INDONESIA:
THE MAKING OF A NATION

Editor: J.A.C. Mackie

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School Secretary,  
Research School of Pacific Studies,  
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PREFACE

The past decade has seen a remarkable increase in the formal study of Indonesia in Australian universities, but nowhere has this increase been more dramatic than at The Australian National University. The choice of Indonesia as the subject for the second annual School Seminar of the Research School of Pacific Studies was therefore both pertinent and obvious. This seminar, entitled 'The Indonesian Connection', was held on the last two days of each week for five weeks during the month of November 1979. In all, fifty papers were presented, covering a range of topics from Indonesia's geomorphological formation to its current politics. These papers were expressly intended for a general audience and were specifically written to provide some idea of the variety of research recently undertaken within Australia and, in particular, at The Australian National University.

Publication of such a large number of diverse papers necessitated a special format. It was decided to publish all the seminar papers as a single volume entitled Indonesia: Australian Perspectives, and at the same time to publish three separate volumes that grouped various papers into broadly appropriate sections. Volume I, Indonesia: The Making of a Culture, deals with the environment and peopling of Indonesia and with the formation of the religious and social identities of its population. Volume II, Indonesia: Dualism, Growth and Poverty, contains papers dealing with the Indonesian economy and its development. Volume III, Indonesia: The Making of a Nation, includes papers on political and social change in modern Indonesia and Indonesia's relations as a nation with its neighbours. Since the intention of the seminar was to juxtapose different academic disciplines in each week's programme, the arrangement of these separate volumes reflects this aim.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:

The 1979 School Seminar was organized on the initiative of the Director of the Research School of Pacific Studies, Professor Wang Gungwu, who kept a supervisory eye on progress at all stages. The seminar was planned by a committee comprising James J. Fox, Ross Garnaut, Peter McCawley, Jamie Mackie, Hank Nelson, Tony Reid, Nigel Wace and Stephen Wurm. Graham Hutchens played a major role in the administration of the seminar, ably assisted by Toni Purdy.

The editors are particularly grateful for the careful work of the copy-editors, Judith Wilson (Volume I), Anna Weidemann and Marian May (Volume II), Virginia Matheson and Charlotta Blomberg (Volume III). They acknowledge with thanks the good work of May McKenzie, who supervised the typing and lay out of the entire volume, and Gloria Alman, Dianne Stacey and Dorothy Hush, who typed the volume with skill and patience. They also thank Professor Stephen Wurm, who organized the design of the cover and advised on the production of the volume, and the cartographers of the Department of Human Geography for their assistance with maps. The volume was produced by SOCPAC Printery under the direction of Mr C. Hutchison.
CONTENTS

Preface iii

Abbreviations 557

Introduction 559
J.A.C. MACKIE

ELEMENTS IN THE CONTINUING TRADITION

Rebellion in the kraton world as seen by the pujangga
SUPOMO SURYOHUDOJO 563

The peasantry and the state on Java:
changes of relationship, seventeenth to
nineteenth centuries
ANN KUMAR 577

Second thoughts on Indonesian nationalism
W.J. O'MALLEY 601

The place of communism
REX MORTIMER 615

Islam as a political force in Indonesia
DELIAR NOER 633
ASPECTS OF CONTEMPORARY POLITICS

Legitimacy questions and the Suharto polity 649
HERBERT FEITH

The New Order: the prospect for political stability 657
HAROLD CROUCH

Integrating and centrifugal factors in Indonesian politics since 1945 669
J.A.C. MACKIE

The regions and national development under the New Order 685
M.A. NAWAWI

The political economy of New Order Indonesia in a comparative regional perspective 699
JEFFREY RACE

THE NATION AND ITS NEIGHBOURS

Timor and West Irian: the reasons why 713
PETER HASTINGS

Irian Jaya: West Papuan nationalism in 1979 721
R.J. MAY

China and the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia 729
CHARLES A. COPPEL

Indonesia and her Southeast Asian neighbours 735
CAVAN HOGUE

Economic relations between Australia and Indonesia 741
H.W. ARNDT

Indonesia and Australia: political aspects 755
E.G. WHITLAM

Contributors 767
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAP</td>
<td>Australian Associated Press</td>
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<td>ABRI</td>
<td>Angkatan Bersendjata Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia)</td>
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<td>ADITLA</td>
<td>Associação Democrática para Integração Timor Leste con Australia (Democratic Association for the Integration of East Timor with Australia)</td>
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<td>ALP</td>
<td>Australian Labor Party</td>
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<td>ASAA</td>
<td>Asian Studies Association of Australia</td>
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<td>ASDT</td>
<td>Associação Social Democrática Timorense (Timor Social Democratic Association)</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAKIN</td>
<td>Badan Koordinasi Intelidjen Negara (State Intelligence Co-ordinating Body)</td>
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<td>BAKOM</td>
<td>Badan Komando (Command Unit)</td>
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<td>BG</td>
<td>Babad Giyanti</td>
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<td>BIES</td>
<td>Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>BJI</td>
<td>Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (Contributions to Linguistics, Geography and Ethnography [of Netherlands Indies])</td>
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<tr>
<td>BKMC</td>
<td>Badan Koordinasi Masalah Cina (Co-ordinating Body for the Chinese Problem)</td>
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<td>BPKI</td>
<td>Badan Penyelidik Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Committee for the Investigation of Indonesian Independence)</td>
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<td>BTJ</td>
<td>Babad Tanah Jawi</td>
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<td>BULOG</td>
<td>Badan Urusan Logistik (Agency for Logistics Affairs)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECAFÉ</td>
<td>Economic Mission for Asia and the Far East</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>ESCAP</td>
<td>Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific</td>
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<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambique Liberation Front)</td>
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<td>FRETLIN</td>
<td>Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor)</td>
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<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<td>HANKAM</td>
<td>Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan (Department of Defence and Security)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KOTA</td>
<td>Klibur Oan Timur Aswaina (Group of Heroes of the People of Timor)</td>
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LPKB  i) Lembaga Pembinaan Kebudayaan Bangsa (Organization for the Building of National Culture)
  ii) Lembaga Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa (Organization for the Building of National Unity)

MC  Ministry of Colonies

Mr  Mailrapport (Mail report)

MFA  National Movement of the Armed Forces

NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NEKOLIM  Neo-Colonialism, Colonialism and Imperialism

NU  Nahdatul Ulama (Orthodox Muslim Scholars' Party)

OECD  Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

OPEC  Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

OPM  Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Movement)

PERMESTA  Perjuangan Semesta (Total Struggle Movement)

PERTAMINA  Pertambangan Minyak dan Gas Bumi Nasional (National Oil Mining and Natural Gas [State Co.])

PGET  Provisional Government of East Timor

PIR  Persatuan Indonesia Raya (Greater Indonesian Union)

PKN  Pakempan Kawulo Ngayogyakarta (Yogyakarta People's Party)

PKI  Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)

PNI  Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party)

PRRI  Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia)

PSI  Partai Sarekat Islam (Islamic Association Party)

RRI  Radio Republik Indonesia

SEATO  Southeast Asian Treaty Organization

SI  Sarekat Islam (Islamic Association)

UDT  União Democrática Timorense (Timor Democratic Union)

UNESCO  United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization

UN  United Nations

USSR  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

v  Verbaal (File)

WNI  Warga Negara Indonesia (Indonesian citizen)
INTRODUCTION

J.A.C. Mackie

The papers in this volume cover a broad span of time and political change. The world of late nineteenth century Java described so vividly by Supomo and Ann Kumar may seem almost unrecognizably different from the world of the 1970s about which Feith, Crouch, Race, Nawawi, Coppel and others are writing. For in the meantime the 'making of a nation' had taken place. The former colony known as the Netherlands Indies, which did not really extend far beyond Java until the 1870s, was consolidated by the Dutch into a single administrative unit for the first time in history around the turn of this century. As a result of this unity there developed between 1910 and 1930 a nationalist consciousness and a vigorous nationalist movement, from which emerged, chrysalis-like, a newly independent nation-state during the revolutionary struggle of 1945-50. Unless we comprehend how the world of the 1970s is related to the world of the 1870s (not only in Java, but in other parts of the archipelago as well), our understanding of what is happening in present-day Indonesia will be shallow and often misleading.

Each step forward entailed deep changes in the lives of many Indonesians and in the social and political institutions they had inherited from their forefathers. It is not the aim of this volume to trace those changes in detail, but the variety of topics it covers helps to illustrate the important point that the processes of change were far more subtle and complex than is implied by the deceptively simple ('hackneyed'? ) terminology we use for purposes of present-day political analysis. When we subject these processes to close scrutiny, in terms of the lives of the Indonesians concerned and of the institutions that were familiar to them, as Supomo and Ann Kumar have so skilfully and eruditely done, we are made aware of the need to relate to those earlier collectivities the collectivities we subsume under such familiar clichés as 'the nation', 'the village', 'the patrimonial state' or 'communism' and 'nationalism'.

The aim of this seminar series was to present, first, some glimpses of the traditional polity just before the 'nation-building' process began to transform it; second, a survey of the three great ideologies which have dominated political life and thought in Indonesia throughout the twentieth century, nationalism, Islam and communism; third, two different analyses of the present-day character of the political system there; and fourth, several aspects of the problem of national unity. Finally, we turned to the external aspect of the 'making of a nation', its relations with the nations and peoples just beyond it - and, in particular, its relations with Australia. This last seemed an appropriate finishing point for a seminar series which had started with prehistoric times, especially since it featured such distinguished and experienced commentators as H.W. Arndt and Gough Whitlam. And if this subject seems far removed from the world of the nineteenth century kraton as seen by Supomo's pujangga or Ann Kumar's 'traditional' villages, which were far less 'unchanging' or idyllic than conventional stereotypes have generally suggested, that gulf merely reflects
the scale of the transformations that have taken place since then. It was possible to do little more than sketch out their character impressionistically in the time available to us. But if we have whetted appetites for further inquiry into the processes of change that have accompanied the nation-building process, our purpose will have been served. There is much more to be investigated under that rubric than we could possibly cover in the time and space available.

Rex Mortimer died of cancer barely a month after he spoke at our seminar. Because he was by then too ill to write a new essay, he spoke to the excellent paper printed herein which had previously been published in Studies in Indonesian History, edited by Elaine Mackay and published by Pitman Publishing Pty Ltd, who generously granted permission to reprint it here. All who heard his courageous, moving talk that day on the successes and failures of the PKI in its three bids to change the course of Indonesian history will cherish the memory of Rex at his best, lucid, incisive and compassionate. These are qualities of the mind and spirit that we should all be trying to bring to bear upon the challenging task of understanding Indonesia in her own terms.
ELEMENTS IN THE CONTINUING TRADITION
REBELLION IN THE KRATON WORLD AS SEEN BY THE PUJANGGA

Supomo Suryohudojo

In 1874 the long, continuous tradition of the pujangga ended abruptly with the death of Raden Ngabehi Ranggawarsita, the last pujangga dalem (His Majesty's court poet) of Surakarta. This tradition dates at least from the first half of the tenth century with the Old Javanese Ramayana kakawin, whose author is unfortunately unknown. In this case he is however not an exception. Only a few Javanese authors - Old and New - are known by their names, some of which are not even their real ones. We can be certain, however, that most of them, like Ranggawarsita, wrote their works under royal or princely patronage, although not all of them occupied the exalted position of pujangga dalem, nor enjoyed the fame their illustrious panutup (last of the line) did.

One of the most important literary figures in the transmission of Old Javanese works into New Javanese was Yasadipura I, the great-grandfather of Ranggawarsita, who served in the kraton of Surakarta during the reigns of Pakubuwana III (1749-88) and Pakubuwana IV (1788-1820). Yasadipura was not only a pujangga with great literary talent, but also a prolific writer with a wide interest in various literary subjects. If there is any pujangga whose works can be taken as the epitome of the Javanese literary scene of the nineteenth century - the century in which the tradition of the pujangga came to an end - it must be Yasadipura I. His achievements include renderings of the Old Javanese works (Ramayana, Bharatayuddha, and other kakawin), an adaptation of the Islamic story of Amir Hamzah (the voluminous Serat Menak), moralistic and didactic poems based on Old Javanese and Islamic works (Nitisastra, Tajussalatin, and some others), and an original work, the Babad Giyanti, which is a literary account of events surrounding the rebellion of Prince Mangkubumi and the resultant partition of the kingdom of Surakarta into Yogyakarta and Surakarta (see Soebardi 1969; 1975, pp.19-20).

Notwithstanding the variety of his works and those of other pujangga, most of them shared the same preoccupation: the world of the kraton, the centre of that particular world - the throne, and the occupant of that centre - the king. The king is always the centre of the pujangga's creative works, and, conversely, there is scarcely any work which is not about a king or a prince, about the kraton or the throne. It it through their works that the idea of kingship seeped into the Javanese community and deeply embedded itself in the Javanese mind - either through direct exposure to these works, wayang, or through the performing arts, mainly wayang.

All wayang lakon begin with a jejer (audience scene), in which a kingdom - such as Astina, Wirathu, Dwarawati, or any other, though usually situated in Java - is introduced in colourful, although stereotyped, description. Of Astina, for instance, the dalang will say:
Long is Astina’s reputation and the telling of it. High is its prestige ... Fertile is its soil; prosperity abounds. Merchants trade by day and night unceasingly in perfect safety, while peasants’ flock and herds freely roam. Never has rebellion stirred the peacefulness of the island .... All state officials are united in a single aim - to increase the glory of the kingdom of Astina. The kingdom stands firm over the earth. Its torch is high, illuminating all the world with its radiance. Many are its colonies. Not only on Java do countries submit themselves to its rule, but kings from afar proffer allegiance, so great is their love for the perfection of the kingdom of Astina. Near, they bow to the earth before its perfectness; farther afield they incline to show their respect (Brandon 1970, pp.274-75; cf. pp.86-87, 176-77).

After the kingdom, the king is introduced and described in accordance with the characteristics ascribed to him. The characteristics of each individual king, and indeed of each individual wayang figure, differ, but in this first jeje r only virtues and excellence are mentioned. Thus of Kresna, the principal ally and adviser of the Pandawas, for instance, it is said that he is, among other things,

- endowed with the characteristics of sage, judge, warrior and noble. The most excellent king, he is powerful yet humble, wise yet shares his wisdom;
- he cares for his subjects; he clothes the naked and feeds the hungry, aids the infirm and offers shelter from the sun and rain, cheers the mournful and helps the sick (Brandon 1970, pp. 86-87).

Even for Duryadana, the ruler of Astina, the arch antagonist of the Pandawas, the dalang will only extol his virtues, and keep quiet - at least in this first jeje r - about his partiality to mischievous conduct against the Pandawas. Thus he is described as having

- merit as warrior, judge, and benefactor. He is a king fond of military arts, well-versed in strategy.
- He is stern but fair in administering justice. Above all, he delights in giving presents: he clothes the naked and feeds the hungry, gives water to those who thirst and shelter to those in the sun and rain.
- To all who befriend him he is most generous (Brandon 1970, p. 275).

Although the description of the king and the kingdom occurring in the literary works generally is more restrained - because of poetical requirements and other literary conventions - it is however not less colourful. Thus Yasadipura begins the narrative part of his Babad Gyanti by extolling His Highness Pakubuwana II who resided in the capital city of Kartasura. He was, so Yasadipura tells us, rich in wealth and relatives; he was an esteemed lord of the whole world, who reigned over the whole island of Java ('ambawani ing bawana tlatah nuswa Jawa’); his troops were
innumerab le, his noble relatives were powerful in battle, all were united in single mind, willing to die for the king ('jroning tyas ghumulung, anderpati abipraya'); the Dutch Council of the Indies has proffered allegiance and eternal friendship to His Majesty ('para ratpeni sampun lambang prasetya, pawong-mitran tahu, salami lan sri Narendra'); the country therefore prospered, people abounded, clothes and food were cheap (BG 1908, I, p.4).

Coming from the pen of a pujangga, whose position at the court was entirely dependent on the king's favour, such a picture of the king and his ancestors is only to be expected. Moreover, the pujangga were themselves shackled by the long literary tradition they helped to create and to preserve. Thus even if Yasadipura knew - and there is no doubt that he was in a position to know Pakubuwana II (see Ricklefs 1974a, pp. xix-xx) - that the king he was about to describe was not, or was no longer the lord of the whole island of Java, let alone of the whole world, that his many relatives were plotting against him as well as intriguing against one another, that armed rebellion beset the country, that the kraton had only recently been sacked by Chinese insurgents and could be retaken only with the help of the Dutch Company soldiers, he would still depict the ruler as if he was the king of the wayang world in the first jejer.

However, the first ruler to appear on the wayang screen is not necessarily the hero of the lakon. As the play progresses and the plot unfolds, another king or prince who is designed to be the hero of that particular lakon will be brought forward and put in the central position. Henceforth all favourable attention will be directed toward him. The first king then will be depicted in accordance with his attitudes towards this central figure - if he is kind and helpful to the hero, he will continue to be depicted as he was in the first jejer; if he proves to be responsible for the hero's suffering and hardship, he will be depicted less and less favourably.

A few pages after the exaltation of Pakubuwana II, it becomes apparent that, as many scholars (e.g. Soebardi 1969, p. 100; Ricklefs 1974a, p. xx) have noted, it is prince Mangkubumi who is the hero of the Babad Giyanti. Throughout the book his noble character is highly praised, his great service to the king in the past repeatedly extolled, and his exploits in battle are depicted in glowing colours. And so to a lesser degree is Prince Mangkunagara, who was Mangkubumi's most prominent ally during the initial period of the rebellion. On the other hand, after the few initial stanzas, Pakubuwana II is depicted less and less sympathetically, first being portrayed as a weak ruler who does not have the courage to resist the Dutch Governor-General's demands - all with disastrous consequences, and later as a sickly person who on his deathbed gives up his kingdom to the Governor-General.

In the framework of the generally accepted assumption that the immediate object of a pujangga's works, babad writings in particular, is the glorification of the reigning king and his ancestors, the choice of Mangkubumi as the hero of the Babad Giyanti, which notably is also called Babad Surakarta, seems to be an anomaly. The relationship between Mangkubumi and Yasadipura's two successive patrons had never been cordial - to say the least. Under Dutch pressure, Pakubuwana III had no alternative
but to agree to relinquish half his kingdom to Mangkubumi, and under
the threat of the combined forces of the Dutch and Sultan Hamengkubuwana I,
former Prince Mangkubumi, Pakubuwana IV had to give up his ambition to
reunify the divided kingdom and to abandon his santri teachers to the mercy
of the Dutch Company - which promptly sent them to Semarang on their way to
exile (see Ricklefs 1974a, pp.64, 334-39).

As it seems most unlikely both that Yasadipura was unaware of these
circumstances, and that his patrons were unaware of his works, one may
wonder whether the court poet had - at least in this particular case - more
independence in composing his works than would be expected of a man in his
position, and whether the king was more tolerant of critical remarks
directed to him or to his ancestors than we would normally suppose Javanese
rulers to be. Even assuming this to be the case, such an apparent anomaly
is, in fact, in conformity with the Javanese cultural pattern. Mangkubumi
was after all a victorious rebel who succeeded in carving out a kingdom
for himself against tremendous odds - and the Javanese people had, and
have, great admiration for such a man.

As we have noted, the description of the Javanese kingdom in the wayang
world always includes stereotyped phrases such as 'merchants trade by day
and night unceasingly in perfect safety', and 'never has rebellion stirred
the peacefulness of the island'. The reality, however, greatly differs
from the idealized picture. Despite the belief that the king was an
incarnation of Wisnu, or Buddha, or the Lord of the Mountain, or any other
deity - as we find in the Hindu-Buddhist period (see e.g. Schrieke 1957,
Part 2, pp.76-95; Supomo 1977, I, pp.68-82) - or that the king
was God's warana (representative) - as occurs in the Babad Tanah Jawi
(see Moertono 1963, p.35) - insurrections and rebellions were common
occurrences in Javanese history.

Indeed rebellion is a favourite theme in both oral and written
tradition. Practically all the babad are concerned with rebels, with their
rise, their fights, their defeats or, very rarely, their victories; and
the victorious rebel is the Javanese folk-hero par excellence. This is
perhaps because while wars and rebellions recurred with almost monotonous
regularity throughout Javanese history, only very few rebellions ended as
intended. Most of them failed, and countless numbers of rebels had to
pay for their reckless, if often gallant, efforts with their lives or, even
worse, by living in exile. For the very few who succeeded, however, the
prize surpassed all the hazards and the perils of their undertaking: the
supreme victor won not only the centre of the kraton world - the throne -
he also won the admiration of the whole population and fired the imagination
of the poets, the pujangga.

Seen from this perspective the depiction of Mangkubumi as hero of the
Babak Gijanti is not wholly unexpected, even if it was the work of a court
poet of Surakarta. Moreover, the decline of the size of Surakarta's
territory after the partition of 1755 was a new political reality which
somehow had to be explained, and the forced abandonment of the state myth
of the unity of the whole land of Java had to be justified. Such an
explanation and justification could only, obviously, be made in terms of
the emergence of Yogyakarta as a separate kingdom, as a new kingdom in its
own right, equal in every respect to the established kingdom of Surakarta,
but not supplanting it. In other words, Yasadipura's main concern seems to be to legitimate the emergence of Yogyakarta without jeopardizing the legitimacy of Surakarta itself. This is obviously something new to Yasadipura as well as to his contemporaries. In the past, as is described in the babad a new kingdom emerged only to replace an old one, and the establishment of a new kraton meant the abandonment of an old one. It has been pointed out by many scholars (e.g. Schrieke 1957, pp.7-8 and Moertono 1963, pp. 56-58), that the emergence of a new centre of power was preceded by the movement of andaru or wahyu, in the form of a bright falling star or divine radiance, from the old kraton to the new, or from the body of the last king of the old dynasty to the founder of the new one. The silence of the Babad Giyanti concerning such a movement is thus a device to suggest that the andaru, the symbol of greatness and divine approval, still resided in Surakarta, and the old kingdom therefore did not lose its legitimacy.

Unable to use the movement of andaru to legitimize the emergence of the new kingdom - as this would effectively 'delegitimize' Surakarta - Yasadipura seems to decide to rely more on legitimizing the rebellion itself. This literary device was, of course, not new. It had been used by pujangga before Yasadipura. However, as it was never used by itself, it tended to be obscured by other more remarkable devices, such as the movement of andaru and wahyu, prophecies and dreams, and the claim on the part of the rebel leader to be the incarnation of a deity or descendant of a great ruler of the past. Thus, while these remarkable devices have long attracted the attention of many scholars (e.g. Schrieke 1957, pp.7-93; Berg 1938), the legitimization of a new kingdom by legitimizing the rebellion which gives rise to its emergence has never been recognized as such a device. But there are so many similar elements occurring in the descriptions of rebellions that succeeded, on the one hand, and those that failed, on the other, that it is apparent that these descriptions were used in accordance with certain patterns, with certain formal characteristics - one for the successful rebellions, the other for the abortive ones. In relation to wahyu (the divine radiance which passed from the disintegrating power of one kingdom to the founder of its successor), Anderson (1977, p.25) has remarked that '... the leaders of these rebellions were never said to have wahyu unless they succeeded in establishing a new dynasty'. It is at least equally true that they were never depicted in the forms reserved for 'legitimate rebels' unless they succeeded in founding a new dynasty - and in the case of the Babad Giyanti, in which the old kingdom had not completely disintegrated, Anderson's remarks are obviously not applicable. Seen retrospectively by the pujangga, it was only successful rebels who had the right to be accredited with true wahyu, and only such rebels who deserved to be depicted as legitimate rebels.

There were no doubt many reasons which drove embittered princes or men of principle to take the desperate path of rebellion - that one-way road which would lead them to the centre of the kraton world, the throne, either as victors to occupy it, or, most likely, as captives to die in front of it or to die in exile dreaming of it. As the pujangga saw it, however, there was only one underlying reason at the root of all the causes which gave rise to the rebellions which from the very beginning were bound to end in
failure. This fundamental reason is lali. In everyday usage, lali means 'to forget'. But lali is also one of those many Javanese emotive words pregnant with 'deeper' meanings. Thus one can be lali (unmindful) of one's parents - which is reprehensible behaviour; when one loses self-control - which is one of the highest virtues - one is also said to be lali (beside oneself). There is another meaning, 'out of one's mind', which occurs in the well-known verse, a quotation from Ranggawarsita's famous Kalatidha, in which it is specifically used in relation to the jaman edan (Age of Madness)⁴ - and Yasadipura in fact simply used jaman lali, instead of jaman edan, to characterize the period of turmoil during the rebellion of Mangkubumi.⁵

It is in these various 'deeper' meanings that Zali (or its krama equivalents, supe and kesupen) is used by the author(s) of the Babad Tanah Jawi to describe the origin of the rebellions of, for instance, Adipati Pragola of Pati against Panembahan Senapati (BTJ 1941, p.110), Prince Puger of Demak against Panembahan Seda Krapyak (BTJ 1941, p.114), and Trunajaya, the infamous rebel who succeeded in plundering the kraton of Plered but who in the end, of course, met his death at the feet of the new legitimate ruler of Mataram (BTJ 1941, p.162).

At the level of everyday morality lali is considered as an inconsequential failing in human nature common to all people, which will invite only light rebuke and readily be forgiven rather than cause condemnation. It is thus not surprising that the common reaction of the king on learning of a rebellion was to be ngungun (greatly astonished), and he would send his trusted man to the would-be rebel to ascertain whether he (the rebel) was truly lali. Some of the rebels were said only to be almost lali but would eventually eling (remember), that is, they would regain their awareness of their true selves, and accordingly they would be pardoned by the king.⁶

Nevertheless such moral slackness is not fitting for one who aspires to the highest position in the community, for lali can, and usually does, lead to more serious moral failings such as losing one's self control and craving worldly comforts, power, wealth, and women. Thus of Prince Puger, who was said to be supe (unmindful) that he was a subject of his brother the king, it was said that he wanted to rebel, to fight for the possession of the inheritance of the kraton. Another rebel, Prince Jayaraga of Panaraga who rebelled against Panembahan Seda Krapyak, was said to be 'kalimput ing kamukten', that is, tempted by or addicted to worldly comforts (BTJ 1941, p.114), and of Suradiningrat of Madura it was said that he was 'melik ing kamukten' (hungry for worldly comforts) (BTJ 1941, p.310). A love story between a handsome young man and a beautiful princess is a favorite theme in both the oral and written tradition, and people's sympathy is always aroused by such a couple. But when infatuation with a pretty woman, princess or commoner, leads to rebellion, then such a rebellion was bound to fail. Sukra's affair with the estranged wife of the Crown Prince of Kartasura, the future Mangkurat Mas, is an example of this (BTJ 1941, p.249-57). The rebel most hated and most condemned by the Javanese, Menakjingga of the Damarwulan Romances (see Holt 1976, pp.276-77), combined this hunger for power with arrogance and indulgence in the lusts of the flesh, so that despite his invulnerability and his initial victorious campaigns his ignominious defeat was inevitable - and his
The severed head ended up at the feet of the Maiden Queen of Majapahit against whom he illegitimately rebelled and to whom he insolently proposed.

The ideal rebel, on the other hand, is depicted as one whose unswerving loyalty to the king was beyond doubt, whose immense service was of vital importance for the glory of the king and indeed often for the very existence of the state itself. Accordingly, he was the most beloved and trusted servant of the king. However, through no fault of his own, he fell victim to court intrigues in which he had no part. As a result of these intrigues, of which the king was unaware, he was treated unjustly by the king. This injustice often took the form of cancellation of a reward this loyal servant should have received for past services, or if it had already been given, the reward was revoked by the king. But what the innocent victim deplored most was not so much the loss of the reward as the loss of face, the feeling of being humiliated. However, he did not become lali; even after this injustice had been done, his loyalty to the king remained firm. He suffered it stoically, and obstinately resisted the pressure from his allies and subordinates to raise the banner of rebellion. It was only after a prolonged period of great anguish - during which he sought an auspicious omen from the Almighty, either by semadi (meditation), or by asking guidance from a spiritual teacher - that he would embark on the desperate course he had tried hard to avoid.

This, in rough outline, is the portrait of an ideal rebel which we can glean from various literary sources. One or two elements might be missing from the depiction, some of the details in one portrait might differ from another, but the main features are always discernible. Such a rebel leader was not necessarily a guarantee for complete victory, but no rebellion succeeded without such leadership.

We can see such a picture in the person of Sidapaksa of the Sri Tanjung Romance (Priyono 1938), where we find the familiar elements: great service to the king and utmost loyalty shown by the hero on the one hand, and injustice perpetrated by the king, on the other. In this story it was the king who was lali - he was infatuated by Sidapaksa's wife - and this brought about his downfall. The Sorandaka kidung (van den Berg 1939; see also Zoetmulder 1974, pp.415-20) departs from the usual outcome for such a rebellion. Here we also find great service, court intrigues, loyalty of the innocent victim, but the rebellion did not succeed. Still, we have a 'happy' ending in this kidung, for at the end, the court intriguer was brought to justice, and was ordered to be killed by the king, who was stricken with grief over the loss of those who once were his best friends and loyal assistants.

In the Babad Tanah Jawi we can discern such a picture in the account of Panembahan Senapati's rise to power (BTJ 1941, pp.53-90). With the help of his father and his uncle, he succeeded in defeating Arya Penangsang in the most memorable battle depicted in babad literature. By this victory, Senapati rendered great service to Sultan Adiwijaya of Pajang, who then became the sole ruler of the Javanese world. But the promised reward - the land of Mataram - was given grudgingly only after long delay. The court intrigues are not particularly prominent in the episode of Senapati's revolt against the Sultan of Pajang, but we find the other elements, such as the long period of meditation performed by Senapati and the auspicious
omen from God before he openly defied the Sultan's rule, as well as the Sultan's great affection for Senapati until his death. Such a picture is more clearly visible in the account of the rebellion of Prince Puger, who eventually ascended the throne as Sunan Pakubuwana I, after he had no other option but to rebel against his nephew, Sunan Mangkurat Mas (BTJ 1941, pp.244-79).

In the autobiographical Babad Dipanegara, it is also obvious that the defeated rebel prince chose to present a picture of himself in this fashion: an aggrieved prince who was unreservedly loyal to the throne, but who was forced to leave the kraton by circumstances beyond his control— a step which he took only after long meditation and obtaining an auspicious omen from the Almighty (see Kumar 1972; Ricklefs 1974b). And— if we may digress a little to a time closer to the present, to a world outside that of the pujangga— perhaps we can even see such a pattern in the apparent reluctance of the then Major-General Suharto to seize the 'throne' in the Merdeka Palace, which it would not have been too difficult for him to occupy at any time he chose after the abortive coup of 1965, and in his firm resistance to the advice of his 'allies and subordinates' to act against President Soekarno, to whom he had rendered great service with distinction and loyalty during the revolution and the West Irian campaign.

And such is the picture of Mangkubumi which was presented by Yasadipura in the Babad Giyanti. Thus, after the description of the kingdom and the Sunan at the beginning of the poem, in six stanzas, there follow two stanzas which describe Baron Hogendorp, the commandant of the Dutch garrison in Kartasura. Then follows the description of Prince Mangkubumi in four stanzas, in which the poet extols the Prince for his loyalty, stressing that he was the only relative whom the King could completely trust to execute his orders on the battlefield or to work on his behalf ('keni kinanthi ing samubarang karya; amungkasi yen tinuduh jurit'), and praising his noble character. Following this, his reward of 3000 cacah of the land of Sukawati for the great service he rendered to the King is explicitly mentioned ('mangka ganjaranipun, genya sampun labet nagri, mungkasi parangmuka'). On the other hand the poet spends no more than half a stanza on the two patih of Surakarta, namely Pringgalaya and Sindureja (BG 1908, I, pp.5-6).

That there were rivalries between Mangkubumi, on the one hand, and the two patih on the other, is clearly implied in the subsequent episode when the Dutch Governor-General visited Surakarta (BG 1908, I, pp.23-51). During the meeting with the King, the Governor-General requested that the Sunan lease the north coast area to the Dutch people as a mark of His Majesty's kindness and generosity. Finding himself alone with the insistent Governor-General, the Sunan resigned himself to the inevitable ('dadya mupus tyasir'), and granted the request.

When Mangkubumi was summoned by the King to be informed of the matter, the prince reminded the King that there was no precedent for a king to conduct negotiations himself ('inggih dereng wonten adat, ratu papadon pribadi'), realizing that a king had authority over the country only ('mung darma mengku kewala'), but the power to govern the country rested with the patih, the nayaka, the tumenggung, and the sentana. However, as the King had already granted the Governor-General's request, Mangkubumi could only advise him that he should claim compensation of 100,000 reyal a year. Pringgalaya, on the other hand, advised the King to claim for 40,000, and Sindureja for only 20,000 reyal. The King took Sindureja's advice.
The fact that it was Mangkubumi alone among the sentana whom the King consulted was again emphasized during the conversation between Mangkubumi and his own councillors, in which one of them remarked that although the King had many relatives, he apparently only consulted Prince Mangkubumi, and no one else; this meant that the Prince was the only one whom the King could trust and consult on all the dangers and problems of the kingdom.

The legitimization of Mangkubumi's rebellion is clearly presented in the account of the following day, when Mangkubumi was again summoned to the kraton, to be informed of the Governor-General's decision - taken on the advice of Pringgalaya - that the Sunan should reduce Mangkubumi's apanage to 1000 cacah only. This episode is depicted vividly in language typical of that beloved by both the and the Javanese audience, in a style which we may perhaps called (heart-rending). Mangkubumi replied with difficulty, not so much suppressing his anger as withholding his tears saying that as it was His Majesty's decision, he had no objection. Unselfishly he even advised the King that he should get rid of him - Mangkubumi, so that this matter would not impair the good relationship between the King and the Dutch Company. Then Mangkubumi asked permission to leave the capital city, as he was too ashamed to see people ('ulun nyuwun lilah katong, sumedya tilar nagara, ... amerang miyat ing jama'). The Sunan, tears running freely down his cheeks all the while, was powerless to do anything but to give him his blessing and his prayer that God might protect him ('sun jurung puja arja, muga winongwong Hyang Agung'), as well as an amount of 3000 royal as pamugut tresna (love-severance payment?) to clothe and feed his troops. The Prince, now no longer able to withhold his tears, accepted the money gratefully, kissed the feet of his brother the King, and left the kraton, never to set foot in it again. That was the last time the two brothers, who Yasadipura would like us to believe loved each other so deeply, met. A week later, just before dawn, and just as the unsuspecting Governor-General set out on his return journey to Jakarta, Mangkubumi and all his family and troops left the 'beauty of the city' for the countryside and began to deploy his army in Sukawati, the district he was supposed to relinquish willingly to the Sunan. Three years later, when rebellions were rampant throughout the realm, Sunan Pakubuwana II died, 'so wretchedly from heartbreak as well as from vermin' - so Nicolaas Hartingh, the Governor of Java's north coast, tells us in his memoir (see Ricklefs 1974, p.44).

One may be sceptical as to the historicity of such a heart-rending meeting between the ruler and would-be rebel and the valedictory blessing the former gave to the latter, but, as Ricklefs (1974a, p.44) has pointed out, 'it is not inconceivable in the Javanese context'.

It is certainly as 'not inconceivable' as the widely reported 'pat on the shoulder' given by a President to a Brigadier-General at Halim on the morning after that fateful night of 30 September 1965, when the General reported to the President that, in effect, he had just launched a rebellion against his government. That this rather bizarre spectacle was readily believed by the general public and accepted as an indication that the President gave his approval and blessing to the attempted coup, no doubt derived, to a considerable degree, from the deep suspicion that he himself
was somehow involved in this sordid affair. Nevertheless, this belief -
namely that President Soekarno gave his approval and blessing - perhaps had
a deeper origin than the mere suspicion of his involvement in this abortive
coup. I believe that it also had its roots in the subconscious. A
relationship between ruler and rebel, between one of the older generation
who willingly gives up his life to one of the younger generation who
reluctantly takes it, is, after all, not an unfamiliar pattern in the older
tradition - a tradition which still has relevance in explaining many
mysteries of that event of 1965, and political behaviour in Indonesia in
general, as has been demonstrated by, for instance, Anderson (1977) and
Resink (1975).

To give a few more examples, we read in the *Bharatayuddha kakawin* that
on the morning of the first day of the battle, when the two opposing armies
of the Pandawas and their cousins the Korawas ranged themselves in the
field of the Kurus, Yuddhisthira, the son of Dharma, alighted from his
chariot and went straight to the elders of the Korawas to pay his respects
and receive their blessing and permission to slay them as well as their
prayers for his victory. In a rather different form, the theme appears in
the *lakon Narasoma* (see Kats 1923, p.249; Anderson 1965, p.8), in which
*beqaran* Bagaspati willingly imparted his powerful magical spell *Candhabirawa*
to his future son-in-law, Narasoma, so that he could be killed by the latter,
for he believed that this would bring about the marriage of his daughter,
whom he loved dearly, to the young prince Narasoma, whom he despised
intensely.

But to my mind, the most moving account of this extraordinary
relationship between ruler and rebel occurs in the story of the fall of
Majapahit as given in the *Babad Tanah Jawi* (1937-39, III, pp.8-14;
1941, pp.29-30). The king of Majapahit, Brawijaya, expressed a yearning to
see his most beloved son, the Adipati of Bintara, and sent another son to
invite him to Majapahit for an audience (*seba*). But the Adipati of Bintara,
who had been converted to Islam, was unable to comply with his father's
request. He realized how deep his father's love was for him, and he was
grateful for his appointment as the regent of Bintara, but Muslim law
forbad him to make *seba* to a *kopar* (infidel) king. Indeed, it was his
duty, he said, to attack Majapahit at once. When the attack on Majapahit
was eventually launched by the Muslim rebels, when the *kraton* was under
siege and his army deserting him in great numbers, Brawijaya, instead of
marshalling the remaining loyal forces, said to the *patih*: 'Thank God
that now my son, the Adipati of Bintara, has arrived. Let us, *patih*, go to
the higher ground for I have not seen him for such a long time'. So he
went to higher ground, looked at his beloved son, and then apparently
pleased with what he saw, ascended to heaven. Then the Adipati of Bintara
entered the *kraton*. Seeing it was deserted, he was dumbfounded - and he
wept silently.

Thus a meeting between a ruler and a rebel, blessing given ungrudgingly
by the former and received gratefully by the latter, and the undying
affection between the older generation preparing to leave the stage of
history and the younger one preparing to take over, is not only conceivable
in the Javanese cultural context - it is the most appropriate way for a
pujangga to present an ideal picture of a legitimate rebel as a device to legitimize a new dynasty or a new order.

NOTES

1 Unfortunately I have had to use volumes from two different editions of the Babad Giyanti for this paper, because there is no full set of a single edition available in Canberra. Thus, while for the first part of this babad I used the Buning edition (1908) for the later part I used the Balai Pustaka edition (1937-39).

2 Thus through Prince Mangkubumi, Yasadipura says in the Babad Giyanti (1937-39, XX, pp.17-18): 'Pan inggih ing nungsa Jawi, warti ing nguni-uni, tan nganggur sapuluh taun, nunten wonten paperang', which implies that there were never peaceful conditions in Java for more than ten years. For the belief that a kraton or a dynasty would not last for one hundred years, see, for instance, Schrieke 1957, pp.92-95, and Ricklefs 1974a, pp.176-226.

3 Mangkubumi is also highly praised in Wicara Keras, a poem by Yasadipura II (see Drewes 1974, p.203). Nor is he badly treated in the Serat Babad Panambangan, written from the viewpoint of the House of Mangkurat Minangkabau. This verse is used by Geertz (1976, p.281) as an example of sinom, because it '... is perhaps the most famous of all tembangs, certainly one nearly everyone knows and you can hear sung by everyone from pedicab drivers to district officers'. See also Drewes 1974, p.205.

4 Thus of Arya Sindureja, a patih of Kartasura, for instance, BTJ (1941, p.252) says that he was meh supe when he learnt that his son was cruelly treated by the Crown Prince, but after a while he was enget (the krama form of eling, 'to remember') that he was an abdi (servant) of the King. For a prince who said kula badhe supe before he went into rebellion, see BTJ 1941, p.336. For ngungun, see, for instance, BTJ 1941, p.114.

5 See Babad Giyanti 1937-39, XX, p.7, where Sultan Hamengkubuwana says: 'Mengko uwis sirna jaman ingkang lali, jaman eling kang ana'.

6 Cf. BTJ 1941, p.262 ff., in which Sunan Mangkurat Mas is said to be kesupen of his father's deathbed instruction, which was the cause of his downfall. See also BTJ 1941, p.154, where Sunan Mangkurat I is said to be ewah kaliyan adatipun ([his wishes and conduct] changed). But ewah is a krama form of edan, which, as we have seen above, is also used in the sense of laili.

7 Ricklefs (1974a, p.43) makes a slip in his comments on this passage (BG 1908, I, pp.38-42). It is clear from the conversation of Mangkubumi's advisers that they did not 'hemoan' the fact that of all the King's sentana only Prince Mangkubumi was consulted by the Sunan, but in fact they were rather proud of it. Nor did they see this 'as a sign of troubles facing
the kingdom', but, according to one of the advisers, 'this means it is only the Prince who was consulted by the Sunan and was entrusted to overcome the troubles facing the kingdom' ('iku tegesipun, baya pakewuhing praja, mung kang rayi ingandel tinari-tari, angalang-ngujurena')

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In 1957, an anthropologist with a special interest in the social, economic and religious organization of peasant groups chose the Javanese village as one of two examples typifying the 'closed corporate peasant community' - that is, of a territorial community characterized by 'localocentrism' to the point where it must be regarded as a separate 'socio-cultural universe' socially and culturally isolated from other communities and from the larger society. Such a community has a pronounced tendency to exclude not only outsiders (who threaten its straitened economic resources, especially resources in land) but also outside goods and ideas; and a complementary tendency to limit the ability of its own members to communicate with the larger society of which they are, in some sense, a part (Wolf 1957, especially pp.2-5). Yet only a little over half a century earlier a colonial official compiling a systematic description of Javanese village communities, which he would have liked to see as well-defined legal entities infused with a strong spirit of community and of self-regulation, commented upon the to European eyes extraordinary ease with which their inhabitants in practice 'broke the communal bond': even comparatively substantial farmers might abandon their land-holdings and leave, with or without their families, sometimes for no apparent reason and with no definite expectation of moving into a more advantageous situation elsewhere (van den Berg 1901, pp.129-30). The first writer - who despite the date of writing draws his material to a large extent from secondary accounts of the colonial situation in the 1920s and 1930s - draws a picture of the Javanese peasant as living in a tightly-knit village in a state of extreme fixity; the second, whose own personal experience of Javanese society also goes back two decades, in this case into the nineteenth century, sees these same peasants' grandparents or more distant ancestors as part of a much more loosely-knit population community in a state of considerable flux. It may be doubted (though the question will be left to other contributors) that Javanese villagers ever became quite so 'localocentric' as Wolf asserts; yet it is undeniable that during the course of the nineteenth century powerful and dominant forces worked in this direction. It is the intention of this paper to look at the way these forces acted upon Javanese society as it had been till then.

The sources available to those interested in developments within rural communities are far from abundant. If the village is a comparatively inaccessible sphere for historians of pre-modern European societies, it is far more so for a society in which literacy came so late, and to so few, among the peasantry. We never hear a villager speak of his own experience. Because of the peculiar characteristics of Javanese colonial society, we even lack the testimonies of those who, though from a more elevated background and perhaps even hostile to many characteristics of peasant life, are nevertheless in some sense members of the same society and culture and who
have lived among peasants - schoolmasters and priests are obvious examples from the European context. This great paucity of internal sources has meant that most descriptions of the Javanese village have treated the different communities involved in a purely systematic manner, describing how the village fitted into the social and economic hierarchies devised by the ruling classes, whether native or colonizing. This approach has perceptible limitations. Though there is no question that there was indeed an increasing correspondence between government fiat and local application as the colonial period wore on, still it was not a perfect one; and since, as we shall see, the colonial government dealt with the village largely as a unit, and official policy was not to interfere in its internal affairs, official reports and statistics give little information on the social and economic effect of government directives within the sphere of the village itself. For any period earlier than the nineteenth century, this approach is still less reliable, since we must deal with a society characterized by very great regional variation in a context of pervasive political turmoil, so that generalized formulations of the institutions of the village and of its place in society cannot be more than theoretical.

This paper begins by adopting a rather different approach, emphasizing not so much the system, as the situation in which the village found itself - looking, that is, at the larger political context within which the village was placed, and attempting to infer what effect developments there must have had on the nature of the village itself. In order not to set the focus so widely as to eliminate all significant detail, let us look, if not at the flow of events pressing on one village (that would hardly be possible, with the available documentation), at least at the history of one region, the valley of Panaraga. This region has been chosen because, though it cannot be described as 'typical' - regional variation was too great for any one region to be that - it was always one of the largest and most productive of the constituent regions of the Javanese kingdoms; it was never itself the seat of government of an important kingdom; and its geographical situation was not such as to give rise to the growth of major towns based on trade. It might thus be described as a rural, agricultural area par excellence.

RURAL REGION AND ROYAL HOUSE (SEVENTEENTH TO EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURIES)

The region enters history quite early: there is a fair sprinkling of inscriptions covering the period from the early tenth to late fifteenth century. We know at least that a number of royal grants were made on behalf of religious communities both Buddhist and Hindu (Adam 1938 pp.107-20) and also that the region was ruled by its own princely or ducal house. It was, however, conquered by the famous Airlangga in the 1030s after an eight-year campaign, the last piece of territory to be absorbed into Airlangga's east Javanese kingdom. It was known, with Madiun, as the region of Wengker (van Stein Callenfels 1918, pp.74-84). Under the later and longer-lived east Javanese kingdom of Majapait (late thirteenth to the first half of the fifteenth century) this region became the apanage of princes of the royal family and a community of Buddhist monks was endowed with a royal grant of tax-free land. With the decline
THE PEASANTRY AND THE STATE ON JAVA

of Majapait there was a resurgence of local autonomy, but even then the region did not develop in isolation. The introduction of Islam is attributed to Batara Katong (Divine Prince), said to be descended from the royal house of Majapait, and to his associate Kyai Ageng Mirah, later his pengulu, and ancestor both of those who were to be hereditary lords of the region and of the most prominent families of kyai (heads of Islamic religious and educational foundations). A close link between governmental and religious authority was thus formed and is reflected in the description which a later Javanese author gives of one of the ruling lords of the region:

He was strong in government, quick in intelligence, deep in understanding, charitable to the poor and those who renounce worldly possessions. He freed ulama [those learned in Islamic law] from tribute and labour; he saw that the commands of religion were observed, in respect to the religion of the Prophet, so that understanding of the Law multiplied. (Soeradipoera et al. 1915, p.54).

The Panaraga nobility, descended from Batara Katong and Kyai Ageng Mirah, was related to other dynasties whose founders had played a prominent role in the spiritual and temporal establishment of Islam on Java - in particular, to those stemming from the two wali Sunan Giri and Sunan Tembayat.2

Where it had once been attached to east Javanese kingdoms, Panaraga was later drawn into the sphere of the south central Javanese kingdom of Mataram (early seventeenth century onwards). Men from the region and from neighbouring Madiun fought in the campaigns of Sultan Agung (1613-45) in both east and west Java. Mataram was unable, however, to establish a stable and enduring regional administration, rent as it was from the late seventeenth century by rival claims to the throne. Panaraga was drawn into the ensuing warfare,3 and at the end of the major rebellion of the 1670s a population count revealed the effect of this involvement: whereas both Panaraga and Madiun were usually accounted at 12,000 cacah (a cacah being the landholder and his household conceived as a unit of agricultural production), Panaraga after the rebellion had been reduced to 5000 cacah, and Madiun to a mere 2000 (Adam 1939, p.29). For a time, Panaraga was drawn into the independent principality set up by the slave-prince Surapati, and seems to have prospered during these decades, for in 1709, when it was returned to Mataram by the Dutch, the number of cacah had once more climbed to 12,000. It is interesting to note that at the conference which took place at this time to reorganize the restored kingdom, Panaraga was now, with Madiun and twelve other regions, declared to be directly under the Sunan, instead of being under the jurisdiction of one of the powerful coastal rupati (de Jonge 1875, p.cx and p.362). As we shall see, this is not the only indication of the region's links with the north coast.

In 1742, the reigning Sultan of Mataram was driven from his capital by a pro-Chinese and anti-Dutch party during the so-called 'Chinese War'. He fled to Panaraga and found refuge there. According to legend, he happened
to hear the dikir⁴ recited by a pious subject who, being interrogated, said
that he was both a farmer and a teacher of santri (students of Islam); and
that he prayed for the ruler every day. Whatever the actual circumstances
of their meeting, the ruler, Pakubuwana II, did indeed reward this kyai,
Kasan Besari, when he was restored to his throne. Kasan Besari and his
descendants were invested as the heads of the free village of Tegalsari —
free, that is, of the obligation to supply produce and labour which rested
on other agricultural communities. The pesantren (school for santri) of
Tegalsari was to become one of the most famous on Java and to maintain its
links with Mataram and its successor states for more than 200 years.⁵

Pakubuwana II's troubles were not over, however. He soon faced a
major rebellion led by his nephew Mas Said (later Mangkunegara) and his
brother Mangkubumi, which was to result in the partition of Mataram.
Panaraga was a major theatre of this long and devastating warfare in its
later years. In 1752, Mangkunegara forced his way from the west through a
little-known pass in the difficult Mount Lawu terrain and conquered both
Panaraga and Madiun; and the subsequent fall of the two richest regions of
the kingdom caused much consternation to the Dutch Company. Panaraga
itself (town and region bore the same name) was sacked and burnt, and new
governors were installed by Mangkunegara.

At the end of the war, Mataram was divided into two principalities,
Surakarta and Yogyakarta. In the complex division of the territories which
had been part of the kingdom before its division, Panaraga was allocated to
Surakarta (and neighbouring Madiun to Yogyakarta).

But what does this turgid picture of dynastic strife reveal to us of
the tenor of village life? More perhaps than is immediately apparent. It
shows how the leading families of the region were both deeply rooted in
local historical tradition and intricately linked to other prominent
families elsewhere in Java, and might be drawn into the sphere of
influence of other centres (not 'the centre') or into supporting one of
the contending factions there. Warfare brought into the region armies which
ravaged and burned, some of whom, foreign mercenary troops like the
Macassarese and Balinese, did not return home when the war was officially
ended but remained to live off the land; and drew the men of the region
out to fight under their leaders in other parts of Java. The extent to
which partisan adherence to this or that dynastic faction had penetrated
the very fabric of village life is reflected in the fact that though the
different regions were officially divided between Surakarta and Yogyakarta,
local leaders did not always accept their official allocation and moved to
change sides, leading to a situation of endemic village warfare (perang
desa) which according to one researcher persisted until 1830 (Onghokham
1975, p.88). Conflict also dramatically affected population numbers,
which might be reduced by half, or even more. Though the destructive
effects of involvement in the affairs of kings and princes are more obvious,
there was also a nurturing aspect of this relationship. It was the patronage
of the Mataram dynasty which supported cultural institutions, particularly
the pesantren schools of the region, physically located in villages, which
played a very significant role in developing both local pride and an
identity which was more than merely local, and whose leadership was widely
valued.
Not all of Panaraga's contacts with the wider world were with dynastic politics, warfare and patronage. A Dutch East-India Company official wrote in 1784 after eighteen years in Surabaya that the Company's trade in these parts had never been of any significance, but that private trade (in ginger, opium, Chinese goods, etc.) had once been very extensive, travelling up-river 'even as far as Panaraga', though it had now declined because of the increased number and heavier levies of the tolls, and because the Chinese toll farmers were now obtaining goods from Surakarta and Yogyakarta and forcing them upon the Javanese merchants (de Jonge 1884, p.62). Scholars have often seen Java as falling into a natural division, into the 'Islamic, trade-oriented' coastal area (the pasisir), and the interior, the location of the agrarian kingdoms with their Indianized-cum-nativist inheritance; but it seems that this division may have been overstated, both in its economic and its cultural dimension. The important coastal centres were located on or close to major rivers, whose valleys provided natural avenues for travellers. Panaraga probably had better contacts with the Surabaya-Giri-Gresik area than it did with the 'neighbouring' region of Kaduwang, to which access was actually very restricted because of the difficult terrain, though roads existed. It may be more in accordance with reality to conceive of pre-modern Java as divided into slices, each centring on a river valley, rather than into coast and interior.

It is interesting to note that a Javanese text dating from the early nineteenth century but containing material from an earlier period already notes a distinctive Panaraga personality (Pigeaud 1933, p.54) - a personality which colonial administrators of a later date were to describe, with a mixture of grudging respect and lofty disapprobation, as characterized by independence and self-confidence - praiseworthy qualities - but also by roughness, impudence, pride, hot temper and a lack of attachment to the domestic foyer; not to mention an excessive incidence of homosexuality (Adam 1938, p.288). The persistence of such disorderly traits even after a century of colonial labour in the cause of orderliness suggests that we may have to revise our stereotype of the Javanese peasant as a meek toiler in the rice-fields reluctantly carried off to fight out of a subservient reverence for his lord; some peasants at least must have embraced a free-booting way of life not unwillingly, and had rather a different kind of relationship with their leaders.

Like many rural regions, Panaraga had its own cultural and art forms, of which the most spectacular in this case is probably the reyog, a dance-drama already established as a specialty of the area by the eighteenth century. It is a performance of considerable eroticism and pageantry, in which the dramatic high points are provided by a magnificent barong (peacock, lion, and tiger, lord of the jungle) and by the performances of hobby-horse dancers. These dancers have traditionally - and at least till very recent times - come from the so-called warok troupes, tightly-knit groups consisting of a strong adult warok and a number of young jatil, boys attractive enough to play transvestite roles. In earlier times the warok troupes had specialized in an explicitly transvestite dance known as the gemblakan, which was banned by the colonial authorities on account of the immoral and disorderly behaviour it was said to occasion. As in other
peasant societies, transvestite performances were popular for weddings because of their connotations of fertility. The reyog looks the very type of purely peasant fertility dance (as the hobby dances in England), but even here there is evidence of a continuing exchange with the court milieu: court circles sometimes produced their own - needless to say more refined (alus) - version of reyog (Kartomi 1976, p.112 ff.) and it seems that the original 'text' of the reyog performance may be found in the Panji episodic romance, which celebrates the refinements, languours, and ritualized valour of court life. The warok troupes themselves are only one example of a number of itinerant, extra-local groups which were a feature of Javanese society through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and which will be reviewed below.

To sum up, a survey of the history of this region has revealed the following developments to be important ones for an understanding of the state of its peasantry in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: a high degree of partisan, factional involvement in dynastic warfare, with peasants following their locally-based leaders in armed pursuit of their extra-local alliances, resulting in dramatic population fluctuations corresponding to periods of major turbulence, and weakness and lack of continuity in the institutional forms of society; yet at the same time a measure of cultural continuity, leading to the development of a recognizable regional culture centring around a particular type of old-fashioned Islam and distinctively local cultural forms. Not all rural regions underwent precisely these developments. The extreme east of Java, for example, emerged from the ferocious wars which devastated this area in the second half of the eighteenth century with neither institutional nor cultural continuity: its former population was dead or fled, leaving a desolate wilderness which was to be reclaimed to human habitation in large part by the Madurese immigration of the nineteenth century, an influx grimly but unsuccessfully resisted by members of the old aristocracy who retained bureaucratic position. At the same time, conversion to Islam was suddenly forced on the region by the Dutch, in a curious reversal of their general policy of containing that religion, in order to break the ties the old Hinduized principalities had had with Bali. Reviewing the situation over the whole of Java, however, it seems that the fact that the Dutch did not possess the military strength to impose their will directly had if anything regressive consequences for the development of native society: for the Company was forced to pursue its objectives by forming alliances with one or other of the competing factions struggling to control the kingdom. This compounded the effects of aristocratic disunity, and the resultant warfare entailed a more prolonged disorganization and debilitation of regional society than was the case where the transition to colonial rule was relatively swift, as in Burma or Vietnam.

Though, surprisingly enough, Panaraga seems not to have been much affected by the last major war to originate from the aristocracy (the 'Java War', 1825-30), it was nevertheless annexed by the colonial government in 1830 together with a number of other regions which had formerly been governed by the successor states to Mataram. From the time the colonial government began to plan the administrative reforms it would introduce in the region, Panaraga begins to be described in more detail in official reports. These do not tell us everything we would like to know,
especially about developments in the village, but nevertheless give some
interesting information about the administration of the region when it
was still part of a Javanese principality. It was found that the situation
lacked tidiness. The lands of the region now annexed to direct rule had
been assigned to a number of different jurisdictions, which are listed
below:

(i) Kabupaten (regencies), under a bupati (regent).

(ii) The narasuwita or sentana lands, which the ruler allocated
to the upkeep of members of the royal family and more
distant relatives living at court.

(iii) The pangrembe land, similarly allocated on behalf of
persons of high rank actually living on it.

(iv) Perdikan grants, for those engaged in providing religious
education.

(v) Kanoang grants, for the maintenance of specially revered

The bupati (known to the Dutch as the 'regents') performed a key
function both under the old and under the later colonial system of admin­
istration. In the political systems constructed at the centre, they held
office by virtue of appointment by the ruler, and sometimes a trusted
official of the ruler might be sent out from the centre to enjoy the fruits
of such an office. Very often, however, they were members of the dominant
local family, allies rather than appointees of a ruler. This was particularly
common in regions like Banyumas, Surabaya, and Penaraga itself where
certain bupati dynasties had established a very strong position. It seems
that the partition of Mataram had led to a marked increase in the number of
bupati appointed in the regions, which now had to support first two, then
three, and then four courts instead of one, and in a smaller proportion of
the island's total area.\footnote{11} The Dutch found that Madiun had seven bupati in
1826, where in 1812 there had been only one; Panaraga also had six bupati
now (Louw 1894, p.10 and [Louw and]de Klerck 1909, p.169). It should be
noted - and this tells us something of the nature of the authority of the
pre-colonial bupati - that the villages under the authority of each bupati
were not grouped together in one block but were scattered about, lying
cheek by jowl with villages which belonged to a different bupati's
jurisdiction. Apanage lands were also fragmented into a number of separate
parcels of cacah. Rulers granted apanage lands not only to their relatives
but also to those who served them, many of whom - and almost certainly the
most generously rewarded group - would have been commanders and subordinate
officers of their armed forces.\footnote{12}

We find, in other words, a variable mix of local and central interests
among those who were confirmed in the right to draw a certain amount of
produce and labour from a certain number of cacah, cacah which may have
fallen within recognizable village boundaries, but need not have done so.
One important circumstance which allowed the court to make provision for
apparently increasing numbers of its own appointees without actually
displacing local potentates was the ready availability of new land for
clearing.\footnote{13} In times of peace, when the rural population, though indeed
thinly spread by later standards, was at least not killed in large numbers or driven out of an area which could no longer offer them subsistence, this land could be brought under cultivation. It is possible that a man coming from the capital, if he had been an important military leader, might bring his own men to do this. This personal bond between lord and follower, not tied to a long-established tenure of a particular parcel of land as in well-developed feudal systems, is behind the intricate interweaving of jurisdictions which, as noted above, the Dutch found in Panaraga, and which they were to attack. It is worth remarking in conclusion that Hoadley's study of Javanese law in Cirebon provides striking evidence from a quite different region and at an earlier period (the first decades of the eighteenth century) that these personal bonds between lord and followers cut across the conceptual unity of the territorial village (Hoadley 1975, pp.137-44 and 172-77), so that we may have to revise our whole assumption that the unchanging, introverted, solidary village was the basic unit of traditional Javanese society.

After 1830, things were never again to be the same. The more or less constant coming and going between region and court (whether of peaceful or violent traffic) suddenly fell away: no more Panaraga men fought in dynastic struggles, no more military and other officers received reward for their services in the form of grants in a particular area (perhaps their own), no more royal benefactions were conferred on peräk is desa such as Tegalsari. And it was the end of the old barefoot bupati: the colonial administration was determined to reduce their numbers (a good start was made by dismissing the 'politically unreliable' and absorbing their jurisdictions among those of the remaining bupati) and at the same time to distinguish them more sharply from the general rural populace. The rough and ready samurai must transform himself into an impassive mandarin. It seems the old Panaraga aristocracy were not pleased, for many of their graves are reputed to carry a curse (wali) upon any 'office-holder' (that is, colonial bupati and their subordinates) who dared come there (Adam 1938, 1939; Purwalelana 1866, p.59). Perhaps they knew that most of their descendants would live in poverty, though not without popular distinction.

Despite the very real changes which were introduced, the old ties were not entirely broken, or not at once. Tegalsari, for instance, continued to be a prestigious institution: one of its kyai had a following at the court of Yogyakarta during the 1880s (Kumar, forthcoming) and the last of the pujangga (court literati), the well-known Surakarta poet Ranggawarsita, was educated at the Tegalsari pesantren (Onghokham 1975, p.4). Other links of a more curious nature remained. The forested area of Lodaya had for a long period been used as a place of exile for those whose presence at the Surakarta court had become troublesome to the ruler, and this population appears to have maintained a lively interest in any subversive movement directed against the establishment in their old home.

PEACE AND SYSTEMIZATION

'Where the ruler is at the same time a merchant, compulsion knows no bounds' (P.J. Merkus, quoted in Furnivall 1939, p.116).
Though we know that there were no major wars after 1830, the colonial government was less assured of the continuance of peace and maintained an elaborate police and spy network designed to pick up potential trouble-makers early in their careers. Yet it was committed not only to maintaining order but also to making the colony pay, and, like the Javanese rulers of earlier times, relied largely on the productive and constructive powers of the Javanese peasantry. Unlike the Javanese rulers, however, the colonial government was not concerned merely to draw off a proportion of the rice grown by its subjects, but to produce and deliver a rather wide range of export crops, and to do this with a good deal more regularity and accountancy. In construction work too, the peasantry was required to undertake more ambitious projects, though not always by technologically more expeditious methods. The constant colonial demand for more peasant labour revealed, *inter alia*, by the continuous canvassing of the *arbeidvraagstuk* (labour question) which runs through nineteenth century official documents, should be seen against the demographic pattern of the early nineteenth century. In its second decade Raffles wrote: 'Over far the greater part, seven-eighths of the island, the soil is either neglected or badly cultivated and the population scanty. It is by the produce of the remaining eighth that the whole of the nation is supported; ...' and 'Many of the best spots still remain uncultivated, and several districts are almost deserts and neglected, which might be the seats of a crowded and happy peasantry,' (Raffles 1817, p.108 and p.69). Even allowing for a generous margin of error in Raffles' estimates, we must still accept a very different picture of the Javanese countryside than the one which had developed by the close of the century.

The colonial organization of peasant labour after 1830 was organized under the rubric of the Cultivation System.16 Its essence was simply that the cultivators, instead of paying a land-rent or tax, would pay their dues to the government by devoting a percentage of their land and time to growing an export crop. Apart from growing this crop, however, they had much else to do. There were three main headings of compulsory labour service: compulsory services for native officials (the so-called *pantjendiensten*); compulsory labour on public works (*heerendiensten*); and labour on behalf of the village's own needs (*deediensten*). Though according to official regulations there was a limit to the amount of time a peasant could be required to set aside for these services, the vested interests of the different beneficiaries of his labour meant that he might actually find himself called upon to labour for the better part of the year. This left little time to grow the crop which actually fed the population, rice; and in some areas serious famines developed, beginning with the Cirebon region in the early 1840s.

What changes did the demands of the System make on local social and economic structures? Once again, the available evidence is defective and regional variation makes generalization hazardous, but from what research has been done certain developments seem significant. In Panaraga, for instance, there are indications of a change in the distribution of land. There appear to have been two types of landholding arrangement within the village. There was land which had been cleared by the original settlers - the 'elite' group of rural society, usually referred to under the name *oakal bakal* - to which their descendants had a hereditary right. But there
was also land which was held by the village itself, and which was periodically redistributed among its inhabitants - not only the o kakal bakal group, but also other long-term residents. Under the Javanese rulers, these landholding villagers were obliged to surrender a certain proportion of their rice crop as tax,17 and were also subject to labour service (corvée).18 In addition, however, to the landholding villagers there was also a class of villagers who held no land, usually designated numpang (lodgers). And since many of those with hereditary rights to land had a good deal more acreage than they could cultivate with only family labour, the landless numpang became a dependent labour force living and working on the land of wealthier villagers. They were not liable to any labour service for the ruler.19 Some Dutch officials saw the numpang as a disreputable, lawless population who led an itinerant life and were always ready to join up with a leader who inspired them with the feats of heroic figures of former days (Louw 1894, p.26).

Faced with enormous demands for labour in the period of the Cultivation System and with this commodity in short supply, it was necessary for the village to shift as many of its inhabitants as possible into a category liable to labour service, in order to spread the burden. This was done by re-classifying land which had once been hereditary in individual families as communal, village land, in which category it could be divided up among more people: the numpang, in particular, were given land (Onghokham 1975, pp.167-88). This had two effects: it broke up large landholdings into smaller parcels; and it tended to fix the numpang to the soil of the particular village where they were allotted land, ending their semi-nomadic way of life.

Research on developments in some areas suggests that this initial sharing-out of village lands among a larger number of people in the early years of the Cultivation System was followed by the emergence at a later period of a group of (in Javanese terms) large landholders, who where able to make use of a relatively advantageous position to enrich themselves while the mass of lesser landholders lost ground (Elson 1978, pp.25-29). It is not possible to say yet to what extent this was a Java-wide phenomenon.

Under the Cultivation System, government directives rested not upon the individual but upon the village, and this had important consequences for its future development. During this period and indeed throughout the century the desire for as much administrative efficiency as could be achieved cheaply led to a gradual shaping of the Javanese village into a better-defined entity than it had ever been. Boundaries were more sharply drawn; regulations were enacted requiring official sanction for the hiving-off or amalgamation of villages; and even when some colonial administrators began to feel that policy towards the Javanese village should be drawn up in the interests of the village itself rather than in those of the government, the ideal was still a parochial community, a self-governing territorially-demarcated gemeente (van den Berg 1901, passim). The position of village headman too became a formalized, entrenched institution, and the individual concerned had reason to be increasingly sensitive to the wishes of those above him in the hierarchy. In the early decades of the Cultivation System, the government had frequently departed from its principle of non-interference in village affairs when it came to the choice of a head, but in 1854 the right to elect its own head was guaranteed to every village.
under direct rule (van den Berg 1901, pp.12, 31, 45). Even then, however, an election could be declared invalid if the village's choice was 'unsuitable', and village heads could still be censured, incarcerated, and dismissed on higher authority. If he were co-operative, however, the village head was obviously the prime example of those mentioned above who were able to profit from a 'relatively advantageous position'; and later, when private enterprise became dominant, village heads were insidiously wooed by European and Chinese entrepreneurs, and found themselves receiving suitable 'presents' when satisfactory agreements were concluded with their village.

Yet, though the standardization and fixity brought about at this time were real enough, it would be wrong to depict all Javanese villages as the same, or the entire rural population as now fixed to a small plot of soil. Apart from variations in physical form - the Sundanese village with its pile houses in scattered hamlets, the central Javanese village with its single large complex of houses - there were also variations in legal and administrative status. There was still a limited area of central Java under the direct rule of the Javanese principalities (a 'rule' which was however exercised under the ever-watchful eye of colonial officialdom, always fearful of the recurrence of a significant revolt). Here the system of royal land grants to officials and dependents was maintained well into the twentieth century: and with a burgeoning aristocracy having to make do with straitened resources in land, further fragmentation of upanages was inevitable. It had been the custom for an official who received an upanage lands to appoint an agent (the bekel) to exercise authority over the village population, and for the bekel to offer a gift of homage (the bektil) to the upanage-holder at the time he was invested with his appointment. With the necessity for upanage-holders to obtain the same financial advantage from ever-decreasing parcels of land, however, this old custom was transformed so that the bekel-ship was in fact sold to the highest bidder, who had, in turn, to recover the price he had paid from the population under him. As the century wore on, the subjects of the principalities (the so-called Vorstenlanden) were remarked for their poverty; and the aristocracy either for moral decadence or for the development of a neo-traditional culture which offered little in the way of social or intellectual renovation.

Another group of peasants who were subject to the authority of their immediate overlords in a manner we might well describe as feudal, were those living on the so-called 'private lands', that is, sometimes very large tracts of land which had been alienated by the colonial government at one time or another, to private individuals. Here, as in the Vorstenlanden, the limited degree of community self-regulation which was allowed to villages under direct rule did not exist, and officials and police were appointed, and taxes and services levied, irrespective of the wishes of the population or of overall colonial policy. Despite a government policy to repurchase these estates, many remained intact until the end of the colonial period.

One type of village which did retain a greater degree of autonomy, and enjoyed special legal status, was the pernikan desa, a class of villages which had previously enjoyed royal grants exempting them from taxation and service because of their religious functions, and which had been confirmed in this privileged status by the colonial government. There were about
one hundred and fifty such villages on Java in 1912 (Bijblad 1913, No. 7847). The heads of these villages were not elected but appointed by the bupati, who was supposed to choose the most suitable member of the family in which this office had been hereditary - always a family of special status and descent, not infrequently going back to one of the wali. These heads often had exceptionally large landholdings. The perdikan villages apparently had their own distinctive cultural atmosphere: in some of them popular Javanese entertainments such as the shadow theatre and the gamelan orchestra were disallowed in favour of more 'Arab' music and recitation, and a general pall of 'hypocritical piety often combined with low standards of morality' (van den Berg 1901, p.140) was said to hang over them, at least by colonial officials, who tended to view the perdikan desa as an unnecessary hole in the revenue net.

ITINERANTS

As has already been said, it would be wrong to depict all rural Javanese as fixed to a particular village, plot, or estate by the end of the nineteenth, or indeed by the first part of the twentieth century. Some groups of Javanese had occasion to travel widely. Firstly, there were the troupe of players who specialized in one or the other of the performing arts in which Javanese society has always been so rich, and for which rural villagers have been prepared to pay not a small price. The warok troupes mentioned above are a notable example, but there were others, and at the 'upper' end of the performing spectrum practitioners of the wayang (shadow-puppet) theatre played to both court and village audiences, though its scenarios are set in an aristocratic and not a peasant milieu. Wayang seems to have exercised an almost mystical fascination for some villagers, who might travel to quite distant centres and at considerable financial cost to study under famous dalang (masters of wayang) to acquire the difficult theatrical and musical skills, and the language, so far removed from that used in everyday life. One writer has seen wayang theatre as a vehicle producing political and cultural identification with the Javanese state (Onhokham 1975, pp.3-4); but it also contains an element of humour and satire which holds up its aristocratic heroes as less than wise and brave - an element which, if emphasized, could give a rather less 'royalist' tone to the whole.

The second major constituent group of the itinerant population were the travelling santri, the 'students of religion'. There were two reasons for the peripatetic character of much of Java's religious life. The first was the old-established custom of pilgrimage (ziarah or sujarah, from the Arabic term for a pilgrimage to a place other than Mecca) to the sites of holy graves, especially those of the wali. Although these graves might be visited at any time (especially when a favour, such as a child, or success in one's occupation or other affairs, needed to be asked) there was usually a fixed time when the most famous graves were to be visited, leading to the development of a sort of pilgrimage circuit and to the assembling of large crowds at a particular site, so that Dutch officials complained about 'quasi-Masonic fraternities' in which the stronger encouraged weaker reeds to 'fanaticism' and even to active resistance.
On this pilgrimage circuit, members of the most prominent of Java's Islamic families - those from the *perdikan desa* and those with other claims to distinction - renewed their ties with one another, ties which were bound up with an intricate genealogical network created by marriage alliances over many generations. The second reason for which santri travelled was to further their education. It was traditionally believed that a serious student of religion could not consider himself fully educated if he had studied at only one pesantren, but must visit a number of pesantren in order to acquire the 'specialisms' of different *kyai* in the various Islamic sciences. There was a particular tradition of west Javanese, Sundanese-speaking, students travelling to east Javanese pesantren to study, for which they first needed to master Javanese.

Not all santri were serious students of religion, however, and it seems evident that, just as entering a university is not necessarily an indication of a scholastically-minded temperament, embracing the life of a travelling santri was also often done for reasons of congeniality not too much connected with thoughts of the divine or the after-life. There was not always a sharp distinction between travelling santri and other itinerant groups, and some Javanese texts depict santri as taking part in such activities as the highly erotic *gembliakan* dancing, and even having affairs with boy dancers, though this type of behaviour is never attributed to the greatest men of religion, who conduct themselves in a much more ascetic fashion. The *warok* dancers themselves claim descent from the disciples of Ki Ageng Mirah, who first converted Panaraga to Islam, and travesty, acrobatics, and conjuring were all popular in the old santri community. It would be equally wrong, however, to see santri cultivation of theatrical and musical genres as merely frivolous self-indulgence: in some areas musical performances of a religious nature which were of foreign, middle-eastern origin, such as the *slawatan*, were introduced by santri to become popular also among the less devout, leading to the development of something of a popular theatre; and in this way the cultural repertoire of rural Java was enlarged to include genres which celebrated more Islamic values.

This rich and complex lode in Java's culture was not, alas, unaffected by overall developments in the colonial period. Firstly, as the rural population became impoverished, it was increasingly hard to support an itinerant population, and competition among *kyai* for popular support was sometimes intense and bitter. Secondly, men of deep religious commitment and what is nowadays described as outstanding leadership potential were precisely those who were most suspect to the colonial government, particularly when they moved from place to place and seemed to be building up a following in more than one locality, or when they seemed to be establishing the sort of relationship with members of the Javanese aristocracy which had given rise to such a difficult alliance to defeat in the Java War. For this reason, religious leaders were exiled (to non-Muslim areas) for even slighter reasons than Javanese princes, and the natural development of movements within the Islamic community was severely handicapped. Furthermore, colonial restrictions on travelling (such as the introduction of the *reis pas*), made movement between regions more difficult.

Lastly, there was still a considerable amount of migration of ordinary peasants from one area of Java to another. Movement out of indigo-growing
areas was common (indigo was probably the most unpopular of all crops, on account of its exceedingly tedious and onerous demands on the cultivator) as was migration of peasants from central Java to areas further east, such as Kediri, which only 'filled up' during the nineteenth century, or the extreme east of Java, depopulated by the wars of the late eighteenth century, where in-migrants made up a large proportion of the population even as late as the census of 1930.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF PEASANT SOCIETY IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY: TWO EXAMPLES

A Changing Frame of Reference

Raffles had been concerned to see some improvement in the apparently slow rate of population increase on Java, a rate his calculations estimated to be very much slower than that of the English, and even below that of the French (Raffles 1817, p.76). By the end of the century this concern seems otiose, for the population had actually grown very much faster than Raffles was able to foresee. Land was therefore no longer as plentiful in relation to population as it had once been, a situation which produced further fragmentation of landholdings. Once again, however, it has to be said that regional variation was wide; some districts in Pasuruan regency apparently had virtually no more land available as sawah as early as the 1830s, whereas in parts of west Java serious fragmentation of landholdings does not seem to have occurred before the twentieth century (Elson 1978, p.12; Horikoshi 1976, p.110 ff). Though, as we have seen, migration to other parts of Java continued, it is nevertheless possible that a larger proportion of those who held land entrenched themselves in a particular village as land became progressively less easy to obtain over the island: certainly, it is a question which requires further investigation.

A second major trend over the last decades of the century greatly affected peasant life. This was the gradual phasing-out of the statist Cultivation System in favour of private entrepreneurs anxious to enter the apparently rich field of the Indies, which had contributed so much to the home country's domestic budget. After 1870, these entrepreneurs were permitted to hire peasant land on a hitherto unprecedented scale; it might be said that the peasant now had the worst of both worlds. He had increasingly to contend with the intrusion of a money economy and with the operation of powerful economic interests susceptible neither to social nor, on the whole, to serious governmental control; yet he himself was much more slowly freed from the social and governmental compulsion of the old days. It seems to the present writer that the peasant producer's obvious difficulties in holding his own or responding to the challenge of a modern economy, later to be attributed by colonial economists to the structural 'duality' of the economy itself, cannot really be explained without at least some reference to the 'duality' of the political and legal apparatus. A villager could not, for instance, usually buy off labour services even if it were economically advantageous: the pantjendiensten (services for native office-holders) were abolished in 1882 but the heerendiensten (services for the state) not until 1902, and even after that date the desadiensten (services for the village) were still obligatory.25 Plantation managements
worked through village heads to the detriment of free choice, and the position of the plantations was strengthened by the fact that labour was no longer a commodity in short supply, so that many peasants now actively solicited work. The whole question of the costs and benefits of the plantation economy is a complex one, and we must await a full accounting from those qualified to provide it. It is clear, for instance, that the irrigation provided for sugar also increased productivity in peasant rice-growing, but equally clear that the terms of the contract with the plantations were a prime focus of peasant grievances, as the outbreaks of cane-burning demonstrate (Elson 1979). Once again, the terms of the contract reflect the political as much as the economic strength of the plantations, as does their reaction to the world-wide depression of the 1880s, which entailed simply paying less in land-rent and in wages. By this time, the returns that could be achieved by the manpower thus turned back into the traditional food-crop sector were not sufficient to compensate for what was lost in wages from the plantations, and the 1880s saw a seriously worsened food situation, and a higher incidence of localized revolt. In the polite phraseology of official reports, the last decades of the century were times of 'diminished welfare' on Java.

A Comparison

For a large part of the nineteenth century, the Javanese peasantry had shared many material and psychological characteristics with their European counterparts, although, if descriptions of European peasant life are at all accurate, one might add that Javanese peasant life was arguably a good deal less squalid. In the late nineteenth century, however, the peasantry in a number of European countries underwent a series of related transformations no less far-reaching because we children of a later age do not readily apprehend how very different things once were. In France, for example, the peasantry had been characterized, for the major part of the century, by poverty and conservatism, and by a degree of isolation which made them see as 'foreigners' those whom we would describe as their fellow Frenchmen living as little as ten or fifteen miles away, and conceive of the 'national' government only as 'le douane et le fisc'. By the end of the century, however, they were much less poor, much less conservative in their economic attitudes and much less 'localocentric', to recall Wolf's term, in their political attitudes; and this radical transformation would continue in the first part of the twentieth century. Let us briefly review the instrumentalities of this process, which made the French peasant, materially and psychologically, a member of a wider community, not a provincial, but a 'citizen' of the nation state. They were: increasing urbanization, which involved both the diversification of upper-class urban society, providing rural people with a wider range of choice in the allocation of their political support, and an increased transmission of innovative urban ideas to rural areas; military service, and the breakdown of regional and local loyalties which it brought about; a great expansion of the education system, which was strongly concerned to improve the oral and written use of the 'mother tongue' and to inculcate the idea of the fatherland and of civic duty; and, not least, economic developments in a period when an expanding and diversifying economy provided new opportunities to those who could acquire new skills, and demonstrated the advantage to be gained by
thinking in terms of a wider, national format rather than of a local one.

Taking them in order, it is clear enough why these instrumentalities did not operate on Java. Such urban development with an economic rationale as had existed prior to the Dutch economic presence had been stultified by that presence, and the nineteenth century did not see a significant development of a native urban society. To the extent that an economically diversified, urban middle class existed, this was predominantly Chinese, and therefore could not provide political leadership to other levels of society. The Javanese 'upper class' did not become more diverse – the bupati remained very much the predominant type of the wealthy and influential Javanese – nor more urban, and had neither reason nor opportunity to court political support among the peasantry. When in the following century something of an urban elite semi-independent of the colonial bureaucracy did develop, it was to be an elite whose intellectual aspirations to leadership were not supported by independent economic resources, and whose ability to attach to itself a peasant following was severely restricted both by the lack of those resources and, of course, by the unfree political climate of a colonized polity.

Military service had been, as I hope this paper has demonstrated, a powerful agency by which peasants had been made aware of developments in the larger polity: I say this, of course, without suggesting that either in Java or in France the experience was a pleasant one, or that wars are desirable because they develop national unity. After 1830, Javanese peasants were no longer recruited to fight for their kings, or would-be kings; and a colonial army could not propagate the necessity of loyalty to the patrie, as the French army did. A similar reversion of previous developments took place in the educational field. It is arguable, I think, that the pesantren network provided, in spite of imperfections, a curriculum which though not strictly 'national' was attuned to the inculcation of a Javanese language and of a Javanese culture and religion. With the loss of royal patronage and the role of the royal court as the real and functioning cultural centre of the kingdom, the pesantren seem to have been increasingly confined to a purely local ambience. The colonial education system which was – very slowly and partially – to provide a supra-local format of educational reference could not, though it unintentionally developed a sense of common interest and common grievances, provide a coherent sense of identity and commonly-held values. This deficiency was to become disturbing to some of its twentieth century graduates, and to lead them to establish more 'national' systems by their own efforts and often at the cost of incurring considerable official displeasure.

Finally, the presence of an 'expanding capitalist economy' meant very different things to the French and to the Javanese peasant. In Java, the peasant made contact with this economy at a period at which the dominance of foreign interests was long entrenched, and when his own resources and consequent ability to maintain his position vis-à-vis the operation of these powerful interests had been significantly eroded; and, as we have seen, a one-sided compulsion remained present in many ways long after the official 'freeing' of the economy. In France, rural populations were able to benefit by the competition for labour among the different sectors of
a diversifying economy: the emigration of workers following job opportunities pushed up wages in the areas from which they emigrated, in which labour was now at a premium. On Java, the economy was not diversifying to anything like the same extent, remaining as it did almost exclusively concerned with the cultivation of food and export crops; nor was there significant competition for labour, due not only to its ready availability but also to pressure from powerful plantation interests on the colonial government to abort any trends which seemed likely to raise the price of their labour. Though a Javanese peasant might migrate in a geographical sense - even, of course, outside Java, where significant numbers of his countrymen worked as contract coolies on plantations such as those of north Sumatra - for some material advantage, there was little opportunity for him to acquire modern skills, and he was always in a relatively weaker bargaining position than his French counterpart. In general it can be said that the modern economy seized upon the Javanese peasant; he could not, unlike his European counterparts, seize upon the modern economy as a means of transforming and bettering himself.

Addressing the question as to why conservatism and resistance to change prevailed for so long in France and new ways, though known, were not adopted, Weber writes:

... we can see now that their narrow vision was the vision of frightened men in desperate circumstances; that the village was a lifeboat striving to keep afloat in heavy seas, its culture a combination of discipline and reassurance designed to keep its occupants alive. Insecurity was the rule, existence consistently marginal. Tradition, routine, vigorous adherence to the family and the community - and to their rules - alone made existence possible...

Since all had to pull together, no deviance could be tolerated (Weber 1976, p.479). On Java, this factor operated more strongly, and not less so as in France, as the nineteenth century drew to a close; and Wolf's article convincingly describes the economic factors underlying the defensive reaction of closing in, of demanding loyalty to the community rather than to exterior ideas or parties, which he found in his case study. This article has attempted, however sketchily, to outline the economic developments and administrative measures of the nineteenth century which are essential to the understanding of the Javanese village in later times: the new precision of its legal definition and status; the fixing of labour within its boundaries, as exemplified by the fate of the numpang of Panaraga; the grip on the village headman of a much more firmly-established ruling apparatus; the likely effects of population increase - all made of the village a more tightly-bound and precisely delimited community than it had been before these developments. It has also been suggested that other less obvious developments were of equal significance for the fate of the Javanese village, that the destruction of the old cultural and political context, and its replacement by a colonial state alien by culture and sterile by policy, made of the village the only society of which its inhabitants could be members. Where the French village was integrated into the nation-state, the Javanese, in all its newly tight definition, was merely encapsulated; and, in the twentieth century, its inhabitants would have a far, far wider gulf to bridge before they too might become 'citizens'.
NOTES

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1 One of the earliest officials to take on the task wrote that he was confronted with a situation where 'no district here in Java, no, not even any village, is run on the same lines as another, for everything among the Javanese is based on adats or customs' (Governor P.G. van Overstraten, writing in 1796, quoted in de Jonge 1884, p.408. Van Overstraten apparently never completed his study).

2 The wali (saints or friends of God) were the first apostles and establishers of Islam on Java. Traditional accounts usually list nine of them, though the personalia are not always the same.

3 Under the Mataram dynasty, the Madiun-Panaraga region had been the apanage area of the prince who bore the title Pangeran Purbaya, and who was the most prominent of the ruler's brothers. There was apparently a tradition of intermarriage between the Purbayas and the Kajoran line, whose patriarch was so important in the rebellion of the 1670s; and the Kajorans were related also to the Batara Katong line. On this network of genealogical ties, see Ongkokham 1975, pp.35-36.

4 The dikir is a repetitive litany, e.g. of the name of God (Allah or another referant), sometimes involving ecstatic-inducing techniques.

5 On the foundation charters of Tegalsari see Fokkens 1877, p.318 ff.

6 It is arguable that the separate development of coast and inland dates from the Dutch acquisition of the pasieir from Mataram in the late seventeenth century, an acquisition which many later Javanese rulers wished to see reversed.

7 See map in de Jonge 1884, p.256, showing the clustering of settlements along major rivers.

8 For as much as it is worth, Panaraga was one of the major road junctions, with roads to Pajang (via Kaduwang), Japan, Rawa (Tulung Agung) and Kediri (Schrieke 1957, p.110).

9 An excellent description of present-day reyog is found in Kartomi (1976).

10 On the extreme east of Java, see Kumar 1979. In north-east Java, the Madurese influx seems to have led to the establishment of separate Madurese and Javanese territorial communities, with those bupati with Madurese connections encouraging immigration into their kabupaten; see e.g. Bosch 1932.
The two major principalities into which the kingdom of Mataram was divided (Surakarta and Yogyakarta) had later to provide some of their lands for the support of two considerably smaller principalities, the Mangkunegaran (created in 1757) and the Pakualaman (1812). Since rather large slices of territory had had to be ceded to the Dutch, the total area of land available had been reduced.

See Kumar 1980, p.29 on the granting to Mangkunegaran army officers of parcels of land which were of a size to provide a very good living indeed.

Once again, however, it should be stressed that, because of the strong links between local and central elites, not all grants made on 'central' initiative were necessarily against local interests. When Pakubuwana IV's niece married one of the kyai of Tegalsari, her uncle made her a grant of pangrembe land which no doubt enriched Tegalsari (see [Louw and] de Klerck 1909, p.172); and it is possible that some of the military officers who received grants were in fact local lads. Finally, some land was not effectively controlled either by central or by local authorities: see, for instance, the account in Soeradipoera et al 1915, Cantos 239-61, of one of the 'robber villages' which were a feature of the Javanese landscape even in times of peace.

When Panaraga was brought under direct rule, the bupati were instructed that they might no longer go barefoot in public, as they had been accustomed to do, but should wear kasoed ([Louw and] de Klerck 1909, p.182), which they can be seen wearing in nineteenth century photographs. At the same time, they were issued with payung (tall parasols) like those used by the coastal bupati, to impress the population. It is said that they were pleased.

See e.g. the official note in Mailrapport 1888, No. 597.

Van Niel (1972, p. 91) makes the point that the Cultivation System was actually not a system but a number of differing local arrangements. This is true, but there is no doubt that in relation to the regulation of agriculture before direct rule it represents a much more systematic approach.

The most usual proportion seems to have been fifty per cent (out of which local officials drew a certain proportion before the remainder was sent to the ruler).

Once again, it has to be said that regional variation had been very great, and in some areas all households, not only those holding land, were liable to labour service.

There were other categories of villager, again classified according to their relationship to land, i.e. those who owned house plus yard and those who owned house alone. They too had no responsibilities to the state. As might be expected, terminology and classification of village groups varies from place to place.
It seems, however, that some of the colonial bupati may have used their power of appointment to advance their own relatives at the expense of the family to which the office had traditionally belonged, thus reducing the influence of these old families.

One report gives an average of seventy times more than ordinary villagers for some perdikan villages in Banyumas (Hasselman 1887-88, p.98).

Many villages freed dalang, gamelan players and dancers (and also village artisans, such as carpenters) from the burden of tax and labour services (van den Berg 1901, p.104f.)

See in particular the Serat Cabolang and Serat Centini, summarized in Pigeaud 1933, passim.

The slawatan became very popular in east Java, and in Bagelen and Kedu 'Arab-style' performances of religious music were popular outside religiously pious circles (Pigeaud 1938, pp.246-78).

Another question which is related to the apparent failure of the growth of a 'modern' economy to stimulate and dynamize the traditional sector is that of landholding. Though the general trend still is not clear, it seems that the transition from communally-held to individually-held land was slower than one might expect in an economy developing in the direction of monetized and capitalist forms. It appears that the plantations actually found it more convenient to continue to deal with communally-held land en bloc, rather than with individual landowners who might have too keen an eye on the economic potential of their own plot of land (see Wertheim 1964, p.140; Furnivall 1939, pp.178-79, 319).

Compare the description of almost unrelieved poverty, isolation, brutality and ignorance given in Weber (1976) with that of the material life of Javanese peasants in Mayer (1897) which represents some peasants (particularly of course village chiefs) as living in pleasant, well-appointed houses far different to many European hovels. This comparison relies, of course, largely on the subjective judgment of these authors.

Why France, it may be asked. Though other comparisons may be equally illuminating, I have chosen this one on the grounds that French rural society was for long characterized by many of the features - pronounced regional and linguistic variation, a tradition of strong local leadership and weak centralizing government, for example - which we observe in Java. Some may feel that a comparison with another Asian society which was modernized in the nineteenth century would be more appropriate; but the clearest example in this category is Japan, where it seems indisputable that even at a much earlier period the village had been incorporated into a relatively centralized system to a far greater degree. We have village records, kept by villagers at central direction, going back to the seventeenth century, a situation inconceivable in Java (and in France, where records of village developments before 1789 were kept either by the the church or by the seigneurie).
This at least is the picture one gains from Weber (1976), whose description of the French peasantry is of a collection of individuals or at most villages without common organization, solidarity, or consciousness - comprising a class, in Marx's famous simile, only as potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes (p. 245).

Which was in fact not the mother tongue of up to one-fifth of the French population at mid-century (see Weber 1976, p.310).

This is perhaps a matter of controversy; but in the opinion of the present writer it is highly questionable to see the pesantren as inculcating a well-defined and exclusively 'Islamic' curriculum conceptually distinguished from 'Javanese' cultural attainments.

Compare, for instance, the very different impressions of the world of the ulama we obtain from Soebardi (1975), dealing with an eighteenth century text, and Horikoshi (1976), dealing with the twentieth century.

The best-known of such movements is the Taman Siswa school system founded by one of the earliest Javanese nationalists.

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Mailrapport. One of a series of official reports begun in 1869, sent by the Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies to the Minister for Colonies to provide background information on decisions taken. Individual reports are identified by citing the year and the number (e.g. 1895, No.998). Mailrapporten are now housed in the new Rijksarchief, Den Haag.


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August 17 1980 marks the thirty-fifth anniversary of the Indonesian Proclamation of Independence. Shortly before 10 a.m. on that now hallowed occasion, an exhausted Soekarno read out what still has to be one of the odder political documents of the twentieth century:

We the people of Indonesia hereby declare Indonesia's independence. Matters concerning the transfer of power and other matters will be executed in an orderly manner and in the shortest possible time.

Jakarta, 17.8.'45
On behalf of the Indonesian people
(signed) Soekarno Hatta

This was terse indeed for people with the experiences and personalities of Soekarno and Hatta, but much of the strangeness of the proclamation we now know to be attributable to the confusion caused by the abruptness of and the uncertainty surrounding the Japanese surrender, to the behind-the-scenes struggles for power and for clarity of ideas, and to the nervous fatigue suffered by the victims of the kidnapping to Rengasdenklok only the day before (Anderson 1961; Dahm 1969, pp.276-315; Legge 1972, pp.181-202). It is not clear that all of the matters referred to have even yet been executed, but it is remarkable how efficiently and effectively any confusion about one important matter, the historical background to the proclamation, was soon dispelled. There came to be little doubt, either among Indonesian leaders or among those who wrote about them, that the proclamation of Indonesian independence was closely tied to a political current that had been rushing along since 1908. The day, the document, and the fact that there were many Indonesian lives pledged to defend its message constituted a high point in a struggle already four decades old, a struggle destined to last some years longer, a struggle the sweeping power of which has dominated Indonesian political history in this century—the struggle of the Indonesian nationalist movement.

The story of the Indonesian nationalist movement has been told well and often (Kahin 1952, pp.1-100; Vlekke 1965, pp.338-99; Zainu'ddin 1970, pp.169-204). Social and economic strains associated with the colonial systems of the nineteenth century, when combined with changes in values being wrought by Ethical programmes introduced after 1900, produced in the Indies, and particularly in Java, a world in which politics, long muted and pent up, could no longer be denied. Budi Utomo founded in 1908 by students who had both political and social aims in mind, has won recognition as the first quickening of a movement that eventually awakened the people of the Indonesian nation (Nagazumi 1972). When soon after its founding, it limited its scope to the Javanese people and its interests largely to cultural affairs, Budi Utomo lost much of its potential and saw itself surpassed by two newer and more broadly based organizations. The Indische Partij was...
the first group in the Indies to espouse radical political changes, but its
complexion - it was seen as a Eurasian party - and stiff government
opposition limited it to the point where it became merely an item of note
in the history of the nationalist movement (Van der Veur 1955, pp.151-76). Sarekat Islam suffered from neither of those limitations and by 1915 its
vague opposition to the *status quo*, and the drawing power of its chairman,
H.U.S. Cokroaminoto, attracted hundreds of thousands of members, making
Sarekat Islam the first mass organization in the Indies (Dahm 1969, p.13).
Floundering somewhat purposelessly in a welter of religious, social, and
economic ideas, Sarekat Islam, with many members but little in the way of
direction or principles, came in the late 1910s to be seriously influenced
by a socialist group which had direction and principles but few members.
This promising combination broke down under the stress of personal rivalries,
of conflicting world views, and of increasing police pressure, leaving the
much reduced Islamic group to cast about ineffectively for further popular
support and the socialist group, now grown into the Indonesian Communist
Party (PKI), to pursue openly anti-colonial aims which eventually led it to
sponsor the disastrous uprisings of 1926-27 (McVey 1965).

The decline of Sarekat Islam and the demise of the PKI left an
organizational void that was soon filled by a new force, that of the secular
nationalists. Drawing on the intellectual strength of leaders trained at
universities and on the eclectic ideological and oratorical skills of its
dynamic leader Soekarno, the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), with its
goal of leading to independence a united nation made up of all the
Indonesian peoples, rapidly pushed to the forefront of politics in the
Indies (Petrus Blumberger 1931, pp.204-49). This push, however, was
perceived by the Dutch as a serious threat to their rule, and late in 1929
the police arrested Soekarno and three other PNI personalities and
subsequently had them tried and sentenced to gaol. The spirit embodied in
the PNI was not so easily extinguished: two new radical secular nationalist
organizations swiftly arose to take its place (Pluvier 1953, pp.45-52).
Partai Indonesia pursued the same goal - independence as soon as possible -
and used the same methods - mass meetings to raise nationalist spirit - as
the defunct PNI. Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia, on the other hand, stressed
not so much mass action as the building up of an educated nationalist cadre,
able to maintain their sense of purpose and to spread their political ideas
no matter how oppressive government actions might be. Those government
actions, in reality, proved too much for both parties, for their chief
leaders were exiled, their meetings were proscribed, and by the mid-1930s
both were leading declining existences. In this harsh, police-dominated
climate, many politically-minded Indonesians re-evaluated their staunch
anti-government stands and formed or joined parties which participated in
the governmental councils set up by the Dutch. Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia and
Partai Indonesia Raya were the leading nationalist parties in the final
years of the Dutch era, and working through both of them Indonesian leaders
pushed for a review of the Indies' position within the Netherlands Empire
and for a meaningful parliament within the colony. Deaf to these appeals
and blind to the hopes that lay behind them (Abeyasekere 1976), the Dutch
were unable to garner popular support for their resistance to the Japanese
in 1942, and a humiliating debacle ensued. During the Japanese occupation,
the nationalist figures returned from exile and, under the guise of support
for the war effort, once more stirred Indonesians with the dream of an independent and united nation. The determination inspired by that dream and the military skills and spirit instilled in a young Indonesian army by Japanese training proved to be an indefatigable combination (Anderson 1966), and through four years of diplomatic, economic, and military struggles, that Proclamation made on 17 August 1945 was successfully defended. Though the 1949 agreement recognizing Indonesia's independence denied the new republic complete sovereignty both over its economy and over all its territory, those shortcomings were rectified when debts to Holland were repudiated in 1956, when Dutch-owned firms were nationalized in 1957, and when control over western New Guinea was transferred to Indonesia in 1963. This completed the achievement of the nationalist ideal, a sovereign Indonesian state, free from Dutch imperialism, stretching from Sabang to Merauke, and wrote a successful ending to the movement started half a century earlier with the establishment of Budi Utomo.

This is a dramatic story, the story of the nationalist movement. It has its own momentum. It has its own compelling logic. It even has its own form of grandeur, incorporating as it does a sequence of high ideals, high risks, high sacrifices, and, ultimately, high rewards. The skeletal version of the story presented above is necessarily incomplete and superficial, but it represents the heart of the version of Indonesian nationalism subscribed to in Indonesia and in much of the world outside. And it is becoming clearer that there are serious problems with it.

The concept of nationalism in a general sense can be, and indeed has been, discussed in soporific detail, and there is probably little new that can now be added to a debate which has failed to stir anyone for the past two decades. From that old debate, however, it is possible to put together what is likely to be the most generally acceptable definition of nationalism: nationalism is a conviction, more or less commonly held, that a people are one and that they ought somehow collectively to make the decisions which shape their shared future. This is a fairly broad definition, but though aspects of it can be questioned, most people would be reluctant to stray very far from it. It is important, nevertheless, to add to it that in a colonial context, this meaning has little significance without introducing a further element, the determination to bring that idea into being. This leads to what has always dominated the discussion of nationalism in Indonesia, the movement. When 'movement' was first applied to political stirrings in the Indies, it had a wide, yet clear, meaning (Petrus Blumberger 1931, pp.1-15). Movement involved participation in organizations, usually but not always parties, which were structured along what people associated with them would have called modern lines: they had statutes; they had a combination of goals and methods which could be considered a programme; they had voluntary members whose roles, rights, and responsibilities as members were delineated; and they had at least a semblance of centralized control. That meaning of movement, however, was gradually narrowed. As there began to be a tradition of these modern parties, and as parties with a particular temporal orientation such as the socialists and the radical nationalists began to appear, the old idea of movement was elided into an almost linear conception of political development, of progress through time. Simply, then, the nationalist movement came to mean, as it appeared in the historical sketch above, a series of parties succeeding one another as the foremost standard-bearer in forwarding the drive that would bring
Indonesians to independence and thus to the ability to make their own political choices. Political concepts and choices came to be judged by their relationship to the vanguard of this movement. And the movement itself came to take on the appearance not only of embodying the nationalist determination to achieve independence but also of moving that conviction which is nationalism from a situation where it was less commonly held to one where it was more commonly held among the people of Indonesia.

This idea, basically equating modern Indonesian political history with the nationalist movement and the nationalist movement with Indonesian nationalism was, in its clarity and in its utility, attractive both to Indonesian political leaders and to those concerned with them and with their problems. Almost fifteen years ago, however, that equation began to lose some of its certainty, as the period for which it was assumed to be valid came gradually within the purview of historians. In sifting through the evidence before deciding what it all meant, historians began raising questions about the movement. Generally speaking, those questions were of two kinds. The first has to do with debunking the effectiveness and the importance of some of the mythical elements in the movement. Basing their considerations on contemporary documents rather than on panicking Dutch or nostalgic Indonesian impressions, scholars have reduced Sarekat Islam from a massive organization to a respectable-sized group and have reduced the PNI and its successors from respectable-sized groups to things considerably smaller (Dahm 1969). They have also raised doubts about Soekarno's role in turning the movement onto purely nationalist tracks (Ingleson 1975, 1979). Perhaps more importantly, they have restored some of the less radical nationalist organizations and leaders to a more proper sense of time and of proportion (Abeyasekere 1972). From the second angle, scholars of Indonesia's recent history have looked at various traditional forms of social organization, expression, and protest, and have found that they were not necessarily superseded by the nationalist drive or even subsumed into it, that in fact many of them continued to exist simultaneously with and oblivious to nationalism, or that it was nationalism which was making concessions to them rather than the idealized opposite (Benda and Castles 1969; Dahm 1969; Sartono 1972, 1973).

This historical approach has begun the process of bringing the nationalist movement into a more realistic perspective. In so doing, it enables and encourages scholars interested in Indonesia to look more closely at the parties which collectively made up that movement and to try to re-evaluate their places in the times in which they existed. It has not yet, however, clearly confronted the problem of whether the nationalist movement can with confidence be considered the equivalent of nationalism embodied. Brief investigations into two different areas of Indies politics, into popular understanding of nationalism and into regional organizations, can help to illustrate the weakness of that equivalence.

Late in 1929, Dutch officials, concerned about rumours that there were soon to be outbreaks of anti-government violence, and recalling the PKI incidents three years before, moved suddenly and concertedly against the PNI. Four of the party's West Java leaders were arrested and charged, members elsewhere were detained for some time, and the houses and offices of prominent PNI people were broken into and searched. This was at a time when the party, in its own estimation, had sufficiently propagandized its
fundamental principles and grown in strength to such an extent that it had already gone over to its action programmes intended to speed up the achievement of Indonesian independence (Paget 1975, pp.71-73). In the trial that ensued some nine months after his arrest, Soekarno, as PNI chairman, put up a defence in the form of an impassioned plea for an understanding of his party and its platform. According to his arguments, imperialism as a system, as a 'lust', should in fact have been on trial instead of him and his PNI colleagues. It was imperialism which had ensured the misery of local peoples while draining colonized areas of resources. This had naturally awakened a political response among the colonized peoples, and if in Indonesia it was the PNI which was said to be leading the drive for independence, this was only because it was 'simply more forthcoming in advocating these ideas; it simply lays more stress on national independence' (Paget 1975, p.53). In doing this, it was doing 'no more than give voice to a commonly held sentiment' (Paget 1975, p.52). Soekarno stated that the PNI had not directed attacks specifically against the Dutch government in the Indies but rather against the system in theory and that it had nothing to do with creating, in fact had tried to squelch, rumours that there would be anti-government actions in 1930. After deploring the breadth, vagueness, and harshness of the laws under which the PNI leaders were being prosecuted, laws which made political organizing in the Indies all but impossible but which, nevertheless, he and his colleagues had not broken, Soekarno ended with a moving statement. Citing 'Mother Indonesia' nine times and the Indonesian people no fewer than twelve times, Soekarno proclaimed that Gatot, Maskun, Supriadinata, and he were innocent, but that if they were found guilty they would willingly suffer, since their sacrifice would not be in vain (Paget 1975, pp.140-42).

Soekarno's speech was more than simply grand political theatre or even political oratory at its best; it was also a chance to show the Dutch the legitimacy and antecedents of his political thought and to argue, fairly convincingly, that the PNI leaders ought to be found innocent of the charges brought against them. But the trial provided more than an opportunity for Soekarno to show his skills. It also made it possible to see how far the nationalists' ideas had carried, how far they were 'giving voice to a commonly held sentiment'.

It is difficult under any circumstances to get an idea of how politicians are doing at getting their messages across to the people who give attention to them. It is particularly hard in a situation such as that which obtained in the Indies. There political speech was constrained at all levels, and the chances of non-literate people ever having their views sounded, never mind recorded, were slim. The 1930 trial, however, does provide an opportunity to see the way in which some people less extraordinary than Soekarno were grappling with political terms and their application. For while Soekarno was devoting a good bit of his months of detention to the preparation of his defence speech, the prosecution was not idle. With the vast resources of the administration and police open to them, those responsible for preparing the government's case against Soekarno and his colleagues were able to use that time to gather numerous witnesses and statements with which they proposed to prove that the PNI had indeed advocated the overthrow of the government. Together, these form an incomplete picture. The prosecution was interested only in certain kinds of witnesses
and statements, that is, incriminating ones. The prosecution was willing
to promise those from whom statements were taken that they would not be
gaoled for what they revealed. And the very process of examination by
police or civilian officials was probably sufficient to influence testimony
along certain directions. All of this means that even collectively the
witnesses' statements are unlikely to reflect a consistently true picture
either of the events they were describing or even of their perception of those
events. But the statements do present an opportunity, within the bounds of
the above and of other caveats, to hear PNI members and hangers-on try to
describe what the organizations meant to them.

Sudar was thirty years old in 1930. He was born in Ambarawa in Central
Java, but was working as a tailor in Bandung when he was interrogated by
the police. He was a full member of the PNI (membership card number 75)
which he had joined in September 1928. As a member he attended courses almost
every Friday evening, had been present at seven of the large public PNI
gatherings and, though he held no office within the party, propagated
frequently in the kampung. The following are some police questions put to
him, and his answers: 2

Q: At the courses or public gatherings was there ever any
talk about independence? How is the purpose of it
explained? By what road was it to be reached? When
was it to come?

A: Yes, I heard about independence, which is, according to
the PNI, being free from the present (Dutch) government.
When Indonesia is independent, there is going to be a
Republic established here. At its head will be a
president chosen by the people. The president will
carry out his tasks in accordance with the wishes of the
people; he will be in office for at most five years.
Independence is to be reached by uniting the people,
uniting them by holding courses and public meetings,
by publishing newspapers, and by propagandizing in the
kampung. About the coming of independence, I don't
know. I just heard at the courses that when the
Indonesian people have reached unity (become one
nation), independence will certainly come.

Q: When the Indonesian people have already become one
nation, how are they going to bring about independence?

A: I don't know about that, because it wasn't explained
at the courses.

Q: At the courses, were there ever explanations about the
imperialists and the capitalists? What were the
explanations like? Did the leaders ever say anything
about, or even hint at, attacking or changing the
present government?

A: The imperialists are people who establish the system
which exists in colonized lands to bring profits to
the colonizing country. Therefore, in Indonesia, the
imperialists are the Dutch, those who have governing
power here (the Dutch East Indies government). The capitalists are people who have much money, capital, and try to see that their money (capital) finds large returns. In Indonesia there are different kinds of capitalists, there are Dutch, English, Japanese, and other capitalists, but the most numerous are the Dutch capitalists, the same as the Dutch East Indies government which exists here in Indonesia. I never heard anything about leaders saying words about or hinting at making any attack on or changing the present government.

Q: What does revolutionary mean?
A: Revolutionary means trying to speed up the intended process, but without violence (not using firearms or machetes).

Q: At the course which you attended on 6 December 1929, did Ir. Sukarno say that the Republic of Indonesia will use modern revolutionary means?
A: Yes, he said that the Republic of Indonesia will use modern revolutionary means, that is, a new style of revolution, meaning revolution without violence, without firearms or machetes, but speeding up the intended process. Also, I want to clarify that the PNI doesn't agree with the revolutionary style like that in France.

Q: Don't you think that Ir. Soekarno, speaking like that, aroused feelings, either by hints or allusions, so that people would destroy public order or attack the Dutch East Indies government?
A: No way.

While this is not in complete agreement with all of Sukarno's statements - Sudar had no need to avoid talking about specifics, and thus for him the imperialists were the Dutch, and not merely those who supported and benefitted from the system of imperialism - it is impressively close, and Sudar's forthrightness and his devotion to the party are obvious.

A great number of those associated with the PNI, however, whether they were members or people further out on the periphery, were not much like Sudar, either in their understanding of the party's precepts or in their loyalty to its service. The police investigations among these people, done both to collect evidence of the rumours of unrest before the arrests and to build up the case against Soekarno and the others afterwards, show quite a different set of motivations and interpretations. People were urged to, and did, join the PNI for any number of reasons both positive - because PNI members would get stone houses and f.1000 in 1930 (MC:Mr 20X/30, V9 May 1930 C5, Appendix 3, p.6); because if one joined the PNI, relatives gaoled in the PKI aftermath would be freed (MC:Mr 501X/30, V9 May 1930 C9, p.13, p.14); because PNI members would soon get wide stretches of sawah (MC:Mr 5017/30, V9 May 1930 C9, p.13) - and negative - because in 1930 all non-PNI
members would be slaughtered like sheep (MC:Mr 20\(^X/30\), V9 May 1930 C\(^9\), Appendix 3, p.8); because people did not want to miss out on whatever the other 17 million PNI members in Java might get (MC:Mr 167\(^X/30\), V9 May 1930 C\(^9\), Interrogation of Sukardi). People had heard of imperialism, but they, like Sudar, had little need for verbal gymnastics: the imperialists were the Dutch, of whom they were soon to be rid. And they had been told by the PNI how they would be shed of them: either by a general strike which, by eliminating Dutch profits, would cause them to depart, or, failing that, by a war in the Pacific into which the Dutch would be drawn, leaving the land empty. The independence which would exist after the Dutch were gone also did not look much like Sudar's Republic: Soekarno was to become king, taxes would be lowered, people would be able to ride free on the trams and trains, wages would be raised, village services would be abolished, and PNI members would get land and the fine houses which the Dutch would leave behind.

Few of these popular concepts will be foreign to those who have looked at the literature on the Saminist movement or on traditional forms of Javanese protest, but it is striking how little nationalism is involved here. Where the ideas are anti-government, they are opposed to the government for what it does rather than for what it is, and independence, in turn, is desirable not for what it means but for what it will bring. It is possible to speak of a gap in sophistication between Soekarno and Sudar, to whom the PNI chairman's quotes from European scholars and socialists when he was explaining imperialism to the judges would probably have meant little. There is an entire world, however, between Sudar's understanding of the PNI and that of two members recruiting another man by telling him that the aim of the PNI was to do away with the Europeans, the Chinese, and the other Asians so that Java could be free and all taxes could be abolished (MC:Mr 20\(^X/30\), V9 May 1930 C\(^9\), Appendix 3, p.5).

If there are difficulties in trying to establish, even within the PNI at its peak, what that 'commonly held sentiment' was to which the party was giving voice, the situation becomes even more complex if the entire political spectrum within the Indies is considered. With the idea of a progressing movement, only the party at the forefront is considered at any one time. Those parties which preceded it drop from sight, and those which are to succeed it, if they already exist, are as yet of little importance. The real situation was that many parties and other kinds of organizations existed for years and that almost all of them have, for the most part, simply escaped attention. A glimpse at the principles and popularity of just two from the multitude of little-known Indies organizations is sufficient to show what complicating factors they are in the nationalism equation.

Paguyuban Pasundan was founded in 1914, a Sundanese counterpart of Budi Utomo. Recruiting its members from among teachers, lower-level officials, and other professionals in West Java, it soon expanded beyond its original apolitical aim of 'promoting popular customs in the lands of the Sundanese by working to improve the intellectual, moral, and social development of the people' (Petrus Blumberger 1931, p.26), and it began to compete, often successfully, for positions in administrative councils. Though it continued its cultural work, running schools, sponsoring social,
institutions, and publishing its own Sundanese-language monthly magazine and daily newspaper (MC:Mr 723/34, Letter 657/K-II Secret, dated 29 April 1934), Pasundan had by the end of the 1920s carved out a fairly important niche for itself in the political world of the Indies. In 1927, it had joined in forming the radical-inspired Permuakatan Perhimpunan-perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia (PPPKI), hoping thereby to improve the 'sense of unity and patriotism which were still lacking among the people' (Petrus Blumberger 1931, p.294). This move, which brought the Sundanese group into step not only with other moderate parties but also with the PNI and Partai Sarekat Islam, was taken because Pasundan was coming to the view that the Sundanese were a people but not a nation, that they formed a part of Indonesia, and that the Indonesian peoples ought to be progressing toward independence. From this position, Pasundan was able to work together with the government in order to try to achieve independence along evolutionary lines, to work together with its new associates to achieve the 'ideal of self-determination', and to feel free to criticize either of its allies when mistakes were made (MC:Mr 723/34, 'Note on the character ...', pp.3-4).

In the 1930s, Pasundan stuck steadily to that unsteady line, continuing its cultural work and criticizing either the government or radical politicians when it believed the time and the issue were right. Maintaining its goal of strengthening the position of the Sundanese people, it won strong backing from among the educated Sundanese and the common Java and alienated itself farther and farther from the aristocracy of the region, who came to see the party as a greater threat to their position than that represented by the extremists.

On its way to becoming the most popular party in West Java, Paguyuban Pasundan struck alliances with both the colonial government and the radical nationalists, and it made serious enemies of the local nobility. In Yogyakarta things were quite different. There, the leading political party of the 1930s earned the enmity of both the administration and the radicals, and it was inspired, founded, and led by members of the local royal family. The Pakempalan Kawulo Ngayogyakarta (PKN) was established in 1930, and from the beginning its combination of political, social, and economic aims, when taken together with the aura of nobility which surrounded it, was sufficient to ensure it great popularity in the lands of the Sultan and Paku Alam (O'Malley 1978). Opposed by the nationalists, who found it a divisive tool of the outdated aristocracy, the PKN also came into bad repute with the Dutch administration, which found the party's size (over 200,000 members) and some of its stances (for tax reductions; against sugar plantations) difficult to accept. Though government opposition eventually proved sufficient to cause the PKN to withdraw from the political field, the organization continued to work for the economic and social betterment of the Yogyanese, and it held the loyalty of many from its vast membership rolls right down to the Japanese occupation.

The interesting thing about Pasundan and the PKN is that their existence and success in the world of Indies politics tells little about the nationalist movement (from the normal recounts of which they are usually excluded). They do, however, say quite a bit about nationalism. The parties were founded, continued to exist, and even prospered on the basis that there was something unique and valuable about local people and their customs, something that should be preserved and even enhanced. In the case
of Pasundan, that preservation and enhancement were seen to be possible, and perhaps possible only, in connection with an independent - and federative, for that was always Pasundan's goal - Indonesia. For the PKN, the question of independence never arose as an important issue: to its royal leaders and its commoner members, the improvement of local conditions and the strengthening of relationships between the two classes were the chief goals, and they could be addressed and perhaps accomplished irrespective of who ran the central bureaucracy. For both parties, popular support was not built up on the basis of philosophical anti-imperialism or devotion to an Indonesian nation which was in the process of becoming. The parties instead grew by establishing and building on a tradition of service to those whose support they wished to attract. They did this so well that the PKN's membership figures were only ever exceeded in the Indies by those of early Sarekat Islam while in the late 1930s only Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, of all the well-known parties, had more members than Pasundan (Dahm 1971, p.76).

The traditional way of understanding modern political history in Indonesia has been to think that within the Dutch East Indies there existed an Indonesian nation bound and kept in place by the colonial government and by the economics of Dutch imperialism. In these terms the nationalist movement represented that nation's stirrings of self-awareness and its four-decade progress toward ultimate independence. It is now becoming clearer that this was not the case. Historians, in looking at the movement's size, its direction, and its effects on the population, have seen a world far more complex than that. They have uncovered a world in which radical nationalism might not have been the natural outflow of political thought and action in the Indies up until 1927, a world in which radical nationalism thereafter certainly did not obscure all other forms of politics. The glimpses which the Soekarno trial offers of some popular conceptions of nationalism are more complicating still. Some simplification of ideas might have been expected along down the ladder from educated thinkers to unskilled followers, but the real distance between the two is staggering. The right defence at the trial would claim, of course, that the leaders were being completely misunderstood by the masses, but it is fitting to ask whether it was not in fact the leaders who were completely misunderstanding the masses. The continued and useful existence of Pasundan and the PKN in what is ordinarily assumed to be a nationalist era also makes the situation more difficult. Their regional bases and their dwelling on local interests made them stronger, not weaker, parties, and they and particularist organizations among Madurese, Acehnese, and other ethnic groups must begin to be appreciated for what they were, spokesmen and formulators of valid alternative viewpoints, instead of as stunted offshoots of a dominant nationalist movement.

If the equation modern political history equals nationalist movement equals nationalism is in danger of breaking down, life among scholars and students of Indonesia is unlikely to be any easier for its passing. The periods of occupation and revolution are going to have to be seen as much more crucial in the welding of national symbols and the moulding of national spirit than they have hitherto been, and much more attention is going to have to be paid to the basic process of nation-building in studies of the years since 1950. New ideas about the place of nationalism among Indonesians and in Indonesian thought are going to have to be built, painstakingly, on what
can be learned of many, many individual and group commitments made to the idea of Indonesia over the course of time. The bases, the depth, even the nature of those commitments are likely to be extremely varied, but the problem of re-creating Indonesian nationalism is likely to make scholars more appreciative of the difficulties involved in trying to create an Indonesian nation in the first place.

NOTES

1 It is generally thought that Soekarno, knowing he was going to be found guilty no matter how effective his defence, pleaded his cause rather than his case. In actuality, his speech does both extremely effectively.

2 The personal information on Sudar and the questions and answers below are from the transcript of his 30 January 1930 interrogation by the police in Bandung. The transcript is part of Mailrapport 167X/1930, filed in Verbaal 9 May 1931 C3. This is from the archives of the former Ministry of Colonies of the Netherlands, at present maintained in The Hague by the Department of Interior Affairs. I am grateful to the Department for permission to consult and cite these materials. Further citations will be noted in the text in abbreviated form. The formula for the document cited in this note would be MC:Mr 167X/30, V 9 May 31 C3. This indicates the Ministry of Colonies archives, the appropriate Mailrapport, and the Verbaal in which the Mailrapport is filed.

3 The writer's attention was first drawn to some of these witnesses' statements in a class given by Professor B.R. Anderson in the autumn of 1972. The trial was covered in some detail in the newspapers De Locomotief and Suluh Hakjat Indonesia, and the testimony given at the trial can be found in them. The sources cited here are official and police statements and interrogations taken before the trial itself.

4 In some cases, of course, parties dropped from more than sight: the PKI, the PNI, and Partai Indonesia were all dissolved after leaving centre stage. Others, however, such as Budi Utomo, the various successors to Indische Partij, and Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia, continued to work long after the spotlight was turned elsewhere. Sarekat Islam, which ordinarily escapes attention and analysis after the split between religious and socialist elements in the early 1920s, was still the largest political organization in the Indies in 1939 (Darun 1971, p.76).

5 This position is taken from the address of the Pasundan chairman, Oto Subrata, at the 1929 Pasundan congress in Tasikmalaya (Petrus Blumberger 1931, p.295).

6 At a regents' conference in West Java in 1934, the Regent of Bandung said that Pasundan 'undermined the outposts of the governmental system and in so doing weakened the fortress against the attacks of extreme organizations'. For that reason, the Regent, presumably one of the outposts himself, saw more to fear in Pasundan than in Partai Indonesia (MC:Mr 723X/34, Letter G5p/9/14, dated 24 March 1934).
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THE PLACE OF COMMUNISM *

Rex Mortimer

At the present time in Indonesia, communism is outlawed both as a movement and a doctrine. Adherence to communism, engaging in communist activities, or possession of communist literature constitutes an offence punishable by imprisonment, or, in some cases, by death. Scores of thousands of Indonesians are in prisons and detention camps because of their past communist activities or associations, and such communist groups as do exist now can only operate in great secrecy. This has been the situation since October 1965, when responsibility for an unsuccessful 'coup' against army leaders was sheeted home to the Communist Party and it was violently repressed by the military.

Immediately prior to October 1965, however, the Communist Party of Indonesia (Partai Komunis Indonesia - PKI) was a very large and popular political organization. It claimed to have over three and a half million members, making it the largest communist party outside the communist countries themselves. In addition, some twenty million people belonged to various organizations linked to the PKI - trade unions, peasant leagues, women's and youth bodies, etc. Moreover, the Party was highly regarded by President Soekarno, the nation's foremost leader since independence was achieved, who insisted that the communists be given more prominent roles in political life and (so many observers believe) favoured them to become his political heirs as leaders of the nation.

Overnight, in the wake of the October 1965 incident, the PKI was deprived of its strength and influence and became a hunted movement. President Soekarno was no longer able to protect it from the wrath of the army leaders whose colleagues had been killed during the coup attempt, and the communists put up little resistance themselves against their persecution. Seldom in history has so large and seemingly powerful a body collapsed so rapidly and ignominiously. Yet this was not the first occasion on which the PKI had amassed considerable mass support, only to be wiped out with one sweep of the sword. Twice before, in 1926-27 and in 1948, similar catastrophes had occurred, marking clear stages in the history of communism in Indonesia.

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Three features of Indonesian communism therefore stand out in its cycle of fortune and misfortune: the capacity of the movement to gather large popular followings; its vulnerability to the attacks of its enemies; and its regenerative powers, which have enabled it on two occasions to recover from destruction and experience a new upsurge of strength. Indonesian communism clearly has notable strengths and weaknesses, then, and an examination of these contrasting features of the movement will go a long way towards explaining its place in Indonesian life.

THE STRENGTHS OF INDOONESIAN COMMUNISM

The Appeal of Nationalism

The Indonesian communist movement arose out of and in association with the national movement that began to develop in Indonesia in the early years of this century. Communist ideas were first introduced into the country by a group of Dutchmen living and working in the Dutch East Indies, who had embraced Marxism back in their homeland and carried their beliefs to the colony. They gathered around them a small number of educated Indonesians, most of whom were already members of the first widespread nationalist organization in Indonesia, Sarekat Islam. By 1920, the Indonesian pupils of the Dutch masters were ready to stand on their own feet, and founded the Indonesian Communist Party 'to supply socialist information and to cultivate a core of socialistically thinking and feeling people'.

The leaders of the newly established PKI worked in two main spheres. They remained within Sarekat Islam and tried to gain leadership of that organization and convert it to their own aims; at the same time they established or penetrated trade unions to bring workers directly under their influence. In both spheres they were remarkably successful, and by 1922 the PKI was challenging the founders of Sarekat Islam for control of that body and were also running some of the largest and most important trade unions in Java. In 1923 a direct collision between the communist and non-communist leaders of Sarekat Islam took place, and the former were expelled from the organization. However, the communists took with them more than half of the mass membership of SI and re-formed them into a Sarekat Rakjat or People's Association.

Within a short time, however, the PKI began to suffer from the same problems that had afflicted the SI and all previous nationalist movements in Indonesia; they commanded large-scale support, but every time they tried to mobilize this support for some tangible objective, they came up against the power of the Dutch colonial army and police. The communists were no more able to overcome this problem than their predecessors; their best leaders were exiled or imprisoned, their strike actions were suppressed, their newspapers outlawed, their members and supporters intimidated into passivity. By 1926 the PKI was definitely on the decline, its membership shrunk and its cohesion undermined.

Yet at this very time, when their fortunes were low, plans were laid for an uprising against the Dutch. The Party's leaders and branches were split over the issue, and when the uprising did take place, it took the form of weak and unco-ordinated sallies in two areas only - West Java and
and West Sumatra - while the remainder of the PKI organization vacillated or repudiated the rebellion. The Dutch very easily put down the disorders and launched a full-scale campaign to crush the communists. So effectively was this done that the PKI ceased to exist as an organized movement for the remainder of the Dutch colonial period.

Summing up this period of the PKI's existence, Ruth McVey in her book, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*, comments:

The PKI drew its cadres from the ranks of those who found themselves socially, economically and psychologically on the border between Indonesia's traditional and modern worlds. Though its core was urban, lower-class, and ethnically Javanese, it extended its appeal to Outer Islanders, merchants, the religiously orthodox, members of the lesser aristocracy, and wealthier peasants, in addition to and in some places even in exclusion of the more familiar sources of Communist support. Frankly playing upon popular messianic traditions, it thus gathered a heterogeneous following whose only common characteristic was bitter discontent at the colonial status quo. In accomplishing this, the party sowed the seeds of its own destruction, demonstrating the danger of relying too much on the anarchist element, which is part of Communism's appeal; the price of the PKI's popularity was the promise of revolution, and in the end it found itself leading a rebellion its leaders knew could not succeed (McVey 1965, P. xiii).

The first phase of the Communist Party's existence in Indonesia thus ended in a whimper, but it had not been all in vain by any means. The first school of PKI leaders had demonstrated that there was a considerable latent support for a movement of their character in the country, and as the initiators of the first attempted revolt against colonial rule in the modern era they had won for themselves credentials as nationalists that were to stand them in good stead in later years. As President Soekarno wrote:

> A Nationalist who is reluctant to stand alongside of and to co-operate with Marxists ... forgets that the origin of the Marxist movement in Indonesia or Asia is the same as the origin of his own movement ... He forgets that hostility towards his Marxist compatriots is equivalent to rejecting a travelling-companion ... (Sukarno 1969, p.43).

The second stage of communist development in Indonesia once again coincided with the upsurge of nationalism, on this occasion the outbreak of the national revolution in August 1945. A small underground communist party had functioned during the Japanese occupation (1942-45), and had recruited some of the youth radicalized during that period. This nucleus re-formed the PKI openly in October 1945, and the Party's ranks were soon strengthened by the return of PKI veterans from exile abroad. Once it had become consolidated in March 1946, the PKI devoted its efforts primarily towards the struggle for national independence, and its policies at that time were not noticeably different from those of many other nationalist parties that
flourished during the war of independence against the Dutch. That is to say, the PKI again identified itself closely with the national movement, and leading members of the Party were included in a number of Republican cabinets.

In 1948, however, the PKI began to take a more militant anti-imperialist line critical of negotiations between the Republican government and the Dutch. It formed a coalition of opposition parties which threatened to displace the government, rely more heavily upon international support from the communist countries, and combine armed struggle against the Dutch with radical social changes in the Republic. It attracted a sizeable proportion of the Republic's armed forces to its side, but proved utterly incapable of standing up to loyalist military units in a direct encounter. In August 1948 a clash between pro- and anti-government forces broke out in Central Java, the causes of which are obscure and controversial. The government, however, branded the affair a communist rebellion, and called for the destruction of the PKI forces. The PKI leaders felt obliged to take up the challenge, and a short but bloody round of violence took place in which the communists were quickly put to rout and decimated. For the second time in its history, the PKI ended a brief bout of success with a shattering defeat, but this time, unlike the first, it could be accused of sabotaging the national struggle or 'stabbing the Republic in the back', as its enemies were fond of saying in future years.

The effect of the 'Madiun Affair', as the episode became known, upon the PKI was important in several respects. In the first place it meant that the Indonesian communists, unlike their fellow communists in Vietnam, Yugoslavia and China, were unable to emerge from the anti-colonial struggle as the acknowledged leaders of their country's struggle for national liberation, with all the prestige and power that that involved. On the contrary, when the Republic finally won recognition of Indonesia's independence, in December 1949, the PKI had been reduced to a small, weak and dispirited minor party.

Secondly, the bloody ordeal which the party had undergone and had barely survived had a profound effect upon the future leaders of the PKI. Only young men at the time, and active nationalists before they became communists, they seem to have drawn the conclusion from their experience that the PKI must at all costs prevent a repetition of the Madiun Affair, and therefore must do everything in its power to avoid an armed confrontation in which the communists would be isolated and risk another shattering defeat. They determined to re-establish the PKI's credentials as a truly national party, and at the same time gain the protection afforded by association with other nationalists who shared some of their ideals. The opportunity to apply the lessons they had learnt came in January 1951, when the older leaders of the PKI were forced to make way for a group of younger men led by the intelligent and dynamic D.N. Aidit. The third phase of the PKI's history had begun, one that was to prove the Party's longest, most successful and ultimately most tragic to date.

The new youthful leaders of the PKI were nationalist by temperament, and they held the view, shared by a great many Indonesians at the time, that the terms of independence won for the Republic from the Dutch were so unsatisfactory as to amount to a betrayal of the national revolution. For
this reason alone, they were prompted to regard the revolution as incomplete. Their belief was strengthened by Soviet and Chinese communist attitudes at that time, which regarded most of the governments of the newly-independent countries of Asia as still dependent upon their former colonial masters and hence as only nominally independent.

Accordingly, the Indonesian communists made the starting point of their policies the issue of achieving complete independence for Indonesia by removing all Dutch economic and political influence from the country, and by 'liberating' Irian Jaya (west New Guinea) from Dutch control. This was a popular political line. In particular, it was a view shared by the radical wing of one of the government parties, the Nationalist Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia - PNI). In 1952, the PNI radicals won the leadership of their party, and in the following year broke with the Masyumi party and formed a government more or less dedicated to the kind of nationalist programme to which the PKI adhered. Since the government was dependent upon a number of smaller parties, including the PKI, for parliamentary support, it was prepared to make concessions to its allies in return for their votes. The PKI obtained the two things it most urgently needed - freedom from persecution by the authorities and the opportunity to expand its mass support.

Under the PNI-lead governments which held office for the best part of the next four years, nationalist issues became more prominent in Indonesian political life than they had been since the end of the war of independence. The government took a strongly anti-colonialist stance in world affairs, promoted Asian-African unity, agitated for the return of Irian Jaya, and balanced its economic dependence upon American and Dutch interests with closer relations with the communist countries. This shift of government concerns from routine administration to ideological issues suited the communists very well. They had in office a government tolerant of them and raising the kind of issues which the PKI could use to popularize its anti-imperialist, pro-communist message.

The communist leaders, ever mindful of past misfortunes, were careful not to run too far ahead of government policy and risk isolation; instead, they tried to demonstrate that they were the most active and dedicated supporters and initiators of policies which the government coalition and its supporters shared. Thanks to their tight and disciplined organization, and their freedom from the temptations and corruptions of parliamentary office, the communists were fairly successful in their endeavours. Nationalist reputation was an important factor in the rapid expansion of the communist movement between 1951 and 1957, when its numbers grew from under 10,000 to over one million members, and it created the largest trade union federation in the country and thriving organizations of peasants, youth and women. The extent to which the PKI had succeeded in re-establishing its fortunes was revealed in the election results of 1955, when the party emerged as the fourth strongest in the country with over six million votes, 16.4 per cent of the national total. In provincial elections in 1957, the PKI did still better, increasing its vote in Java for instance by more than two million.

However, by 1957 the parliamentary system in Indonesia was in its death agonies. President Soekarno and the army leaders, viewing political party conflict as divisive and destructive of national morale, and being faced with
widespread regional rebellions, suspended constitutional procedures, declared martial law in the country, and began to work out the framework of a new system of government which Soekarno labelled 'Guided Democracy'. In effect, the new system concentrated power in the hands of Soekarno and his circle of intimates, on the one hand, and the army leaders on the other. The two groups were by no means united in their objectives, but they were both determined to use more authoritarian means to preserve national unity and discipline.

The PKI leaders were apprehensive at the overthrow of parliamentary institutions under which they had been making spectacular progress, and especially fearful of more power passing to the army leaders, who were well known to be anti-communist in their outlook. However, the communists were in no position to challenge the new system of government, especially at a time when the central government was under attack by anti-communist rebels in the regions.

One thing more than any other reconciled them to the new situation. President Soekarno needed a powerful mass organization to mobilize the population behind the nationalist goals dear to his heart, and at the same time to strengthen his position in rivalry with the military leaders. The PNI, the party with which he had been identified, no longer fulfilled his requirements; its long period in government had sapped that party of grassroots vitality and it was split into warring factions. Soekarno had come to look more and more favourably upon the PKI leaders because they obviously had a dynamic and united organization behind them, they shared his nationalist commitment, and they were even more interested than he was in restraining military power. He was satisfied that the communist leaders were genuinely patriotic and free of foreign control and that they would follow him loyally. For their part, the PKI leaders saw Soekarno as the force which could offer them political protection and also promote causes which would further heighten an anti-imperialist atmosphere in Indonesia. They decided to throw in their lot with the President, back him to the hilt, and allow him to make the pace in the policy areas in which they were most vitally interested.

The PKI decision proved to be of great benefit to the Party in the following years. Soekarno embarked on his crusades against the imperialists, colonialists and neo-colonialists, backing up his verbal denunciations with direct challenges to the Dutch in Irian Jaya and the British-promoted Federation of Malaysia. Nationalist fervour and activity became the most important passports to influence and presidential favour, and in this political climate the PKI flourished. It showed itself to be the most devoted and reliable supporter of Soekarno's ideas and policies, and hence earned the esteem that flowed from his popularity and authority. In addition, the party was able to mount its own campaigns within the context of the anti-imperialist crusade. Thus the PKI, in the name of patriotism and anti-imperialism, pressed for measures to oust Dutch, British and American influence; called for communist inclusion in the national government; attacked Soekarno's and its own opponents and critics as unpatriotic and faint-hearted; advocated land reform as a means of raising production, etc., etc. Not all the communists' efforts were successful by any means - they never managed to obtain positions of real importance in the government, for example - but they helped to create a mood in the country that Soekarnoism and communism were virtually indistinguishable, that anti-
communism was unpatriotic, and that they, and they alone, knew and were prepared to carry out the social reforms which would make Soekarno's vision of a free, independent and prosperous Indonesia realizable. On the other hand, the anti-Malaysian campaign, like the Irian Jaya campaign before it, led inescapably to the strengthening of the PKI's old foe, the army.

In the period from the onset of full-scale confrontation against Malaysia in September 1963 to the October 1965 coup attempt, the PKI enjoyed its greatest success in linking nationalism with campaigns for the domestic changes desired by it. Confrontation severed Indonesia's relations with the West and drew the government ever closer to China, the most fervently anti-imperialist of the communist countries. Capitalizing on this situation, the communists successfully agitated for the takeover of British and then American enterprises in Indonesia, and forced the withdrawal of most US cultural and welfare agencies in the country. They made a virtue of the cessation of Western aid to Indonesia by preaching the benefits of economic self-reliance. They pushed their land reform campaign in the name of raising production for patriotic purposes. They launched vigorous agitation against their enemies amongst Indonesia's 'new rich' bureaucrats and right-wing politicians by accusing them of sabotaging the patriotic struggle, succeeding in driving some but not all of these opponents out of public life in disgrace. They attempted with some success to penetrate the army rank and file and win sympathy from lower-ranking officers, while at the same time pressing for the creation of a 'fifth force' of armed workers and peasants, ostensibly to help defend the country but in reality to give them some counter to the vastly superior armed might of their foes among the army leaders.

By 1965 the PKI was enjoying such affection from Soekarno for its militant nationalism and reforming zeal that many inside and outside Indonesia thought that he was preparing the way for an eventual communist takeover. This argument will always be a controversial and unresolved one, but there can be no dispute that nationalist fervour acted as the closest bond uniting Soekarno and the PKI leadership, and that it therefore was the factor above all which brought the party closest to power.

The ability of the communists to use nationalism so effectively to advance their interests was partly due to the fact that they sincerely believed in the close connection between national interests and radical social reform, and partly because Soekarno's nationalistic crusades needed an organized popular base which only the PKI, with its commitment to the uplift of the workers and peasants, could provide.

Social Welfare

Not surprisingly, the PKI from its outset was concerned to mobilize the common people of Indonesia to improve their lot in society. This concern flowed directly from the fundamentals of communist belief. When an Indonesian was attracted to communism rather than to the forms of nationalism which confine their aspirations to national liberation from colonialism, he adopted two basic concepts: one, that the workers and peasants constitute the most revolutionary force in society, upon whom the national struggle must be...
based; and two, that the ultimate aim of the struggle against imperialist oppression is not merely independence but a socialist society dedicated to the abolition of class struggle and oppression.

For both these reasons, the PKI tried to organize the workers and peasants for the defence and improvement of their material interests. The fact that in pre-independence days the main exploiter and oppressor was a colonial master ensured that communism would be part of the nationalist movement if it were to amount to anything, but the PKI's particular concentration upon social and economic issues rather than political independence alone also gave it a distinctive character within that movement. This should not be pushed too far, however. Actually, some leaders of the Sarekat Islam in particular had recognized the potential and interests of the workers before the communists came on the scene, and had organized a number of trade unions which had engaged in sporadic strike action. The PKI carried on and developed the same tradition, and before long dominated the major unions of workers in Java, among railway workers, sugar workers, metal workers, automobile mechanics and drivers, and pawnshop employees.

Like their predecessors, however, the communists found that the colonial power had too many means of suppressing workers' activity to enable trade unions to win many of their struggles for better wages and conditions. After initial support and enthusiasm, the unions tended to wither away when the members discovered that the costs of militant action were higher than the tangible benefits. By 1926, when it launched its disastrous uprising, the PKI had lost much of the worker support it had had a few years earlier. The Party in this period made little effort to tackle the far more difficult task of organizing the peasantry.

When it was reorganized in 1945, the PKI was the first political party in Republican Indonesia to set about organizing the workers and peasants in a concerted way. It soon headed the largest union federation in the Republic, and the largest and most active peasants' league. For the most part, however, the Party engaged in little explicit social action during the national revolution; subscribing to the notion that social changes must be postponed until after the common struggle for independence has been realized, it confined its work among the workers and peasants largely to political agitation and propaganda.

It was only after the PKI had been reconstructed a second time in 1951 that it made full use of the opportunity to bind the workers and peasants to it by activity on behalf of their immediate interests. Trade union action took priority at first, if for no other reason than that PKI links with the workers were already of long standing and well institutionalized, while it had yet to reach out to the peasants to any significant degree.

It did not take the PKI long to discover, however, that militant industrial action was a costly business for a small party when the government and army were hostile to it and the working class itself weak in numbers and self-consciousness. After a series of strikes in 1951, the government clamped down hard on the Party, threatening it once again with the prospect of destruction, and the leaders reassessed their tactics. Even when times changed, and PKI relations with the government became much more friendly, there was a clear understanding between the two that class agitation by the communists would not be tolerated. The PKI was only too well aware that the
army leaders were anxious to be given another opportunity to crush it. Accordingly, the PKI leaders were very restrained in their industrial tactics from that time on. They used various kinds of pressure to protect the living standards of the workers, particularly against the ravages of inflation, and preserve their jobs, but strikes were rarely resorted to. Communist influence and pressure undoubtedly helped to persuade the government to introduce measures to cushion the workers against inflation, such as the direct supply of food and other essentials to workers in government employment. But the workers never became a major base upon which the PKI could rely to force political concessions in its favour. The fact that hardly any industrial development took place between 1951 and 1965 contributed to a situation where the unions were relatively powerless to act independently in support either of their own interests or specifically of communist objectives.

In 1951, the communists had declared that 'the Indonesian revolution was above all an agrarian revolution' and that, next to the expulsion of imperialists influence, their major objective was to put an end to feudal exploitation of the peasants by ensuring that the land should belong to those who worked it. It followed from this that they planned to win the support of the peasants on the basis of radical social reform. But for years the party had only very sparse organizational connections with the peasantry, sufficient to win votes among them but not to mobilize them effectively on the basis of their special interests.

Realizing this weakness, the PKI leaders set the Party only very moderate tasks in this field in the fifties. The communists had to win the confidence of the peasants, they argued, and the best way to do this was by small, modest activities which would have the support of the overwhelming majority of villagers. The success with which they carried out this policy accounts in no small way for the tremendous expansion of communist support in this period.

With careful diligence and patience, the PKI tended to the everyday problems of the peasants, 'organizing the sharing of agricultural tools, arranging mutual assistance when feasts were held, building new water channels, and helping the victims of fire and floods' (Feith 1963, p.339), as well as forming sporting, cultural and other associations to relieve the tedium of village life and in particular provide attractive outlets for the interests of young people.

One factor aiding the PKI in winning peasant support was the absence of competition from the other political parties. The Muslim parties carried out welfare activities among the more devoutly religious peasants, but the great majority of villagers were given slight attention by the major parties. Most of the leaders of these parties were educated men from the cities and towns of Indonesia, with little knowledge of conditions in the countryside; coming largely from families of high status in the traditional society, they were prone to share the attitude of disdain towards the villager typical of their class.

By the early sixties the PKI had made substantial headway in organizing the peasantry in the moderate ways described, but the very moderation of its approach meant that class sentiment and activity had not been developed among the villagers. Consequently, the communists could not rely on their
huge peasant base as a solid phalanx should they find it necessary or
desirable to press their revolutionary aims more strongly. An attempt was
made by the party to change this state of affairs in 1964, by means of a
campaign to mobilize the peasants to carry out land reforms. The PKI based
these actions on laws passed by the government in 1959 and 1960, which
promised the share-cropping peasant a minimum of 50 per cent of his crop,
and provided for the division among landless and poor peasants of large land­
holdings held by a single landowner. The laws had not been implemented very
energetically by the authorities, and so the PKI sought to radicalize the
peasants and strengthen its power by having them take land and divide the
crops by direct militant action.

The campaign aroused a good deal of support among the poorer peasantry
of Central and East Java in particular, but it also aroused strong resistance
from local authorities and devout Muslim groups in the countryside, many of
whose members belonged to the class of richer villagers. Violent clashes
took place between supporters and opponents of the land reform, with
religious passions being injected into the conflict. In the end, the results
were rather inconclusive, with the communists forcing some land redistribu­
tion but getting the worst of the violence. They were obliged by the end
of 1964 to phase out their land reform actions in order to avoid further
losses and the risk of harming their top-level political alliances.

Taken overall, the PKI may not have been able to do anything very
spectacular to improve the conditions of the peasants and workers in a
period of economic stagnation and mounting inflation, but the fact that it
tried hardest of all the political parties to do so won it the greatest
support from these classes. How useful this support was to the party as a
leverage to achieve its revolutionary objectives was another matter, as we shall
consider in more detail below.

Moderation and Flexibility

Enough has already been said about communist policy to indicate that the
PKI leaders were anything but wild revolutionary agitators. They aimed at
nothing short of total political power in Indonesia, but they were
intelligent, careful and pragmatic leaders who appreciated their own
strengths and weaknesses, and acted on the assumption that their road to power
was a long and difficult one. They had decided that they could not mount a
successful armed revolution, and must work through the existing political
system to gain their objectives, making the maximum use of important allies
such as President Soekarno. Consequently, they went out of their way to try
to impress those in power, and potential followers, with their moderation,
patriotism, and constructive approach to the country's problems.

The general policy of the PKI leaders was to base themselves on Soekarno's
ideas and declarations, interpret them in the most favourable light for
themselves, and judge other political figures by their reaction to these
interpretations. In this way, opponents of the communists could be made to
appear as opponents of Soekarno, an uncomfortable position for any prominent
person under Guided Democracy. Confining the targets of their opposition
to their most obvious foes, the PKI tried to isolate those on the political
right, push the general political climate steadily to the left, and thus make
easier its eventual claim to leadership of the nation. It enjoyed considerable success in this endeavour, with increasing co-operation from Soekarno after full-scale confrontation with Malaysia began in September 1963.

Organization and Ideology

The PKI demonstrated its organizational ability early in its history, when it succeeded in taking over most of the local branches of the Sarekat Islam. Again, during the national revolution, the party very soon established itself as the most successful founder of workers' unions and peasant leagues. After 1951, when the PKI commenced the longest and most successful phase of its existence, its growth in numbers, its successful sponsorship of mass organization, and its ability to deploy these mass battalions effectively behind its policies, were all quite phenomenal in the Indonesian context.

As one expert observer of Indonesian communism noted in the early sixties, the PKI leaders displayed 'intellectual rigour and shrewdness' of a high order, they 'motivated and inspired dedicated cadres', and promoted 'an intellectual ferment which is lacking elsewhere'; he paid tribute to the 'honesty, integrity and dedication' of the Party's leaders, as well as their 'skill, realism, imagination and boldness' (Fauker 1965, pp.258-60, 276).

A large reason for the PKI's strength in organization lay in the fact that it believed more strongly than any other party or group in the value of mass organization and the role of the workers and peasants in social change. This belief, of course, sprang from the ideology of communism itself, which cannot hope to reach its goal of total social change without mobilizing the actual and potential dissatisfied elements in society. Of the other parties, the Muslim groups could lead the faithful into action, often with devastating results, when their religious interests appeared in danger, but for the most part the non-communist parties wanted to preserve the distance between the elite and the masses of the people.

Independence

A common view of communist parties is that they are merely appendages of one of the major communist countries, either the Soviet Union or China. There is no doubt that many communist parties were heavily under Russian influence, especially in the Stalinist period (1924-53), and some continue to follow the USSR or China blindly. On the other hand, particular communist parties have adapted to conditions in their own countries and developed original strategies designed to advance their prospects in them.

In the case of the PKI, we have a communist party which at all times was largely independent from outside control or direction. In the colonial days, a number of factors served to insulate the PKI from Moscow control - distance, poor communications, the preoccupation of the Comintern (International Communist Organization) with developments in other parts of the world, and the effects of Dutch persecution. It is notable that of the two most important decisions taken by the PKI in this period - to break with the Sarekat Islam in 1923, and to stage the 1926-27 rebellions - the first was made without consultation with Moscow and the second in defiance of its directions.
During the national revolution, influence from Moscow only began to make itself felt to any degree on the very eve of the Party's destruction at Madiun. Until that time, the communists had little contact with Moscow, and followed their own inclinations and insights, although some of the leaders, having spent many years in exile in international communist circles, felt that they were being consistent with Comintern principles.

In the PKI's heyday, between 1951 and 1965, the Party leaders were very jealous of their independence. They re-established the PKI's strength with no help or guidance from outside, and this made them confident of their ability to handle Indonesian political problems themselves. They respected Soviet and Chinese experience, and studied it to help them formulate policies, but they themselves decided what parts of those experiences were relevant to their conditions. They not only valued their independence, but knew it was an important political asset. Their PNI allies and Soekarno would not have been prepared to co-operate closely with the PKI if they had believed that it was subject to orders from foreign communist powers, while the party's enemies, who were always keen to depict it as an alien force in Indonesian politics, would have made great play upon any evidence of foreign control.

When the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties came into open conflict from 1960, the PKI was very careful to adopt a neutral stand between them, and to reassert its independent policies. This approach served the PKI very well, as shown by the fact that it was one of the very few communist parties in the world which did not suffer serious splits in the course of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Eventually, in 1963, the PKI came down more decidedly on the side of the Chinese party, but only after Soekarno in the wake of confrontation with Malaysia had himself turned to China for moral support; even then, the PKI only accepted those aspects of Chinese ideas which were congenial to its own strategy in Indonesia. At no time did the PKI leaders allow themselves to be dictated to by either of the major communist powers.

The Javanese Tradition

The PKI was always a predominantly Javanese party, and particularly so after independence. This was clearly revealed in the 1955 general elections, when more than 88 per cent of its vote was received in that part of Indonesia. Later, the PKI did succeed in expanding its support in the other islands, but to nothing like the extent of its backing in East and Central Java. A number of factors accounted for this geographical limitation on PKI support. During the revolution, the Dutch controlled many of the Outer Islands, and did their utmost to suppress communism there, while after independence army commanders exercised considerable power outside Java and were equally intolerant of communist activities. Religious and sociological factors also influenced the situation: the predominantly Muslim and Christian communities in the Outer Islands resisted communist penetration, and the individualistic type of cash crop farming and trading widely practised outside Java made the inhabitants more prosperous and less susceptible to communist appeals.

The basis of the PKI's support in Java after independence can be established with some confidence. From the 1955 election results and other
evidence it is clear that communism appealed particularly to that section of the peasantry and urban poor known as the abangan, the majority of Javanese who are nominally Muslims but who in fact adhere to many pre-Islamic (animist and Hindu-Buddhist) customs and beliefs. The PKI made very little impact upon the santri or devout Muslims of Java, who had their own religious and political organizations to take care of their interests. The abangan, on the other hand, were relatively deprived of political and social representation in independent Indonesia. Their traditional patrons, the priyayi or urban official class, tended to take peasant support for granted and did little to serve the interests of this numerous class.

Yet the abangan after independence were in urgent need of a political champion. They felt themselves vulnerable in two respects. In the first place, the santri, who were better organized and more active in social and political life, were threatening to dominate village life and force their customs on the peasants to the great discomfort and dislike of the abangan. Secondly, as subsistence rice-farmers, the abangan felt the effects of land shortage, government taxes, military power and other pressures of population growth and 'modernization' as dangers to their very existence.

Consequently, when the PKI came to them with its promises of economic and social reform, the preservation of social customs and communal rights, and protection against bureaucratic abuses, they took the party to their hearts. This was all the more the case since the PKI could present itself as the ally of the non-Islamic nationalists and later of Soekarno, who based his appeal strongly on ancient Javanese cultural traditions. The PKI at first demanded little of the peasantry other than generalized support, and it tried to ease their situation by constant and painstaking attention to their grievances, as well as establishing social organizations to meet their cultural and recreational needs.

The PKI, then, had a ready-made electorate among a large underprivileged and politically underrepresented section of the population.

THE WEAKNESS OF INDOONESIAN COMMUNISM

Failure During the National Revolution

As mentioned earlier, the inability of the Indonesian communists to win the leadership of the national revolution represented a major handicap for them in post-independence politics. In almost every case where communist parties have come to power as a result of their own efforts (Russia, Yugoslavia, China, and Vietnam), it has been under conditions of war where the communists were able to take advantage of a vacuum of power resulting from the dislocation caused by the hostilities. In each case, nationalism was a crucial element in the communist appeal to populations shaken and up-rooted by the wars. (Cuba is the sole exception to this rule.)

In Indonesia, on the other hand, the communists lost out in their struggle to win the leadership of the national revolution against the Dutch, partly as a result of the fact that there was no significant communist underground during the Japanese occupation. Consequently, when the communists had to devise tactics for revolution in an independent Indonesia, they were
faced with a government and an army in control of the country and themselves clothed in the mantle of nationalism. The communists decided that they could not directly challenge these forces by armed struggle with any hope of success, and therefore had to work through the established political system with all the constraints that this implied.

In a sense, the PKI was always in the position of an 'out' group trying to replace an 'in' group under conditions which favoured the latter; hence the pains they took to win friends and allies among the powerful, to cultivate an image of moderation, patriotism and responsibility, and to prevent themselves becoming isolated and open to repression by stronger opponents such as the army.

Weakness of Class Factors

The strongest appeal of communists everywhere is to the class interests of the workers and peasants. The workers are organized around the struggle to improve their wages and conditions, and the communists try in the course of these struggles to accustom the workers to the value of solidarity and mutual sacrifice. At the same time, they try to give the workers political consciousness - in other words, to convince them that their basic interests demand a revolutionary struggle for socialism.

Mention has already been made of some of the difficulties faced by the Indonesian communists in this field. The Indonesian working class was small in numbers, and vulnerable to governmental and army repression in the urban centres; even the PKI's allies in the government after 1953 were not prepared to tolerate strikes and other forms of radical worker action on any scale. It is doubtful, in any case, if the workers would have been prepared to follow the PKI if it had forced them into stern confrontations with the authorities. Only a relatively small proportion were in large enterprises where numbers would have given them any security, while in the smaller workplaces, where most of the workers still had attachments to the land, the employer was often regarded as a *bapak* or patron who could be counted on to protect his employees during periods of slackness or illness. Consequent upon these circumstances, there was little opportunity for the PKI to develop the workers into revolutionary material.

The position among the peasantry was similarly unhappy from a revolutionary point of view. In China and Vietnam, for example, the communists had aroused the militancy of the poor peasantry by directing their grievances against landlords who monopolized the land, charged high rents, etc. In Java and the rest of Indonesia, too, on the other hand, landlordism was not highly developed; in most villages, there were few landholders who owned more than enough land to maintain themselves, and the main problem facing the Javanese peasantry was an absolute shortage of land. The most prosperous farmers were usually the village * lurah* (headman) and his subordinates, who received grants of land instead of money payment for their services, and who after independence were elective and therefore not hereditary owners of their land.

For these reasons, the PKI found it difficult to find issues which would develop class divisions within the villages, and it tended instead to promote welfare and social reforms which benefited richer and poorer villagers.
alike. Only in 1964 did the communists try to stimulate more class-conscious actions around land reform, and, because of the conditions already described, including the antipathy between abangan and santri, these actions do not seem to have been very successful in raising the revolutionary outlook of the poorer peasants.

The attitude towards the PKI on the part of most of the workers and peasants appears to have been that they were prepared to support the communists so long as the latter could bring them benefits without too great a cost. But when the PKI was put on the defensive after October 1965, and it became dangerous to be associated with it, then the masses of PKI supporters deserted it by the million.

In other words, conditions in Indonesia were not ripe for class programmes and class action. The PKI could not hope to win power by relying upon the militancy of the poor, and its hopes had therefore to be pinned upon the goodwill of a patron such as Soekarno. This was a grave disadvantage for a party standing for the complete restructuring of society.

Hostility of Civilian and Military Elites

Muslim party leaders and most of the senior officers in the army were always strongly opposed to the communists, and distrusted Soekarno's policy of giving them a share of governmental power. In addition there was a strong right wing in the PNI which shared this hostility towards the PKI. Even among those in the government or bureaucracy who paid lip service to Soekarno's policies, however, there were only a relatively few who wholeheartedly endorsed the view that the PKI could be and should be drawn fully into the government and other key positions.

There were many and varied reasons for this suspicion and hostility towards the communists, but one general explanation stands out. No matter how moderate and accommodating the PKI leaders might show themselves to be, they did stand for a revolutionary transformation in society, and greater power for the workers and peasants. But those already in positions of power in Indonesia were naturally more satisfied with things as they were than eager for radical changes in the existing state of affairs. If the communists succeeded in bringing about such changes, most elite members, in the light of experiences in other communist states, could have little confidence that the PKI would genuinely share power with them or preserve their privileges as men at the top. Therefore, as a matter of self-preservation, they resisted any moves that would increase communist prospects of gaining power.

This presented the PKI leaders with a considerable problem, since, for reasons already advanced, they had little alternative but to rely upon a significant section of the elite in power to acquiesce in their hoped-for takeover of the country. The PKI's only solution was to try to divide the elite among themselves to the point where they would be unable to offer any concerted opposition to communist pressure for greater positions of power. They were accomplishing this very skilfully until the coup of October 1965 put an end to their plans, but it is by no means certain that they would have succeeded in any case; crisis of one sort or another was always around the corner in Indonesia at this time, and the PKI lacked the real
punch to stand up to the army in a crisis. Its support in the armed forces was insufficient to be more than a provocation to the generals, while the Fifth Force proposal had yet to materialize.

There is no agreed version of the October coup of 1965. The present Indonesian government, and a considerable body of expert Western opinion, believe that the PKI planned and carried out the putsch against the generals to rid themselves of the major obstacle in their path to power. Other writers who have studied the events, however, disagree with this view; they argue that the PKI was doing very well by pursuing peaceful pressure tactics, and the Party leaders would not have been so foolish as to tackle the army on its own ground by precipitating violence. According to this second view, the PKI leaders were caught up in the coup attempt by the intrigues of other elements, particularly pro-Soekarno officers who wanted to get rid of their 'reactionary' chiefs.

Whatever the truth of the affair, its aftermath revealed the acute weakness of the PKI in the face of any army onslaught, and the extent of the hostility it had aroused among the politically powerful. Soekarno stood almost alone in defending the PKI and trying to protect it from army vengeance, while most prominent Indonesians showed little sympathy with the victims of the massacres which took half a million or more lives.

The Javanese Tradition

Having described the positive effects of this tradition in providing the PKI with a large electorate among the abangan, it remains to put the other side of the story – the limitations for the PKI of being a Javanese and abangan party. The first thing to note is that, so long as the PKI was weak in the Outer Islands, it could not hope to come to power nationally except by working through the national government apparatus, based in Java. A revolutionary path to power was, in other words, ruled out by the communists' geographical limitations alone; if by any stroke of fortune they could have taken over Java, they would have faced a counter-revolution on the other islands which it is difficult to see them subduing. Java, on the other hand, was unsuitable terrain for peasant guerilla warfare – a crowded island, it had relatively good road and rail communications, few safe sanctuaries, and no line of retreat whatsoever.

Next, the abangan themselves were not strong revolutionary material. Quite apart from the absence of sharp class differences among them, already referred to, their culture placed a high value on social harmony and deference to superiors. It was therefore a major problem to persuade them to engage in activity which would divide village loyalties or bring them into conflict with the authorities. That the communists did succeed to some degree in overcoming these disadvantages is a tribute both to their persistence and the extent to which the sheer pressures of land hunger were breaking down long-established abangan traditions. But when it came to a showdown in which the abangan were pitted against other powerful social forces, the weakness of the PKI position became clear. Thus in 1964, during the land reform conflict, the santri, who are freer of traditional restraints than the abangan, proved to have more stomach for a fight and eventually forced the PKI to retreat. Similarly after the coup episode in 1965, the abangan
(admittedly deprived of clear PKI leadership) succumbed to combined army and Muslim assaults with hardly any resistance.

The PKI position forced it to champion the abangan against the santri, and so to attract and reinforce the antagonism of the committed Muslims. In doing so, it found itself at critical stages on the losing side of communal conflicts.

In conclusion, it would appear that the place of communism in Indonesian life has been that of representative of the material and cultural interests of the workers and subsistence peasants of Java, the most numerous classes in the country. Its revolutionary aims and objectives undoubtedly equipped it to fill this role, but the objectives themselves could not be attained in a country where the national revolution was consummated under non-communist auspices and class differences have not developed to the point where they override commitments to older loyalties. So long as the communists could meet needs felt by their huge following without subjecting that following to undue attack from other forces in society, they prospered. But as soon as this borderline was passed, the communists found their support wilting and their organization exposed to drastic repression. The irony for the PKI, then, was that its large numerical strength was useful for everything except the revolutionary aspirations it held. This may change in the future, if the gulf between the well-to-do and the poor in Indonesia grows, but so far communism has had to play a role far short of that which its ideology lays down for it.

NOTE

1 Hartough, an early Communist leader, quoted in McVey 1965, p.49.

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In the last few years the political significance of Islam has once again become a subject of widespread interest throughout the world, among non-Muslims as well as Muslims. The Iranian revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini, the firm intention of the government of Pakistan to implement the Shari'a, the restlessness of Muslims in Southeast Asia (especially among the Patani and Moro people in Thailand and the Philippines respectively) and the increasing tension between Muslims and non-Muslims, particularly the Christians, in Indonesia, have aroused concern in many quarters. Some look upon this development as a possible resurgence of Islam across the world, perhaps as an alternative to prevailing ideologies and life styles, while others see it as a danger which will retard progress in the countries concerned and revive the lifestyle of the Muslim Middle Ages.

This paper will deal with the position and role of Islam as a political force in Indonesia in the twentieth century. More stress will be laid on the developments since the achievement of independence, but some discussion of Islam in earlier periods, especially the late colonial period, will be necessary if we are to assess present-day Indonesian Islam in a historical perspective. The character of Indonesian Islam has indeed been influenced greatly by developments over the last sixty or seventy years.

THE DUTCH PERIOD

Ever since the seventeenth century Muslims in Indonesia have in general played a prominent part in spearheading the resistance of various groups throughout the archipelago to the intrusion of Dutch colonialism. This was manifested in various small and large-scale uprisings, right down to the time when Dutch power became firmly secured in the archipelago in the early twentieth century. This Islamic resistance to the intrusion of alien influences was also expressed in activities of a peaceful nature, such as those of the Islamic educational and social organizations and political parties, notably the Muhammadiyah and Syarikat Islam, starting from 1912. The various pesantren and other religious schools became centres of opposition to Dutch power and quite a number of their teachers, whether traditionalists or modernists, were exiled by the Dutch. The fact that the Dutch were non-Muslims constituted sufficient reason for the Muslims to adopt an inimical attitude toward them. Such an attitude was also inflamed by the various forms of injustice, discrimination and suppression which colonial rule gave rise to throughout the country, as manifested not just in the political sphere, but also in other fields of activity as well (Noer 1973).

Aware of the potential threat that Islam posed for them, the Dutch tried to appease the Muslims by adopting an apparently tolerant attitude toward Islam as a religion, while at the same time trying to keep Islam separate from politics. The Dutch also tried to give an impression of neutrality
toward religion in general. They allowed freedom in practising rituals and Muslim religious courts were also maintained. An adviser on religious and native affairs was appointed and a number of schools which had been set up by various Muslim organizations obtained government subsidies. The Dutch government also assisted with the hajj (pilgrimage) by, inter alia, opening a consulate in Jeddah. Dutch shipping companies made special arrangements for the transportation of pilgrims to Mecca.

Muslim reactions to the Dutch policy toward Islam were, however, based on distrust for obvious reasons. Unlike the Spanish government in the Philippines, the Dutch government was not much concerned with proselytizing efforts to convert the local people, but it was very conscious of the 'white man's burden'. On many occasions, including the inauguration of the Ethical Policy in 1901 as expressed in the royal address to the Dutch Parliament, the government expressed support for the spread of Christianity in Indonesia. It therefore gave assistance to Christian missionaries, who gradually also penetrated Muslim sultanes. Subsidies to Christian organizations and schools amounted to more than one hundred times the sum given to Muslim schools.

Muslims also resented the curtailment of the power of their religious courts. Following the Dutch recognition of adat as distinct from Islamic law around the beginning of this century, the 'reception theory' was adopted, according to which Islamic rules were considered as law only if they had been absorbed so into the adat. In the 1930s cases of faraid, the Islamic law of inheritance, were transferred from the religious to the civil courts (Lev 1972; Hooker 1978, Chapter 5).

Muslims did not regard the establishment of the Dutch consulate in Jeddah and the office for Islamic and native affairs in Jakarta as a help to them. Both offices, they said, were opened with the aim of monitoring and controlling the Muslims at home as well as in the Holy Places. The Dutch shipping companies were certainly aiming to make profits from the pilgrimage rather than engaging themselves in such activities for religious or humanitarian reasons.

Subsidies to Muslim schools were very insignificant. Much more money was needed, and it was in the field of education that the government could have done more. In general it can be said that since the turn of the century Indonesians demanded more and more schools. But from the Islamic point of view the Dutch policy on education was detrimental to the development of Islam. On the basis of the ideas of Snouck Hurgronje, the Dutch adviser for Muslim and native affairs at the turn of the century, the Dutch embarked upon an 'emancipation' policy of the Indonesian youth by establishing secular schools. Future leaders of Indonesia, at least a part of them, became therefore estranged from their own religion. They also came to share the idea developed in the West that religion was simply a personal matter, and that it was concerned merely with the spiritual aspects of life. Thus the idea of the separation of church (i.e. religion) and state was introduced. Only the spiritual realm of Islam was recognized, as also was part of its family law. Yet, in matters of personal law the authority of Islamic law was weakened, as witness the declining role of religious courts.
The pre-war Indonesian educational system had a dual character, with secular and religious (Islamic) schools existing side by side. The Muslims tried to overcome the secularization process by demanding the introduction of religious lessons at school (which was conceded by the government in the 1930s for secondary schools, although they were given only after school hours) as well as by setting up their own schools in which secular subjects were taught. Modernist Muslim teachers were especially active in this field. In addition, leaders of Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Islam, Al-Irsjadj and Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia, especially men such as Haji Agus Salim and Ahmad Hassan, were active in looking after the spiritual needs of the educated youth. In 1925 the Jong Islamieten Bond (Union of Young Muslims) was established with the aim of enabling young Dutch-educated Muslims to upgrade themselves in matters of religion (Noer in Soemarsono 1978, pp.240-55). They also became cadres in the political struggle as well. Muslim scout movements also did a great deal to prevent their members from becoming estranged from their own religion. Many Masjumi leaders of the independence period came from JIB and these scout movements.

The dual character of the educational system produced on the one hand secularly oriented intellectuals or leaders and, on the other, religiously-oriented (i.e. devoutly Islamic) people. This polarization, which continues to exist today, was reflected both in political groupings and in the dominant ideas about various matters, such as education, law and the nature of the future Indonesian state. The secularists did not necessarily have an antipathy toward religion; in fact, quite a number of them were themselves devoutly religious. They did, however, adopt a neutral attitude toward all religions in general by looking upon them as equal in status to each other. They were also of the opinion that real unity in Indonesia could only be brought about on the basis of nationalism rather than religion.

On the other hand, the Islamic-oriented people wanted to see Islamic teachings implemented not only in individual life, but also in social and political life. Naturally debates occasionally flared up between the two groups. The most serious of these were reported around 1930 when nationalist leaders, mostly from the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), branded as out of date certain aspects of the teachings of Islam on matters which included marriage and divorce and even the hajj. The decline of the federation of political parties PFPKI, in the late twenties, was caused by, inter alia, these differences.

In the second half of the thirties the two groups became reconciled in the political federation GAPI and joint actions were launched as part of the struggle for independence. But it was already clear then that tensions between the two groups would arise again in the future. The MIAI, a federation of Muslim organizations, resolved in 1941, for example, that the future head of the Indonesian state and two-thirds of the cabinet ministers

*This term is used throughout the paper to refer to the more devoutly Muslim, or santri, people who identify strongly with one or other Islamic organization or party.
should be Muslims, that there was a need for a ministry of Islamic affairs and that parliament be based on Islam.

Muslims blamed the Dutch for their differences with the nationalist group who, they said, were products of Dutch educational policy. Even traditionalist Muslims, who previously were more concerned with the spiritual than the political aspects of Islam, began to be active in the political sphere as well. Together with the modernists, they mounted a campaign for the withdrawal of the Dutch plan in 1932 for an ordinance on private schools which would have hampered the development of Muslim and nationalist education; and in 1937 they opposed a marriage ordinance which would have secularized marriages of Muslims. Both plans had to be abandoned by the Dutch in the face of the widespread opposition they aroused.

It was thus that the Muslim movement developed during the last four or five decades of the Dutch period. Originating as a diversity of local organizations in various parts of Indonesia, it had established itself by the early forties as a unified force that had to be taken very seriously by the Dutch as well as by the religiously neutral nationalists. On many occasions the latter had to come to terms with the Muslims, who in turn were increasingly beginning to regard themselves as part of the global Muslim movement.

THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION

In spite of the difficulties of the period, the Japanese occupation of Indonesia during World War II gave ample opportunity for Indonesians, including Muslims, to prepare themselves for an independent Indonesia. Quite a number of Muslim leaders, including traditionalists from the pesantren, joined the government bureaucracy. Religious offices were expanded into the regions, all manned by Islamic-oriented people. The Muslim youth obtained military training and were even allowed to set up their own armed groups, such as Hizbullah. Some of the prominent pre-war members of Muslim organizations became Peta (defence army) commanders, including Kasman Singodimedjo and Sudirman (both of them from Muhammadiyah, the latter subsequently becoming overall commander of the armed forces during the revolution).

In the national leadership, as reflected in Putera and Jawa Hokokai, Muslim leaders could not match the popularity of Soekarno and Hatta, but neither were the latter able to ignore the Muslim part of the population. Both admitted the need to join hands with them, and invited one of the Muslim leaders, Kyai Haji Mas Mansur, to become a member of the Empat Serangkai (Four-leaf Clover). Soekarno and Hatta as well as other nationalist leaders had regular contacts with local pesantren and kyai, and leaders from Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama. The strength of the Muslims was also reflected in the continuation of their federation, MIAI, and later on in the establishment of Masjumi. This unity of Islam was maintained not only through organizational means, but was also promoted through visits of their leaders to various regions. It was further strengthened by the training of ulama by the government. Some Sumatran leaders also visited their colleagues in Java. A feeling of self-esteem among the Muslims was aroused by news about the firm stand of Haji Abdul Karim Amrullah, a very respected ulama who had been exiled by the Dutch from West Sumatra to Sukabumi, West Java, in
the early forties, in defiance of Japanese instruction to bow in the direction of Tokyo as a token of respect to the Japanese emperor; this fortified their spirit in the struggle.

However, the Muslim position during the Japanese occupation also had its drawbacks. The devout Muslims were certainly outnumbered in the bureaucracy, which had never been attractive to the Muslims during the Dutch period. In the various 'representative assemblies' they did not have a proportional number of seats. Only fifteen out of sixty members of the Investigation Committee for the Preparation of Indonesia's Independence, formed in 1944, belonged to the Islamic group. In the Preparatory Committee for Indonesia's Independence, set up in July 1945, only two out of twenty-one members (later on three out of twenty-seven) were Islamic-oriented people.

But the small representation did not automatically produce a negative result for Islam. This was made possible by the firm insistence of the Islamic representatives to incorporate Islam into the constitutional framework of the future state. On 22 June 1945 an agreement was signed by Soekarno, Hatta, Subardjo and Yamin (on behalf of the nationalists), A.A. Maramis (a Christian), and Haji Agus Salim, Abikusno, Wahid Hasjim, and Abdul Kahar Muzakkir (on behalf of the Muslims), in which the 'obligation to follow the Shari'a by adherents of Islam' was stipulated. The agreement, later known as the Jakarta Charter, was honoured by all the signatories throughout the rest of the Japanese period. It was also incorporated in the preamble of the draft constitution of 1945 (Anshari 1979).

However, one day after the proclamation of independence, on 18 August 1945, the 'Shari'a clause' was deleted.

THE INDEPENDENCE PERIOD

This period started with the revolution (1945-49), followed by phases of parliamentary democracy (1950-57), 'Guided Democracy' (1957-65), and the New Order (from 1966 on). The role of the Muslims in this period of independence varied from one stage to another.

The revolutionary period saw a very significant role for the Islamic-oriented people. They fought in the battlefields with their own armed bands (Hizbullah, Sabililla), or as part of the official army, which was headed by a former Muhammadiyah member, General Sudirman. Kyai in the villages gave moral support while quite a number of them joined the fighting themselves. The call of 'Allah Akbar' (God is Greatest) was heard everywhere. Muslim organizations and ulama issued fatwa (decisions of a religious character) that it was obligatory for every Muslim to defend the country from the Dutch.

In the political field the Muslims were represented by one of the largest parties, Masjumi, which was set up in November 1945. In almost all the cabinets of the revolutionary period, the Masjumi (which until 1952 included the Mahdatul Ulama) participated. The one exception was the cabinet headed in 1947-48 by Amir Sjarifuddin, a socialist Christian who later declared himself a communist. But even Amir Sjarifuddin could not ignore the Muslims and invited pre-war PSII leaders to join the cabinet, thereby
reviving the PSII party. Masjumi's representation in the provisional parliament was also substantial at this time.

In the field of diplomacy Mohammad Roem of the Masjumi was one of the key figures. He participated in negotiations with the Dutch as a member of the Indonesian delegations. He was head of the Indonesian delegation in 1949 when he was able to extract from the Dutch delegation an agreement that the Indonesian Republican government, many of whose members had been captured by the Dutch following their second military action in late 1948, should return to Yogyakarta, then capital of the Republic of Indonesia as a prelude to negotiations towards independence. This agreement paved the way for the Round Table Conference in The Hague which resulted in the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch to Indonesia toward the end of 1949. Roem was later vice-chairman of the Indonesian delegation to the Round Table Conference (Soemarsono 1978).

It was also during this difficult period 1948-49 that another Masjumi leader, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, headed the Indonesian emergency government, following the capture by the Dutch of Soekarno, Hatta and several other cabinet ministers.

The second phase of parliamentary democracy (1950-57) saw a balance in the roles of the Islamic and the nationalist forces, represented by the Masjumi and Partai Nasional Indonesia respectively. Both parties in turn led successive coalitions of cabinets. The position of the Islamic-oriented people declined, however, after the withdrawal in 1952 of the Nahdatul Ulama from the Masjumi and its transformation into a separate political party. Although NU and other smaller Islamic parties adhered in general to their Islamic principles, as reflected in their stand at the Constituent Assembly, in day-to-day politics they often adjusted themselves to the various circumstances that arose, and especially to the wishes of the head of state, Soekarno. The period was characterized by a struggle for power among the main political parties, and it was in this connection that the Islamic parties, other than Masjumi, seemed to have been swayed by short term considerations of tactical advantage. The Masjumi was often regarded as inflexible in its attitude.

In one instance, however, the Muslim parties were firmly united. This happened in the Constituent Assembly, which was elected in 1955 and dissolved by President Soekarno in 1959. All the Islamic parties in the Constituent Assembly defended their wish that the state be based on Islam. They were not against the existing five principles of the state, *Pancasila*, but they thought they should express what for them would be the ideal basis of the state and in line with the mandate they obtained from their voters. When in 1959 preparations were made to reach a compromise on this issue (the chairman of the Constituent Assembly having said that only 10 per cent of the Assembly's work remained to be done), the government proposed that the Assembly should revive the 1945 Constitution. The Islamic faction made a counter proposal accepting the 1945 Constitution but also incorporating the Shari'a clause of the Jakarta Charter into it. This was rejected by the other members of the Constituent Assembly as well as by the government. As neither side obtained the necessary two-thirds majority, the government simply dissolved the Assembly and inaugurated the 1945 Constitution by decree, thereby expanding the power of Soekarno from his titular position as head of state to be also the effective head of the government.
The main aim of the Islamic parties at this time was the establishment of a state as mentioned in the Qur'an: 'baladatun tayyibatun wa rabbun ghafur' (a fair land and an indulgent Lord [Q 34:15]) in which the government exercises its authority by consultation with people through their elected representatives; in which the norms of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as commanded by Islam have to be realized; in which the people are granted the opportunity to arrange their lives as individuals and as a community in line with their respective religious teachings.

Conditions in Indonesia had deteriorated in 1957, however, when several Outer Island military commanders established their own regional councils as the basis for their authority in place of the normal government administrative hierarchy, in order to meet the rising demands of people in the Outer Islands. These regions, especially Sumatra and Sulawesi, felt that the central government had neglected their development, although most of the country's export produce came from there. Masjumi ministers withdrew from the cabinet after they had failed to convince the PNI prime minister, Ali Sastroamidjojo, that a resignation of the cabinet would ease the tensions and contribute toward a solution of the regional problems. Eventually early in 1958 those regions revolted against the central government, not with the aim of separating themselves from the rest of Indonesia but in order that the central government should be replaced by more trusted leaders. Many local and several national leaders of Masjumi joined the revolt. The government suppressed the revolt quickly, arrested many of the leaders, and, in spite of granting of a general amnesty, continued to detain them. In the meantime the government had begun to overhaul its administrative apparatus, replaced legislative assemblies with appointed ones, indoctrinated the people with the idea of Nasakom unity (nationalists, religious people and communists), limited freedom of expression and association and extended its control over the press (Feith in McVey 1967, pp.304-409; Lev 1966).

Following the failure of the revolt the political role of the Islamic-oriented parties declined considerably. The Masjumi was banned in 1960, but NU was not able to give the sort of leadership necessary to unite the Islamic-oriented people, in spite of the fact that it maintained its position in successive cabinets as well as in the central and regional legislative assemblies. It was, however, successful in demanding full loyalty from its followers. But the government's methods of rule by oppression and intimidation caused leaders of the opposition, to whom former Masjumi leaders belonged, to lie low. Some of them secretly maintained contact with each other as well as with their followers. There were also some who were double-faced, pretending to support the government while in fact they sided with the opposition in order to prepare for any eventualities. Tensions mounted in the last few years of the Guided Democracy period, especially between communists and anti-communists. It was generally felt that since the communists had successfully penetrated large parts of the government apparatus, and since they had been able to build up the strongest party in Indonesia at that time, they might take over power at any opportune moment. The army, however, was anti-communist (Crouch 1978).
A dramatic turn of events occurred with the attempted coup of 30 September 1965, followed by a struggle between communist and anti-communist forces in which Islamic-oriented elements played a prominent part on the anti-communist side. Within the Muslim fold, a significant development occurred in the political field. Former Masjumi leaders made efforts to revive the party, but this was rejected by the government. Quite a number of young Muslims, under the leadership of Mohammad Hatta, tried to organize themselves into a new Muslim party, Partai Demokrasi Islam Indonesia, which was again unacceptable to the government. Finally a new Muslim party, Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi), was formed in early 1968, supported by various social and religious organizations previously affiliated with the Masjumi (Singgih 1972; Ward 1972). Government approval, however, was coupled with various restrictions which in general prevented former Masjumi leaders from taking up the leadership of the new party. Among the leaders proscribed were not only those who were involved in the 1958 rebellion, but also others as well. Thus, Mohammad Roem, who was elected president of the party in 1968, was unable to assume office as he was not recognized as such by the government. It seems that the government tolerated as party leaders only those whom it thought would be willing to support its policies. Thus when Djarnawi Hadikusumo, the first president of Parmusi, became inclined to oppose the government, the party leadership passed to Mintaredja with the support of the government. Mintaredja had been known as a strong supporter of President Suharto, and in the 1971 election campaigns he went so far as to express sympathy with the government party, Golkar. He also stated that Parmusi was a completely new party and not a revival of Masjumi, with a result that many Masjumi sympathizers lost enthusiasm. The party got only 5.36 per cent of the votes and twenty-four seats in parliament in the 1971 elections (Pemilihan Umum 1971, 1972; Nishihara 1972; Ward 1974).

NU succeeded throughout the New Order period in maintaining its standing as a party to be reckoned with. Its leaders during the Guided Democracy period have continued to enjoy the support of its members, and have sat in the cabinets and legislative assemblies. Group loyalties and the attachment of many Muslims to their kyai have certainly contributed towards the relatively strong position of NU in the political arena of Indonesia. Thus the NU gained the second largest number of votes in the 1971 elections (18.67 per cent) or fifty-eight seats.

Two other Islamic parties, PSII and Pertif, have fallen into insignificance in comparison with their position during the Guided Democracy period: The close relations of their leaders with President Soekarno and the communists in that period were largely responsible for their decline, for they had been regular participants in conferences organized or sponsored by either Moscow or Peking. PSII gained only 2.39 per cent of the votes or ten seats in the 1971 elections, Pertif 0.7 per cent and two seats.

In early 1973 after pressure from the government over a period of several years to 'simplify' or consolidate the nine recognized parties into two blocs, one Muslim and one 'nationalist', the four Muslim parties merged into a single party, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan. The pressure from the government to bring about such a merger turned out to be a blessing in disguise for the Islamic-oriented people, as this had long been a widely shared aspiration which they had not been able to achieve on their own. This new party even obtained support from former Masjumi leaders, including the influential
Mohammad Natsir, and in the 1977 elections they openly voted for the party. The result of the 1977 elections was not overwhelming for PPP, but it was able to gain control of the regional assembly in Jakarta, the national capital, and Aceh, the northernmost province of Sumatra. Overall, it gained 29.29 per cent of the votes or ninety-nine seats in parliament. Considering the malpractices in the elections (PPP claimed that in East Java alone more than one million of its supporters did not receive ballot papers), and the restrictions on its campaign in contrast to Golkar's activities, which gained every support from the government apparatus (including the military), PPP did well to retain such extensive popular support in the elections and proved that it was the major threat to the dominance of the government party, Golkar. PPP leaders look optimistically to the next elections in 1982 provided that clean elections are guaranteed (van Dijk 1977a, 1977b; Liddle 1978, pp.18, 175-185).

Several other developments in the Indonesian Muslim world also deserve attention in the study of Islam in that country. The first was the recent emergence of a new wave of reformist ideas which a number of young people, especially Nurcholiq Madjid, began to propagate in the early 1970s. They championed the 'liberation' of ideas in Islam, including the secularization of politics. These ideas were at first warmly welcomed by certain sections of the people, including the government and non-Muslims, but their impact later diminished, especially after H.M. Rasjidi, professor of Islamic Studies at the University of Indonesia, who was from Muhammadiyah and a former Masjumi supporter, launched severe criticisms against them. Many considered that the young people had not devoted enough study to the character of Islam (Rasjadi 1972; Boland 1974, pp.37-50).

Another development was the establishment of Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islam Missionary Council or DDII) by former Masjumi leaders under the leadership of Mohammad Natsir. Banned from political activities, these leaders devoted their energy and attention to dakwah (missionary activities) in order to improve the position of Islam in Indonesia. The dakwah movement has been active in the educational field by supplying books and equipment to religious schools, training missionaries, offering scholarships for further studies abroad, and organizing upgrading courses for teachers, including those from ordinary universities. It has also organized regional educational conferences in which pesantren and other Muslim educational organizations have participated. Dakwah activities have also been directed towards resisting the proselytization efforts of Christian missionaries who have been very active among Muslims since 1966, often causing tensions in the society. Likewise, efforts have been made to curb the spread of kebatinan (Javanese belief) which has grown considerably during the New Order period. DDII has also established close relations with Muslim organizations elsewhere in the Islamic world. Natsir, who has often been consulted by Muslim leaders in other parts of the world, sat in the Committee of the World Muslim League, which has its headquarters in Mecca, and the World Muslim Congress of Karachi (Puar 1978).

Dakwah has indeed been able to bring many less devout Muslims more fully to the Islamic fold. Religious discussion groups have been formed in almost every section of the Muslim population, especially in big cities and towns - and they include housewives, artists, university and secondary school
students, government servants and military people - in order to learn more about Islam. During school holidays students organize training camps in Islamic studies, usually located in mosques or pesantren, or any religious schools. There has also been an increasing desire on the part of people from various walks of life to perform the hajj.

The relations of the Islamic oriented people with the government in the New Order period have undergone changes. This can be concluded from the above discussion on Islamic political parties, but such changes have also been noticed in non-political fields as well (Noer 1978). After the honeymoon phase of solidarity among anti-communist forces immediately following the 1965 coup attempt was over, and the danger of a communist take-over had been eliminated, relations between the government and Muslim groups became increasingly strained. The government not only resisted the political aspirations of the Muslims but also thwarted their efforts in more directly religious matters. A plan of the Muslims to hold an all-Muslim Congress in 1968 could not be realized because of government disapproval, although the preparations had already developed to an advanced stage. The government monopoly over the hajj since 1969 has been looked upon not only as an attempt to deprive Muslim enterprises of an opportunity to develop their business in certain areas, but also to control and check the pilgrims from any 'undesirable' influence at home as well as at the Holy Places. Previously Muslim religious and educational organizations had helped their members and sympathizers with the pilgrimage, thereby strengthening their relationship or their mutual loyalties. If this desire to exercise control was indeed the reason for the hajj monopoly, it reminds us of the Dutch government's suspicious attitude toward the Mecca pilgrims. In the educational field, the government's efforts to modernize Islamic religious educational institutions, especially those which followed the appointment of A. Mukti Ali in 1971 as Minister of Religion, have been related to an alleged secularization programme pursued by the government in the 1970s. Rumours have circulated to the effect that the government wants to introduce lessons on religion in general in its schools at all levels, from elementary to the tertiary, rather than the present separate religious courses in Islam, Christianity and Buddhism/Hinduism. The government's abolition of school holidays in the fasting month of Ramadan this year has also been mentioned as part of the secularization programme. It has also been alleged that devout Muslim businessmen have been deprived of necessary facilities. As is well known, trade and business activities among the indigenous people of Indonesia have long been in the hands of the more devout Muslims.

The strongest opposition so far launched by the Muslims against the government's programme in the religious field arose in 1973, when the government introduced a draft marriage law which was considered by all devout Muslims, especially the ulama, as in conflict with the teachings of Islam. Almost all Muslim organizations protested, particularly the Islamic youth who joined in demonstrations in the capital and elsewhere; at one stage they even broke up a parliamentary meeting. Eventually the government agreed to incorporate all Muslim demands pertaining to the law, which as finally passed was quite different from the first draft bill (Noer 1978, pp.51-52). As regards relations with other religious groups, the Muslims have been questioning the government's attitude toward Christian missionaries, who have enjoyed facilities and freedom from the government to carry out their work, often at the expense of the Muslim interest. Restrictions on dakwah activities
have been considered much more severe than those on Christian missions (Natsir 1969, pp.188-216; *Kristenisasi dan Transmigrasi di Sumatera Barat* 1975).

All in all, it can be said that a widening gap has developed between the government and the Islamic-oriented people since 1968. Viewed from another angle this can perhaps be related to one's view of development. The New Order government has committed itself to development, for which stability, peace, and security are needed. Therefore tensions between different religious streams have had to be kept to a minimum by any means whatever, or even completely eradicated. The government has therefore been engaged in social engineering in order to see its ideas on development realized as quickly as possible. Social groups, especially the youth, and people's ideas have been shaped, moulded, and directed towards specific goals in line with the government's development policies.

For those who wish to see more freedom realized in society and also for those who considered that Guided Democracy was a deviation from the original goals of Indonesian independence, it is inappropriate that developments should be confined to the economic field only. They believe it should also include social and political development as well. This means, *inter alia*, a more just distribution of wealth and the promotion of political freedom.

Islamic-oriented people have never been opposed to development. They have traditionally been the ones who travelled abroad for trade and study purposes; and to a certain extent it was they who introduced changes in the past in their own communities. What they have opposed is the interpretation of development merely in materialistic terms which neglect man's spiritual and social needs. According to them, when these aspects are also developed, peace and tranquility will prevail in society, and development will therefore be promoted in the desirable direction. Besides, as Islam wants to bring about a balance of man's spiritual and physical development, devout Muslims in Indonesia wish therefore to see Islamic teachings promoted in any government programme. They regard the present tensions in society, especially among the young people, as resulting from the inappropriate basis for the government policies in development (Noer 1977; 'White book of the 1978 students' struggle' 1978; 'Defense of the student movement' 1979).

*Wa'ilāhu a'lam –* God knows best.

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*Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia* (n.d.)


ASPECTS OF CONTEMPORARY POLITICS
A quick survey of Indonesian politics in the last four years suggests that the Suharto polity has survived a period of high instability - in a way which makes it arguable that those like myself who expected radical discontinuities in the country's politics were operating on false assumptions. The long period of stability and continuity which began in 1966 and was re-established after the January 1974 riots certainly looked to be threatened by a number of events between early 1976 and early 1978. That two-year period was replete with embarrassments for the government: the revelation of Pertamina's huge debts, the failure to achieve either military or diplomatic victory against Fretilin in East Timor, several big corruption scandals and the need for a drastic expansion of rice imports in 1977. And it was replete with challenges, particularly the attempted 'spiritual coup' of Sawito Kartowibowo in 1976, the fiery Muslim denunciations in the rallies which preceded the May 1977 elections, and above all the student-spurred opposition movement, indulged at least episodically by sections of the army leadership, which flourished in the six months before the People's Consultative Congress session of March 1978.

But Suharto was successful in getting himself re-elected at that session of the Congress. And, once re-elected, he quickly defused the major challenges to his rule. In the period since March 1978 many of those who are knowledgeable about Jakarta politics have been talking as if the present group of rulers can assume that their position is safe, at least until the elections scheduled for 1982.

Are we then to assume that those who spoke in 1976-78 of a situation of regime impasse were seriously underestimating the ballast which supports the Suharto project? Are we dealing with a polity which is now well on the way to becoming institutionalized? I myself continue to question judgements of this kind. But I am now more inclined than I was two or three years ago to concede that the continuityists have a chance of winning their wager. The arguments for probable rupture are still strong, particularly in the light of instabilities in the political economy of the world at large. But those who expect further continuity and a dialectic of reform have a case worth serious consideration - whether they are arguing that the regime has proved its flexibility in a fast-changing international environment, or that it has proved to be responsive to the demands of its middle class constituency, or that it will continue to draw strength from middle class fears of the Pandora's Box of popular politics being opened once more, or that it stands a good chance of remaining the beneficiary of crucial external support from the US and Japan.

In this paper I want to look at the questions of continuity, ballast and institutionalization from the point of view of one of its determinants, that of legitimacy. In addition I want to open up questions to do with
how that one determinant is coming to be affected by a particular set of
types changes in world society and world culture.

What then are the patterns of legitimacy by which the Suharto polity
is sustained? What are the would-be legitimizing messages its leaders
send out -

(a) to the members of the state apparatus;

(b) to the non-apparatus members of the political public,
and its various class and ethnic segments (the political
public being seen as a group roughly coterminous with
that of regular newspaper and magazine readers); and

(c) to the mass of the population, and its various class
and ethnic groupings?

(My assumption is that achieving legitimacy in the eyes of the first two
of these three categories has been a major objective of the Suharto
leadership throughout its period of rule, and that it has also accorded
some importance to achieving a measure of legitimacy in relation to the
third category, though legitimacy is far less important there as a means
of generating acceptance and compliance than coercion and manipulation.)
And what are the responses to these messages?

Perhaps the central message the Suharto group sent out in its early
years of rulership was 'We have saved the country from chaos, hyper-
inflation and the prospect of communist domination. Now leave it to us to
establish stability on a solid footing'. Supplementing this were messages
like 'All of us want development, and development requires the kind of
stability that only continuing army rule can provide', and 'Our army has a
right to rule because it is a special kind of army, one which has made
unique contributions to the freedom and integrity of the nation in the
past'.

After a few years these messages were further supplemented by 'Look
how well we have done in economic stabilization. And look how much foreign
support and foreign investment we have attracted. We are a government the
outside world trusts and one that delivers the goods'. And after the 1971
elections a further major theme was added: 'We are the legally constituted
government, a government that has the consent of the people, expressed
through the established procedures'. The relative importance of this last
theme has grown since 1971, partly by the very effluxion of time as the
events of 1965–66 have receded further from memory.

The Suharto government has also advanced a series of what might be
called defensive appeals. They seem to me to fit into six main headings,
corresponding to six main types of grievance with which it has had to
contend. These are:

1. Nationalist appeals: 'We are standing up to the multi-
nationals'. 'We are helping indigenous Indonesian
businessmen against their established Chinese competitors',
and 'We are taking an active part in the struggle for a
New International Economic Order';
2. Traditionalist appeals: 'We are a government that does things in the Indonesian way', 'Far from wanting to make Indonesia a country of slavish imitators of Western ways, we are determined to maintain the vitality of Indonesian culture';

3. Moral appeals: 'We are taking firm action against corruptors, smugglers and other blood-suckers', 'We are maintaining vigilance against the encroachments of cosmopolitan decadence into our cities';

4. Egalitarian appeals: 'We are working hard to see to it that the new wealth is widely shared' and 'Development certainly means uplifting the victims of poverty in the villages and urban kampung';

5. Appeals to counter anti-military sentiment: 'We are moving away from a situation in which the armed forces are a privileged caste, though this has to be done slowly'; and

6. Appeals to do with political freedom: 'We do allow criticism, even when it is anything but constructive. Look at the freedom that students are getting to criticize the government. Look at the way the press is free to find fault with everything officials do. Look at the things the Muslims have got away with saying in pre-election rallies. And we have released most of the communist political prisoners'.

But the principal would-be legitimizing messages are the positive ones. These are I think to be seen in terms of three main categories, legal-constitutional, practical-technical, and developmentalist. The three central messages are:

1. 'We are the established constitutional government, the guarantors of stability and orderly change'.

2. 'We are a group of practical sensible people who are doing the technically feasible things - and keeping a check on politics lest the old forms of sectionalism, fanaticism and traditionalistic irrationality re-emerge'; and

3. 'We are the promoters of development, the government that has transformed the skyline of Jakarta and moved Indonesia into a period of fast exciting change. We are the leadership group which is moving the country forward to a better future'.

I will not attempt here to address the question of how persuasive these would-be legitimizing messages have been to particular segments of the population. Rather I propose to look at some dimensions of what has changed over the last thirteen years with respect to legitimacy questions.

In other papers I have discussed the way in which the anti-populist backlash which undergirded the Suharto government's acceptability to middle class Indonesians in the late 1960s and early 1970s has more
recently been ebbing. I have argued that this ebbing can be seen in the emergence of a new interest in the person and ideas of Soekarno and the birth of a new search for what is to be learned from Indonesia's history of emancipatory nationalism, particularly in its manifestations between 1908 and 1949 (see Feith 1978 and 1979). Here I propose to survey some predominantly external dimensions of cultural-intellectual change. I want to examine some new elements in the character of world society which are affecting Indonesian responses to the Suharto government's appeals for legitimacy.

My general argument is that the cultural-ideological character of world society into which Indonesia has become more and more fully integrated puts major restraints on the capacity of regimes like that of Suharto to justify exclusionary and anti-populist political arrangements, and anti-egalitarian trends in income distribution, by reference to an over-riding goal of fast development. A corollary is that Suharto's successors would be likely to come up against major politico-cultural obstacles, both international and domestic, if they attempted to move in the direction of a more streamlined and more repressive developmentalist polity.

Here I can do no more than sketch three dimensions of my avowedly speculative argument. The propositions are asserted in bald and unqualified form to provoke controversy.

THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF POLITICS

What happens within nation-states has come to be determined more and more in the last fifteen years by actions taken beyond their borders, not only by processes of interaction and interpenetration among states and governments but also by the actions of intergovernmental agencies (OPEC, the Group of 77, UNESCO), of transnational corporations, and of transnational associations - religious, professional, scientific, and so on (World Council of Churches, International Press Institute, International Commission of Jurists, Amnesty International, Worldwatch Institute, etc.). This trend reflects the intensified internationalization of business activity in this fifteen-year period, especially the expansion of multinational manufacturing. It also reflects the fast expansion of international travel, especially conference travelling and tourism, the growing scale of labour migration, the expansion of expatriate communities (including communities of political exiles using the free space of other societies to organize opposition to the governments of their countries of origin), and the rapidly growing readership, listenership and viewership of transnational media organizations. Moreover it reflects the growing importance of transnational cultural flows, both those originating in the industrialized North, like James Bond, Donald Duck, Christian Barnard and Mohammed Ali, and those originating in the South or Third World, like reggae music, Indian gurus, batik and acupuncture. There are major political implications in the fact that the world is coming to be a global village, that growing minorities of people in every part of it are becoming involved in long'distance interactions with others outside their own countries and cultural regions, interactions which are becoming more fully empathetic and more frequently dialogic.
The internationalization of politics and the increased porousness of most nation-state borders means that the rulers of states, both powerful and weak, have no alternative but to pay increasing attention to norms and values which hold sway in the world outside their borders - because the successful management of states depends more and more on the skilful handling of events outside. Malcolm Fraser's recent stances in relation to racism and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia should probably be understood in this light.

In addition the political publics of all countries have come to include small but fast-growing minorities of persons whose perspectives on their own countries' problems are informed by a disposition to draw conclusions from what they see to have been happening elsewhere. Thus significant numbers of Indonesians have been drawing inferences for Indonesia in 1979 from what has been happening in Iran, South Korea, China, Kampuchea, Pakistan and the Philippines.

THE EFFORTS OF DOMINANT STATES TO ESTABLISH CONSENSUAL NORMS FOR WORLD SOCIETY

The dominant states and dominant classes of world society, frightened by the tenuousness of world order, have had a high and rising incentive in this fifteen-year period to support initiatives likely to enhance global stability. This is partly because of the tinderbox-like character of an increasingly militarized world, a world in which weapons of large-scale mass destruction are being acquired by more and more states. It is also because of the mounting urgency and saliency of various tasks requiring a wide measure of international co-operation, from hijacking and the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons to world food shortages, refugee crises and the encroaching thresholds of ecological disaster - marine pollution, the destruction of forests, the dangers to the ozone layer, and so on.

Increasingly aware of these many dangers, the dominant states and classes have promoted a variety of initiatives intended to stabilize world order on the basis of at least minimal consensus. The heads of the OECD states have sought to draw in the leaders of the USSR, China and various states of the Third World behind efforts to fashion new rules and new values, not only rules governing inter-state transactions but also ones relating to the behaviour of states towards their citizens. So there has been a tendency for more and more areas of government business to become accepted as legitimate areas of international and transnational concern. This has occurred in relation to torture, the long-term arrest of untried prisoners, unexplained disappearances, the harassment of minorities and the denial of rights to emigration. And there has been a tendency for the major states to give increasingly active support to the attempts of UN agencies and other transnational bodies to fashion acceptable norms for political and social life within states, particularly norms to do with human rights, racial equality and the protection of the environment.
The same period has seen major changes in the way in which Third World societies perceive their problems. This is partly a result of the way in which Third World solidarity has grown in the years since OPEC's successes of 1973, of the processes by which the Group of 77 has become a major factor in the previously US-dominated United Nations, and of the way in which the world agenda has come to be shaped by demands for a New International Economic Order.

But it is also a result of other, subtler processes whereby the leaders and publics of Third World societies have been redefining their goals in response to the development debate, and particularly in the light of what they have observed of the questioning of social and cultural directions in the industrialized states. The various ways of new consciousness which Western societies have experienced since the 1960s, environmentalism, feminism, counter-culturalism, and more recently anti-nuclear-power movements and the search for alternatives in energy and technology - all of these have had major reverberations in Third World thought. In the words of the Brazilian, F.H. Cardoso, 'People in the Third World are convinced that alternative styles of development are possible - precisely because there is a crisis of confidence over the predatory-industrializing model among the elites of the industrialized countries' (Cardoso 1977, p.31).

It would of course be foolish to talk as if GNPism were dead in the Third World. Large numbers of Southern states continue to be ruled by people who see their central task as catching up to the advanced industrial states, and use this goal to justify policy stances which are pro-Western, exclusionary and repressive and anti-egalitarian. But stances of this kind have become difficult to justify in Third World assemblies, where the dominant ideological themes are those of the Cocaloy Declaration of 1974: self-reliance, popular participation, basic needs, eco-development and the restructuring of global society. And for that very reason they are becoming increasingly difficult to justify at home.

I propose to argue that each of these three trends has helped to corrode the foundations on which Suharto's project was initially built. The managers of the project have adapted to a number of the elements of the changed situation - and have gained a degree of legitimacy as a result. But some of the gestures they have made in the direction of what their critics have demanded have been purely tokenistic, and manifestly so, and may thus have aggravated the legitimacy problems they face.

NOTE

1 This Declaration and a number of similar documents are published in Erb and Kallab 1975. See also various contributions to Development Dialogue (Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, Uppsala), Alternatives (Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, New Delhi and Institute for World Order, New York) and IFDA Dossier (International Foundation for Development Alternatives, Nyon, Switzerland). The principal Indonesian vehicle of this orientation is Prisma.
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THE NEW ORDER: THE PROSPECT FOR POLITICAL STABILITY

Harold Crouch

When General Suharto seized power in the disguised coup of 11 March 1966, few observers of Indonesian politics would have dared to suggest that not only would he take over the presidency but that he would still be in office at the end of the 1970s. The two decades of instability and upheaval that preceded the military's take-over of power did not offer strong grounds for believing that the next two decades would be characterized by stability and consolidation under an increasingly strong and unified political elite. During the early years of the New Order some observers continued to expect that factional conflicts within the military would soon lead to a new phase of instability in which coups and counter-coups would follow each other in quick succession. By the late 1970s, however, the orthodox view — shared by both sympathizers and opponents of the regime — is that the present system of government is likely to last without undergoing fundamental change for a good many years to come. In this paper I intend to question this view and suggest that there are still grounds for believing that the instability which some observers had expected in the early 1970s might appear in the early 1980s. While not denying the force of some of the arguments supporting the view that stability will continue, there seem to be other factors which are either not taken into account or are underestimated.

THE CASE FOR STABILITY

The case for continuing stability has been put from several different points of view. Attention has been drawn to growing internal consolidation within the army itself, the increasingly dominant position of the state bureaucracy in society, and the integration of the Indonesian economy with the world economic system.

Consolidation within the Army

One of the main arguments of those who predicted instability in the early New Order period was based on the long history of factional conflict within the armed forces. The armed forces had been formed during the revolution as local fighting units over which the central army leadership had only nominal command. Personal and factional rivalries were strong and several regional rebellions involving local military forces took place after 1949, the most serious in 1956-58. During the Guided Democracy period inter-service rivalry was encouraged by President Soekarno and the army itself was divided between various factions. Finally in 1965 military officers participated in the coup attempt in which several top army leaders were assassinated. With such a history of political conflict and internal disunity before 1965, it was hard to believe that the armed
forces would eventually unite behind General Suharto after 1966. In the early years of the New Order Suharto was faced with the need to deal with the Soekarnoist remnants in the army and other services, a challenge from a group of New Order militants, and the disaffection of the former Defence Minister, General Nasution, all of which were potential threats to his hold on the government.

But, as Ulf Sundhaussen has pointed out (Sundhaussen 1971), the apparent turmoil within the armed forces since 1945 could also be seen as a process of gradual consolidation. Even during the revolution the army shed its leftist wing in the wake of the Madiun affair of 1948 and extremist Muslims with the formation of the Darul Islam. The regional rebellions of 1956-58 formed another watershed which allowed the central army command to strengthen its authority when its main rivals were defeated and detained. The 1965 coup attempt led to another purge of the armed forces, firstly of those thought to have been associated with the communists and then of supporters of President Soekarno. Suharto gradually moved against other potential challengers such as the militant group led by Generals Dharsono and Kemal Idris while neutralizing General Nasution, and in 1969 carried out a reorganization and integration of the entire armed forces under his own command. By gradually purging the armed forces of dissidents and potential dissidents whom he replaced with his own men, Suharto succeeded in creating a military elite dependent on his patronage and sharing a more or less common political outlook.

It could be argued that this trend towards consolidation will continue. As a new generation of professional officers, trained at the Magelang Military Academy after the revolution, rise through the ranks, it could be expected that the old factional and inter-divisional rivalries will become even less important. Although personal and group rivalries are normal in any organization, it has been argued that the professional ethos, discipline, and respect for hierarchical authority of the new generation will serve to limit internal conflict and make officers less inclined to involve themselves in political ventures (see Sundhaussen 1978, pp.79-81).

Thus it is argued that the long-term trend towards consolidation and professionalism makes it unlikely that junior officers will be drawn into plots and coup attempts directed against the senior officers in control of the government. Later in this paper, however, it will be suggested that new sources of cleavage might arise between the professional officers of the younger generation and those of the generation now in power.

Emergence of the Bureaucratic Polity

In a recent study Karl Jackson has argued that Indonesian politics can be understood as a form of 'bureaucratic polity', a concept originally formulated by Professor Fred Riggs to describe the political system of Thailand in the mid-1960s (Riggs 1966). By broadly defining a bureaucratic polity as 'a political system in which power and participation in national decisions are limited almost entirely to the employees of the state', Jackson is able to argue that the bureaucratic polity emerged in Indonesia with the collapse of the parliamentary system in 1957 and has not changed fundamentally since then (Jackson 1978). This broad definition, however,
fails to take account of the mobilizational aspects of Guided Democracy politics, particularly the growing power and influence of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Thus, for Jackson, the post-coup elimination of the PKI, the fall of the charismatic President and the abandoning of his mobilizing campaigns did not lead to a fundamental change in the form of government. While the concept of bureaucratic polity does not seem to me to be of much use in understanding the dynamics of Guided Democracy, a strong case can be made, however, in support of Jackson's view that Suharto's New Order should be seen as a bureaucratic polity.

The main features of a bureaucratic polity - to define it more narrowly than Jackson does - are: firstly, the dominant political institution is the bureaucracy, defined broadly to include the army and police. Secondly, other political institutions, such as parliament, political parties, and independent interest groups are weak and thus unable to balance or check the power of the bureaucracy. Thirdly, the masses outside the bureaucracy are politically passive, which is a major cause of the weakness of the political parties. Thus, the political passivity of the masses means that political parties and interest groups are weak, which in turn allows the bureaucracy to be strong. As a result of this structure of power, political competition is limited largely to manoeuvres and counter-manoeuvres within the bureaucratic elite itself between rival factions and personalities whose success or failure does not depend on support from outside the bureaucracy. In these circumstances political struggle is not really concerned with issues, policies and ideologies, because the participants share a more or less common outlook and a common interest in preserving the system. Rather, the goal is power and the perquisites that go with it.

The political system of Indonesia during the 1970s conformed in many ways to the bureaucratic polity model. The army-controlled bureaucracy was clearly the dominant institution in society. Although elections were held and political parties continued to exist, the power of the bureaucracy was not seriously challenged by forces outside itself. Increasing pressure was put on the political parties, which were forced to merge themselves into two new parties under leaders acceptable to the government, while steps were taken to undermine their bases of support through the implementation of the 'floating mass' programme of depoliticization, especially in the rural areas. Unchallenged in power and purged of ideological dissidents, the members of the military-dominated bureaucratic elite were free to pursue their struggle for the spoils of office. For many of the participants a major objective of the struggle was to obtain contracts, licences, monopoly rights, credits, exemption from regulations and so on for firms with which they themselves were associated, as well as to get straight-out bribes. Although intra-elite struggle was vigorous it took place within limits, as the competition did not involve contrasting ideological programmes and everyone had an interest in not permitting excessive conflict to endanger the system. Moreover, losers were often compensated with consolation prizes. The stability of the system was undergirded by the provision of business and other opportunities on a diminishing scale down through the hierarchy to the colonels and majors and indeed, to some extent at least, to ordinary soldiers.
The bureaucratic-polity model helps to explain the stability so far enjoyed by Suharto's New Order and leads to the expectation that the system will continue much as it is for some time to come. But the continuation of the bureaucratic polity rests upon two key assumptions: firstly, that the bureaucratic elite will remain ideologically homogeneous and that all factions will remain content with the system as it is; and secondly, that the non-elite will remain politically passive. While the concept of the bureaucratic polity provides us with a useful model to understand the politics of the New Order's first fifteen years, I am not, as will be discussed later, as convinced as Jackson is of its value in our efforts to foresee probable trends in the future.

Integration with World Capitalism

The view that the New Order regime will be able to continue in power for the foreseeable future is also generally supported by adherents of the radical, 'political-economy' approach to the politics of the Third World. For them, the dominant trend during the New Order period has been the re-integration of the Indonesian economy with world capitalism, especially through the large increase in foreign investment – mainly Japanese and American – that has taken place since 1967. The effect of this investment and related policies has been to destroy the small indigenous national bourgeoisie and block the possibility of such a bourgeoisie re-emerging in the future. Instead, domestic businessmen have aligned themselves with foreign capital either as partners in joint ventures or as managerial employees. There is thus no possibility of a significant national bourgeoisie class developing to oppose the dominant comprador class. Although personal and group rivalries within the dominant class might be intense, that class itself is fundamentally united so that the nature of the system cannot change. The only way basic change can take place, according to this view, is through a revolution of the workers and peasants but this is unlikely in the foreseeable future (see Mortimer 1973).

The radical view thus also tends to support the prediction that the present system will remain stable in the immediate future. But I feel it underestimates the possibility of significant change. While the radicals make the important point that whatever non-revolutionary change takes place must be within limits set by the nature of its integration with world capitalism, there still seems to be scope for the emergence of different types of regime. A regime can be more or less nationalist, more or less welfare-oriented and more or less repressive while still remaining part of the world capitalist system. Changes in the leadership need not simply be a matter of General X replacing General Y, but may involve important changes in policy and style of government.

The arguments outlined above have some force. They have the merit of helping to explain why stability was achieved during the last fifteen years despite contemporary expectations to the contrary and they also give grounds for believing that this stability is likely to continue. The case for the view that instability might re-emerge does not so much deny the strength of factors making for continuing stability but stresses other factors which might endanger that stability.
POTENTIAL SOURCES OF INSTABILITY

As noted above, the concept of bureaucratic polity rests on two assumptions that can be questioned in the Indonesian context: firstly, that the bureaucratic elite is united in general outlook; and secondly, that the masses are passive and therefore do not support alternative centres of power like political parties which can balance the power of the bureaucracy. The radical, political-economy approach also sees the ruling class as essentially united with the comprador component completely dominant over the national element while the masses, represented by the peasants and workers, are still not ready to revolt.

In seeking sources of instability we can look for (i) signs of conflict and disunity within the elite; (ii) signs of discontent outside the elite.

The Elite

It could be argued that a bureaucratic polity can last indefinitely. The elite is fundamentally united in outlook and in its desire to preserve the system. Competition is confined to the struggle for power within the system; no one wants to change it. At the same time the masses remain passive, at least as long as the elite can provide them with the bare minimum of basic necessities. The patrimonial states of the past, with similar structures, continued more or less unchanged in essentials for centuries. Why can't contemporary bureaucratic polities last for centuries too?

The basic problem for a contemporary bureaucratic polity is its need to meet rising material expectations at the elite, middle and mass levels. The legitimacy of a modern bureaucratic polity depends on its ability to promote economic development. The material aspirations of the elite are most easily met because its members are few. But there is increasing pressure to provide bigger material benefits for a widening circle of senior bureaucrats, military officers and political leaders whose cooperation the regime needs. Equally important is the growing 'middle class' of middle-level bureaucrats, managers, professionals, medium-scale businessmen and white-collar employees with their expectations of improving their own lot and providing better opportunities for their children. Finally, the masses themselves are not in fact isolated from the revolution of rising expectations so that more resources have to be set aside to alleviate discontents that might propel them into political activity. Repression has its place in maintaining a bureaucratic polity, but is unlikely to be effective in the long run in the absence of economic growth.

Can a bureaucratic polity in fact promote sustained economic development? In the early stages of development the patrimonial atmosphere of the bureaucratic polity need not be an obstacle to growth. Under patrimonial conditions investors, foreign and domestic, get the security they need by placing themselves under the protection of powerful patrons in the bureaucratic elite. This association increases the material resources at the disposal of the patron and thus further strengthens his political
position and his ability to protect the investor. The stronger the patron, the more secure the investment.

Ultimately however, as Max Weber pointed out, this type of structure is likely to hinder economic development because of the inherent incompatibility between the arbitrariness and unpredictability of patrimonial-style rule and the needs of industrial capitalism (see Weber 1968). In the early stages of industrial growth, when the number of big investors is small, the security needed by investors can be obtained through alliances with powerful patrons, but as the number of investors grows and the economy becomes increasingly complex, investors want more concrete guarantees than can be given by individuals, no matter how powerful, whose tenure of office need not be permanent and who, in a patronage-sellers' market, increasingly have an incentive to play investors off against each other. In the early phase of development security can be obtained through patrons, but eventually a stage is reached at which investors feel secure only when the conditions of their investment are guaranteed by consistently applied laws, rules and regulations.

The Indonesian economy is still largely under patrimonial domination. Virtually all major enterprises have alliances with military patrons, often in the form of joint ventures between foreign investors and Indonesian firms in which prominent military figures are associated with Chinese businessmen. While the foreigners and the Chinese supply capital and commercial expertise the military officers ensure favourable treatment at the hands of the bureaucracy. Under this system big profits can be made by investors who pick the right patron but the pervasive uncertainty makes rational calculation difficult and inhibits long-term investment, especially in manufacturing. Many investors complain that additional taxes, for example, are imposed by regional authorities which were not part of the original agreement signed in Jakarta. One case illustrating the uncertainty of the system is that of a Singapore company, Prima, which in the early 1970s had its plan to establish flour plants approved but at the last moment had to withdraw in favour of the newly-formed Bogasari flour company with which the President's wife and his business colleague, Liem Siu Liong, were associated. The rise and fall of patrons further complicates business decisions, as investors who had linked their fortunes with Ibnu Sutowo discovered after 1975. While some investors continue to invest their capital in alliance with military patrons, especially in industries like mining and oil, it could be argued that the system deters many other potential investors, especially in manufacturing, who, despite the lure of high profits in Indonesia, prefer to invest in places like Singapore and Malaysia where patrimonial pressures are either absent or not so strong. Indonesia's rapid economic growth during the New Order period has been heavily dependent on the oil boom rather than industrial development.

The domination of patrimonial features in the Indonesian politico-economic structure has not meant the complete absence of legal-rational elements, however. The generals who took over power in 1966 were conscious of their need for technocratic advisers to guide them through the economic chaos that they had inherited from the Guided Democracy period. The technocrats were needed to devise policies to overcome inflation, restore balance to the balance of payments, attract foreign investment and give
assurance to foreign governments that their loans were being properly used. Originally attached to General Suharto's private staff, the leading technocrats were later appointed as ministers in the cabinet, where most of them still serve. The technocrats, however, have had to propose policies in a patrimonial context. Major economic institutions such as the oil corporation, Pertamina, and the rice trading agency, BULOG, lay outside their control while technocratic guidelines for foreign investment were often ignored when the Indonesian partner in a project was associated with a powerful general. It would appear that the influence of the technocrats has grown during the 1970s in part because the increasing complexity of the economy has made them all the more needed. The falls of the heads of BULOG in 1973 and Pertamina in 1976 were not due directly to pressure from the technocrats but showed an awareness in the government that patrimonial excesses could do enormous harm to the economy and endanger the government's developmental objectives.

Pressure towards regularized, rule-based administration does not come from the civilian technocrats alone but appears to be supported by sections of the armed forces themselves. It is obviously dangerous to be dogmatic about the assumed attitudes of dissident military officers, especially those of the younger generation who are not in the habit of airing their discontents publicly. But there are signs that many younger officers - as well as some retired officers - are deeply concerned about the long-term legitimacy of military rule. Unlike the officers of the 1945 generation who won their spurs on the battlefield and were drawn from many social backgrounds, members of the new generation have mainly middle-class backgrounds, that is they are from families which could afford to give their sons a full secondary education and thus make them eligible for selection to the Military Academy. At the Academy they have received a professional military education and been indoctrinated in the formal values of the military leadership. While their middle-class backgrounds and military education might make them, as Sundhaus sen expects, disciplined professional soldiers whose respect for hierarchy would inhibit them from taking political action against their superiors, it seems equally possible that their very professionalism might become the source of their disillusionment with the present military elite which itself so conspicuously lacks the values that the Academy extols. It is quite likely that the majority of young officers do more or less conform to Sundhaus sen's picture; others, no doubt, are just waiting patiently for the day when they can get their hands on the booty after the passing of the present leaders; but it is also reasonable to believe that some will feel motivated by their professionalism to cleanse the army leadership of the men accused of giving it a bad name. Although ideology might play a part, the most important factor is the self-interest of this generation, some of whom can foresee that the condition of the nation will be parlous indeed by the time that they are ready to inherit power if reform measures are not carried out soon. Moreover, it is the field officers of the younger generation who have the distasteful duty of maintaining order when student demonstrations and urban riots break out as expressions of popular discontent with the regime. Although the patronage system remains strong, the influence of the reform-minded officers, from both the younger and older generations, is likely to grow, especially if the patrimonial character of the present leadership is seen to be an obstacle to economic development.
The growing contradiction between a patrimonial politico-economic structure and the need for rapid economic development in order to satisfy rising material expectations can be seen as a crucial source of factional conflict within the armed forces. Certainly the normal rivalry between 'ins' and 'outs' is always important as one group of generals tries to oust another group which is closer to the President's ear. But several of the crises that the New Order has faced could also be interpreted as attempts by reform-minded officers together with other dissidents to curb the powers of the leading patronymal dispensers of patronage and replace them with officers committed to a more regularized and bureaucratized form of administration. In most of these confrontations students were used as the shock-troops who in each case were sacrificed when the move failed. This pattern appeared initially in mid-1970 when student demonstrations and a newspaper campaign were directed against several generals such as Ibnu Sutowo, Suryo and Sujono Humardhani, all of whom were very close to the President. A similar combination of forces, this time clearly associated with General Sumitro, challenged the President's inner circle of advisers in late 1973, leading to the Malari rioting of January 1974. Again in late 1977 and early 1978 students, presumably with the backing of military dissidents, not only campaigned against the President's advisers but called on Suharto not to stand for re-election as President. The falls from office of leading patrimonial-type figures such as Generals Achmad Tirtosudiro in 1973 and Ibnu Sutowo in 1976 could also be seen against this background.

The argument of this section, then, is that the struggle between elements of the military-bureaucratic elite probably involves more than the straightforward factional rivalries envisaged in the bureaucratic-polity model. To some extent the struggle between elite groups in Indonesia appears to involve contrasting perceptions of how the government should behave and the objectives that it should pursue. While patrimonial struggles for power can usually be settled through compromise and the compensation of losers, conflicts which involve contrasting perceptions of what the government should be doing are more difficult to resolve. If this argument contains some truth, we can expect increasingly sharp conflict within the military elite, especially if investment fails to grow at a rate sufficiently fast to meet elite and middle-class expectations for rapid economic growth.

The Non-elite

A key assumption of the bureaucratic-polity model is that the non-elite - the middle class and the masses – will accept their political powerlessness and remain passive. After the political mobilization and upheaval of Indonesia's first two decades after 1945, the New Order government set out on a programme of depoliticization in which the political parties were gradually emasculated, the bureaucracy cleansed of political affiliations, and the villages largely isolated from political activity. This programme has succeeded in curtailing the activities of formal political organizations, but whether it has eradicated the urge to participate in politics is another matter. By suppressing the formal channels of political communication the government may only have succeeded
There seems to be no prospect of revolutionary change in the foreseeable future, however. Even the PKI during its heyday was not a revolutionary party but one which tried to mobilize one part of the Javanese peasantry in defence of its interests within the existing order; indeed, one of the reasons for the quick decimation of the PKI in 1965 was the party's lack of revolutionary capacity. That part of the Javanese peasantry which formed the mass base of the PKI before 1965 is still as poor as it was then, but poverty alone does not lead to revolutionary activity. The poor are usually too dependent on better-off patrons to be attracted to revolutionary movements directed against the interests of these patrons; in most cases of peasant revolution it has been the middle peasants rather than the very poor who have provided the key base of support for the movement (see Wolf 1971). In Java, however, it is the small landholders who, among the rural classes, seem to have gained most from the Green Revolution and commercialization of agriculture. This is not to deny that there are signs of potential tension in rural Javanese society. It is now common for observers to visit Javanese villages and note signs of progress such as increased numbers of bicycles and motor cycles, and even the presence of a few cars; the political significance of these changes, however, might lie more in the fact that they indicate a sudden and very visible widening of the gap between rich and poor at the village level in a society which in the past was not marked by the sharp contrasts found in, for example, the Philippines and Vietnam. Increasing stratification is likely to have political consequences, especially in the context of Professor Sumitro's scenario of the gradual urbanization of rural Java; by the year 2000, he calculates, the population density of the entire island of Java will be greater than that of any West European city today (Djojohadikusumo 1976, p. 163).

If history is a guide, revolutionary opposition to the government is more likely to come from Islamic movements outside Java than from revived communism in Java. While the PKI struggled to win constitutional respectability during the parliamentary and Guided Democracy periods, Muslims revolted in several regions, such as West Java, Aceh, and South Sulawesi, and Muslim support was an important element in the PRRI revolt of 1956-58. Although there are no signs at present that a Muslim regional revolt is likely - despite some unrest in Aceh - the possibility cannot be dismissed completely, especially if developments in Jakarta were to lead to a weakening of the authority of the central government. In the meantime, Islam has become the main rallying point for constitutional opposition to the government. After their high hopes of playing a major role in the post-1965 government had been disappointed, the Muslim leaders felt themselves increasingly pushed into a corner by the military leaders. Although the role of the political parties has been sharply curtailed during the New Order period, the Muslim group has been able to maintain contact with its supporters through the mosques and religious schools, with the result that it has fared much better electorally than the secular party formed by the merger of the old nationalist and Christian parties. In 1977 the Muslim party won nearly 30 per cent of the votes, with majorities in several provinces. The most serious threat posed by Islam
to the government, however, does not lie in the remote possibility of the Muslim party eventually winning an electoral majority, but in the capacity of religious leaders to mobilize mass agitation on particular issues. The most notable case in the 1970s was the campaign against the proposed marriage law in 1973 which eventually forced the government to make substantial amendments. Indeed, two senior political figures in Jakarta believed that the government would have fallen if it had not compromised with the Muslims a few weeks before the January 1974 rioting.

It is the possibility of a repeat of what happened in 1974 that worries the military leadership most. An important element in the background to that riot was the growth of general middle-class disaffection. The urban middle class has certainly been the major non-elite beneficiary of the New Order's economic policies. Civil servants' salaries have increased sharply and lucrative new employment opportunities have opened up with foreign enterprises. But it is precisely members of this class who are most alienated by restrictions on political freedom, large-scale corruption which gives the government such a bad image, small-scale corruption which affects them directly, and the general sense that the system is geared primarily to serve the interests of those at the top. It is this class too which would react very quickly to any slow-down in economic expansion. While middle-class parents often feel alienated from the regime, their sons and daughters in the universities from time to time burst out into the streets following the tradition established in 1966. And when students demonstrate on a large scale, there is always the possibility that the urban poor - the unemployed and semi-employed people of the urban kampung - will join them, following the pattern of the 1974 riot in Jakarta and creating conditions in which a coup attempt would be possible.

CONCLUSION

The fragile legitimacy of the regime makes it vulnerable to dissident groups within the armed forces who are ready to exploit Muslim, student or other agitation for their own purposes. On the one hand military discipline and the bonds of patronage stand in the way of a successful coup attempt; on the other, we have to take into account the probability that more and more officers are being convinced that the regime needs to be reformed, and that, as members of the middle class themselves, they increasingly reflect the alienation felt by many members of that class. In the past, student demonstrators have been encouraged by military dissidents to spearhead opposition to the regime, and there is every possibility that they will be used again.

In the event of a major change in government taking place, what could be expected? It is of course possible that the new government would be much the same as the old one, but with new faces. On the other hand, it seems possible also that a new military government might be more technocratic in outlook, more concerned with administrative regularization, perhaps more interested in alleviating social conditions for particular sections of the poor, and possibly more nationalist. It might also be more repressive. The main aim of such a government would be to carry out reforms in order to strengthen the viability of the existing social order. As the political-economy writers remind us, the extent of integration of
the Indonesian economy with international capitalism is such that it would be difficult for a new regime to adopt a radically nationalist stance, while the middle class origins and self-identification of the officer corps would inhibit a new government from taking measures in favour of mass interests at the expense of the middle class.

NOTES

1 The following argument is based in part on Crouch 1979.

2 The dismal progress and prospects of industrialization are discussed in McCawley 1978.

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INTEGRATING AND CENTRIFUGAL FACTORS IN INDONESIAN POLITICS SINCE 1945

J.A.C. Mackie

'... Archipelagic in geography, eclectic in civilization and heterogeneous in culture, Indonesia flourishes when it accepts and capitalizes on its diversity and disintegrates when it denies and suppresses it ...' (Clifford Geertz).

One of the most striking but least well understood features of Indonesian political life during the last thirty-five years has been the apparent transformation of the relative strengths of the disintegrative and centralizing tendencies at work there. The new Republic was plagued throughout the first fifteen years of its existence by problems arising out of sporadic regional dissidence, demands for greater local autonomy and the centrifugal pulls of an economic system which the Jakarta government appeared quite unable to control. These problems seemed to pose a serious threat to the precarious unity of the nation in its early years, culminating in the 1956-58 regional revolts in Sumatra and Sulawesi, when an overt challenge to the authority and effective power of the central government was launched in those provinces (Feith 1962; Mossman 1961). The rebellions were easily crushed, however, and with the advantages of hindsight we can now see that the victory of the central government on that occasion marked an important turning point.

Ever since then the power of the central government has been paramount; regional dissidence has been muted and the continued existence of regionalist sentiment almost tends to be forgotten by outsiders. Moreover, the patrimonial character of the political system, marked by the overwhelming dominance of the central government in the control of financial resources, coupled with a top-downwards flow of funds and decision-making power, has become increasingly apparent since the 1973-74 oil price rises. The main purpose of this paper is to examine the extent and causes of this transformation by trying to identify the nature of the various factors involved in it.

Throughout the last decade the power of the central government in Indonesia has been so preponderant that foreigners often find it hard to comprehend why the nation's leaders still seem so nervous about potential threats to their country's unity. One of the reasons most commonly given for Indonesia's unwillingness to tolerate an independent East Timor, for instance, was the fear that secessionist tendencies might then develop elsewhere in the eastern islands of the archipelago, especially if it became known that the Jakarta government could be defied with impunity. Whether or not that argument was valid is beside the point; it is the touchiness of Indonesian leaders on this score that is significant. Certainly it would be premature to assume that Indonesia's national unity can be taken for granted as something now settled and beyond question, in view of such self-evident facts as the nation's archipelagic character, its ethnic and cultural heterogeneity, ramshackle transport system and still rudimentary administrative structures. And because Indonesia's territorial boundaries were determined by the Dutch through the historical accidents of their dealings with the British, Portuguese, Spaniards and others during the colonial era, it has often been asserted that the new nation is a factitious, even unnatural, entity, therefore intrinsically fissiparous and fragile.
The same has been said, of course, about many of the new nations that have arisen out of former colonial territories which were not coterminous with previously existing political units. It may indeed happen that as the forces of change released by the process of decolonization continue to unfold, various colonial boundaries will at some future date be called into question - as, indeed, the boundary with Portuguese Timor has already been. But I do not anticipate that Indonesia will disintegrate just for this reason. Few of the new nations of Asia or Africa have been eager to upset the boundaries they inherited from their colonial masters, not least because the very sense of nationalism which lay behind their drive for independence was itself defined mainly by reference to the territorial unit that had been created in colonial times. Modern India does not conform to the empire of the Moguls or that of Asoka, nor China to that of the Tang or Ming dynasties. And while Indonesians have claimed that the fourteenth century kingdom of Majapahit was a forerunner of the present-day Republic in some sense, neither the boundaries nor the political structures of the two entities were identical. The raison d'être of the latter owes little to the former, except as an exemplar of former greatness. The sense of nationalism and pride in a glorious past which, I would argue, has been one of the important factors helping to bind the Indonesians together as a united people has, indeed, been nourished by the historians' reemphasizing of Majapahit and the other early empires of the archipelago. But it has also been nourished by other elements, notably the widespread adoption of Islam, the spread of bahasa Indonesia as the national language and the diffuse sense of being racially akin to each other as bangsa Indonesia. We will need to examine the scope and limitations of these factors in the nation-building process later. But contrary to the argument that modern Indonesia has no real roots in either historic unity or shared traditions, customs and values, one could equally well formulate a case that the new nation-state represents the latest and strongest in a long historical series of political or socio-cultural entities that have exercised a substantial degree of paramountcy over much of the archipelago (Srivijaya, Majapahit, Mataram etc.). The historical roots of the new nation go a good deal deeper than is implied by the assertion that modern Indonesia is just a creation of Dutch colonial rule or a manifestation of Javanese hegemony over the rest of the archipelago.

Previous writings on various aspects of the process of national integration or central-regional relations in Indonesia have thrown valuable light on some of the problems involved here, but none gives an entirely satisfactory survey of their relevance to the present-day state of affairs. In a set of papers on 'Regional, ethnic and national loyalties in village Indonesia' which he edited in 1959, G.W. Skinner observed that 'most of the traditional loyalties are related to the kinship structure, religious organizations, or the civil-adat administrative hierarchy' - virtually, to what Clifford Geertz later categorized as 'primordial ties', that is kinship, ethnicity, language and religion (Skinner 1959; Geertz 1963). There was little sense of a broader regional identity, he argued, and even less self-identification with the more remote and abstract nation-state. It would be hard to gauge how much the perceptions and attitudes of village Indonesians have changed since then. But I would guess that among the urbanized elites, even in the more remote Outer Islands, the twin processes of education and political socialization have created a much stronger sense of Indonesian-ness. Fifteen years after Skinner's articles, however, a leading Indonesian social scientist, Professor Harsja Bachtiar, still felt it necessary to warn us
against overestimating the extent to which the nation-building process has yet proceeded, insofar as it entails self-identification of individuals with the national community (Bachtiar 1974). Among the various 'old nations' or 'ethnic societal groups', as he calls them (e.g. Acehnese, Minangkabau, Balinese, Buginese etc.), the sense of primary identification as members of these groups has by no means been displaced by a new sense of Indonesian-ness, although the vast majority of inhabitants of this archipelago probably do think of themselves as members of both categories. The problems known variously as 'regionalism', 'provincialism', 'daerahism' or 'sukuism' arise, he observes, when local loyalties come into conflict with the claims of the nation-state.

The phenomenon of regionalism has been analysed by several writers. Nawawi (1969) seeks to identify its causes in the character of regional elites, relating the latter to the degree of ossification and stagnation they suffered during the colonial era. Liddle (1970), in a study of regional politics among the Simelungan Bataks has given us a very detailed account of the ways in which primordial sentiments (in particular, Outer Islands' antagonisms towards Java) became intermeshed with both local and national politics in the ideologically polarized circumstances of Guided Democracy. Barbara Harvey's (1974) admirable studies of the Kahar Muzakkar and Permesta revolts in Sulawesi in the 1950s and Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin's (1975) careful account of the Darul Islam rebellion in Aceh under Daud Beureueh (1953-61) give us excellent case studies of the diverse causes of regional discontent with the national government, deriving from elite rivalries and the problems of mobilizing or maintaining followers in their struggles; both are dealing with avowedly Islamic movements, but reveal the significance of non-religious factors also. Legge's (1961) standard work on Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia, written against the backdrop of the PRRI-Permesta rebellion in 1958-59, although now somewhat outdated, also throws a good deal of light on the way regional hostility to central government policies had become intermeshed with debates about how the system of regional government should best be reorganized to provide a greater degree of local autonomy.

My own approach to the problem will be a combination of the analytical (identification of the major centrifugal and centripetal forces that have had a bearing on Indonesia's national unity) and the historical. By starting with three 'snapshot' pictures of the state of relations between the central government and the regions (pusat and daerah, in the common parlance) at different points of time, the main elements I want to highlight can be summarized fairly briefly.

The first of these depicts the early post-independence period, around 1952-53, when central authority still seemed to be very shaky, regionalist or suku ('ethnic group') sentiments were still very powerful and national unity was rather precariously maintained. The second reveals how greatly the situation had changed by the end of the Soekarno era, 1964-65, after all the regionalist challenges to the central government had been crushed. Jakarta's authority then seemed unchallengeable, at least so long as the armed forces were solidly behind the government, and the intensely nationalist ideology of President Soekarno seemed to be a potent unifying force, although the outward facade of national unity did not entirely hide the deep-seated strains on the political system which had both ideological and regional ('Java versus the Outer Islands') dimensions (Liddle 1970). A third snapshot of Indonesia in
1974-75 shows yet another radically different picture of central-regional relations. Powerful centralizing and integrating forces were now at work, for the central government had command of vastly greater resources, financial, administrative and logistical, than ever before. President Suharto had tightened his control over the armed forces to a degree which had earlier seemed barely conceivable. Regional 'war-lords' were a thing of the past (McVey 1971-72; Sundhaussen 1978). A new law on regional government was steamrollered through the parliament in 1974, amounting to a virtual abolition of any real local autonomy for regional assemblies or regional authorities. And yet nagging doubts persisted, even then, about the real strength of the edifice behind this new facade. Would it be able to survive unexpected shocks to the political system, or was it inherently fragile and brittle?

That is the essential question we will need to analyse in the concluding section on centrifugal and integrating factors. Meanwhile let us examine the changing pattern of forces revealed by our three snapshots.

1952-53

During the early years of Indonesian independence, the Jakarta government was confronted by a series of challenges to its authority which all had their roots in the fact that its writ simply did not run in many parts of the country (Feith 1962; Nawawi 1969). Indonesia was not yet united either by consensus on political and social goals or by the central government's capacity to impose its will on dissentients. In the South Moluccas, the least serious of the regional revolts, the resistance was led by pro-federalist elements who had never been reconciled to the dismantling of the Dutch-sponsored federal state in 1950: the government eventually stamped out this revolt by force, although it took some time to do so. In West Java, a Darul Islam insurgency had been dragging on since 1948-49, as much an expression of regional and social discontent as a strictly Islamic movement; but the government and the army seemed powerless to do more than contain it until its leader was finally killed in 1962. In Aceh, a serious regional revolt broke out in September 1953, which combined a very strong Islamic colouring with smouldering regional discontent which arose from both political and economic causes. In South Sulawesi a low-level but troublesome rebellion led by Kahar Muzakkar, a former guerrilla leader in the revolution, broke out in 1951 under the banner of Darul Islam and continued until 1964. But its religious character was relatively unimportant and the deeper causes of the movement were social and political, reflecting acute regional discontent in many forms.

The causes of regional discontent in Aceh and South Sulawesi have been analysed well in two recent studies (Sjamsuddin 1979; Harvey 1974). In both cases a crucial factor was that the new Jakarta government created a lot of antagonism in its early years by appointing outsiders to influential positions there over the heads of anak daerah, local men, who were deemed to have inadequate educational qualifications or bureaucratic seniority, although their revolutionary records were in their eyes sufficient to qualify them for higher ranks in the bureaucracy or army. It was only when the army leaders and politicians later abandoned the attempt to impose uniform universalist criteria throughout the entire country in matters of appointments and promotions and began instead to deal with each province on a case-by-case basis that they were able to mollify the anak daerah and win over at least a part of the local elite to Jakarta's side. An intriguing feature of the
politics of both rebellions was the interplay of local-level and national-level political jockeying which was at least as important as the straightforward tug-of-war between the regional governments. Underlying the conflict in South Sulawesi, for example, was an intra-elite rivalry between the Jakarta-oriented men with pro-Republican records in the struggle for independence, some education and a capacity to deal with the new, modernized national political and bureaucratic apparatus (most of them Christian Minahasans who had found jobs in Makassar under the Dutch) and the local men who had little western-style education and hence poor job prospects in the new society that was being created. This rivalry became entangled with the Permesta regional revolt of 1957-58 in a very complex way because of the internal army politics involved, but that story cannot be adequately summarized here. Both groups were essentially trying to exert pressure on the Jakarta political scene in the hope of bringing to power there the groups who were most likely to be sympathetic to their demands. They were not 'secessionist' in a crude sense and their demands for greater autonomy were not at all carefully formulated, but the political crisis they generated in 1957-58 posed a real threat to Indonesia's national unity. In the Acehnese case, the objectives of the rebels were more concrete: they wanted separate provincial status (later conceded), the right of 'barter trade' with Penang (also conceded) and a greater degree of autonomy. The religious factor was undoubtedly more important in Aceh, but by no means a sole explanation.

Why could the pusat not simply crush these rebellions by force majeure? One reason was that the various governments of that time were loose and precarious coalitions with rather shaky authority, always susceptible to pressures from their constituent parties, including some which were sympathetic to the rebels. Another was that the army was logistically weak and politically divided by many of the same cleavages as the society at large, ethnic and regional loyalties, ex-guerrilla versus 'professional' orientations, 'bapak relationships' (mutual loyalties between leaders and followers of former irregular forces) etc. Several regional commanders were anak daerah who identified more strongly with their regions than with the central army leadership - and in some cases became heavily involved in smuggling ('barter trade' was the euphemism), allegedly to promote regional interests at a time when inadequate central government funds were forthcoming.

'Barter trading' increased greatly in the years after 1953, at a time when inflation and the depreciating value of the rupiah were creating economic difficulties, all of which aggravated the regional unrest which culminated in the much more serious regional rebellions of 1957-58, the PRRI-Permesta revolt. Regional discontent and demands for greater local autonomy played a central part in these also, but there was an important difference in that this whole episode was intermeshed with a complex governmental crisis in the national parliament and government, a veritable regime crisis, in fact, which marked the collapse of parliamentary democracy (Peith 1962), questions about the army leadership were also in dispute. I will not elaborate on the episode in detail, but merely observe that an important causal factor was the widespread belief at that time that the central government had lost both its moral authority and any capacity to restore control over the economy or to prevent the dissident regional officials from condoning barter trade. The government seemed to have no further instruments at its disposal except the ultimate resort to force - and the disunity of the armed forces was widely thought to have made that too perilous a gamble to attempt. What the regional
dissidents were trying to do was not to secede (they always denied that) but to bring about the collapse of a government they disliked in the hope of imposing one they favoured. They were confident that in the last resort they had the strongest cards in their hand, because it was in the Outer Islands that by far the largest part of the country's foreign-exchange-earning export commodities were produced. In this belief they were wrong - and when their bluff was called they collapsed.

1964-65

By this time, the relationship between the regions and the central government had changed radically in several respects. The PRRI-Permesta regionalist challenge of 1957-58 had brought to a head the national political crisis (resulting in the collapse of the parliamentary system and its replacement by the 1945 presidential constitution) which led to a shift in the power balance to the disadvantage of the two main pro-regionalist parties, which were banned by Soekarno in 1960. The army had at least shown that the central government could assert its will over rebellious provinces if it had to do so. By 1962 the Darul Islam rebellions in Aceh and West Java were also defeated and in 1964 South Sulawesi was completely pacified. The political system which took shape after 1958 under the rubric of Guided Democracy centralized power strongly in the hands of the President. No elections were held in this period, so the political parties which were allowed to survive had neither reason nor opportunity to mobilize grass-roots support by fanning regionalist grievances, as in the mid-1950s.

It could hardly be denied that the sheer power of the army was the key factor in this centralizing process. Regional discontent did not disappear; if anything, its economic causes became intensified as inflation worsened and smuggling increased. But defiance of Jakarta was no longer feasible. Nor was it politically imperative, for the anti-communist forces which had been opposed to Soekarno and the Java-based parties supporting him before 1958 now tended to look towards the anti-communist army leadership for political protection in the triangular power relationship between President, PKI and army that came to dominate the scene between 1959-65 (Feith 1963). A politics of manipulation and compromise replaced the earlier confrontational pattern of politics. But the limitations on the army's political and military power at that time should not be forgotten. There was much it could not do. It still had great difficulty in just crushing by force the rebellions in Aceh and South Sulawesi, which it preferred to settle by negotiations. And while it made great progress in the years 1957-65 towards overcoming the earlier ethnic and regional cleavages within its own ranks which had so plagued it - by mixing up units to some extent, giving the officer corps a more national outlook through geographical rotation and training courses and yet at the same time deferring to local sentiments in the appointment of regional commanders - it was not yet a tightly-knit structure by any means (McVey 1971-72; Sundhaussen 1978). Most units tended to identify closely with the regions they were drawn from, particularly as the regional commanders inevitably found themselves playing important political roles there also.

Many other factors also played a part in the centralization of power that occurred in the years before 1965 - Soekarno's manipulative skills and charismatic appeal, the stress on nationalist symbols, ideology, national
unity and on the importance of consensus rather than competitive politics, the top-down rather than bottom-up thrust of the new political system, the strait-jacketing of political parties, in fact almost all aspects of the Guided Democracy system. But looking at the other side of the coin, we also see that the facade of increasing centralization of power was still more than somewhat illusory in 1964-65. As economic conditions deteriorated, the central government became increasingly unable to provide financial resources to the regional authorities or wield effective sanctions over them, with the result that they tended to go their own way in either 'bending' or disregarding central government regulations. A system which some observers characterized as 'de facto federalism' came to apply, in which the central government's capacity to implement its policies in the daerah largely depended on a process of virtual bargaining with the local authorities. It was far from being a system of autonomy or decentralization in any real sense, but it was a very ramshackle framework of central authority. The main cause of this was the rapid decline in the real value of central government subsidies to the regional governments, on which they depended heavily simply to carry out the most minimal functions; almost 90 per cent of provincial revenues came from this source and usually about 60 per cent or more of kabupaten revenues, for the official division of tax powers left them virtually no fields of taxation capable of yielding substantial revenues. They therefore encroached into all sorts of unofficial levies on local trade, particularly on exports and imports by condoning smuggling. This undermined the central government's major tax base and further reduced its capacity to subsidize the regions. At the same time the uniformity of the administrative system was crumbling and being replaced by a series of ad hoc political accommodations between the central and regional authorities, with the former turning a blind eye to much of what the latter were doing, since there was nothing else that either could do to remedy the situation. If this state of affairs had continued for long, it must undoubtedly have meant the gradual disintegration of many of the more basic integrating ties linking the various daerah together, such as the trading and financial network, the commercial and administrative orientation towards Jakarta and so on.

This process of attrition had not reached a critical point, however, before the October 1965 coup and Soekarno's downfall. But the political crisis of 1965-66 itself created a real danger that Indonesia's national unity might crack under the socio-political strains of those years. In fact even before the coup, when the PKI seemed to be gaining strength so rapidly that a communist-dominated government in Jakarta seemed quite conceivable, it was commonly said that this would immediately precipitate a repudiation of Jakarta's authority by the anti-communist Outer Island military commanders. After the coup, when it was uncertain for many months whether Lt. Gen. Suharto could prevent an outbreak of civil war in Java or assert his new authority at all forcefully over regional military commanders opposed to his policies, the basic weaknesses of the central government were highlighted more clearly than ever. Suharto's own political position was initially very shaky and it took him nearly four years before he could confidently override challenges to his authority (Crouch 1978). The political system was still marked by a series of bargaining relationships, accommodations and compromises between the central and regional authorities. Throughout 1967-68 Suharto frequently had to issue orders (which were often disregarded with impunity) barring the latter from
levying unauthorized local trade taxes which were obstructing the free flow of goods upon which his new economic strategy depended. As Suharto's position gradually strengthened, an inexorable trend towards a recentralization of power set in. It was accentuated by the fact that the financial resources becoming available to the Jakarta authorities after 1968 from foreign aid and oil revenues gave them a powerful instrument with which to buy the obedience of the regional governments, which were ultimately too dependent on central subsidies to go their own way indefinitely.

1974-75

By this time, the power of the central government was vastly greater than it had ever been before. Various trends within the political and economic systems were operating to strengthen the hand of the centre vis-à-vis the regional authorities, both civil and military - above all, the vastly greater financial resources Jakarta now had at its disposal from foreign aid, oil revenues and foreign investment sources. No longer was it necessary for Jakarta to syphon off tax revenues from the regions into the national treasury to anything like the same extent as in the past. If anything the flow of funds was, for the most part, in the other direction (apart from oil revenues, which almost all governments treat as a national rather than provincial resource).

It could, in fact, be argued that the pendulum has swung too far in the direction of an overcentralization of power, that what Indonesia needs now is more effective decentralization of decision-making authority and initiative to local bodies, which ought themselves to be more representative of local opinions and interests, as Nawawi urges in the next paper, not left utterly dependent on the central government's administrative apparatus, as at present. But there is no possibility that daerah politicians can achieve this unilaterally by stirring up regionalist sentiment as a basis for mass support as their predecessors tried to do in the 1950s. In fact, provincial governors stand a better chance of getting additional financial resources and development projects for their regions these days by co-operating with the central government and learning how best to manipulate the Jakarta political system from within, not by confronting it head-on. More important is the fact that the general improvement of the economic situation has reduced the intensity of regional discontent well below earlier levels. So there has been little sense or urgency to overturn the whole system of government in order to prevent further economic deterioration, as there used to be. Plenty of grumbling can still be heard in the daerah, of course, about Jakarta's alleged neglect or unconcern or about the inequitable distribution of funds and development projects as between regions. (For instance, Acehnese complain that the Arun natural gas field is yielding little immediate benefit to their province because Jakarta syphons off all the revenue and returns almost none of it to them.) But such grumbling about neglect is very different from earlier charges that the daerah were being positively exploited by Java through the workings of the multiple exchange rate system. To this extent the change in 1968-71 to a unified exchange rate and the elimination of the foreign exchange black market, which had hitherto seemed to be the most glaring manifestation of the Outer Islands' exploitation, has had considerable political significance. Smuggling of export products is no longer necessary or profitable, while the smuggling of imported goods
is now a matter of only secondary concern, not a threat to the viability of
the country's economic structure, as it was becoming in the 1960s.

Several other changes which have greatly enhanced the central government's capacity to exercise control over the regions since about 1970 may be summarized briefly.

- The tightening of central authority within the army through the 1969-70 reforms of the command structure and territorial organization has almost eliminated any possibility that regional commanders can aspire to warlord roles as some did in the 1950s.

- The process of depoliticization since 1969-71 has had the effect of frustrating local politicians in any attempts to stir up mass grievances against the central government. Political activity has largely been confined to the bureaucratic sphere, where tendencies towards dissidence or defiance are easily curbed — in sharp contrast to the 'liberal' parliamentary system of the 1950s and Soekarno's Guided Democracy, in which political parties were still able to engage in mobilization politics.

- Such limited political activity as is now permitted amongst the masses is now structured in such a way that the old Java-Outer Islands dichotomy of the Soekarno era has become blurred almost to the point of elimination as a political issue. Paradoxically, the 'government party', Golkar, attracts greater support in the Outer Islands than in Java, with a few exceptions; its support tends to be greatest in the more isolated areas. Conversely, the two parties which function as channels of opposition sentiment are strongest in Java, a curious reversal of the earlier position.

- The improvement of the inter-island shipping and airline services since 1967 as well as the telecommunications, commercial and banking networks generally, has also been another integrating factor of great importance in recent years, for their deterioration during the previous decade had threatened to undermine one of the major pillars of national unity.

On the negative side of the ledger, one could also identify a number of unfavourable factors. President Suharto has not been able to provide the sort of inspiring symbols and rituals of nationalism which Soekarno conjured up so prolifically as a nation-building device. The heavy hand of the Ministry of the Interior over the last decade may also have been counterproductive in some respects, generating much resentment against overcentralization. The fact that the appointment process for governors and bupati leaves little scope for regional councils to exercise any real influence in the matter if they disagree with the government can only have an unhealthy effect on the local government system and seriously reduce regional autonomy.
We can readily identify a number of factors which have created pulls in either centrifugal or integrative directions from time to time throughout recent decades. The main point to be noticed about these is that for analytical purposes they do not always operate as unambiguously in one direction as we might suppose. In fact they are themselves question-begging concepts, bringing to light new analytical problems even as they help to clarify old ones. Some of them exert an influence almost imperceptibly and over a long time span, changing only slowly and gradually; others are historically determined and subject to rapid changes in their intensity and impact. The list below is by no means exhaustive. It covers only the most basic and obvious factors that must be taken into account. But there are also many intangible considerations which have had an important influence one way or the other at various times and would deserve closer attention in any treatment of particular cases of central-regional conflict or tensions.

CENTRIFUGAL FACTORS

Geographical fragmentation.

The political and economic implications of being an archipelagic nation-state with four major islands and dozens of smaller ones largely dependent on sea and air transportation links are obvious. But Japan and the Philippines also share this problem: how critical a factor is this in impeding national unity?

Ethnic heterogeneity

This factor is related to linguistic and cultural differences which have their roots far back in the past, aggravated in some degree by geographical fragmentation and usually overlapping with other dimensions of diversity in matters such as agricultural practices, ecological conditions, economic and social structures etc. The Java-Outer Islands polarity is the most striking manifestation of this type of cleavage, but as there are many crosscutting sub-cleavages which blur the sharpness of that polarity, we should not overemphasize it.

The lack of earlier historical integration

Except insofar as Islam, the trading networks and some degree of common exposure to the pressures of foreign powers had exerted a culturally integrating influence to some extent prior to the nineteenth century, there was no real tradition of 'national unity' throughout the archipelago, no concept of it as a 'nation', nor even a more appropriate word for it than bangsa or kebangsaan, neither of which is entirely satisfactory in its essentially racial connotations. This lack of any prior tradition of nationhood was a consideration that seemed more important in the earlier years of the spread of the national idea, however, than it does after thirty-five years of independence.

Divergent economic interests

It is well-known that the export-oriented outer provinces were severely disadvantaged in the early years of independence by policies which created
overvalued exchange rates, protective tariffs, high taxes etc., while the net importing provinces on Java have benefitted therefrom. The significant point to notice about this factor is that these 'interests' are not absolute and immutable. It is the subjective perceptions of what these interests are (or are thought to be) that makes them politically salient, not the mere fact that different parts of the country have different sectional interests. Most countries, after all, experience similar problems in greater or lesser degree and in Indonesia their significance has waxed and waned considerably over the last thirty years.

Vested interests of some regional elites

Inevitably, the former rulers of 'self-governing' areas (swapraja, mostly in the eastern islands) have striven to minimize the degree of central control over their traditional authority, even today when many of them have been absorbed into the pamong praja as bupati or lower officials. This is no longer a very important centrifugal factor, though in the 1950s it probably contributed significantly towards resistance to the central government.

INTEGRATING FACTORS

Race, religion and language

A common language, a near-common religion (close to 90 per cent of the Indonesian population being at least nominally Muslim, although the intensity of their adherence to that faith differs a good deal) and a high degree of racial homogeneity - these three factors are normally given pride of place as key elements in the nation-building process. It cannot be denied that the spread of bahasa Indonesia between 1928 and about 1945 had an enormously significant impact, at least among the educated elite, in helping to prevent the development of separatist movements based on linguistic or ethnic affiliations. But is is easy to over stress both the extent of usage of bahasa Indonesia (for in some areas, even in Java, the regional language is far more dominant, especially where the inadequacies of the educational system have limited the spread of the national language) and its influence as an integrating force. It has waxed and waned in significance over the last fifty years, so it should not be regarded as simply an immutable 'given' in the equation. Nor should the role of Islam, which has had a divisive as well as a unifying effect. The significance of the ethnic factor also cuts both ways, integrative vis-à-vis outsiders (and ethnic Chinese, whether Indonesian citizens or aliens) but divisive insofar as it brings suku differences to the fore. In short, while these factors are undoubtedly important in creating a sense of national consciousness, it should not be assumed that they tell the whole story about its emergence.

The power of the central government

The steadily increasing strength of the national government, its coercive and persuasive potentialities, the administrative machinery (and the legitimacy attaching to control thereof) inherited from the Dutch colonial regime which created it - all these represent powerful unifying factors which have gradually triumphed over the power structures which had survived in the Outer Islands in the form of vestiges of earlier kingdoms and principalities. Likewise a common legal system, common currency, the nationwide network of the
old pamong praja structure of local administration and the ultima ratio represented by the military might of the nation's armed forces all need to be taken into account as factors which have contributed greatly to the inexorable consolidation of a national political system and the demise of former local entities. The armed forces have also served as a national 'melting pot' for a crucially influential part of Indonesia's new elite. Yet the armed forces themselves were subject in the early years of independence to many of the ethnic, religious and ideological cleavages which then plagued the country at large. The story of their consolidation and emergence as a powerful integrating force in the political system has been a complex one, as we have seen briefly above. But the same can be said of all the other factors mentioned here, whose influence has varied in different times and circumstances.

Commercial, financial and transportation networks

This factor deserves more attention than it is usually given because it played a crucial part in binding the archipelago together during the formative decades 1890-1941, when the KPM shipping line and the Dutch banks exerted a major influence in deflecting Outer Islands trade away from Singapore towards Batavia/Jakarta. With the nationalization of KPM in 1957 and the economic decline of the 1960s, this network deteriorated seriously, thus giving rise to extensive 'barter trade' directly with the outside world, a process which seriously endangered Indonesia's national unity until it came to be gradually reversed in the 1970s, as inter-island transport and communications were steadily improved (Dick 1977).

Nationalism

The sense of nationalism and the legitimacy attaching to the nationalist credentials of political leaders of the 1945 generation have been influential in many ways, of which only a few can be mentioned here. Nationalist sentiment created loyalties to national symbols and goals at the expense of regional or suku ties, initially for the sake of unity to defeat Dutch attempts to split the pro-independence movement, later to defeat the federalists and, in the Guided Democracy period to conjure up anew the revolutionary spirit of 1945. The sense of nationalist solidarity was particularly important amongst the educated elite in the post-independence decades; many of its members had shared their schooling and formative years in politics together in the handful of secondary and tertiary institutions open to them in the period 1910-50, when something of a national 'melting pot' effect occurred, giving them much broader political horizons than hitherto. There was also a good deal of ethnic intermarriage within that elite. Insofar as rival regional elites capable of resisting the claims of the national leaders survived after 1945, their legitimacy was undermined by the fact that they could be branded as either 'feudal' or federalist or both. Ever since 1950, the tendency for children of prominent regional families to look towards Jakarta, Bandung or Jogja for their higher education has had the effect of reinforcing this nationalist elite and stunting the growth of regional elites. Whether this will continue to be the case for future generations is, however, far from certain.
The operation of the educational system

The astonishing spread of Indonesian language schooling has surely been one of the most influential forces moulding a sense of nationhood and inculcating a national outlook since 1945 (Beeby 1979). It has also contributed greatly to the spread of bahasa Indonesia and of awareness of the nation's history and culture as well as to some sense of Indonesia's place in a wider world. Much more could be said on this score, but it is hardly necessary to go into the matter in detail. One point which is of interest is that some Indonesian educationists were becoming worried around 1970 that the deterioration of the primary school system in many rural areas appeared to have resulted in a decline in ability to converse in Indonesian and a resurgence in use of local languages for teaching purposes. If such a tendency went too far, it could indeed have a most adverse effect on national integration. Fortunately the trend seems to have been checked in recent years. At the level of university education, however, it should be noted that the proliferation of provincial universities since about 1958 has begun to offset the early dominance of the three major 'national' universities as the training grounds of the new elite.

Socio-cultural 'nation-building'

Ever since the Youth Pledge to create 'satu nusa, satu bangsa, satu bahasa' (one country, one nation, one language) in 1928, nationalist intellectuals in Indonesia have seen themselves as having a positive mission to establish a national culture, national language and national literature that override or subsume regional cultures. They have sometimes lost their way a little in trying to avoid becoming either excessively cosmopolitan or excessively nativist, but their idealistic commitment was both strong and deliberate throughout the early decades. Now that 'the nation' can be more or less taken for granted, I suspect that this impulse is more diffuse than formerly. The first generation of nationalist leaders had a strong sense of building a new society which would be neither capitalist nor feudal but in some vague sense socialist, with the state playing a major role (under their 'modernizing' guidance) in both social reconstruction and nation-building. All this created a degree of ideological cohesion which partially offset other ideological cleavages between Islam, communism and Parna Sila. But there too the strength of the initial impulse may be weakening as the earlier idealism gives way to confusion, doubt and cynicism about the character of the society actually taking shape in independent Indonesia.

The integrating role of institutions and social relationships

At the most obvious level, national institutions like Bank Indonesia, Pertamina, the various other state enterprises, in fact, the entire bureaucratic structure (as well as the armed forces, previously noted) contribute towards the growth of a nationalist rather than narrowly regional outlook. Through rotation of personnel, the establishment of universalist criteria of performance and by acting as channels of upward social mobility towards the national capital, they break down particularist attitudes and loyalties,
although not all to the same degree or with the same effect. (There are very few nationwide private institutions which perform this function to the same degree.) The bonds established by these organizations apply only at the elite level, for the most part. There seems to be very little sense of either class solidarity or national consciousness among peasants, labourers or even merchants. The PKI's attempts to create a strong national trade union movement, SOBSI, was a first step in that direction, but went little further than that.

The roles of Soekarno and Suharto

No discussion of this topic would be complete without reference to Soekarno's contribution as a great symbol of Indonesian national unity (ideological as much as territorial) throughout a critical forty year period, controversial though his role may be. There is no doubt that he provided a focus of political leadership which cut the ground from under the feet of regionalist organizations and parties in both the 1920s and 1950s, or that the ideology he articulated dramatized the symbols of nationhood and generated a sense of solidarity against real or imagined enemies. On the other hand, he was also a rather divisive element in his final years, at least as far as the Outer Islands were concerned (Legge 1972; Liddle 1970). It was in the sphere of ideological reconciliation and the damping down of aliran conflict that he was most successful. In matters of central-regional politics he was far less so - and less, it could be argued, than President Suharto with his quieter manipulative skills and unprecedented control over both the armed forces and the regional authorities.

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Many other factors could well be added to this list and their influence assessed within the on-going process of nationbuilding in Indonesia. Some obvious examples are the impact of nationwide radio and television services, the national (i.e. Jakarta-based) press, the national airlines system and the (outrageously expensive) Palapa communications satellite, which gives the central government unprecedented speed of communication with outlying regions. Others are more abstract or intangible - for example, the ambitions of able young men from the provinces to go to Jakarta to play a larger role on the national stage than they could ever hope for locally. Not all of these are unmixed blessings. In fact, the very process of national integration can be intrusive or even destructive of valuable local institutions and traditions. I am not arguing that the process is in itself good or bad, desirable (from whose viewpoint?) or undesirable. If anything, I would prefer to see a much greater degree of administrative and political decentralization conceded, now that the essential unity of the political system can be taken for granted. But the issues here, as also the assessments different people make of them, are too convoluted to be reduced to simple, easy generalizations.
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THE REGIONS AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE NEW ORDER  
M.A. Nawawi  

This essay is based on the assumption that the political and economic systems of any society are interrelated and mutually supportive. It aims at exploring the interrelationships of the political and economic patterns in the Indonesian regions outside Java and seeks to show how the regional political economy buttresses and is shaped by the national political-economic configuration.  

THE PATTERN OF THE REGIONAL ECONOMIES  

It is common to regard the outer regions as richer than Java and Bali. There is some truth in this observation for in 1971 (the earliest year for which the comparative regional income statistics are reasonably complete) only four of the twenty outer provinces had lower than the average per capita income of the five provinces on the three inner islands, excluding the national capital, Jakarta. Nevertheless, the observation can also be misleading. Only Riau, East Kalimantan, South Sumatra, Jambi, North Sumatra, Central Kalimantan and North Sulawesi had in fact conspicuously higher incomes (Pendapatan Regional, n.d., p.15). A striking feature of this group is that the majority of them were very small in respect to population. More importantly, a number of these 'rich' regions were very dependent on the exploitation of natural resources which had little to do with the majority of their population. The most important resource, oil, was concentrated mainly in Riau, South Sumatra and East Kalimantan. The first and the last of these regions in particular also benefited greatly from timber, the most lucrative resource after oil.  

In terms of both the size and the density of their populations, the major regions outside Java are clearly North Sumatra, South Sulawesi, South Sumatra, West Sumatra, Lampung, West Nusa Tenggara, East Nusa Tenggara, Aceh, North Sulawesi, South Kalimantan and West Kalimantan. Apart from South Sumatra, North Sumatra and North Sulawesi, only South Kalimantan, West Kalimantan and Lampung had per capita incomes in 1971 appreciably larger than that of East Java (Pendapatan Regional, n.d., p.15). This reflects another distinctive feature of some regional economies, namely the major contribution of the perennial commercial crops. Except for South Kalimantan, all these six provinces derived at least 30 per cent of their agricultural product from this sub-sector. The other five regions resembled Java not only in income but also in their reliance on food production. In each of these provinces more than half of all agricultural production in 1971 was food crops (Pendapatan Regional, n.d.)  

In broad outline, then, at the beginning of the New Order the regional economies could be divided into three groups. The richest regions were largely dependent on natural resources, particularly oil and timber, while
the poorest relied heavily on the production of food, principally rice. The
rest included the main growers of cash crops, most importantly rubber
coconut and coffee. There are two points that deserve emphasis with regard
to this pattern. The first, the crux of the argument of this essay, is that
it facilitates political centralization and patronism. For the moment,
it is important to stress that it had in fact long been a well-established
pattern, having evolved under the colonial regime. It is unreasonable,
therefore, to expect the New Order to have drastically altered it, especially
in view of the fact that the ardently 'revolutionary' Guided Democracy regime
only managed to blunt some of its features and to create in the process
considerable economic uncertainty. Nevertheless, in order to elucidate the
political process under the New Order, it is necessary to examine the
economic policies of the regime in relation to this pattern. Since most of
the major regions were dependent on the food and cash crops, the following
discussion will focus on the promotion of these crops.

Food Production

Perhaps the greatest achievement of the New Order has been the
substantial increase in rice production. While rising only by less than 1
per cent between 1959 and 1965 (Booth 1977, p.70), the total rice output
for the whole country jumped by almost 31 per cent from 1968 to 1974. Much
of this, however, was due to an increase of production in Java and Madura
which was almost ten percentage points higher than that in Sumatra,
Kalimantan and Sulawesi (Booth 1977, p.70; Statistical Yearbook 1975, p.433).

The superior achievement of Java and Madura was the result of greatly
improved and expanded irrigation and a more vigorous 'Green Revolution'.
With regard to irrigation, it is significant that while their sawah (wet
farm) area remained stable, their harvested area expanded through multiple-
cropping by more than 40 per cent between 1963 and 1973 and by 15 per cent
Outside Java, the harvested acreage also increased significantly, but the
increase was accompanied by a considerable expansion of the cultivated area.
Reflecting the very modest efforts made to extend and improve irrigation in
the outer regions, South Sulawesi - the only region outside Java which had
had substantial modern irrigation works since the colonial period - only
managed to widen its technically irrigated area by less than 8000 hectares,
or 11 per cent, between 1972 and 1976. At the same time, both its semi-
technical and village systems shrank, resulting in an actual diminution of
its total irrigated area (Monografi Sulawesi Selatan 1978, p.180). In Aceh
and West Sumatra, the two other most important rice-producing regions, the
irrigation expansion appears to have been equally limited. Until the end
of 1973 Aceh continued to lack large-scale technical irrigation altogether,
while in West Sumatra technical and semi-technical irrigation served less
than 100,000 hectares or only about 45 per cent of its sawah in 1975
(Boediono and Hasan 1974; Sumatera Barat 1976, p.224).

The Green Revolution was not effectively under way until 1971. There-
after, however, the BIMAS programme (the central programme providing credit,
subsidized inputs and extension services) and the INMAS programme (a supplementary scheme supplying only subsidized inputs and extension services) expanded very rapidly, reaching a peak at the end of 1974 when they together covered around four million hectares (Rice and Hill 1977, p.24). The concentration of these programmes in Java is revealed by the fact that in South Sulawesi and West Sumatra, for example, their combined coverages during 1971-74 were only 48 per cent and 59 per cent of the harvested savah areas respectively. In 1974, South Sulawesi had only just over 600 extension workers for its harvested area of more than 470,000 hectares, while West Sumatra had about 200 to serve around 395,000 farm families harvesting almost 250,000 hectares (Monografi Sulawesi Selatan 1978, pp.69, 280; Sumatera Barat 1976, p.255; Statistical Yearbook 1975, pp.425-26; Sumatera Regional Planning Study 1977, p.120).

Of the other food crops, most importantly corn, cassava, sweet potato, peanut and soybean, it is sufficient to note that only the production of the last two has appreciably increased between 1968 and 1977 (Indikator Ekonomi, December 1978, p.105). Both happen to be cultivated almost entirely in Java and Madura.

The Perennial Crops

Of all the perennial crops rubber is certainly the most important. It is the most significant export product after oil and timber, and its cultivation has been the most extensive, covering more than 2.3 million of the 5.9 million hectares devoted to commercial crops in 1973. About four-fifths of this acreage has always been operated by smallholders outside Java. Despite its importance, smallholder rubber has received very little attention. Practically all the existing trees, at least 30 per cent of which are beyond the normal maximum age of thirty years, have been grown from unimproved seeds, and cultivation and production practices have remained primitive. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the average annual production of 554,000 tons during the 1974-77 period was almost exactly the same as that in the previous eight years, in spite of an actual expansion of the total acreage by about 9 per cent between 1966 and 1973 (Indikator Ekonomi, December 1978, pp.119-21; Statistical Yearbook 1975, pp.490-91; Arndt 1969, p.16; 1977, p.23; 1978, p.14; McCawley 1972, p.6; Glassburner 1978, p.12).

It may be said that serious official concern was not evident until the beginning of the second Five Year Development Plan (Repelita) in 1974. During the first plan, the Smallholder Plantations Service had concentrated all its efforts on the distribution of high-yielding planting material but because of financial and staff shortages had achieved very limited results (Gwyer 1974, p.35). The only policy especially designed to affect the smallholder sector was the attempt to improve product quality by prohibiting the export of low-grade rubber and giving generous incentives for the establishment of crumb-rubber factories (Arndt 1969; Collier and Tjakrawerdojo 1972).
With the start of the second Repelita, attention was finally directed to the central problems of modernization. So far, however, efforts have been concentrated on schemes (the 'village units', the 'assisted replanting projects', the 'group coagulating centres' and the 'nucleus estates') designed to involve only a few selected sites and therefore to involve relatively small groups of cultivators. The impact of these various programmes can be judged from their achievements in South Sumatra, the largest producer of smallholder rubber, accounting for 26 per cent of its total area in the country and 25 per cent of its production in 1973. By the beginning of 1978, two village units, one replanting project, and four coagulating centres had been started in different parts of the province. In the best of circumstances, these few ventures could not possibly have affected an appreciable percentage of all smallholders in the province, who constitute about 60 per cent of its agricultural population. In fact, at most 1000 hectares in all had been either newly planted or replanted under the scheme (Rahman 1978, pp.58, 82-117).

As noted earlier, coconut and coffee have also been especially significant crops in the outer regions. Coconut has been as extensively cultivated as rubber and, since estate cultivation has always been negligible, has in fact been the country's smallholder crop par excellence. Its only disadvantage has been its small and declining contribution to export. On the other hand, coffee has for a long time been the second most important agricultural export commodity. From 1968 to 1975, for example, it brought in on the average almost one fourth as much export earnings as rubber. Roughly 10 per cent of the coffee acreage is in estates but these have mostly been confined to East Java (Statistical Yearbook 1975, pp.490-91; Indikator Ekonomi, December 1978, pp.119, 121).

In terms of their total production, these two crops have been better off than rubber. With respect to smallholder coffee, the average annual production during the 1974-77 period was almost 19 per cent larger than that between 1966 and 1973. The comparable growth for coconut was 14 per cent (Arndt 1969, p.16; McCawley 1972, p.6; Glassburner 1978, p.12). However, these increases almost certainly did not result from improved productivity. The cultivation of both crops had also expanded quite substantially. Between 1966 and 1973 the total areas planted to coconut and smallholder coffee increased by 35 per cent and 22 per cent respectively (Statistical Yearbook 1975, pp.490-91). In spite of the expansion, in 1970 more than half of the coconut trees in North Sulawesi, the principal coconut grower, were over the normal maximum age of fifty years (Boediono 1972, p.71). The condition of the coffee bushes was no better. It has been estimated that per hectare yield in South Sumatra, also the largest smallholder-coffee producer, could be more than doubled simply by better husbandry (Sumatera Regional Planning Study 1977, p.54). Up to now, no special schemes have been introduced for either crop. In the case of coconut, efforts have been limited to initiating research and growing improved imported seeds in government experimental estates (Tempo, 29 October 1977, pp.49-50).

The much faster growth of food production in Java and the stagnation of the perennial crops in the major regions together have reduced the difference
between them. Between 1971 and 1975, per capita income in East Java grew faster than in Aceh, South Sumatra, West Kalimantan and West Nusa Tenggara. Indeed, in the same period, income in Java as a whole (excluding Jakarta) rose faster than that of these four regions plus Lampung collectively. From this point of view, the New Order could claim success in reducing a major economic imbalance in the country. The crucial feature of the inherited pattern of the regional economies, however, was the concentration of wealth in a few, mostly small, regions. Unfortunately, this aspect has actually been aggravated. In the same period between 1971 and 1975 the two super-rich regions - Riau and East Kalimantan - raised their combined income twice as fast as Java (Pendapatan Regional, n.d., p.11).

REGIONAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

The colonial regime derived several political advantages from promoting the basic pattern of the regional economies. Since both farming and the growing of smallholder perennial crops could be left almost entirely to the initiatives and resources of the local communities, the colonial government was not required to interfere very much with them. On the other hand, the large estates and the exploitation of the natural resources could be undertaken and managed with little or no direct reference to them. This convenience was accompanied by the luxury of centralization. The bulk of government revenues could be easily and centrally collected in relatively large amounts from the enclaves and the modern urban sector. The main local expenditures, such as the construction and maintenance of infrastructures, could thus be financed largely from the centre, which could thereby exercise benevolently paternalistic control. The same advantages are now available to the New Order.

Local Leadership and Government

Traditionally, local communities in most of the outer regions were small and parochial, generally no larger than clusters of a few small villages which were not effectively incorporated into any wider political entities. When the Dutch extended their colonial administration to these communities at the beginning of this century, they were content with bringing them together into artificially created groupings under Dutch district controleurs or Dutch-appointed native officials. These officers were given considerable power, but communications difficulties and the risk of inciting too much opposition did not encourage them to make full use of it. In general, they allowed the traditional chiefs to continue to govern very much as they had, wherever possible. These patriarchs continued, for example, to derive their incomes entirely and directly from their communities (Nawawi 1972).

Up to the end of the colonial period, then, these village and village-cluster chiefs were the effective political leaders in most of the regions. After independence, however, these traditional leaders were shunted aside or ignored, partly due to the distrust of the revolutionaries. Since then,
partly because of a perceived need to have a uniform administrative structure throughout the country, the local communities have remained in limbo. Their complete political degeneration was prevented only by inertia and ad hoc regulations until the enactment of the first major post-colonial legislation on regional and local governments at the beginning of 1957. The new law did not help them much, however, for although it clearly provided for the formal existence of governmental units at a level below the district, it avoided specifying how they were to be established (The 1968; Legge 1961). The main difficulty was that in most parts of the Outer Islands, while villages were too small in population compared to the desa in Java, village clusters were generally too large in territory. As a result, that section of the law was virtually not implemented. It was soon abandoned altogether and improvisations continued openly.

The New Order has not offered a way out of this muddle. It did not replace the 1957 basic law on regional government until the middle of 1974. And far from settling the question of the third level of local government, this new legislation ignored the issue entirely by emphasizing only two levels of local government: the province and the district or municipality (Tempo, 25 May 1974, 6 July 1974). The regime was content with continuing to leave the fate of the local communities to their provincial governments and the Ministry of the Interior. Consequently, there has been neither uniformity nor certainty in their treatment. In South Sulawesi, the difficulty raised by the 1957 law has apparently been partially resolved by the creation of new entities between the traditional villages and their lilik (village clusters). In South Sumatra, both the marga (village cluster) and the dusun (village) have continued to have formal identities, although there has recently been an inclination on the part of the provincial government and the central agencies to emphasize the former. But everywhere the status of the heads of these communities appears to be unsettled. None have become civil servants, but apparently some are receiving official salary (Tempo, 23 November 1974, p.7), some have been appointed, and some have been removed at the discretion of the district officers and the governors.

On the other hand, the key unit in the national administrative hierarchy, the district (kabupaten), precisely because it had little or no traditional basis, was endowed with the essential malleability that has made its administrative identity unproblematical. There has also been no fundamental difficulty with regard to the status of its head (the bupati) who has continued to be unquestionably a formal government official. The only controversial issue has been whether he should, like the Dutch controleur, be primarily an agent of the central government or a local leader. The 1957 law identified him as the latter, that is as kepala daerah, who should be chosen by and responsible to an elected district legislative council of which he should be a member. Partly due to vigorous opposition by the civil service, this provision was never implemented. With the establishment of Guided Democracy in 1959, the law was replaced by a presidential decree providing for a district head to be centrally appointed from among candidates nominated by the local council but not responsible to it (The 1968, pp.203-21).
Under the New Order, the status and power of the district heads as agents of the central government has been greatly enhanced. From the beginning, the generally accepted principle that the local councils should nominate candidates was tempered by an informal understanding on the desirability of prior consultation between the councils, the governors, and the Ministry of the Interior. This selection procedure, as formalized in both PP 6/1959 and the 1974 law, has helped the regime to fill the bupati posts almost entirely with its own preferred candidates, in most cases retired or active military officers. One justification for this strategy has been that it would ensure the dominance of the bupati in district affairs over the district consultative committees (muspida). Introduced toward the end of the Old Order, these committees, formally chaired by the bupati and consisting of the local military commander, police chief, judge, and public prosecutor, have become fairly well institutionalized.

The strengthening of the bupati as agents of the central government has not improved the effectiveness of local leadership and government. Lacking the traditional roots they have in some parts of Java, the bupati in the outer provinces cannot easily get the co-operation of the local leaders under them or relate directly with the local populace. On the other hand, deprived of real power, the local leaders themselves are resentful and demoralized and are losing the traditional respect of the villagers. A good indication of the continuing political weakness of the local communities is the poor collection record of the land tax (ipeda) which is by far the most important revenue source in the districts. Although formally a central government imposition, this tax has actually been collected by the village and village cluster heads, who have been allowed to retain a certain percentage of their collections. Except for another small percentage contributed to the province, the proceeds have been turned over to the districts entirely.

The scanty data available suggest that although there has been a dramatic increase in the amounts collected, the overall efficacy of the ipeda has not grown substantially. In all the major outer regions taken together, total collections for 1978-79 were estimated to be, in nominal terms, more than twenty times as large as those in 1969-70 (BIES, July 1970, pp.136-37; Daftar Perkiraan 1978). However, much of the increase was simply due to the fact that in most of these regions the tax had just begun to be seriously enforced at the beginning of this period. Hence, on the average, the rural ipeda tax payers still constituted in 1971 only 22 per cent of their adult rural populations. Even in South Sulawesi, the only province apart from West Nusa Tenggara to have inherited colonial land records, coverage was only 44 per cent (Booth 1974, pp.110, 127). Reflecting this fact, collections there grew only by one-fifth from 1971-72 to 1973-74, compared with their doubling during the preceding three-year period. The remarkable expansion was also the consequence of very low initial assessments, and thus did not require a corresponding enhancement of the collecting efficiency. In South Sumatra, even though the proceeds increased nearly 90 per cent during 1974-78, the ratio of the realized collections to their targets not only continued to be low but actually fell from 42 per cent to 38 per cent at the same time.
Centralization and Paternalism

Even more than the _bupati_, the governors have become the unambiguous representatives of the central bureaucracy. The same selection procedure has been utilized even more blatantly as a convenient cover for their direct appointment by the President. In most instances, military officers have been preferred, although some of them had retired before their assignment. In effect, then, the 1974 law on regional and local government confirmed not one but two centralizing grids. It entrenched the bureaucratic network controlled by the Ministry of the Interior and tacitly reaffirmed the military line of influence.

These structures have contributed to and in turn have been greatly strengthened by the success of the regime in controlling local and regional politics. In part, this control has been imposed through the prohibition of political activities below the district level. Rationalized by the curious 'floating mass' doctrine, which extolled the virtues of politically insulating the vast majority of the people, this ban was only slightly relaxed by the 1975 law on political parties (Samson 1973; Hansen 1976). But above all, the control has been exercised through the regime's domination of the provincial and district councils which in turn has been achieved through a combination of reservation of seats and the electoral success of the government party, Golkar. In both the 1971 and the 1977 general elections, one-fifth of the seats were reserved for appointed members, mostly active soldiers and veterans. On both occasions Golkar also managed to capture the majority of the other seats in all but a few of the councils, thanks principally to its open sponsorship by the _bupati_ and governors who mobilized their bureaucratic as well as military resources (Silalahi 1977; Liddle 1978).

Such an edifice of centralization is a tribute to astute political management. It has been founded, however, upon the maintenance of the regions' acute financial dependence on the central government. The portion of the total budgeted revenues of the district and provincial governments in the major regions resulting from their own levies, including the _ipeda_, although appreciably higher than in the 1960s, was projected to be still only around 10 per cent for 1978-79. Indeed, the districts and the provinces together would have been able to meet only a minor fraction of their routine expenditures from their own revenues. On its own, the provincial government in Aceh could meet at most 17 per cent of its routine budget in 1972-73. The comparable ratio for South Sulawesi in 1974-75 was only around 12 per cent and for South Sumatra in 1975-76 no more than 14 per cent (BIES, July 1970, pp.136-39; _Daftar Perkiraan_ 1978; Boediono and Hasan 1974, p.54; _Tempo_, 13 April 1974; _Sumatera Selatan_ 1977, p.280).

Having such a strong financial upper hand, the central government could be tempted simply to impose its will on the regions. But it has understandably chosen to continue to rely on paternalism, a convenient mode of governance. This style has been embodied and facilitated by the INPRES programmes. At least since the beginning of the second Repelita, a very large proportion of the central funds for the regions, designated as developmental and included
in the development budget of the central government, has been channelled almost exclusively by means of these programmes. Beginning with the village and district subsidies introduced in the first two years of the first Repelita, these programmes have grown to seven in number. The second Repelita was ushered in with the provincial subsidy and the elementary school and public health centre schemes. In 1976-77 the public market and reforestation projects were initiated.

Being general in nature, the village, kabupaten, and provincial programmes have provided the best opportunity for display of the characteristic relationship between the central government and regional and local leaders. The kabupaten subsidy is particularly revealing. Unlike its provincial counterpart, which has continued to be seen in many regions basically as compensation, it has been a 'pure' grant. At the same time, it has been regarded in Jakarta as the symbol of and the necessary support for the status of the district, emphasized in the 1974 law, as the focus of local autonomy. It has therefore become one of the landmarks of the New Order and aroused the most interest outside the country (de Wit 1973; Hady 1974; Salim 1975; Hoadley 1976; Richards 1978).

Formally, the scheme is endowed with a very complicated structure. To begin with, although the subsidy is in principle at the complete disposal of the district government, it has a well-defined purpose and scope. Basically, its aim is to alleviate unemployment and underemployment within the districts. Hence it is supposed to emphasize labour-intensive activities. Reflecting another major concern of the central government, it is also meant primarily for the rehabilitation and expansion of the physical infrastructures, mainly roads, bridges, and irrigation channels. A small portion of it has therefore actually been given in the form of heavy equipment for road construction and maintenance.

Above all, there is a very elaborate procedure governing the selection, implementation and post-evaluation of projects. Prior to the start of each new financial year, after a Presidential Instruction has set the per capita amount, the Ministers of the Interior and Finance and the Chairman of the National Development Board (Bappenas) jointly determine the full allocation for each kabupaten. Following this, the bupati is expected to exercise his prerogative as the programme executive to prepare a priority list of projects to be undertaken in his district in the coming year. However, he is required to submit his list to the governor, who has the authority to review it in the light of his own plans for the province. The list is then returned to the district, where the approved projects are prepared in detail before they are again presented to the office of the governor for technical refinement and then submission to Jakarta. After they are finally approved, the projects are supposed to be put up for public tender by a special committee chaired by the bupati, which would then select the winning contractors. In the meantime, with the consent of the governor, the bupati is required to appoint a special treasurer responsible for maintaining liaison with the Bank Rakyat (Rural Bank) for the release of funds at the various stages of each project. Lastly, he has to submit progress reports to the governor and the co-ordinating committee in Jakarta at regular intervals throughout the year.
In practice, many of these guidelines and requirements have often been ignored or bypassed. It is widely acknowledged that although the major portion of the subsidy has indeed been expended on infrastructural projects, a substantial part has gone directly and indirectly into such forbidden objects as office buildings, official residences, monuments and vehicles. To some extent, the purpose of the elaborate procedure to minimize waste and to make the misuse of funds difficult has been achieved, but it has become common knowledge that, for example, the same stretches of roads have been repeatedly upgraded and some bupati, other district officials, and Rural Bank branch managers have become visibly richer than they should be. There is no doubt that these deviations have resulted partly from the continuing communications and administrative inadequacies. The lack of detailed independent field inspection and auditing has made possible the submission of misleading or simply fictitious reports and even photographs with impunity (Richards 1978, p.195; Tempo, 6 March 1976, p.21). Fundamentally, however, these irregularities are unavoidable. In the absence of strong extra-bureaucratic local political organizations as its base, the political effectiveness of the provincial and district officials depends on maneuverability (Silalangi 1977, p.20). Probably this was the decisive reasoning behind the special invention of the INPRES programmes in the first place. The overriding importance of the consideration is in any case evident from the fact that even though the subsidy has formally been included in the district budgets, and government supporters have dominated most of the district councils, the selection and implementation of the projects have been exempted from discussion and scrutiny in these councils (Richards 1978, p.194).

The main point that should emerge from the discussion in this section is that with regard to government, and politics as well, the basic colonial pattern which continued to prevail up to the establishment of the New Order has, partly by necessity, clearly been reaffirmed. This does not in any way belittle the record of the New Order for, as noted above, considerable efforts have gone into the very difficult task of rehabilitating regional and local government authority and administrative efficiency, which had suffered grievously during the Japanese occupation and the revolution and under the first two post-independence regimes. The argument is simply that these efforts have not been directly aimed at changing the pattern. The efficacy of local political leadership has not been enhanced in order to break the vicious circle linking low resource mobilization and low economic participation. As this circle has remained largely intact, needed resources have had to come largely from the central government and thus have further entrenched paternalism.

CONCLUSION: REGIONAL AND NATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMIES

In conclusion, it seems clear that the regional economic and political patterns under the New Order have indeed been closely interrelated and mutually supportive. The vast majority of the population in the outer regions have remained peripheral and passive participants in the development process, both economically and politically. Only a few regions have become or
continued to be very rich, although largely in spite of most of their inhabitants. In some major regions the larger part of the regional product has been contributed by the great majority of the people, but the main economic activities of this majority have continued to be generally stagnant. Politically, the continuing neglect of the local communities, and the reluctance of the regime either to allow independent political organization or to undertake serious political mobilization, have reinforced the passivity of the overwhelming rural mass. Quite clearly, economic stagnation and lack of political participation are not only two sides of the same coin, but actively reinforce each other.

The overriding reality is that the regime has continued to rely mainly on resources largely unconnected, at least directly, with the activities of most of the people. Indeed, its economic independence of their contribution has grown. Thus, to consider only the domestic revenues, the combined contribution of corporation and oil taxes, import and export duties, and other oil receipts, accounted for, on the average, 72 per cent of the total official revenues of the central government between 1974 and 1978, compared to 63 per cent during the previous four years (Indikator Ekonomi, December 1978, p.78). Economic independence has, not surprisingly, encouraged the politics of benevolent, fatherly authoritarianism. Many foreign and domestic observers have described the actual operation of the national political system as patrimonialism, which appears to some to be well-ingrained in the Indonesian national psyche (Crouch 1979; Silalahi 1977; Robison 1978; May 1975). Regardless of the actual mechanics, the fact is that so far the vast majority of the Indonesian people have almost always remained onlookers around the arena, although perhaps less so between 1945 and 1965. Consequently, national politics has actually been the exclusive game of a small minority. It is to the credit of the leaders of the New Order that they have made some efforts to avoid being unnecessarily harsh and to temper blatant patrimonialism with administrative reform. But they have not found it useful to forego convenience in favour of strenuous exertion.

The fundamental issue, then, is that the perpetuation of many key features of the pre-independence pattern of the regional economies has entrenched, and in turn been affirmed by, a national political system basically characterized by paternalistic centralism and negligent, laissez-faire liberalism. This system has also stimulated, and been further strengthened by, the development of concentrated, large-scale economic activities principally in and around the metropolitan centre. In short, the dilemma relates to the mutually reinforcing structures and orientations of the national polity and economy. Hence, to borrow the words of Gunnar Myrdal, 'the real mystery is how [Indonesia] can escape from equilibrium and can develop (Myrdal 1972, p.434). The effort to solve the puzzle must surely begin with the abandonment of obfuscation and rationalization.
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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NEW ORDER INDONESIA
IN A COMPARATIVE REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Jeffrey Race

INTRODUCTION

Large social institutions such as governments generally act not for single reasons or because of the wishes of single persons, but rather because coalitions of interest form behind certain 'least constrained' actions. What follows is a broad overview of the structure of the political economy of Indonesia, intended to help us understand why certain coalitions of interests characteristically come together behind certain kinds of policies. I focus in particular, and at a somewhat abstract level, on the fiscal system financing not just the government, but the governing elite in general. I am relying for this abstract analysis on the very detailed investigations of other scholars such as Crouch and Robison.

This paper is largely an analysis of structure and its implications; it is not intended to be a statement about the particular magnitude of any numbers, or of their trends. This is also an interim report of work in progress, and thus a suggestive contribution to discussion, rather than a definitive, finished work.

Finally I should say that what follows is not written in a critical spirit; rather it is a candid attempt by an outside observer to interpret, and to explain, how public policy formation is influenced by structural factors in the political economy of Indonesia.

THE ANALYTICAL APPROACH

My analysis herein is strongly influenced by the work of an American sociologist, Gerhard Lenski, as expressed principally in his important study of social stratification, Power and Privilege (1966). Lenski's analysis, and the one I will apply here, views the economic system as one for generating economic surplus, and the political system as one which, among other things, perpetuates an unequal distribution of this surplus. Political struggle is thus conceived as the struggle over the distribution of the surplus. Many illuminating questions stem from this line of analysis, such as: How does this distributive system work? Whom does it benefit? How is the distributive system changing, and under what influences? What are the axes of tension? How does the means for appropriating and distributing the surplus interact with the system for generating it? To mention just one line of inquiry which I will not pursue, we can infer that one reason it is so hard to get governments to execute development policies to uplift the poor is that this is literally not what governments are designed for.

THE EVOLUTION OF 'THE SYSTEM'

From this analytical standpoint, the most striking feature of political authority in Indonesia is its highly extractive nature, since long before the time of the Dutch. Indeed, one can fruitfully look at the past four
centuries of Indonesian history as the struggle over who will appropriate the surplus generated in the archipelago: first petty chiefs and kings; then the Dutch (the figures on the export of capital are fairly clear); then, at Independence, the political parties (through sale of import permits and the manipulation of multiple exchange rates); and since 1965, the army and its friends.

While the orientation to the economy of the Indonesian armed forces is strongly extractive, we must pay special attention to the interlude of three or four years after October 1965, when ABRI (the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) led a broad coalition oriented principally to rationalizing the economy and getting it producing again after the distortions and ultimate run-down, culminating in capital consumption, of the final Soekarno years. This early New Order coalition – students, intellectuals, the PSI, various factions within ABRI, orthodox and reform Muslims – had been thrown together out of their common fear of the PKI. Their somewhat unlikely coherence in the early New Order years is well known and needs no repetition here. What is important to note is their unity around a programme of economic reconstruction, before the expanded mechanisms for the appropriation of surplus described below were installed.

This movement toward rationalization and reconstruction was very clear; the following list is suggestive, not exhaustive in this regard:

1966: Reform of state enterprises, including retrenchment of excess personnel and development of a new, more flexible legislative system;
1966: Elimination of most price controls;
1967: Return of many foreign enterprises to original owners; promulgation of the Foreign Investment Law;
1968: Domestic Investment Law;
1968: Restructuring of state banks and rationalization of interest rate structure;
1969: Promulgation of legislative framework for state enterprises;

Thus from the perspective of 1965 (declining production) ABRI was decidedly a rationalizing force, aimed at improving economic policy-making, administration and the rate of investment, and allied with other forces in society in favour of rationalization, rising production, and against the PKI.

With the success of stabilization, the principal orientation of ABRI shifted from rationalization to establishing and perfecting a whole array of mechanisms to extract the surplus now being generated, or about to be generated, by the newly functioning productive system. This shift could be dated in various ways, but one which comes to mind is the establishment, in 1968, of the firm P.T. Rumpun, to take over a number of estates in Central Java. After that, there is a virtual avalanche of incorporations of companies by ABRI personnel, reaching a peak probably in 1972 or so (see Robison 1975).
Table 1

New Order fiscal system

- State banks
- ABRI
- Bureaucracy
- Charitable foundations
- Domestic private sector and joint venture partners
- Foreign investors
- External markets and funding sources
- Domestic population

Flowchart showing the interconnections of different entities and funds in the New Order fiscal system.
Concurrently the broad coalition behind the New Order disintegrates: the so-called 'PSI generals' are released from duty; the students and intellectuals drift off; the Muslims go into opposition; the base of the regime becomes narrower and narrower not just in society at large, but even within the military, as one military faction fastens its extractive mechanisms on the economy.

THE OPERATION OF 'THE SYSTEM'

My principal interest is in how the emergent system for funding both the government and the groups who control it influences the formation of public policy. The accompanying diagram - 'The New Order Fiscal System' - highlights at an abstract level the important structural characteristics of this system.

Its most striking, and most essential, feature is that it rests on the creation of a whole series of artificial scarcities throughout the economy. These scarcities give rise to 'monopoly rents' - the spread between an implicit free-market price, and the artificial scarcity price.

The scarcities include:

(a) Government services. The lethargy and inefficiency of the government apparatus creates a scarcity of government services. This motivates those needing government decisions, permits, licenses, etc. to make special payments to expedite government action.

(b) Minerals, petroleum, forestry. By statute or constitutional provision, the extractive sectors are all government monopolies. In the mining and petroleum sectors, state enterprises collect from domestic and foreign private enterprises monopoly rents that are directly (and indirectly) passed on to the military. In the forestry sector, various army-owned companies (e.g. Tri Usaha Bhakti) and trusted private-sector intermediaries (as joint-venture partners) collect the monopoly rents.

(c) Jakarta entertainment. Much of the capital's hotels, gambling, and tourism are directly controlled by the military, since unlike industry and agriculture this sector generates quick cash.

(d) The hajj. The pilgrimage to Mecca requires a special permit from the Directorate of Hajj Affairs. The cost of a government-organized trip is hiked substantially above the normal cost of a trip from Southeast Asia to Mecca. These funds go into a special public account controlled by the president.

(e) Domestic trade. Through such state-controlled organizations as BULOG, various aspects of internal trade can be manipulated to generate monopoly rents.

(f) External trade. High tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and discriminatory allocation of licenses allow similar
rents to exist in external trade. This is claimed by
the state or quasi-state monopolies that control a large
part of external trade. For example, the two firms
sharing the clove import monopoly are both politically
well-connected, to say the least.

(g) Inter-island shipping. In a country where transportation
is inadequate and costly, ABRI and ABRI-protected
enterprises' dominance of shipping provides them with a
generous source of funds.

(h) Credit. In a chronically capital-short economy, the
government's extensive presence in the banking system is
particularly significant. The five state banks grant
82 per cent of all loans, with eleven foreign and
ninety-seven domestic private banks sharing the remaining
18 per cent. Political loyalties and a willingness
to sanction diversion of funds have in the past qualified
individuals for positions either in the state banks or in
'private' banks that have significant official participation.
Accordingly, bank failures or capital impairment are
common. The most recent financial scandal involved the
largest state bank, Bank Bumi Daya, whose president-
director was removed in January 1977. In late 1977 during
the pre-election anti-corruption campaign, Admiral Sudomo
revealed that the sacked president-director had admitted
receiving US$500,000 in bribes in exchange for granting
dubious credit.

It is only fair to note that much of the rents generated by this system
go to financing official government operations - though a smaller proportion
now than in the early 1970s, before a series of more recent financial
reforms. For example, of perhaps special interest to Australians is that
much of the funding for the Timor invasion was furnished 'off the books'
directly from Pertamina to HANKAM (Department of Defence and Security).

Nevertheless the structure just described is fairly well understood both
at a theoretical level and in its specific Indonesian form. The picture
which emerges is remarkably similar to the tax-farming fiscal systems of
European monarchies from the fifteenth century until their gradual disappear-
ance in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Such systems typically
develop to support rapidly rising military expenditures in a context of
poor communications and weak central control. Since these systems have been
studied extensively in the past, certain observations can be made about the
future of Indonesia's variant.

The system impedes economic development

Despite the prominent role of the technocrats, the fiscal system just
described establishes parameters which constrict economic growth (not to
mention development) in very important ways:

(a) The pricing distortions implicit in the monopolistic
structure lead to resource misallocations.
(b) Granting chunks of the economy as fiefs in return for political support discourages economic rationality and sound management.

(c) Since costs are higher than under free-market conditions, production does not develop to the full extent economic under free-market prices.

(d) As a separate but related point, exports are also impeded by the higher costs (including exports of manufactured goods using 'cheap' domestic labour).

(e) Bureaucratic monopolies impede innovation, and add to the cost (in time at least) of almost every transaction.

For these reasons, the corresponding structures were overthrown in Europe by rising entrepreneurial classes; we will explore this point in more detail below. It is important to note, though, that it was historically not technocrats who overthrew such systems: their goals have been circumscribed by the injunction to make more for the sovereign, or to make the system work more predictably for him.

Revenue is hard to collect

The limitations on the system's capacity to collect revenue generate a bias in favour of policies that produce situations where cash is easy to recover (e.g. capital-intensive development projects); here the centralized control of resources (e.g. by a foreign investor) makes 'skimming' easy. There is thus a bias against agriculture and labour-intensive manufacturing, and for a few big projects over a large number of smaller projects; a tendency to 'live on capital' by the exhaustion of mineral, petroleum, and forestry resources; and a preference for external borrowing.

This fiscal system is incompatible with the development of the rule of law

Since criminal or quasi-criminal activities are seen as essential to the maintenance of the state under this type of financial system, the present leadership has a vested interest in illegality, that is in preventing the emergence of an articulated, autonomous legal system that could provide the basis for competitive commercial activity (not to mention political and civil rights). This accounts for the absence of legislation to create the courts authorized by the constitution; the lack of codification (most importantly, in my view, of land law and commercial law); and the measures used to coerce or induce favourable judgments from existing tribunals.

Lest I be accused of being overdramatic in this regard, let me point to one illustrative incident in the recent history of Indonesia's greatest economic success and its greatest disaster: Pertamina. That Pertamina was not being run according to law (or even sound management principles) had long been apparent; it was made a matter of record in the report of the Committee of Four in 1970. But a particularly interesting and clear item of evidence appeared in 1978 of how unimportant this all was, relative to other priorities, even at that late date. At that time, in order to prepare
a possible defence that General Ibu Sutowo had exceeded his authority in signing agreements with Bruce Rapaport (who was then suing the Indonesian government for large sums), the Indonesian government procured from the General an admission, sworn in a deposition filed in a New York court, that he had received a US$2.5 million undocumented 'loan' from Bruce Rapaport, with whom he was at the time supposed to have been conducting arms-length negotiations on behalf of the Republic of Indonesia.

This enforced enfeeblement of the legal system also retards economic activity, by imposing either an additional risk or an actual 'insurance premium' (a payoff for protection) on most transactions.

The interaction between this fiscal system and its actual beneficiaries greatly complicates succession

'Tax-farming' systems are inefficient, which is why in modern states they have evolved into bureaucratically organized 'internal revenue services'. But their very inefficiency makes them appealing to the tax farmers and their allies, since so much of the revenue remains with them. Accordingly the Indonesian tax farmers, to a considerable extent Chinese, have a powerful incentive to perpetuate the system, and to perpetuate in power until the last possible moment whoever (now Suharto) 'authorizes' such a system.

There is further the crystal-clear precedent, both of the Dutch and of the palace millionaires around Soekarno, that if one loses political power in Indonesia, one loses everything. Thus the interests of the president's family and their business associates are closely synchronized with those of the tax farmers: they must continue the system as long as possible, by arranging a transition into 'safe' hands (i.e. someone who will continue the present rules, and guarantee their property). Otherwise once they lose control of the top governmental positions, they may suffer severe personal economic losses. This is probably a more serious constraint on the Indonesian side, who want to remain in Indonesia, than on the Chinese side, who are prepared to move elsewhere and have the means abroad to do so.

This fiscal system impedes ASEAN integration

Since much of the revenue under this system is financed by the spread between domestic and world prices (lower domestic prices for exports, higher for imports), it is immediately apparent that it is inconsistent with economic integration among the member states of ASEAN. I judge that this is an important factor contributing to Indonesia's characteristic stance as a nay-sayer on schemes of further economic integration.

SOME COMPARISONS WITH NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

Thailand

Of the countries with which I am familiar, the political economy of Thailand bears the most resemblances to the Indonesian structure I have just described, but with important current and historical differences which tell us much, I believe, about the possibilities for Indonesian development.
In Thailand, under an agreement reached in the mid-1950s, Chinese entrepreneurs served, as in Indonesia, as the junior partners and business managers of a military government, though in terms of proportion to gross economic activity, the system was much attenuated compared to Indonesia. There were structural similarities, however: military power led to political power, which led to wealth; the Chinese were the managers while the military were the enforcers; and state enterprises (frequently monopolies) established 'for the public benefit' in fact were siphons for money into the hands of the military.

The differences were important:

1. The distinction between public funds and private funds is clearly drawn in Thailand; unlike the situation in Indonesia where there is a virtual continuum between government agencies, government enterprises staffed by military or civil servants, commercial firms staffed by officials operating for public purposes, commercial firms staffed or owned by officials operating for private purposes but making 'rent' payments (e.g. to the army or one of the array of 'charitable' foundations), or truly private firms operated by trusted private individuals but making 'rent' payments, all either getting funds from or giving funds to the government, depending on the circumstances. In part this development arose from the consequences of the Bowring Treaty (see 4 below); in part from legal notions imported by King Chulalongkorn from the west; and in part from the Revolution of 1932 which overthrew royal absolutism and established clear distinctions between the Privy Purse (the sovereign's personal property), the Crown Property (originally royal property, seized in 1932, and now used to produce revenue which may be used for some public purposes such as charities, at the discretion of the sovereign), and the Public Treasury. I make the point that this distinction (and indeed the overthrow of absolutism), which occurred in this century in Thailand, and in European monarchies from three to four centuries ago, has yet to take place in Indonesia.

2. The Thai Chinese are a much larger proportion of the population (perhaps 10 per cent) than in Indonesia, and they are much better assimilated.

3. Thai society is more homogeneous, ethnically and religiously, than is Indonesian society.

4. There is an important difference in the degree of openness of the economy. Under the Bowring Treaty of 1855, a regime of virtual free trade was imposed on Thailand by the British. Thus already in the last century (and by the threat of violence, it is important to add, when contrasting with the possibilities of the present) the existing Thai fiscal system was revolutionized. Operated before 1855 much like the Indonesian fiscal system of today, Thailand was debarred by the Bowring Treaty from ever having the kind of fiscal regime such as Indonesia's I have earlier described. Thus it also escaped the consequent problems, and military rule in Thailand has had much less serious economic consequences than in Indonesia.

Having said all this, I am now in a position to observe that the parliamentary period in Thailand, from 1973 to 1976, and the policy changes resulting therefrom, actually represented the coalition of one sector of this Sino-Thai business community with a group of royalists and some other varied interests. That is to say, one section of the conservative business community essentially turned on their protectors in the military, and
attempted to undo even the attenuated Thai version of the Indonesian-model fiscal system I have described. They attempted to do this by such measures as: selling off some state enterprises; reducing subsidies to or terminating monopoly rights of others; dismantling de facto price-fixing cartels; legislating the military out of business and politics; and reforming the taxation system to raise more direct taxes through levies on gifts, inheritances, and property. They were, from the military viewpoint, frighteningly successful, as a result of which there was a coup in 1976 casting the economic reformers out of office. Military public relations then and since cast the coup in terms of 'saving the country from communism', but it is quite clear that what was saved was quite different, and the threat came not from 'communists' but from some quite undeniably conservative businessmen (such as Boonchu Rojanasathien, now president of the Bangkok Bank).

The point I would make here, to draw the contrast with Indonesia, is that prior to 1973 the Thai technocrats had been in the service of the military for a decade or more; but they only tinkered. Real structural reforms came with a new political coalition, and that was possible in Thailand because the Chinese community is large enough and assimilated enough, and Thai society as a whole homogeneous enough, that Chinese businessmen, Thai aristocrats, and secular progressives could make common cause against a minority military.

I suggest that this kind of coalition cannot emerge in Indonesia, and that the most important potential economic rationalizers, the overseas Chinese, are too small and too vulnerable, and too unacceptable to other potential coalition partners in Indonesia, to strike out against the military in favour of a system relying on legality. Instead they must continue as the junior partners in the military-run protection racket.

The Philippines

The example of the Philippines under martial law may serve us as a salutary warning against any kind of optimism that patrimonial tax-farming systems are doomed, mere way stations on a unilinear path toward modernity. For while Thailand is clearly moving away from this structure, if in fits and starts, the Philippines is clearly moving toward it, from a structure which in theory, if not always in practice, was a modern legally-oriented one.

My analysis of the Philippines has been published elsewhere (Race 1977), so I will here only note that under martial law the Philippines has moved from a structure where there was a small state sector, the military had no role in the economy, and the legal system provided a fairly reliable matrix for commercial activity, to one where the reverse of all these statements is true. We thus see the emergence of problems quite similar to those of Indonesia: palace millionaires on a grand scale (Disini, Silverio, Tantoco, Cuenca); the erosion of the legal system for both civil and commercial rights; the appearance of great patrimonial fiefdoms (e.g. in grains, coconuts, sugar, shipping, and gambling); an identical succession dilemma; and, probably, an ultimate military takeover.

The Philippines thus demonstrates that there is nothing inevitable about evolution away from a patrimonial tax-farming system; it has strong attractions for a certain class of people!
THE FUTURE

Experience tells us that patrimonial tax-farming systems are very stable and long-lasting, at least in part since the same few people control political, military and economic power – a hard hand to beat. As I think about it, I believe they undergo major structural reform under three circumstances:

(a) external shock (e.g. the Bowring Treaty in Thailand's case, imposed under threat of violence);

(b) a rising entrepreneurial class, which ultimately grows strong enough to turn on the system in alliance with some part of the existing elite;

(c) mass-based revolutionary uprising.

This is perhaps a circuitous way of saying that the leaders of such systems never reform themselves. Their technocrats can never bring about structural reforms, only fine tune the system at the margin, and make it produce a bit more revenue for the sovereign, and more reliably. For this reason I place no credence in the oft-declared desire of current Indonesian leaders to bring about reforms. However much they may desire this in their hearts (and there are legitimate questions about that), the coalitions which make such systems work can never agree, however compelling the case may be: it is always like Augustine's plea: 'Oh God, save me - but not yet!'

What then of the three possibilities I listed? Each seems excluded. An external shock seems excluded by the disappearance of the gunboat diplomacy which it implies, and which was used by the British against Siam, and later by the US against Japan. Foreign investors and foreign financial institutions are pushing modest reforms, such as we have recently seen in the tax and customs codes. But the influence of external entrepreneurs is limited by the absence of gunboats; even the increasing financial dependency of Indonesia on what Ben Anderson humorously - but rightly - calls the 'annual IGGI fix' does not make the country more amenable to advice. Indonesia is now in so deeply that it can resist external pressures for reform by arguing, credibly, that 'bankruptcy will be worse for you than for us'.

For the reasons noted earlier about the fragmented nature of Indonesian society, a coalition of domestic entrepreneurs (either Chinese or Islamic) with other groups, à la Thailand, also seems excluded. So does mass-based revolution, for complicated reasons which others can supply better than I.

If this is so, then the future of Indonesia seems only to consist of variations on military marches. A 'pessimistic' scenario would see the Suharto group successfully arranging succession into the hands of a 'team player', who will permit the game to run on as at present. An 'optimistic' scenario would see some of the more professional younger officers attaining increased influence, leading perhaps to a 'Korean' model of military business relations (i.e. de-emphasizing dov fungsi), but without Korean efficiency. For either of these, the external options are limited by the overpowering fact of dependency: radical solutions vis-à-vis the foreign sector are excluded now in a way they were not in Soekarno's time. Then it was plausible to seek a new patron in a 'Jakarta-Peking axis', reneging on debts, nationalizing, and opting out in general. This is no longer possible with China's discovery that, for a poor country, the world capitalist system is 'the only game in town'.
CONCLUSION

The foregoing has been intended not to demean ABRI as an institution, but to place its achievements in some kind of regional and historical perspective. Indeed, the strength of ABRI and its contributions to the country are clear when evaluated against a 1965 baseline and against military performance in the Third World generally. The armed forces were initially a strong supporter of economic rationalization, bringing technocrats who could initiate a return to production into influential positions. The secular and cosmopolitan orientation of the ABRI leadership also permitted it to tap the energies and talents of a broad spectrum of people, whose co-operation would not have been forthcoming had more narrow-minded ethnocentric or religious groups had power. With its emphasis on national unity, ABRI has held the country together in the face of strong centrifugal tendencies. Similarly, the insistence of its leadership on respect for constitutional formalities has kept Indonesia free from the repeated coups d'etat that plague other military-dominated states.

With ABRI's shift in practice around 1968 from supporting economic recovery to a posture of skimming the surplus, the weaknesses of military rule have become more apparent. These include the increasingly serious constraints placed on the technocrats in their quest for economic rationalization; the vested interest in illegality created by the country's fiscal system of structural corruption; the parcelling out and management of chunks of the economy to secure political and financial support, leading to weak management and repeated financial collapses of large enterprises; and the reliance by Suharto on a group of yes-men and politically unpopular advisers, resulting in Suharto's growing isolation and rising social tensions.

NOTE

1 BULOG in 1973; Pertamina in 1975; Bank Bumi Daya in 1978.

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THE NATION AND ITS NEIGHBOURS
TIMOR AND WEST IRIAN: THE REASONS WHY

Peter Hastings

The most noticeable element missing from the great Australian debate over Timor was any attempt to create a historical framework to Indonesia's actions and statements over the former Portuguese colony between 25 April 1974, the date of the Portuguese revolution which led to the rapid dissolution of Portugal's overseas empire, and 7 December 1975, the day on which elements of the Brawijaya Division landed in Dili. There are numerous reasons for the uninformed nature of the debate. Two stand out. One is the habitual intellectual isolationism that informs public discussion of external issues in Australia, the tendency to simplify, where not deliberately to distort, in the interests of domestic politics. The other is the habitual paucity of official Indonesian documentation on the issue other than publicity handouts. Most Australians appeared to be shocked by Indonesia's armed intervention, while at the same time giving the impression that they had all along regarded annexation as inevitable. If one cares to read history backwards one can see that it was inevitable, but there is little evidence that the Indonesians involved in the complex decision-making over East Timor thought annexation inevitable or gave it real consideration until quite late in the day. If it had not been for the events of 25 April in Portugal leading to the uncertain, and (to Jakarta) threatening, course of a leftist revolution, East Timor today would still be a backward Portuguese colony, of no particular moment to the Suharto regime.

One of the more striking aspects of Indonesia's attitude towards East Timor in the years following independence was Jakarta's failure to capitalize for propaganda purposes on the undoubted historical contacts, trading and political, between the great Hindu empires in Java, or succeeding Muslim kingdoms, and the eastern islands of the Timor and Solor archipelagoes which were from the ninth century onwards regarded as valuable sources of sandalwood (Ormeling 1957). At the peak of Madjapahit power in the fourteenth century trading contacts had developed into a political relationship in which the small chiefly societies of coastal Timor, Flores, southern Sulawesi and Sumbawa paid regular tribute to Gadjah Mada (Vlekke 1943). The Indonesians were commendably quick in the 1950s to elevate rather tenuous links between the Sultanate of Ternate and Tidore and the Dorei Peninsula into formal evidence of territorial rights to West New Guinea. Why then did they fail to promote far more substantial historical claims to East Timor? One need trace only in small detail the long quarrel between Dutch and Portuguese over the Timor Archipelago to understand better Indonesians' latter-day dilemma over Portuguese Timor.

Islam moved into eastern Indonesia in the sixteenth century. The Portuguese followed in the wake of Islam and the Dutch followed hard in the wakes of the Portuguese carracks. For nearly two centuries the Dutch waged sporadic warfare against the Portuguese before evicting them from
Solor and Kupang and finally driving them from their great stronghold in Makassar in the latter half of the seventeenth century. But they never succeeded in dislodging the Portuguese from East Timor, where they remained stubbornly entrenched for the next three centuries. The tensions engendered between Portugal and Holland through their intermittent warfare in Nusa Tenggara remained unabated up to the time that the Dutch finally quit Indonesia in the 1950s, their mutual anxieties reflecting two sides of the same coin. The Portuguese feared, until the outbreak of World War II, that the Dutch intended by one means or another to drive them from their sole remaining East Indies possession. Holland was fearful (as was Australia), particularly in the first forty years of this century, that a third country might annex East Timor by either driving the Portuguese from it or by negotiating its sale. These fears on the part of the Dutch and Portuguese led to signing the Luso-Hollandsa Treaty in 1904 in which, significantly, Article XIII bound each signatory wishing to dispose of its half of the island to make first offer to the other party (Hastings 1975a).

The Treaty's existence did not lessen the desire of the Dutch to secure East Timor to the Dutch crown any more than it assuaged Portuguese fears of Dutch design. These fears were not unreal. As recently as 1920, the Dutch foreign minister enquired of the British ambassador at The Hague the likely reaction of the British government to Dutch purchase of Portuguese Timor (Hastings 1975b). Moreover, while the Dutch and Portuguese hammered out a pragmatic arrangement regarding border crossing by east and west Timorese for traditional reasons of trade and family reunion, the Portuguese were intensely suspicious of Dutch intentions and contacts. They actively discouraged their subjects from learning Dutch or pasar Melayu, as in the post-World War II period they discouraged their Timorese subjects from learning Indonesian or listening to RRI (Radio Republik Indonesia) vernacular broadcasts. One of the hidden penalties for Indonesia's intervention in 1975 was the extraordinary problem of communication at the administrative level between Indonesians and East Timorese (except in those areas where Tetum was the lingua franca) which is only being slowly overcome by the introduction of Bahasa Indonesia.

Portugal was no less suspicious of possible Indonesian intentions over East Timor in the post-World War II period than it had been of Dutch intentions in the pre-war period. However there is little evidence that the Indonesian government entertained the same annexationist thoughts about East Timor as their Dutch predecessors. It is true that in the months preceding the Indonesian independence declaration in August 1945 the BPKI (Committee to Investigate Indonesian Independence) had considered the inclusion of Portuguese Timor within the boundaries of the new Indonesian nation. These proposed boundaries included all of the former Netherlands East Indies, the Straits Settlements, part of the southern Philippines, and the Borneo Territories. This concept of Indonesia Raya was largely promoted by Professor Mohammed Yamin and like-minded political romantics, some of whom believed that Indonesian culture stretched from Madagascar (whose language, closely affiliated with Indonesian, belongs to the great Malayo-Pacific group) to distant Hawaii. In the end the BPKI settled for the territorial boundaries of the new state as comprising neither more nor less than those of the former Netherlands East Indies.
Any notions of pressing for the inclusion of Portuguese Timor, or for that matter Malaya, were lost initially in the urgent and pressing business of fighting the Dutch in order to establish the new state.

But as time went on there were other reasons why President Soekarno did not press any claims to Portuguese Timor. While ritually castigating the Portuguese colonial regime in Dili, and Portugal's African colonial policies, as Nekolim, he never gave so much as a hint of irredentist claims over East Timor because any hint of Indonesian incorporationist plans for East Timor, especially 'doing a Goa', would irreparably have damaged, in the eyes of many of Indonesia's Third World supporters, and the British and Americans, the integrity of Jakarta's claims to Netherlands New Guinea, which rested on legitimacy, on the fact that Indonesia was the incontestable successor state to the former Netherlands East Indies. In fact, Jakarta was in a cleft stick over Portuguese Timor throughout this period. Indonesia could not make any sort of claim to East Timor, or be seen actively to foment trouble there, without prejudicing its West New Guinea case.

Nor could it too actively promote the idea of independence for East Timor, even in the sacred name of anti-colonialism, without risking the possibility that the West Timorese might also be stirred to demand independence or that Holland might exploit the fact that Indonesia opposed independence for the West Irianese but supported it for the East Timorese. Wherever policy makers turned there were difficulties, and if there were formal plans at any time for Indonesia's annexation of Portuguese Timor they perforce gathered dust in some Jakarta office. There was in fact a curiously ironic footnote to Indonesia's dilemma over East Timor. In 1958 some Permesta refugees sought asylum in East Timor and some months later several of them led an anti-Portuguese pro-independence uprising in which between 150 and 600 Timorese were killed (Hastings 1975a, p.28, n.23).

One doubts in fact that in so far as the Indonesian government was concerned there were ever plans for East Timor's annexation. In his chapter in this volume Mr. Whitlam makes the telling point that President Suharto in conversation with the former Prime Minister in 1974 and 1975 used to refer to 'Portuguese' Timor. I can attest that in an interview with President Suharto in 1972 he also used the term Portuguese Timor in discussing regional boundaries. It is also worth recalling that in 1966, in what was quite possibly his first foreign press conference, the President went out of his way to assure some visiting Portuguese journalists that the New Order government had no territorial designs on East Timor. I believe that statement to have been sincere, as were, eight years later, the sentiments expressed by the then Foreign Minister, Mr Adam Malik, in his letter of 17 June 1974 to Fretilin leader Ramos Horta. The letter, inter alia, said that '... whoever will govern Timor after independence (my italics) can be assured that the Government of Indonesia will always strive to maintain good relations, friendship and co-operation for the benefit of both countries'.

In the months after the issue of that letter Indonesia's stance changed, not because previous attitudes expressed in Mr Malik's letter had been a sham, but because of the increasing uncertainty surrounding the nature of Portugal's revolution and the consequent direction that East
Timor's independence would take. The fears which plagued the Dutch from time to time in the nineteenth century as to the uncertain consequences of a change in sovereignty in the very centre of a Dutch controlled archipelago - fears which increasingly, and with good cause, fixated on the Japanese after 1920 - now began to afflict Indonesia's policy makers, resulting in the prolonged debate between establishment hawks and doves which was eventually resolved by the President's reluctant acquiescence in invasion and enforced incorporation.

Looking back at events what was Indonesia to do? What were the alternatives? To let events run their course? To seek to create a friendly client state? To intervene by subversion or by force? Obviously the most desirable solution was a voluntary act of incorporation in Indonesia by the East Timorese. But this became less and less likely with the passage of time. So did the possibility of creating a client state. There was the ever-present risk that the very existence of a nominally independent East Timor would only serve to fan into flames east Indonesia's minor but smouldering secessionist movements. In a unitary state which had fought for its independence, to risk fragmentation was unthinkable. No less unthinkable was the risk that an independent East Timor, under a Fretilin government, no matter how deferent to Jakarta its formal posture, would inevitably attract disgruntled former PKI elements and perhaps serve as a launching pad for subversive activities against the Republic. After all, Jakarta had not forgotten the lesson afforded by the activities of Permesta refugees in 1958 in promoting an anti-Portuguese rebellion in East Timor. Greatest risk of all, given Jakarta's somewhat paranoid preoccupation with a possible recrudescence of PKI activities, was that a Fretilin government in East Timor in self protection as well as in ideological affinity would establish close contacts with Hanoi, Peking and Lourenço Marques. While Indonesia's fears may have been grossly exaggerated they were nevertheless genuinely held. All of these unpleasant possibilities, combined with the 'self-righteous thrust of Indonesian nationalism', ensured invasion, occupation and annexation, with all the accompanying evidence of Indonesian indifference to human suffering and loss of life.

But the major element in Jakarta's decision to annex East Timor was clearly the uncertainty attending any change in sovereignty once Portugal had abdicated all political responsibility for its former colony. In some vital respects the action was not so dissimilar to that of Holland and Australia in despatching troops to Portuguese Timor thirty-four years earlier to prevent a possible change in sovereignty in the form of a Japanese takeover. While the action was militarily justifiable in terms of World War II it was certainly of dubious legality, as the Portuguese maintained in their reluctant acquiescence in the landing of the joint force.

There is little in the foregoing to suggest that there were Indonesian expansionist designs on East Timor or, if it comes to that, on Papua New Guinea. Historically, neither since independence nor in Dutch times, has there been much interest on the part of those governing in Jakarta in the far eastern end of the archipelago. Indonesia is certainly preoccupied with unstable states on its borders, and is instantly suspicious - a very different thing from expansionism - of any situation in which its
sovereignty seems to be under challenge, as certainly was the case when Papua New Guinea's government for a while followed policies, because of domestic pressures, which tolerated if they did not actually afford tacit support for OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, or Free Papua Movement) border activities and for Papua New Guinean politicians and elite groups advocating a one-island Melanesian state. So much has been written about the Papua New Guinea-Irian Jaya problem since I first drew attention to some of its ramifications in *New Guinea Quarterly* and elsewhere in the mid-1960s and after Pepera in 1969, that it will suffice to list a few of the major elements in the situation.

First and foremost is the reluctance of Papua New Guineans, conditioned by nearly a generation of Australian-inspired anti-Indonesian sentiment in Papua New Guinea itself - a legacy of past attitudes on the part of the PIR, missionaries, planters and administrators - to recognize either the legal basis of West New Guinea's inclusion within the Republic or the province's political significance to Indonesians. Most Papua New Guineans, who never fought an anti-colonialist war, fail to recognize that Irian Jaya has a symbolic significance which deeply impinges on Indonesian nationalist values, that 800 Indonesians including prominent revolutionary leaders like Mohammed Hatta and Sutan Sjafrir once languished in the camps of Tanahmerah in colonialist times and that for a unitary republic, regarding itself as successor state to the former Netherlands East Indies, the return of Irian Jaya after seventeen years struggle was intimately connected with the anti-Dutch revolution, the very foundations of the Republic.

Nor is Irian Jaya less central to Indonesian nationalism because urban Irianese are deeply resentful of Indonesian-style administration and of economic discrimination in favour of migrating Buginese and other Indonesian ethnic groups, or because they are aware of the painful disparity in economic development and job opportunities between Irian Jaya and Papua New Guinea, or because an independent Papua New Guinea reminds older Irianese politicians that the Dutch had once promised them a subsidized ride to independence. Jakarta sees the problem as a long-term process by which the Irianese, like other ethnic minorities, will be ultimately Indonesianized, speak Indonesian as a first tongue, and identify themselves with Indonesian national goals and values and with Indonesian social and political institutions.

The problems facing Jakarta over OPM operations along the border have been greatly reduced with the arrest of Jakob Prai and Ondwame and their exile to Sweden. The OPM itself was never a large organization, numbering at best 100 hard core guerillas, poorly equipped with antiquated rifles and traditional weapons but able to influence large numbers of border villages and, perennially alarming to Indonesian authorities, able with impunity to cross the border into the Melanesian sanctuary of Papua New Guinea. With the loss of Jakob Prai the OPM is now badly split by rival leadership problems, while the new tough line adopted by Papua New Guinea in co-operating with Indonesian border controls, and in sending back nearly all self-described refugees, has contributed to a marked lessening of tensions between Jakarta and Port Moresby. The extent to which these tensions are in part generated by lack of economic opportunity in the border area, and the extent to which the two governments carry out their
pledges to bring economic development to the region, remain highly speculative (Herlihy 1979).

The border will remain a problem simply because the Melanesians who live along it will continue for a long time to regard the Indonesians as ethnic aliens. But by the same token the processes of Indonesian acculturation, subtle as well as brutal processes, will continue. The main problem is not the long term result, that is not in doubt, but the middle term effects on the Melanesians which will make very difficult demands on them.

There are probably some 260,000 non-Irianese Indonesian migrants now in Irian Jaya, about a quarter the total population. Of this number between 30,000 and 50,000 are official \textit{transmigrasi} (mainly Javanese rice farmers), while the remainder are principally Buginese and other voluntary settlers from eastern Indonesia. They have tended to settle mainly in Irian Jaya's towns, all of which, Indonesian style, are showing signs of rapid growth. Although the settlers have not impinged on rural areas to the same extent as on urban centres, there is a degree of rural impact which is in any case compounded by the increasing internal migration of the Melanesians. Serious ethnic tensions are in the making which in the short term are likely to manifest themselves in increased unrest and violence which will undoubtedly be reflected in increased anti-Indonesian feeling in Papua New Guinea (see Hastings 1979).

While this scenario broadly implies fluctuating tensions between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, involving Australia, it is a very far cry from any hint of Indonesian expansionist designs on Papua New Guinea. It is simply a harbinger of future troubles. Papua New Guinea in the first place is not a politically unresolved colonial remnant (such as Portuguese Timor was) but a sovereign state, whose independence Indonesia welcomed, its capacity to remain united higher than was anticipated, a member nation of the UN, of the Commonwealth, of the Pacific Forum and an independent country enjoying a special relationship with Australia. For that matter Australians and Papua New Guineans should carefully ponder the fact that Indonesia has only acted, or threatened to act, in unresolved colonial situations such as Irian Jaya, the Borneo Territories Confrontation and Timor. Since 1966 Indonesia has shown no improper interest in Sabah or Sarawak; it has clearly accepted Brunei's future status as one to be determined by the parties principal, Brunei, Britain and Malaysia; and over the Sulu Archipelago situation has played a discreet and friendly role. There seems little reason to foresee any change in the current, careful relationship between a populous Southeast Asian state and its mini-state neighbour. There will be constant problems, of course, due to interaction between two sides of a Melanesian island, and underlying tensions will surface. But the basic restraint which has marked the approach of both countries - each with its fair share of internal instabilities - to problems remains an encouraging pointer to future relations.
NOTES

1 A. da Sousa Santos and J.S. Dunn, personal communications. Mr da Sousa Santos was Inspector General Overseas Services in 1974 and Director, Native Affairs, Dili and Bobonaro, 1940-43.

2 HANKAM (Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan, Department of Defence and Security) briefing, September 1978.

3 Copy of a letter given to me by Ramos Horta.

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IRIAN JAYA: WEST PAPUAN NATIONALISM IN 1979 *

R.J. May

Ever since the transfer of sovereignty in Irian Jaya in 1962, the Indonesian government has faced opposition from West Papuan nationalists within the country and abroad. Following the so-called 'Act of Free Choice' (PEPERA) in 1969, however, the position of Indonesia's Melanesian population has attracted little attention from outside observers (though the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1975 provided occasion for some comment on Indonesian imperialism in Melanesia and some speculation about Indonesian ambitions towards East Irian).

Events in 1977 and 1978 temporarily changed this. Local 'uprisings' in several parts of Irian Jaya drew renewed attention to the demand for Irianese separatism, and Indonesia's handling of the situation elicited widespread sympathy for the West Papuans, especially amongst Irian Jaya's Melanesian neighbours.

This paper briefly recounts the events of 1977-78 and attempts to assess their impact, particularly with respect to relations between Indonesia and its neighbour, Papua New Guinea; it also offers some tentative comments on the state of the nationalist movement and the future of West Papuan separatism.

THE EVENTS OF 1977-78

Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s sporadic armed clashes occurred throughout Irian Jaya between Indonesian authorities and West Papuan freedom fighters. Since such incidents were seldom reported, and were probably exaggerated on both sides when they were, there is no reliable measure of the extent or scale of this conflict, but it was widespread and persistent.

However, from early 1977 there is clear evidence of an escalation of conflict between West Papuan groups and Indonesian government forces. The escalation appears to have coincided with the approach of national elections in May 1977 and to have been associated with Melanesian resistance to pressures to vote for the ruling Golkar party. Reports of refusals to take part in the election, digging up of airstrips, and attacks on government

* This paper was prepared at short notice when it was learnt that Peter Hastings would not be able to be in Canberra for the presentation of his paper. It draws on material presented to a seminar on the Indonesia-Papua New Guinea border held in May 1979 in Canberra (May 1979 α).
posts came from as far afield as Arso on the north coast near Jayapura, Timika on the south coast and Enarotali and Wissel Lakes to the west. In the Baliem Valley of the central highlands 250 people were said to have been killed in a major confrontation between Indonesian troops and Dani tribesmen (Sharp 1977). As had happened during previous periods of unrest, large numbers of Irianese villagers, fearing Indonesian reprisals or intimidation, fled across the border into Papua New Guinea. At the end of May 1977 there were over two hundred refugees in Papua New Guinea's Western Province and several hundred more at other points along the border; an editorial in Papua New Guinea's daily newspaper commented: 'The problem is not new, but ... the trickle has become a human flood' (Post-Courier 31 May 1977). There were also reports (subsequently denied by intelligence sources) that a Papua New Guinea villager had been shot by an Indonesian patrol on the Papua New Guinea side of the border (Post-Courier 30 May 1977). Yet when Papua New Guinea's Foreign Minister, Sir Albert Maori Kiki, expressed concern at the border situation Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik told him, curtly, that the recent 'tribal fighting' in Irian Jaya was a domestic affair and that Indonesia would not tolerate those who attempted to exploit the tribal clashes for political purposes (Post-Courier 8, 13, 15 June 1977).

During the second half of 1977 and in 1978 it became obvious that what Malik had dismissed as 'tribal fighting' was in fact part of a widespread confrontation between the Indonesian government and West Papuan nationalist guerrillas led by the OPM (see p. 724 footnote). In one incident, OPM agents and supporters sabotaged a pipeline and other installations at the Freeport copper mine in Tembagapura. Reports of the conflict are scant and mostly of doubtful reliability. However, it seems clear that though much of the conflict was localized and perhaps rather more spontaneous than part of a broad strategy, OPM operations caused concern to Indonesian authorities and the scale of border crossings presented something of an embarrassment. During 1978 military action against the OPM intensified.

As operations against the OPM were stepped up, an increasing number of Irianese crossed the border seeking either temporary refuge or permanent asylum in Papua New Guinea. Faced with a growing number of Irianese in refugee camps along the border and under pressure from Indonesia to honour its commitment, under a 1973 border agreement, to prevent the use of its territory for hostile activities against Indonesia, the Papua New Guinea government announced late in 1977 that it would take 'a tougher line with all border crossers' (National Parliamentary Debates 2(4), p. 381, 10 November 1977). And in April 1978 it was reported that Papua New Guinea's Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence, and the Defence Force commander, had held talks in Port Moresby with OPM leaders Jacob Prai Prai and Seth Rumkorem and had told them to remove camps on the Papua New Guinea side of the border or have them burnt (Post-Courier 28 April 1978, 1 May 1978). Also, in May 1978, following a visit to Indonesia, Papua New Guinea's Foreign Minister, Ebia Olewale, announced that Papua New Guinea was now mounting 'constant patrols' along the border (Sydney Morning Herald 18 May 1978).

Activity along the border further intensified in late May 1978 following the kidnapping of Indonesian officials by a rebel group south of Jayapura. At the end of the month it was reported that a large-scale Indonesian military operation was in progress. Shortly after, Papua New Guinea's Prime Minister Somare announced his government's decision to deploy troops and
police along the northern sector of the boundary in order to prevent OPM rebels from crossing. By mid-June Papua New Guinea had about 500 army and police personnel in the border area. According to Sydney Morning Herald reports (14, 21 June 1978) Indonesia had four battalions - about 2800 men - plus police paramilitary units and other ancillary forces in Irian Jaya, with about 700 men patrolling the border. But although there was liaison between the two governments (as required under the 1973 border agreement), Papua New Guinea firmly resisted repeated Indonesian requests for joint patrols (Post-Courier 12, 13, 21 June 1978).

In the following weeks there was at least one major border incursion by an Indonesian patrol which was reported to have raided a Papua New Guinea village and destroyed gardens, bringing an official protest from the Papua New Guinea government. Early in July Indonesian operations escalated; villages were strafed and plastic bombs dropped in the border area. In Papua New Guinea the government expressed to the Indonesian Ambassador its fears for the safety of Papua New Guinea citizens near the border, but requests to Indonesia to confine bombing raids to an area not less than 8 km from the border were refused. Conscious of the possibility of an accidental clash between Indonesian and Papua New Guinean patrols, the Papua New Guinea government began withdrawing its troops from the area. Once again hundreds of Irianese villagers moved across the border into Papua New Guinea. Then, in September 1978, after months of conspicuously unsuccessful patrolling by Indonesian forces in the border area, the Irianese rebels released their hostages. Indonesia's military operations were scaled down.

On top of this, in late September, OPM leaders Prai and Otto Ondowame were arrested in Papua New Guinea, charged as illegal immigrants, and, having been denied permissive residency in Papua New Guinea, eventually granted asylum in Sweden.

A few weeks later, a statement (reported in Far Eastern Economic Review 24 November 1978) by Indonesia's Defence Minister, General Jusuf, gave notice of a shift in Indonesia's policy towards Irianese dissidents. Under a new 'smiling policy' there would be greater tolerance of Melanesian culture and 'there was no need for the army to pursue rebels'. In December 1978 this new policy was outlined to the Papua New Guinea government during an official visit by Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja; there was also talk of co-operation in the social and economic development of the border area.

Peter Hastings has suggested (1979, p.4) that the escalation of military operations in Irian Jaya in the second half of 1978 - which he saw at the time as 'a typical exercise in Indonesian overkill' - 'may have been quite deliberate in order to urge upon the Papua New Guinea government the growing seriousness of unchecked border crossings and to obtain from it a proper response'; that as such 'it was successful', and that it largely made possible the switch to the 'smiling policy'. I have argued elsewhere (May 1979b, p.95) that this explanation does not fit the sequence of events and that the buildup of activity along the border can be explained simply as a response to the May kidnapping and that the 'de-escalation' in September - following an operation in which Indonesian troops lost face by their failure to capture the rebels - resulted from the release of the hostages.
Further, I have argued that if Indonesia's 'policy' was as suggested by Hastings, then it was a dangerous ploy of dubious effect, since Papua New Guinea's eventual response was to withdraw its troops, and since it considerably exacerbated ill feeling towards Indonesia in Papua New Guinea and elsewhere.

THE OPM*

The West Papuan nationalist movement is characterized by what Hastings (1979, p.7) has referred to as 'sheer Melanesian complexity'. It is fragmented geographically between Holland, Irian Jaya, Senegal and Papua New Guinea (from time to time since 1963 it has also maintained offices in London, New York, Sydney, Christchurch and Stockholm) and it is divided both ideologically and by personalities.

The movement in Holland is largely in the hands of the early nationalist leaders, described by Savage (1978, p.142) as an 'educated elite'. It includes people, both those who were initially pro-Indonesian and those pro-Dutch, whose opposition to incorporation within the Indonesian state forced them to leave Irian Jaya. This group contains at least two elements: one, identified with the National Liberation Council and supported by a fundamentalist church organization, is led by Nicolaas Jouwe; the other, grouped around the former Federation of Melanesia, is led by Markus Kaisiepo. Although differing on some points, these two elements share a stance broadly pro-Western, strongly Christian and politically right of centre. During recent years they have been active propagandists for West Papuan separatism, but their linkages with the movement in Irian Jaya appear to have become tenuous and the leadership of the older generation is being challenged by younger, more radical members of the Dutch Irianese community.

In Irian Jaya itself, at least three factions appeared in 1977-78 to be operating independently of — and at times in opposition to — one another. The most broadly based of these was under the leadership of a former Indonesian army officer, Brigadier-General Seth Rumkorem. A press release from Dakar, dated November 1978, described Rumkorem as President of the Revolutionary Provisional Government of West Papua (RPG) and Commander-in-Chief of the National Liberation Army (NLA). In 1976 a group led by the then President of the Revolutionary Provisional Senate of the RPG, Jacob Prai, broke away from the NLA and formed a separate force, which during 1977-78 operated mainly in the area near the Papua New Guinea border. According to RPG sources (Press Release 1-78, Dakar, 3 November 1978) the reason for the split was a disagreement between Prai and the RPG over Prai's Marxist-Leninist ideological orientation and his advocacy of an approach to the Eastern bloc for military and financial assistance. Subsequently Prai

*OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka - Free Papua Movement) is used here as a shorthand term to describe the various organizational and factional components of the West Papua nationalist movement. For a more detailed discussion see Savage and Martin 1977, Savage 1978 and Parsons 1978.
announced the establishment of a rival 'RPG' with himself as President and Jouwe as Vice-President. During 1977 the Rumkorem and Prai factions came into open conflict and some members of the 'official' RPG were said to have been held captive by Prai's men. A third, apparently maverick, group was carrying out guerrilla operations in the area south of Jayapura in 1977-78 under the leadership of Martin Tabu. It was this group which was responsible for the helicopter ambush of May 1978 (see above). Following the arrest of Prai in Papua New Guinea in September 1978, Tabu appears to have succeeded him (Wantok 24 November 1979 carries a report of recent fighting between Tabu's forces and those led by Rumkorem.) Collectively, the OPM forces operating in Irian Jaya are small in number, with few weapons and poor access to supplies. They appear not to have received significant assistance from outside Irian Jaya and have had to rely for their existence on the hospitality of friendly villages (though some reports suggest that Tabu has coerced villagers). To the extent that they have succeeded in harassing the authorities, they have done so largely through their ability to carry out small ambushes and evade military retaliation, and their ability to exploit the grievances of larger village groups.

The Senegal group, led by another early nationalist, Ben Tanggahma, opened its office in Dakar in 1975 and operates under the banner of the ('official') RPG. Ideologically, it seeks a free, democratic West Papuan state and the eventual reunification of the two halves of the island; it rejects the left wing ideology of Prai and others ('Our struggle is a national liberation struggle, not a class struggle. Our ideology is Melanesian nationalism, not Marxism-Leninism'), and it sees the Melanesian people as 'ethnically and culturally linked to the peoples of Africa and the Caribbean, and quite dissimilar to those of Indonesia' and Europe (a declaration of negritude which has won it the support of, amongst others, the US NAACP).

Under the terms of their permissive residency, Irianese refugees in Papua New Guinea are not allowed to engage in political activities in support of West Papuan nationalism. Nevertheless the Irianese community in Papua New Guinea seems to have had good contacts with the OPM in Irian Jaya, and in 1977-78 acted as a channel for information to the Sydney-based South Pacific News Service (SPNS). The SPNS generally adopted a broadly neo-Marxist line, supportive of Prai. Early in 1978 a group within Papua New Guinea calling itself the South Pacific Group opposed an officially sanctioned visit by Jouwe (see Post-Courier 12, 24, 25, 30 January 1978) and subsequently the SPNS published a strong criticism of Jouwe, describing him as 'something of a joke within the freedom movement'. However, when in April 1978 Jouwe released the names of an eighteen-man 'cabinet of the de facto government of West Papua', ten were names of Irianese in Papua New Guinea (six citizens, two permissive residents and two serving gaol sentences for illegal entry). (The other eight included Tanggahma, Prai and six Irianese in Holland.) The complexity of the shifting allegiances within the West Papua movement has been reflected, in part, within Papua New Guinea's Irianese community; but notwithstanding this, the existence of a fairly large group of politically conscious Irianese refugees (official estimates are 2000-3000) has undoubtedly sensitized Papua New Guineans to the grievances of their Melanesian neighbours. This became increasingly evident during 1977-79.
THE MELANESIAN CONNECTION

During 1977-78 relations between Indonesia and its eastern neighbour, Papua New Guinea, came under considerable strain. At one point Indonesia's First Secretary in Port Moresby was reported as accusing Papua New Guinea of having double standards on the border issue and saying that if Indonesia wanted to invade Papua New Guinea 'we would do it now when Papua New Guinea is weak' (Post-Courier 19, 26, 28 April 1978; Sydney Morning Herald 2 May 1978). And in July 1978 a meeting at the University of Papua New Guinea, perhaps with an exaggerated sense of drama, described Papua New Guinea as 'slowly entering a state of war with Indonesia' (Post-Courier 7 July 1978).

In point of fact, the Papua New Guinea government has consistently acknowledged Indonesia's sovereignty in Irian Jaya and has accepted the principle that action against dissident elements in the province is a matter of internal policy for Indonesia and not a concern of Papua New Guinea. Nevertheless, there has been widespread recognition of an underlying conflict between Papua New Guinea's official policy, dictated by the political reality of the situation, and the fundamental sympathies of Papua New Guineans for their Melanesian brothers. And there is no doubt that, without affecting its acceptance of Indonesian sovereignty in Irian Jaya, the Papua New Guinea government has, over time, exercised varying degrees of diligence in its administration of the border - and that Indonesia has been sensitive to this (May 1979b).

With the intensification of conflict between the OPM and the Indonesian government in 1977 - coinciding in Papua New Guinea with a national election - the saliency of Irian Jaya in Papua New Guinea's politics increased substantially. The cause of the West Papuans was taken up variously by students, church leaders, intellectuals, and a number of prominent politicians (see May 1979b). And the sympathy of these groups for their fellow Melanesians was reinforced by growing resentment of Indonesia's high-handed response to expressions of concern from the Papua New Guinea government. Although some commentators seem to find it necessary to import expatriate journalist and academic stirrers (the patronizing suggestion made by Whitlam 1980, p.5 in his address to this seminar) or allegations of 'Indophobia' (Hastings 1979, p.2) to explain Papua New Guineans' legitimate concern at the events of 1977-78, the fact of the matter is that Papua New Guinean sympathy for the West Papuan rebels has historical roots which go back to the stirrings of nationalism in the two halves of the island in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and draws on a strong (if poorly informed) sense of common Melanesian ethnic identity (not to mention a concern for human rights).

Thus in 1977-78 the Papua New Guinea government found itself squeezed between the demands, on the one hand, to respond to Indonesian pressure to demonstrate its commitment to the border agreement and to the acceptance of Indonesian sovereignty in Irian Jaya, and, on the other, to recognize the considerable local pressure (including pressure from the representative of the UN High Commission for Refugees) to deal sympathetically with border crossers and to not let itself be pushed around by Indonesia. In this context it is scarcely surprising that there was some evidence of conflict between the public attitudes and private feelings of Papua New Guinea's
leaders. What is perhaps more remarkable is that Papua New Guinea did not waver in its official policy of friendship towards Indonesia; that the parliamentary opposition offered no alternative policy on the subject (despite criticisms of the government's handling of events); and that a document, published in the Papua New Guinea press in February 1979, allegedly outlining plans for an Indonesian invasion of Papua New Guinea (Nation Review 1 February 1979 and Post-Courier 8, 12 February 1979) was dismissed as a fabrication with little public comment.

In 1979 the border agreement was renewed, after amicable negotiations; President Suharto made a successful visit to Papua New Guinea; Papua New Guinea and Indonesia announced joint development plans (Sydney Morning Herald 21 July 1979); and in Papua New Guinea domestic political concerns pushed the Irian Jaya issue once more into the background.

PROSPECTS

The capture and subsequent deportation of Prai and his deputy undoubtedly took some of the steam out of the OPM in Irian Jaya; and the announcement by the Papua New Guinea government of a tougher line against border crossers, and against those expressing sympathy with the OPM within Papua New Guinea, seems likely to inhibit support from that side of the border. Nevertheless, despite internal divisions the OPM continues to be an irritant to Indonesian authorities, and there is evidence of continued widespread support for the movement within the province. It is just possible that a shift to the 'smiling policy' coupled with a more positive approach to development in the border area will, over time, do something to alleviate the dissidence, but it is by no means obvious that this will happen, and in fact it remains to be seen whether - apart from military operations - the pronouncements of the national government can be translated into meaningful changes in policy in the field. In the longer term, some commentators see continued in-migration from other provinces as a factor which will facilitate the Indonesianization of Irian Jaya and, by sheer weight of numbers, reduce the problem of Melanesian dissidence. But those who put this view do so in the face of historical evidence elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

In short, a marked resurgence of West Papuan nationalism seems unlikely (and effective Papua New Guinean support for such a development even more unlikely). But, at least to this observer, the prospect of a steady decline and eventual disappearance of the West Papua movement also seems remote. Less dramatic, but perhaps more realistic, is a scenario in which a policy of assimilation, supported by substantial in-migration, is sustained against opposition - sporadically violent - from a nationalist movement which draws strength from a growing number of disaffected young educated Irianese and from an increasingly marginalized rural population. It goes without saying that this is a prospect which offers no joy either to the Indonesian government or to those whose sympathies lie with the Papuan nationalists.
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The complexity of the situation of the Chinese minority in Indonesia and the twists and turns of Sino-Indonesian relations during the past thirty years are such that one is tempted to write an introduction to the subject of book length. A proper understanding of what is requires a grasp of how it came to be that way, but in a paper of this scope the historical dimension will necessarily be lost (cf. Mackie 1976 and the references cited in its select bibliography).

The Indonesian Chinese are a small ethnic minority when compared to Indonesia's total population of about 140 million, numbering probably less than four million or about 2.6 per cent. The approximation of this estimate must be stressed, since reliable statistics are unavailable. The national census does not help us since it does not enumerate the population by ethnic origin. Whilst it does classify the population by nationality, the greater part of the Indonesian Chinese are subsumed under the majority who are Indonesian citizens (WNI Chinese).

In 1979 the State Prosecutor's Office conducted a nation-wide registration of everyone of Chinese descent, an action which offended those with Indonesian citizenship. Not only were they (and the alien Chinese) required to answer a lengthy and inquisitional questionnaire at considerable expense, but the very fact that they were treated in the same way as the alien Chinese demonstrated to them the hollowness of the government's claim that it does not discriminate against its Indonesian citizens who are of Chinese descent (Kamm 1979).

Although previous history encourages us to adopt a cautious, if not downright cynical, view of the government's intentions, it appears that this measure was a prelude to a major change in policy toward the Chinese minority. The Badan Koordinasi Masalah Cina (Co-ordinating Body for the Chinese Problem), which is a division of BAKIN, the State Intelligence Co-ordinating Body, has formulated a plan to extend access to Indonesian citizenship to the estimated one million alien Chinese. According to Major-General Sunarso, the head of BRMC, every alien will have the opportunity to become a citizen (Jenkins 1979d).

The plan, which is being implemented with some urgency in 1980 (Kompas 1980), represents a reversal of the trend which had been evident since the early 1950s to restrict access to Indonesian citizenship for the alien Chinese. The lengthy Sino-Indonesian negotiations and treaty concerning dual nationality in the 1950s and 1960s, no less than the Indonesian nationality law of 1958, had left the alien Chinese and their descendants with virtually permanent alien status, while at the same time supposedly clarifying the position of the remainder of the Chinese minority who had previously been regarded as holding both Chinese and Indonesian citizenship (Coppel 1972).
The origins of the present shift in policy are said to lie in the deterioration of relations between China and Vietnam and the exodus of refugees (many of them of Chinese ancestry) from Vietnam. It was, in fact, from Indonesia that the first great exodus of overseas Chinese refugees in Southeast Asia had taken place. A decree by President Soekarno in 1959 which banned retail trade by aliens in rural areas had resulted in some 119,000 Indonesian Chinese leaving for China and another 17,000 for Taiwan (Mozingo 1976, Chapter 6). The economic dislocation caused by that exodus was an important factor in the Suharto government's rejection in 1966-67 of demands by more vociferously anti-Chinese organizations and individuals that the alien Chinese should be expelled from the country (Coppel 1975, Chapters 3 and 4). The expulsion by Vietnam of the greater part of its Chinese bourgeoisie has compelled the more moderate and/or the more cautiously technocratic elements of the Indonesian policy-making elite to move toward a longer-term solution of 'the Chinese problem' than had been possible a decade earlier. Now, as then, they reject the views of such advocates of mass expulsion as the nationalist former Indonesian ambassador to Vietnam, Usep Ranawidjaja, who reportedly said in May 1979: 'It must be admitted that North Vietnam is the only country in Southeast Asia which has succeeded in dealing with the problem of the Overseas Chinese' (Jenkins 1979a).

The Indonesian government is anxious to continue to take advantage of Chinese skills and capital for economic development. At the same time, it has been coming under increasing pressure from indigenous (Pribumi) businessmen to exercise positive discrimination in their favour (and thus at the expense of the Chinese, whatever their national status). Pribumi economic nationalism has had a long and chequered history since Indonesian independence. Earlier measures, in the 1950s, to give preference to indigenous businessmen had frequently merely provided Chinese business with an Indonesian front - the so-called 'Ali-Baba' partnership.

In the first five or six years of the Suharto New Order government, top priority was given to the rehabilitation and growth of the economy. In this climate foreign investment and domestic Chinese capital were given every encouragement, even though as early as 1968 the government had in its domestic capital investment law signalled its intention in the longer term to promote 'national' enterprise. For some years, however, indigenous businessmen complained that Chinese companies were being given preferential treatment for government licences, contracts and credit. In part, the Chinese access to credit could be justified on strictly commercial grounds in that the larger Chinese businesses could be seen as more credit-worthy. Often, however, their success was alleged to be founded on their backing by powerful officials and army men.

Indigenous resentment of growing Chinese business success came to a head in the rioting which broke out in Jakarta during the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka in January 1974. The riots were on the face of it an expression of hostility to growing Japanese economic penetration, but the underlying anti-Chinese feeling was apparent in the destruction of Chinese stalls at the newly-built Senen shopping centre. This, together with continual criticism of the role of the Chinese cakong (big businessmen in league with the politically powerful), awakened the
government from its complacency that 'the Chinese problem' had been solved, alarmed the more vulnerable members of the Chinese minority, and gave steam to the increasingly assertive demands by *priyumi* business for a larger slice of the economic cake.

The outcome of these developments was Presidential Decree No. 14 of 1979 which gives preferential treatment in several economic sectors to what is euphemistically described as 'the economically weaker group' - that is, *priyumi* businessmen, or companies in which a large percentage of the capital and top management is indigenous (Jenkins 1979b).

This decree sits uneasily beside the government's moves to liberalize citizenship, and calls into question its proclaimed opposition to any form of discrimination amongst Indonesian citizens. On the citizenship issue the government has been ahead of, if not in conflict with, public opinion, and it is significant that it has not asked the parliament to amend the citizenship law. In the case of Presidential Decree No. 14, the government has been lagging behind *priyumi* business demands. In each case there are powerful vested interests opposed to change. Many of the politically influential benefit directly from arrangements or partnerships with Chinese businesses, just as many government officials benefit from the squeeze they are able to exert on the Chinese (particularly but not exclusively the aliens) through the administration of the existing citizenship requirements.

A central concern of the government in formulating its policies on 'the Chinese problem' is its continuing need of Chinese capital and skills for development and its fear of the political and economic instability which would result from measures which affect the Chinese business community too drastically and abruptly.

Because of the Jakarta rioting in January 1974, a group of WNI Chinese and others who had been active proponents of the assimilation of the WNI Chinese under the banner of the semi-government body Lembaga Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa (LPKB - Institute for Promoting National Unity) in the 1960s resumed their activity under the aegis of the Jakarta provincial government. This was later elevated to the national level by the Department of Home Affairs with the formation of BAKOM PKB (Communication Body for the Instilling of National Unity). Like its 1960s predecessor, the BAKOM PKB has been attempting to instil the ideal of assimilation or absorption of the Chinese minority into the wider Indonesian nation. It is the instrument through which in late February 1980 the government organized a five-day indoctrination course for private entrepreneurs (mostly non- *priyumi*) in the *Pancasila* state philosophy (Tempo 1980a).

Over the past decade Chinese communal associations have been severely curtailed and cultural manifestations of Chinese-ness greatly restricted. Chinese-language schools have been outlawed, publications in Chinese characters banned, and the import of Chinese-language videocassettes prohibited. Even the popular Chinese *kung fu* films are strictly censored and are required to have Indonesian-language sub-titles. Antagonism toward the display of Chinese cultural characteristics by the Chinese minority is a common feature of anti-Sinicisim in Indonesia. It is often linked with a fear that the Indonesian Chinese could be a Trojan horse or
fifth column for China, which the Indonesian foreign policy elite see as a serious threat to Indonesia. Indeed, the fear of China seems to be more closely related to size and power, its traditional hegemonic position in East and Southeast Asia, and its Chineseness, than to its communism (Weinstein 1976).

Soviet propaganda in Southeast Asia in the 1970s has played on the theme of the overseas Chinese as an instrument of Peking in a bid to prevent normalization of relations between the Southeast Asian states and China. The Jakarta nationalist daily Merdeka, which has been influenced by Soviet diplomats and is reputed to have received a large Soviet loan, has adopted a strong anti-Peking line on this theme. It is ironical that the Soviet Union in the 1970s has taken over the role adopted by the United States in the 1950s of exacerbating the suspicions held by many Indonesians that the ethnic Chinese could be a fifth column for China. (cf. Simoniya 1961 and Andreyev 1975; for American and Australian examples of fifth column theorizing, see Elegant 1959 and Millar 1964; for Russian influence on Merdeka, see Tasker 1979).

Although Indonesia, in 1950, was by far the first of what were to become the five ASEAN states to establish diplomatic relations with China and was closely aligned with China in the first nine months of 1965, the bilateral relationship deteriorated drastically from October 1965 as a result of political upheaval in Indonesia. After two years of diplomatic hostilities, the Indonesian government suspended relations with China. Despite the recognition of the Peking government and moves to normalize relations with China by the governments of Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, the Indonesian government has to date shown a marked reluctance to lift the suspension.

There can be little doubt that, if the Indonesian government had wished to resume normal relations with China, it could have done so. That it has not yet done so has been due largely to the strongly anti-China (and anti-Chinese) thinking of strategists in the Indonesian Department of Defence and Security. The return of Chinese consular and diplomatic officials to Indonesia if relations were normalized would, in the view of these defence strategists, merely offer them an opportunity to meddle in Indonesian internal affairs and to subvert Indonesian security under the guise of protecting the interests of Chinese nationals. (Some of the Chinese embassy and consular staff in Indonesia in 1966-67, inspired by the Cultural Revolution in China, had evidently acted to stiffen the resistance and protests of the Indonesian Chinese against the anti-Chinese excesses which they were experiencing at that time (Coppel 1975, Chapter 4).

The present drive to naturalize the alien Chinese and to clarify the status of the WNI Chinese (Kompas 1980) suggests that Indonesian defence strategists may have developed a new approach to the problem. If most alien Chinese in Indonesia adopt Indonesian citizenship and the Chinese government accepts their choice, the most important obstacle to a normalization of relations with Peking would be removed (Tempo 1980), including interview with Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja). In such a situation the Indonesian Chinese would no longer be a complication for the bilateral relationship because the Chinese government would no longer have the right or feel the obligation to intervene on their behalf.
The Chinese government's policy toward the overseas Chinese has been far from static over the thirty years since the communist government came to power in 1949. Stephen FitzGerald has cogently argued that since 1957 China has, apart from the anomalous interlude of the Cultural Revolution, actively encouraged the overseas Chinese to adopt the nationality of, and identify themselves with, the countries in which they reside (FitzGerald 1972). This would indicate that China would be prepared to accept the absorption by Indonesia of its Chinese minority.

Since early 1978, however, there have been indications that there may have been a shift in the Chinese government's attitudes toward the overseas Chinese and the rhetoric in which they have been expressed. The Chinese government is no longer distinguishing clearly between the different kinds of Chinese abroad, and overseas Chinese businessmen are once again being encouraged to contribute to the development of China. On the one hand, all Chinese abroad are called 'overseas Chinese' and are said to 'constitute part of the Chinese nation', including those who are no longer citizens of China (who are 'still our kinsfolk and friends'). On the other hand, these same 'overseas Chinese' are urged to take part in the campaign by the Chinese government to achieve the 'Four Modernizations' (Wang 1979; see also Liu 1979a, 1979b).

It is ironical that the Indonesian government should be clarifying the national status of the WNI Chinese and encouraging the alien Chinese to become WNI Chinese by naturalization at the same time that the Chinese government is blurring the distinction. It also remains to be seen how the Indonesian government would act if, in reaction to Indonesia's Presidential Decree No. 14 and in response to encouragement from the Chinese government, the Indonesian Chinese seek to use their capital and skills for the development of China rather than Indonesia.

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In considering Indonesia's relations with its neighbours we should first look briefly at methods of policy formation and the basic principles of Indonesian foreign policy.

Foreign policy is an executive matter which means it is ultimately decided by the president. He is advised by the minister for Foreign Affairs, by interested military sources, by some personal advisers, by parliament and by other ministers where relevant. There is not a wide popular interest in foreign affairs although educated people tend to think about it more than others. The two dominant figures since independence, Soekarno and Suharto, have very obviously determined Indonesia's basic policy lines during their presidencies.

The Soekarno period was characterized by a strong nationalist line, non-alignment and a reaction against colonialism. Soekarno's preoccupation - and his achievement - was to build a nation out of the diverse groups making up Indonesia. This internal need influenced his foreign policy and was undeniably one factor in the well known confrontation of Malaysia.

The Soekarno policies, especially towards the end of his rule, were highly personal but certain principles were laid down which have remained important even if the emphasis has changed. Concern for national cohesion and a desire to limit the influence of outside powers are two of these. The New Order's nationalism is more moderate and more positive than Soekarno's, but nationalism is still an essential component of Indonesian policy.

The president takes the decisions on the main lines of Indonesian policy but his decisions must take account of a number of internal views and pressures as well as of purely external considerations. Like any complex society, Indonesia contains a variety of opinions and outlooks which the political process must harmonize. Since independence these have included such diverse forces as traditional Muslims (NU), progressive Muslims (Muhammadiyah), militant Muslims (Darul Islam), Christians, communists (PKI), westernized liberal intellectuals, the military, the priyayi-influenced public servants, regional interests, pragmatic technocrats, mystic Javanese (kebatinan) and idealistic students. All these people may have different approaches to foreign policy questions. The realignment of forces and the consequent foreign policy changes after Soekarno's downfall, for example, show how things can change when different groups are in the ascendent.

THE NEW ORDER AND ITS NEIGHBOURS

In examining the New Order's relations with its Southeast Asian neighbours we need to look at Indonesia's relations with individual countries and with the region as a whole. We need also to consider
political, economic and defence relations. The dominant internal
influences on New Order foreign policy have been the turn from a communist
oriented non-alignment to a more genuine, and even slightly pro-Western
bias, plus a pragmatic, economically oriented approach to international
relations.Externally, the most significant developments have been the
formation of ASEAN and the Indo-China situation. Following the fall of
Soekarno, Indonesia became much less interested in strutting on the world
stage and has concentrated its efforts more on regional relations.

In political and strategic terms Indonesia's Southeast Asian
neighbours now take pride of place. This is not yet so in economic terms
and it is likely to be some considerable time before the other countries
of the region approximate in importance to Japan, North America and
Western Europe. But given the developments in Indo-China, political and
strategic concerns are obviously of great importance now to Indonesia.
ASEAN is becoming a central feature of Indonesian foreign policy and
increasingly its political and economic policies are being channelled
through ASEAN.

Malaysia

Malaysia is probably the most important of the ASEAN countries to
Indonesia - at least in a political and strategic sense. The Malay
Peninsula is very close to Sumatra and there is a great deal of contact
and intermarriage amongst people on either side of the straits. Similarly,
the two countries have a common land border in Kalimantan. There is also
a close feeling for the Malays who speak the same language and have close
ethnic, cultural and historical ties with the Indonesians. A hostile
Malaysia would be of very great concern to Indonesia. There is close
military co-operation in Kalimantan as well as joint naval operations to
combat piracy and smuggling. In recent times the two countries have co­
operated in handling Vietnamese boat refugees who tend to land in Malaysia
but then sometimes move on to Indonesia. Confrontation seems to be
regarded as a temporary aberration and is not a factor in today's
relationship.

The trading relationship however is a very slim one indeed. Malaysia
takes 0.02 per cent of all Indonesia's exports and supplies 0.34 per cent of
Indonesia's imports.

Philippines

Ties with the Philippines are less close although those parts of
Indonesia close to the Philippines have traditional ties with people on
the other side of the border. The Indonesians maintain close liaison with
the Filipinos in combating piracy and smuggling. While there are ethnic
ties and some historic ties there are no longer linguistic ties between
most Indonesians and the Filipinos, and contact amongst educated leaders in
the past was minimal. The Philippines is not a large customer and takes
only 1 per cent of Indonesia's exports (oil). The Philippines would like
to buy more Indonesian oil. There is some Filipino investment in
Indonesia; for example, timber and pharmaceuticals.
Thailand

Indonesia's relations with Thailand have been traditionally less close than with some others, but are cordial. Indonesia is concerned about the effect on Thailand of developments in Indo-China. Thailand buys very little from Indonesia (0.2 per cent of Indonesian exports but supplies 3.6 per cent of Indonesian imports) - mainly rice and oil seeds.

Singapore

Singapore is Indonesia's most significant regional trading partner, buying 2.35 per cent of all Indonesian exports. It supplies 9.67 per cent of Indonesian imports.

There are a number of other links including co-operation in anti-smuggling operations. There are, however, occasional strains and even some resentment by Indonesians at the money Singapore makes as an entrepôt port for Indonesian products.

Asean

After a relatively slow start ASEAN has become a vital force in the region. It began as an avowedly economic and cultural organization but has always had political overtones. The Bali declaration in February 1976 for the first time admitted formally that ASEAN had political aspects. In fact, the political aspect was always there and has probably been ASEAN's major achievement. ASEAN has created among the members a sense of belonging to a common region. The ASEAN countries increasingly consult closely on a wide range of issues and try to work out a common position. In some cases one or more ASEAN country has sacrificed some interests in the cause of ASEAN unity. Indonesia has been affected by this process just as the others have.

Indonesia is the largest most populous and potentially the wealthiest member of ASEAN. Some Indonesians believe that this gives them a right to greater influence within ASEAN than the other four members, and some outsiders accuse them of believing it. Some have even claimed that Indonesia is already dominating ASEAN in some unspecified way, but I do not think the evidence justifies this assertion. For example, within ASEAN Indonesia has been a proponent of a stronger secretariat but has not yet managed to convince all of the other members. The secretariat remains embryonic.

The economic relationship with its neighbours is not a vital one to Indonesia. It takes about 14 per cent of its total imports from the other ASEAN countries and they take only 9 per cent of Indonesia's total exports (dominated by a few products: crude petroleum, rubber, timber and fertilizers).

Although intra-ASEAN trade remains limited ASEAN has had some success acting as a bloc in pursuit of economic interests. In other words they have used political means to an economic end. This gives them greater bargaining power with outsiders and increasingly they are taking advantage of this.
ASEAN has always claimed not to be a military alliance and there is no reason to doubt this claim. Obviously there are bilateral arrangements amongst the members for specific kinds of co-operation and joint exercises. Indonesia is active in this field. However, Indonesia like the other ASEAN countries, believes that military action is only part of the story. They see the main threat to their security coming from subversion rather than from some kind of outright invasion. They therefore feel that the best method of defence is to build up 'national resilience'. What they mean by this is that social and economic development should be sufficient to keep people happy and convince them that the existing government is to be preferred to any possible alternatives. There is also the implication that people will be strong and patriotic enough to resist outside military action.

Indo-China

Indonesian relations with the countries of Indo-China can be looked at from two points of view. The first is its bilateral relations with those three countries, especially Vietnam. The second aspect is the effect of recent events in Indo-China on the ASEAN countries including Indonesia.

Looking first at Indonesia's bilateral relations, the first thing to note is that Indonesia has maintained cordial, if not especially close, relations with Hanoi for some considerable length of time. To this day they would claim to have closer or better access to the Vietnamese leadership than most other countries. But while there is no historical legacy to plague them, Indonesian attitudes have cooled recently because of Vietnamese actions in Kampuchea. Pham Van Dong's visit to Jakarta in 1978 promising peace shortly before the invasion of Kampuchea must have left Indonesians wondering whether Vietnamese promises can be trusted.

The whole Indo-China imbroglio presents Indonesia with some difficult choices. Indonesia would prefer to see an independent Kampuchea which would provide some balance in Indo-China. On the other hand, because of their well known suspicion of China we can not expect Indonesians to react favourably to a Chinese dominated Kampuchea. The position is complicated further by the fact that if Vietnam remains bogged down in Kampuchea then it will not have the resources or energy to make trouble elsewhere. While opposed to the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea the Indonesians hold no brief for the discredited Pol Pot regime. Nor would they wish to see a Vietnam dominated by the Soviet Union even though this may provide some counter-balance to China. These conflicting factors mean that it is not easy for the Indonesians to settle on a simple straightforward line which they can follow inflexibly. They therefore keep their lines open to Hanoi in the hope of influencing the Vietnamese government towards more moderate policies. They also encourage Vietnam to maintain its independence from the USSR. They tend to distinguish clearly - at least in their own minds - between the short and long term. However dramatic present events in Indo-China may be, the long term consequences must never be forgotten.

From the point of view of ASEAN as a whole the obvious issue of major concern is the refugee problem. Indonesia has been directly affected by
this, although not to the same extent as Thailand and Malaysia. Clearly anything which has a destabilizing effect on its ASEAN neighbours is of concern to the Indonesian government. The outflow of boat refugees to Malaysia has been of special concern both because of the general effects on Malaysia and because of the importance of Malaysia to Indonesia. It has also had a direct effect in that Indonesia and Malaysia have had to work out ways of handling refugees who move between Malaysian and Indonesian waters.

The position of Thailand is also a matter of great concern to Indonesia. While the influx of land refugees from Kampuchea (and to a lesser extent, Laos) does not pose an immediate threat to the basic stability of the Thai government and nation, it clearly causes problems for the Thais. As the flow increases so do the Thais' difficulties. Add to this the dangers of cross-border shelling or forays by Vietnamese/Kampuchean troops and you can see what kind of pressures the Thai government has to face.

While the Indonesians retain an open mind on the subject, like most other countries in the region, they are worried that Vietnam might not be satisfied with dominating the old French Indo-China. A direct military threat to Thailand would have obvious and most serious repercussions for ASEAN and for Indonesia. The Indonesians are also concerned about the introduction of great power rivalries in the region and do not want Southeast Asia to become a battleground for Soviet and Chinese forces - either military or ideological. The Indonesians are committed to the concept of ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality) which they see as an expression of their ideal to keep great powers out of the region. (This does not apply to positive economic involvement.)

It has been argued by some that events in Indo-China have put strains on ASEAN because of differing views on the Indo-China situation. While it is true that there are differences of emphasis in their approach, I would rather argue that the existence of what might almost be called a common threat has acted as a unifying factor. Whatever the internal differences of its members may be, ASEAN has presented a unified front and has acted as a group both inside and outside the UN.

FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

Relations with its Southeast Asian neighbours will remain a basic element of Indonesian foreign policy in the foreseeable future. We can see a clear trend since the end of the colonial era for the countries of the region to come closer together and this trend will continue. ASEAN will have its ups and downs but it is clearly here to stay.

Nevertheless it seems probable that Indonesia will maintain significant links with countries outside Southeast Asia. Its economic links with the West are very strong and it is hard to see any alternative in the near future. While we may expect intra-ASEAN trade to grow, its growth will be slow. It would certainly not be the kind of thing which would enable Indonesia to shift its trade and investment away from the major outside powers. Ties will therefore be close in the politico-strategic field
where countries of the region have essential common interests. In the economic field there will be a growing tendency to negotiate as a bloc in the pursuit of common interests, but this kind of activity is limited by the extent of their common interests and by the extent to which the ASEAN countries are in a position to put pressure on outside countries.

Indonesia will remain committed to the concept of ZOPPAN and will continue to oppose the spread of great power influence in the region. Its policies towards events in Indo-China will be concerted with its ASEAN partners.

Present indications are that Indonesian foreign policy in general will maintain its present pragmatism and not return to the ideologically oriented Soekarno days. Non-alignment will remain a basic tenet of Indonesian foreign policy. This means that it will maintain what it calls a non-communist approach although it is sometimes difficult to distinguish when a non-communist becomes an anti-communist approach. Its present attitude is one of peaceful co-existence but the Indonesian leadership would be concerned at any growth of communist influence in areas touching on Indonesia's borders.

The Indonesians would prefer to avoid the development of two blocs in Southeast Asia: ASEAN versus Indo-China. But they probably assess that this is a very likely development and if nothing can be done about it will learn to live with it. The major powers in such groupings would obviously be Indonesia and Vietnam.

CONCLUSIONS

Indonesia's Southeast Asian neighbours are and will remain the focus of Indonesian foreign policy but economic ties are growing only slowly. Major outside powers - principally Japan, China, USA and USSR - are important actors in the region and the EEC has an economic role to play. But these countries are important because of their influence on the region which is vital to Indonesia's security.

* * * * *

*I must stress that this contribution is designed as a seminar paper which sets out to stimulate discussion rather than to provide an exhaustive treatment of the subject. I should also note that it is presented in a personal capacity and the views expressed do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Foreign Affairs.*
Rather more than ten years ago I wrote an article in which I tried to explain why it is that 'Australia and Indonesia, two large neighbouring trading nations, hardly trade with each other' (Arndt 1968, p.168). Part of the explanation, I suggested, was that Australia and Indonesia had for long been parts of different colonial empires, their economies geared to those of the metropolitan countries. But this had ceased to be very significant. 'Historical associations have not prevented major changes in the pattern of trade. But the changes that have occurred have not, so far, been such as to favour bilateral trade between Australia and Indonesia. The basic fact is that, contrary to first appearances, the Australian and Indonesian economies have not in the past been strongly complementary and their economic development since World War II has done little to alter this situation' (Arndt 1968, p.171).

Both countries had in the past been, and remained, exporters of primary products and importers of manufactures. With quite minor exceptions - sugar in the past and perhaps copper in the future - their exports had not been competitive, but where there had been complementarity, fortuitous circumstances seemed to have worked against mutual expansion of markets. What little demand for Australia's temperate-zone foodstuffs there had been before World War II had largely disappeared with the expulsion of the Dutch, while the discovery of oil in Australia in the 1960s had put an end to by far the largest component of bilateral trade, Australian imports of crude oil from Indonesia. The economic decline of Indonesia in the 1960s, changes in technology and tastes adverse to traditional Australian imports from Indonesia, such as tea, rubber and kapok, Australian preference for Papua New Guinea, shipping difficulties, all these had conspired to keep bilateral trade at a low level.

Nor did prospects for the future look very encouraging. In both directions, hopes for exports of manufactures were circumscribed by relatively high costs, difficulties for a newcomer in breaking into export markets and the relatively small size of the other market. Indonesia would continue to need Australian wheat and would, if her development gained impetus, have a large demand for capital equipment of all kinds, some of which Australia might be able to meet. For Indonesia, the best export prospects, apart from tourism and handicrafts, appeared to be for timber.

Some years later, a committee of the Australian Senate enquired into prospects for trade between Indonesia and Australia (Senate Standing Committee 1975). Its conclusions were more optimistic.

The prospects for long-term development of trade between Indonesia and Australia are good, particularly for the export of Australian goods to Indonesia ... The greatest potential for growth in exports to Indonesia probably lies in capital goods including machinery, transport
equipment and other metal manufactures ... It is not easy to identify commodities imported from Indonesia for which any very considerable growth in trade can be predicted. Timber probably shows the greatest potential, followed by coffee and rubber. Other imports may be expected to show unspectacular but steady increases. In the long term, petroleum-derived chemical products and low cost manufactured goods may also become significant. The resumption of imports of oil is also possible.

The report added that 'considerable opportunities exist for Australian participation in joint venture enterprises in Indonesia', though they are rarely easy and considerable patience may be required (Senate Standing Committee 1975, p.4).

How far has the picture changed in the last five years? Is there more or less ground for optimism now than five years ago? I propose to deal first with development in merchandise trade between the two countries and then to say a little about other aspects of bilateral economic relations, shipping, direct investment, consultancy services and development assistance.

**MERCHANDISE TRADE**

The overall picture presented in Table 1 is disappointing. Indonesia's share in Australia's foreign trade has shown no clear upward trend and remains very small. Australian imports from Indonesia have risen in the last three years but the increase is mainly due to the resumption of imports of crude oil. All other imports continue to account for less than 0.5 per cent of total Australian imports. Indonesia's share in total Australian exports has actually declined, from 2.0 per cent in 1974-75 to 1.5 per cent last year, but this was due to exceptionally large wheat exports in the former year.

Australia is only slightly more important to Indonesia as a trade partner. Even including oil, imports by Australia still account for less than 1 per cent of Indonesia's export earnings. Indonesian imports from Australia have in recent years accounted for about 3 per cent of the value of total imports (c.i.f, according to Customs statistics). Another way of putting these figures into perspective is to point out that Indonesia, despite its size, accounts for less than one-fifth of Australia's trade (exports plus imports) with the five ASEAN countries.

**Australian Imports from Indonesia**

Of the more than fivefold increase in the value of Australia's imports from Indonesia in the last four years, more than half is accounted for by the resumption of imports of crude oil, a reflection of Australia's diminishing degree of self-sufficiency (Table 2). As in the 1950s and 1960s, when Indonesia supplied on average about one-fifth of Australia's oil imports, the crude oil comes from the Caltex Minas field in Sumatra. It is imported by Ampol under a contract concluded with Caltex in New York and refined in the Kurnell (Sydney) refinery. For the moment, this trade is more important to Australia which, like other net oil importers, has had some difficulty in
Table 1

Australia-Indonesia trade: share in each country's total trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$USm.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>$USm.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7426.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>11643.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To Australia</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>106.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which: oil</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6085.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>13757.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Indonesia</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>99.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which: oil</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3841.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>6690.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Australia</td>
<td>129.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>218.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6914.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>14233.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To Indonesia</td>
<td>106.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>217.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Indonesia: Central Statistical Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics.
Table 2
Australia's trade with Indonesia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total From Indonesia</td>
<td>Total To Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$Am. % $Am. %</td>
<td>$Am. % $Am. %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>2939 56.7 1.9</td>
<td>5.1 0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>3045 53.5 1.8</td>
<td>3.1 0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>3264 52.4 1.6</td>
<td>3.0 0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>3469 55.7 1.6</td>
<td>4.3 0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>3881 43.7 1.1</td>
<td>5.2 0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>4150 15.6 0.4</td>
<td>6.9 0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>4008 4.4 0.1</td>
<td>9.9 0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>4121 1.4 12.2 0.3</td>
<td>16.0 0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>6085 0.6 16.0 0.3</td>
<td>18.8 0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>8080 3.1 18.8 0.2</td>
<td>21.4 0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>8241 3.1 21.4 0.3</td>
<td>45.8 0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>10411 4.4 45.8 0.4</td>
<td>55.0 0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>11167 29.1 55.0 0.5</td>
<td>84.1 0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-79</td>
<td>13757 49.3 49.9 0.4</td>
<td>99.2 0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


securing supplies in the post-Iran period of world shortage, than to Indonesia which can easily sell all the oil it is able and willing to make available for export. This is likely to remain the situation for the foreseeable future, and while it continues Australia's oil imports make no contribution to Indonesia's total export earnings. In 1978-79, Australia also imported $4.5 million worth of refined petroleum products, the precise nature of which is a mystery.

Much of the increase in the value of other Australian imports from Indonesia in the last few years is due to what must be assumed to be a temporary factor, the world coffee shortage which resulted from the 1975 frost disaster in Brazil. Indonesia benefited substantially from the fivefold rise in the price of coffee, and a consequential threefold rise in the price of tea. Australia's imports of the two commodities combined rose from $7.7 million in 1973-74 to $36.1 million in 1977-78 (Table 3). In the case of coffee, Indonesia also filled part of the gap left by reduced supplies from Brazil (Table 4). Her coffee exports to Australia almost doubled in volume, while those of her chief competitor in the Australian market, Papua New Guinea, actually declined slightly. In the case of tea, however, Indonesia lost some ground, as did her former chief competitor,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>333</td>
<td>Crude oil</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29051</td>
<td>44796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>334</td>
<td>Petroleum products</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>071</td>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>20147</td>
<td>19384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>074</td>
<td>Tea</td>
<td>5843</td>
<td>15906</td>
<td>15397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Timber, wood</td>
<td>4226</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>1606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Rubber</td>
<td>2209</td>
<td>8823</td>
<td>5413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Fertilizer (urea)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1081</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84, 85</td>
<td>Clothing, footwear</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>1572</td>
<td>2890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other</td>
<td></td>
<td>1549</td>
<td>6786</td>
<td>4215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Imports</td>
<td></td>
<td>16550</td>
<td>84096</td>
<td>99239</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coffee ('000 kg)</th>
<th>Tea ('000 kg)</th>
<th>Rubber ('000 kg)</th>
<th>Timber ('000 m³)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2987 5988 8917</td>
<td>9211 7973 9082</td>
<td>4024 11517 6056</td>
<td>74 7 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>- 63 21</td>
<td>- - 1</td>
<td>2124 3902 5635</td>
<td>26 22 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>- 100 94</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>51386 22736 27972</td>
<td>275 242 167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>- 63 46</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>- - 15</td>
<td>75 50 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>15510 14034 11970</td>
<td>1661 3049 3667</td>
<td>5823 4290 4190</td>
<td>49 21 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>10855 8877 6698</td>
<td>267 63 40</td>
<td>- - -</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sri Lanka, while Papua New Guinea's share increased. The fact that Australia continues to grant tariff and other preferences to Papua New Guinea probably continues to impose some handicap on Indonesia. As world coffee and tea prices have fallen back, the value of Australian imports of both commodities from Indonesia has also declined, in the case of coffee from $25 million in 1976-77 to $19 million in 1978-79. It remains to be seen whether Indonesia can hold on to her larger market share in the Australian market for coffee.

Some other of Indonesia's commodity exports have made modest gains. During a period while Australia's total imports of natural rubber, and her imports from her leading supplier, Malaysia, have fallen by half, mainly because the recession has reduced demand for tyres and for other industrial uses, Indonesia has surprisingly achieved a fourfold increase in the value of her exports of rubber to Australia, due in about equal halves to higher prices and larger volume. It appears that Indonesian rubber has had a price advantage over Malaysian, while the previous wide gap in quality has been reduced through the development of crumb rubber and other upgrading in Indonesia. The statistics also indicate some Indonesian success in selling to Australia some of her newer export products, fish and fruit.

By contrast, the export commodity which looked most promising in 1975, timber, has done very badly. After rising to almost $4.5 million in 1974-75, Australian imports of timber from Indonesia fell in the following year to less than $1.5 million and declined further until 1977-78. Two factors have been responsible. One has been the effect of the Australian recession, particularly severe in building, in reducing total Australian imports. But, in addition, Indonesia lost most of the market share she had gained by the policy of trying to encourage domestic processing through a tax on exports of unsawn logs. This made unsawn logs less competitive in Australia; it also encountered a 5 per cent Australian tariff on sawn timber (while unsawn logs are admitted duty free). It was imports of logs from Indonesia that bore the brunt of the fall in Australian demand.

Indonesian exports to Australia of labour-intensive manufactures, especially clothing and footwear, have grown quite rapidly, from under $0.5 million in 1973-74 to almost $3 million in 1978-79. But they consist almost entirely of handicraft, especially batik, for which the Australian market is believed to be too small to warrant a major Indonesian export promotion effort. In the field of mass-produced textiles and other labour-intensive manufactures, Indonesia is still well behind the newly industrialized countries of East and Southeast Asia and is unlikely to gain a major footing in the Australian market in the near future.

Australian Exports to Indonesia

Five years ago, the Senate Committee was confident that Australia was well placed to meet burgeoning Indonesian demand for capital equipment for development, including everything from agricultural machinery, mining plant, earth-moving, air-conditioning and road-making equipment, railway rolling stock and motor vehicles, machine tools and household appliances (Senate Standing Committee 1975, p.19). This confidence has so far proved to be almost entirely misplaced.
Australia's exports of manufactures to Indonesia reached nearly $50 million in 1974-75, the year of the Senate Committee's report. By 1977-78 they had fallen to $16 million (Table 5). The latter figure may be compared with that for Australian project aid to Indonesia in that year of $20.3 million. While this includes a good deal of technical assistance as well as capital equipment, it leaves little room for commercial, as contrasted with aid-financed, exports of manufactures.

Table 5
Australian exports to Indonesia, 1973-74, 1977-78

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item No.</th>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>1973-74</th>
<th>1977-78</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$'000</td>
<td>$'000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Food and Live Animals</td>
<td>26926</td>
<td>83560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>041</td>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>16085</td>
<td>57939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>Dairy products</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>10008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>Fruit and vegetables</td>
<td>6913</td>
<td>11156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-6</td>
<td>Crude and Processed Materials</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>1184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>Iron and steel</td>
<td>4136</td>
<td>20427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>686</td>
<td>Zinc</td>
<td>7173</td>
<td>17416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>684</td>
<td>Aluminium</td>
<td>1668</td>
<td>2250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>682</td>
<td>Copper</td>
<td>2355</td>
<td>3221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>685</td>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>2815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>513.27</td>
<td>Carbon black</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>4051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Plastics</td>
<td>843</td>
<td>3312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-8</td>
<td>Machinery, Miscellaneous</td>
<td>45350</td>
<td>16376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufactures</td>
<td></td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>732-3</td>
<td>Motor Vehicles</td>
<td>12789</td>
<td>2528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>734-5</td>
<td>Other transport equipment</td>
<td>22554</td>
<td>1804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>Non-electric machinery</td>
<td>6386</td>
<td>8625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>Electric machinery</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>7343</td>
<td>10615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Exports</td>
<td>106,467</td>
<td>196,259</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The decline chiefly reflects the collapse of the Indonesian market for Australian motor vehicles and other transport equipment, exports of which, after reaching a combined total of $35 million in 1973-74, amounted to only $4 million in 1977-78. But there has also been a decline in exports of electrical and other machinery and of all other categories of more highly fabricated manufactures. Australian products which have done well in the Indonesian market are wheat (and some rice) which account for about one-third of total exports and of which only about 10 per cent is now financed by the food aid programme; other foodstuffs, particularly dairy products; and metals and other intermediate goods, such as industrial chemicals (petroleum products, carbon black and plastics). The 'growth sector' among Australian exports to Indonesia in recent years has been that of steel and non-ferrous metals (chiefly zinc, but also lead, copper and aluminium); their combined value has risen from $16 million in 1973-74 to $46 million in 1977-78 and $52 million in 1978-79.

In 1975, the Senate Committee thought Australian exports to Indonesia of aluminium would decline with the completion of the Asahan smelter, and the same might be true of copper because of development of the Irian Jaya deposit. These fears have proved premature. Construction of the Asahan aluminium smelter has yet to begin. But there is no doubt that, as Indonesia develops her own mineral processing capacity, her need to import processed metals may decline. For Australia the most significant case is steel. For while Indonesia has the raw materials for aluminium, copper and nickel smelters, she will depend entirely on imports of iron ore or pellets for her developing steel industry. Australia is in the fortunate position of being able to supply the raw material if she should lose some of the Indonesian market for processed steel. Unfortunately, Australia appears so far to have been entirely unsuccessful in persuading the management of PT Krakatau, the Indonesian state steel enterprise, that nearby Western Australia is a better source of iron ore than German subsidiaries in South America.

The failure of Australian manufactures to maintain the footing gained in the Indonesian market, and the shift in the composition of Australian exports to Indonesia towards processed minerals and other intermediate goods, are a miniature reflection of the larger scene. The mineral developments of the past twenty years, together with steeply rising costs and lagging capacity for technological innovation, have shifted Australia's comparative advantage in international trade against manufactures back to primary and intermediate goods. As a knowledgeable observer (who must remain anonymous) of Australian trade with Indonesia has put it, 'Indonesia will develop as a major market for high technology industrial equipment. But the technology required to produce the goods and equipment necessary for development is, by and large, not held in Australia, and we will have to watch the major industrial powers enjoy the development of the Indonesian market, whilst we content ourselves as suppliers of basic materials'.

The Balance of Trade

Indonesian official spokesmen have sometimes professed to be unhappy about Indonesia's adverse balance in her bilateral trade with Australia.
Economists are not much interested in this argument. What matters is each country's overall balance of payments and, in bilateral trade, whether either country needs the other's goods more or less than its market. But as a talking point, the Australians can now show that the resumption of oil imports has done something to narrow the gap.

OTHER ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Shipping

In 1968, I discussed complaints that trade between Australia and Indonesia was being hampered by inadequate shipping services and pointed out that 'by far the most important reason why trade between the two countries does not enjoy the benefit of reliable and cheap shipping services is that there is not enough of it' (Arndt 1968, p.184).

There have been fewer complaints from shippers in the last few years. Regular liner services are provided by the Australia-Indonesia Outward Shipping Conference which increasingly uses containerized vessels. But Indonesian participation in shipping services between the two countries has suffered a severe setback, due partly to the two-year boycott of Indonesian flag ships in Australian ports imposed in 1976 by the Australian Waterside Workers Federation to express their sympathy with the Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Timor (Fretlin) and partly to Indonesia's limited capacity in container shipping which she prefers to deploy on more important routes. Jakarta Lloyd no longer serves Australian ports directly but participates through slot charter arrangements with other national carriers.

Direct Investment

The anonymous observer quoted above reports that there has been a major decline in Australian interest in Indonesia as a home for joint-venture and other investment during the last five years. He attributes this chiefly to difficulties in the Australian economy which have caused Australian companies to concentrate on survival rather than expansion, particularly overseas, and to the policies of the Indonesian government which have narrowed the range of industries open to foreign investment. He adds as contributing factors disappointments with some existing Australian investments and 'unfounded fears of political instability, aroused by bad and biased reporting in the Australian press'.

A number of Australian joint ventures have operated successfully in Indonesia for some years. Among them are Indomilk (condensed milk), James Hardie (asbestos cement), ACI (glass), Petermills (icecream), and CIG (industrial gases). But in the last two years no new projects have come forward, and there is disappointment in Indonesia about the slow rate at which some $200 million of approved 'intended' Australian direct investment is being realized.
Consultancy Services

While Australian direct investment in Indonesia is in the doldrums, Australian civil engineering, management and other firms have been building up considerable business in the form of consultancy services in Indonesia. In 1977-78, over forty Australian firms earned a larger income from consultancy fees in Indonesia - $12 million - than in any other foreign country (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1979). A good many of the contracts appear to have been connected with Australian aid projects, but Australian firms have also won contracts from the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, and from the central government, provincial governments and state enterprises in Indonesia. The expertise they supply is, not surprisingly, in fields in which Australia has developed technology for its own needs, such as agricultural and livestock management, mineral exploration, offshore oil surveys and civil engineering for irrigation, roads, harbours and other public works. But there are also some in more general lines such as architecture and town planning, computer installation, project management, and engineering training (Australian Professional Consultants Council 1979). It is not big business, but it suggests that Australia may have relatively more to offer in tertiary than in manufacturing technology.

Development Assistance

Indonesia remains, next to Papua New Guinea, the largest recipient country in Australia's development assistance programme, with a total expenditure of $28.3 million in 1977-78 and $35.5 million in 1978-79. Of the 1977-78 total, $20.3 million was accounted for by projects, $5.8 million by food aid, and $2.1 million by training schemes. Among the larger projects are the West Sumatra road project, the Animal Husbandry Research Institute at Bogor, the trans-Sumatra microwave telecommunications project, the Australian contribution to electric power distribution networks in Sumatra and Kalimantan, and upgrading of municipal water supply in several Indonesian cities and of some railway main lines. Food aid continues to take the form of contributions of wheat and rice, partly to a new Bilateral Reserve for Emergencies. Under the training programme, some 150 Indonesians are brought to Australia each year for postgraduate study and training.

I continue to adhere to the unfashionable view that this is the kind of aid that Australia should give, because this is the kind of thing that foreign governments can do and Australia is reasonably good at. I doubt whether we shall make much headway with attempts, in deference to current rhetoric, to find projects 'having an identifiable welfare or social development content'. Provided the selected projects are regarded as essential to Indonesia's development plan, it is sensible for the Indonesian government to request foreign aid for those that foreign governments can efficiently handle, while doing itself what it can to mobilize the necessary effort in rural and other grassroots social development which does not generally lend itself to intervention by foreign government agencies.

Australia's contribution accounts for just under 2.5 per cent of the IGGI (Inter-Governmental Group for Indonesia) consortium's development
assistance programme this year. It is debatable whether the whole programme makes a decisive difference to the rate of Indonesia's economic development. Certainly, if Australia's contribution were abandoned tomorrow, Indonesia's economic development would not be affected by one iota. But that is not to say that each of the projects does not in one way or another improve the efficiency of the Indonesian economy and thus the living standards of some of the people of Indonesia. In any case, Australia could not afford to abandon its aid programme to Indonesia and look the rest of the world - or itself - in the face. In the world today, respectable aid programmes are a necessity for donors at least as much as for recipients.

CONCLUSION

It is taken for granted by almost everybody in Australia that, politically, Indonesia is important. Whether this sentiment is reciprocated in Indonesia is doubtful. When they are concerned about foreign policy and national security, Indonesia and Australia both tend to look north. This means that Australia looks at Indonesia among other countries, while Indonesia has its back to Australia.

Economically, neither country is very important to the other. History and geography have conspired so far to make their two economies neither seriously competitive nor notably complementary. Australia and Indonesia do not compete in world markets for any major products, though some degree of competition may develop in future among exports of metals, such as nickel, copper and aluminium, and perhaps of liquefied natural gas. There are areas of complementarity, but they have so far given rise to little trade. Australia is a net importer of some of the tropical produce which Indonesia exports, such as rubber, coffee, tea and tropical hardwoods, but she gives preference to Papua New Guinea, and the market is not large. Indonesia is a net importer of some of the temperate-zone foodstuffs Australia exports, such as wheat and dairy products, but again the market is limited. Indonesia has become a significant market for steel, non-ferrous metals and other intermediate goods, but some of this market may shrink as Indonesia develops her own processing industries. Australia should be a competitive supplier of ores, such as iron ore and bauxite, to such industries, but factors other than price and quality may influence Indonesia's choice of suppliers.

Complementarity in international trade, after an early stage of exchange of manufactures for primary products, becomes increasingly a matter of specialization and mutual trade in manufactures between industrial countries. Both Australia and Indonesia have, for somewhat similar reasons, so far failed to become major exporters of manufactures. Both have followed a protectionist import-substitution strategy in their industrial development. Both have in the recent past experienced a large shift in comparative advantage in favour of natural resource industries - through mineral discoveries in Australia and through the oil price increase in Indonesia - at the expense of their high-cost manufacturing sectors.

This may change. There are reasons to hope that Australia may in the next few years move towards a more open trade policy, giving the industrializing countries of East and Southeast Asia freer access to her domestic
market for labour-intensive manufactures in return for an increasing share in their rapidly growing markets for foodstuffs, basic materials and intermediate goods. While bilateral trade between Australia and Indonesia will continue to take the form chiefly of exchange of foodstuffs and raw or processed materials, it may not be over-optimistic to look forward to a steady if unspectacular expansion of trade in some manufactures, Indonesian handicrafts, textiles, furniture and other light industry products for a few dozen items of specialized machinery or equipment which innovation and enterprise may enable Australian manufacturers to supply competitively. There is also scope for further growth in Australian exports of services of the consultancy type in which, as we have seen, a beginning has been made.

It is very desirable that both countries adopt policies which will promote such bilateral trade, not only for its direct economic benefits but also because it can serve as one way of bringing the two nations closer together.

NOTES

1 For an earlier account see Arndt 1970.
2 Compare Arndt 1979. For a critique of Australian foreign aid to Indonesia from a conventional radical left point of view, see Eldridge 1979.

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INDONESIA AND AUSTRALIA: POLITICAL ASPECTS

E.G. Whitlam

When Indonesia achieved international recognition of her independence at the end of 1949, Australia probably stood higher in the esteem and affection of Indonesians than did any other country. Australia had sponsored her independence and her membership of the UN.

The Menzies government, however, had just taken over in Australia and the new Minister for External Affairs was Spender. In order to explain the view commonly held in Australia and Papua New Guinea that Indonesia is aggressive and expansionist, and the view equally commonly held in Indonesia that Australian politicians are legalistic hypocrites, it is necessary at the outset to examine Spender's attitude and conduct towards Indonesia.

Spender had protested in the House of Representatives on 9 December 1948 that at the ECAFE conference being held at Lapstone Australia had supported a New Zealand motion for Indonesia to be admitted as an associate member. The motion was carried although the US and the Netherlands opposed it and Britain abstained. On 16 February 1949 Spender spoke at length on the Chifley government's attitude towards Indonesia. He said that the course pursued by the government was imperilling the White Australia policy, would 'leave the entire area of the so-called Indonesian Republic to the political body set up by the collaborators with the Japanese and those who have, in fact, the blood of white people on their hands' and would hand over 'the whole area of Dutch New Guinea ... to the natives'.

Mr Tom Critchley, who has had the closest involvement in the affairs of the region for thirty-five years, has recently described - in a speech in Jakarta in November 1979 - his surprise when the Dutch introduced the future of West New Guinea as a special item on the agenda for the Round Table Conference commencing at The Hague in August 1949. When Indonesia's independence was recognized, it was agreed that the question of West New Guinea should be deferred for one year, during which time its territorial status would be determined through negotiations between the Netherlands and Indonesia. Spender set out to abort such negotiations. In a ministerial statement on 9 March 1950 he spoke of the new government in Indonesia but emphasized that 'the island areas immediately adjacent to Australia are ... our last ring of defence against aggression, and Australia must be vitally concerned with ... changes ... in them ... The Australian people are deeply interested in what happens anywhere in New Guinea'. In the House on 8 June he asserted Australia's claim to be a party principal; he declared:

should discussions between the Netherlands and Indonesia tend towards any arrangement which would alter the status of western New Guinea, the matter is no longer one merely for those two parties themselves ... It would, we think, be both unreal and unreasonable that any change of status
On 29 August in The Hague he stated:

The Australian government does not consider that Indonesia has any valid claim to Dutch New Guinea, the future of which is of vital importance to the Australian people ... Australia has a deep attachment to the people of Australian New Guinea ... If the claim of Indonesia to Dutch New Guinea were conceded to any degree at all, it would be a matter of time, no matter how genuine may be assurances to the contrary, when the claim will be pushed further so as to include the trust territory of Australian New Guinea and its people ... Experience has shown to the Australians how strategically vital to Australian defence is the mainland of New Guinea. I have pointed out before that we cannot alter our geography which for all time makes this area of supreme consequence to Australia. Quite apart from its military and strategic significance, one cannot disregard the ever-increasing communist pressure in Asia. Communism has not got any foothold yet in Australian New Guinea. Australia is determined in so far as it can to ensure that it will not.

At the UN General Assembly in 1950 Spender pursued his crusade on west New Guinea with relish. As Beazley later summed up:

There is no doubt that the whole tenor of Australian policy was to urge the Dutch to shut the door upon negotiation at that time. (Hansard, 29 March 1962)

Thus the tone of Indonesian-Australian relations until well into the 1960s was set from the outset of the 1950s. The senior figures in the ALP in the 1950s did not provide an adequate counter to Liberal policies on either west or east New Guinea. (One stalwart who constantly clamoured for the withdrawal of Australian troops from Malaysia went berserk when I pointed out that he really wanted withdrawal no further than west New Guinea). It took some brashness for me to point out on 14 March 1956 that west New Guinea was the only part of the old Netherlands East Indies which the Indonesians did not rule and that it was their only territorial claim. On 11 April 1957 I returned to this theme and in particular to the strategic argument:

We persist in misrepresenting Indonesia's claim to that territory. It makes no geographical or racial claim; otherwise the Indonesians would make a claim to east New Guinea or to eastern Timor also, or to North Borneo and Sarawak, or to Palawan and the Sulu Archipelago. But Indonesia's claim is based on the ground that Indonesia is the successor state to all the Netherlands East Indies, in which west New Guinea was included.
We are often given a strategic justification for Australia's attitude, but only by those who ignore the fact that the Kai, Tanimbar and Aroe Islands, lying between that territory and Australia, are occupied - and we acknowledge the occupation - by Indonesia, and were occupied during the war and used as bases by the Japanese.

West New Guinea was the only instance where an imperial power had been allowed to detach and retain some part of a former colony. None of the 100 states which have achieved independence since World War II has settled for smaller boundaries than those it enjoyed as a colony. Indonesians had to put up a longer struggle to unite their country than any people in our region other than the Vietnamese. Australians today are still in the lead in raising false hopes and fears in Papua New Guinea on the subject of west New Guinea. It must therefore be emphasized that to this day no state will officially condone a process for severing some part of another state. Such a principle would lead to the breakup of such large entities as the USSR, China and India which all claim to be multinational states, while the US herself knows that she will be vulnerable to Hispanic separatism by the end of this century; New Mexico could revert to Mexico. Expatriate journalists and academics, the younger of whom have little awareness of the background to the West Irian issue, do no service to young men in Papua New Guinea in stirring them up over an issue on which only the latter would have to bear the consequences.

Spender was succeeded as Minister for External Affairs by Casey in April 1951 but, as Australia's Ambassador to the US, he continued to make the running against Indonesia in the UN until he went to the International Court of Justice in 1958. In the General Assembly Australia voted against resolutions on the question of west New Guinea on 30 November 1954, 22 February and 19 November 1957 and 27 November 1961. The resolutions urged that Indonesia and the Netherlands should settle their differences under the auspices of the UN. On every occasion there was a majority of votes but not the two-thirds majority which is required on questions which have been determined to be important. Except on the last occasion, the US never voted with the Dutch or Australia and maintained neutrality; the nations which the US was then able to influence most strongly, particularly in Latin America, used to be evenly divided in their votes. All other countries in our region, including SEATO and Commonwealth countries, always voted with Indonesia.

It was not until the mid-1950s that Australia raised the issue of self-determination. She was inhibited in raising it because of its implications for Papua New Guinea. The principle was not mentioned in the first edition of Lord Casey's book Friends and Neighbours in 1954; it was only mentioned in the second edition. It was belatedly and grudgingly that Australia shifted her arguments in the General Assembly and the Political Committee of the Assembly to the principle of self-determination. The government never really adhered to the principle because Menzies himself and Barwick when they in turn became Ministers for External Affairs declared that if the parties principal came to a peaceful agreement or if the International Court of Justice decided the issue, the principle of self-determination could be overlooked.
Soon after the tension between Australia and Indonesia over the protracted decolonization of west New Guinea by the Netherlands began to abate, following the settlement in 1962, a new source of friction arose over the precipitate decolonization of northern Borneo by Britain. For Indonesia Spender's hectoring style was replaced by Barwick's. Efforts by Spender, Casey and Menzies to involve the US in New Guinea had failed. Now the efforts by Barwick to involve the US in Borneo were to fail more conspicuously. He thrice made public assertions that America would come to our aid under ANZUS if Indonesia attacked our vessels. This irked the State Department. Menzies was so embarrassed that Barwick suddenly abandoned an extensive tour as Minister for External Affairs and without further delay took up the vacant position of Chief Justice.

Confrontation came to an end when Suharto took over from Soekarno. The unhappy episode had not commanded total internal support as Indonesia's incorporation of west New Guinea had always commanded. Moreover, the episode had damaged Indonesia's international standing, which Suharto strove to restore.

It had taken ten years for Menzies to pay a visit to Indonesia. In December 1959 he chartered a DC6 to go there and to Malaysia. He took two followers with him and he asked Evatt and Calwell to nominate one of their colleagues. When they hesitated he gave me a direct invitation. With the leadership of the ALP soon to be decided, I declined. Eight and a half years later, in June 1968, Gorton visited Indonesia and McMahon followed him, chartering a Boeing 707. I was determined to restore the trusting relations with Indonesia which Australia had established in the late 1940s. In February 1973, immediately after my visits to New Zealand and Papua New Guinea, I visited Indonesia in order to demonstrate the political and economic interest which Australia would now take in the region. I took with me Sir Richard Kirby, who had been the Australian representative on the UN Security Council Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian Question in 1947 and 1948. I had first met General Suharto in 1966. He now established the same frank relationship with me that he had with the heads of government in the ASEAN countries. He invited me to discussions in Wonosobo on 5-7 September 1974 and I invited him to discussions in Townsville on 3-5 April 1975.

In Portugal on 25 April 1974 the army junta of the National Movement of the Armed Forces (MFA) launched a coup and took over full control of the country. The new government was committed to a policy of decolonization of the Portuguese empire. East Timor was the least of Portugal's colonial worries but was to cause the same tensions between Australia and Indonesia as the Dutch and British decolonization of west New Guinea and northern Borneo had caused. Ill-informed and ill-disposed commentators have surmised that President Suharto and I foresaw and even planned the events which happened in East Timor months after our two meetings and which caught everyone by surprise. In what follows I shall refer to the many statements and answers given by ministers at the time, such as Willessee's and mine in parliament on 26 August and 30 October 1975. The records of the conversation between the Indonesian President and myself are by custom confidential; when they become available they will bear out the account I now give.
Indonesia's critics should acknowledge the point made by Professor J.A.C. Mackie in a seminar at the Australian National University in August 1979 on the Indonesia-Papua New Guinea border that 'if the Suharto government had mounted a campaign to assist in the liberation of East Timor from Portuguese rule prior to 1974, justifying this on the ground that it was also helping to overthrow Portuguese colonial rule and helping the freedom fighters of Angola and Mozambique, it would almost certainly have won widespread international support and left the Fretilin leaders no option but to side with Indonesia' (Mackie 1979). I myself can testify that President Suharto placed great stress on legality and legitimacy and in his conversations with me always used the term 'Timor Portugis'. For that reason he seems to have been most reluctant to sanction military action in East Timor and only to have done so at the eleventh hour when he felt he had no alternative.

Political parties emerged in Portuguese Timor for the first time a few weeks after the coup in Lisbon. The only links which this isolated and neglected colony had had with the outside world, apart from Portugal, were with Taiwan and Mozambique. On 11 May the UDT (União Democrática Timorense) was formed, on 20 May ASDT (Associação Social Democrática Timorense) and on 27 May Apodeti (Associação Popular Democrática Timorense). Peter Hastings (1975, p.27) says that the UDT was by far the largest of the parties. On 12 September ASDT was abolished and replaced by Fretilin (Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente). These three parties were the only ones granted recognition and media facilities by the Portuguese authorities. The leaders were mostly mestizos who had spent some time in seminars and the army and who often seemed to be desperate to succeed the Portuguese as rulers over the rest of the population.

Also in September 1974 the small Trabalhista Party emerged. On 26 January 1975 the monarchist party (Associação Popular Monárquica Timorense) was formed; a year later it became KOTA (Klibur Oan Timur Aiswain, Group of Heroes of the People of Timor). By March 1975 a party ADITLA (Associação Democrática para Integração Timor Leste con Australia) had even been formed to seek integration of Portuguese Timor into Australia. An approach was made by a representative of the party to the Australian authorities in Indonesia. Any Australian government in the first half of this century would have been attracted to the proposition.

As late as 18 July 1944 Spender objected to New Caledonia and Timor being returned to France and Portugal, at least unless Australia were given bases there. During and after World War II prominent Australians on both sides of politics expressed more imperialist and proprietary views on eastern Timor than any Indonesians have done. They were not inhibited by the fact that in 1893 and 1904 the Netherlands and Portugal had made treaties under which each party undertook that in the event of cession of its Timor territories it would give first option to the other or by the fact that in 1943, as part of the deal for the Allies to use the Azores, South Africa and Australia joined in the British assurance to Portugal that her sovereignty would be maintained in her colonial possessions after the war. So much for self-determination in those days! In order to declare that 'the Australian government most certainly would not be involving itself in the activities or the aspirations' of ADITLA, Wriedt, in
Willesee's absence, had to arrange a question on 6 March 1975 from the government whip. I myself thought it prudent in Townsville the following month to disavow again any Australian ambitions in Timor.

President Suharto and I agreed that Portugal should be encouraged to maintain her authority in Timor for some time longer, probably five years, in order to give the population some experience in managing its affairs. We were to be frustrated in this by the irresponsibility of the Portuguese and the intransigence of the parties. At my suggestion Indonesia moved to establish diplomatic relations with Portugal; it was announced on 21 January 1975 that these would be at ambassadorial level. The Australian consulate which had been established in Dili in 1941 had been withdrawn in August 1971, but foreign affairs officers now made frequent visits to the territory. Australia sought to take a constructive interest in Timor's political development. Willesee had discussions with the Portuguese and Indonesian Foreign Ministers, Mário Soares and Adam Malik, in New York on 26 September 1974, and he and I with Antônio de Almeida Santos, Portuguese Minister for Interterritorial Co-ordination, in Canberra in mid-October. Willesee saw José Manoel Ramos Horta of Fretilin on 11 December 1974, Malik again at ESCAP at Delhi on 27 February 1975 and Domingos Pinto Soares and Casimiro dos Reis Araújo of Apodeti on 21 May 1975. Cairns visited Jakarta at the end of January 1975 and six members of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party visited Timor in March. Morrison as acting Foreign Minister had discussions with Francisco Xavier Lopes da Cruz and Cesar Augusto da Costa Mouzinho of UDT on 23 April 1975.

On 18 November 1974 a new Governor arrived from Lisbon, Colonel Mário Lemos Pires. The two dominant figures in his cabinet came from the MFA, Major Francisco Mota, who had served in Timor in 1968–70 and now took the portfolio of Political Affairs, and Major Silvério da Costa Jónatas, who had served in Timor in 1969–71 and now took the portfolio of Mass Media. Their objectives seem to have been to extricate the metropolitan government as quickly as possible and to promote Fretilin as the successor government on the model of the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo).

On 22 January 1975 UDT and Fretilin formed a coalition. A month later the Portuguese banned Apodeti from Radio Dili for forty-five days. This ban might not have been unwarranted but the Portuguese broadcasting committee was not evenhanded. Talks proposed for March in Lisbon between the recognized parties were not held because Apodeti boycotted them. Early in May, however, the Portuguese decolonization committee, dominated by Majors Mota and Jónatas, at last succeeded in getting representatives of UDT, Fretilin and Apodeti together in Dili. At this time it appeared likely that the parties would agree on a programme for decolonization at a meeting to be held in Macau at the end of June.

Nevertheless, UDT was becoming increasingly distrustful of the left-wing influence in Fretilin, which had attracted the support of the few but conspicuous university students who had returned to Timor after the coup in Portugal and which had adopted songs, insignia and salutes from Frelimo. On 27 May 1975 UDT announced the end of the coalition. On 26–28 June Apodeti and UDT attended the conference in Macau, which planned the election
of a People's Assembly in October 1976 and the continuation of Portuguese sovereignty till October 1978, but at the last moment Fretilin boycotted the conference. A Fretilin delegation, however, did attend the independence celebrations in Mozambique commencing on 25 June 1975. Fretilin now rejected the idea of elections in Portuguese Timor on the ground that Frelimo had been recognized as the government of Mozambique without elections. (Elections were not held in Mozambique until December 1977, when all candidates came from Frelimo, still the sole political party.) The relations between the parties were deteriorating rapidly. UDT and the smaller parties came to prefer integration with Indonesia to domination by Fretilin; Apodeti had always sought integration.

The Portuguese were pursuing the contradictory policies of running down their armed forces and building up their military equipment. At the beginning of 1975 there were over 1000 Portuguese soldiers in Timor; by mid-April the number was down to about 200. On 9 April, however, forty paratroopers were flown in to form a bodyguard for the Governor and his staff; they had the use of two Alouette helicopters. The MFA also sent more than 10,000 of the latest NATO rifles together with mortars, bazookas and ammunition to Timor.

It was in August 1975 that the situation got out of hand. In a show of force on the evening of 10 August UDT occupied the police headquarters and other administrative buildings in Dili and demanded the arrest of Fretilin leaders and the expulsion of Portuguese officers and officials alleged to be communists. UDT acquired the police weapons and established the 'Revolutionary Anti-Communist Movement of 11 August'. On 15 August Fretilin proclaimed a general armed insurrection against 'all traitors to the fatherland'. On 17 August Majors Mota and Jónatas flew out of Dili to Darwin and thence home. On 18 August Fretilin forces occupied the Armed Forces Training Centre at Aileu and on 19 August Fretilin was joined by troops in Maubisse and Dili. On 20 August Fretilin announced a revolutionary counter-coup against UDT. On 21 August the Portuguese authorities reported that five people had been killed and over thirty injured that day. On the same day Portugal notified the UN Secretary-General that the International Committee of the Red Cross, Indonesia and Australia had been asked to give humanitarian support. On 25 August Portugal notified him of evacuation arrangements and 'generalized panic' in Dili. On 26 August the Governor radioed that he could hold out for a further twenty-four hours and that no exact casualty figures were available, since the dead were being burned for health reasons, but they were 'mostly women and children who fell victim to indiscriminate grenade explosions'. On 27 August he transferred the administration from Dili to the off-shore island of Ataúro and all the Portuguese armed forces went with him. A mestigo second lieutenant Rogério Lobato was left in charge of the Timorese forces and the NATO weapons. These found their way to Fretilin, whose Vice-President was Nicolau Lobato, his brother. Also on 27 August the Indonesian destroyer Monginsidi arrived in Dili. The captain arranged a temporary truce between UDT and Fretilin to permit the evacuation of the Indonesian consul and his staff, as well as some Portuguese and Taiwanese nationals, and to unload food supplies. The Portuguese ordered the destroyer to leave Portuguese waters on 29 August. Fretilin was left in effective control of Dili and district.
On 22 and 23 August Santos had discussions in New York with the Secretary-General and the Chairman of the Committee of Twenty-Four on Decolonization. On 28 August a Royal Australian Air Force plane took Santos' advance party and André Pasquier, the ICRC representative, to Ataúro. On 29 August Santos held talks in Jakarta. On 31 August the Indonesian acting Foreign Minister, Mochtar, announced that his government and Santos had on the previous day made a tentative plan for Indonesia, Portugal and, if they agreed, Australia and Malaysia to send units to Portuguese Timor to form a peace-keeping authority. He said that Santos had opposed an offer by Indonesia to send troops of her own accord. On 1 September Mochtar announced that Malaysia had agreed on the previous day to participate in the joint authority. On the same day Santos had talks with Morrison and me. We told him we were not in a position to indicate a definitive view on Australian participation in a possible multinational supervisory body before the outcome of the talks which he would be having in Timor and the further talks between Indonesia and Portugal in Jakarta on the subject. On 2 September a RAAF plane took Santos to Ataúro. He returned to Darwin and then went back to Ataúro and finally returned to Darwin on 9 September. Only Portugal had official status and direct responsibility in east Timor but at no stage did she take specific initiatives in the UN or make specific proposals to Australia or other regional powers. On 4 September Fretilin sent a message to the Secretary-General and the Chairman of the Committee of Twenty-Four that the party could not accept any arrangement worked out by Santos and any foreign government.

In the full-scale civil war which broke out in August, Fretilin's NATO weapons proved far more effective than UDT's police weapons. Australia's efforts had to be devoted to persuading the combatants to hold discussions and lay down their arms and to providing considerable and constant means of evacuation, communication and relief. RAAF aircraft flew to Timor on four occasions in August, sixteen in September, five in October and two in November. Between 14 August and 13 September 2,580 evacuees arrived in Australia from Timor, 235 on Australian service aircraft, six in a Portuguese government De Havilland 104 (Dove), eight in an Australian charter aircraft and the rest by merchant vessels. On 18 September and 2 November Australia made contributions of $100,000 and $150,000 to the International Committee of the Red Cross for its programmes in east and west Timor. On 25 September I had talks with Pasquier and Stubbings, Secretary-General of the Australian Red Cross Society. After the change of government in Australia a first gift to the Indonesian Red Cross was made in October 1976 and RAAF aircraft brought in ninety-nine evacuees on 13 and 14 January 1979.

Willesee, who had seen Horta again on 20 August, saw him yet again on 28 September. During September Portugal suggested that the parties talk at Ataúro or Macau or on a corvette. Up to the end of October the contending parties made various counterproposals but never agreed on the place, subjects or participants for the meetings. The Australian government's efforts at this time to bring the parties together were not helped by a visit to Timor by some backbench partisans of Fretilin. They were accompanied by a candidate from the far right of the New South Wales Liberal Party. Transport on the island was provided by Frank Favaro, an
Australian citizen who owned a hotel in Dili and flew an aircraft registered in Australia. It is often thought that support for Fretilin was confined to the left in Australia. There was, however, a small faction in the Department of Defence which, having failed to keep Indonesia out of New Guinea, was now intent on establishing an enclave in the midst of the Indonesian archipelago in case of future conflict with Indonesia.

Favaro's role harmed Australia's credibility with Indonesia. On Thursday 16 October, in answer to an arranged question by the government whip concerning newspaper 'reports of alleged spying activities by our de facto consul in Timor, Mr Frank Favaro', Willesee stated that Favaro did not represent the Australian government in Timor in any capacity whatsoever and was a private citizen. Renouf and Willesee only learnt over the following weekend that Favaro had been recruited by the Australian Security and Intelligence Service early in the year. The Indonesians almost certainly knew his role. The head of ASIS had to be relieved of his position the following week.

Australia, Indonesia and Portugal made a last attempt to end the civil war. On 30 October Willesee offered an Australian venue for round table discussions. After talks in Rome on 1 and 2 November a new Portuguese Foreign Minister Eduardo Augusto de Melo Antunes and Malik issued a memorandum of understanding on 3 November noting that Portugal represented the legitimate authority in Portuguese Timor and was fundamentally responsible for its decolonization. They agreed on the need to hold a meeting as soon as possible between Portugal and all the Timorese parties with a view to bringing the fighting to an end. Fretilin did not recognize the Rome meeting.

Soon after the coup in Canberra on 11 November, Fraser wrote to Suharto that he hoped to establish with him the close personal relationship that he understood that I had had with him. On 28 August 1975 Fraser had endorsed Anthony's criticism of Fretilin as communist and this criticism had been repeated by Erwin and Carrick a month later. From 11 November Indonesia knew that any 'anti-communist' action she took would have support in Canberra.

On 28 November Fretilin proclaimed the Democratic Republic of East Timor; the nomenclature had overtones of East Germany, North Korea and North Vietnam. The next day UDT, Apodeti, KOTA and Trabalhista, which on 7 September had issued a joint statement at Batugade calling for integration with Indonesia, proclaimed that integration at Balibo. On the same day Portugal rejected both the declaration of independence and the declaration of integration; similarly Peacock, who had been briefed by the Indonesians in Bali on 24 September, repudiated Fretilin's unilateral declaration of independence. On 7 December Indonesian air and naval forces landed at Dili. On the previous day President Ford and Kissinger were in Jakarta. Presidents Suharto and Ford have both denied that they discussed Timor; Malik and Kissinger cannot deny that they themselves did.

During September and October Fretilin, with its Portuguese weapons, had swept all before it. In the following months, with Indonesia's growing intervention, the other parties successfully counter-attacked. On 17 December a Provisional Government of East Timor was established with
Arnaldo dos Reis Araújo as President and Lopes da Cruz as Vice-President. On 31 May 1976 a 'Popular Representative Assembly' petitioned the government of Indonesia for integration of the people and territory of East Timor into the Republic of Indonesia. On 7 June President Suharto accepted the petition. On 3 July Araújo was designated as Governor and Lopes da Cruz as Vice-Governor of East Timor; they were both from UDT. The Raja of Atsabe, Guilherme Maria Gonçalves, was installed as Chairman of the East Timor House of Representatives and the Raja of Maubara, Gaspar da Silva Nunes, as Deputy Chairman; they were both from Apodeti. On 15 July the House of the People's Representatives in Jakarta passed the bill integrating East Timor as a province of the Republic and on 17 July the President signed it into law. Araújo now represents East Timor in that parliament. The new Bishop of Dili, Martinho Lopes, had been Deputy for East Timor in the Portuguese National Assembly before 25 April 1974.

During the civil war tens of thousands lost their homes and lives. An ICRC representative, after visiting west Timor on 19-26 September 1975, estimated that the total number of refugees from east Timor was 40,000. After the initial landings Fretilin killed dozens of their prisoners, including the Portuguese police chief and Red Cross representative and leaders of UDT (Costa Mouzinho and João Bosco Lopes da Cruz) and Apodeti (José Osório Soares, the Secretary-General, and Domingos Pinto Soares, a Central Committee member). On 16 December 1975 Australian Federated Press reported from Jakarta that Tomás Gonçalves of Apodeti had said on Radio Dili that 55,000 Timorese had been victims of Fretilin terror. On 15 February 1976 AAP reported from Jakarta that Lopes da Cruz had said that 60,000 had been killed in fighting in East Timor; on 5 April PGET circulated a note in New York that 'the 60,000 victims of the civil war during the last six months as mentioned by Mr Lopes da Cruz was the total number of victims, including the more than 40,000 refugees who had fled'.

Three Portuguese corvettes made eighteen visits to Darwin between October 1975 and May 1976 for re-supply, repair and maintenance. On 18 November the Afonso Cerqueira landed 130 men from the Ataúro garrison in Darwin and they were immediately repatriated on a Portuguese Army Boeing 707. On 21 November the same aircraft landed a small replacement contingent which was transported to Ataúro, and flew home with some more refugees. The Portuguese Dove carried officials to and from Darwin on forty occasions between 15 February and 7 December; it was then abandoned at Darwin airport, where it can still be seen without its tail and engines. On 11 December the Governor and the remainder of the garrison, some seventy men, flew home from Ataúro. He made his final broadcast from Lisbon two days later. The 707 took its last refugees back to Portugal from Darwin on 14 December.

The Portuguese had been the first imperialists from Europe to reach the East Indies and the last to leave. Their departure was not only more ignominious and pusillanimous but more swift and bloody than that of the Dutch or British. It has caused frustration and recrimination between and within Australia's political parties. When he was Opposition spokesman on foreign affairs Peacock had been under the illusion that Indonesia could be influenced through her partners in ASEAN. On 7 December 1975 he lamented that Australia had not taken 'a strong regional initiative'. The ASEAN
countries soon disabused him. On 11 December the fourth Committee of the UN General Assembly called on Indonesia to withdraw her armed forces from Portuguese Timor by a vote of sixty-nine to eleven, with thirty-eight abstentions. On 12 December the General Assembly itself voted seventy-two to ten, with forty-three abstentions. In each case Australia voted against Indonesia, although she abstained on the paragraph deploiring Indonesia's military intervention; Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand voted with Indonesia; Singapore, like Britain and the US, abstained. It had become clear to me that ASEAN would not become involved after I had spoken to Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore on 8 August 1975 and to Tun Razak in Canberra in mid-October.

Peacock continued to maintain a high profile on the issue for much of 1976, but came at last to realize, like his Liberal predecessors in the 1950s, that Australia, although European and Christian in civilization, would not be accepted as a party principal in colonial disputes in the region and would not be supported in such disputes by her great and powerful friends in the northern hemisphere. President Suharto had talks with Fraser in Jakarta in October 1976; no Australian took a record. Thus the new Australian government buried the hatchet.

The motion on East Timor has not again secured the support of a majority in the UN. On 1 December 1976 it was carried by sixty-eight to twenty (now including the US), with forty-nine (including Britain, Singapore and now Australia) abstaining. On 28 November 1977 it was carried by sixty-seven to twenty-six (now including Singapore), with forty-seven (still including Australia) abstaining. On 13 December 1978 it was carried by fifty-nine to thirty-one (now including Australia), with forty-four abstaining. On 21 November 1979 it was carried by sixty-two to thirty-one, with forty-five abstaining. Iran switched from no to yes and Laos and Vietnam, which had respectively abstained and been absent on the vote in 1978, voted for it again as they had in 1977. It will be some years before the motion is defeated. It has strong but not total support in Africa and the Caribbean because of the Portuguese-Brizilian connection; Fretilin leaders are given army accommodation and ministerial status in Mozambique. Portugal, Sweden, Greece, Albania, Russia, Byelorussia and the Ukraine are the only supporters of the motion in Europe, and Afghanistan, China, Democratic Yemen and Mongolia are its other supporters in Asia.

It is still most difficult to have an informed or rational discussion on East Timor in Australia because Australian journalists have been embittered by the death of five of their colleagues at Balibo on 16 October 1975. I handed to the Indonesian ambassador, who was going on home leave, a letter to President Suharto expressing my government's anxiety. It was delivered to the President on 13 November. The Fraser government never followed it up. It was on 16 October that Fraser announced that the Senate would hold up the budget. My government could have taken the heat off itself internally by exploiting East Timor as a great patriotic issue, but this cynical course would not have helped the Timorese at the time when a new phase of their civil war was being launched.

The number of casualties during the civil war and the famine which ensued has been shamefully and recklessly exaggerated in the Australian press and parliament. People who had fled to the hills or to west Timor
have been counted as 'dead'. Fretilin was amazingly successful in newspaper offices and Parliament House in recruiting advocates of its military regime and critics of Indonesia's military regime. Some of those advocates and critics have appeared before US congressional committees but have not convinced them; they have not appeared before Australian parliamentary committees. Publicity and credence used to be given to extravagant Fretilin broadcasts through 1976 and into 1977. The principal broadcaster, Alarico Fernandez, Comisario for Information and Security, later responded to the Indonesian amnesty and now lives in Dili.

One must hope that we have now seen the last of the tense situations which have been brought about between Australia and Indonesia as the Netherlands, Britain and Portugal have successively extricated themselves from our region. Brunei will tranquilly move from the British to the ASEAN aegis. And Australians will not be able to blame Indonesia as France inevitably withdraws from the South Pacific.

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H.W. ARNDT
Professor of Economics, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University.

CHARLES A. COPPEL
Senior Lecturer, Department of Indonesian and Malayan Studies, University of Melbourne.

HAROLD CROUCH
Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University Kebangsaan, Malaysia.
Visiting Fellow, Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1979.

HERBERT FEITH
Reader in Politics, Monash University, Melbourne.
Research Fellow, Department of Pacific History, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1960-63.

PETER HASTINGS
Senior Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1974-77.
Associate Editor, Sydney Morning Herald.

CAVAN HOGUE
Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra.

ANN KUMAR
Senior Lecturer, Department of Asian Civilizations, Faculty of Asian Studies, Australian National University.

J.A.C. MACKIE
Professor of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University.
R.J. MAY  
Senior Fellow, Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University.

REX MORTIMER  
Associate Professor, Department of Government, University of Sydney.  
Formerly Professor of Politics and Administrative Studies, University of Papua New Guinea.  
Died December 1979.

M.A. Nawawi  
Senior Research Fellow, Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University.

DELIAR NOER  
Senior Fellow, School of Modern Asian Studies, Griffith University, Brisbane.  
Visiting Fellow, Department of Pacific and South-East Asian History, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1975-76.

W.J. O'MALLEY  
Research Fellow, Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University.

JEFFREY RACE  
Visiting Fellow, Department of Political and Social Change and Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University.

SUPOMO SURYOHUDOJO  
Senior Lecturer, Department of Indonesian Languages and Literatures, Faculty of Asian Studies, Australian National University.

E.G. WHITLAM  
Visiting Fellow, Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University.