties of communication and transportation in Papua-New Guinea, its limited economic infra-structure, its great ethnic heterogeneity, and linguistic diversity as making it a unique entity to administer. All these may be applied to the American Trust Territory, although water distances across its 3,000,000 square miles of ocean replace mountains to traverse, and with a population of 90,000 people, the ethnic and linguistic diversity of Papua-New Guinea's 2.2 million people is replicated only in miniature. In both regions until the bringing of a forced peace, local groups fought and feuded, with struggle more for enhancing prestige, acquiring booty, and repaying wrongs than for the annexation and consolidation of territory. Lest it be thought that the relatively recent bringing of white man's law and order to the 'bush' sets Papua-New Guinea completely apart, as late as 1957 the Fishers (1957:181-2), describing how the 'calaboose' had become a substitute for fighting in the Eastern Carolines of Micronesia, wrote:

it does seem plausible that fighting between some communities would break out eventually in the hypothetical event that all Americans and other non-Micronesian officials, missionaries, and teachers suddenly pulled out. And without dragging up hypothetical cases, the lack of confidence which the people of any one community feel in a man of another community is great enough to make most respectful leaders hesitant about accepting official positions outside of their own community, and to put a considerable burden on those who do.

¹ Much of the foregoing is also applicable to Papua.
Micronesian traditional leaders fall between Sahlins 'Melanesian big-men' and 'Polynesian-chief' models (1963:285), and though Micronesia knows stratified status rare to Melanesia, many of the islands did not have elaborate forms of rank and chieftainship, and unlike Polynesia, few political units covering extensive population and physical terrain. As in Melanesia, Micronesia's tribal plan was more segmental than pyramidal, to borrow Sahlin's political geometry. Even within areas that had common cultures there was little political unity. However, the undifferentiated character of the New Guinea groups, lacking all specialised political machinery (Read 1959:425), was not usual in Micronesia, and the variance between the two Territories did permit greater attention in Micronesia to indirect rule as a system of government. Under American administration, this led to the early construction of self-governing municipalities on traditional structures, sometimes erroneously understood. The municipal and district levels of the judicial system, too, could be 'localised'. Thus, in the mid-1960s when the two Territory-wide legislatures were first convened, Micronesians noticeably differed from their Melanesian counterparts in enjoying a greater role in local government.

As in Papua-New Guinea, it was necessary for the administering authority in Micronesia to foster the development of a sense of regionalism which transcended parochial localism. Comparable to people of the Sepik beginning to identify themselves with their area, or the Chimbu with theirs, by 1953 the Marshallese were petitioning a U.N. Visiting Mission against being indiscriminately 'lumped together with other groups of Micronesian peoples' (Richards 1957:382). In both areas the creation of administrative districts facilitated this transformation, but in Micronesia it was furthered by the addition of district legislatures. Until the representatives to the district bodies began grappling with district-wide problems, and in turn aided their constituents to look beyond the physical boundaries of their village or island, it was difficult to detect the existence of anything but localised public opinion. These bodies also provided training in rudimentary parliamentary procedure which was to stand many of the Micronesian Congressmen in good stead when a Territory-wide legislative body was finally established.

The indigenous peoples in each of the Territories have been introduced to cash cropping, and there is a degree of mixed economy in both. Under the Japanese mandate in Micronesia, economic development was encouraged, but primarily for the benefit of Japanese nationals, and much of what was built was destroyed during World War II. With the repatriation of all Japanese after the war, Micronesia was left to the Micronesians, and compared with the previous period, the economy stagnated. It was only in 1962 that the Territory was opened to the free entry of United States citizens and their investment, but even then safeguards precluding exploitation of the region's cheap labour and requirements for Micronesian
participation slowed the advent of American enterprise. Unlike Papua-New Guinea, there is no resident European population with extensive economic holdings engaged in a wide variety of agricultural and commercial pursuits. As Micronesia has moved toward greater self-government, there has been no need to in-build protection for European interests or to assure them special representation.

A final major difference between Papua-New Guinea and the American Trust Territory is that in the latter education has been stressed as an agent of deliberately fostered cultural change upon the premise that trained manpower is essential for increased economic activity and an informed public necessary for self-government. Rather than relying upon religious bodies as in Papua-New Guinea, education became primarily the responsibility of the new municipalities, and when this proved too onerous, was transferred to the districts and later the Territorial government. Reinforced by a tradition of the Japanese which stressed the importance of schooling in the training of leaders, the Micronesians were cognizant of the value of raising the educated to the forefront when selecting representatives for the legislative institutions introduced by the Americans.

Interestingly, the first efforts at establishing legislative bodies for the two Trust Territories were similar in concept - the use of a legislative council with official majority and unofficial minority membership. The Legislative Council structured by the Papua-New Guinea Act of 1949 for a unified Papua-New Guinea was in accordance with the classical British model for areas moving to self-government. Under the Navy Administration between 1948 and 1952, a Legislative Advisory Committee composed of heads of Territorial departments was created in the American Trust Territory, a form unfamiliar to American practice. The original design was to expand the Committee with indigenous members, which would then evolve into a representative legislature of Micronesians. This never occurred, and the introduction in 1956 of an annual inter-district conference of Micronesian leaders prepared the region for the eventual creation of a legislature along normal American lines.

Both Australia and the United States face the delicate task of progressively transferring authority while retaining responsibility before the world for the administration of their wards. In both Territories normal powers over internal matters were delegated to the new legislatures, but with the safeguard of executive approval being required for legislation to become effective. In Micronesia the High Commissioner was granted full discretion to approve or veto acts of the Congress; in Papua-New Guinea, Canberra reserved legislation in designated subject-matter areas for its own review, and other ordinances submitted to the Administrator for approval could be later subject to disallowance within six months. The Congress of Micronesia has the power to pass bills over the High
Commissioner's veto, final resolution then being transferred to Washington. The reciprocal limitation on the powers of both the House of Assembly and the Australian Government was nicely put by Mr John R. Stuntz when he said:

Although there is no way in which we can pass a Bill in this House which is not acceptable to the Australian Government, there is also no way in which the Australian Government can pass a Bill in this House which is unacceptable to us. Therefore, our present power, which we can exercise here, is a negative power.1

In Micronesia, the final word lies with the Administration for the High Commissioner has retained the additional right of submitting 'urgent' legislation, which if not enacted by the Congress can be put into effect by his executive order.

The major restriction on both legislatures involves the expenditure of money. In Micronesia, the Congress can only make recommendations on the Trust Territory's tentative budget prepared under the Federal Government's authorisation ceiling of $U.S.17.5 million;2 when it disagrees with the High Commissioner's proposals, this is reported to the Secretary of the Interior, but Washington's decision is final. However, the Congress has been granted full appropriation powers over approximately $U.S.1 million of locally raised revenues and discretion to initiate and revise Territorial tax legislation. In line with the Westminster system, in Papua-New Guinea the Territorial government presents its budget - currently based on a Commonwealth grant of $A70 million, internal revenues of $A43 million, and $A7 million in loan funds - which the House may criticise but only reduce. The elected Members face the danger that any cuts they make will cost Papua-New Guinea the loss of this sum out of Commonwealth-provided funds.3 Also reserved to the government is the proposal of all tax legislation, and amendments which elected Members may offer are limited to transferences or reductions. The legislators in both regions have expressed disappointment over their limited fiscal discretion, as this means they lack control of the main tool for directing the course of their respective administrations.

The House of Assembly which convened in Papua-New Guinea in 1964 is double the size (64 Members) of the Congress of Micronesia (33) which met the following year, but consists of only one chamber.

1 H.A.D., 1:6:810.
2 For future Congresses this ceiling has been materially raised.
3 T.C.O.R., 32nd Session, 1252th Meeting, 9 June 1965, par.7.
The same compromise which saw the United States originally opt for bicameralism contributed to the structuring of a Senate for the Congress with two Senators from each of the American Trust Territory's six administrative districts. Representation for Papua-New Guinea's forty-four Open Electorates was fixed at a ratio of about one Member for 46,000 people. In Micronesia, each Representative in the lower house on the average speaks for only 4,200 persons.

Following the Westminster-model, the House of Assembly includes ten Official Members appointed by the Government. Although a minority, they are responsible for most legislative business, and carry the burden of effecting the Administration's programme. An Advisory Administrator's Council with both Official and elected Members and originally ten (now eleven) Parliamentary Under-Secretaries constitute the rudiments of a future ministerial system. In contrast to this, the separation of powers doctrine is built into the Congress of Micronesia.¹ Members of the Administration must press their stands on proposed legislation from outside the legislature, and except for influence exerted in testifying before committees and lobbying, their official role is only peripheral to the work of the Congress.

No ethnic qualifications for office were imposed in the Micronesian elections; in Papua-New Guinea only Europeans could stand for the ten superimposed Special Electorates. When the final returns were counted, the occupants of these seats together with 6 Europeans from the Open Electorates and the 10 Official Members comprised two-fifths of the total membership. Some of these elected European Members had formerly been kiaps, or employers of large numbers of indigenous workers, and they brought the aura of the authority which they had exercised with them to the House of Assembly.

Both areas faced the problem of having to accommodate a number of languages in order to conduct their legislative proceedings. Neither designated English as the sole language but each emphasised its use, particularly in written materials. Papua-New Guinea made provision for the simultaneous translation of debate into three languages - English, Police-Motu, and Pidgin - while non-English-speaking Micronesian legislators are accompanied with their own personal interpreters² and only English is employed on the floor. The voters of the American Trust Territory recognised that

¹ Actually, legislators and executive are in close informal contact under the American system, despite the theoretical cleavage between the two branches of government.
² At government expense, unlike the interpreter for M.H.A. Handabe Tiaba, who speaks none of the three recognised languages.
English-speaking skill would be a valuable aid to a legislator, so although the English language was introduced into Micronesia later than into Papua-New Guinea, only 2 of the 33 Congressmen in the first Congress of Micronesia asked for the assistance of interpreters.

Part of this difference in English language ability may be traced to the two areas' differential treatment of public servants as politicians. Papua-New Guinea has required them to resign on running for the Assembly, and if successful, their severance becomes final. Thereafter they serve as full-time legislators, with their remuneration set accordingly. For the first Congress of Micronesia, and until the 1968 elections, a civil servant can hold both legislative and administrative posts, as the former is not considered to require more than part-time attention. As a consequence a majority of those who stood for office were public servants, and many Congressmen were elected whose command of English had been sharpened by government service. It also assured Micronesia that its first Congressmen would have a greater comprehension of governmental affairs than could be expected of the indigenous Members in the House of Assembly.

The contrast in the Membership of the two Territories' legislatures is striking. Although the Members of both are relatively young - the median age of the Congressmen is 33 years, that of the elected Members of the House of Assembly is 36 - the education, travel experience, and preparation for legislative duties sets the two bodies' membership apart.

The Micronesian legislators were introduced to their new Congress through a preliminary seminar designed to erect each house's formal procedures in accordance with their own directions. Though following fairly closely the format observed by other American legislatures, their Permanent Rules constitute more an elaboration of what many Congressmen already had been exposed to in their district legislatures than a completely new body of parliamentary practices. With

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1 The Congress of Micronesia's thirty-day session about equals the length of time the House of Assembly meets during the course of a normal year. Pre-session meetings, special sessions, and committee attendance extend the period devoted to Congressional work, so that except for Parliamentary Under-Secretaries, the Micronesians' 'part-time' legislative duties may exceed those of the Members of the House of Assembly.

2 Also the median age of indigenous Members only. Papua-New Guinea data for age and Table 6 are taken from van der Veur 1965:445 ff. Micronesian data are extracted from a forthcoming book by the author, The Congress of Micronesia.
Table 6

Legislatures of Papua-New Guinea (1964) and Micronesia (1965):
Members' education, travel, governmental and legislative experience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Papua-New Guinea</th>
<th>Micronesia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Europeans (16)</td>
<td>Indigenes (38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College graduate</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some college</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some high school</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>10.5%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel outside Territory</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-legislative government experience</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territory and district***</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>55.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local#</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Legislative' experience</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territory-wide</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 4 Papuans and New Guineans had teacher training.
** Approximate. (All had visited Guam, 72.7 per cent Hawaii, and 27.3 per cent Japan and other Pacific islands.)
*** In Papua-New Guinea, includes town and district advisory councils.
# In Papua-New Guinea, local government councils; in Micronesia, municipal office.
## N = 32, as Yap Outer Islands not in Yap Islands (district) Congress, so member elected to Congress of Micronesia from Yap Outer Islands constituency excluded from base of 33.

the convening of the Congress, they entered on their tasks with a confidence¹ and sense of objective absent among the indigenous Members in Papua-New Guinea. A similar seminar preceded the opening of the House of Assembly, but one of its purposes was to explain the use of Standing Orders already prescribed. Fundamentally

¹ This is not to be confused with mastery of these Rules, for throughout the first session, many Congressmen showed they had grasped little more than the simple order of enacting bills and resolutions.
similar to those of the preceding Legislative Council, they had been expanded to correspond with the Standing Orders of Australia's House of Representatives. With the House of Assembly's indigenous Membership relatively uneducated and inexperienced, few gained a comprehension of their complex provisions, and to the European Members fell the major responsibility for conducting the House's business. This, together with the very nature of the Westminster system, contributed to the average indigenous Member starting out at the periphery of the legislative process in Papua-New Guinea's House and never becoming central to its decision-making.

The House of Assembly's procedures are built mainly around influencing and not specifically directing the administration of the Territory and, more generally, are aimed at the shaping of public opinion. Raising Questions, making Budget and Adjournment speeches, and bringing matters of public importance before the House for debate, all have the potential of structuring public opinion, but they do not of themselves compel, and at best only persuade, action on the part of the government. Direction and authorisation in the form of bills normally are initiated by the Official Members in the House, and the presumption is that governmental policy, possibly modified, will prevail. Should it suffer defeat elsewhere the government may fall, but not in Papua-New Guinea. To take meaningful part in bending the government to Members' wishes requires mastery of subject-matter and skill at parliamentary manoeuvre. Lacking both, most indigenous Members merely raise the needs of their constituencies and voice their general satisfaction or disapproval of bills, but remain outside of the legislating phase of the House's work when the technical details are reached. To the extent that there is opposition within the House to the Official minority, it has primarily been European-led.

In Micronesia, with all chief executive officers outside the Congress, the latter is by its very nature always potentially in conflict with the Administration. There is no assurance that the Administration-sponsored programme will be enacted, and indeed, at the very first session of the Congress, 2 of its 11 bills died and others were amended. Most of the measures considered were initiated by the Congressmen themselves. As it consisted solely of indigenes, to the extent that leadership was exerted, it had to be by them. Through sitting on subject-matter committees, Congressmen developed varying degrees of competence in dealing with the specifics of government. Since the Congress, too, has limited financial powers, it principally had to rely upon requesting rather than compelling the Administration, but the vehicle used, the resolution, required majority concurrence of the body adopting it, rather than mere voicing for the record by a single legislator. One of the consequences was an absence of the parochialism and appeals to localism so prevalent in Papua-New Guinea's House
of Assembly: to secure majority approval required a Territory-wide outlook. Later would come the agreements of convenience by which assistance for one local improvement project is gained by promising to support those championed by other Congressmen. Of the 204 bills and resolutions introduced at the first Congress, only 10 carried any reference to a local area in a way pertinent to future governmental action and of these, two were at the instigation of the Administration.

Other contributing factors to these differences between the two legislatures were: (i) the prevailing philosophy among the Congressmen that the Congress was representative of the entire Territory, so should not give attention to problems which could be brought before district legislatures; (ii) the presence of Official Members in the House of Assembly who attended to the general matters, balanced at times by the opposition of the elected European Members, leaving the indigenous Members to concentrate their attention on local concerns; (iii) the procedures of the House, which facilitate the airing of parochial issues.

Evaluating the first years of the two legislatures, the House of Assembly has proven its competence in enacting legislation for a relatively sophisticated and specialised administration. It has not been as successful in providing form for the views of the individual elected Members so as to help shape both those laws and the general course of Papua-New Guinea affairs. As a preparation for the meaningful participation of indigenous Members in self-government it has been even less adequate, and has failed to promote the emergence of a structure of leadership among their number. The indigenous Member was not made to consider himself a meaningful part of government, which has remained external to him. In contrast, if comparably crude generalisations be attempted, the strength of the Congress of Micronesia has lain in its Members being encouraged to accept active roles in the governing of the Trust Territory and a sense of responsibility for setting its policies. The Congress did not succeed at its first session in developing strong leadership, so that its work was not as expeditiously handled as in Papua-New Guinea. However, the more permissive, 'gentle' form of direction practised well-fitted Micronesian mores, and was more conducive to the active involvement of Congressmen than would have been the case if a few Congressmen had dominated the proceedings. Left to its own resources, the Congress of Micronesia would not have had the capacity to accommodate the range and volume of business which the Papua-New Guinea government sought from its House of Assembly.

In neither area is there a sizeable body of informed or well-organised public opinion, which has meant, in Papua-New Guinea, that the procedures of the House of Assembly, which are so particularly designed to hold the Government before the judgment of
public opinion, were in this respect of relatively little utility. Paradoxically, given the education and general governmental experience of the Micronesian legislators, a Westminster-style parliament might have had more chance of realising its full capacity for thrust and parry if adopted for the American Trust Territory than for Papua-New Guinea. Viewing the conduct of government solely as a matter of engineering efficiency, with its purpose to be achieved with the least expenditure of energy and in the shortest possible time, the House of Assembly was far more productive, and in the light of the comparative inadequacies of its indigenous Members, far safer than an experiment with a structure embodying a separation of powers. Considering only the single aim of developing a viable polity for both areas, in which the indigenous inhabitants are aided along the course to self-government in the least possible time, the American model appears to offer greater promise. The same conclusion might not be reached had the organisation and processes of the House of Assembly been adapted more to fit the situation in Papua-New Guinea and not so directly copied from Australia.

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Chapter 7

Two New Guinea elections: Henganofi in 1964 and 1967*

In any country where elections are taken seriously they constitute a sort of bottleneck in the political process, a narrow strait or channel in which political life is for a short period concentrated under the eye of the observer. (Mackenzie 1957:242.)

The aim of this paper is to examine certain aspects of the 1964 and 1967 elections in Henganofi with a view to outlining some problems they raised that may be of use for future students of elections in the New Guinea highlands. The 1964 election was part of the country-wide general election, while the 1967 by-election was required under section 38, clause 4(a) of the Papua and New Guinea Act 1949-1963 because of the death of Ugi Biritu on 15 March 1967.

Background

The Henganofi electorate straddles the main highlands highway like an east-west figure of eight trending from the north-east to the south-west between Kainantu and Goroka. It embraces the Kafe and Dunantina census divisions of the Henganofi administrative area (which was raised to subdistrict status in 1965), and the Yagaria, Labogai and Unave (which was split from Labogai in 1966) census divisions of the Lufa administrative area. Not only do the

* The author would like to thank the following people who are in no way responsible for the shortcomings of this paper: Professor N. Meller for his guidance and encouragement; Mrs A. Bromman, Librarian, Department of District Administration, Konedobu, Mr Simon Kaumi, Deputy Chief Electoral Officer for Papua and New Guinea, Mr R.J. Giddings, A.D.C. Henganofi and Mrs Giddings, and Mr B.B. Holloway, M.H.A., Kainantu, for their assistance both in the field and afterwards. Professor S. Encel, Dr R.G. Crocombe and Mr J. Anthony made useful comments on an early draft of the manuscript. The map was drawn by John and Margaret Rumens.
electorate's boundaries cut across the normal administrative boundaries in the area, but they seem to have been drawn up with a minimum regard for the social and cultural affinities of the local people.

The Henganofi subdistrict consists almost entirely of Kamano speakers who are, for reasons of dubious administrative convenience, cut off from their wantoks (Pidgin for 'speakers of a common language') in the Kamano census division of the Kainantu subdistrict. In all, probably rather more than 31,342 people (Wurm 1960:127) now speak Kamano, but only about one-third of them are residentially qualified and of sufficient age to vote in the Henganofi electorate.

Following administrative usage, the Kamano now identify themselves with the Kafe people of the Henganofi area, or the Kamano of the Kainantu subdistrict. The distinction is not traditional.

In pre-contact times (i.e. pre-1930), and probably until the area was brought under administrative control (by about 1953 at Henganofi, and 1954 at Lufa), language-group names served 'as a basis of social identification but [did] not imply either political unity or collective action' (Berndt 1965:78). Indeed, in alignments formed for fighting, intermarriage and participation in religious and secular ceremonies, 'linguistic affiliations were largely irrelevant' (Berndt 1965:79). Political alliances were forged both within and across linguistic boundaries.

The Gimi (often referred to as the 'Gono' around Lufa) numbered 16,735 in 1960 (Wurm 1960:127). They live in the Unave and most of the Labogai census divisions of the Lufa area, and in the Gimi census division of the Okapa electorate and subdistrict.

Glick (1967:39) said of the Gimi shortly after they had been brought under control:

Relations among villages comprise all there is of political organisation; from the viewpoint of one village, other villages are the home of either consanguinal kin, affinal and avuncular kin, or enemies. These relations shift over time, so that today's enemies may be tomorrow's affines.

Less is known of the social structure of the 14,294 Yagaria speakers (Wurm 1960:127) in the northern Labogai and Yagaria census divisions, but it is probably similar to that of the Gimi and the Kamano. Whatever the linguistic status of Yagaria, the people there seem more conscious of internal dialectal differences than their neighbours. Thus, they distinguish carefully in conversation

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1 A language with a name that sounds like 'Bagage' is spoken in a few villages at the Head of the Dunantina Valley near the Ramu Fall. This language is rapidly being displaced by Kafe.
between speakers of the Lufa dialect, and Frigano which is spoken throughout most of the Yagaria census division from about seven miles east of Lufa station along the road to Goroka. The Lufa dialect extends south into the northern part of Labogai near Lufa station.

Throughout this part of the highlands, linguistic boundaries are vague, and may cut across traditional trading routes and other social, political and ceremonial linkages. There is also a great deal of bi- and even multi-lingualism towards the edge of each linguistic area.

The 1964 general election

Henganofi was one of only five electorates in Papua and New Guinea in which the candidate who gained a plurality of the primary votes cast in the 1964 general election did not win after preferences had been distributed (Hughes and van der Veur 1965:406-11). The Henganofi electorate was also remarkable for the high percentage turnout (86.6 per cent) of eligible voters, one of the three highest in the country (Hughes and van der Veur 1965:402), and the persistence with which voters voiced their second and subsequent preferences. Only 10.89 per cent of the votes cast for the first three candidates to be eliminated were exhausted before the fourth count, although it is impossible to tell whether the voters who gave their first choice to Ugi or Bono were equally as assiduous in indicating their subsequent preferences. Both the high turnout of voters and the careful expression of preferences may have been a reflection of the polling officials' zeal rather than the voters' interest in or understanding of the election.

The result of the election was:

Table 1

The allocation of preferences at Henganofi, 1964

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>First count</th>
<th>Second count</th>
<th>Third count</th>
<th>Fourth count</th>
<th>Final count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forapi Maunori</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(787)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posi Latara'oi</td>
<td>1,758</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(1,770)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pupuna Aruno</td>
<td>3,708</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(3,822)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bono Azanifa</td>
<td>8,028</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>8,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ugi Biritu</td>
<td>3,925</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>1,362</td>
<td>3,274</td>
<td>9,228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exhausted</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>681</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Candidate's personal total at time of elimination.

Fortunately, the unofficial breakdown of the primary vote by polling-centres has survived. As the voting at the Maimafu, Guwasa,
Liborei, Ubigubi, Heroana, Karulai and Mengino booths was so uniform, however, they will be shown together as the Gimi booths, while the Kafetegu, Hageri, Kesavaka, Henganofi, Komoga, Kingio and Tebeega booths will be treated as the Kafe set of booths. Even at those booths where votes were more freely shared among candidates, it is possible to assign each booth to a specific cultural or linguistic area: Higibabi, Fore and Nupuru served mainly voters from the Frigano dialect area, and Lufa, those from the Lufa dialect. Only Hairo served a markedly heterogenous population of Lufa and Frigano speakers, while the number of alien voters at Henganofi and Lufa was too small to be of any account.

The primary vote can, therefore, be broken down according to area:

Table 2

Breakdown of the primary vote by booth(s), 1964

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Forapi</th>
<th>Posi</th>
<th>Pupuna</th>
<th>Bono</th>
<th>Ugi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polling booth(s):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gimi</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3,629</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lufa</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hairo</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higibabi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fore</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>956</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nupuru</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1,866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafe</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,649</td>
<td>1,866</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pupuna came from the Gimi, Forapi from Lufa, Ugi and Posi from the Frigano, and Bono from the Kafe area. Thus, excluding absentee votes which could not be allocated to particular booths, every candidate polled more than 95 per cent of his primary vote in his home dialect (language in the case of Bono and Pupuna) area, while 98 per cent of the votes cast in each such area, except at Lufa and Hairo, went to candidates speaking the local dialect as their first dialect. Forapi gained 82.04 per cent of the Lufa vote and only 1 per cent of the votes cast at Hairo, while Ugi gained 14.86 per cent and 85.02 per cent respectively. Ugi lived on the station at Lufa and was able to campaign in the Lufa dialect area before the election, while Forapi was in gaol.

In only one dialectal area was there more than one 'ethnic' candidate.¹ Ugi won at the dialectally mixed Hairo booth and at Nupuru, ¹ 'Ethnic candidates' are men who come from villages of the area and are 'each ethnically and linguistically identified, willy-nilly, with a certain segment of the larger electorate' (Watson 1965:97).
the two (Frigano-speaking) booths nearest his home. Posi, on the other hand, won at the two Frigano booths nearest his home, although the Higibabi vote was quite seriously split. Ugi gained 228 votes at Higibabi to Posi's 334, with only 3 votes going to outsiders, thereby reflecting the geographical position of the booth, i.e. only just on what might be termed 'Posi's side' of the Frigano.

The leading vote-getter on the primary count at each set of polling booths had the following characteristics:

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader at polling booth(s)</th>
<th>Spoke local dialect as own</th>
<th>Spoke local language as own</th>
<th>'Home' village nearest the booth* #</th>
<th>Lived nearest the booth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gimi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lufa</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hairo (dialect-ally mixed)</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higibabi</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fore</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nupuru</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafe</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

/ = has this characteristic. x = does not have this characteristic. - = not relevant.

* More than one candidate may claim a polling place, and one candidate may claim more than one polling place if several are almost equally distant from candidate's home village or current place of abode.

# 'Home' as defined by the candidate.

** Ugi and Forapi lived at Lufa and, therefore, equally close to Hairo.

Thus, the winning candidate at each booth came from the local dialectal area. Where the vote was split, as at Lufa and Hairo, the candidates' places of abode at the time of the election and the extent of their campaigns may have played a part. Only at Nupuru did the winning candidate not live closest to the booth, though Posi scarcely lived close by, and Ugi's home village was closer than Posi's. It seems, therefore, that the primary vote was distributed largely on dialectal and linguistic lines, but was modified by the presence of a dialectal outsider but linguistic insider, at Lufa. Where there was more than one 'ethnic' candidate, the closeness of the candidates' homes, rather than their current places of abode, appears to have determined how the vote was split.
The distribution of the primary vote on dialectal and linguistic lines was repeated when preferences were distributed. Ugi alone of all the candidates was fluent in Gimi, Kafe and the two principal Yagaria dialects. He was also well known throughout the Lufa area as an Administration interpreter. Thus, 84.74 per cent\(^1\) of Forapi's second preferences went to Ugi, his fellow Lufa speaker and co-resident at Lufa. Also, 76.93 per cent of Posi's preferences went to his wantok, Ugi, and 85.65 per cent of Pupuna's preferences followed suit. It is impossible to tell how many of Posi's preferences went to Ugi via Forapi, and how many of Pupuna's via Posi and/or Forapi. The geographical factor cannot easily be distinguished here, as the Frigano, Lufa and Gimi areas shared a common border. So few of Posi's preferences went to Bono, however (2.4 per cent), that purely geographical considerations seem to have been offset, firstly, by dialectal affiliation, and, given Pupuna's slightly better showing, even by subdistrict boundaries.

It seems clear, then, that linguistic affiliation was the principal determinant of how people voted initially and allocated their preferences. Perhaps the entire phenomenon is explicable simply in terms of the traditional flow of communications through, for example, trading routes or kinship ties, or in terms of the ease with which both candidates and voters could communicate with each other. While linguistic affiliation was the single most dominant determinant of voting behaviour, it provided at best only a partial explanation of the result of the poll.

A single factor explanation would not cover the results at Lufa and Hairo. In these two cases it seems certain that Ugi's residence in the area may explain his comparatively high primary vote at Lufa (at least for a dialectal outsider), while Forapi's failure to campaign may have meant that the Hairo voters knew of only one relative linguistic insider who spoke their dialect, Ugi.

The result of the 1964 poll did imply, though only very inconclusively, that in areas where there was a relatively high degree of bilingualism, as at the Nupuru booth, where some Kafe is spoken in addition to the local Frigano dialect, preferences would not cross administrative boundaries. At this stage, it was only a hunch.

A comparison was made of the election results with the extent of a candidate's campaign cover. Forapi spent the last month before the polls opened in gaol for adultery. Nonetheless, he still won at home, at Lufa proper, although he lost at Hairo, which is still in the Lufa dialectal area. Ugi, Pupuna and Posi campaigned over

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\(^1\) The percentages cited here include all formal votes cast, both absentee ballots and those cast within the electorate.
a considerable part of the Lufa administrative area, and ventured
together some distance into the Kafe area. They gained very few
primary votes in the Kafe area, although it is impossible now to
discover how preferences, if any, were allocated on Bono's ballots.
Bono campaigned in the Kafe area, and in the Lufa area as far south
as Beha, where some of his party allegedly got into trouble with
local women.\(^1\) His trip yielded him only 271 preference votes
altogether. Bono was also the only candidate with a campaign-
poster, which read 'oli makim Bono long big guvmen' (Pidgin for
'everyone is voting for Bono to go to the big government'). Its
influence either in Bono's home area or beyond cannot be estimated,
as the poster's circulation is unknown.

It seems, therefore, that campaigning, at least in Western terms,
was useful only as a means of solidifying the votes of the candi-
dates' wantoks rather than in gaining support in linguistically
alien areas. Campaigning in alien areas seemed to be useful only
where the local ethnic candidate did not campaign, or was unknown.
Secondly, where there were two candidates from one linguistic
area, the vote was split according to the residential proximity of
either candidate to a particular group of voters. At Lufa, Ugi's
residential proximity enabled him to draw away 14.86 per cent of
the Lufa primary vote from Forapi, who lived, but could not cam-
paign, there.

The 1967 by-election

Seven candidates nominated for the 1967 by-election, although
the winner would serve for no more than six months in the House of
Assembly, i.e. for two meetings of the House, before having to
stand for election again, in either of the new Lufa and Henganofl
electorates early in 1968.

Originally it seemed that there would be six likely candidates
from the Kafe area. The first to withdraw his proposed candidature
was a Papuan schoolteacher from the Gulf District. He had taught
at Henganofl for a few years until the start of 1967, and had had
quite a deal to do with the local councillors, of whose support he
was relatively confident. His confidence seemed, however, to have
very little basis in fact despite his evident idealism about what
he could do for 'his' people if elected. He renounced his intention
to stand when he was shown a map of the electorate, and realised
that he did not know, and was not known in, the Lufa area, or much
beyond the station area of Henganofl.

\(^1\) It seems to have been a feature of the election period in a
number of areas that a few candidates and/or their followers re-
garded it as an occasion for relatively unrestrained sexual activity
away from home.
The five remaining potential Kafe candidates were the president of the Kafe (now Henganofi) local government council, Kimi Anozapme (Atiheme), the principal vice-president, Bono, whose census division had entered the council in March 1964, a member of the council's finance committee, Kutanama, the council tax clerk, Nom, and its bosboi, Breraruso. Bono and Kutanama had been probably the two most outstanding lulua in the Kafe area throughout the 1950s, while Breraruso had been a councillor for three years until Kimi, who had been the station interpreter since 1951, was elected in his stead. Breraruso and Kimi had what they loosely termed a 'brotherly' relationship, for their mothers both came from the one clan in the same village, although their fathers, and in consequence they themselves, belonged to different clans within Ababe village.

Just before nominations opened, there was some talk in the Kafe area in favour of convening a general meeting to decide who should nominate in the forthcoming by-election. The meeting did not eventuate, however, so on 2 April, six days after nominations had opened, Kimi raised the matter at a meeting of the Kafe local government council. Four men from Lufa had stood at the last election, Kimi said, and the Lufas had won. The Kafe people, he felt, must remedy the situation. Whether he defined the Kafe people as a linguistic or a council group at this stage is uncertain. A councillor from the Henganofi area, who had attacked Ugi for dereliction of duty before the House of Assembly's Select Committee on Constitutional Development the previous March, therefore moved that Kimi be allowed to stand for election. A second councillor then moved that Bono be a candidate too, and the council resolved that there be only two candidates from the Kafe area. Curiously, the councillors from the Fayantina census division, which is included in the Okapa electorate, were allowed to vote on the resolution.

In private interviews later on, the local kiap conscientiously emphasised to the thwarted would-be nominees that they still had the right to stand for election, but to no effect. The council's decision, whatever its legal standing, seemed to be accepted as legitimate even by the losers. The council manoeuvre seems to have been carried out with no prior warning to those it prevented from nominating. Only Breraruso had heard mutterings in his village against his proposed nomination as being that of a bighead and upstart.

At Lufa, Pupuna was again a candidate, though he was no longer a mission catechist, but the local council's tractor-driver. There were two candidates from the Frigano again, Wanumei Dimigura and Sunavi Otiyo, and two from the Lufa dialect group, Lovana Yaneipa (James) and Dogeba Aigoba (Moses). Both Wanumei and Moses were related to Ugi. Wanumei is a poroman or age-mate of Ugi, and is Ugi's obvious successor in that he now drives Ugi's truck and looks
after Ugi's wife and three children. Moses and Ugi had a common grandmother, while Moses's mother also came from Mobei, Ugi's birthplace. Moses claimed to have called Ugi 'brother' and that this regard was mutual. Whether Wanumei and Moses were attempting to assert a family right of inheritance seems doubtful. Perhaps their candidature simply reflected a common political background, although it seems more likely that they both stood for reasons connected with traditional rivalries in the area.

Bono took advantage of the local kiap's offer and accompanied him on electoral education talks at various central points in the Kafe area during the first week of July. Kimi did not accept the invitation due to pressure of council work, and campaigned only at Kesavaka, where Bono lives, and nearby. The kiap made a point of not allowing the candidates to speak until after the electoral education talk was over, and he had walked away. Thus, Bono was able to campaign over the whole of the Kafe area, though he did not venture outside it.

Wanumei, who works in Goroka, and Sunavi, who often stays in Goroka with his wife's people, came to Henganofi during the campaign period on business, but did not campaign there. James worked as a coffee-buyer throughout the campaign period, and did not campaign much beyond his immediate home area, because, as a relative put it, 'the other people will not vote for him'. Pupuna alone of the Lufa candidates ventured into the Kafe area, to Gintinu, to campaign for a day when a local mission lent him a motorcycle. Pupuna, Wanumei, Sunavi and Moses did a limited amount of campaigning together in the area around Lufa station.

Apart from the help given to Pupuna, a second candidate received a more spiritual form of assistance from the same mission. He claimed to have been told that God would help him to win if he changed his mission affiliation to that of his wife on the Sunday after polling day. The mission gained an extra soul, though not that of the local member.

Of those enrolled, 75.8 per cent turned out for the country's first one-day poll, still a slightly higher percentage than the country-wide average of 72.3 per cent in 1964 (Chief Electoral Officer 1964:36), but lower than the 1964 figure for Henganofi, perhaps because of the local kiaps' insistence in their electoral education talks on the purely voluntary nature of the right to vote.

The result of the election was:

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1 The official explanation of their use of official vehicles is that one candidate used his official position, and one a personal reason, to obtain passage in the kiap's car.
Table 4

The allocation of preferences, 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>First count</th>
<th>Second count</th>
<th>Third count</th>
<th>Fourth count</th>
<th>Fifth count</th>
<th>Sixth count</th>
<th>Final count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kimi Anozapme (Atiheme)</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(770)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunavi Otijo</td>
<td>1,121</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(1,129)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dogeba Aigoba (Moses)</td>
<td>1,373</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(1,393)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lovana Yaneipa (James)</td>
<td>1,416</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(2,191)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanumei Dimigura</td>
<td>2,375</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(3,498)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pupuna Aruno</td>
<td>3,565</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>798</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>5,977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bono Azanifa</td>
<td>5,954</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>6,505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exhausted</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>2,656</td>
<td>4,092</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Candidate's personal vote at time of elimination.

Although only 54.56 per cent of Kimi's primary votes indicated any preferences at all, 97.16 per cent of his second preferences went to Bono. From personal observation, it seemed that very few indeed of the primary votes cast for Bono indicated any preferences at all, although a very clear majority of those expressed were for only a second choice, Kimi. Having been beaten on preferences last time, Bono's supporters showed a very clear dislike of the preferential system and were usually content to indicate just a first choice, although, once again, the kia'ps' insistence that voters could express as few preferences as they liked may have influenced the result.

Both Sunavi and Wanumei spend much of their time at Goroka, while James, although a Lufa-speaker by birth, lives in the Frigano area near Ologuti. Thus, 54.8 per cent of Sunavi's votes on the second count that expressed any further preferences at all went to James, who lived roughly midway between Sunavi's and Wanumei's home villages anyway, and who was, therefore, closest to Sunavi's. Indeed, the allocation of Sunavi's preferences tallies quite well with the split in the primary vote at Higibabi and Fore, where James drew 26.42 per cent of the total primary vote away from both Wanumei and Sunavi in the first case, and 41.45 per cent from Sunavi alone in the second.

Most of Moses' preferences (72.11 per cent) went to Pupuna, his co-resident at Lufa, while 12.75 per cent went to his wantok James who was but little known in the area, and 14.55 per cent to Wanumei. The distribution of Moses' preferences can, presumably, be explained in much the same way as Forapi's failure to do well at Hairo in
1964. Where the leading candidate's wantok (in this case, James) is not well known in the area, then a candidate who lives and is known there can be expected to do well. The drift of preferences to Wanumei can probably be explained in terms of his association with Ugi.

An analysis of the drift of James' and Wanumei's preferences would be futile here, as it is not known via whom they were passed on to the candidates still remaining in the ballot. Most of James' remaining preferences went to his fellow Yagaria speaker, Wanumei, though it is not known via which eliminated candidates or why so many went to Pupuna. At the outside, however, no more than 35.46 per cent of Wanumei's primary votes included any reference at all to other candidates, and then only to those who had already been eliminated. Certainly, very few of the ballots that were counted at Lufa went beyond stating a third preference, while only 10 ballot papers in all at Henganofi went past number two.

Of the primary votes in the Henganofi subdistrict, 99.86 per cent went to the two Kafe candidates, who together polled only 29 votes in the Lufa area. Bono alone polled 77.31 per cent of the total Kafe vote. Bono's overwhelming defeat of Kimi, however, requires a special explanation. Bono is probably one of the best known and most widely respected leaders in the Eastern Highlands. As a luluai he was, like Kondom, 'a very enthusiastic, pro-government man, [although] too often coercion [found] a place in his otherwise enlightened outlook' (Brown 1963:10). He was as much an Administration satrap as ever Kondom was, i.e. 'his manner and his continued patronage by the administration preclude(d) any question of authorisation to deal with matters never handled by traditional leaders' (Brown 1963:11), nor probably by most luluais.

The traditional criteria for leadership among the Kafe people depended on a man's prestige gained from his skill at economic exchange, and his 'strength'. 'Strength' in this case called for 'a dominant, aggressive personality' (Berndt 1962:174), which had 'just those traits...admired by the Administration' (Berndt 1962:320) at least in the early years after contact. Bono's name, then, was widely known, admired in official circles, and highly respected in his own area. Indeed, for a time he was luluai of two villages, Kesavaka and neighbouring Beiyanofi, when the local Administration experienced some difficulty in finding a new luluai for the latter. Bono's reputation as an individual entrepreneur of some standing (indeed, probably the most considerable indigenous businessman in the Kafe area, and certainly in the Dunantina Valley), and his pro-Administration attitude were probably responsible for his selection for an Administration-sponsored political education tour to Australia in 1963 (De'Ath 1963).¹

¹ As 9 of the original 38 members of the House of Assembly (now, of course, 10 out of 39) went on these tours in 1962-63 (van der Veur
Quite apart from Bono's prestige as a leader among the Kafe, he was probably helped by widespread fears about Kimi's health following the latter's two stomach operations a few months before the poll. These fears, however rationally based at first, received additional impetus from the widespread belief in the Eastern Highlands that there must be something inherently dangerous about politics, for several prominent politicians from the Chimbu and Eastern Highlands Districts had died during the preceding few months. Bono also campaigned throughout the Kafe area, and this probably consolidated his hold on the local vote.\(^1\)

Kimi did not win a majority even at his 'home' booth, Henganofi, where he lived on the station, and where his home village, Ababe, voted. It seems likely, though the figures are not sufficiently accurate to prove the point, that even the Ababe vote was split, perhaps complicated by Brereruso's elimination from the contest. Only at Tebega did Kimi gain a narrow majority of the vote (390 to Bono's 304), for which there is no ready explanation. Perhaps the split vote there, and the low voter turnout (only 52.11 per cent) indicated an equal dislike of both candidates, following Nom's failure to stand in view of the council's earlier decision to restrict the number of Kafe candidates.

Again, Pupuna gained almost all the primary votes cast in the Gimi (96.85 per cent), although this time only 88.24 per cent of his total vote came from the Gimi. He gained second place to Moses at Lufa with 323 votes, so that 97.57 per cent of his total vote came from his own linguistic area, and where he lived (see Tables 5 and 6).

From the Lufa area (i.e. from the Lufa and Hairo booths) came 93.96 per cent of Moses' primary votes, although Wanumei also did well at Lufa proper and gained 181 votes, presumably mainly from Ugi's personal following. James, the second Lufa dialect candidate, gained only 6 votes at Lufa station, although he came second to Moses at Hairo, near his birthplace. In the end, James gained only 39.79 per cent of his total vote in the Lufa dialect area.

(continued)

1965:449) it seems worthwhile to ask to what extent these trips represented a reward for recognised leadership, and to what extent they unintentionally added the prestige of Administration approval and overseas travel to the aspiring.

\(^1\) I was told, after the election, that Bono had dreamt beforehand that Ugi had handed him the key to the House of Assembly thereby indicating that Bono would win the by-election. I was unable to check either the circulation or the currency of the story, and so cannot evaluate its likely influence on the results of the poll.
Table 5
Breakdown of the primary vote by booth(s), 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polling booth(s)</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Gimi</th>
<th>Lufa</th>
<th>Hairo</th>
<th>Higibabi</th>
<th>Fore</th>
<th>Nipuru</th>
<th>Kafe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gimi</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3,146</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lufa</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hairo</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higibabi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fore</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nipuru</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1,485</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafe</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,903</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6
Characteristics of the leader on the first count at each polling booth, 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader at polling booth(s)</th>
<th>Spoke local dialect as own</th>
<th>Spoke local language as own</th>
<th>'Home' village nearest the booth* #</th>
<th>Lived nearest the booth*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gimi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lufa</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hairo</td>
<td>/###</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>x###</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higibabi</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>only when in the Lufa area at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fore</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nupuru</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafe φφφ</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

/ = has this characteristic. x = does not have this characteristic. - = not relevant

* More than one candidate may claim a polling place, and one candidate may claim more than one polling place if several are almost equally distant from candidate's home village or current place of abode.

# 'Home' as defined by the candidate.

** Pupuna and Moses lived equi-distant from the Gimi, but here the alien's residential proximity gained him only 1.5 per cent of the vote.

*** Moses and Pupuna both lived at Lufa. ## True of both James and Moses.

### Untrue, James came from closer by than Moses, but, taken together, they were the two closest candidates.

φ James lives closest, but is dialectally alien.

φφ James did well at Higibabi because he usually lives in the area, whereas Sunavi is often out of the area altogether.

φφφ For the purposes of this table, Bono and Kimi are treated together. The Kafe vote was significantly split only at Henganofi and Tebega (see above).
Some questions and tentative conclusions

One feature especially emerges from the foregoing study. With a preferential voting system in which it is not compulsory to indicate all preferences, it is largely a matter of luck who wins. Thus, had so many of Wanumei's votes not been exhausted on the sixth count, or perhaps had the local polling officials in the Lufa area been more assiduous in eliciting preferences from those voters who required their assistance (officially estimated at more than 95 per cent of those who voted), and had Pupuna been placed anywhere ahead of Bono in most of those preferences, as seems likely, then Pupuna might have won. In 1964, the Henganofi electorate provided one of the most startling demonstrations of how well a preferential system could appear to work so as to force once-hostile groups to compromise on a particular candidate. In 1967, it showed that a preferential system is neither understood by most of the local people, nor is the result it provides statistically meaningful unless the winner can, in fact, gain a majority of the formal votes cast, at least after preferences have been distributed. Bono won only because so many of Wanumei's votes were exhausted at the sixth count, at which stage Bono had half of the votes remaining in the ballot, but was still 10.76 per cent short of a majority of the total votes cast in the election. In 1964, he had gained 44.09 per cent of the vote on the first count alone, and still lost. A comparison of the 1964 general election with the 1966 by-election in Kaindi leads to exactly the same conclusion, i.e. in 1964 Bloomfield had to come from behind another candidate on the first count to win on the eighth count, while Voutas managed to win on the first count in 1966. Apparently, most of Voutas' primary votes, like Bono's, indicated no subsequent preferences at all. Clearly, therefore, it would have been in Bono's and Kimi's interest to discourage voters from expressing anything beyond a second preference (though they did not explicitly do so) and in that of the Lufa candidates to argue against going beyond a fifth preference, i.e. against marking any preferences at all for the Kafe candidates, if they wished to ensure the victory of one of their own men, or at least to spoil their opponents' chances.

Deals formulated along these lines may be expected between candidates in 1968, as well as a no-preferences campaign by 'spoilers' sure of victory in their home areas.

Several problems stand out as likely to repay closer study in 1968.

(i) Localisation of support

According to two students of the 1964 election, 'localisation was the outstanding characteristic of electoral support' (Hughes and van der Veur 1965:427). Groves (1967:239-40), however, has criticised this formulation on three counts: (a) the failure to define exactly what is meant by 'local' support; (b) the alleged
lack of empirical support for the hypothesis; (c) the failure of
the hypothesis, even if it were meaningful and sound, to explain
anything. Although it is not my intention to enter into the
general argument between Groves and Hughes-van der Veur, the two
Henganofi elections discussed illuminate the disagreement.¹ The
foregoing analysis, it is believed, provides some indication as to
the probable components of 'localised' support based on evidence
derived from two separate elections, and may help to explain the
importance of campaigning and candidates' behaviour while on
campaign.

In both elections, language played a considerable role in
determining how people voted. Why it did so is still in doubt,
although it does seem that a strong feeling of language-group
identity is emerging in some parts of the highlands.

In no area in either election did less than 74 per cent of the
local vote go to a wantok. On the other hand, only two candidates,
James with 39.79 per cent and Ugi with 42.19 per cent, did not gain
at least 88 per cent of their primary vote in their home area. In
both of these cases, the candidates received more than 99 per cent
of their votes from their home language area, though not their
primary dialectal area, as they were resident in a foreign dialectal
area of the same language-group.

Residential or home village proximity, therefore, may affect the
vote within a given linguistic area, and across dialectal bounda-
ries, although even then James received only 20.84 per cent of the
total Frigano vote in 1967. Ugi on the other hand, was able to win
52.59 per cent of the total Lufa dialectal vote. Residential or
home village proximity is also the apparent, though not necessarily
the only, explanation of the split in the Frigano vote in 1964 and
1967, and in the Lufa vote in 1967. Clearly, this point requires
detailed investigation by an anthropologist.

Ugi's victory at Lufa and Hairo, therefore, and James' compara-
tive success at Fore and Higibabi, also indicate that residential
and/or home village proximity outweighed linguistic similarity to
the area in places where the linguistic insider was unknown, but
the comparative outsider lived. Western-style campaigning just
before the election seemed to be of little relevance, in that
Bono's campaign in 1964 yielded him scarcely a preference in the
Lufa area, and no one else seems to have benefited from campaigning.
Bono's clearcut victory over Kimi, and Ugi's victory over Forapi,
as well as James (above) indicate that campaigning may be important
in order to become better known and to consolidate the local vote,
rather than to gain converts from a linguistically alien area.

¹ This paper casts no light on the problem of 'localised' support
for European or non-ethnic Papuan and New Guinean candidates.
The comparatively small drift of preferences from the Lufa area to Bono on both occasions indicates that in areas where there is a relatively high degree of bilingualism, such as at the Nupuru booth, administrative boundaries play their part in 'containing' the local vote.

Few of the candidates in 1967 knew each other, or could even name all of their rivals, and none ventured far afield to campaign. The phenomenon of a group of candidates campaigning together, which occurred in 1964 and 1967, also indicates either that the conception of campaigning is essentially alien, that the determinants of voting behaviour are 'given' so that the candidates might as well be seen together in areas of heterogeneous population in the hope of picking up a few stray preferences, or it may be a culturally founded trait based on the traditional idea of group leadership, and a desire to avoid charges of individual bigheadedness.

Thus, although conflicts at the local level may still continue as before, many Papuans and New Guineans may be beginning to identify themselves in different contexts according to the widest-ranging point of identifiable differentiation between two competitors in a given situation. Thus, men from different villages and clans may still hate each other as before while at home, but will perceive their interests in language-group terms, then subdistrict or district terms, and in highlands-versus-coastal terms, etc., when away from home. This is certainly the emerging urban pattern. Could it be that new intermediate loyalties are being set up, as a preliminary to, or to delay the long journey from, 'village chauvinism' (Glick 1967:39) to Territory-wide nationalism?

The final word on the importance of language in the country's politics, at least in the Kafe area, has been provided by the two Kafe candidates. Kimi complained that Ugi had not done anything to implement his request that the Kamanos of the Kainantu subdistrict be allowed to leave the Kainantu council for the Kafe council:

We are one language-group and should be under one council.
One language, one way of thinking.... A council is something that serves one language-group. That is a good idea....
(Translated from Pidgin.)

Bono's first question as a member of the House of Assembly was directed to the Assistant Administrator (Services):

(1) Is he aware that the people of the Kumano [sic] are concerned at having been included in the Kainantu electorate rather than in the Henganofi electorate, since they belong to the same linguistic group as the Henganofi people.
(2) Can anything be done to restore these people to the Henganofi electorate.\textsuperscript{1}

There may be more at stake in this area than mere ease of communication. Clearly, at least the Kamano-speaking people have quite a strong emotional attachment to their language, an attachment that seems to have obvious implications for political action. The inclusion of the Fayantina in the new Henganofi electorate so that the Kafe have one electorate census of their own, and representation still at Kainantu, clearly does not provide the unity of Kamanos that they seek, even at the cost of losing a say in an additional electorate.

(ii) The role of local government councils

The tactic of seeking a local government council's endorsement was used by Toni Voutas in the 1966 by-election in Kaindi, and is already being attempted by a number of potential candidates for the 1968 general election. Usually, however, endorsement is sought from the councillors as individuals, for councils have no legal power to decide who should or should not stand for the House of Assembly. But the tactic was used at Henganofi, for the first time to my knowledge, to eliminate prospective candidates. Clearly, the local council must have 'taken' well in the Henganofi area, for not only is association with the council a potential source of prestige in itself, but the council's preselection of candidates for the House of Assembly was regarded as legitimate even by those who were eliminated by it.

(iii) Kinship

It is uncertain, but doubtful, if Wanumei or Moses was trying to assert a family right of succession to Ugi. Moses claimed that he would have stood for election in 1968 even if Ugi had lived. Comparison of the Lufa situation with that at Henganofi, where both Kimi and Breraruso wanted to stand, and with similar family rivalries in other areas as candidates prepare for the 1968 election, indicate that there is a problem here which merits study by an anthropologist. It does seem, nonetheless, that a tentative hypothesis can be put forward that, while more distantly felt rivalries can be contained within the facade of linguistic unity, very close, intensely held interclan or intra-familial rivalries may be projected onto the national electoral scene. In such cases, the nomination of a candidate from one group is sufficient to provoke its rivals to action, and thus group honour may be maintained, although the electoral chances of either candidate may be destroyed.

\textsuperscript{1} H.A.D., 1:13:2706.
(iv) General

Finally, it would be interesting to know to what extent mission interference may have influenced the result of the election, and how fears of sorcery and magic, especially in the light of Kimi's recent operations, may have affected especially the Kafe voters. As both Ugi and Bono lacked an obvious foil, one can also only speculate how much and why a candidate's reputation as a 'government man' may have helped him.

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