MELANESIA: BEYOND DIVERSITY

R.J. May and Hank Nelson
editors

Volume I

Research School of Pacific Studies
The Australian National University
Canberra 1982
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Since its establishment in 1947 the Research School of Pacific Studies has been a major international centre for the study of Melanesia. Its scholars have been prominent both as commentators and as advisers and consultants in the developments which have taken place in the region. Melanesia thus provided a natural focus for the third annual School Seminar of the Research School of Pacific Studies.

The Seminar was held on two days a week over four weeks in October-November 1980. Fifty papers, mostly by ANU scholars, were presented to the Seminar; all but four of them are included in this volume.

Because of the quantity of material, rather than any essential differences in subject matter, the papers have been presented in two volumes. The contributors to the first volume define the region, draw attention to forces flowing from the geographical and social facts of isolation and smallness of scale, and examine various issues in the prehistory and history of the area. In the second volume the writers are principally concerned with basic contemporary political, social and economic change.

The 1980 School Seminar was organized on the initiative of the former Director of the Research School of Pacific Studies, Professor Wang Gungwu, and was planned by a committee comprising the present Director, Professor R.G. Ward, and Ross Garnaut, Roger Keesing, Ron May, Hank Nelson, and Stephen Wurm. Edward Helgeby, ably assisted by Toni Purdy, bore most of the administrative burden.

The editors gratefully acknowledge the assistance, in copy-editing and proofreading, of Hilary Bek, Charlotta Blomberg and Elizabeth Kingdon. May McKenzie supervised the typing and layout of the volume which was executed with great skill and tolerance by Dorothy Hush. The cartographers of the Department of Human Geography assisted with mapping.
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BOUNDARIES AND IDENTITY

In the first session of the seminar scholars representing various disciplines were asked to set the cartographic boundaries for subsequent papers. Here an anthropologist, a linguist, a biogeographer and a prehistorian locate Melanesia.

Melanesian Boundaries

Definitions of people and place

ROGER M. KEESING

The linguistic point of view

S.A. WURM

Biogeographical markers

DONALD WALKER

Prehistoric movement and mapping

JACK GOLSON
Where is Melanesia? What is Melanesia? And who are the Melanesians? It is worth pausing at the beginning of a volume on Melanesia to ask what universe we have chosen as our subject — and why. Unfortunately, the answers are not simple; but sketching them will give a useful initial orientation.

The term 'Melanesia - Black Islands', or in this case 'islands of black people' - has been with us since the French navigator Dumont d'Urville introduced it in 1832. It began to acquire a meaning in anthropology and linguistics about a century ago.

'Melanesia' as a noun is a geographical term: it refers to an area with somewhat ambiguous edges. I will come back to it. The term 'Melanesian' - as an adjective (as in 'Melanesian countries', 'Melanesian cultures', 'Melanesian languages') and as a noun ('Melanesians and Polynesians') - is more interesting historically, and more complicated.

'Melanesian', as adjective and noun, has been used both in a narrower sense and a broader sense. In its narrower sense, which emerged about a century ago in anthropological and linguistic usage, Melanesian is contrasted with 'Papuan'. 'Melanesian' in this sense referred to the languages and peoples of most of the islands east of New Guinea, across a zone extending as far as Fiji and New Caledonia. These Melanesian peoples spoke languages that were visibly related to those of Indonesia to the west and Polynesia to the east, as they were known from the philology of the time. But the languages of these Melanesians were different, and themselves diverse; and the people who spoke them, unlike Indonesians and Polynesians, had dark skin and frizzy hair. Their cultures were diverse, but had a certain commonality in economy, social organization, and in religions focussed on spirits and ghosts of the dead.

The Melanesian cultures and languages, in this sense, that were known by the turn of the century were those of Fiji, parts of the Banks Islands and New Hebrides, the southeast Solomons, some of the islands off eastern New Guinea, and the Torres Strait. Knowledge of them had come from pioneer missionary scholars (notably Codrington and Leenhardt), administrator-scholars, and pioneers of social anthropology (notably Rivers and Haddon).

The Papuans with whom the Melanesians were contrasted inhabited the vast continental island of New Guinea (and some of the islands to the west, known from the early spice trade and Dutch sources). Little was known of the 'Papuan' peoples, but they seemed to be different (and to European eye, more 'primitive') physically and culturally, and to speak scores of
languages unrelated to one another as well as to Indonesian, Polynesian, and Melanesian.

In another, broader usage, 'Melanesian' was used to refer to all the dark-skinned, frizzly-haired peoples of Oceania (other than Aboriginal Australians), thus lumping Papuans with Melanesians. In this sense, the term can be used to refer to people, and (slightly less comfortably) to cultures - but not to languages. All the Melanesians, in this sense, had in European eyes a 'primitive' cast, physically and culturally. They lacked the centralized political systems, elaborate systems of rank, priesthoods and other elaborations that since Cook's day had stamped the Polynesians; they seemed given to internecine warfare and dark deeds of cannibalism. With the exception of some of the Fijians - who for this reason appealed to British upper class imagination (and fit uncomfortably into the 'Melanesian' category) they had no proper appreciation of hereditary rank, sanctified by deities.

Two points are worth noting about these usages. First, Melanesian-ness was in many ways negatively defined. Melanesian languages were Malayo-Polynesian (now Austronesian) languages that were not Polynesian or Indonesian. Melanesian cultures in the narrow sense, those of Melanesian-speaking peoples, were again cast in terms of what they (and those who practised them) were not. Even more negatively defined were the 'Papuans', who linguistically and culturally were the ultimate residual category, dark-skinned 'primitives' whose languages and cultures had not even the saving grace of affinity with those of Indonesia and Polynesia.

This characterization suggests a second pervasive theme: racism. Melanesians fell unfortunate heir to the racism toward dark-skinned peoples brought from Africa to the Pacific, with its associations to primitivism, black savagery and mumbo jumbo. Melanesians - and especially the Papuans, who by early stereotype could not count past five - were targets for European scorn and condescension, and projections of ideas about cannibalism and savage rites. When Polynesians practised cannibalism or human sacrifice, European apologists rose on all sides to defend their noble 'race'; when Melanesians practised cannibalism, it was a natural expression of their savagery. This racism is largely - though not, I fear, entirely - gone from Pacific scholarship. But scholars are finding that the negative lumping of 'Melanesian' and 'Papuan' no longer fit the very complicated facts. The more complex, and more fascinating, picture that is emerging in place of this rough early lumping will be set out in the papers that follow.

What, then, of 'Melanesia'? In a broad, and loose, geographical sense (as in the title Melanesia: Beyond Diversity), it remains useful. Partly, I suggest, this is because the term is ambiguous. The fuzzy and shifting boundaries of what, in a particular context, is included in 'Melanesia' will serve us well. In a particular context of political, historical or anthropological discourse, we can use it so as to include all of the island of New Guinea (and sometimes islands to the west) or to exclude Irian Jaya. We can use it to include the Torres Straits Islands in anthropological discourse, and to exclude them in referring to contemporary states. We can use 'Melanesia' to include, or exclude, Fiji. Such conceptual ambiguity, distressing as it might seem to those who imagine that scholarly categories
can or should be neatly defined, is in my view inherent in (and essential to) the way we humans (including academics) use language.

Melanesia, as a zone of the southwest Pacific between island southeast Asia and Polynesia, has fuzzy edges; and Melanesia as a conceptual category with fuzzy edges, will prove usefully ambiguous as we move from context to context in the papers to follow.
THE LINGUISTIC POINT OF VIEW

S.A. Wurm

The linguistic boundaries of Melanesia are in part not very clear-cut, though it is possible in all cases to delineate at least linguistic border areas of Melanesia which are however quite fuzzy in the west and to a lesser extent in the north. Melanesia contains two types of languages, Papuan (or non-Austronesian) and Austronesian. Numerically, both from the point of view of the number of languages and from that of the numbers of speakers, the Papuan languages dominate. There are close to 750 Papuan languages in the area, but only about 400 Austronesian languages. The number of speakers of Papuan languages is over 2.9 million, whereas that of Austronesian languages is only 1.2 million with the Fijians and some Austronesian areas in the extreme western fringe of Melanesia accounting for about a third of the speakers of the Austronesian languages in Melanesia.

The Papuan languages belong to Melanesia par excellence, only in the extreme southwest of the indistinct western border region of Melanesia around Timor, Alor and Pantar they overlap to some extent into areas in which the local Austronesian languages do not quite belong to the Austronesian languages of Melanesia, but constitute languages which are to some extent transitional between the Austronesian languages of Indonesia and Melanesia. There is still the possibility that one or two hitherto unknown Papuan languages may be discovered further west - there are rumours of strange languages being located westwards in the lesser Sunda Islands. In any event, some Papuan linguistic influence appears to be present in those areas. The southern border of Melanesia in terms of Papuan languages is fairly clearcut vis-à-vis the Australian languages, though mutual influences of the two language types across Torres Straits appear to be present. One Australian language, Mabuiag, which is spoken on the western Torres Strait Islands, shows strong influences in its basic vocabulary and its phonology from a particular Papuan language, Miriam, which is spoken on the eastern Torres Strait Islands. There is a possibility that the speakers of this western Torres Strait Islands language, who show very strong Papuan racial influence, may have been originally speakers of a Papuan language and have taken over an Australian language. In the north and east, there is no potential overlapping of Papuan languages into areas outside Melanesia.

The question arises whether the Austronesian languages of Melanesia constitute something typically Melanesian. In the eastern half of the Austronesian world, the Polynesian languages clearly form a group and are set off from other Austronesian languages through a number of features and
characteristics. The same can be said to some extent about the majority of the Austronesian languages of Micronesia which constitute another group. Only a few of the Austronesian languages of Micronesia are quite aberrant and are at present not even regarded as belonging to the Oceanic type of Austronesian languages. Disregarding these languages, the Micronesian languages can as a group be separated to some extent from the Austronesian languages of Melanesia, because they share some features largely in contrast to the latter.

In contrast to these two language groups, the Austronesian languages of Melanesia do not form a single language group and it is therefore a priori only possible on geographical grounds to speak of Melanesian Austronesian languages. In some respects, especially on the lexical level, the differences between the individual Austronesian language groups in Melanesia are sometimes greater than such differences between individual Austronesian language groups in Melanesia and Austronesian languages outside Melanesia. However, the existence of clear-cut borders of Polynesian languages in areas where they abut on Austronesian languages of Melanesia, of less clear-cut borders of Micronesian languages where they abut on the latter, and the different nature of Indonesian Austronesian languages to the west of the western geographical border area of Melanesia, makes it possible to regard the Austronesian languages of Melanesia, by way of a negative definition, as something different from all the surrounding Austronesian languages. At the same time, there are some structural features which are typical of Austronesian languages of Melanesia in general in contrast to languages of other Austronesian groups, though the borders of the distribution of such features are quite fuzzy and tenuous in some areas, especially in the west. As a non-linguistic factor, the interesting point may be mentioned that speakers of Austronesian languages of Melanesia are generally melanid, i.e. more dark-skinned than speakers of other Austronesian languages, though here again the borders of this phenomenon towards the west are very blurred.

The delineation of groups within the Austronesian languages is essentially based on the findings of comparative linguistics which takes into account mainly phonological criteria, i.e. features of sound structure. Blust (1978) established that the Austronesian languages of southern Halmahera and northwestern New Guinea constitute a transitional form between the Indonesian and Oceanic Austronesian languages, and that languages of the Moluccas constitute a further transitional form between the southern Halmahera-northwestern New Guinea languages and Indonesian languages further west. He regards the south Halmahera-northwestern New Guinea languages plus the Oceanic Austronesian languages as constituting a higher-order group which he contrasts with the Indonesian Austronesian languages further west. This results in a fuzzy, transitional border of Melanesian Austronesian languages towards the west. On phonological grounds, there is a clear border in the east between the Austronesian languages of Melanesia and those of Polynesia. In Polynesian languages, certain consonants which are separate in Austronesian languages of Melanesia, have coalesced into one type of consonant. So for instance, \( b \) and \( p \) which are distinct sounds in Austronesian languages of Melanesia and serve to distinguish between different words (as in English 'back' and 'pack') coalesce into \( p \) in Polynesian languages. In the north towards the Micronesian languages, the border is less clear-cut on this level though the Micronesian languages differ from most Austronesian languages of
Melanesia through certain phenomena in their sound structure, especially through a very high elaboration of their vowel systems. Towards the south of the Austronesian languages of Melanesia, no other Austronesian languages exist.

It has already been pointed out that on the level of lexical relationships between the Austronesian languages of Melanesia and other Austronesian languages, the borders are not clear. Fijian for instance, shows a greater sharing of lexical items with Polynesian languages than with a number of Austronesian languages of Melanesia, though phonologically and structurally, Fijian is much closer to Austronesian languages of Melanesia than to Polynesian languages. Apart from the phonological features referred to above which define the border between the Polynesian languages and the Austronesian languages of Melanesia (and Micronesia), and determine the fuzzy border area between the Austronesian languages of Melanesia and those of Indonesia, it is only on the level of some features of language structure where, with the exception of areas to the west of Melanesia, the borders between the Austronesian languages of Melanesia and other Austronesian languages are relatively well defined and on which, at the same time, the Austronesian languages of Melanesia can be regarded as constituting, to some small extent, a unit vis-à-vis other Austronesian languages. The expression of possession in Austronesian languages of Melanesia is a feature typical of them: the nouns are divided into one group of nouns indicating close possession which are provided with possessive suffixes, and another group indicating less close possession with which possession is expressed with the help of auxiliary words to which possessive suffixes are added. There are usually at least two, sometimes a few, separate auxiliary words of this kind, with one of them indicating general possession and the other one food (with the few additional categories relating for instance to drink, etc.). In Austronesian languages of Indonesia, the possessive systems are different except in areas abutting Melanesia where systems similar to the one just described are found. The Polynesian possessive system is based on different principles, whereas the Micronesian one is in essence similar to the one found in Austronesian languages in Melanesia, but the categories indicated by auxiliary words are very much more numerous than those generally found in Austronesian languages of Melanesia. At the same time, in some Austronesian languages of Melanesia, especially in the southeast, highly complex systems of the indication of possession are found which differ to some extent from the usual system found in Austronesian languages of Melanesia. Some other structural features shared by a large number of Austronesian languages of Melanesia, to some extent in contrast to other Austronesian languages, can be observed, though the borders of the distribution of such features are again unclear and their appearance can only be described as a trend - the delineation towards Micronesia is especially difficult in this respect.

To sum up, it can be said that with some reservations, it is loosely possible to say that linguistic borders between Melanesia and the surrounding areas exist though in some regions, especially in the west, and to a lesser extent in the north, these borders are very fuzzy and indeterminate.
REFERENCE

BIOGEOGRAPHICAL MARKERS

Donald Walker

GEOLOGY

The Melanesian islands are situated roughly along the border between the Australian and Pacific crustal plates. They are composed of material thrown up as a result of subduction of one plate edge beneath the other, or of continental fragments drifted into the region and modified by tectonism in it. Northward and northwestward shear at the interface between the plates also affects the positions of the islands as does local seafloor spreading within some island groups. Mainland New Guinea is formed on a fragment of continental Australian origin extended by mountain building in the present location and the resultant accumulation of extensive lowlands from the materials eroded from these highlands. Westward from New Guinea, the Asian crustal plate replaces the Pacific plate as the Australian plate's neighbour and the Indo-malaysian island arcs are, in some senses, analogous to the Melanesian islands. Perhaps the best, if somewhat arbitrary, northwestern boundary should be drawn at the limit of the contribution of Australian plate fragments to the islands; this would include Timor and cut through Sulawesi according to some geological reconstructions.

Superimposed on this basic lay-out are coral reefs and islands more-or-less recently constructed around or on top of older rocks in warm seas.

BOTANY

On the basis of similarities and differences of the floras at the generic level, the following classification can be derived (following Balgooy 1971).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Subprovince</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indomalesian</td>
<td>Malesian</td>
<td>East Malesian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Southwest Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Caledonian</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>New Zealand + Kermadec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian</td>
<td></td>
<td>Chatham etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lord Howe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Norfolk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rapa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Easter</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Melanesia therefore contains the distinct floristic region of New Caledonia (including the Isle of Pines and Loyalty Islands) with high species endemicity and the subprovinces of East Malesia and Southwest Pacific. The plant genera of these three areas have the following general relationships (data simplified from Balgooy 1971):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>E. Malesia</th>
<th>S.W. Pacific</th>
<th>New Caledonia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cosmopolitan genera (%)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old world genera (%)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian genera (%)</td>
<td>&lt;2</td>
<td>&lt;2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New world genera (%)</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other genera (%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A rather weak northwestern boundary passes between Borneo and Sulawesi but an almost equally good one could be drawn immediately west of New Guinea; the Nusa Tenggara and Timor are outside the region. The flora of Melanesia thus defined is essentially one of cosmopolitan genera together with a large Asian component attenuating southeastwards. A few islands with ancient continental fragments (e.g. New Caledonia, New Guinea) have a significant element derived from Gondwana and held in common with parts of the Australian region. The size of the flora (i.e. the numbers of species) on an island is also strongly influenced by the size of the island and its distance from its neighbours, particularly those with richer biota.

ZOOLOGY

The boundary between the Australian and Oriental Realms defines the southwestern limit of Melanesia. Within the Papuan and the Polynesian divisions of the Oriental Realm (which includes all Melanesia) the fauna is dominantly related to that of Southeast Asia with considerable local speciation. The faunas of particular islands become increasingly depauperate with distance from Southeast Asia and New Guinea and, as with plants, the numbers of different animals on an island are related to its size and isolation.

The western boundary might be traditionally defined by 'Wallace's Line' but this represents an oversimplification of the definition of a region of very pronounced faunal change between western Indonesia and Malaysia on the one hand, and New Guinea and points east and south on the other. There is also a significant intrusion from the Australian Realm into New Guinea and, to a lesser extent, New Caledonia.

There is no well defined northeastern boundary between Melanesia and the rest of the Oriental Realm but American influences, which exist for instance in Hawaii, are negligible in Melanesia.

SUMMARY

Geologically Melanesia is definable as a chain of islands along the interface between two crustal plates of opposed movements. Biologically its strongest regional relationships are with Southeast Asia substantially


modified by the effects of island size, isolation and latterly by the effects of man himself in moving organisms from one place to another.

REFERENCE

PREHISTORIC MOVEMENT AND MAPPING

Jack Golson

The boundaries the prehistorian draws for Melanesia are similar to those of the ethnographer, the linguist and the physical anthropologist, despite the difficulties and dangers, some would say the virtual impossibility, of translating archaeological evidence into the categories used by them. If the fit is close, it is in large measure the result of the geographical character of the region, which imparted a particular character to its colonization.

I

Between Asia and Australasia are the water barriers of the eastern Indonesian archipelago, which prevented the eastwards expansion of Asiatic mammals, since they persisted even at times of Pleistocene low sea levels, when the Sunda shelf was dry land extending the Southeast Asian mainland as far as Borneo and Bali and the Sahul shelf linked New Guinea to Australia. The evidence from Java is that human settlement was very ancient in Sundaland, beginning with extinct forms of man related to early types in other parts of the world. The general conclusion from world prehistory must be that it took humankind a long time to achieve the capability to settle effectively over sea crossings of the width involved (see Birdsell 1977:124-125; Jones 1979:447-450). We do not know when people started moving out from Sundaland to settle the eastern islands, or indeed who they were. Excavations in southeast Australia show, however, that those who eventually made landfall on the Greater Australia continent were people of modern type, Homo sapiens sapiens, and had arrived by 40,000 years ago. The stone tools which form the only basis of widespread comparison between the early communities spread over the new continent show a family resemblance (cf. Jones 1979:455-457) but the sites from which they come are too scattered in time and space to support more detailed conclusions as to relationships.

Though the colonists came by sea, we assume for a number of reasons that their watercraft were simple and limited in performance, so that they arrived in small numbers, intermittently, from a number of possible points of immediate origin, at the 2,500 km coastline which the enlarged continent presented to the islands north and west (cf. Birdsell 1977:124-125). Small groups of later comers would have found this coastline increasingly filled up, their own successful establishment there increasingly difficult and their impact on the life styles of resident communities correspondingly reduced. Even such an apparently radical innovation as the appearance of
agriculture, claimed for a site in the Papua New Guinea highlands 9,000 years ago (see Golson, this volume), may, according to one interpretation (Yen, this volume), have been an indigenous New Guinea process out of existing hunter-gatherer systems of plant management, in circumstances which have yet to be adequately identified. If the alternative interpretation of the evidence is correct, that the earliest New Guinea agriculture already incorporated Southeast Asian plants, as well as the Southeast Asian pig, there is nevertheless no archaeological evidence from the highlands, where alone sites of the period have been discovered, that the intrusion was accompanied by innovations in material culture signifying, even indirectly, the arrival of other cultural traditions.

What is clear is that the process whose beginnings we see in the highlands 9,000 years ago, and which certainly by 6,000 years ago was associated with pigs and possibly with Southeast Asian crops, was the one which most decisively reflects the divergence of New Guinea and Australian cultural history. Much attention has been focussed recently on its geographical expression at Torres Strait (Moore 1972, 1979; Beckett 1972; Golson 1972a; Wurm 1972; Harris 1977).

II

Movement east from the New Guinea mainland into the nearer islands had begun before the end of the Pleistocene. The specific case, recently established, is that of New Britain, itself visible from the mainland, where excavations at a rockshelter in the southwest of the island have not only produced a date of 11,000 years ago for human settlement, but also discovered the presence of obsidian probably from the source at Talasea on the mid-north coast (Specht et al. 1981:14-15). Talasea obsidian occurs throughout the deposit at Balof rockshelter, at the northern tip of the closely neighbouring island of New Ireland, where the earliest occupation goes back about 7,000 years (Downie and White 1978). It appears then that the main Bismarck Archipelago was widely settled at an early date, perhaps considerably earlier than is indicated by the present evidence, since the first sites excavated are hardly likely to be the oldest on these archaeologically little known islands. Given their geographical position in relation to the mainland and each other, this would not be a surprising result. Beyond them, however, west to the Admiralties and east to the Solomons, there are wider water gaps without the benefit of a string of intervisible islands and requiring efficient watercraft and proficient seamanship for their crossing.

The Solomons are a long chain of islands, many of them large and high, which open a way deep into the Pacific, once they have been reached. Yet the earliest archaeological evidence we have for the group, around 3,500 years ago, is no older than that for remoter islands to the southeast (compare Green 1979:47 and White 1979:357 with Green 1979:33). Like the Bismarcks, the Solomons are archaeologically not well known and there is a strong likelihood that their settlement goes back further than is presently indicated. Some years ago (Golson 1968:5-7) I suggested, as possible evidence of such greater antiquity, that a number of undated artifact types from the northern Solomons had parallels in New Britain and beyond that on the New Guinea mainland and that their occurrence might be explained in the light of the presence in both the Bismarcks and the Solomons of so-called
Papuan languages related to those of New Guinea itself (see Wurm this section). Though the original comparative net was thrown too widely (cf. Golson 1972/1974:546), the suggestion has, I think, some validity and has found some support (e.g. Bellwood 1978:242-244). The artifact types in question are, however, still undated and we do not know whether they belong to a period of settlement in the Solomons earlier than the current dates. In the same way it cannot be assumed that speakers of Papuan languages, to whom they have been plausibly attributed, were older settlers in the area than speakers of the Austronesian languages found there (cf. Green 1976:52-55).

III

Beyond the Solomons, the world becomes increasingly oceanic, the islands or island groups more remote and more impoverished in terrestrial resources. It is today axiomatic amongst Pacific prehistorians that successful discovery and settlement in these circumstances required efficient ocean-going watercraft, well developed navigational techniques and an integrated set of cultivated plants and appropriate agricultural procedures. These were evidently all in the possession of the people of the Lapita culture who left their highly distinctive pottery at a string of sites from the Bismarcks to Samoa in the course of a remarkable millennium of expansion and settlement between 4,000 and 3,000 years ago (Green 1979; cf. Irwin 1980). It has for some years now been generally accepted that the Lapita communities which settled the Fiji-Tonga-Samoa region towards the end of that millennium were ancestral to the culture we know as Polynesian (Green 1981 for the most recent statement).

To account for the greater diversity of language and physical type in the Melanesian islands further west, it has been argued that Austronesian speakers must have settled the islands southeast of the Solomons well before Lapita made its appearance there (e.g. Bellwood 1979:18-20). However, evidence for such prior settlement in what is archaeologically the best known region of Melanesia has just not been found and the archaeological arguments advanced in its support and against the primacy of Lapita are becoming increasingly strained (e.g. those of Green 1979:47-48).

The time is ripe for a reconsideration of the proposition that the greater diversity in southern Melanesia compared to Polynesia is due to events and developments that took place there subsequent to Lapita colonization and not before it. This is a point of view taken some years ago in the linguistic field by Wurm (1967) and on archaeological grounds by myself (1968:10; cf. 1972b:10-11, 13-14) and at one stage by Green (1963:243, 266-267, 250). The archaeological evidence is in general much as it was then: the southern Melanesian islands see the appearance of one or more pottery traditions later than Lapita and not readily derivable from it. Though the details are complex and their interpretation matters of dispute, this post-Lapita ceramic innovation extends no further east than Fiji, which thus stands at the border of Melanesia against Polynesia. The innovation affecting Fiji seems to have been particularly late - about 900 years ago in a Lapita-based settlement history of more than 3,000 years - so that what Frost calls the Polynesian vector of Fijian culture was not overwhelmed (Frost 1979:79-80, but I follow Hunt (1980) in considering
Frost's first post-Lapita intrusive Melanesian ceramic tradition as derived from Lapita in Fiji).

IV

We do not know the origin of the post-Lapita ceramic innovations of which I have been speaking. There are a few general resemblances in form and decoration between some pottery in southern Melanesia and some in the northern Solomons, while fairly specific similarities in decorative technique and motif have been indicated between material at a number of New Caledonian sites and undated pottery from surface sites in northern Bougainville (Golson 1972/74:574-576). What we know of Solomon Islands archaeology suggests that there is a more complex history to be discovered here than is emerging for southern Melanesia. This is perhaps only to be expected for a large archipelago, containing islands of substantial size between which communication is easy and lying adjacent to the major landmass formed by New Guinea and the Bismarck archipelago, which together present a long northern coastline running west to Indonesia, open to receive and transmit cultural influences at all times during the sea-going era.

We are beginning to get some localized insights into New Guinea coastal and island archaeology, but there are so many areas unknown, or known only from surface collections of pottery in a superficially bewildering variety of styles, that it is impossible to generalize. All we can say is that the vast arc of whose prehistory I have been confessing our essential ignorance — the New Guinea north coast, the Bismarcks and the Solomons — forms the frontier of Melanesia against the Micronesian islands to the north.

V

The most arbitrary archaeological boundary to Melanesia is that to the west, which I draw at the western tip of Indonesian New Guinea. This is not simply because Irian Jaya and the eastern Indonesian islands are archaeologically the least known of any region I have surveyed. More importantly it is because the lands west of the line underwent a historical experience similar to that in particular of the eastern regions of mainland and island New Guinea, which resulted in some of the features we characterize as Melanesian. This was the coming into contact, along the entire gamut of relationships which that phrase allows, of resident populations speaking Papuan languages and possessing particular characteristics of physical and social type, with groups of physically and socially variant Austronesian speakers arriving over a period in the relatively recent past. It can further be argued, as Wurm (1967) has done, that it is the physical and cultural results of these prolonged and varied encounters transported into the islands of the southwest Pacific as far as Fiji that make them Melanesian.

The particular Austronesian impact that was experienced in Indonesia was massive by comparison, and longer-lived, though it was weaker in the east and locally patchy. The more recent growth of regional polities and the intrusion of outside forces like the Chinese, Islam and eventually the
Europeans tended to pull the islands west of New Guinea into the orbit of systems centred still further west. The far western coasts of New Guinea itself had indeed been caught up in this wider world by the time the region was first visited by Europeans in the sixteenth century. Hughes (1977:15-18) discusses the antiquity, nature and extent of outside contact with the island of New Guinea as a whole up to the arrival of the Europeans, beginning with the discovery of bronze objects of so-called Dongson (Southeast Asian metal age) type in Irian Jaya and the claims for Dongson influence in prehistoric and ethnographic art styles further east. The very thinness of the record he compiles, however, underlines the essential isolation of the Melanesian world from events beyond the western boundary I have nominated.

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Walker, D., ed., 1972. *Bridge and barrier: the natural and cultural history of Torres Strait*. Canberra: Australian National University, Research School of Pacific Studies, Department of Biogeography and Geomorphology, Publication BG/3.


BOUNDARIES AND IDENTITY

Islets and Enclaves

Isolated populations in enclaves or on small islands

NORMA McARTHUR

Melanesian linguistic diversity: a Melanesian choice?

D.C. LAYCOCK

Traditional enclaves in Melanesia

ROGER M. KEESING
Although most of the papers that are presented in this volume deal specifically with one or other aspects of Melanesian populations - their languages, their cultures, etc. - my emphasis will be on the diversity in the sizes and rates of growth of populations as long as they remain small and isolated. The diversity in these patterns is not necessarily peculiar to Melanesia, but there are (or were) small islands which remained comparatively isolated for long periods and population groups on larger islands which retained an identity separate from their neighbours.

As long as a population remains small - and it is still too early in our simulation studies\(^1\) to decide when a population ceases to be 'small' - each individual counts for more than they would in a larger aggregate, and therefore the conventional techniques of demographic analysis are not applicable. While retaining the same demographic logic, one must adopt an approach which the statisticians describe as 'stochastic' or 'probabilistic', in which each individual is subjected to the probability of dying at the age he or she has attained in any year, and for the females the probability of their giving birth in that year. This latter of course implies that there is a male in the population with whom she can mate.

In the experimental situation that we create in the computer the rules about marriage might be varied, as might all the other rules. Rules of one kind or another lie at the root of our simulations, which are basically projections of very small populations under stipulated conditions. The patterns of mortality and fertility have been described elsewhere (McArthur, Saunders and Tweedie 1976), and in the results presented here they are what were described as 'Pacific models'. In this earlier paper the effects of changes in the mortality schedules were examined: here there are some modifications in fertility behaviour, with no changes in mortality and no restrictions on mating.

Given a prescribed probability for each demographic event for any one individual, the computer produces a random number between zero and one: if that number falls at or below the probability prescribed for a particular event to a particular individual, the event occurs; should the random number exceed the decreed probability for that individual in that year of age, all that happens is that the survivor becomes one year older.

The operational sequence begins by creating the births for the year, and then allocating sex to the children born, assuming that there is an even chance of a child being male or female. Whatever its sex, it enters
the population at age 0 and is given an identifying number by which it can be traced through the years to come. Each individual is then subjected to the probability of death stipulated for their age and sex, and the survivors are then aged by one year to create the population for the following year when the same sequence of operations is performed.

Because of the storage capacity allowed by the computer programme there are limits to the numbers of years and numbers of persons that might be traced, but there is a fascinating diversity among the populations produced under identical demographic conditions. In this experimental situation at least twenty populations need to be generated under each set of assumptions dictated to the computer, and each of them warns against any generalization whatsoever except that the survival of a population hinges on the survival of more or less balanced numbers of males and females born within a relatively short time.

In a set of experiments starting with a population of only three - two females aged eighteen and one male aged twenty - two hundred populations were generated in the computer, one hundred of them populations with no restrictions at all on the prescribed fertility schedule, and in the other one hundred the women who gave birth in one year were allowed an infertile year in the following year. In biological terms this interruption to the fertility schedule might be regarded as a lactation period which reduces the likelihood of conception. Both sets were run for up to a maximum of five hundred years, and the probability of success in establishing a viable population from such small initial numbers is shown in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Populations classified</th>
<th>No limit to fertility</th>
<th>Infertile year after each birth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presumed success</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doubtful</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headed for extinction</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When there was no fertility constraint approximately three quarters of the populations were still viable after five hundred years and only one-quarter had become extinct. When fertility was constrained the success rate fell to less than one half, and probably fewer than one half would have survived for much more than five hundred years. This is a rather greater difference than would be expected from the average numbers of children born to the women in each series. For 2,172 women who had no infertile year, the average size of completed families was 6.7 children; for 1,227 women who completed their childbearing in a more relaxed fashion the average was 5.4, a reduction of only 20 per cent. The explanation for
this is that the probability of failing to conceive at each age is always greater than the complementary probability for conception.

In addition to the two hundred populations that were allowed to run for up to five hundred years, there were also twenty for each hypothesis about fertility which were printed out by age and sex at five year intervals up to a maximum of two hundred and fifty years. From these it is possible to detect and analyse the causes of the variability in growth, and why some populations head for extinction while others thrive. The proportions of the populations in these smaller samples were compatible with the success or failure rates in the larger samples described above, although by an oversight no direct comparison was possible because of the different time durations for the runs.

The course of growth and development of the individual populations can be illustrated dramatically graphically, but the kind of scale required is not easily reproduced in small format. Instead, Tables 2 and 3 present the population sizes attained at fifty year intervals from year fifty under each fertility hypothesis, ranked by their size at year fifty. The distribution of sizes then was not markedly different in either series, but with each successive time interval thereafter the differences between them tended to increase until the range of sizes two hundred and fifty years from their origin contrasted quite vividly.

The populations might be regrouped by size after one hundred years of existence when there was still no very great difference in the range of sizes under each hypothesis, but a century later five of the fifteen populations still surviving with unrestrained fertility exceeded the maximum size of any subjected to the fertility constraint. Fifty years later the differences in sizes, both within and between the two sets, are greater, but even so some of the populations which had experienced the limitation on fertility were as large or larger than some which did not.

In Table 2 the size range is from eighty-two to more than nine hundred amongst the fourteen populations which survived two hundred and fifty years from their origin under unchanging and identical conditions: in Table 3 the range for the twelve populations which survived this period, also under unchanging and identical conditions, is from five to two hundred and twenty-seven. There is not space to detail why some of the smaller populations at year fifty or year one hundred fared better than those that were larger at those dates, but it hinged very largely on the sexes of the children born some number of years previously and who survived so that there were sufficient partners available from the start of the female reproductive cycle.

As long as the number of births in any five year period remained small, there were runs of up to fifty years in some populations where, purely by chance, one or other sex predominated among the births and the survivors. As the populations increased in size and the number of births increased, the numbers of males and females born within a specified period became more nearly equal, again purely by chance. In small, isolated populations it need not necessarily be the Darwinian law of the survival of the fittest which prevails.
Table 2

Population sizes attained at 50 year intervals, with random mating and no limit to fertility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population size at year:</th>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>250</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>378</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>158</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<td>525</td>
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<td>403</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>&gt;938*</td>
<td>-</td>
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</table>

*Overflowed storage capacity of computer before 250 years
### Table 3

Population sizes attained at 50 year intervals, with random mating and one infertile year after a birth

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<th>Population size at year:</th>
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<td>23</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>108</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
NOTE

This work is being done in collaboration with Drs I.W. Saunders and R.L. Tweedie of the Division of Mathematics and Statistics, CSIRO.

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MELANESIAN LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY: A MELANESIAN CHOICE?

D.C. Laycock

The facts of the linguistic diversity of Melanesia are now commonplace - a quarter of the world's languages (Laycock 1969), spoken, over a land area much less than a hundredth of the inhabitable land surface of the world, by a fraction of the world's population that is too small to bother calculating. The reasons for this diversity are less well established, and perhaps still arguable; but some of the suggestions at least have been round for a century or more.

A common nineteenth century view, for instance - and a view far from extinct - was that 'our' languages (by which was meant, essentially, the large languages of Europe and the 'civilised world') were subject to normal processes of linguistic change, but that 'primitive' languages were unstable, not only because they were unwritten, but also because they were supposed to be abnormally subject to the effects of word-taboos, and dependent on the whims of chiefs and other prestigious persons. A good representative of this view was Max Müller, who cites (1875(I):58) the case of a missionary in Central America who, in 1833, was supposed to have found that the dictionary he had made ten years earlier was already 'antiquated and useless'.

With the development of descriptive linguistics, and associated relativistic views about the equivalence, in any value scale, of all human languages (and societies) such views became unfashionable, and new explanations for extreme linguistic diversity were sought. A popular first guess was a hypothesis based on isolation, terrain, and time; the languages of small communities cut off from their neighbours, for thousands of years, simply went on diverging at a normal rate, with no possibility of convergence. But this is too simple an explanation for Melanesia, where we find, typically, the largest languages (that is, the least diversity) in the most isolated areas (such as the Highlands of Papua New Guinea) and the greatest divergence in areas of easy terrain and extensive trading contacts (as in north coast Papua New Guinea, and island Melanesia).

Accordingly, I once speculated that the divergence, in areas such as the Sepik and Madang Provinces of Papua New Guinea, was caused in fact by the ease of migration, allowing groups to divide, cut through others, and force new combinations of remnant groups.

Multiple migration and isolation are still probably important factors, but I now suggest that the real reasons for Melanesian linguistic diversity are closer to the nineteenth century views - thereby setting linguistics
back 100 years. The opposition is not between 'civilised' and 'primitive' languages, or even between 'written' and 'unwritten' languages, but rather between 'large' and 'small' languages. In other words, the dynamics of linguistic change are very different in languages whose speakers number in the hundreds, or even thousands, as against languages whose speakers are numbered in the lakhs, myriads, or millions.  

All linguistic communities, of whatever size, are always subject to simultaneous pressures towards convergence and divergence. Pressures towards convergence include standardization of a language (through writing, academies, and educated groups), centralized control, media, prestige, and excess of numbers (of one language or dialect as against the rest). The pressures towards divergence are the inbuilt mechanisms of linguistic change, that will, unchecked, make the speech of two communities, originally speaking the same language, unintelligible to each other in approximately 500 years. In Melanesia, virtually all the pressures towards convergence are absent. Prestige is hardly a factor in egalitarian societies at the same level of technological development — though there is slight evidence (Laycock 1979:95) that Austronesian languages, whose speakers brought technological innovations and wider trading contacts to Melanesia, may have had a slight edge on the Papuan languages. But this is relevant only for multilingualism, in determining which foreign languages are learnt; it does nothing to reduce the number of distinct languages. Similarly, the question of numbers seems relevant only in multilingualism; speakers of a particular dialect in Melanesia see no reason to adapt their speech in the direction of a mutually intelligible dialect just because it may have ten times as many speakers.  

Also, in the absence of the influence of media and central control in traditional Melanesia, the only way for linguistic change to spread is by personal linguistic interaction — that is, people talking to other people. The maximum number of people in Melanesia who could have this personal linguistic interaction would seem to be about 8,000. In a geographically contiguous linguistic community, an adult male — and we are speaking of male-dominated societies — needs to keep track of only about 2,000 other adult males (discounting the 4,000 or more children, and the 2,000 adult women). Everyone in the society is then in some kin relation with someone the adult male knows personally, so there is always the possibility of personal linguistic interaction.  

In practice, as we have seen above, the linguistic and social groupings in Melanesia are much smaller. I estimate, from the observation of Sepik languages, that the maximum number of persons in Papua New Guinea speaking exactly the same dialect of the same language is about 500. In every village of more than 500 people, there are at least two identifiable hamlet dialects; and every language which is spoken in more than one village tends to have a recognizable form of speech for each village.  

The cause of this linguistic differentiation, at the dialect level, lie in Melanesian social organization and Melanesian attitudes to language. It has more than once been said to me around the Sepik that 'it wouldn't be any good if we all talked the same; we like to know where people come from'. In other words, linguistic diversity, of however minor a kind, is perpetuated, as a badge of identification. It is this attitude, I suggest,
that is at the heart of the multiplicity of languages and dialects in Melanesia.

An example can be taken from the large village of Malol, on the north coast of Papua New Guinea, whose inhabitants speak the Austronesian language of Sissano. In 1970 Malol had a population of 1,566, speaking three or four hamlet dialects. Informants told me that one of these dialects, that of Tainyapin hamlet, was a 'very strange' form of Sissano. However, a wordlist taken from Tainyapin speakers showed only two or three lexical items that differed from those of other dialects — and no phonological or grammatical differences. One of these words caught my attention: the word *pala* for 'dog', as against the rest of Sissano *aun*. The word for 'dog' in the inland Papuan language of One is also *pala*, and further enquiries established that the inhabitants of Tainyapin hamlet were in fact One refugees who had settled in Malol about the middle of the nineteenth century. What is significant is that since that time the group had completely adopted the Sissano language, but had retained just a few words from their original language — solely, I believe, as linguistic markers of their origin.

We can see the strength of linguistic identification also in the maintenance of small languages. The speakers of very small languages are always at least bilingual, speaking, for survival purposes, one or more of the large languages around them (the numbers game again). In most areas of the world, a small language, coupled with bilingualism, is a sure indication of impending language death; yet in Melanesia a few hundred persons can maintain a language against all pressures. The Sepik village of Yelogu, in the Washkuk Mountains above Ambunti, had in 1971 only seventy inhabitants, all of whom were bilingual in Kwoma, and who counted, for all social purposes, as part of the Kwoma community; but when they went home to their own village they spoke the totally different language of Kaunga. Here we have a situation where a language is maintained for virtually no other purpose than that of linguistic identity — if the language died out tomorrow almost nothing in the lives of Yelogu people would be changed — and yet it continues to be maintained against all odds. (See also Laycock 1979.)

As Grace (1975) has pointed out, maintaining this degree of linguistic diversity is not without its cost, in terms of human effort and time. But he has also indicated, citing Leenhardt (1930) on New Caledonian languages, the cost is not as great as it may appear. In the case of languages of a single stock, whether these be Austronesian or Papuan, the languages differ more in their lexicon than in their phonological and grammatical organization — that is, they are very close to being the same language with a different set of labels. It is often possible to translate morpheme from one language to another. This means that the words of a different language can be used in the same way as synonyms in one's own language — for purposes of rhetoric, stylistic differentiation, or even obfuscation.

All of which means that language in Melanesia is, in its very diversity, being used constructively, to maintain social groupings at a small and manageable level — and, conversely, to keep other groups at a distance. Someone who speaks exactly as you do may or may not be a friend; but someone who speaks differently is always automatically an
outsider, no matter how close the degree of contact. The way is open to use language as a weapon: to refuse to speak a language that one knows well, in order to put one's interlocutor at a disadvantage, or to insist on speaking a particular language to include or exclude certain groups among one's hearers.

Because of this, Melanesians tend to have very strong feelings about language. On the one hand, they tend to solve their communication difficulties on purely pragmatic levels, using whatever shared languages — including pidgins — are available, to get the message across. They are tolerant of errors and linguistic differences which do not impede communication. On the other hand, however, they maintain and exploit linguistic differences for alliances and divisions that go far beyond the question of mere communication.

There is a deliberateness about the Melanesian exploitation of diversity that may also have parallels in the creation of that diversity. In addition to the normal mechanisms of linguistic change mentioned above, there is some evidence that additional differences are deliberately created. The clearest example is found in the Uisai dialect of Buin, in south Bougainville. Buin has currently about 17,000 speakers. It is a complex language, which has a strong gender system: pronouns, verb agreements, numerals, deictics, and common adjectives show concordance for gender, through three numbers (singular, dual, and plural). The Uisai dialect has about 1,000 speakers. In this dialect, we find all the gender agreements reversed — that is, all the masculines are feminine and all the feminines are masculine. There is no accepted mechanism for linguistic change which can cause a flip-flop of this kind and magnitude. I believe that at some stage in the past, some influential speaker of the Uisai dialect announced that from now on his people were not to speak like the rest of the Buins. Once the change was adopted, it would become the natural speech of the community within one or two generations.5

But it would take us too far here to explore all the indications of human tinkering with language in Melanesia. It is enough here to suggest that Melanesian linguistic diversity is not merely the by-product of accidents of history and geography, but is a positive Melanesian reaction to their environment — in other words, a Melanesian choice.

NOTES

1 The usual assumptions of linguistic change are:

(a) phonological change proceeds by small modifications, perceptible, if at all, only over several generations. Major restructuring of the system occurs when splits and mergers obscure important contrasts. Phonological change may be accelerated by contact with other languages.

(b) lexical replacement proceeds randomly at modest speed (approximately 19 per cent per millennium for basic vocabulary), and may occur as a
result of gradual semantic shifts. May be accelerated by culture change and by contact with other languages.

(c) grammatical changes arise when phonological or lexical changes mean that significant morphemes can no longer be kept apart.

2 One of these days I shall check up on the details of this story. After thirteen years absence from south Bougainville I noticed that the Buin language had undergone a large number of changes - but nothing that would impair communication.

3 Sankoff (1977) calculated, from a sample of about 190 languages of Papua New Guinea, that 35.6 per cent had less than 500 speakers. I made a count of 607 Papuan languages, and found that 40 per cent had less than 500 speakers - while the average number of speakers of Papuan languages is less than 4000. The inclusion of Austronesian languages in the count would not change the figures greatly - and it is as well to remember that the numbers of speakers of different languages may have been much smaller in the past.

4 Kwoma itself has only about 3,000 speakers. There are perhaps 200 additional speakers of Kaunga outside the Kwoma-speaking area, but including them does not change the Yelogu situation greatly; inhabitants of Yelogu have much more interaction with Kwoma speakers than with other speakers of Kaunga.

5 Schwartz (1963) characterizes the Manus system of interrelationships as a network of 'roads'. Linguistic choices may be seen as a means of keeping the roads open - or closing them where necessary.

6 A final instructive footnote from Müller (1875), quoting 'Dr. Rae, The Polynesian, No.23, 1862'. Only the remarks on 'degeneracy' and 'confined range of ideas' seem inappropriate today:

Most men of mark have a style of their own. If the community be large, and there be many who have made language their study, it is only such innovations as have real merit that become permanent. If it be small, a single eminent man, especially where writing is unknown, may make great changes. There being no one to challenge the propriety of his innovations, they become first fashionable and then lasting. The old and better vocabulary drops. If, for instance, England had been a small country, and scarce a writer of distinction in it but Carlyle, he without doubt would have much altered the language. As it is, though he has his imitators, it is little probable that he will have a perceptible influence over the common diction. Hence, where writing is unknown, if the community be broken up into small tribes, the language very rapidly changes, and for the worse. An offset from an Indian tribe in a few generations has a language unintelligible to the parent-stock. Hence the vast number of languages among the small hunting tribes of Indians in North and South America, which yet are all evidently of a common
origin, for their principles are identical. The larger, therefore, the community, the more permanent the language; the smaller, the less it is permanent, and the greater the degeneracy. The smaller the community, the more confined the range of ideas, consequently the smaller the vocabulary necessary, and the falling into abeyance of many words.

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TRADITIONALIST ENCLAVES IN MELANESIA

Roger M. Keesing

INTRODUCTION

New Guinea has long stirred Western popular imagination as a last frontier of the 'primitive' world, along which could be found tribes untouched by Western influence. But in truth virtually all of the most remote hinterlands peoples of Papua New Guinea have now been pulled peripherally into their young country and the world economy.

The traditionalist enclaves I will examine are not those communities in the most remote hinterlands of Papua New Guinea that continued into or through the 1970s to practise the customs of the past. Rather, they lie in what anthropologists call seaboard Melanesia - the Solomons, Vanuatu (until recently the New Hebrides), and the coastal and eastern island regions of Papua New Guinea. I will draw heavily on my own material from Malaita Island in the Solomons, but the patterns I will describe have analogues in parts of Vanuatu, notably the interiors of Santo and Malekula, and some parts of seaboard Papua New Guinea, notably the interior of New Britain and the Massim (Milne Bay Province).

What makes the continuing practice of traditional cultural patterns in these areas more intriguing than the cultural conservatism of the most isolated pockets of the Papua New Guinea interior is precisely that they have not been isolated from Western contact. They have been tied into the world economy for a century or more. The grandfathers of the Malaita people whose cultural conservatism I will sketch went to Queensland and Fiji from the 1870s to the turn of the century, in the famous - or infamous - labour trade. For three quarters of a century these Malaitans have been under concerted pressure from Christianity. Yet as jet airliners land, and affairs of a young nation are debated, a scant seventy-five miles away, the stubborn Kwaio of the central Malaita mountains continue to sacrifice pigs to their ancestors, stage mortuary feasts using strung shell valuables, and enact ancestral customs.

Why I will ask, have some Malanesians kept their commitment to their ancestors and their past, in the face of Christianity, copra and cash, and nowadays, tourists, transistors, and Toyotas?
TRADITIONALISM AND NEOTRADITIONALISM

In contemporary Melanesia, we find a dwindling number of people following the customs of their ancestors; and an increasing number talking about kastom. Kastom as political symbol has been used in the rhetoric of secessionists, most recently on Espiritu Santo; it has been used by political leaders in appealing to national unity and the preservation of Melanesian values - and the votes of villagers. And it has been used by cultists - Moro of Guadalcanal, the Jonfrum leaders of Tanna, the Nagriamel cultists of Santo - who have created syncretic ideologies out of customary, Western and often millenarian elements. The rhetoric of kastom covers a spectrum between those committed to the new who want to deny that it must destroy the old, and those who seek to accommodate new ideas and political realities with a continuing commitment to old ways and values, and an ancient mode of village life. This latter end of the spectrum comes tangent to the kinds of traditionalism I will examine. Thus in the interior of Espiritu Santo, small pockets of die-hard traditionalists have continued to follow ancestral ways while around them Nagriamel cultists talk about these ways and construct elaborate codifications of kastom, in communities where introduced and indigenous ideas, Christian and pagan practice, cash and cowries, are woven together. In northern Malaita, in the Solomons, die-hard traditionalists share the largely empty mountains with peoples grouped into kastom villages according to the ideology of the post-Second World War Maasina Rule movement (Ross 1973:104), while on the coast their Christian cousins become increasingly Westernized and 'developed'. I have described how, in the mountains of central Malaita, people follow traditional customs for six days a week; and once a week, at a Maasina Rule-style meeting village, they organize in terms of 'chiefs' and 'common people' and use the rhetoric of kastom to demand autonomy from alien laws and invading Christianity (Keesing 1968, 1980b). The relationship between practising customs and talking about them in political rhetoric is, then, far from simple. In focusing on those pockets of seaboard Melanesia where dwindling populations remain committed to ancestral ways, I will inevitably deal with such peoples' political struggles to be allowed to live their lives as they have chosen. In these struggles, kastom inevitably becomes a political symbol, externalized and objectified. The Santo traditionalist may use the same symbols as Jimmy Stephens, but he is playing a different game for different stakes.

In relating what I am calling traditionalism - an unbroken, continuous enactment of the precolonial social and religious system (as inevitably transformed by pacification, steel tools, and introduced cultigens) - to various forms of neotraditionalism, a further theme in contemporary Melanesia is worth noting. This is the revival of elements of traditional culture in areas that had long been Christianized and substantially Westernized. The resurgence of interclan warfare in the Papua New Guinea highlands is the most spectacular return to ways of the past. But more interesting, in relation to my focus on traditionalism, is a resurgence of customary practice in parts of seaboard Melanesia. Thus, for example, many of the Manus Islanders described by Mead as having adopted 'New Lives for Old' (1956) have resurrected many elements of ancestral religion and traditional social organization (T. Schwartz, personal communication): old lives for new, we might say .... Partly this represents a counterreaction
against the subversion of Melanesian values of kinship and community in the process of capitalist development.

Here, the agents of neotraditionalism have not only been elders who once lived the old ways; they include university students schooled in the rhetoric of black nationalism and anticolonialism. This reemergence of old customary practices in long-Christian communities may also represent a Melanesianization of Christianity. Many communities in seaboard Melanesia that were dominated by conservative European missionaries through the first half of the century have in the last twenty or thirty years regained substantial control over their religious life, as missions have become indigenous churches. What had been patriarchally-tended flocks have been able to create their own syntheses of traditional feasting and even elements of old religious practice with a Christianity ironically rendered more Christian by Melanesians.

But the puzzle of those Melanesians who, across the decades, never adopted Christianity, never gave up their feasts and rituals and shell valuables, remains.

CONSERVATISM AND CHANGE: THE CASE OF MALAITA

The island of Malaita in the Solomons provides an ideal laboratory for studying the forces of cultural conservatism and anticolonial resistance, and the pressures of change that are finally overcoming them. For among the island's 65,000 people are sizeable populations that resisted Christianization and Westernization into the 1960s; and substantial pockets where such conservatism still prevails. Although we cannot simplistically assume that the forces of conservatism and change are the same in other parts of Melanesia, we can at least draw from such a case insights into the factors—historical, cultural, geographical, economic—that shape peoples' stances to new alternatives.

Malaita, about one hundred miles long and twenty-five miles across at the widest point, is striped by a series of language- and dialect zones (figure 1). A partly distinctive variant of a common social and religious system is found in each language group. However, the most striking differences among Malaita peoples from one end of the island to the other are found not in the realm of society and culture, but in ecological adaptation and economic system. Populations who share a fundamentally common language and culture have, in parts of Malaita, radically contrasting and complementary economic systems and occupy sharply separated ecological settings.

Two of the three peoples whose conservatism I will examine inhabit the shallow coral lagoons and strands of coastal Malaita, living in large and crowded settlements on islets or coral platforms built up from the lagoon floor. The third follow the pattern that in pre-European times prevailed over most of the island, living in tiny, dispersed homestead clusters scattered through the mountains.
LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS
OF MALAITA

1 TO'ABAITA
2 BAELELEA
3 BAEGU
4 LAU
5 FATALEKA
6 KWARA'AE
7 LAJALAJA
8 KWAIO
9 KWAREKWAREO
10 KWAIKWAIO
11 'ARE'ARE
12 SA'A

Figure 1
I will briefly describe the nature of traditionalism in these three populations as they were when I first worked on Malaita in the early and mid-1960s. I will begin with the bush people, the Kwaio of the central mountains.

The traditionalism of modern Kwaio pagans can only be understood against a historical background of anticolonial struggle. A brief Kwaio-centric view of Malaita history will provide needed background.

During the nineteenth century labour trade, the Kwaio responded violently to the death of recruits taken under drastically harsh conditions to distant lands. In the 1880s Kwaio captured and looted two recruiting ships, massacred part of the crew of a third, and killed a number of European recruiters. When a missionary established a church on the Kwaio coast and began preaching against ancestors, he was assassinated. In the early 1920s the British administration imposed a head tax and sought to break the cycle of blood feuding. The Kwaio responded in 1927 by assassinating the architect of pacification, District Officer W.R. Bell, and massacring his British cadet and police patrol. The wantonly destructive punitive expedition that followed ended the possibility of armed resistance (Keesing and Corris, 1980). But in 1939, anticolonialism emerged in new guise in a cult movement: an ancestress, speaking through human intermediaries, prophesied the coming of Americans, destruction of Tulagi, and expulsion of the British colonial masters (Keesing 1978, 1980a). A few years later, in the wake of massive American presence on Guadalcanal, Kwaio joined with other Malaitans in Maasina Rule to form a united front against reimposition of prewar-style colonial rule. Organizing into hierarchies of clan and district 'chiefs', they demanded a loosening of direct rule and a recognition of customary law (Keesing 1978, Laracy 1979). This Maasina Rule movement was broken by heavy-handed repression, but it has reappeared in altered guise over the last twenty-five years in a series of 'custom movements' - in the Kwaio case, a continuing project to codify, hence legitimize and demand recognition of, customary law (Keesing 1967, 1980b).

The east central coast of Malaita rises steeply from the sea, with no coastal shelf. When I began research in the early 1960s, about half of the east Kwaio population had become Christian. Virtually all of these Christians lived in villages along the coast or on the lower coastal slopes; the bulk of the Christians had in pre-European times been what the Kwaio call 'downhill people', living on the coastal slopes and margins.

In the mountains, a population of some 2000 continued in the 1960s to practise a traditional way of life. Young men left home for plantation labour, as they had been doing for eighty years; and they brought home steel knives and axes, pipes, calicoes, and a trickle of other trade-store goods. But beyond this, cultural conservatism was striking. The old religion, focussed on propitiation of ancestral spirits by sacrifice of pigs, flourished. Mortuary feasts, with exchange of strung shell valuables, continued. These valuables, locally-manufactured, were the pervasive medium of exchange: cash was a rarity. Tiny scattered homesteads, shifted every few years, still followed the old pattern: men's house above, domestic houses in the middle, menstrual huts below - a spatial representation of Kwaio cosmology. Unmarried girls and women still
went nude, and married women wore only tiny pubic aprons, as they went about their daily tasks of subsistence cultivation, pig husbandry, and domestic work. Although blood feuding was no longer possible, men's houses were still constructed for defence, and men still went to feasts armed with bows and arrows, clubs, or spears; sporadic killings still occurred. And the old hostility to colonial intrusion and Christianity had not abated. When work began on a Seventh Day Adventist hospital on the Kwaio coast in 1965, the New Zealand medical missionary was killed by an unknown assassin. Relations with Christian Kwaio were strained, and the two communities were largely separate (Keesing 1967).

Up the east coast, where a fringing reef creates a large lagoon, speakers of Lau (one of a cluster of northern dialects) had over a span of several centuries worked out a striking adaptation. The Lau people lived in the lagoon, in large, tightly-packed villages built on artificial islands, platforms built from coral from the lagoon floor or extensions of sand spits. Almost entirely without garden land, the Lau people concentrated on fishing; they bartered fish and marine products for their bush neighbours' taro and yams, at coastal markets. In pre-European times 'bush' and 'saltwater' peoples had been in constant feud, and these markets were conducted under heavily armed guard and temporary truce.

Cultural conservatism in the Lau lagoon was as striking in the 1960s as it was in the Kwaio mountains, but in quite different ways. Several islet villages were still non-Christian. In these, men's and women's spheres were radically separated, ancestral sacrifice continued, and shell valuables were still in use for feasting and bridewealth. Yet this was no conservatism born of isolation: for almost a century, European ships had been plying the lagoon; missionaries of several denominations had been in Lau since the first years of the century. Only a few hundred yards from the men's houses and shrines were Seventh Day Adventist settlements. Sulufou, most populous lagoon island, had been Anglican for decades. Economically, Lau people had been tied much more directly into the cash economy than the Kwaio: locally-owned cutterboats plied the lagoon, men went regularly to the Solomons capital, Honiara; many worked as stevedores when overseas ships arrived, a pattern going back to the 1930s. The shell-and porpoise-teeth prestige economy and the cash economy flourished side by side.

In the Langalanga lagoon on the west coast of Malaita, a similarly specialized economic and ecological adaptation had emerged in recent centuries. Partly this depended, as in Lau, on bartering of fish for root-crops produced by bush peoples. But more important traditionally had been manufacture of strung shell discs, and their export across a wide area of the south and central Solomons. Canoes carrying shell valuables made to various local specifications returned laden with pigs and vegetables.

By the 1960s many of the Langalanga villages were Christian. Many of the communities previously sited on artificial or semi-artificial islands had been shifted to the mainland, with encouragement from missionaries anxious to promote a clean break with the pagan past, and inducement in the form of greater access to land for subsistence gardening and cash cropping. But as in Lau, traditionalist communities - notably the large central village of Laulasi - remained committed to the ancestral religion. Exposed
to European visitors, missionaries, and the cash economy, these Langalanga traditionalists were more Westernized than the Kwaio across the central mountains. But shell valuables were still being made, using traditional methods, for a declining but still substantial market (Cooper 1971). As in Lau, commitment to the ancestral religion entailed separation from pollution by Christian women, hence complete spatial segregation between Christian and pagan communities.

MALAITA: THE LAST FIFTEEN YEARS

In 1965, Malaita was part of a sleepy and remote British Protectorate where plumes and swords were paraded on Queen's Birthday and an almost caricature colonialism prevailed. With no internal air services, even outlying government stations seemed remote; the villagers saw occasional Chinese copra traders and were visited once or twice a year ritually by a District Officer. Education was limited, mainly the work of missions.

In the last fifteen years the Solomons have been transformed dramatically, moving to and beyond independence. Honiara is a bustling capital; Melanesians have mainly replaced the colonialists. By Pacific standards, the economy is booming. Villagers throughout the Solomons have gained access to primary education. Many have moved to urban centres. Development in the form of cash crops, cattle, and petty entrepreneurship has brought cash into formerly remote areas, many becoming more accessible through roads or airfields as well as commercial sea transport.

It would be surprising if the traditionalists of the 1960s continued their commitment to the ancestors amid new temptations and opportunities. Let us look first at the Lau of the northeast lagoons of Malaita.

Several key Lau villages have maintained their commitment to the ancestral religion, with the separations between male and female, Christian and pagan, that entails. However, participation in the cash economy has considerably expanded. The economic focus of the area has shifted from the lagoon islands to the coastal road (that links the Lau to the provincial centre of Auki, on the opposite coast) and to Honiara. Although older men still maintain ancestral rituals and sacrifice, and women follow pollution taboos, the younger generation has increasingly turned from the old ways. Children from the pagan islands now go to primary schools. Many younger people have apparently moved from the islands to settlements growing up along the road. Many have also moved to a large Lau settlement on the margins of Honiara, where fishing for the commercial market provides income. Participation in baitfishing for the government-Japanese joint fishing venture competes with old patterns of fishing in the lagoon. Although the ancestral religion lives on, this would seem to be its last generation: it has been eroded more by capitalism than Christianity.

The transformations of the last fifteen years have had a dramatic but quite different impact in the Langalanga lagoon, across the island. The same kinds of changes deriving from education, road access, and development schemes have hit Langalanga; but the differences are more striking. Laulasi, once the main bastion of conservatism, exemplifies one set of changes. A decade ago, expatriate entrepreneurs and Langalanga tradition-
Traditionalists worked out a scheme whereby culture could be turned to profit; tourists flown to Auki are taken down the lagoon by 'war canoe' and treated to a day-long exhibition of dancing, 'custom', and shell money-making. Laulasi has become one of the notable tourist attractions of the South Pacific - with all the predictable consequences for the integrity of the ancestral religion and the fabric of community social life. Moreover, the expatriate entrepreneurs were Baha'is, and offered a ready-made religious accommodation between ancestors and capitalism. Only a dozen families on Laulasi, Connell (1977) reports, remained nominally pagan in the late 1970s.

The second and even more dramatic change in the Langalanga lagoon also centres on making money: but the dollars and kina come from the old export product, shell valuables. Production of shell valuables, which had been dwindling in the 1960s, has been spectacularly intensified through the 1970s. Langalanga villagers who a decade ago had been dabbling in copra or cocoa and subsistence gardening are now back in the shell game, with a vengeance. When the tourists descend, the old bow drills and grinding stones come out. In between, steel drills and imported grindstones have permitted a major intensification of production.

But where are the markets for these valuables? Some go to the tourists, in the lagoon and in Honiara and Auki. Some still go to other parts of Malaita, where bridewealth is paid in shell, either continuing old practices or reviving them as Christian missions become indigenous churches. But the main markets are far beyond Malaita: across the Papua New Guinea border in Bougainville. Here we have an interesting linkage between traditionalism - or neotraditionalism - in different areas. Connell (1977) describes how, as Bougainville has become increasingly developed through cash cropping and the giant copper mine, use of shell valuables made in Langalanga - for bridewealth, compensation, and other transactions that symbolize 'custom' and identity - has risen sharply. A heavy and continuous flow of valuables from Langalanga into Bougainville, carried by air or brought in by sea to avoid duty, has brought a flood of wealth into the once economically-stagnant lagoon. Production and export of valuables unites in similar enterprise what had been die-hard traditionalists on Laulasi and leaders at the top levels of government. The remaining pockets of Langalanga conservatism have, as in Lau, been broken down not by Christianity but by capitalism; curiously, here it is custom that has gone capitalist.

What, then, of the Kwaio mountaineers who through the years have risked so much in armed struggle and political resistance? Fourteen years ago a large Seventh Day Adventist hospital was opened on the Kwaio coast; it now has regular air service from Honiara and Auki. A trans-Malaita road only a few miles to the north of Kwaio country makes the central east coast much less isolated by land, as well as by air. With these changes, with so much emphasis on development on Malaita, and with the emergence of an independent government that would seem to have answered the post-war call of Malaitans for freedom from colonial subjugation, we might expect the Kwaio conservatives to have come down from their mountain fastnesses to join this new world.
A few have. But for most, the ancestral ways still offer more than the new alternatives and temptations. The fabric of traditional social life remains substantially unbroken, although something of a sexual revolution has come among the young several decades after the life-and-death sanctions of the elders were lifted away by colonial rule. Traditional mortuary feasts still go on, still using the shell valuables the Kwaio view as much more important than their meagre supplies of cash. Traditional dress — and undress — still prevail; bows and arrows, clubs and spears replace the ubiquitous long bushknives when Kwaio gather for feasts or litigaiton. Bamboo tubes still serve for water containers and cooking vessels; and, when discarded, as torches. Production centres around taro, sweet potatoes, and pigs: surplus is produced with shell valuables, feasting largesse, and ultimately prestige — not cash income — as the stakes.

What, then, about the air service to Honiara? Let me quote from a letter received by the Adventist hospital manager from pagan priests along the Kwaio-Kwara'ae border, by way of a Christian scribe:

I just want to let you know that I don't want your plain to fly over my village...from now on...for the following reasonable reasons:

1. The plain carry women with bloody babies.

2. He always fly over our most Holy Alters where we burnt offering to our devil.

3. It always cause death to our people because the devil get angry and kill people.

4. Many pigs are kill [because] the plains fly over our devil....

On Behalf of majority of headen people who are living here if you are Christians please don't set your flyth over our area for it cause us death.

Thank you,

Yours sincerely Ere ere Devil Priests

Even the medical services of the hospital are out of reach for many Kwaio non-Christians, particularly men, who would be massively polluted by a structure that incorporates a maternity ward.

What about the lure of cash, the temptations of hardware? Most Kwaio would like more money — and through it, more things — if they could get them without cost to the quality of traditional life. But those men who travel in the Solomons have seen the tremendous losses, in the bonds of kinship and community and the value of self-sufficiency, incurred by Solomon Islanders who have opted for the new ways. For most Kwaio, this trade-off is barely tempting. And even the new material goods, if they could be had, would be incorporated into the structure of old values and
ancient ways. Again an anecdote will illustrate. An aged pagan priest who is a master craftsman made for me a number of traditional ornamental combs. When I paid him in cash, he asked me to buy him a tape recorder and cassettes in Honiara instead. Why, I asked, did he want a tape recorder? His nephews, he explained, were heirs to his magic, his genealogical knowledge, and his ritual duties; but they were lazy pupils who couldn’t keep it all in their heads. If he recorded it all on cassettes, they could not only perform their religious duties properly; they could stage the mortuary sequence after his death in just the right way.

What about the old political issues of taxation and the autonomy to follow customary law, now the Melanesian government rules in Honiara? The Kwaio traditionalists are still fighting the same battles, and more openly and politically than they have for fifty years. In defiance of the provincial and national governments the Kwaio are collecting their own taxes — at about a third of the provincial rates — and keeping the money themselves, under a council of traditional leaders. And on the issue of customary law, these leaders are defying the laws of the country in seizing jurisdiction of serious criminal cases and settling them through compensation in shell valuables.

Custom and community are alive and well in the Kwaio mountains; and not, as in Lau, among what is visibly a last generation of die-hards. When a dance is performed, or panpipes are blown, fathers and young sons join together in weaving ancient designs. Daughters are raised to follow the rules of the ancestors and teach them to their daughters.

WHY CULTURAL CONSERVATISM?

Why were Melanesian peoples such as the Lau, Langalanga, and Kwaio speakers of Malaita still following an ancestral religion and maintaining a traditional social order into the 1960s? And why have the Kwaio, and a few other Melanesian peoples, maintained this conservatism into the 1980s despite the striking changes in their countries?

A first point is that many, if not all, precolonial Melanesian societies had social systems that could potentially provide the foundations for a highly satisfying life even in the latter twentieth century. These positive features of Melanesian ways of life do not constitute an explanation for cultural conservatism where it has occurred. But understanding them is a prerequisite to interpreting stances that cannot be comprehended only in negative terms — the absence of geographical or economic factors that would encourage Westernization.

I have made the point recently in regard to the Kwaio (Keesing n.d.):

There are deep satisfactions in being able to produce with one's own hands, through work in family groups, virtually everything one needs to live. There are enormous satisfactions in living in a physical landscape filled with ancient landmarks, surrounded by history: gardening, living, worshipping in the settings where one's parents, one's grandparents, and one's great-grandparents spent their lives, and bound
to them by direct social bonds. There are satisfactions in following ancient ways and rules.... The means to prestige and prosperity - raising pigs, growing big gardens, earning or fabricating shell valuables - lie in people's own hands. If we can measure a standard of living in cultural and human terms, the traditional way is highly satisfying.

We could make the same point for the Trobriands, where canoes bearing prow boards of ancient design still carry kula exchange valuables across the seas, for the Lau lagoon of Malaita, or for the central mountains of New Britain or Santo: ways from the past can still be richly rewarding.

A second and essential point is that the modes of life being followed in traditionalist enclaves represent new cultural syntheses of the last hundred years, transformations of old social and economic systems, not simply perpetuations of the past. Most of the populations of seaboard Melanesia lived in a climate of internal blood feud and/or external threat: warfare and feud were endemic. The imposition of colonial peace has created a political climate where traditional social bonds and economic relationships could be maintained free from terror and murderous violence. What has replaced the warrior life for men has partly been plantation labour which, however exploitative, has partly freed young men from subordination to their elders, and has in many areas long been Melanesianized into a rite of passage. It has also been a means to steel tools, new cultigens, and other elements of a changed economic system. The life of Kwaio traditionalists, or their counterparts in other pockets of hinterlands Melanesia, is rewarding as much because of the changes in the old order as its preservation: striking conservatism masks deep change.

This raises a third point. Many communities in seaboard Melanesia that adopted Christianity decades ago similarly represent syntheses of old and new, where structures of kinship and community have been preserved and given new meaning, where Christianity has been Melanesianized and may represent a liberation from a local religious tradition that enmeshed people in fear of ghosts and sorcery, and oppressed and excluded women.

Whether villagers have embraced or rejected Christianity has depended on geographical, economic, and political factors, and the circumstances of missionization, as well as cultural factors. Where political organization was sharply hierarchical, chiefs could act as forces of conservatism (Mekeo or Kiriwina [Trobriands]) or as agents of rapid Christianization (South Malaita); the spatial dispersion and ordered anarchy of bush populations in the interiors or large islands (Kwaio, Kaulong-Sengseng of New Britain, Santo) has often been a sociopolitical obstacle to Christianization, as well as a physical barrier to missionary work.

It is against this background that we can begin to understand the geographical and economic circumstances promoting conservatism or change, can begin to assess the traditionalism on islands like Malaita and its differential transformation in the last fifteen years.
Bush peoples such as the Kwaio, living either in remote interiors or above precipitous (or crowded) coasts that offer no promising setting for a new life, may have been making the best trade-off in economic as well as social terms by maintaining their subsistence orientation and the traditional order of feasts, shell valuables, and sacrifice it sustains. Remote from roads and transport, without the coastal lands that could bring relative prosperity from copra or cocoa, opting for relative self-sufficiency cast in cultural terms may be sound strategy.

In an area such as the Massim (Milne Bay Province, Papua New Guinea), maintaining traditional exchange systems may at once preserve cultural values and identity and a fabric of social relationships, and maintain a delicate system of regional trade in resources that sustains economic viability partly free from neocolonial dependency (Macintyre and Young, this volume). Precolonial exchange systems may also be put to new uses, as surrogates for warfare, as media for escalating competition for resources and prestige, and as ways of incorporating and legitimizing new wealth into old cultural idioms and prestige systems. Cultural conservatism may be most striking not in small peripheral communities, in such regional systems, but in their most densely populated, ecologically rich, and strategically placed centres, such as Kiriwina in the Massim, which have long been focal points of cultural creativity (Schwartz 1963).

The Lau speakers of Malaita illustrate another variation on the same theme. Poorly placed to exploit the early avenues to cash on Malaita, especially copra, they have built on their traditional specializations as fishermen, traders and middlemen, to become one of the most mobile populations in the Solomons, and now to exploit the new urban niches in Honiara. Education and the lure of urban jobs are doing now what seventy-five years of missionary presence only partially achieved.

For the Langalanga too, old economic strategies provided a kind of preadaptation for new ones. Again the Langalanga were poorly placed economically, because of the lack of coastal land, to exploit copra, for decades the main source of income for Solomons coastal communities. Continuing the old orientation of fishing and exporting shell valuables to a dwindling market was, into the 1960s, an economically useful choice. And as in Lau it was a new external structure of opportunity — although here, ironically, one based on selling culture for cash through tourism and increased shell export — that provided means and incentive. And so the grandson of a man who once paddled his shell valuables to Guadalcanal or Ysabel now peddles his shell valuables in Bougainville by jet airliner.

But what, then, of Bougainville, or East New Britain, where shell valuables are used alongside kina, and custom and capitalism seem to be thriving together? Where copra, cocoa and mining have brought floods of cash, and the old village life has largely disappeared in favour of metal roofs, imported foods, and trucks, we can hardly speak of traditionalism. But why, then, the resurgence of symbols of the past? Why the payment of bridewealth or compensation in Langalanga shell strands or Tolai tambu? A partial answer is that Melanesians, from the most Westernized urban elites to the prosperous villagers who can now buy everything they once thought they wanted from the trade stores, see with genuine and deep regret the disintegration of old obligations of kinship and bonds of community, values
of sharing and caring, that were once the keystone of the moral order. They see with genuine regret, and with increasing knowledge that they may have lost at least as much as they have gained, the transformation of the lands where their forebears once worked into plantations, cattle properties, and roads. If cash is symbol of, as well as means to, the new opportunities and rewards, shell valuables and other cultural trappings have become symbols of old values, meanings, and social relationships. In paying bridewealth or compensation in shell valuables — or talking about kastom — Melanesians who have opted for the new can assert their continuing Melanesian-ness, their cultural identity and ties with the past and can deny the deep and widening contradictions in their lives. For them, the rhetoric of kastom has become a political stance toward the past and toward the future.

But so it is, as well, for traditionalists like the Kwaio pagans. Kwaio see that in other parts of the Solomons, peoples have lost their cultures, their roots in the land and the past. Alienated from their customs and their ancestors, these Solomons Islanders have become outsiders in their own homeland. As a Kwaio leader articulated the ideology of resistance:

Those people always say we [Kwaio]...don't have good sense, that we are backward [lit. 'the people at the rear']. But I say we are the wise ones, holding onto our land, holding on to our customs.

To follow the rules of the ancestors in the latter twentieth century in what its leaders piously pronounced to be a 'Christian country', is a mode of political struggle, as well as a way of life.

Those Melanesians who continue to practise their customs in traditionalist enclaves, those who are abandoning their customs for the lure of modernization, and those who are using symbols of custom to deny that they have left the past and their Melanesian heritage behind all have something important to tell us about the world we have created, and about ourselves, as well as about the old Melanesia, and the new.

NOTES

1 Field research among the Kwaio of Malaita was carried out in 1962-64 (supported by the United States National Institute of Mental Health), in 1966, in 1969-70 (supported by the United States National Science Foundation) and in 1974, 1977, and 1979 (supported by the Australian National University). Survey research on Lau and Langalanga, Malaita, was carried out in 1964 (supported by Harvard University).

2 A pervasive Melanesian Pidgin term for 'custom' though one that has different meanings from region to region, and in urban and village settings (Tonkinson 1980).
A term I dislike but use reluctantly, without pejorative implications. There is no good alternative: 'Non-Christians', which I also use, not only is clumsy, but describes the practice of a Melanesian religion in a Melanesian country in negative terms as if it were an aberration.

My data on the contemporary situation in Lau are limited. I was able to visit the area fleetingly in 1974-75 (the date span here is deceptive: I spent New Year's eve anchored off Fou'eda Island, after briefly visiting that community where I had done survey research in 1964, and the adjacent Seventh Day Adventist village of New Lands), and otherwise am relying on second-hand unpublished information.

As I noted earlier, well-educated urban Melanesians may also have political and economic motives for talking about kastom and using symbols of cultural identity: in doing so they can maintain village political constituencies, use ties of kinship for entrepreneurial advantage, maintain land rights, etc.

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BELIEFS AND VALUES

Villager and Missionary

Madang and beyond

PETER LAWRENCE

Vanuatu values: a changing symbiosis

ROBERT TONKINSON

Binandere values: a personal reflection

J.D. WAIKO

Missionaries in Melanesia before the First World War

DIANE LANGMORE

Custom, change and conflict: Fijian Wesleyan ministers, 1835-1945

A.W. THORNLEY
In this paper, I attempt to summarize my research in the general field of cargoism in the southern Madang Province, Papua New Guinea, since 1949. I am concerned with three issues. The first is the reactions of the inhabitants of the general area to their gradual incorporation in the modern international world from 1871 until the present day. The second is the main problem they have to overcome if they are to settle comfortably and successfully in this new order. The third is the relevance of my conclusions for areas outside the southern Madang Province. I limit my account to Papua New Guinea because I believe that those who have worked in other parts of Melanesia should discuss them.

I present my argument in the following stages. In the context of the first issue, I concentrate on cargoism, the set of assumptions that underlie cargo cult and provide a series of explanations of the nature of the colonial and post-colonial order in the southern Madang Province. I summarize its history from 1871 until 1980. In the context of the second issue, I discuss the people's concept of 'true knowledge', which they attribute to divine revelation and which obviously impedes their understanding of the modern world. I consider why traditional epistemology has been so impervious to change and suggest that we have been wrong to assume that it would automatically atrophy when we changed socioeconomic conditions. I compare this situation with that in seventeenth century England, in which secular science eventually replaced many 'magical' explanations of reality previously associated with and endorsed by Christianity. In the context of the third issue, I glance at other parts of Papua New Guinea and comment on certain criticisms of my own work.

CARGOISM IN THE SOUTHERN MADANG PROVINCE, 1871-1980

At the outset, I stress two points about my outline of cargoism in the southern Madang Province. First, I concentrate on rural villagers because I have not worked among urban dwellers. This is not to suggest that cargoists are mentally retarded yokels. Cargoism is a culturally induced phenomenon, and many cargoists I have known are perceptive and intelligent men. Second, cargoism is not invariably anti-European. To interpret it as such is to ignore the subtleties of Papua New Guinean traditional politics, which are best summed up in Lord Palmerston's classic enunciation of wise foreign policy: no permanent friends; no permanent enemies; but only permanent interests. Cargoism is an expression of what the people see as their permanent interests in the modern world. Through it they have
expressed both good will and hostility towards outsiders in alternating waves in keeping with changes they have perceived in their situation: their behaviour has accorded with whether or not they have thought that white men would reveal to them the secret of their wealth or make ample supplies of it available. Even during periods marked by strong anti-white feeling, there are differences in local attitudes. In 1948 (Lawrence 1964) and 1972 (Lawrence and Lawrence 1976), cargoists in the southern Madang Province were said to be planning physical violence against whites. I am now satisfied that, although this was true of the immediate vicinity of Madang, where there was a long tradition of racial bitterness, it was less so of the inland Ramu area and the Rai Coast near Saidor, paradoxically the stronghold of Yali, the Cargo Movement's figurehead, where the people were relatively friendly.

To understand cargoism in the southern Madang Province, it is essential to begin with the people's interpretation of the traditional cosmic order, of which it is an outgrowth. As I have written elsewhere (Lawrence 1964:28-33), the people's outlook has always been anthropocentric and materialist: the cosmos exists for man and he is master of it. They have always conceived their total cosmic order as a single physical realm inhabited by gods, ghosts and men, and have never attributed to it any significant element of super-naturalism or transcendentalism. Deities and spirits of the dead are believed not only to live on the earth near human habitations but also to be, like men and women, corporeal. The deities created the cosmic order by introducing vital resources, economic skills, and the social system. The spirits of the dead are not creators but protect their living kinsmen's interests. Man believes that the cosmos will always provide him material concomitants of living that are his by right of birth - land, crops, livestock and game, sylvan and marine products, and serviceable artefacts - as long as he can maintain harmonious relationships with both its human and its superhuman inhabitants. He sees himself as the focal point of two networks of relationships: between himself and other human beings (social structure); and between himself, deities, and spirits of the dead (religion). For our present purposes, the different forms of social structure (patrilineal, double unilineal, and cognatic), which have been reported from three different parts of the total region, are irrelevant: they all rest on common principles of social equivalence. In general terms, what is important is that by fulfilling his social obligations to kinsmen, affines, and economic associates man ensures for himself the physical help he needs in major tasks, and gets access to rare and valued goods that he himself cannot produce, and whose source of supply is outside his society and controlled by 'foreign' trade partners. By the same token, he has to fulfil his ritual obligations to gods and spirits of the dead so that they will use their powers to guarantee the success of his important secular and ceremonial undertakings. He has to perform ritual to gain the co-operation of the specific god or goddess who introduced and still presides over the particular activity in which he is engaged, and honour his forebears' ghosts so that they will support the deity's efforts.

Cargoism is no more than these social values and intellectual assumptions in modern dress. During my first visit to the field, my most intelligent Garia informant explained this to me elegantly and cogently: 'You ask us about this "cargo talk". It is like this. Everything that we have was created by its own particular deity: taro, yams, pigs,
slit-gongs. If we want to grow taro, we perform ritual to the taro goddess - and so forth. All right, you white men come with your goods and we like them, so that we ask ourselves: "Who and where is the god of the cargo? How do we contact him?" Then the missionaries arrive and tell us about your Jehovah, and we assume that he is the key to our problem'. In fact, his explanation was incomplete on two counts. First, cargoism can also be secular: the search for what Burridge (1960) has called the 'moral European', who will hand over either the secret or ample supplies of the new wealth. Second, the cargo god or gods can at times be pagan rather than Christian. Nevertheless, my informant's summary gave me the clue to the history of the cargo movement in the southern Madang Province from 1871 until the present day: the people's search for either of two buttons to press, one labelled 'Tame European' and the other 'Cargo Deity'. In sociological terms, the people have tried to incorporate Europeans into a cosmic order that they have never ceased to conceive in traditional terms, and to establish their right to European goods once again as concomitants of living, a *sine qua non* of existence. Yet beyond this they have used cargoism as a means of explaining and coming to terms with virtually all the important events in their area since 1871: administration, missions, two world wars, the postwar development programme, self-government, and independence. Indeed, the achievement of self-government and independence, in the view of many people, should have guaranteed the acquisition of cargo: the two concepts were synonymous. Briefly, cargoism in the southern Madang Province is a false but highly sophisticated philosophy that so far has absorbed virtually every foreign import.

Space allows me only to summarize the genesis and growth of cargoism in the southern Madang Province, which I have described in detail in other publications (Lawrence 1954, 1959, 1964, and 1965; Harding and Lawrence 1971; and Lawrence and Lawrence 1976). Briefly it has passed through five general stages: two pagan, one Christian, one syncretic (Christian-pagan), and the fifth pagan. Although the sequence is clear, by no means every linguistic group in the area went through them all in a regular manner.

The First Cargo Belief began in 1871 on a note of friendship for white men. The people of Astrolabe Bay treated their first European visitor, the Russian scientist Miklouho-Maclay, as their god Kilibob, who was believed to have sailed along the coast in his canoe, establishing language groups and giving their members material and social culture, after quarrelling with his brother Manup, who tried to kill him with the post of a men's club house. They seem to have assumed that Maclay-Kilibob had once again appeared in their midst with new gifts, although they saw no point in performing ritual in his honour because they enjoyed face to face dealings with him. Ritual was merely a substitute for ordinary social interaction when the deity was not visibly among them. Yet this technique did not work with their next visitors, the Germans, who arrived after 1884, and were mean in exchange dealings and greedy for land. Friendship gave way to hostility: the Germans were evil gods who had come to enslave the people by means of fire-arms, although at the turn of the century, having witnessed many European deaths - notably that of Governor von Hagen, shot in 1897 by an escaped native convict - the people decided that the foreigners were merely malign human beings with superior religious knowledge. They revised the Kilibob-Manup myth as the Second Cargo Belief: Kilibob had sailed along the coast in a modern steam-ship, offering the people the choice between rifles and bows and arrows, and dinghies and
outrigger canoes. In each case, the people chose the second alternative, so that Kilibob went to the land of the white men and gave them what was left in his ship: the cargo. In an alternative version of the myth, the brothers' roles were reversed: Manup rather than Kilibob was the cargo god. In practical terms, this matters little: either god was to return with rifles with which to expel the Europeans.

The Second Cargo Belief gave way to the Third after 1914, when the people decided to make their peace with what appeared to be a more amenable Australian Administration and convert to Christianity, which they revised in their own terms. God had given cargo to Adam and Eve at the time of the Creation but later confiscated it in circumstances I do not need to repeat. After Cain's murder of Abel, He decided to exterminate mankind, with the exception of Noah and his extended family, whom He taught to build the ark (again, a modern steam-ship) and to whom He restored the cargo. After the voyage, Ham lost the cargo when he 'raged at his father's nakedness, while his brothers Shem and Japeth, who had shown proper filial devotion, were allowed to keep it. Ham became the ancestor of the Papua New Guineans, and was allowed the local gods and a culture they invented, while Shem and Japeth were the forbears of the economically superior Europeans. To regain the cargo, the people had to adopt Christianity and observe its rituals faithfully. They believed that God had sent the missionaries, their 'brothers' as common descendants of Adam and Noah, to this end. As this was a period of friendship, they no longer hoped for rifles with which to drive out Europeans but merely for consumer goods. They believed that God and their ancestors made cargo in Heaven, which was a suburb of Sydney or above Sydney in the clouds with a connecting stairway.

After about 1933, the Third Cargo Belief was superseded by the Fourth, when cargo had not arrived and the coastal people had begun to distrust their missionaries. Once more they became hostile to whites and worked out two new theories, blending the Kilibob-Manup myth with Christianity, so that Kilibob was equated with God and Manup with Jesus Christ. Both lived as émigrés in Sydney but would return with rifles to expel the Europeans. This explained collaboration with the Japanese who occupied the area in December, 1942, and were evicted only in 1944.

At the end of the war, the people were disoriented. As many of them still hoped for the return of the Japanese, the Australian Administration welcomed the services of ex-Sergeant-Major Yali Singina, who was making propaganda on its behalf, urging the people to restore the prewar order on the grounds that they were to achieve a higher standard of living in the future. Immediately the people switched to friendship with whites on the grounds that the latter had been persuaded to make available ample stocks of cargo, even if they had not as yet revealed its source. Yet there was complete misunderstanding on both sides: while the Australians thought in terms of their Government's development programme, Yali assumed that he would be given a bulk reward of European goods in return for his and the people's allegiance. His hopes were dashed when he visited Port Moresby in 1947 and the officers told him the truth. He vented his spleen on the missionaries and, on his return to the Madang Province, urged the people to renounce Christianity and adopt paganism for purely traditional ends. Yet his pagan revival was soon subverted by a renegade Catholic catechist, who turned it into the Fifth Cargo Belief. This caused considerable unrest in the southern Madang Province between 1948 and 1950, especially around
Madang, where the people openly hoped for a war of liberation against the Europeans.

Yali's imprisonment in 1950 saw the gradual decline of the Cargo Movement as such but not of cargoism as a general phenomenon. After his release in 1955, he was able to reorganize his followers only on a limited scale because their numbers had dwindled after his public disgrace. Yet he could still make his presence felt. When he stood as a candidate in the 1968 national election, his platform was interpreted in strictly cargoist terms: he would go to the Parliament to inaugurate the economic millennium, which was identified with impending self-government and independence (Harding and Lawrence 1971). It was only a little more than a year before his death that he publicly dissociated himself from the Movement.

Between 1955 and 1980, however, throughout the whole southern Madang Province there has been a succession of minor cults and comparable incidents, often not connected with Yali and, in fact, sometimes denounced by him while he was alive: claims to be the Black Jesus; the actual sacrifice of a Black Jesus in 1961; a theory that Miklouho-Maclay was Jesus Christ; the use of my book Road Belong Cargo (Lawrence 1964) as a sacred text; the Red Box Cargo Cult (Morauta 1974); the renaissance of Kukuaik on Karkar Island (McSwain 1977); an attempt in 1972 to destroy the monument erected in honour of Governor von Hagen after 1897 on the grounds that it was the house post with which Manup had tried to murder Kilibob—the representation of evil that was impeding the cargo millennium; and, in 1980, an announcement by one Josephine of Utu in the Gogol Valley that God had told her in a dream that she was to take over all the money in the vaults of the Madang branch of the Papua New Guinea Banking Corporation. At the same time, the people have consistently sought for 'tame' Europeans whom they could induce either to reveal the cargo secret or make available the supplies they crave. In one case, an indigenous ordained Lutheran pastor importuned his German missionary companion of twenty-five years to this end and, in another, Garia students from Tusbab High School in Madang urged their parents to prevail on me to buy them a four-wheel drive truck on the grounds that I had become rich and famous by learning traditional religious secrets.

THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF KNOWLEDGE

As cargoism is a logical modern continuation of traditional religion, by the same token, it must rest on traditional epistemological assumptions—old ideas about the source of knowledge—even though, with the introduction of Christianity and western secular education, some new beliefs have arisen. It is essential, therefore, to consider these assumptions. I summarize here what I have written on this score in other publications (Lawrence 1959, 1964, and 1965; cf. also McSwain 1977).

As an outsider, I define two categories of knowledge: secular or empirical knowledge, which the people actually possess; and sacred knowledge, which has no empirical foundation but which they believe to have been revealed to them by their deities. I discuss each category in turn.
That the people have a sound body of secular knowledge is attested by their proficiency in agriculture, use of slit-gongs for telecommunication, and seamanship. In terms of our own concepts, these skills represent their own achievements in the field of human intellectual endeavour. Yet the people do not interpret and evaluate their secular knowledge in this way. Except in minor matters, they dismiss the principle of human intellectual discovery. They accept myths as the sole unquestionable source of important truth. They claim that their deities invented all the valued parts of the culture, and taught their forbears both the secular and ritual procedures for exploiting them: deities either lived with men or appeared to them in dreams, showing them how to plant crops, make artefacts, and so forth, and instructing them in ritual formulae and taboos. Even when a man composes a new melody or dance, he authenticates it by claiming that it came from a superhuman source rather than out of his own head.

Moreover, the people not only assume that the deities are the sole authentic source of both types of knowledge but also, of the two, emphasize sacred knowledge as paramount. They describe secular techniques as 'knowing' but only at an elementary level. The hard core of knowledge is mastery of mythology and secret spells, as is evident in traditional education and leadership. A small boy's upbringing is informal. Although often left to himself, he constantly imitates his elders' activities – dancing, hunting, even garden work – so that by early adolescence, with little formal instruction, he has picked up much of the secular knowledge of his society. Yet this is not rated as high intellectual achievement. He gains 'true knowledge' only during and after initiation, when he is introduced exclusively to taboos, mythology, and ritual. Again, secular skills alone are inadequate for leadership. Big men have to master religious secrets which ensure success: they 'really know' and can direct the activities of others – those who do not 'really know' – to the best advantage. Popular recognition of this ability makes it possible for the particularly successful leader, who has an outstanding personality and has never been defeated by unforeseen circumstances, to lure followers away from less fortunate rivals.

Nevertheless, the predominance of religion in intellectual life does not signify a high degree of mysticism in the people's thought, which is, in fact, essentially pragmatic. As gods and ghosts, like human beings themselves, are conceived as corporeal inhabitants of the natural environment, their existence is never doubted: it is physically real, and their co-operation with men in any task is as certain as that between human beings themselves. Although the people regard work as a compound of secular and ritual techniques, they see both as equally valid: both derive from the one source and involve collaboration between beings on the same plane of existence. In a word, these are religions not of faith, which allows the possibility of doubt, but of conviction, which allows only certitude.

THE PROBLEM: THE PERPETUATION OF TRADITIONAL EPISTEMOLOGY

At this point, I must emphasize that I do not argue that cargoism has arisen in the southern Madang Province simply because its people have the epistemological system I have outlined. As I have pointed out in Lawrence (1964), we must distinguish between motivation and conceived means: why do
the people want cargo? Why do they explain its source in theological terms and see religious ritual as an effective means of getting it? Motivation is clearly economic and sociopolitical: people want the new wealth for its obvious utility but also as a prestige symbol allowing them relationships of equality with Europeans, in keeping with those they enjoy among themselves in traditional society. Conceived means, however, must relate to their epistemological system: they apply the techniques by which they believe they have always controlled their cosmic order to the new one they conceptualized after European occupation. Although problems of motivation have their place, I find them less interesting than those of conceived means, which are more difficult to understand, which defy slick interpretation, and on which I now concentrate.

Some may argue that cargoism is a non-issue: that the people have the democratic right to use it, if they wish, as a means of coming to terms with the twentieth century and should thus be left to their own devices. I regard this as unrealistic. Papua New Guinea is an important nation in our region. For her people to take their rightful place, they must pay their own way by developing more village economies to the stage where they contribute to the country's budget, and rely less on Australian aid and royalties from transnational companies. (There are already warning signals: Australian aid is likely to be cut by 5 per cent as against 3 per cent and Bougainville Copper will lay fewer golden eggs than in the past [The Sydney Morning Herald, 26 October 1980].) Yet to do this - even to achieve the limited objectives of the Somare Government's Eight Point Plan - there must be a population that understands the operation of the modern world. The traditional epistemological system is a chief obstacle to this. It has proved remarkably durable because, once its underlying assumptions are accepted, it is so logical yet flexible that, as I have indicated, it has easily incorporated in cargoism (its modern form) virtually every major event and imported institution during the last 110 years. The problem is how to get the people either to discard it or, at least, to keep it in proper perspective.

The whole issue must be seen against the background of the people's increasing material prosperity and educational opportunities. In 1949, a man was affluent if he wore shorts as against a laplap. In 1968, the criteria were transistor and bicycles, and in 1980 motor vehicles owned by kinship associations or individuals. Again, in 1949, many had been to mission primary, and somewhat fewer to mission secondary, schools. By 1980, there were opportunities for young people to go to Government primary and secondary schools, and to tertiary institutions. Initially, this might seem to provide a solution to the problem. Certainly, it was the basis of Worsley's (1957 and 1968) and my own (Lawrence 1964) suggestions that by changing material conditions we could liberate the individual from the prescriptive socioeconomic kinship bonds of his own society, and thereby induce him to think for himself and understand the world in our terms. Worsley was the more extreme: he argued that cargoism would retreat before modern economic development and secular political institutions in the near future. I was more moderate: I believed that there would be a longer time lag but that eventually the process could take place of its own accord.

McSwain (1977:xv-xvi) chides both Worsley and myself on this score: She argues cogently that, for cargoist epistemology to disappear by itself in her field work area,
economic change must be far more comprehensive than anything so far inaugurated in Papua New Guinea or suggested by Lawrence's analysis. On Karkar, considerable economic, political and educational change has occurred over a relatively long period, yet the traditional intellectual system remains....

There is good evidence from the southern Madang Province in both the economic and educational fields to support her argument. The Karkar own copra plantations, trucks, tractors, trade stores, and bakeries. Yali of the Rai Coast enjoyed a relatively high standard of living. Josephine of Utu was driven with about 300 followers to the Papua New Guinea Banking Corporation offices in Madang in native-owned trucks. Material prosperity by no means dampened enthusiasm for cargoism in any of these cases. Again, the Karkar have long had good mission and now government schools. Yali's last secretary was a high school drop-out, as were many of Josephine's older followers. She had recruited also some primary school children. The well educated indigenous pastor clung to his German friend in the hope of discovering the cargo elixir, and it was Garia high school students who suggested that I had got ahead through my knowledge of traditional religion. All this accords with what European school teachers in Madang have told me during the last twenty years: that their pupils, certainly at secondary level, have given evidence of a high degree of magico-religious thinking. It suggests also that there is no automatic remedy. Thus I turn to a different but analogous setting, England in the seventeenth century, to see what it can suggest.

THE TRIUMPH OF SCIENCE OVER 'MAGIC' IN SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND

For this paper, the importance of the seventeenth century in England is that it witnessed the substitution of modern natural science for much of what Thomas (1971) calls the 'magic' embedded in Christianity as a system of explanation of the working of the physical cosmos. Yet it was a schizophrenic age: the struggle between science and 'magic' was hard and long drawn, and for all its triumphs at the end of the period science had to suffer many decades of magico-religious extravaganza. Even the most prominent and best educated tried to solve their economic and socio-political problems by such practices as alchemy (in which even Sir Isaac Newton experimented) and astrology (whose practitioners were the associates and sources of comfort of monarchs and aristocrats in times of political upheaval). Witchcraft was accepted as a fact, a capital offence before the law. Moreover, the answers being provided by the new science were not accepted immediately: they threw up many new problems that tortured men's reason and consciences because they challenged Holy Writ. How did creatures from the ark, starting as they did from Mount Ararat, become scattered all over the world despite the dividing seas? As gold does not turn to powder in high temperatures, how did Moses calcinate the golden calf? Sir Thomas Browne, medical practitioner and devout Christian, called the debate playing chess with the devil.

The seventeenth century was also an era of religious chiliasm. Many Englishmen believed that their colonization of North America would hasten the establishment of Christ's kingdom on earth (Porter 1979). Others supported the Fifth Monarchy Movement, the doctrines of which were first
enunciated about 1630, and were taken very seriously during and after the Civil Wars. They believed that, with the death of Charles I, who represented for them total iniquity, Jesus Christ himself would reign as King in England with the aid of his personally selected saints. Some of them held these doctrines with such conviction that, after the accession of Charles II, without backsliding or even flinching they were prepared to be executed in an unspeakably barbarous manner: hanged, drawn, quartered, and disembowelled (Rogers 1966).

Nevertheless, by the end of the century, 'magic' was much discredited among intellectual men. Although not finally dismissed by the Royal Society until 1783, alchemy's false assumptions and claims were largely destroyed by Boyle's chemistry. The Royal Society disproved by experiment the idea (inherited at least from the time of Pliny the Elder) that insects could pullulate spontaneously. The scientists progressively discarded astrology as its principles could no longer be shown to be true – a view that Newton endorsed by his own cosmic experiments. The surgeon William Harvey, famous for having demonstrated the circulation of the blood, struck a body blow at witchcraft by carefully dissecting a toad, alleged to be a practitioner's satanic familiar, and exposing the falsity of popular assertions about the nature of its entrails. Religious chiliasm progressively passed into the secular utopianism of the eighteenth century Enlightenment and socialism of the nineteenth century.

The debunking of 'magic' was never complete: quacks (like the self-styled Count Cagliostro in superficially rationalist Paris) could always make a living. Yet the years after 1700 broadly represented a new intellectual climate: an age of comparatively secular reason. Thomas (1971:656-7), an Oxford historian who has read a good deal of social anthropology, has much to say on this score that I regard as relevant to the problem of the southern Madang Province. He argues that although 'most sociologically-minded historians are naturally biased in favour of the view that changes in beliefs are preceded by changes in social and economic structure', in the case of 'magic and technology' (in seventeenth century England), 'it seems indisputable that...magic lost its appeal before the appropriate technical solutions had been devised to take its place. It was the abandonment of magic which made possible the upsurge of technology, not the other way round'. In a word, it was the case of one logical system replacing another because it was seen to be based on sounder epistemological assumptions. In this context, we should not forget a remark by Weber (1958:55), which supports Thomas and to which social anthropologists have paid too little attention: 'without doubt, in the country of Benjamin Franklin's birth (Massachusetts), the spirit of capitalism was present before the capitalistic order'.

This is not to negate sociological argument but to keep it in its proper place. As Tawney (1948), who never was at ease with Weber, has shown very well, the Protestant Reformation liberated the individual from the commercial and intellectual restraints of mediaeval society so that he could amass profit by lending his money at reasonable rates of interest without fear of spiritual damnation, and new information by means of his own relatively unfettered intellect rather than having to attribute his discoveries to divine revelation. Yet I do not believe that the advance in intellectual discovery was automatic. There was a joker in the pack: another factor to which we have given too little consideration.
In western Europe, Christianity had to come to grips with two distinct epistemological traditions, the second of which was the key to its eventual decline as an intellectual force: the Judaic and the Graeco-Roman. The Judaic tradition was based on the assumption of divine revelation: that all knowledge came to man from God. In the thirteenth century, its Christian champions were St Bonaventure, Franciscan Professor of Theology at the University of Paris, and the heterodox millenarian scholars. The Graeco-Roman tradition was that man had to accumulate knowledge by means of his own secular intellect. In the thirteenth century, its Christian champions were St Thomas Aquinas, Dominican Professor of Theology at the University of Paris, and the alchemists, who tried to syncretize the belief in divinely revealed knowledge with Aristotelian natural science. From the end of the thirteenth century, there was a running battle between the Christianized forms of the two traditions. By 1400, the Graeco-Roman forged ahead as the central principle of the Renaissance in Italy and the Scientific Revolution in northern Europe. In brief, when liberated and individuated man of the seventeenth century was ready to think for himself and become a scientist, he found ready-made and ready to use a secular intellectual tradition originally forged in ancient Greece.

If we consider the southern Madang Province in this context, the two essential factors are the individual's socioeconomic liberation from the bonds of precriptive relationships and his intellectual liberation from the tradition of divinely revealed knowledge. The first is the enabling condition for the second. Neither the Australian administration nor the indigenous Government has achieved the first condition. The villager is still enmeshed in a network of traditional relationships because, contrary to our expectations of thirty years ago, his traditional sociocultural system has survived the impact of western development. Yet, even if this first condition had been met and the villager had become a citizen-isolate, I doubt now whether his transition to the second condition — the world of the inquiring secular intellect — would have been easy for him. As I have stressed, the people's epistemological tradition is akin to the Judaic rather than the Graeco-Roman: divine revelation as against independent human investigation. They certainly possess empirical knowledge, as I have shown, but no immemorial usage whereby they can forge it into a system of explanation leading to further discovery: a system in its own right. Rather, they tend to sweep such knowledge under the carpet of religion, as it were, in the manner of St Bonaventure and the millenarians. They validate it as afflatus from a deity: not the product of their own minds as such but of a dream experience of some kind. This in no way reflects on their capacity for logical thinking but only on their perception of fact. Many of their essential 'facts' (largely their deities) have no empirical foundation but the analyses they base on them are devastatingly reasoned.

PAPUA NEW GUINEA: BEYOND MADANG

If I venture outside the southern Madang Province, I have to take into consideration criticisms of my own work. My rejoinders explain my views about other areas of Papua New Guinea. The first critic is Worsley (1968), who suggests that I have oversystematized the traditional religious systems I have studied. I should argue that he is confusing two issues: basic assumptions (the epistemological system) and the different expressions of belief (the superstructure), which they underlie. Certainly, I contend
that basic intellectual and religious assumptions are consistent and systematic: that gods (of some kind) created the cosmos, and that they and the spirits of the dead must be ritually honoured to keep it functioning. Yet, in both traditional and especially cargo doctrines, beliefs built on these assumptions are invariably flexible and allow contradictions. There are always variants of local myths, and the identity of the cargo deity is constantly redefined with an obvious loss of regularity.

The second critic is Chowning (1977:63-65), who has questioned Meggitt’s and my Introduction to Gods, Ghosts, and Men in Melanesia (Lawrence and Meggitt 1965). In this work, Meggitt and I stressed, initially, the broad uniformity of social values in Papua New Guinea. Despite local idiosyncrasies, all traditional societies were essentially stateless and organized on the basis of kinship, marriage, and descent. This generalization is widely accepted, so that I need say no more about it. In religion, we maintained that the basic element were beliefs in creative or regulative spirit-beings (such as gods and goddesses) — although we cited apparent exceptions — and spirits of the dead, most of whom lived on the earth with men. Once again, there was no concept of a transcendental realm. Ritual was used to manipulate both gods and ghosts for economic and social ends.

Beyond this, we agreed that seaboard religions were generally comparable to those in the southern Madang District that I have outlined above: people relied heavily on gods and ghosts as guarantees of material benefits, and regarded 'true knowledge' as the esoteric formulae that could harness their power to serious undertakings. For the highlands, we suggested that religion dominated people's lives to a lesser degree: men relied more on secular skills. Yet we added several caveats, especially individual field workers' personal equations, and the different experiences of highlands and seaboard peoples under colonialism. In the first context, when highlands ethnography was in the ascendant, Durkheimian structuralism, including the social approach to religion, dominated research. Field workers steeped in this theory were not likely to see epistemological themes as important: their interest was to portray the quasi-secular sociopolitical systems of the peoples they studied. In the second, race relations in the highlands were more equitable than on the seaboard. Australians entered the highlands mainly after 1945, when colonialism was already in decline and it was essential for them to achieve a modus vivendi with the people. Administrative techniques were beginning to improve. Hence the people experienced relatively little frustration and engaged only infrequently in cargo cults, which — had they been more prevalent — would have forced the anthropologists to study epistemology. In contrast, on the seaboard, there was a long history of unfortunate race relations and cargoism: anthropologists had to provide epistemological answers.

Chowning has criticized this survey on technical grounds. First, she indicates that the suggested distinction between highlands and seaboard religions is too extreme. Especially in view of Strathern's (1979) recent discussion of this subject, I am happy broadly to take her point. Yet I still believe that the differences Meggitt and I suggested do to some extent exist, although probably they are distributed randomly throughout Papua New Guinea as a whole instead of being confined to the highlands and seaboard respectively. Second, Chowning asserts that we over-emphasized the importance of 'creative or regulative spirit beings' and were wrong to
state that 'all Melanesians perform rituals for the dead with economic ends in view'. As she does not quote chapter and verse in either context, it is difficult to answer her specifically. Yet, in the context of creative or regulative spirit-beings, her reading of the literature published before 1965, which we examined carefully, obviously differs from ours. Since then various authors have produced accounts that support our generalization: Smith, R.A. (1973) on the Adzera of the Markham Valley (whom, on the basis of previous evidence, we listed as definitely not possessing creator gods); Trompf (1977) on the Sauwo Valley people in the Papuan Highlands; Smith, M.F. (1980) on the Kairiru islanders in the East Sepik Province; Tamoane (1977) on the people of the Murik Lakes; Counts and Counts (1976) on the Kalinge of West New Britain; Strathern (1979) on the Mount Hagen people; Plannery (1979) on the Tolai; and Johnson (personal communication) on the adherents of the Peli Association in the Sepik region. In the context of ritual honour to the dead to get economic benefits, once again I beg to disagree: 'all' may be somewhat of an overstatement but I am ready to assert, in my turn, that the practice is so common that its failure to be universal is of small significance.

CONCLUSIONS

Generalizations for all Papua New Guinea, let alone all Melanesia, are difficult. Nevertheless, I offer three tentative opinions. First, if Chowning and Strathern are right in believing that there is no rigid dichotomy between highlands and seaboard religions - a point that, with few reservations, I readily concede - and if Meggitt and I are justified in arguing the overall prevalence of creative or regulative spirit-beings and of ritual honour to the dead for economic ends, then despite varying degrees of reliance on ritual as a technology, as it were, there are probably more wide-spread regularities in Papua New Guinea religions than Chowning allows, and even than Meggitt and I originally claimed. Mutatis mutandis, the general picture I have sketched for the southern Madang Province is valid also for many other areas throughout the whole country.

Second, it is against this general background that we must view the intellectual crisis through which, I believe, some Papua New Guineans at least are going at the present time, which has expressed itself in cargoism in the past, and to which western secular education is now probably contributing. I think particularly of one incident. In August 1977, a Rai Coast lad attending a Government secondary school told me that he was confused: in science classes, he had been told that 'human beings came from animals' and - well, that was very different from what the Lutheran mission had said. He could easily accept the Genesis alternative, which was in keeping with his own society's mythological traditions, but he could not fathom the basic concept of evolution. In recent years, there has been trouble over this issue in the universities. Again, Smith, M.F. (1980) describes the current situation in Koragur village on Kairiru Island, East Sepik Province. The people became committed Catholics at the beginning of this century and, like the inhabitants of the southern Madang Province, assimilated orthodox Christian teachings to their own religious assumptions. All went well until Vatican II, when a new spirit emanated from the mission: toleration of the old religion, a decline in sacramentalism, voluntarism, the substitution of symbolism for dogma and doctrine, and so forth. The people saw this as a dilemma: certainly many
of the young were no longer impressed by a religion that ceased to claim to represent literal, total unquestionable truth. They turned to scepticism and even, in one case, secular rationalism 'as a better tool for the explanation and understanding of the world' (Smith, M.F. 1980:50).

Third, we should consider seriously Thomas' analysis of the change from 'magic' to science in seventeenth century England: that it was due to the recognition that one system of logic was superior to another rather than to an automatic response to technological change. The two examples I have just cited indicate that villagers argue at least as much in intellectual as in materialist-technological terms: indeed, in neither case did materialism or technology enter, for the sole issue was the nature of cosmic explanation, which they espoused or rejected largely on the basis of what they perceived as its claim to represent factual truth. Hence, although every attempt should be made to improve material conditions, educationists should not pin their faith on this as an ultimate panacea but must seriously address themselves to the problem of introducing modern secular knowledge as a satisfactory explanatory system in its own right. For this, they must do two things: understand the epistemological system their pupils bring with them into the classroom (Philip and Kelly 1975); and not use their own epistemological system uncritically to explain their pupils' inability to understand, for it too can get in the way. I cite, with diffidence, examples reported to me from the universities.

During the last fifteen years, several university lecturers have stressed to me the great difficulty they have found in presenting to their students in Papua New Guinea what we should regard as basic scientific concepts. One of them, a self-defrocked Catholic priest, blamed his mission for teaching so much nonsense that undergraduates could not be expected to follow what he was trying to impart. Obviously, this could not be true: many of his students were not Catholics and had been educated in secular Government schools. He was projecting his own hang-ups. A second argued very reasonably that his pupils had not been given the sciences basic to the subject he was presenting. There is no reason to doubt this as far as it goes, although I believe that the problem lies much deeper. He learnt that many of his students still believed in sorcery. Hence I make two suggestions: First, he has been offering them concepts culturally so alien that they could not be expected to comprehend them unless they had been most carefully prepared from their earliest years. Second, they are learning western science largely by rote, and sorcery still represents for them a more satisfactory logical system when they are in critical situations. I mean no disrespect by what I have just written, but I recommend that the next generation of field workers address themselves to this issue with greater care and interest than mine has done: I should be very happy to be proved wrong. Its resolution is of vital concern for the future prosperity and stability of the Pacific community - certainly that part of it that we inhabit - for reasons I do not see as needing elaboration.
NOTES

1 I am indebted to Mrs Deidre Koller and Mrs Carol Wise for reading and commenting on an earlier and longer draft of this paper.

2 Josephine is, as far as I am aware, the second woman to have led a cargo cult in the southern Madang Province. The first was Polelesi of Igrure in 1947 (Lawrence 1964).

3 I must say in my own defence that in my study of Garia religion I concentrated on the principles underlying it rather than on learning the esoteric spells that were regarded as its power. I was taught a few, but not a great many, of these spells. Of those I did learn, out of respect for Garia belief, I have never revealed any to outsiders. The same is true of my field work among the Ngaining of the Rai Coast.

4 Yali Singina had a similar experience in Port Moresby in 1947, when he was told about the concept of evolution by a well read indigene. He was able to evade intellectual dilemma by equating the idea with his society's belief in ancestral totemism (Lawrence 1964:173-175). My schoolboy informant was probably too sophisticated to make this sort of equation. Hence his disquiet.

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VANUATU VALUES: A CHANGING SYMBIOSIS

Robert Tonkinson

INTRODUCTION

Vanuatu is no less culturally diverse than the rest of Melanesia, and has in the era since European contact been subject to the same kinds of outside influence, as colonial powers, Christians and entrepreneurs have sought in various ways to transform 'traditional' societies. This paper examines the changing sociopolitical significance of diversity, particularly the effects of Christianity and the dynamic nature of the resulting symbiosis of Christian and customary values.

First, the nature of cultural differentiation in 'traditional' Vanuatu societies is summarized. Despite considerable ethnocentrism and a high level of intergroup tension, there was also considerable communication and diffusion of new elements, such that trade in lore was as common as that in material goods. These were relatively mobile, flexible societies geared to cope adequately with fairly continuous diffusion via external contacts.

Secondly, some factors affecting the rapidity and success of the spread of Christianity are outlined, notably historical developments between first contacts with Europeans and Christianity's coming, the nature of the new faith and its purveyors, and certain characteristics of the traditional cultures.

Thirdly, the nature of the transformation wrought by Christianity is discussed, with respect to its effects on diversity and on attitudes to cultural differentiation, and to indigenous reworkings of the new faith. The effect of Christianity on 'traditional' values and on attitudes to the past is also discussed. The major difference between Christian lore and that which was traditionally exchanged throughout the islands was the Christians' insistence that theirs was the only valid belief system. It was intended to replace all that preceded it, rather than be added on to existing systems. In fact, many continuities remained, but these elements were absorbed into Christianity. The new faith became a potent force in breaking down Melanesian cultural boundaries and creating new unities that went beyond the islands to parent churches overseas.

Fourthly, the revival of kastom (Pidgin: 'traditional culture, customs') and development of national identity are discussed, together with some problematic aspects of the modern symbiosis of Christian and 'traditional' values. The use of kastom to promote a sense of cultural
historical accounts of the process of conversion are relatively few and
one-sided, it is impossible to say for certain why people became
Christians. We do not know what ni-Vanuatu thought about it, except
indirectly through missionaries' brief accounts.

The introduction of European diseases, trade goods, rifles and liquor
via sandalwood-buyers, labour recruiters and traders preceded the arrival
of missionaries in most islands. The strong opposition encountered by some
missionaries could well have stemmed from prior traumatic Melanesian
encounters with Europeans, and the deaths of several Christians were
allegedly motivated by revenge, to balance earlier deaths at the hands of
whites. But as Shineberg (1967:13) notes, the more numerous, mobile and
affluent sandalwood-traders got in first, and thus raised the indigenous
people's expectations concerning European wealth. Their desire for iron
and other trade goods thus whetted, the Melanesians accepted the presence
of missionaries as a potential source of this wealth, in the early years at
least. In those areas where rifles had changed the technology of the feud
and escalated the death-rate, the missionary presence may well have been
welcomed with relief because of its insistence on peace.

The association in Melanesian minds of whites with superior power,
which was no doubt primarily assessed on the basis of technology and much
later on the weight of colonial authority, had much to do with their
acceptance of the Christian presence. In line with dominant 'traditional'
values, acquiescence to the superiority of European power also involved
attempts by individuals and groups to gain access to it. Historical
contingency, in the form of sheer luck, sometimes played a major role in
early attempts by Christians to 'prove' the superior power of their God.
In southeast Ambrym, where I worked, the bearer of Christianity was a south
Ambyrne man who had been converted while in Queensland. He met with
strong initial opposition, but was quick to turn to Christianity's
advantage his 'miraculous' escape from death, allegedly at
point-blank range, by an enraged local chief. His explanation that God's
power protected him was widely accepted and gained him a solid core of
devotees, and he never looked back.

Despite undoubted communication gaps, missionaries and their Islander
and local converts must have managed to convey to the local people some
basic elements of the new faith, particularly those that were broadly
congruent with indigenous values and understandings. Ideas of rewards and
punishment, of reciprocity guaranteed as long as certain rules or
procedures were faithfully adhered to, and of spiritual and/or human
retribution for persistent disregard of the rules, all accorded well with
existing understandings. However, the notion of a reciprocation delayed
until the next life was, in its reward aspect, neither traditional nor
particularly satisfying (cf. Keesing 1967:96). Likewise, the notion that
rewards in the afterlife depended principally on moral conduct in this
would have been nonsensical to a people who judged ritual efficacy mainly
in terms of correct performance.

The possession by Christians of esoteric knowledge, and its intimate
association in Melanesian cultures with power and status differentiation,
did not in itself set them apart from other whites encountered by the
indigenous people. The uniqueness of the Christians lay in their great
willingness to impart this knowledge, and thus share with the Melanesians a considerable portion of it. The fact that the missionaries expected people to labour for the Church in return would have been perfectly acceptable. Knowledge given freely by people outside a narrow range of kin and friends would have been perceived as lacking value and therefore power (cf. Lindstrom n.d.a). The establishment of schools, as well as concerted attempts to bring literacy to the indigenous people so that they could read the Bible, proved the sincerity of the Christians in wanting to communicate their esoteric knowledge.

In the 'traditional' society, the mark of the big-man or chief was his achievement of a nodal position in local and regional information networks such that he could significantly monitor and influence the flow of messages as well as material goods. As Lindstrom (n.d.b) notes, he gained prestige by the selective use of socially usable knowledge, but would never have told others all that he knew, since it was his reputed possession of unshared knowledge that differentiated him and made him 'bigger' than others. Lindstrom also points out, that esoteric knowledge is vital but its management is problematic: a person without secrets is without prestige, and a person with too many unshared secrets negates a fundamental imperative to exchange, so he too lacks prestige. Prestige, then, depends on the judicious husbandry of knowledge. It follows that missionaries would not have been expected to tell the whole story, and that what they withheld contained the major secret of their greater wealth and power. Melanesians who in later years became involved in cargo cult activities often said as much when they accused missionaries of hiding that part of the Christian message that contained the key to the cargo. For a majority of ni-Vanuatu most of the time, however, the new faith appeared to offer sufficient promise to ensure their continuing adherence and support.

It may also be possible to account for the success of Christianity satisfactorily in terms of certain shared features of Melanesian social structures. Their receptivity to external forms undoubtedly predisposed men to view Christianity in pragmatic terms as a likely medium for increasing power and prestige. Lawrence (1964) has argued persuasively that Melanesians' cosmic order was a predominantly physical realm, and their religion centred on reciprocal relationships conceived to exist among humans, gods and spirits. There was an undisguised materialism and anthropocentrism in the view that males had of their cosmic order and its utility to them in their largely individualistic strivings. The focus of power lay not in any supernatural realm, but in the interaction between the environment and man, usually through the medium of spirits, with human activity as an essential ingredient of the mix that made power available; through the application of esoteric knowledge and intelligence, men could generate power while in a state of heightened receptivity to co-resident spirit-beings (cf. Lane 1977:365-374). As Lawrence has shown, religion was for them a technology, a potent means for achieving patently secular socioeconomic ends. Individual self-interest predominated, even in many collective rituals and related activities such as food distribution (Barnes 1962; Brown 1962; Feil 1978).

While gathering data concerning what people could recall of the 'traditional' religious life in southeast Ambrym, I was struck by the apparent lack of integration of the various elements and the complete
absence of anything functionally analogous to the over-arching 'Dreamtime' concept of the Australian Aborigines, which lends to their religion an internal logic, consistency and strength. There was no fit between southeast Ambrymese myths and rituals, very little among songs, dances and rituals, and no evidence that people saw any organic unity among the components they described. Guiart (1951) had concluded of north Ambrymese rituals that they lacked mythological validation and exhibited a high degree of secularization; I was led to the same assessment in the case of southeast Ambrym.

This lack of systematization I initially attributed to cultural loss and the effects of several decades of Christianity. But considering the openness of much of the rest of the social system, it is probably that the various components of the religious life had been quite loosely integrated. My data suggested that individual magical rites and communication with ancestral ghosts assumed far greater religious importance than collective rituals and appeals to mythic beings (cf. Deacon 1934). Individualism pragmatism and materialism were dominant, but with the exception of certain sorcery acts, individual rituals were acts towards, and reactions to, concerns of wider social groupings (Tonkinson 1968:34-35).

There was ample evidence that the southeast Ambrymese had been in prolonged contact with neighbouring islands, such as Paama and Lopevi, and also that they had adopted the graded society from Malekula via west Ambrym not long before their first contact with Europeans. Their receptivity to innovations from elsewhere showed them to be typical Melanesians in this important respect. This willingness to borrow was congruent with the kind of flexibility and openness that has been reported for much of the region. Observers as far back as Codrington (1891) noted the lack of systematization in Melanesians' worldviews and the willingness to borrow cultural elements. Lane (1965), discussing the religion of the people of south Pentecost, who have close links with north Ambrym, conceded that order may have existed in the religious system, but it was certainly not an explicit feature of what he observed; beliefs were not developed in precise and systematic detail, nor woven into any overall scheme. Brunt on (1980:112) makes the same general points when he suggests that Melanesian religions are '...weakly integrated, poorly elaborated in a number of sectors, and subject to a large degree of individual variation and a high rate of innovation and obsolescence'.

From the foregoing, it should be clear that individuals had considerable freedom to choose whether or not to try new forms, and that once the Christians had established beachheads they were usually assured of at least a few people willing to give them a hearing and dabble in the new faith - if only to see if Christianity was a difference that would make a difference, as Bateson would have put it. In this kind of society, any initial opposition by big-men or chiefs would not appear to have been a decisive factor. In southeast Ambrym, despite strong initial opposition from some of the chiefs, it took little more than two decades for the culture area to go from 'pagan' to close to 100 per cent nominal Christian. In many other parts of Vanuatu, Christianity enjoyed a similarly rapid success.
CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION

The missionaries and their zealous converts set out to win Melanesian hearts and minds as much by emphasizing the sinfulness and shortcomings of the old way of life as by stressing the advantages of the promised new life. Many were certainly not averse to rough, direct methods to get the message across to those who appeared incapable or unwilling to heed it. But in the early years, particularly, the Christians were at times the objects of physical violence in some areas (cf. Miller 1975). In all but a few interior areas on large islands, such as Tanna, Santo, Malekula and Ambrym, Christianity triumphed throughout the archipelago. The Presbyterians (who remain by far the largest denomination) concentrated their efforts in the southern and central islands, agreeing to leave the north to the Anglicans (who now rank third). The Roman Catholics, predominantly French-speaking, began later (1887); they ignored the earlier Protestant agreement and established missions throughout the islands. Churches of Christ, Seventh Day Adventists and Apostolics followed later, and in the last two decades there has been a proliferation of other religious groups in Vanuatu.

The processes of rapid transformation of the pre-contact societies, a major facet of which was the revolution wrought by iron tools, were set in train by the European traders and labour recruiters, but these men had specific and immediate goals in their interaction with the Melanesians. They did not see themselves as social reformers, however barbaric they may have judged (and in turn, have been judged by) the indigenous peoples. It was the missionaries and their converts who mounted the first deliberate assaults aimed at transforming 'traditional' cultures. Different missionaries and churches varied in their attitudes to kastom, but most considered much of the Melanesian cultures unacceptable. Their frequent revulsion and disgust are forcefully revealed in their diaries, as is their dogged determination to triumph over the forces of evil. Their tropologies of conversion, aimed at the home congregations whose physical and financial support they sought, were rich in metaphor and made much of the 'light versus darkness', 'soldiers of Christ going forth into battle', 'rescue of the innocents' kinds of imagery (cf. Young 1980). The word of God was delivered as an imperative, a replacement for rather than an adjunct to existing knowledge, and it carried with it the promise of rich rewards for compliance and hellfire and damnation as certain consequences of its rejection. The Melanesians were doubtless much more attracted by the material possibilities of the former than repelled or terrified by the latter.

Such was the fusion of natural and spiritual components of their cosmic order that many ni-Vanuatu converts continued to have belief in, and react to, various kinds of co-resident spirits whose activities either helped or hindered them. Likewise, the belief that other people may resort to sorcery also remained powerful. Today, trade in many different kinds of magical substances (for protection, fighting, sorcery, love-magic and antidotes) continues to thrive, in convincing demonstration of the constancy of 'traditional' Melanesian notions about power.
Attacks by white and black Christians on all that was un-Godly in the indigenous cultures struck at the very heart of the old way of life: polygyny, pig sacrifice, kava-drinking, singing and dancing, men's secret societies, 'devil-worship' (i.e. ritual communication with spirit-beings), 'idolatry' (any carved anthropomorphic image was deemed an 'idol'), physical violence, practices that degraded women and so on came under persistent heavy fire as typifying 'heathenism' and the forces of evil. But the seeds of destruction of major social institutions, such as the graded society, had already been sown by labour recruiters, traders and other Europeans who preceded the missionaries into most islands.

In pre-contact times, the great game of climbing the grade-ladder to socioeconomic pre-eminence was played with finite resources and a predictable modus operandi, and the older men were apparently in complete control of the moves. The introduction of valued European material goods, via traders and returning plantation workers, in effect short-circuited the grade system. The returnees were predominantly young; they re-entered their home communities with wealth and, perhaps more importantly, with esoteric knowledge - that which generates power. By both retention and judicious distribution of portions of their wealth, they achieved a level of prestige quite out of proportion for men of their age and grade-rank in the pre-contact society. Many either bought their way in high up the ladder, or refused to participate at all. Their skills in Pidgin and assumed sophistication in the ways of the whites assured them of a useful and prestigious role in societies that were suffering drastic, unforeseen depopulation and change. In many coastal areas, it seems, disorganization bordering on chaos prevailed, and Melanesians faced with grave threats to their very survival would have ignored the old game and looked instead to the repatriated sophisticates, whose presumed knowledge of the ways and strategies of the whites might well have been the key to the regaining of some kind of equilibrium.

Whether the ex-Queenslanders were zealous Christians or fervently anti-white in their attitudes and behaviours, ni-Vanuatu soon came to realize that continued resistance to the newcomers was futile in view of the great difference in power. The threat and periodic application of punishment, which took the form of bombardment of offending communities by French or British warships, did much to convince the Melanesians of the reality of 'God's wrath'. Besides, in view of the traumatic events that in many areas preceded Christianity, the donning of clothes and cessation of certain overt behaviours may have seemed a small price to pay for peace and the opportunity it offered for re-organizing what was left of the old life. Any realistic appraisal of their situation would have led the indigenous people to accept the label of 'convert' and acquiesce to the demands of the newcomers. It is most unlikely that people understood much of the theological content of the new faith; their interest lay in its materialistic possibilities rather than its theological detail. As Lane (1965:277) notes:

The dissociation of Christians from aboriginal traditions does not involve rejection of aboriginal ideas as false or erroneous, but rather an acceptance of a system empirically demonstrated to be more practical in the contact situation...non-Christians
adhere to their system not because they believe that it is more valid but because, assessing the contact situation differently, they believe that the older ways continue to offer a better solution to their problems.

The fact that at the time of the first official census in 1967 about one ni-Vanuatu in six identified themselves as following a kustom religion attests to a negative assessment of Christianity's exclusive claim to the truth about power. Many kustom believers are cargo cultists who abandoned Christianity in favour of a new 'faith' more compatible with their perceptions concerning the road to wealth and self-respect.

Even among those who steadfastly remained Christian, there were significant continuities in their understandings. Behaviour of some kinds can be effectively forbidden, but beliefs and values, those denizens of an individual's cosmic order, cannot. Their variability in the old society was maintained and augmented in the new. Whites inevitably occupied a major place in the new cosmic order that was fashioned from the old. The missionaries tried to dichotomize the old and new, but they failed to negate prevailing conceptions about power.

The important point here is that in ridiculing and condemning 'traditional' beliefs in spirits and ghosts as 'savage superstitions' and the work of the devil, the Christians were in effect affirming that such powers indeed existed and impinged significantly on human affairs. The Melanesians would have been most interested to learn that there are ultimately superior and triumphant benevolent powers (i.e. the Holy Ghost) ranged against malevolent powers (i.e. the devil) in an uneven contest. This absolutist conception of clearly dichotomized good and evil powers flatly contradicted a fundamental Melanesian notion; namely, that power in itself is undifferentiated, but depending on the technologies applied to it by human or spiritual beings, it can have a wide range of effects, from positive to mortally negative.

The potential for people with the necessary esoteric knowledge to exploit these powers was considerable, whether or not the Christians were correct in claiming a clear demarcation between good and evil. If they could be safely tapped (a foregone conclusion in Melanesian understandings), both kinds of power would be socially useful, just like productive and destructive magic. In 1973, when southeast Ambrymese church leaders decided to mount an all-out attack on sorcery through an evangelical campaign, their strategy lay not in the denial of the reality and efficacy of sorcery power, but was instead phrased in terms of the inevitable triumph of the Holy Spirit, whose superior power, activated by prayers, confession and the destruction of magical objects, would render sorcery impotent (Tonkinson, n.d.a). Furthermore, the wholly benevolent Holy Spirit could be indirectly destructive, by turning the power of sorcery objects inwards upon their possessors, causing illness or death by backfire.

There were other important cultural continuities besides notions about power. Local languages have been maintained strongly, notwithstanding the universality in Vanuatu of Pidgin, the national lingua franca. Despite the introduction of steel tools, basic subsistence strategies remained much the
same, even after cash-cropping became an integral part of local economies. Shared notions about exchange and compensation persisted, however much the content and social contexts of exchanges were transformed. Kinship ideologies, and strongly supportive behaviours among kin and co-residents, have continued to figure significantly in village life and beyond. Arranged marriage, bridewealth payment, adoption and many other valued institutions have survived, some despite strong opposition from Christian leaders, and others with the blessing of the church if they were held to be compatible with Christian values.

As in the past, outward conformity to the new order masked great variability in personal beliefs. For want of understanding or inclination, many people remained nominal or 'subsistence' Christians, whose emotional and spiritual commitment to the faith was marginal. Despite this, the work of the church increasingly assumed a central place in the social life of village communities; taking up the slack caused by cessation of major institutions such as the graded society and men's secret clubs. It was possible to be an 'active Christian' in public life while maintaining private commitment to aspects of the past and to alternative avenues for enhancing personal power. A strong measure of at least outward conformity to Christianity was assured since in the church and mission schools the people saw obvious avenues to gain an understanding of the origins and nature of superior European power - and with understanding came the possibility of gaining access to it.

Contact with Europeans brought a sudden and unprecedented broadening of the cultural horizons of the indigenous people, which was accelerated by the Queensland labour trade and by the establishment of plantations whose demand for labour stimulated considerable local migration by able-bodied men. These experiences, plus the spread of Pidgin, contributed greatly to a dramatic increase in people's awareness of cultural variation as well as shared cultural elements throughout Vanuatu. The diffusion of ideas and objects increased in momentum and geographical range, blunting the role of local parochialism while dramatizing the ethnic and socioeconomic gulf that separated Melanesians from the white masters who now dominated and exploited them.

In the case of the Christians, however much the missionaries privately believed about innate racial differences, their public profession was of a common humanity demonstrable in the sharing of one true faith and the attainment of unity in the body of Christ. Their active attempts to bridge the cultural gap made Christianity a very strong force in eroding ethnic boundaries and creating new bonds of 'brotherhood'. Not only did the new faith link ni-Vanuatu of different districts and islands and thus weaken the feared category of 'stranger', but it also bonded the Melanesians through their missionaries to home congregations overseas. Christianity was presented as a world faith, blind to skin colour (despite the manifest 'whiteness' of Jesus and company) and cultural difference, as long as people professed belief and behaved as Christians should. The gulf in attitudes and behaviours that separated missionaries from a lot of other whites might have puzzled the Melanesians, especially in view of the considerable material wealth of many of the 'heathen' whites. Whatever their puzzlement, however, Melanesians went to work for both categories of European, expecting reciprocity of a material kind from their plantation
employers and hoping that rewards from the missionaries would be both material and spiritual.

During World War II, the presence of huge numbers of American service personnel and vast quantities of war material, food, etc., certainly created a lasting impression among ni-Vanuatu and broadened their horizons. Much of the able-bodied male population went to work for them, and encountered a material generosity and friendliness that had not been characteristic of their Anglo-French colonial masters. The ni-Vanuatu were especially intrigued by the black servicemen and impressed by the attempts of some of the latter to assert brotherhood on the basis of colour; but they noted, too, the fact that the blacks held low status positions in the service hierarchy. The American presence certainly spurred cargo cultism on some islands, most notably Tanna, and it left a lingering gratitude and feelings of indebtedness among many ni-Vanuatu who had experienced for the first time in their lives genuine comradeship and bonds of affection with Westerners. Also, because many of the servicemen were Christians, ni-Vanuatu associated the egalitarian behaviour of the troops with the shared faith.

One of the major consequences of Christianity was its generation of a new baseline in indigenous conceptions about time. In the pre-contact cosmic order, people recognized ecological time, the succession of the seasons; genealogical time, which spanned only a few generations and remained constant in depth; and mythological time, an era in the distant past with no chronologically marked beginning or end (cf. Lawrence 1973: 223-224). Notable events of the recent past were no longer gradually and easily absorbable into the mythological past, once a clear dichotomy between the pre- and post-Christian worlds was established in people's minds.

This dichotomy was both a moral and a sociological one. It solidified in a decidedly negative way Melanesian perceptions of what had been a dynamic and flexible culture. Brunton (personal communication) makes the important point that the effects of Christianity were always such as to rigidify people's notions about their pre-contact culture, and thus to develop in their minds an 'uncustomary' attitude towards cultural variation. The early fundamentalist missionaries communicated their lack of tolerance for variation and a blanket condemnation of all things 'traditional' to many of their local converts. With a clear baseline to work from, Christians could convey much more meaningfully dichotomies such as 'light-darkness', 'morality-immorality', 'Christian-pagan', 'civilized-savage' and 'life-death'. It was easier for the missionaries to adopt an absolute rather than selective view of the aboriginal past, especially since most had trouble sorting out 'religious' from 'secular' elements in the cultures that confronted them. While there must have been some syncretism and stress on shared values as part of the emphasis Christians placed on common humanity, the over-whelming impression gained by the Melanesians was that to look back was to peer into the darkness, at their former 'depravity'. 
THE CONTEMPORARY SYMBOLOGY OF CHRISTIANITY AND KASTOM

As noted earlier, in a few areas of Vanuatu there were pockets of strong resistance to Christianity, and the stand-off between the two groups has continued into the present. Traditionalists in Santo, Tanna and elsewhere have maintained that Christianity contains neither the only nor the best truths, and they have continued to look to kastom as a road to power and material wealth. But they have also looked to the French government and to certain American capitalists, and have achieved a degree of success through secular political manoeuvrings. Their claim to a monopoly on things kastom, as basic to their group identity and well-being, remained uncontested until the past decade when kastom began to gain favour in the opposing Christian camps.

The Christian majority in Vanuatu have long since come to terms with their religion and have given it a distinctive Melanesian stamp. In many cases local churchmen have turned a blind eye to practices that had been deemed un-Christian but were destined to persist: smoking, periodic drinking, premarital sex, bouts of physical marital strife, the use of magic, beliefs in non-Christian spirit-beings, observance of 'traditional taboos', and so on. Theirs was a fairly relaxed Christianity in most respects; it expected regular church attendance as well as physical and financial support for church-related activities, but otherwise placed few strong demands on its followers beyond observance of the sabbath and an outward conformity to its principal values.

The granting of local autonomy to major Vanuatu churches by parent bodies overseas served to strengthen ni-Vanuatu claims to an indigenized kind of Christianity, one closely in tune to Melanesian life-styles. The biggest church, that of the Presbyterians, became self-governing in 1948, and in the decades since there has been in most churches a steady replacement of overseas personnel with local people. Significantly, this major shift in responsibility began long before the Anglo-French colonial regimes made any similar moves. When the colonial powers finally began to demonstrate some genuine commitment to education and other forms of development, it was the British who led the way, and therefore British educated ni-Vanuatu who established the first political party, which was to develop into a nationwide independence movement.

The founders of the New Hebrides National Party (later renamed the Vanuaaku Pati) were practising Christians who in the course of their overseas training became highly sensitized to the iniquities of colonial domination of their homeland. They saw a vital need for the development of a distinctive national identity and a raised political consciousness concerning the weight of colonial oppression and paternalism. To achieve this, they needed a powerful symbol of shared values that would appeal to all ni-Vanuatu, uniting them by evoking their uniqueness and their difference from whites.

Despite its pre-eminence, Christianity clearly would not do as a dominant symbol. For one thing, a sizeable minority of ni-Vanuatu did not profess belief in it, so its appeal was not universal. For another, there was not one but several different kinds of Christianity in active competition for people's allegiance, and the major division between
Anglophone Protestants and Francophone Catholics meant that the new party would probably fail in its appeal to members of the second largest church in the country. Faced with this dilemma, the leaders chose instead the notion of *kastom*, that body of distinctive non-European 'traditional' cultural elements, as the focus in their quest for a national identity to underpin the independence movement.

*Kastom* would have to simultaneously represent and transcend local and regional diversity if it was to successfully symbolize ni-Vanuatu unity. Unfortunately, Christianity's effect had been not only to rigidify indigenous notions about *kastom* and the past, but also to bind *kastom* more closely and inflexibly to place— to freeze it in space and time. As a result, it gave rise to notions that important surviving *kastom* should remain unshared and thus mark local ethnic and cultural boundaries rather than transcend them. While it is true that there has been a continuing diffusion of magical knowledge throughout Vanuatu, larger complexes such as rituals have remained closely identified with particular groups and areas, as anchors of local rather than national group identity. This highlights a major problem with *kastom* as a dominant unifying symbol: it is inherently divisive if treated at any level more analytical or literal than an undifferentiated and vague symbolic one.

Lindstrom (n.d.b), in a recent paper on the political revaluation of tradition on Tanna, notes, 'If shared custom defines national unity, unshared custom is able to define national separation'. Because of the extent of cultural loss and of Melanesians' vagueness about the content of their 'traditional' past, questions concerning *kastom* are inherently political, open to different claims by rival factions. The leaders of the fledgling independence movement, while cognisant of the suitability of *kastom* as a symbol of ni-Vanuatu unity, free of the taint of colonial domination, were no doubt also aware of its dangerous ambiguity. In the face of so much cultural diversity in Vanuatu, shared *kastom* was inadequate for underpinning a nationwide political structure capable of supporting a mass movement. The party leaders hoped that the *kastom* rallying-cry would bring to their side both the *kastom*-based Nagriamel and John Fruam movements and the Francophone ni-Vanuatu. However, they were not surprised when no such alliance materialized, since influential European commercial interests and the French administration had laboured hard to encourage the formation of an opposition coalition of Francophones and *kastom*-followers.

The party activists decided that they had the numbers to prevail despite this opposition, so while continuing to champion *kastom* and the need to revive and maintain it, they looked to the organizational strengths of their churches. By exploiting existing church structures, they could bridge the rural-urban and educated-uneducated gaps so as to broaden and strengthen their political power base. The fact that several prominent party leaders were also Protestant clergy helped influence the churches to lend active support to the independence movement.

Among the organizers were men and women who had studied elsewhere in the Pacific, and for whom the promotion of *kastom* was much more than just a catch-cry. They had come to appreciate its vital role in providing indigenous peoples with a strong sense of the uniqueness of their cultural heritage, and as a source of identity that seemingly owed nothing to
European forms. In seeking to promote kastom, they realized that ni-Vanuatu Christians were faced with a drastic re-evaluation of their 'traditional' past. After decades of internalizing essentially negative values and attitudes about the time before Christianity, the people now had to adjust to the notion that not only was 'tradition' not all bad, but some of it was an essential component of their shared identity as ni-Vanuatu.

Coming to terms with a new symbiosis of values drawn from past and present, 'paganism' and Christianity, proved to be problematic for many ni-Vanuatu in the 1970s. Much of the problem lay in the party leadership's need to keep the kastom symbol as generalized and undifferentiated as possible. They hoped that the people would undergo a consciousness-raising experience through unquestioning acceptance of the message in the ideological spirit in which it was being promulgated. On the contrary, many people tried to grapple with it pragmatically, wondering which kinds of kastom they would have to embrace, where it would be obtained from if long lost among them, and what Western elements they would have to abandon as a result of the swing to kastom. The result was considerable confusion and much debate, as I have detailed elsewhere (Tonkinson n.d.b: 7-12). The main reason why so many people were puzzled about the composition of the new symbiosis was because their leaders had failed to make clear that some kinds of kastom would certainly not be resurrected; i.e. that kastom could be morally evaluated as good or bad on the basis of whether or not it was held to contradict or undermine Christian values.

Many ni-Vanuatu did not appreciate that what their party was promoting was in fact kastom-within-Christianity. In this period, the movement's leaders were seeking the support of the major kastom-based regional movements, both of which had strong anti-Christian biases. It is thus not surprising that in promoting kastom, the party leaders left unstated the corollary that any kastom which conflicts with Christian values should not be revived. Everyone was aware of Christianity's central role in devaluing and destroying a great deal of kastom, so it must have been perplexing to have political leaders who were also prominent clergy extolling kastom in unqualified terms.

Rather than attempt to disambiguate kastom, the leaders chose instead to affirm publicly the essential compatibility of both kinds of cultural elements. By the time that independence was granted, in mid-1980, this symbiosis had become so firmly entrenched in the collective consciousness that no ni-Vanuatu could possibly have failed to get the message. In the official platform of the Vanuaaku Pati, in the new constitution, in the myriad events leading up to and surrounding independence, kastom and Christianity were fused in the public imagination. The new nation's anthem and flag include elements of both and affirm that the alliance is fundamental to national identity.

As the new republic takes its place in the global arena, the emphasis given by its government to kastom will doubtless remain predominantly symbolic. Its utility will lie mainly in the validation of a distinctive ni-Vanuatu, Melanesian or Pacific 'way', some of whose major component values are held to be 'traditional', even though they may well owe much to Christian morality. Father Walter Lini, the nation's first Prime Minister, says, 'We believe that small is beautiful, peace is powerful, respect is
honourable, and that our traditional sense of community is both wise and practical for the people of Vanuatu' (1980:290).

Certainly, in the post-colonial era more attention and respect will be paid to *kastom* in matters of land, mechanisms for dispute settlement and compensation payment, chiefly authority, life crisis rites and other ceremonial activities, symbols of rank, and so on. But the dangers inherent in the use of *kastom* are many and real, so '...tradition's future will depend very much on what value it is given by the Government of Vanuatu and other bodies like the church and education' (Lini 1980:285). It is thus most probable that in the drafting of new legislation and the creation of enduring political institutions and strategies, Vanuatu's leaders will utilize principles that are broadly Western and Christian.

The newly elected government is heavily Christian in composition: the Prime Minister is an Anglican priest, and the Deputy Prime Minister and three other members of the government ministry are Presbyterian pastors. Several other ministry members are Church elders, and a leading member of the Opposition is a Roman Catholic priest. The nation's motto is 'long God yumi stanap' ('In God we stand') and its self-identification is as a Christian country, regardless of the presence of non-Christian minority groups within it. Church and state are likely to remain closely allied in the foreseeable future, so the dominance of Christian values seems assured.

Despite the new stress on *kastom* and its re-evaluation into much more positive terms, there has been no significant shift in the dominant values of the ni-Vanuatu. In the past, many of the values and attitudes that persisted from pre-European times merged with those of Christianity and became indistinguishable from them: norms of mutual support, sharing and cooperation among close kin and friends, small-group solidarity, strong affection for children, a willingness to work hard when the occasion demanded, ideals of peace, harmony and balance between individuals and groups, and so on.

The choice of *kastom* as rallying-cry can in no way be interpreted as some cold-blooded strategy of a cynical intellectual elite. Theirs was a heartfelt move to claim back for *kastom* much that had once belonged to it, before Christianity usurped many of its positive aspects and claimed them as its exclusive property. This process is part and parcel of a strongly felt need among colonized peoples to claim self-respect and national pride by restoring legitimacy and moral strength to their 'traditional' cultures.

People have not begun to behave much differently, but their altered perceptions of their 'traditional' past are according it a much larger share of the total *kastom*-Christian symbiosis. Just as the Christianity preached to them was a set of norms and ideals that were not in fact attained in much of the everyday behaviour of the Europeans with whom the Melanesians were acquainted, so also is their old culture capable of a much more positive assessment than whites have given it, when it too is judged in terms of its ideals. Thus the recent statement by a prominent ni-Vanuatu woman that '...traditionally we are peacemakers', a people who settled all disputes by *kastom* (Sope 1980:53), should be accorded at least the same status as a Christian commandment, since both express ideals whose achievement everywhere and all the time is impossible. Since 'tradition'
is such a heavily filtered artifact of the present, it matters very little whether or not those elements now attributed to the pre-contact past were in fact part of it; as long as the re-evaluation is a positive one, ni-Vanuatu can draw satisfaction and pride from it.

The continued identification and revival of elements of kastom and reinforcement of the notion of nationally shared kastom will serve to further solidify the new nation's identity. If the emphasis remains on unities that transcend regional diversity, the divisive potential of kastom unshared could stay dampened. Following the recent successful quelling of the Santo rebellion, the government is bound to continue the heavy stress on national unity, but with assurances that regional diversity will be catered for by decentralization. With the removal of European agitateurs and the allaying of fears about major losses of local autonomy, there is good reason to believe that the Melanesian members of the kastom-based Nagriamel movement will offer no further resistance to the government. The new respect for kastom should help ensure this.

NOTE

1Field research was carried out on Efate and Ambrym Islands in 1966-7, 1969, 1973, 1977-8, 1979 and 1980. Financial assistance for these trips was provided by: National Science Foundation, University of Oregon, University of British Columbia, Australian National University and the National Institute of Mental Health. My thanks to Myrna Ewart Tonkinson, Anthony Forge, Hank Nelson and Marian Sawer for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.

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BINANDERE VALUES: A PERSONAL REFLECTION

J.D. Waiko

INTRODUCTION

After a brief description of the territory of the Binanderere people of the Oro Province, Papua New Guinea, I discuss the way in which they classify their physical surroundings as an integral part of their value system. This is followed by a story which illustrates Binanderere values, some of which have changed since contact with Europeans. Lastly, I reflect on values in a changing situation, and on my role as a member of the Binanderere community.

There are about four thousand Binanderere people whose land is within the Binanderere Census Division, Ioma District, Oro Province. All Binanderere are familiar with their land boundaries which are marked by prominent physical features and are given names with evocative associations. The Binanderere share their boundary with the following people: the Taian Dawari in the east; the Agea in the south; the Sirima and Biage in the southwest; the Goilala in the west; the Bia-Mawae in the northwest; and the Jia and Suena in the north. (See map).

The Goilala mountains provide the sources of the Mamba, Gira and the Eia Rivers which flow north to the sea. All the villages are situated on river banks or along the sea board. The climate is divided into two seasons, wet and dry. Around September to April rain falls on the ranges, and drains out to sea, depositing silt on the fertile plains. The drier and cooler period occurs between May and August. The wet season is called Wareba when the tree of the same name is brilliant with red berries. The dry weather is termed Tuvira, after a tree that produces beautiful dark red flowers. The Binanderere know times to plant taro, their main crop, as well as other vegetables, and when not to plant them. Out of economic necessity and from close observation of their environment, the Binanderere are always conscious of the passing seasons.

We cannot discuss values, customs and tradition without describing the way in which the Binanderere classify their physical surroundings. Naturally we start in the village and move out to the forest.

The Nasi: The village is about one hundred yards long by forty yards wide, and the arapa, the street, is bare ground. The houses are built on stilts with thatched sago leaf roofs and the walls are made of sago palms split and tied together. There used to be two rows of houses, one row of
mando, houses belonging to women, and the other of oro, the men's houses. This segregation has changed so that now a family has a house with one or two wawa, platforms, beside it.

Green grass invades the bare street in spite of the constant sweeping of the women. At the back of the houses the grass meets the variegated crotons and hibiscus of many kinds. Behind this decorative vegetation there are village bananas and above these rise betel-nut trees and coconut palms. The latter's fronds are the tallest of the leaves swaying against the sky. The varying sizes of the trees provide a strong hedge which protects the village against the wind and blazing sun. Beyond the hedge three types of bush flourish.

The Rorobu: There is rorobu where the villagers cut and clear patches of bush to make gardens. The wild animals are few in number here because the villagers are constantly moving through the area to tend their gardens and they are ready to pursue any edible game. This consists of lizards, bandicoots, cuscus, birds, etc. The teenagers make traps here to catch birds and bandicoots especially during the twaira season. The rorobu also provides fruits of wild trees on the higher ground, and ground fruit such as uwa ato, and many others. The fruits are ready for picking during or after the wareba season. On the river plains and meanders the tame pigs root and roam in the damp ground and scavenge food scraps near the village. In fact the villagers do not often hunt here with their dogs to avoid killing domesticated pigs, an act which is a source of constant conflict among the residents.

The land in rorobu is dudumba, river silt deposits, and therefore meta, 'heavy' and fertile. The growth in this area ranges between fifteen and thirty feet in height. The vegetation is cleared for planting at an approximate interval of between five to twelve years. The trees are not too big to cut and this provides for easy clearing, less labour and regular gardens for the Binandere. In the river meanders towu, bread fruit trees, are everywhere and their bearing season is between December and May.

Wood for fuel, sticks and logs for housing and other needs are obtained in the rorobu. In some cases certain species of trees such as benuma are cut here for canoe making. Strings from strips of tough bark, vines, liana, and some type of lawyer canes for fastening are also collected in the rorobu.

The Taote: Passing the rorobu one comes to the taote, where the trees are tall and the undergrowth less dense. In the damp ground there is a lot of wild game, especially pigs which meet with some domesticated animals for breeding. During the twaira, the drier and cooler seasons, the wild fruit of various kinds ripen and fall to the ground. These include warawa, wasia, taga or wild pandanas, rarew, tao nuts, and other innumerable berries; and here the pigs gather in herds.

The villagers hunt the animals with dogs, or at other times they set pu wao, pig traps. They obtain goroba, black palm for various uses - handles of axes, knives, spears, parts of canoes, and so on. Some sticks are cut and black palm pieces are sharpened to set traps in holes in garden fences to catch pigs when the latter come to root in the crops.
Trees are much taller than in the rorobu and the fallow period may range between fifteen to sixty years. Ponds and creeks are infested with fish and the wild animals abound. Hard wood for building materials is also obtained in the taote.

The Toian: Beyond taote and furtherest from the village there is the toian, the hunting ground. The trees are tallest here and the wild game and fish of all sorts breed under the damp forest and in the streams. Wild pigs, wallabies, tree kangaroos, echidna, cassowaries, cuscus, lizards, and birds of all kinds, including hornbills and birds of paradise, live among the forest. Villagers build bush huts here to hunt animals and to fish. The fish is smoked, sago is made, and nuts are collected and taken to the village for distribution.

In some cases there are babaro to, flying fox caves, where virtually thousands of flying foxes and bats of various species are found. The caves are blocked with sticks and leaves and the flying foxes are caught, killed and smoked for consumption and distribution.

Thus toian is ujivo, a vital capital resource from which the Binandere draw food and material to sustain their way of life. Since all Binandere villages are on the river banks and since they make gardens in the rorobu and sometimes in the taote, the natural forests in between the rivers have not been cut at all since the Binandere invaded and conquered the rorobu, taote and toian from an enemy tribe. This was the Girida who were either wiped out or absorbed, most probably around the turn of the eighteenth century. The Binandere visit toian during the tuvira season when it is drier and cooler.

The Wogoro: Not every clan owns toian because some villages are situated on low lying land, at the edges of extensive swamps. Therefore, they have swamps for sago making and creeks for fishing as well as places to set traps for catching pigs. During the wareba season heavy rain causes floods which bring wo bodari, the flow of fish and eels from the ujivo, the heart of the swamps, into the creeks and rivers. The size of the fish range between ten centimetres to fifteen centimetres and the eels are about fifteen centimetres to one metre. They both flow with the flood almost in millions.

Near or in the wogoro there are three types of sago: mamboro and kutao species have no thorns on them. They are entirely propagated vegetatively by humans. Both types are planted on banks of rivers and creeks as well as edges of swamps. The other specie is jinuma, a wild variety propagated by seed from mature flowering trees. The jinuma variety has thorns on it.

The Koita: The land on the coast, the koita, is sandy. Apart from owning rorobu and taote clans living on the seaboard also have rights over and access to sea resources, particularly fish and shell-fish of various kinds. Imia, the collection of shell-fish by women, is an important activity. In many ways toian is for the inland dwellers what koita is for coastal inhabitants. Temporary huts of nipa palms are built, and a variety of imia and fish are collected or caught and smoked before taking them to the villages. More often than not the shell-fish are carried with shells
in baskets. These are loaded into the canoes which are paddled home where the food is cooked and eaten.

Thus the Binandere classification of their local environment begins with the village to rorobu, toian, wogoro and kotka. In terms of exploiting the resources in the various zones, rorobu is most utilized for its land and tree growth; some parts are sometimes overused while other areas are underused depending on the sparsity or the density of the village population in the vicinity. All types of trees, plants, snakes, lizards, cuscus, bandicoots, insects, grubs and so on in the rorobu are well identified and their uses are known widely. This knowledge and the utilization diminishes as one moves from rorobu into toian and wogoro. This means that the forest furthest from the village represents a partly unknown and complex eco-system. Thus the near village areas are regarded as the periphery of the total forest to be exploited by man. The toian, or the centre of the primary forest, is the growing core from which all the other areas are rejuvenated, i.e. taote, toian, wogoro, and the sea can be termed capital resources.

The resources obtained from taote, toian and wogoro include the following:

(a) Housing materials - hard woods of various types including bendoro, bove, tato, kimia, etc., for posts, stilts, cross-beams, rafters and so on; sago leaves for roofs and stalks for walls; various palms for flooring including black palms; various types of lawyer canes; and several kinds of trees for dugout canoes.

(b) Food - nutritious nuts such as tao, rarewa, sino dendegi, areda, etc. Some wild fruits include mema, mango, sisira, as well as edible leaves, especially genda, tulip (two leaves in Tok Pisin); sago - tiwa, sago grubs; mono, tree grubs, especially the delicious warawa mono. The game includes pigs, wallabies, kangaroos, cuscus, huge lizards, echidnas, birds and bird eggs, particularly ground bird eggs like tomboru, cassowaries, riara, etc.

(c) Medicinal plants applied by individuals or by sorcerers to kill, heal, protect, counteract, strengthen or weaken.

The villagers see taote, toian, wogoro as distinct but linked. They are intensely conscious of the need for all to be conserved, and if possible, to be flourishing. Now we want to concentrate on rorobu.

Because of the constant use of rorobu through gardening activity, we want to describe the latter in two separate phases. The first stage starts with buro yawari, the cutting of the stunted growth, vines and lianas. Most sticks are piled, and lianas collected and put aside for fencing. This may take several hours to a couple of days depending on the size of the new garden and number of people involved in the labour. Buro dari, felling of trees follows and the leaves and logs are left to dry. Buro dungari takes place when the trees are burnt. Most of the logs are cut and pumangu detari, the logs are leaned against the stumps of trees. These are carried to the village when dried and used for firewood. The wood on the pumangu is also split for making fences around the perimeter of the garden.
Buro tetu follows with clearing and burning logs and debris. Then the urari, planting, starts with ba-kopuru, selected taro species, planted before others. The gardening activity described so far is done mostly by men and each stage is carried out by individual nuclear families, or on a communal basis. If it is the latter then the owner of the garden with other members of the clan provide buro tau, food, for the days when the work is being done. If an invitation is given for planting taro, then the suckers must be ready before the day appointed for placing them in the ground. The women prepare food in the village when men plant in the garden, although sometimes food may be cooked in the garden as well.

The second phase is to do with weeding and attending the taro when it is growing. This may be further divided into three stages. Ba papa dari is the stage when the taro is planted in the ground until new suckers shoot up beside 'mother taro'. This is followed by ba devi ketari when the suckers are removed for replanting and some taro is pulled out for spacing purposes. In fact this is the stage when the ba jiari, the taro, is almost mature with only four or five leaves on the plant. The taro is really mature when there are only three or less leaves left on it.

The women are given the responsibility for tending and picking taro. They are thought to be much more careful and resourceful than men. But some women, especially newly married ones, are badaia, that is, they pull out taro and other vegetables before they are ready. There are careless women but the mukina women, particularly the wives of the middle aged men, are quite resourceful. They leave the vegetables until they are mature.

This means that the second phase has three stages with distinct markers - the growing period, the ready stage when the taro is three quarters mature and manene. The latter is the final stage in the garden when the taro and bananas ripen and rot. In the manene, or the waro, bushes have grown up to about two metres high but still the mukina women preserve taro and other vegetables under this growth.

In fact jiroru and baioaga, varieties of balsalm, are planted at the same time as taro. The former grows and flowers within six months and dies - a sign that the taro is mature. jiroru and baioaga, therefore, are maturity indicators for the taro harvest. After taro is pulled out, bananas, pitpit and hibica remain in the manene, though the bush overtakes them sooner or later. Thus the old garden returns to rorobu for about ten years before the garden cycle begins again.

BINANDERE BELIEFS AND VALUES

Having described the Binandere classification and use of their land and forest, we now turn to discuss perception, beliefs and values relating to the various zones of the local environment. The Binandere man is always conscious of that village environment and he interacts with it in an intricate way. He is always guided by customs, traditions and experiences, all of which are embedded in a complex belief system called sinenembari.

Sinenembari is the way in which a Binandere perceives himself in relation to his physical environment. It is a complex concept to
understand. Nevertheless, we want to define this term because it is basic to the Binandere belief system.

The word *sinenembari* is translated literally as *being*. As a verb it is to be or to become. It does not connote separate pieces becoming to make a whole, nor does it indicate stages of evolving from something. *Sinenembari* is the total and independent being or thing itself which is not created as there is no creator. As a noun *sinenembari* is a conceptual frame in which a being or thing is placed and there is neither a point of reference nor context; it is the very existence of the being or thing. In Binandere legends, the origins of living and non-living things are not explained: they just are. A character in the story may take on several forms: he may appear as a person, an animal or an object, but his essence, which just is, remains constant. That is to say *sinenembari* connotes wholeness, enmeshed unity and changeless manifestations of essence. Rather than continue with an abstract explanation of *sinenembari*, I will use a particular incident to illustrate the integration of the Binandere and their environment, and how their values flow from that context.

A Binandere sees a crocodile basking in the sun on the *banga*, that yellowish, brittle river bank rock which crumbles when passed between the fingers. He knows that he must be cautious for he believes that the animal has four eyes: two that sleep when it is basking and two that remain open and alert in case of danger.

He approaches with *karowa dungari*, a spear made from *goroba*, the strong black palm tree. It has an arrow pointed end with a barbed hook which is burnt on one side. Once it hits its target, it emits poisonous magic to kill its victim.

With the spear in his right hand and a steel axe in his left, he walks slowly but stealthily, avoiding treading on the rattling leaves, towards the basking animal. With his eyes fixed on the crocodile, he pulls the small plants under his armpit and touches the big trees and whispers to them when he passes 'Imbaga tabo guire', do not tell the crocodile. He reveals no more and no less because the crocodile is not alone on the *banga*. It, too, has relatives, friends and enemies who guard and watch ready to expose or assist any attempt to kill it. The Binandere, therefore, is obliged to pay respect to and communicate with the living things as he draws near. Failure to observe this obligation would mean that the trees and birds would warn the animal to return to the water.

Cautiously he comes near enough to throw the spear and stops at that range. He has done all he can do within the limit of human knowledge and as custom has required.

Bending his knees and peeping through the bushes he sends his eyes to explore the body of the animal from head to tail in order to decide the exact spot to aim the spear. Trusting the spirits of his ancestors encased in the *karowa*, and not too sure where on the body the spear will land, he chooses to aim at the *jimi tatari*, the joint between the two hind legs and at the base of the tail where it meets the hip. His past observations tell him that crocodiles usually paddle mostly with their two hind legs and their tail. This experience assures him that once the spear reaches that
joint the animal is unable to swim, but instead it will sink to the bed of the river.

The choice, therefore, is to give a wound which will be fatal or at least prevent it from running away. Even if he does not kill the crocodile instantly for meat, he feels the urge to attack it to gain revenge for a villager once taken by a crocodile. Conscious of the obligation he has to fulfil, feeling the blood pulsing through his body for revenge, the muscles bulge on his right hand. Before the spear is discharged he invokes the spirits of his ancestors encased in the shaft to take charge of the weapon when it flies between his hand and the crocodile. Chewing the *beiaua*, that hot and powerful ginger, the Binandere lifts the spear and blows onto the barbed and hard-burnt end. Turning, he blows some ginger behind him to drive away enemy spirits that might have followed him to foil his aim. Lifting his mouth he spits the ginger to his front, in the direction which the ancestors spirits are to travel with the spear to the victim; the ginger's power must go ahead to remove any obstacle that might hinder the spear.

With all his force he quivers, then launches the spear which lands on the desired spot. The crocodile makes a raucous noise, jumps into the water, thrashing it like the sea breaking on the rock. With the spear sticking out like a mast of a canoe, the animal is taken by a whirlpool produced by the eddy close to the *banga*. The hunter, his heart beating and his hand shaking, stands, watching the animal struggling as if to knock out the spear. But the body sinks to the bottom with the spear stuck on the *jint tatari*. He dare not pursue it in the water for he stood firm on the land to inflict the wound; the crocodile is in a stronger position in the river to challenge his life. The water is the crocodile's element; the land is man's. He asks the spirits to remain with the animal, and hold it where it sank near the mouth of a small creek.

Cutting a stalk of *dayana*, a fern, he hollows it and blows a *tumbari* to, an emergency call. This goes far and wide like a conchshell blowing and brings his clansfolk to the bank of the river. They build a fence and block the mouth of the creek. With long poles they locate the crocodile and it is caught.

It is taboo for the clans of this village to eat the meat of the crocodile. For generations they have never touched the flesh of the animal. The urge to kill it is to avenge the death of a woman whose body was swallowed by a crocodile in the past. The people from a nearby village cooperated in the search for the woman. It is decided therefore that the meat of the animal will be given to the neighbouring clansfolk to fulfil an obligation entered into a generation ago.

This story is chosen to place the general comments in a specific location and to add detail to the previous comments on the belief system of the Binandere. He lives in a complex social relationship with the animate and inanimate world. He has obligations to the entire physical environment and spiritual universe. He is not free to use the crocodile meat because the customs of the clan regulate the way in which members dispose of the meat. On the other hand the Binandere is not absolutely controlled or enmeshed in the system. His own empirical observation and knowledge passed to him by others guide his opportunities and limit his actions as he
encounters the challenges and obligations. This is shown when he has to calculate the chances of his success or failure in his decision to spear the crocodile on the jimi tatati. He could indeed have decided not to attack at all; or he could have aimed at other parts of the animal.

I now turn to another fundamental idea out of which the Binandere derive their intrinsic belief system, that of amenga or chance.

The Binandere believe that there is no such thing as chance. If the hunter of the crocodile, for example, was about to throw his spear and a branch entangled the end of it causing him to miss, he would accept that the spirit of the crocodile had been responsible.

The assumption that spirits intervene in human affairs is used by the Binandere to give authority for accepting new ideas. This intervention is often in the form of dreams, and the knowledge resulting from such a source is called atuwo da gari, or knowledge acquired from dreams. That is, ancestors are said to appear in dreams to show their kin new medicines, magic, sorcery, dance dramas and so on.

A person who has received ideas in dreams from his ancestors must test them before he introduces them to the public. If it is a revelation of new elements in a dance drama, the individual undertakes to work out the plots and the motifs, bearing in mind the normal performance. This is sorted out during the rehearsal stage. The drama in the new form is then performed in the village for public view. This is an opportunity for others to criticize the new elements. Later the innovation may be rejected or accepted. If it is accepted, the drama becomes part of the traditions.

Dreams, therefore, are an important form through which innovation occurs and through which the creative imagination contributes to the dynamic culture: it is the way in which the Binandere rationalize and legitimize change in their culture.

Ge be ari and Gari: There is a distinction between ge be ari and gari, or beliefs and knowledge. Beliefs are accepted or taken for granted without serious questioning of their moral basis or their rationality. These consist of sinenembari, codes of moral behaviour, origins of traditions, legends and so on. Gari, on the other hand, is empirical and it contains elements based on experience, observation and practice. It is accumulated and has been passed down from one generation to another. Both ge be ari and gari exist side by side, but the latter can be tested and its source and reliability is open to challenge.

Binandere distinguish several areas of gari. Dubo gari is the knowledge that stems from the neck, that part of the body which is said to contain wisdom. Hence dubo embo, man of neck, means a man of wisdom who commands respect and power. Tari gari is knowledge given or told without the possessor showing how it works. Ari gari, on the other hand, is the knowledge which is imparted and the giver shows the receiver how it works. More often than not the giver and receiver both take part in an attempt to make the knowledge work. A good example is that of a sorcerer or a magician who teaches others how the sorcery and magic works. The teacher gives advice, warns against dangers and explains how the process involves specific items: plants and stones, and rituals of avoidance. Ari gari is
knowledge acquired by watching while the teacher demonstrates: it is action-oriented. This knowledge includes *ipa ove*, dexterity, or artistic work done by hand. This may be done on the prow of a canoe, in the carving of an image, or the style of building a house, etc. Lastly, there is *aturo da garì*, or knowledge acquired from dreams. Here, as indicated earlier, the role of the individual is reduced and innovation attributed to the spirits. But dreams are also considered important sources for more mundane information. In the ordinary early morning conversation, as people find scraps of food and prepare for the day's work, they will discuss their dreams and look for signs of coming events or warnings. Once it is accepted that ancestors and spirits are important, and they communicate through dreams, then it is inevitable that the people will spend time speculating on dreams.

There have been changes in the last eight decades. Certainly Christianity has had its impact on the villagers. The Anglican Church has had a long influence and in the last few years a Christian Revival Crusade has penetrated the villages. The Binandere community is now divided between the Anglicans and the Revivalists. The Binandere express their balance between old and new values when they use the image of a house. They say that when you build a new house, that does not mean you have to abandon the old one. You might often find it convenient to move back to the shelter of the old home. Also you will probably shift a lot of your possessions from the old to the new, even taking the strongest of the poles and split palm to build into the new. The Binandere are as pragmatic in their acceptance of beliefs as they are in building; and they do not necessarily see the tensions and contradictions that might worry outsiders.

I want to illustrate this image with two examples. Firstly, the Binandere have acquired new items of magic or sorcery from outsiders but they still use their old techniques to achieve the desired aim. For example, some sorcerers obtain DDT solution to kill other people but claim that traditional sorcery is still at work. That is, the old belief system and the old techniques are sustained although there is no doubt that a new agent has been used to bring about the actual death.

Secondly, the Binandere have modified the way they use ritual magic when hunting with dogs to catch wild animals. The ethnographic data on the way in which the Binandere use medicines and other rituals to cause the dogs to bite the hunted animals do not concern us here. But with the introduction of fire-arms the Binandere applied the traditional medicines to the gun to make it shoot well.

If we now modify the earlier description of the crocodile hunter to bring it up to the present, we can see more clearly the blend of new equipment and old beliefs. In the early dawn a Binandere hunter leaves the village with a gun on his shoulder and a steel bush knife in his hand. On entering the *morobu*, the immediate bush after the village, the hunter pulls *binei gabu* (literally, ancestor stick) and places this plant across the track. The hunter appeals to the house spirits to return to the village and he calls upon his dead kin to hunt with him. The hunter asks that the dead kin provide him with animals, and guide his bullets to inflict fatal wounds.
Walking through the damp ground he sees a wild pig digging near the buttress of a huge tree. He hides behind the leaves, drops the knife and lifts the gun. Pointing the gun at the pig, he puts the butt on his shoulder. The hunter aims at the animal just below the base of the front legs where the heart is located. This is the spot he would choose to thrust his spear into for a quick kill. He pulls the trigger, but he misses his target. Something must be wrong. The dead kin had provided the animal as requested by the hunter; the fault must lie with those relatives who did not observe the rules of distribution when he shot an animal last time. One member of the clan desired to eat a specific part and this was not given to him. As a result he was angry; and now he has directed a spirit to make the bullet miss the pig. The hunter therefore has to return to the village to sort out the fault before he uses the gun again.

Again we see the close association between the man, his past and his environment. He is a Christian but when he acts in ways similar to his ancestors, he practices the rituals associated with old beliefs. The old easily accommodates new tools and techniques, as no doubt it did in the past.

Participant and observer. What is it like to be a participant and observer in one's own community? I was born to ordinary, subsistence farming parents. They do not know how to read and write. My date of birth is said to be around August 1944. I grew up in the village of Tabara on the Gira River. By the 1950s the Binandere had abandoned the elaborate initiation ceremonies so I missed that traditional formal education and test. One important custom which was not lost with initiation, however, was that described in the local language as 'growing under the armpit of the parents'. That is, the child was expected to develop while maintaining a close relationship with an adult. The child would constantly be instructed, taught by example, and given tasks. Children of my age had to collect firewood, betel nuts and other things. In the evening we had to light a fire in front of the men's house, the oro. We sat around it and listened to an elder who told legends, gave accounts of warfare, discussed moral issues, and presented a view of the world and its meaning. Another fire was always lit under the house during the early evenings because the ancestors would only 'give taro' where the fire was. The fires under the house were built up late in the night and the members of a family went to sleep.

In the early dawn the teenagers lit fires in front of the house again. Before the day's work began the family sat around the fire and talked about current issues and moral behaviour. They shared dreams of the previous night interpreting them and relating them to the day's work - warning children and adults if misfortunes were predicted, giving hopes and expectations if good luck was shown. By the time I was ten years old, I must have heard the legends and other stories a thousand times. I had absorbed much of the oral tradition and other customs before I entered a formal system of western education. That is to say, I was a village child until about twelve years old, and then I received all my primary and secondary education within my home province. I have never had the misfortune to feel alienated from the language, customs, old people or age mates of the village.
In 1967 I entered the recently established University of Papua New Guinea. I had begun the training to enable me to be an observer of my own people. After graduating I was awarded a British Commonwealth Academic Scholarship to complete an MA at the University of London. While at the University of Papua New Guinea and since coming to the Australian National University I have returned to the Binandere with some of the technical and theoretical equipment of the social scientist. I have sat with old men and some women with my tape recorder between us. As I have prepared to ask them for the sorts of evidence that I know western scholarship expects, they have reminded me of my grandparents, referred to incidents in my childhood, and asked about recent political changes. Often I avoid interviews; I prefer to record stories, quarrels, chants and other events when they happen in their natural contexts. This method saves me the embarrassment of asking questions of elders because the juniors are not expected to raise queries.

I am conscious of my role as participant in a community, and as observer of it. My informants too are aware of my two functions. They know that I share much common oral culture with them, they need not explain allusions or point out the obvious. They want their history preserved and they want it to be full and accurate. But some knowledge gives prestige: to share it with others is to devalue it or risk it being used irresponsibly. Also the members of some clans might see me as the representative of rivals; and they are therefore reluctant to be completely frank with me. Such occasions are rare although there is knowledge that has some practical value that old men are reluctant to give away easily.

An outsider would not necessarily find the old people any more ready to reveal their knowledge: the outsider is just as likely to be perceived as unworthy or as an enemy agent. On balance I trust that my education in two cultures has given me advantages that are not available to foreigners dependent on limited time in the field. Very few outsiders have gained the degree of familiarity with a Melanesian language to allow them to penetrate the metaphors, the words charged with sentiment because of their association with past events, and the terms without English equivalents.

My systematic attempt to record Binandere culture began in 1966 even before I went to the university. Most of the old people who knew the pre-Christian community are now dead or dying. Slowly but steadily some Binandere are regarding me as a worthy custodian of their traditions. Just like a father transmits his knowledge to his trusted son, so that he in turn can preserve the family's special learning, I find myself in the position of being the carrier of Binandere traditions. Already the old and the young alike are demanding from me oral traditions dealing with customary land rights.

What kind of oral traditions and values are the Binandere not teaching their children due to changes that have taken place? Are oral traditions to be just relics to be preserved in museums? Or notes and manuscripts for scholars' academic exercises in the brick wall seminar rooms? Am I bowing down to cry over the lost cause of dying traditions?
There have been situations in which I have been expected to act like a disinterested anthropologist and others when the authorities have depended on me to help with problems that have threatened the official position. At times I have acted against the interests of the authorities. I feel that I have to make up my own mind over issues that concern the Binandere. I cannot accept the decisions of others in trying to synthesize the different viewpoints I can see. Sometimes I must act against the national government, sometimes I act against village authorities.

In June 1978, for example, I planted a large area of garden and built a fence around it. In early November when the taro was growing, several pigs belonging to a 'big man' from Taire, the next village, broke down the fence and destroyed the taro. I mended the fence only to have it broken again. I got a spear and killed one pig. I reported the case to the village komiti, a representative of the Tamata, Local Government Council. He carried the pig to the owner. I heard that a lot of young men brandished their steel axes in the air threatening to cut me up because I had killed the pig.

Other pigs kept uprooting the garden. My warning to the big man had fallen on deaf ears. So I speared another pig in mid-December. This time I sent word for the big man and his young men to come to the garden, cut me up and carry away their pig. Some of my own young men and I remained in the garden, but no one turned up except the big man's wife. She said that the pig was earmarked for another man from Tubi village and we carried the pig there.

On New Year's Day 1979, both national and provincial politicians called a meeting to discuss a proposal from a trans-national corporation to buy timber rights. It was scheduled to take place in Taire village and in front of the house of the 'big man' whose pigs I had been killing. Tamata Council President, Clive Youde, was in the chair and the politicians explained the benefits that would flow to the village people from the investment. Some leaders opposed the politicians, while others supported the proposal. I spoke last, pointing out the weakness of the politicians' case and the advantages and disadvantages of the investment.

The big man whose pigs I had killed has a lot of land and forest, especially in the third zone or toian. He said that he wanted nothing from the politicians and the companies. He refused to agree to sell the timber rights from his land, and other land owners followed his example. The politicians, with their uniformed police escort, left the village in disgust on the next day. Their belief that the big man would use the occasion to oppose and shame me had proved false.

I do not think that I could sit and watch the march of multi-national corporations to exploit Binandere resources anymore than I could watch the pigs uproot my garden. Nor could I sit aside and observe only the mounting of the village opposition against the authorities who regard them as naive, irrational or even label them as cargo cultists. In this situation I have to declare where I stand.

To be a participant/observer is a contradiction. There is a tendency among scholars to sit on the fence and merely observe the events as they go by. But to participate is to have some responsibility for causing change.
As for me, I cannot and would not be an observer in the Western sense. I must take part in changing things. This is why describing myself as an actor and the custodian must be part of my description of the events. I can only take heart from the view that true knowledge comes only with praxis.

Binandere values stem from the community's interactions with the zones of the immediate physical environment; their beliefs and customs are closely interwoven with the various classifications. The hunter is always conscious of his relations with the material and the non-material. He assumes that his prey is equally capable of making allies and enemies in the environment. To be successful the hunter must constantly ensure that he has met all his obligations so that at the moment when he most needs aid, when he launches his spear, he has a maximum of support and a minimum of opposition. In a world where nothing is attributed to chance the pressure on the hunter to resolve all disputes and look to every detail of his behaviour are great. As one brought up within the Binandere community and then trained in the techniques of Western social sciences, I am at the same time a participant and an observer; a custodian of tradition for the Binandere and an interpreter of Binandere ways to outsiders; and I accept my responsibility to play a part in changing Binandere life.

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NOTES

1 I prefer to use 'Goilala mountains' in recognition of those peoples' occupation of the ranges rather than 'Owen Stanley' as on official maps.

2 I entered the University of Papua New Guinea to do a Preliminary Year, a bridging course between university and school. I enrolled for a BA in 1968 and obtained the degree in the middle of 1971. Then I enrolled for BA with honours and completed it by mid-1972.

3 I completed my MA between September 1972 and September 1973, and returned to Papua New Guinea in December of that year.

Daniel Boruda of Tabora village, who saw the practice of cannibalism, died in 1964. He used to tell me a lot of traditions when I was a boy. It was his death that made me conscious of the loss of valuable traditions. During the Christmas vacations I started writing down the oral traditions from other old people in the village. Later I used tape recorders.

For example, in July 1980, a magistrate of the Provincial Court at Popondetta handed down a decision on a land dispute between Kanevidari and Doepo clans of Yundari and Datama villages, and Buekane clan of Kurereda village, all on the upper Mamba River. The decision favoured Kanevidari and Doepo. I was asked to provide some information for the appeal case to be prepared.

For full accounts of the village political struggle against authorities, and the opposition which I represented at the conference tables, see Waiko, J.D., 'The People of Papua New Guinea, Their Forest and Their Aspirations', in Winslow, J., ed., The Melanesian Environment, 1977, Canberra: Australian National University Press.

I took up my scholarship at the Australian National University in May 1977. I returned to Papua New Guinea in March 1978 on field work. I had planted the garden because a big flood had destroyed most gardens in the previous year. I had to make a garden for food and at the same time started my field work. I could have reported the matter to the government officer at Ioma Patrol Post and demanded compensation from the 'big man'. I have estimated that he would have paid about K100.00 based on the number of taro, bananas, tapioca and other vegetables destroyed in the garden. Despite my parents' pressure to claim the compensation, I decided not to pursue the matter as the 'big man' did not have that amount of money. He would have gone to gaol and I did not want that either.

Dr Louise Morahta has alleged that I distort Binandere views to suit my ideological ends. I responded that I write about the Binandere as a Binandere and that she failed to appreciate the political position of the village people. See her 'Indigenous Anthropology in Papua New Guinea' along with my comments in Current Anthropology, 20(3), 1979.
MISSIONARIES IN MELANESIA BEFORE THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Diane Langmore

The European missionaries who came to Melanesia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries carried with them a system of beliefs, values, attitudes, opinions and assumptions which were as much part of their baggage as the solar topees, quinine and mosquito netting packed in their trunks. Although, like all human beings, their behaviour was at times impulsive, irrational or perverse, much of their activity in the field was a translation into action of these particular thought-forms. To understand mission activity, or more generally, culture contact, in Melanesia, therefore, it is as necessary to understand the conceptual world of the European participants as of the Melanesian. It has been the lament of at least two distinguished anthropologists that so far, the belief and value systems of the European missionaries have received scant attention (Beidelman 1974; Burridge 1973:207).

The purpose of this paper is not to describe or evaluate mission activity in Melanesia but to look at some of the beliefs and values which informed it. Although it refers mainly to missionaries in Papua (or British New Guinea as it was previously), they can to some extent be seen as representative of missionaries throughout Melanesia, for all belonged to the same or similar organizations. The London Missionary Society (L.M.S.) which began work in New Guinea in 1871 had its main Pacific sphere of activity in Polynesia, but also had missionaries in the Loyalty Islands until 1922. It handed over its other Melanesian field, the New Hebrides to the Presbyterians in the 1840's, but much the same style and outlook were maintained. The Missionaries of the Sacred Heart (M.S.C.), a French Catholic congregation which arrived in British New Guinea in 1855, also worked in German New Guinea as well as in Micronesia. In structure and orientation it was similar to the Society of Mary at work in the Solomon Islands, the New Hebrides and Fiji. The Methodists who worked in British New Guinea from 1891 were employed by the Australasian Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society, which also staffed the Methodist missions of Fiji, German New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. The South Seas Evangelical Mission, a nondenominational mission also at work in the Solomon Islands, had no counterpart in Papua, but its missionaries were not far removed from those of the evangelical wings of the Protestant missions. The Anglican mission in New Guinea, sole Pacific field of the Australian Board of Missions was, in its High Anglican orientation as in other respects, similar to its neighbour, the Melanesian Mission. The four missions in Papua covered the broad theological spectrum – Roman Catholic, Anglo-Catholic, liberal Protestant and evangelical Protestant – of mission
activity in that period. From 1914, the incursion of a proliferation of sect-type missions complicated the scene.

THEOLOGICAL BELIEFS

Despite the vast range of social, economic and psychological motivations which influenced the decision of individuals to become missionaries, there was one belief which lay behind all mission activity in Melanesia as elsewhere. This was a belief in the necessity for obedience to the divine commission: 'Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature'. Mostly raised in deeply religious families, Protestants and Catholics alike felt it was a matter of 'plain duty' to obey. Many believed this general command to have been translated, for them, into a personal call from God. An Anglican woman missionary, who subsequently died in the missionfield, explained to her bishop 'My Lord, I came out to New Guinea in answer to a command from God which I dared not disobey' (Newton n.d.).

For some missionaries, Roman Catholics especially, an additional incentive to mission activity was provided by their aspiration for personal sanctification, which, according to contemporary Catholic belief, was to be achieved through suffering and sacrifice, the ultimate manifestation of which was martyrdom. 'The only true missionaries', wrote Bishop Verjus, spiritual leader of the M.S.C., 'are those who aspire to missions for one sole reason - to suffer and sacrifice themselves totally for the salvation of souls' (Vernard 1966:28). Sacred Heart missionaries 'begged of God the grace to die for Him in the missions' (Ceresi 1934:186) and many did. Some Protestants were totally unsympathetic towards this orientation to the missionary vocation. 'By a course of privation and hardship, they are all engaged in saving their own souls', wrote one (Crosfield 1897). Nevertheless echoes of this same preoccupation are also apparent in the Wesleyan quest for 'entire sanctification' and amongst evangelical Protestants influenced by the 'holiness movement' of the late nineteenth century, which saw suffering both as a proof of spiritual vitality and as a source of spiritual growth. One such Protestant, informing his brother of his application to the L.M.S., wrote: 'I cannot describe to you exactly what prompted me to do this. It may only be possibly to try my faith and lead me to further consecration' (Tomkins 1895).

Throughout most of the nineteenth century, all missionaries, Catholic and Protestant alike, believed that their task was to save the 'perishing heathen' from eternal punishment and give him the assurance of everlasting life. But towards the end of the century, amongst non-Roman Catholics, their belief came under attack and was finally abandoned. John Wear Burton, going to the Methodist mission field of Fiji in 1903, gave his interpretation of his task to an audience on the eve of his departure. It was not, he told them, the belief that the heathen was destined to hell that impelled him to go, but the 'unhappy condition of people deprived of the joy of the Gospel'. His statement provoked a violent response from one of his audience, the venerable Presbyterian missionary, John G. Paton:
'Young man', he almost roared, 'do you think I would have risked my life among the savages and cannibals of the New Hebrides if I had not believed that every man, woman and child I met was going to hell?' (Burton 1949: 12).

Knowledge afforded by the evangelisation of distant lands led to an uncomfortable awareness of the immense numbers condemned to eternal torment by the current Protestant theory of the everlasting punishment of the wicked. It was challenged in 1853 by P.D. Maurice in his Theological Essays and more fully in 1877 by Samuel Cox in a series of essays published as Salvator Mundi. Their doctrine of universalism or the 'larger hope' which inspired Tennyson's influential 'In Memoriam', was taken up in the theological debate which gathered momentum in the seventies and eighties. An alternative theory was advanced by a Congregational theologian, Edward White, who, while also attacking the grounding of mission activity in the belief in hell, felt that universalism reduced the urgency of the missionary imperative. His doctrine of 'conditional immortality' hypothesised that God created mankind mortal but with a capacity for immortality, achieved through Christ. For those without faith, mortal life was followed not by eternal torment but by annihilation.

These challenges to traditional doctrine were reflected in the stated beliefs of missionaries in New Guinea. The last L.M.S. missionary to New Guinea to express the traditional doctrine was Albert Pearse who, in 1866, had written that his heart 'burned to save the perishing heathen' (Pearse 1966). In his exposition of conditionalism, Life in Christ, published in 1875, Edward White claimed that the doctrine of everlasting punishment was doubted amongst L.M.S. missionaries and in 1882, one of their number, T.E. Slater, declared that it had been abandoned. It appears to have survived longer amongst Methodist missionaries, whose theology was generally more conservative than that of their L.M.S. counterparts. They continued to preach a confident hell-fire theology till the closing years of the century, though by the early years of the twentieth century, missionaries such as Matthew Ker Gilmour, possessed of a more enlightened and humanitarian theology, probably shared the convictions of their colleague, J.W. Burton. Amongst Anglican missionaries, the doctrine of everlasting punishment was also abandoned. 'It was no grim feeling such as had moved our forefathers that the heathen would be damned if they were not converted that inspired [us] to spread abroad the religion of Jesus Christ', asserted one (Occasional Paper, 51:4). Only the Roman Catholic missionaries retained unchallenged the doctrine of the salvation of souls as the proclaimed raison d'être of their apostolate.

Despite the demise of the doctrine of the perishing heathen amongst Anglican and Protestant missionaries, conversion remained for them, as for their Roman Catholic counterparts, the pivot of missionary endeavour. All believed their prime task to be to bring 'the heathen' to a knowledge and acceptance of the Christian faith. Much mission activity, including teaching and healing as well as their specifically religious tasks, was directed towards this goal. Believers in the 'convicting power' of the Holy Spirit, they saw themselves as its 'co-workers' in the conversion process. For many, this belief was a source of disillusionment when 'the
heathen' remained disbelieving of, or, more commonly, indifferent to, their presentation of the gospel.

Although all agreed on the primacy of the task of conversion, conceptions of it differed. While for all it implied a confession of faith following a period of instruction, the Tridentine doctrine, *extra ecclesiam nulla salus*, meant that for Catholic missionaries conversion was essentially incorporation into the visible church through the sacrament of baptism. Protestant missionaries had a more individualistic concept of conversion. It was the establishment of a personal relationship between an individual and God, through faith in Jesus Christ. These fundamentally different conceptions underlay contrasting attitudes to mass and individual conversions, varying modes of instruction and differing expectations of converts.

Changes in contemporary theology, from the wrath of God to the fatherhood of God, from atonement to incarnation, from transcendence to immanence and hence to a more socially-oriented gospel, meant that, towards the end of the century, Protestant and Anglican missionaries came to place conversion in a broader context. Concern for the after-life of 'the heathen' was largely replaced by a concern to ameliorate the conditions of his life in this world. Interest in his soul gave way to an interest in the whole man, body, mind and spirit. Teaching and healing were undertaken for the benefits that they might bring, rather than simply as instruments of conversion. In the rhetoric of the Protestant missionaries of the late nineteenth century, their role was seen as to 'raise' or 'uplift' rather than 'convert' or 'save'. Sacred Heart missionaries, despite their adherence to traditional doctrines of salvation, also allowed themselves an uplifting role. Only the Anglican missionaries, while sharing the broader conception of the missionary task, resisted the rhetoric of 'uplift', their resistance symptomatic of a fundamentally different perception of native cultures and their own relationship to them.

**CULTURAL BELIEFS**

The conviction of the missionaries that their task was to 'raise' the Papuan was related to and reinforced by their perceptions of Papuan cultures. Protestant and Roman Catholic missionaries alike believed themselves to be confronted with inferior peoples and cultures in New Guinea. William Lawes, first European missionary on the mainland, likening the vices of civilization to 'weeds in a cultivated garden', contrasted them with the vice of heathenism which, he said, was 'one wilderness of little but weeds'. New Guinea was a land of 'moral degradation and spiritual darkness', he told L.M.S. supporters in England (King 1909: 136, 150). The verdict of Archbishop Navarre, M.S.C., was similar: 'Our kanakas are like wasteland which has never been cultivated - all weeds grow there...' (Navarre 1889:455). In the Methodist missionfield, William Bromilow, settling at Dobu, saw only 'sullen savages, brutal cannibals and merciless women' (Bromilow 1908:7), while his colleague Samuel Fellows, found, at Kiriwina, a 'dark and degraded people' (Fellows 1897:xxiii). Allowing for the evangelistic intent of some of these statements, those of the Protestants at least can be seen as a reflection of the 'ignoble savage' stereotype, promulgated by evangelical literature since the end of
the eighteenth century in reaction against the 'noble savage' of the enlightenment.

While such judgements abound in the writings of Protestant and Roman Catholic missionaries, they fall less readily from the pens of the Anglicans, for whom the 'ignoble savage' was less a part of their thoughts and experience. Their impressions of Papuan culture were generally warm and appreciative and unclouded by the metaphors of darkness and degradation in which Protestant responses were soaked. Albert Macaren, arriving among the Massim in 1891, found them a 'very social, kind-hearted, contented lot of folk, and very affectionate' (Macaren 1891:95). Bishop Gerald Sharp wrote even more appreciatively of the 'great attractiveness of the Papuan people':

Affectionate, confiding, sunny tempered, polite in manner, attentive to one's works, very graceful and winning in their manners, most distinctly good-looking, with a wealth of intelligence...they are people for whom one can easily conceive a very strong personal affection (Sharp 1910:169).

Missionaries of all persuasions found their preconceptions modified by experience. For some, close acquaintance with Papuan cultures reinforced their opinions. William Bromilow, for nearly two decades the guiding spirit of the Methodist mission, wrote of the people of Dobu: 'As we learn their manners and customs and get an insight into their village life...we are brought face to face with the terrible sin prevailing in the heart' (Bromilow 1897:lxvi). All his years as a missionary served only to convince him of the 'essential vileness' of this 'ignorant and barbarous race' (Bromilow 1929:98; 1914:543). More commonly though, increased contact led to growing understanding and appreciation. Even the pioneer missionaries of the L.M.S., who had only their own observations to mould their impressions, made thorough and not wholly unsympathetic assessments of the cultures of the Motu and their coastal neighbours. Lawes, visiting the village of Kerapunu, found a new 'respect for the stone period', extolling its technology, its social organization and its 'cleanliness, order and industry' (Lawes 1876:37). In 1878 his colleague W.Y. Turner read a paper to the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain, on the ethnology of the Motu, the first such study of mainland Papua (Turner 1878). Although some of his observations perpetuated stereotyped beliefs about the 'native', many were careful and objective. He believed the Motu to be moral, affectionate to their children and peaceable, but conservative, deceitful and dirty in their habits. His colleagues Lawes and Chalmers followed his lead in writing ethnographical papers, as did pioneers of the other missions, amongst them Frs. Jullien and Guis, M.S.C., Methodist missionaries, J.T. Field and Samuel Fellows and the Anglican bishop, Stone-Wigg.

The new science of anthropology was crucial in helping the missionaries to shake themselves free of their initial cultural assumptions and in giving them a conceptual framework for their observations. Although none of the missionaries of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century had much exposure to anthropological theory during their training, some found, when in the field, that intellectual curiosity or contact with practising anthropologists guided them towards it.
For a small minority this led to close involvement with the discipline. One such was L.M.S. missionary J.H. Holmes. A poorly educated Devonshire house-painter, Holmes arrived in New Guinea with the same prejudices as most of his colleagues. He found the nakedness of the Gulf men 'repulsive', the Maipua *dubu* (sacred house) 'too horrid to describe' and the New Guinean generally avaricious and insensitive (Holmes 1893, 1894, 1897). In 1898 the anthropologist, Seligman, visited Holmes' station at Moru and towards the end of the year Holmes started reading Tylor's *Anthropology*. From that time on, a change is apparent in his writings. His diary for January 1899 records his reactions to a cannibal raid which he witnessed at Maipua, where 'the whole night was given up to debauchery and revellings of the most immoral and base kind'. Juxtaposed with this judgement, however, are scholarly and dispassionate notes describing the feast and the associated sexual ceremonies. His subsequent writings, which culminated in his large study, *In Primitive New Guinea* (1924), are marked by an attempt to see the Gulf peoples on their own terms. In his preface to his book he wrote: 'Their views of life do not lack a philosophy which was intelligible to them. I do not endorse them, neither do I condemn them. I have set them down as I got to know them'.

In a more diffuse way, anthropological thought influenced all but the most rigid and inflexible missionaries after the turn of the century. Wholesale condemnation of practices such as infanticide and polygamy gave way to attempts to explain them. Missionaries stressed the need for understanding and at the annual conferences of the various missions, members read papers and discussed aspects of traditional cultures. The terms used to describe the people softened. Throughout the first decade of the twentieth century there were decreasing references to 'savages' and 'degradation'.

The influence of anthropology on missionary thought is best illustrated by the evolution of attitudes towards Papuan religion. 'Religiously all is a blank', declared W.G. Lawes after five years' residence in New Guinea (King 1909:138). Pioneer missionaries of the Methodist and the Sacred Heart missions endorsed this opinion, as did his own colleagues. They saw only a 'slavish fear of evil spirits' and a 'deep and terrifying belief in magic' (Bromilow 1914:594). The Papuan had no 'religious enthusiasm', no 'devotional instinct', no 'notion of prayer' and no 'true penitence'.

The Anglican missionaries seem to have been more agnostic about the lack of Papuan spirituality from the outset; their writings avoid the confident assertions made by their colleagues. The first sustained appreciation of Papuan religion was made by Bishop Stone-Wigg, in an essay entitled 'The Papuans, a People of the South Pacific', published in 1907. In his essay, Stone-Wigg defined and analysed that 'religious instinct' among the Papuans, the lack of which had been asserted by many of his counterparts. Addressing himself to the question: 'How far can traces be discovered of anything that may be called a religion?', Stone-Wigg answered that 'the Papuan lives in daily and hourly realisation of an immaterial world in which he believes intensely'. He saw the whole of Papuan life as regulated by totemism. With a wealth of illustrative detail, he analysed the features of Papuan belief and observance, concluding that they embraced 'all the elements of a religious system', an openness to the supernatural,
the use of propitiation, incantation and sacrifice, and a belief in the immortality of the soul. While Stone-Wigg's perceptiveness depended in part on his own learned and flexible mind, it was also stimulated by an acquaintance with anthropology. In 1902 his sympathetic observations had combined with the theoretical understanding of A.C. Haddon to produce a joint lecture at Cambridge on the similarities of Papuan religion and Christianity.

The writings of two anthropologists especially were important in opening the shuttered minds of the missionaries to the presence of the spiritual in Papuan culture. They were E.B. Tylor and Sir James Frazer. Although Tylor's *Primitive Culture* was published in 1871 there is no evidence of missionaries in New Guinea reading it until the late nineties, and it was Frazer's more popular work, *The Golden Bough*, published in 1890, which was frequently the missionary's introduction to the concepts of 'primitive' religion. Missionaries who came to Papua in the early twentieth century often came with a knowledge of Tylor's axiom that all people had a religion, an insight of which the pioneers had not been aware. They looked at Papuan culture guided by Tylor's comprehensive definition of religion as 'the belief in spiritual things' or by Frazer's alternative definition: 'A propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man, which are believed to direct and control the course of nature and of human life'. It is not surprising that they found evidence of religion that their forebears failed to see. Ben Butcher, arriving in 1904, could assert, albeit with hindsight, that he never felt himself to be among 'an irreligious people' (Butcher 1963:121). Older missionaries, originally dismissive of Papuan religion, revised their opinions. Holmes, for example, used animism, Tylor's minimum definition of religion, to organize his thoughts about the religion of the Papuan Delta, which he compared with the totemism of the Elema (Holmes n.d. a:12).

Paradoxically, though, as anthropology encouraged in the missionaries a greater flexibility towards aspects of Papuan cultures, it also stimulated a greater rigidity in their overall assessments of them. As the doctrines of cultural evolutionism gained popular currency in the early years of the twentieth century, the missionaries' vague metaphors of darkness and degradation gave way to confident pseudo-scientific statements. 'Poor New Guinea, it is awfully low in the scale of mankind', wrote L.M.S. missionary Will Saville in 1902 (Saville 1902). Archbishop de Boismenu told an Australasian Catholic Congress in 1904 that the Papuan was 'near to the lowest type', while one of his colleagues found him 'incontestably at the lowest level of humanity' (de Boismenu 1905:270; Casper 1911:610). Most believed him to be 'below' the African negro, the American Indian and the Polynesian; some held him to be 'above' the Australian Aboriginal. As they became familiar with the various peoples of Papua, some of the missionaries were tempted to arrange them on the scale. J.H. Holmes found the people of Maiva 'higher' than those further west; Percy Schlencker believed the 'awful drop' occurred at Orokolo. In both cases they reflected a belief widespread amongst missionaries and consistent with popular opinion, that the 'black' Papuans of the west were inferior to their light-skinned neighbours in the east. The only known dissenter from the hierarchical model was the Anglican bishop, Stone-Wigg, who, in a letter to the Lieutenant-Governor, castigated government officers
for regarding the Papuan as an 'inferior type of humanity' (Stone-Wigg 1901:169).

At one with most of their contemporaries in the belief that the Papuans were a degraded people 'low in the scale of humanity', the missionaries were at odds with many of them in their conviction that they could be 'raised' from this lowly position. Their belief was based upon the Christian doctrine of the spiritual unity and equality of all humankind, a source of optimism which was not necessarily available to non-believers. In cultural terms, this was translated into a firm adherence to the doctrine of monogenism which asserted the unity of the human race as descendants of Adam. Despite an almost universal acceptance of the alternate theory of polygenism by the end of the nineteenth century, their respect for the scriptures ensured their adherence to the Adamite interpretation. Believers then in the unity of mankind, they were therefore believers in the modifiability of human nature. Racial differences were seen not as innate - a logical corollary of the polygenist position - but as the result of an evolutionary process involving constant interaction with the environment (Harris 1968:83).

These assumptions are reflected in the comments of even the earliest missionaries to New Guinea. The term almost universally used to describe the condition of the Papuan was 'degradation'. This term implies a decline from a higher to a lower state rather than an innate lowness or inferiority. Moreover the missionaries generally described the Papuans as having been exposed 'for generations' to the corrupting influence of a heathen environment. This qualification again suggests that they did not see their condition as permanent and immutable. Heathenism was seen as an environmental influence, like a disease, to which the people had succumbed and from which they could be retrieved. Holmes stated explicitly in his preface to *In Primitive New Guinea*: 'The savage is soul-sick, and we cannot help him satisfactorily till we can diagnose his disease of heathenism'.

The conception of a fall from a higher state may have been loosely related to the biblical doctrine of the Fall, but it seems to have been more directly influenced by theories of degeneracy which, current since the eighteenth century, were given new significance as a concomitant of cultural evolutionism. According to such theories, the unilinear progress of certain groups was arrested at particular points by hostile or difficult environmental factors, often encountered through migration. Under pressure from these influences, the people slipped backwards while other races continued along the path of progress. Although only implicit in most missionary writings, theories of degeneracy were explicitly stated by a few. Samuel MacFarlane believed that the Papuans had 'fallen from a higher civilisation', that their progress was 'downwards' and that they were merely 'remnants of a worn-out race' (MacFarlane 1888:96, 98). William Bromilow saw the dignified dancing of the Dobuans as 'a vestige, probably, of better days' (Bromilow 1929:114). Fr. Jullien, M.S.C., glimpsed in the death rites of the Roro and Mekeo 'vestiges of a higher civilisation, of a primitive religion, of which these poor people, across numbers of migrations, have preserved the practice while forgetting the meaning' (Jullien 1898). Fr. Hartzer wondered if they were the lost tribe of Israel.
The doctrine of cultural evolution was attractive to the missionaries because it gave a conceptual framework to their belief in the unity of mankind and a 'scientific' imprimatur to their attempt to 'raise' the Papuan. It gave coherence to another of their assumptions: that they had the right and the ability to 'raise' the Papuan. Like most of their contemporaries, many missionaries believed in a triangular hierarchy of races with, in H.A.C. Cairns words, 'the white race, western civilisation and Christianity' at the apex, then the 'complex but stagnant' cultures of the east and a broad base of the 'non-literate, technologically backward cultures' of Africa, America and the Pacific (Cairns 1965:74). It was with unshaken complacency as to their position at the pinnacle of the racial hierarchy, that many European missionaries reached out to give the Papuan, whom some saw as a 'contemporary ancestor', a 'guiding hand' along the evolutionary path. Seen from the 'giddy heights of modern civilisation', the Papuan may seem 'a sorry type of manhood', wrote Holmes. 'He is nevertheless a man following the trail the rest of mankind has trod' (Holmes n.d. b:6).

SOCIAL BELIEFS AND VALUES

The national and social backgrounds of the missionaries were diverse. The L.M.S. missionaries in Papua during this period were almost all British, and lower middle class or artisan in origin. The Methodist missionaries came from comparable strata of society but, although a quarter were of British origin, most grew up in the colonial societies of south-eastern Australia or New Zealand. Where the L.M.S. missionaries were almost entirely urban, mostly from the provincial towns in which nonconformity was strong, the Methodists were more often from rural backgrounds. If the shop and counting house were the main recruiting ground for the L.M.S., that of the Methodists was the farm. The composition of these two missions was notably different from that of the Sacred Heart Mission which drew most of its missionaries from continental Europe. Among the Roman Catholic priests were a few whose family were aristocrats or notables in French society, but the majority were the sons of peasants or artisans for whom a career in the church was a recognized avenue of social mobility. The Sacred Heart brothers were artisans from Holland or Belgium, or French or Italian peasants. The sisterhood of the mission embraced daughters both of affluent middle-class families and of peasant families, mostly from Brittany. The majority of Anglican missionaries were recruited from the capital cities of eastern Australia, though one-third were British-born. Many of the priests and a number of the women missionaries were from upper middle-class, often professional families, while most of the laymen, some of the women and a few priests, ordained during their missionary service, had origins similar to those of their Protestant counterparts.

Missionaries differed in their understanding of what it meant to 'raise' the Papuan. All were committed to some degree of change - a metanoia - in the lives as well as in the hearts of their converts (Burridge 1975:10). All assumed the need to introduce education and medicine; all agreed to oppose such practices as cannibalism, head-hunting, malign sorcery and infanticide - objectives in which they supported and were supported by government policy. Although each of the
four missions proclaimed the intention of retaining all native customs compatible with Christianity, the decision as to what was or was not compatible was a unilateral one. In their choice of what to oppose, what to retain and what to introduce, the missionaries most clearly revealed the beliefs and underlying values which were a product of their own social origins.

Earlier in the century, missionaries had debated whether they should first civilize or Christianize. Samuel Marsden in the Pacific and the Moravian missionaries in Greenland had chosen the former. By the 1870's Protestant missionaries were inclined to assume that civilization without Christianity was meaningless; that 'a savage in a shirt is no better than one without' (King 1909:139). This axiom reflects what the missionaries meant by civilization. It was associated in their minds with the externals of western culture, especially the adoption of clothing. Most Protestant missionaries, although sceptical about attempts to civilize before converting, still saw the two as inextricably intertwined. Their goal, as one of them explained, was the 'Christian civilization of the Papuan people' (Beharell 1915). Only a small minority expressed any doubts as to the necessity of their civilizing role.

In their efforts to 'civilize' the Papuans, the Protestant missionaries showed a concern for the minutiae of behaviour which was not so common among their Anglican and Sacred Heart counterparts. While all but a few of the older Protestant missionaries were free of the inhibitions about traditional dress, or the lack of it, associated with their predecessors in the Pacific, they interfered with numerous other aspects of Papuan cultures. Bishop Stone-Wigg, visiting the Methodist head-station of Dobu in 1901, noted the 'very persistent opposition given by the Mission to many native ways' (Stone-Wigg 1901:161). These included the chewing of tobacco, the marking of the face with black gum, use of impure language, the observation of traditional funeral rites, and the beating of the drum on Saturday nights. Strict Sabbath observance was imposed. That other great hallmark of late Victorian Methodism, teetotalism, was less prominent, because of effective government enforcement of the regulations prohibiting alcohol to Papuans. In the L.M.S. which, consistent with its congregational tradition, was less unified than the Methodist mission, there was greater diversity of practice. While some of the staff earned the respect of anthropologists for their tolerance and restraint, others adopted prohibitions comparable to those of the Methodist mission. The bitter campaign waged by W.G. Lawes and some of his colleagues against the traditional Motu dance, the mavaru, was the most notable example (Lawes 1898).

In the early years of the twentieth century there was growing recognition amongst Protestant missionaries, as amongst their secular contemporaries, that changes induced and prohibitions imposed by mission and government had led to apathy and a loss of direction in village life. This conviction meshed with a fashionable neo-Darwinian pessimism about the survival of the 'backward races' to stimulate them to seek substitutes for the activities which they had banished.
Their answer was the 'gospel of work'. They would teach the Papuans the 'dignity of labour' and thus provide them with a corrective to apathy, skills with which to compete in a secular world and training in the 'necessary habits of thrift and industry'. Earnest self-improvers themselves, imbued with the Samuel Smiles philosophy of self-help, they would enable the Papuans to help themselves to a future other than that of hewers of wood and drawers of water. Amongst Protestant missionaries of the early twentieth century, in Melanesia as elsewhere, these objectives were frequently translated into a policy of 'industrial mission' through which local peoples, generally gathered into settlements away from the 'contaminating' influences of the village, were taught carpentry, boat-building and other manual skills.

The Sacred Heart Mission adopted, in theory, a position close to that of the Protestants. Archbishop Navarre stated for the benefit of the government that their object in coming was to 'civilize' as well as 'convert' (Navarre 1887). But in practice, for the Sacred Heart missionaries, civilizing seems to have been seen as a concomitant of conversion rather than as an intrinsic part of a two-pronged objective. Unlike many Protestant missionaries, they encouraged traditional dancing until 1908, when a review of mission policy suggested that it was interfering too severely with church attendance. Their attitude towards other aspects of traditional cultures was tolerant and pragmatic. Early denunciations of sorcery gave way to attempts at understanding and some accommodation, and in Mekeo, opposition to mortuary ceremonies was withdrawn when church attendances plummeted (Hau'ofa 1975:17). Although industrial education was a dimension of the activity of the Sacred Heart Mission, it generally took place within the routine of village life, the brothers, artisans themselves, imparting their skills to the people amongst whom they lived.

The link between Christianity and civilization was most firmly repudiated by the Anglican missionaries. Bishop Stone-Wigg drew on the tradition, exemplified by Bishop Tozer and his successors in the Universities Mission to Central African and also endorsed by the Melanesian Mission, of divorcing Christianity from its western context and integrating it with village life. Less convinced of the superiority of the European or the degradation of the Papuan, the Anglicans in New Guinea did not want 'a parody of European or Australian civilisation' (Newton 1914:251-2). Aware of the limits to their understanding and knowledge of Papuan cultures, they remained 'conservative in dealing with native customs' except those universally condemned. They debated what attitude to adopt towards death feasts until 1929, when they decided they should be opposed. Dancing was encouraged and they looked at the possibility of synthesizing initiation ceremonies, usually opposed by their Protestant counterparts, with their own ceremony of confirmation. In 1900 Bishop Stone-Wigg, inspired by his Protestant neighbours, introduced industrial work into the mission, but it was never carried out with sufficient vigour to interrupt the even tenor of traditional life, and during the episcopacy of his successor, it was abandoned.
Implicit in such different perceptions of how the Papuan was to be 'raised' were a range of social beliefs and assumptions. Mostly middle class or artisan in origin, the Protestant missionaries reflected, in Papua as they had elsewhere, the values of that section of society, in their greater preoccupation with dress, decent language and sabbatarianism, and in their condemnation of secular pleasures such as dancing and feasting. Men and women, generally, of limited education and narrow cultural experience, they assumed moral and spiritual renewal to be associated with particular cultural forms. They attacked customs which, while perhaps an affront to lower middle class respectability, were scarcely imical to Christianity, replacing them with the mores of their own society and its values of improvement, industry, sobriety and decency. In contrast, the leaders of the Anglican mission, mostly well-educated members of the upper middle class, exhibited on most issues a greater broad-mindedness, flexibility and tolerance which was probably derived in part from their scholarly education. Their more muted enthusiasm for industrial mission may well have been a product of a less intimate association with the world of business and trade than that of their Protestant colleagues. Similarly, the leaders of the Sacred Heart Mission, though in some cases of more modest origins, had shared with the Anglicans the experience of an academic education with its benefits of objectivity and perspective. Their greater tolerance towards traditional culture may also be partly explained, as Burridge has suggested, by their origins in southern and Mediterranean Europe where 'diverse cultural forms and moralities exist in some profusion' rather than in the monocultural countries of northern Europe (Burridge 1973:205).

It is artificial and misleading however to separate the social attitudes of the missionaries from their other beliefs and values, with which they were in constant interplay. As in all aspects of the missionary's conception of his role, theological beliefs were crucial. Greater acceptance of traditional cultures on the part of Catholic missionaries was closely tied to their Natural Theology which held that while sin had brought about a certain perversion of human nature, by his surviving powers of reason, man could comprehend God through the reality of creation. A partial manifestation of God could be sought and found in all cultures, and thus a greater measure of accommodation and assimilation allowed. By contrast, Protestant missionaries influenced by the Reformation doctrine of total corruption, which rejected the competence of fallen human reason to engage in Natural Theology, saw a greater need for a total break with heathenism.

Differing conceptions of the Church also influenced the relationship of the missionary to the Papuan and his culture. For both Roman Catholics and Anglo-Catholics, the Church was a universal, divinely-ordained institution which, for centuries, had embraced all manner of people. Its preservation insofar as it rested on human endeavour at all, depended upon the fidelity of its clergy, not upon its members. From the convert was expected assent to a formal theology and a faithful observation of the sacraments. The evangelical Protestant's understanding was totally different. For him the Church was not an institution which derived its strength from divine ordination and historical continuity. It was the body of believers. With a lower view of the sacraments and the ministry, and a less formal theology, the Protestant church defined itself in terms of its
members. Hence it was impelled to a much greater concern for the ethics and morality of each individual convert.

Protestant enthusiasm for industrial mission drew its inspiration in part from the influential 'social gospel', which provided both a model in the carpenter of Nazareth and an imperative in its concern for the whole man. It was reinforced, in some cases, by the cultural belief that the Papuan was too benighted to receive a purely spiritual gospel.

Missionary activity in Papua, as elsewhere, is then partly explicable in terms of the professed beliefs of the missionaries and the values, often unarticulated which lay behind them. But it would be naive to explain missionary behaviour solely in these terms. Nor do they explain the range of missionary responses to the Papuan and his culture. Some missionaries came to Papua with an affection for the Papuan, others did not. Copland King regretted that it was duty that brought him to the Anglican mission field rather than the love which inspired his leader, Albert Maclaren. Another Anglican, Arthur Chignell, at first felt revulsion at the touch of a brown skin, but later his warm-hearted, enthusiastic nature guided him to a genuine, albeit paternalistic, affection for the Papuans. Charles Abel of Kwato, in contrast, continued to feel 'nausea' in their presence throughout his long career. James Chalmers, despite his autocratic manner, was motivated by a deep affection for the people which enabled him to fling his arms around them as spontaneously as he stamped his foot at them. Such a response depended on no theoretical understanding. Chalmers was completely unlettered in anthropology, while his colleague Will Saville, for example, combined a solid theoretical understanding with a cold and remote personal style. While the missionary was unquestionably moulded by beliefs and values absorbed from his national and social origins, his religious upbringing and training, his education and the intellectual climate to which he was exposed, at the heart of his response to the Melanesian lay the mysteries of his own personality.

NOTE

1For detailed studies of missionaries in other parts of Melanesia, see Hilliard 1966 and 1978, Laracy 1976 and Thornley 1979.
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CUSTOM, CHANGE AND CONFLICT: FIJIAN
WESLEYAN MINISTERS, 1835-1945

A.W. Thornley

In the century before 1945 some 440 Fijian men were ordained and worked as Wesleyan (after 1902, Methodist) ministers in their native land. 'A decidedly fine lot of men', they were once casually described by a British civil servant (Brewster 1922:147). Christian missions have a well-worn cliche that indigenous pastors in most foreign work were the backbone of evangelical work. It was largely the truth in Fiji, simply because the handful of missionaries, who by 1875 were coping with an enterprise of over 100,000 church adherents, could scarcely fulfil the demands of an administrative role let alone of proselytisation. So they turned to their new converts as possible preachers. Who then were these Fijians who chose the ministry, or more correctly the church, as a career? What was the background of these men, their work, their achievements, their failures? How were they regarded by missionaries on the one hand and chiefs - the traditional secular leaders of Fijian society - on the other? In an area of study deficient in the detailed sources historians crave to work with (such as correspondence and journals), how much can we uncover of the ministers' collective and individual characteristics?

Wesleyan Methodist mission work began in Fiji in 1835, the same year as a mission was commenced in Samoa and thirteen years after a mission had been started in Tonga. Of these three island groups, Fiji sprawled over the largest area and the Methodists were soon afflicted with a transport and communications problem, their own 'tyranny of distance'. So it was not unusual that by the late 1840s missionaries were considering the ordination of indigenous teachers and more especially at that stage Tongans who had figured largely in the early years. The development of the mission had not been spectacular, almost to the contrary, but more ministers were needed at strategic centres to overcome the difficulty of extending mission work to even half of Fiji's 300 or so islands.

The Fijian and Tongan converts who worked for the mission had initially and modestly been described in mission reports as 'Native Helpers'. But in the early 1850s four men from within this category were elevated to the rank of 'Native Assistant Missionaries'. According to the missionary R.B. Lyth, these men, one of whom was the legendary Joeli Bulu, were rewarded with promotion because of their 'superior piety, ability, diligence and faithfulness' (Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society 1854: 127-129). As a result of these ordinations Christian rites such as communion and marriage could be extended into more isolated areas.
After 1860 church membership mushroomed and ordination figures reflected this growth (see Table 1). But even when a general decrease in population brought a corresponding decline in church membership more Fijians continued to be ordained. There were two reasons for this: firstly, the demand from local chiefs who, for reasons of status and prestige, preferred an ordained man rather than a teacher to be stationed in their village; secondly there was considerable pressure from within the church hierarchy as the burgeoning ranks of teachers and catechists sought the greater social position and improved remuneration of the ministry. After 1920 the missionaries severely reduced recruitment and the proportion of Fijian ministers to church supporters settled back to somewhere near the figure it had been at the turn of the century.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1852</th>
<th>1880</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1946</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Church Members</td>
<td>2,322</td>
<td>24,109</td>
<td>33,959</td>
<td>28,915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Communicants)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church Adherents</td>
<td>5,120</td>
<td>102,639</td>
<td>78,542</td>
<td>102,567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Those who attended services regularly)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fijian Ministers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Missionaries</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mention has been made of the strong Tongan complexion of early Methodist work, a result partly of the Methodist connection between Tonga and Fiji and partly of the general spread of Tongan influence that occurred during the reign of King George Tupou I. An important effect of this expansionism which reached its zenith in the 1850s and 1860s was that those areas in the east of Fiji — virtual Tongan colonies at this time — were the provinces that first confronted the impact of Christian missionaries and subsequently supplied many ministers. If a line is drawn from the westward tip of Kadavu, south of Viti Levu, through the south-eastern corner of Viti Levu, thence to skirt Taveuni in the north, the Fijian ministry was dominated by the island groups to the east of that line (see Table 2). That dominance was most evident in the nineteenth century and has lessened in more recent years. But the fact remains that a primary trend in the spread of Christianity is that those people from the first areas of conversion have a greater influence than their numbers might warrant over the whole island group. In a curious twist of this argument, the scholarly missionary, Lorimer Fison, jumped to the erroneous conclusion that these 'highly favoured circuits' in eastern Fiji thereby had 'a monopoly of the cleverest men' (Methodist Mission 1881). It was beliefs such as this, held widely at the end of last century, which persuaded missionaries to maintain the central theological institution in the same favoured area and hence contribute to the regional dominance within the Fijian ministry.
Table 2

Native Province of Fijian Ministers (those known)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1850-1900</th>
<th>1900-1940</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southern and eastern areas of Fiji:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bau, Kadavu, Lau, Lomaiviti, Rewa, Tailevu.</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern and western areas of Fiji:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba, Bua, Cakaudrove, Macuata, Matailobau, Nadroga, Naitasiri, Ra, Rotuma, Serua Vuda, Yasawa.</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are some interesting consequences - if somewhat peripheral to the intent of this article - of the geographical bias in the ministry. The Methodist Church has never been strong in Macuata, Bua and Cakaudrove (where Tongan intrigue was greatly resented) and in Ra, Ba, Nadroga and Navosa (where there is long-standing antagonism to the power of Tailevu and Bau). In these areas the Roman Catholics and Seventh Day Adventists have gained their largest following, although their combined totals have never exceeded more than 20 per cent of the Fijian population. Further, the Methodists have had to face the continued influence of traditionally-based and syncretic religious beliefs, both of which have flourished on the two main islands away from the areas of strongest Methodist influence.

Turning now from questions of a minister's regional origin, we must consider the more individual factors of background and motivation in the choice of a church career. Of the first generation of ministers there is insufficient data to reliably answer what is a crucial and tantalizing question - from what ranks in traditional society were ministers drawn? Were there chiefly representatives among them or did all ministers (as present day scholars usually prefer to argue) come from the lower echelons of society and bring social prestige on themselves and their families by 'graduating' into a respected church position? Both views carry some weight. Missionary records, usually rich sources of detail and statistics, are disappointingly incomplete on the background details of Fijian ministers. However they do reveal sufficient to calculate about 5 per cent of ministers coming from a titled family. A reliable secular account dating back to the late nineteenth century remarks that in one of the more prominent Methodist districts in Fiji, Bau/Tailevu, 'all the subordinate native clergy were the flower of the flock and the pick of the training institutions and were principally members of chiefly families - Fijian gentlemen in fact' (Brewster 1922:147).

By contrast there is the case of Josefa Ravuaka from the Lomaiviti island of Koro who, in the words of a missionary, had been taught elementary subjects at his village school but while on a canoe voyage to the mission centre at Levuka was said to have been impressed by the better clothing and education of 'the boys who lived with the Missionaries'. Ravuaka's intelligence and strength of character were noted by missionaries who claimed that he achieved a 'chief-like' position even though he was not
a chief by birth (Wesleyan Missionary Notices 1873:83). The desire to attain chief-like status in the eyes of the non-titled undoubtedly motivated Fijians into the ministry. In 1888 missionaries disparagingly commented on the tendency of native ministers to 'lord it' over teachers and lay preachers.

There is less of a problem in discovering the background of twentieth century Fijian ministers. In 1940 a fairly comprehensive survey of ministers was carried out. It revealed that of the fathers of 139 ministers, three were high chiefs, thirteen were minor chiefs and the remainder were non-titled village heads or commoners. Of further relevance the survey showed that one half of all the ministers' fathers occupied official positions in the church, ranging from lay preacher to minister. The remainder all came from strong church families. Many ministers would have been like Mataiasi Vave who, when talking of his intentions in the church, indicated a frequent desire to 'take the place of my father' (Chambers 1953:881). Two main conclusions can be drawn from this survey: firstly, generations other than the earliest either initiated or maintained a new tradition of family involvement in the church, if possible by aspiring to the ministry; secondly that there can be no easy solution to the question of motivation for while some ministers might see the pulpit as a road to influence and a chance to better themselves, others showed classic symptoms of an emotional struggle involving choice of career.

It has been noted that only a handful of ministers were of chiefly origin, even fewer of high chiefly rank. The decision of sons of chiefs to enter the ministry bears the most fruitful examination for these were the men with guaranteed employment opportunities in the civil service (and attractive salaries) as well as customary obligations and privileges stemming from their position in Fijian society. In addition chiefly titles gave no automatic status in the mission hierarchy and denied the use of traditional personal services. Putting aside these adverse features, several young chiefs resisted considerable pressure in their determination to gain ordination. Ratu Nacanieli Mataika, son of Ratu Josua Tubunavere and Adi Laisa Beci, inherited one of the highest chiefly titles in Lomaiviti, Tui Naira. From 1902 he spent three years at the district training institution for aspiring ministers. He then faced a crisis over a choice of career:

My heart was heavy at this time as I went about my daily tasks for within me I heard clearly the call of God to His service, but being a Chief of my people, the Government was urging me to serve my people in the capacity of an officer of the government in connection with the survey of native lands; my own home Province was also making overtures to me to return and engage in provincial work. But I resisted these offers because of the voice of God within me. (Chambers 1953:874).

Again Ratu Kolinio Saukuru was from a Kadavu chiefly family. Having led the life of a prodigal after finishing school, Kolinio became interested in the scout movement which was introduced to Fiji by a Methodist missionary. He goes on:
It was about this time that my mother told me of the wish expressed to her and my father by the Rev. C.O. Lelean namely that I should become a minister and a missionary. This caused a great deal of heaviness of heart to me, for I loved my work as a technical instructor...I presumptuously prayed that God would make me forget my mother's words, but the harder I then prayed the more persistent was the impression of her words on my mind (Chambers 1953:877).

Kolinio Saukuru worked many years as a missionary in western Melanesia. Both he and Mataika believed themselves influenced by a 'calling' though it is difficult to know how much this view was the interpretation of the missionary who recorded their testimony. Though the concept of a 'call' makes sense to Europeans, it was less important to Fijians; their most crucial decision came at a relatively young age (middle or late adolescence), when their elementary education at a mission school was complete and they chose, sometimes at the parents' bidding, to attend one of the provincial mission stations for one or two years' training as a village teacher. The students or vuli were then deemed qualified to take up preaching appointments in the villages and from that situation to begin their move up the mission hierarchy.

For the first fifty years of the mission, training played a secondary role to experience. No formal theological education commenced till 1857 and then only to a few ministers. Most gained their small amount of learning through years of residence in the mission compound where education depended entirely on the abilities and whims of the circuit missionary. From the 1860s, one missionary was set aside to take responsibility for theological training which began in Rewa in 1857 and shifted to Kadavu, Navula and finally Davuilevu. Until the early 1900s Fijian ministers required no formal educational standard. Their years in the various training institutions gave most an adequate grounding in a fairly predictable course of study: the Bible, especially Jewish history and the Prophets from the Old Testament and Pauline doctrine from the New Testament, the sermons of John Wesley and some didactic literature such as Pilgrim's Progress.

In 1905 oral examinations gave way to written to try and improve the educational level of new candidates and in 1909 the new principal, William Bennett (later to head Leigh College in Sydney), discouraged the applications of older and sometimes illiterate catechists and made two or three years' fulltime theological training a prerequisite for the ordained ministry. Some ministerial candidates after 1920 were qualified school teachers while by the 1940s theological students were familiar with Bible criticism and Old Testament documents. A pass rate of 60 per cent was mandatory for success in the annual examinations; yet in 1945 the rules were still being bent to allow the ordination of men who had passed the test of experience but could not cope with examinations.

Though somewhat limited in their theological expertise, most Fijian ministers excelled in the pulpit, to which rostrum they took the oratorical skills encountered with few exceptions throughout the Pacific Islands. Preachers by instinct rather than learning, these men moved people and
impressed the missionaries in so doing. Their diction was eloquent and poetic, their prayers powerful and emotional, their mode of address centred around analogies rather than biblical exegesis. Apparently this teaching method was of greater instructional value to the congregation. One minister of whose preaching more than a passing comment has survived, was Ratu Osea Tuni, a chief from the island of Moala in eastern Fiji, who showed he had imbibed deeply from the evangelical well of the Wesleyan missionaries. Tuni was portrayed:

with one hand, containing a cambric hankerchief, admonishingly raised and the other gracefully reposing in the fields of tapa, vigorously declaiming and apparently with much fire and eloquence from the pulpit. Of the nature of the discourse we were entirely ignorant, but the effect upon the feminine portion of the congregation was great - violent fits of hysterical weeping, wailing, as if in the very extremity of penitential woe (Britton 1870:38).

As a warning to the reader who might wish to regard Tuni as a typical minister, note parenthetically that he was expelled from the ministry in 1876 for boxing the ears of his wife. He was partially forgiven in 1881 when permitted to work as a lay preacher.

Naturally ministers' preaching commitments were only one facet of their work. How were they generally employed? Under the Wesleyan circuit system of organization, Fijian ministers were distributed amongst the thirteen circuits or parochial districts of the Fiji mission, each minister having responsibility for between fifteen and twenty-five villages. The number of ministers in each circuit varied according to its size but in 1911, a fairly typical year for stationing of ministers, the largest circuit of Ra had eighteen and the smallest circuit - the isolated island of Rotuma - had two.

Ministers were appointed by the annual meeting of the Fiji District on the recommendation of each circuit. Usually missionary opinion carried the greatest weight though local chiefs lobbied frequently and occasionally successfully for a minister of their choosing. Unwritten rules were observed in the stationing of ministers; normally they were not appointed to their home district since the missionaries believed that 'familiarity breeds contempt'. Lau was an exception to this rule since the locals had a reputation for paying scant attention to strangers. Furthermore, in deciding Fijian stations, missionaries avoided placing a man near his wife's home since the latter was tempted to frequent absences from her husband. The length of one term of service was about five years though some ministers who were well-liked stayed considerably longer.

Ministers involved themselves in the predictable and the unexpected. They conducted church services, celebrated communion, baptisms and weddings and officiated at funerals. They organized class meetings - held once a week along strict Wesleyan lines - and prayer groups, received prospective candidates for membership and examined those members who had been on the compulsory probationary period of a year. In addition ministers were required to visit all the villages under their jurisdiction once a quarter.
Ministers maintained church discipline and checked on the work of the local teacher or catechist. In more isolated areas older ministers would maintain a small training centre for boys interested in becoming a teacher or catechist.

Once every three months all ministers were required to meet with their missionary at the circuit headquarters for the Quarterly Meeting, the cornerstone of Wesleyan organization, at which the day-to-day local work of the church was reviewed and any problems dealt with. Some of the more senior ministers were called to the annual mission gathering or Synod where questions of finance and stationing were resolved. Apparently Fijian ministers were not impressed with this frequently volatile meeting of European superintendents. They nicknamed the Synod 'Gauna ni Veicudrivi' - a time of quarrelling - because there was a notable absence of Christian brotherliness at this gathering (Methodist Mission of Fiji 1928).

Along with official duties, Fijian ministers confronted a wide range of demands from missionaries. They acted as local representatives of the mission in relations between chiefs and the church, conveying messages of congratulation, condolence and occasionally criticism. Cultivating harmonious relationships with the more influential chiefs had been a constant theme in church-state affairs from the days when Ratu Seru Cakobau had championed the Wesleyan cause throughout most of Fiji. But at times it was a difficult task for it was well known that the information ministers gathered reached mission headquarters more quickly than the telegraph could send it. It was little wonder that some chiefs were lukewarm in attitude towards the agents of an institution that campaigned aggressively for loyalties over and above the local concerns of chiefs. Generally speaking however, except for a few years shortly after British annexation in 1874 when church-state relations plummeted to dangerous levels, the Methodists sought to uphold traditional leadership by supporting communal obligations ahead of church commitments and gaining in return almost unfettered access to their existing and potential converts. Chiefs were not ungenerous either in the grants of land for church sites though ownership of the soil never changed hands.

As far as the Fijian minister was concerned, he often suffered in the tangled web of church-state relations. If ministers were found unsuitable in the eyes of local chiefs they were sometimes shifted. At other times the mission refused to accede to the demands of the chiefs if their grievances against ministers lacked clear evidence. Then again the shrewd minister who did not wish to shift could manipulate chiefly opinion in his favour and thus resist consideration at the time for reappointment.

What emerges from this detail of mission organization is the tight centralized control exercised by the Methodists over every Fijian village and the role played by the minister in that process. Such was the penetration of mission influence into every village that in the first decades of colonial rule, the Methodist bureaucracy probably gained better reports on the state of Fiji than government officers could hope to gain access to. And the intelligence fed by Fijian ministers to their superiors gave missionaries useful ammunition in their attacks on a seemingly hostile colonial administration.
With the proportion of church adherents to missionaries running at almost 10,000:1 by 1900, many Fijian ministers increasingly took on positions of onerous responsibility. They performed beyond expectation. They organized the collection of large sums of money for the church coffers, either bringing the money directly to their circuit missionary which sometimes involved an open boat trip of eight to ten hours, or drafting the money through a local copra agent (such was the case in Rotuma). After thirty years of mission work in Fiji the senior missionary Arthur Small testified to the faithful honesty of ministers in this aspect of work. Apart from dealing with finance, ministers chaired church meetings, contributed hymns and translated others for the revised hymn book of 1938, made long and exhausting journeys with missionaries on their visitation and initiated campaigns for the building of local schools and churches. In many respects then, the leadership potential of ministers was recognized and utilized from an early stage, a phenomenon not all that usual in Christian missions elsewhere (Neill 1966:515). However as will be seen this enthusiasm for granting local responsibility had well-defined limits.

Having examined generally the experience of Fijian ministers, a glimpse at the career of one particular minister might illustrate the qualities that missionaries praised and the individual flair of the Fijian pastorate.

Eliesa Bula was born in the village of Somosomo on the island of Gau in 1839. A first generation convert, Bula joined the church as part of a wave of conversions that occurred in Lomaiviti after the high chief Cakobau's nominal acceptance of Christianity in 1854. Bula was baptised by Joseph Waterhouse in June 1856 and four years later he was recorded as teaching in a Gau mission school. His ability as a village teacher was quickly recognized and in 1865 he was nominated for the ministry, one of a group of younger men given rapid promotion due to the shortage of ministers. Bula was ordained in 1869. Among his appointments were Vuda, Nadroga and Taveuni but almost half his ministry was spent at Naduri in the Macuata province (1877-83, 1895-1907). A man of imposing appearance though not of high rank, Eliesa Bula earned the respect of chiefs; they utilized his reputable architectural skills in the building of council and chiefs' dwellings, and responded to Bula's diplomatic approach to problems of morality, well illustrated in an incident involving an unnamed 'great chief' whose wife had recently died:

After a short time the chief sent for a native woman and church member to live with him - there was no question of marriage. Before going to the chief's house Eliesa met her but at that stage did not prevent her from going on to the chief's house. Later on he visited the chief and advised him against retaining the woman. 'Arieta is a member of class and if she stays with you she must be expelled and you will endanger her soul. If you want her have a marriage arranged'. The chief yielded (Missionary Review 1915:14-15).
It is possible that Eliesa's good relationships with the chiefs of Macuata stemmed partly from his astute exploitation of the traditional tauvu (lit. 'joking') connection between the people of Gau island and Macuata in Vanua Levu. Such links exist between villages and provinces throughout the Fijian group and their advantages and disadvantages for ministers in a particular situation is an area of study that needs further investigation. In 1907, one year before Eliesa was due for retirement, the missionaries were obliged to re-appoint him from Naduri to Verata after his position was compromised by the alleged association of his daughter with the high chief of Macuata. Subsequently the chiefs of Macuata province petitioned unsuccessfully against Eliesa's removal.

Between 1881 and 1908 Eliesa frequently represented his fellow circuit ministers at the annual district meeting. He retired to Gau where he died in February 1915. Described by various missionaries as a man of 'undoubted piety and worth' and a 'perfect Christian gentleman', Eliesa's most laudable characteristic in their estimation was a self-effacement to the point where 'he never took liberties nor overstepped his position' (Missionary Review 1915:14). In short, Eliesa Bula displayed the qualities stressed in circuit training institutions and designed to reinforce mission organization, i.e.: reliability, diplomacy, conscientiousness, discipline and loyalty. For the Fijian who sought adventure in church work, the kind of challenges that ministers had faced briefly in the 1850s, then the place to go was westwards, to New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. People like Eliesa Bula are scarcely recalled in Fiji today; rather it is the Fijian missionaries such as Aminio Baledrokadroka and Simioni Momoivula, whose exploits abroad have been preserved in vernacular mission literature.

Of course not all Fijian ministers can be counted as success stories. There were failures within the organization, the incompetent and inefficient, the fallen and the rebellious. Forever hanging over a minister's head was the shadow of a complicated and strict disciplinary code, parts of it stemming from the European experience in Australia and England, and applicable equally to European and Fijian alike, but in addition many local rules devised by the missionaries were imposed on the Fijians. Most ministers acknowledged the need for rules, abided by them, interpreted them narrowly in judgement on their peers and were more severe than missionaries in applying the general mission code throughout the community. A high standard of conduct characterized the Fijian ministry, a product of frequent discipline as much as highly competitive selection. Ministers who invoked personal impositions on teachers, drank yaqona (the local beverage) to excess, misappropriated mission funds, or by-passed mission convention such as the calling of marriage banns in church, were all either suspended or expelled from the ministry, depending on the seriousness of the charge. However missionaries found it difficult to expel persistent minor offenders and in these cases the ministers were either superannuated for a period or simply left without any appointment, a penalty which must have resulted in considerable loss of face for the recipient.

Two of the most difficult areas of discipline were questions of morality and the influence of traditional beliefs. Missionaries tended to act high-handedly and with a minimum of visible justice when Fijian ministers were charged with a moral offence such as adultery. On this
obviously delicate matter a double standard tended to operate, one law for the missionary, one for the Fijian. Imbued with the secretive attitudes of Victorian times, missionaries would dispatch any suspected compatriot back to Australia where more often than not he was dealt with leniently. But there was no mercy shown to the Fijian offender; evidence was sometimes slight, punishment severe. The Fiji church was only reflecting the hard-line moral precepts inherited from the days of Wesley but the discrepancy in treatment of expatriate and local did not go unnoticed among the whole church community and had an immeasurable effect on the image of the church in Fiji. For the record, charges of a moral nature accounted for over 40 per cent of all disciplinary measures against ministers.

A second major transgression of the Fijian ministry was the tendency to lapse into traditional practices and beliefs, including forms of syncretic worship. A catalogue of these activities, interesting though they be, would consume too much time and space. The fact is that some ministers, whether consciously or not, found it difficult to cut themselves off from the world of custom and tradition. This statement challenges the long-held myth, first perpetuated by the influential writer, A.B. Brewster, that all of the Fijian Wesleyan ministers were 'trained to show contempt for the old superstitions' (Brewster 1922:89). Some ministers undoubtedly saw their function as breaking down irrational beliefs inconsistent with Christianity; thus Reverend Joni Ulunaceva was recorded by Brewster as confiscating stones of religious significance in inland Fiji. Again Mataiasi Vave, the revered tutor at Davullevu Theological Institute for twenty years, visited one town where the people were terrified by the old foundations of a dead wizard's house; to approach them meant certain death. 'Mataiasi showed his complete emancipation from the ancient dead by deliberately climbing onto the site' (Deane 1921:164).

Contrary to Brewster's sweeping assertion, some ordained ministers (and many more teachers and catechists) were so steeped in their environment as to make detachment from the ancestral spirit world an impossibility. Only occasionally did their involvement reach the ears of a church court. One minister, Apaijia Tuiomanikoro, was accused of acquiring medicine from a traditional priest in order to release himself from a spell. In his own words, 'the sickness which has taken me is from the land belonging to the work, and I think it is draunikau' (Methodist Mission of Fiji 1903). (Draunikau in Fiji is sorcery or priestcraft and is the secretive use of certain leaves to affect other people). Although expelled from the ministry, Tuiomanikoro was defended by at least one missionary who claimed in 1903 that 999 out of 1000 Fijians of Tuiomanikoro's generation believed in draunikau spells.

Significantly, three years later, the Synod imposed less severe discipline upon a minister who had been implicated in draunikau practices on the island of Koro in Lomaiviti. Rather than face the disapprobation of the missionary and inevitable church discipline, church workers often remained tight-lipped when instances of draunikau were known to have occurred. Thus in 1907, when such ceremonies were celebrated in parts of the Macuata province on Vanua Levu with the obvious knowledge of church officers, nothing was disclosed of the affair. As one missionary report stated; 'It is practically a case of European versus Fijian, with the
usual result. Blood is thicker than water and the natives will not declare the names of wrongdoers' (Methodist Missionary Society of Australia 1907).

Of all the rules formulated within Fiji the most sensitive and contentious related to questions of missionary authority, and by implication, to the limitation of ministerial rights and the degree of responsibility which Fijian ministers could be accorded. The concluding section of this article is concerned with the crucial matter of local autonomy.

In 1863 the missionaries allowed all ordained ministers to meet before the annual meeting and pass on any recommendations they might have to the missionaries. This meeting was gradually phased out due to the logistical problems of gathering all the ministers from throughout Fiji and accommodating them for a considerable time. In 1875 the Fijian ministry was thrust backwards with a new constitution which severely limited the representation of Fijian ministers in the Synod and also placed them in a subordinate, arguably servile, position for the next seventy years. Through this constitutional change missionaries cleverly neutralized the impact of a growing Fijian ministry and assured themselves of European domination in the Synod, for the number of ministers at Synod was limited to the number of circuits - each represented by one minister.

It is at this point that one of Fiji's most dynamic and colourful Methodist ministers rose to fleeting prominence. Few would know of him today; that is the fate of even the best Fijian ministers. Within his church during his lifetime he was controversial, a rebel with a cause, certain to fail. The extent of comment on this man by missionaries testifies that he must have been an extraordinary minister for very rarely did missionaries refer to individual Fijian ministers in their letters except it be on their retirement or death.

His name was Tomasi Naceba (pronounced Nathemba). Born at Weilangi on the island of Taveuni in 1842, Tomasi was converted at the age of seventeen and faced 'bitter persecution from heathen chiefs', a missionary reference to the sustained opposition to Christianity from the ruling families of Cakaudrove led by their high chief. Tomasi attended the district training institution on Kadavu during the 1860s, was sent to take charge of the Rewa circuit institution at Davuilevu and then, on the suggestion of missionary Lorimer Pison, returned to Kadavu as an assistant teacher at the district institute from 1869-71. The principal there, Jesse Carey, was impressed by Tomasi. To Pison he wrote, 'He is really a worthy fellow. I have known him now for twelve years and his course like a river, though not without a few windings, has ever been onward' (Mitchell Library Manuscript Collections 1870). Pison too thought highly of Tomasi and proposed him for the ministry in 1871, describing him as a candidate of 'notable diligence and unquestionable faith' (Methodist Overseas Mission 1871).

Received on probation in 1873, Tomasi worked at the Navuloa Training Institution and then in various circuits until 1892 when he returned to Navuloa as senior Fijian tutor. Of those nineteen years between 1873-92 very little is known. Thomas Williams, co-author of Fiji and the Fijians, met him on the island of Viwa in 1885 and noted Tomasi's command of English and his strong preaching. However Tomasi's most formative and crucial
years would have been between 1874-77 when he worked as a relatively young man in the same circuit as Joseph Waterhouse, missionary and fierce supporter of equal rights for Fijian ministers at the Synod. Naceba was no doubt witness to the intense and sometimes bitter wrangling between Waterhouse and his younger Superintendent, Frederick Langham, over the place and position of Fijian ministers. Clearly influenced by his association with Waterhouse, Tomasi attended the Fiji Synod as one of the twelve ministerial representatives in 1883, 1886, 1888 and 1890. At the 1886 meeting there was a long but little reported tussle between missionaries and Fijian ministers over grievances relating to salaries and general conditions. Tomasi's role in that debate is not known.

By 1890 Tomasi was expressing his discontent with the rights of Fijian ministers to his colleagues at the Synod. Frederick Langham, who was throughout his forty years in Fiji unsympathetic to such demands by Fijian ministers, has left the only account of Tomasi's opinions. His prejudices are obvious:

Apisai [Radravu] and Tomasi told us that they would vote for having an increase to their [salaries?] and the latter would like to be free to 'live by the cakacaka' - meaning to feed on ones Teacher 2 or 3 days and on another same time and so on while he was on raicakacaka [visitaton] - the teachers would have to spin round and find fowls ... and their wives would have to go out fishing etc. etc. to prepare feasts while the Rev. T. Naceba was 'doing the Lord's work'. You may depend on it there is a lot of feeling on all these subjects. I would there were as much about getting souls saved. I told [Tomasi] very plainly that I would not allow other native ministers to be anxious or ashamed through his stirring them up and that if he had anything to propose to do it frankly at Synod ... He is the cutest native minister we have ... and has more in his head than most folks in his position (Methodist Overseas Missions, Langham 1890).

In May 1892 Tomasi rebelled. He had been only five months at the Navuloa institute where, as Qase ni Vuli or the senior Fijian tutor, he occupied a position of considerable influence among the students. Mission records are silent on the rebellion; any documents that should exist have been excised from their proper place. The only account—and a sparse one—comes from the governor of Fiji at the time, Sir John Thurston who, over many years, did not have cordial relations with either Langham or almost all missionaries. According to Thurston, six young Fijians, described as 'young chiefs' were expelled from Navuloa for refusing to cut wood for the Mission steam launch. The missionaries gave the remaining students—almost 200 of them—the opportunity to submit to mission rules or leave if they were 'hurt' by the decision against their fellows; the next morning the Institution was empty. Tomasi Naceba led a delegation of aggrieved students and appealed to Thurston to intervene but the Governor replied he would only if the students returned to Navuloa. They complied and Thurston travelled to Navuloa where he heard both sides of the case and
delivered judgement, bringing about 'a perfect reconciliation' (Pacific History 1892).

Subsequent mission accounts indicated that Tomasi Naceba was at the centre of the rebellion and a most effective leader. He argued the students' case in front of Thurston clearly and with moderation. Langham wanted to expel Tomasi from the ministry immediately but his immediate superior in Australia, George Brown, counselled delay since precipitate action might bring further trouble. The missionaries were shaken by the whole affair. They believed Tomasi's part in the rebellion to be purely a callous act of insubordination. Brown unfairly placed more blame on Waterhouse. In fact for over fifteen years before his outburst, Tomasi Naceba had been campaigning, with the support of other ministers, for improvements in the position and pay of Fijian ministers. His action in 1892 was the culmination of growing frustration with missionary intrusiveness and domineering authority.

At the end of 1892, Tomasi and Apisai Radravu - his closest supporter - were expelled from the ministry. No record remains of the disciplinary committee meeting. Six years later in 1898 Tomasi was reinstated as a local preacher by a unanimous Synod decision. According to the official record he had, since expulsion, 'acknowledged his guilt and shown a spirit of contrition' (Methodist Overseas Mission 1898). In 1900 he was reinstated as a minister, eight years being taken off his standing. After serving at Navuso for four years he died of pneumonia on Christmas Day 1904 and was buried on his own request at Navuloa. There appears to be no trace of his grave at Navuloa today. After the catastrophic influenza epidemic in Fiji in 1918, most graves at Navuloa were covered up.

The spirit of reform which Tomasi Naceba espoused was slow to gather momentum and grievances continued to be expressed. In 1904 the dozen or so ministers of Ra Circuit submitted to their annual meeting an astonishingly lengthy document (fourteen pages) requesting equality between missionary and minister in the mission house - to be able to sit on the chairs, eat at the table and drink from a china cup rather than a tin mug. The missionaries dismissed the document as puerile folly and replied arrogantly with a sermon on their heavy responsibilities as white missionaries:

If we were all one and the same in social and general development and in ability to judge and rule, there would be no longer need of the white Missionary to remain here. But there is a vast difference between us, of which they seem to be unaware, and it is impossible to treat them as equals if we are to have the rule over them and watch on behalf of their souls, as those that must give account (Methodist Missionary Society of Australasia 1904).

Faced with this evidence of unrest among Fijian ministers, one is tempted to look beyond day-to-day problems such as wages and working conditions. These were urgent problems but may not be the only source of explanation. One grasps at straws such as the minister Rusiate Vunivalu's futile request for a special meeting of all ministers about 1911 to discuss the condition of Fiji in the light of the declining native population. Or
the bizarre case of the two ministerial representatives who appeared at Synod in 1916 wearing the missionary colours of black instead of the usual white reserved for Fijian ministers. Could this minor agitation be part of the overall growth of nationalist feeling in Fiji, the same current of dissatisfaction with white rule which saw the explosive emergence of Apolosi Nawai and the Viti Kabani (Fiji Company) during World War I? The conjecture is tempting and the theme of nationalism has yet to be thoroughly explored in Fiji's history.

As far as the church was concerned, it was not till the 1930s, with the great depression, that the Fijian ministry was finally given the opportunity to display its leadership and management abilities. After a drastic reduction in the allocation of Australian mission funds to Fiji three European missionaries were forced to return to Australia. In their place three Fijian ministers were appointed to take charge of circuits with the official title of 'Assistant Superintendent' and under the overall responsibility of the senior missionary, Richard McDonald.

McDonald quickly recognized the potential of this new scheme. He travelled around the three circuits, encouraging the ministers, assisting them with financial advice and noting the degree of chiefly approval for the Fijian superintendents. When McDonald retired from Fiji in 1935 it appeared as if Fijian ministers had permanently achieved a degree of responsibility and were considered as competent administrators by their European brethren. However McDonald's successor, Charles Lelean, had less faith in the leadership qualities of Fijians. He removed the Fijian Superintendent from one circuit but Fijian opinion within Synod prevented him from doing likewise in the two other circuits. In essence Lelean believed that greater responsibility for Fijian ministers was a premature move. A number of missionaries still believed that Fijians had not yet graduated to the level of skills possessed by Europeans, for instance in book-keeping and circuit management. Secondly it was believed that only Europeans, since they were not Fijians, could resist the dominant influence of chiefs.

Missionaries had often raised the argument of chiefly influence over ministers and had used it to maintain their stranglehold on authority. They could support their case with evidence. When, in 1922, a suggestion was made to replace European missionaries with senior Fijian ministers, Ratu Asesala (government representative on Kadavu and a high-ranking chief) claimed that the chiefs had no confidence in the Fijian ministers as leaders. One senses in that comment the heavy influence of tradition and rank; ministers were pulpit chiefs only and should remain as such. Besides, the zealous and 'straight' minister, if given authority, might expose his social superiors for the shams that some of them were. Even if Fijian ministers had gone on record in the late nineteenth century as saying that chiefs might manipulate them if missionaries withdrew, this feeling had declined by the 1940s. The Fijian superintendent scheme had entrusted a degree of authority on the ministers which had been denied them for many decades and which they were not prepared to relinquish. Even the chiefs recognized that the church was entering a new phase of development after World War II and that leadership would eventually be transferred to Fijian churchmen; as Ratu Tevita, a chief of Vuda, said in 1945, 'the day
when the things in the church were decided vakavanua (according to custom or tradition) seemed to be passing' (Methodist Mission of Fiji 1945).

The search to identify and give some flesh to Fijian ministers, indeed probably ministers of all Melanesian churches, has just begun. Many of them, it has been noted, leave no other evidence of their work than a name on the station sheet in the annual mission report. A bare handful in the nineteenth century leave any trace through missionaries' letters. Because an autobiography was written for him by a missionary, the best known Fijian minister is a Tongan! - Joeli Bulu. To simply conclude that a paucity of written material on the rest sums up their unimportance is totally inadequate. Oral accounts can play a part here in filling the gaps.

What were the strengths and weaknesses of the Fijian ministry? Their weakness was primarily one of position - caught between the traditional power of a chiefly society which quickly gained ascendancy within the church and the untouchable authority of the missionary. Within these narrow constraints, ministers performed more than adequately. Their strength lay in their conviction born of character and commitment. They were not mimics of their teachers; had they been, the Fiji Methodist church might never have survived for the missionaries often displayed cultural ignorance and unfeeling disapproval of Fijian thought and behaviour.

Finally, this is not the kind of article that carries a major line of argument. It has no sustaining thesis to emphasize unless that be the remarkable tradition of service that has not been well recorded and hence neglected. More simply, this article is the story of the contribution of hundreds of men to the establishment of an institution which is now part of Fiji's heritage for the Fijians speak of the three pillars of their society as the land (vanua), the government (matanitu) and the church (lotu).

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BELIEFS AND VALUES

The Colonial Mastas

The Australians in Papua and New Guinea

HANK NELSON

The Germans in New Guinea

STEWART FIRTH

Double Dutch and Indons

PETER HASTINGS

The British in Fiji

DERYCK SCARR

The French in New Caledonia

LINDA LATHAM

The Japanese 1942-1945: a note on the scale of the dying

HANK NELSON
In just over a decade the political map of Melanesia has been transformed. In 1969 President Suharto declared West Irian to be a province of Indonesia, and in 1973 its name was changed to Irian Jaya. At the other end of the Melanesian chain Fiji became an independent nation in 1970. Papua New Guinea in 1975, the Solomons in 1978 and Vanuatu in 1980 went through the same fundamental constitutional change, the final national rite of passage. The formal political power of the mastas had ended in most of Melanesia. Within the previous century Melanesians had experienced many varieties of colonial rule: Dutch, German, Japanese, Australian, British, and French. In addition they had met thousands of Americans during the war, and the Indonesians now possess western New Guinea. It therefore seems opportune to attempt to assess Melanesia's many varieties of mastas.

In this group of papers the writers are attempting to isolate what was distinctive in the aims and attitudes of the different metropolitan powers. A more complex question is to what extent have Melanesians taken over the specific styles, methods and purposes of their one-time rulers. A start in finding an answer could be made by talking to the people living in the villages near the coast west of Vanimo in the West Sepik Province of Papua New Guinea. Their first mastas were German, but Hollandia in Dutch New Guinea was their closest town where they could trade, and some found work there. They were inhabitants of an Australian mandated territory from 1914 until the Japanese arrived in 1942. After the American landings at Aitape and Hollandia in 1944 black soldiers worked a sawmill in the area, and Australians recommenced patrolling. In the postwar the villagers have seen Hollandia become Kota Baru, then Sukarnopura and now Jayapura, and they have met the Indonesians as rulers of the area beyond the 141 meridian. In this serial of colonial confusion did the villagers perceive national differences? And did the differences matter to them? But the following papers are not concerned with the perceptions of the villagers, they present variations in the styles and policies of the mastas.
On Empire Day 1937 His Honour, Judge Beaumont Phillips, visited the Rabaul Public School. Before the assembled school he presented badges to four boys recently enrolled as scouts, and asked all to remember that they were British. 'The Empire', he said, 'stood for justice, a square deal and playing the game'. The junior choir sang 'Golden Wattle', the seniors sang 'Australia', and all joined in 'Rule Britannia' (Rabaul Times 28 May 1937). It was a fine combination of British and Australian sentiment: the wattle and the British fleet were important in the minds of the masters, and both were irrelevant to Simpson Harbour. No Chinese attended the Rabaul Public School although some students had now passed from St Teresa's Yang Ching School and the Overseas Chinese School to private schools in Australia (Cahill 1972:110). It went almost without saying that no New Guineans were at the school; and later His Honour would make a point of visiting the main government and mission 'native schools' at Malaguna, Vunapope and Vunairima. They might be separate and unequal, but they would receive a public gesture towards that 'square deal'.

Four days after Empire Day, on Friday 28 May the citizens of Rabaul noticed a succession of earth tremors. Old hands told startled newcomers that there was no need for alarm; Rabaul often trembled and heaved (McCarthy 1963:172). There were still the attractions of the weekend to look forward to: the Rabaul Club or the less exclusive New Guinea Club; the three hotels, the Rabaul, the Pacific and the Cosmopolitan; or a run down the coast to the Kokopo with its swimming baths, tennis courts, billiard room and dance floor; the sporting teams with their names reflecting the dominant interests - Administration, BPs, Carpenters and Commerce; and the talkies at the Regent where Herbert Marshall and Jean Arthur were to star in 'Birds in the Spring'. ('He gave up a million for her! She gave up a park bench for him!') But the tremors continued into Saturday, coming with such consistency that only two or three minutes separated the shuddering waves. A couple of houses slumped from their concrete posts; cracks opened in the Matupit road; dead fish floated to the surface of Simpson Harbour; and a few people took launches out to Vulcan Island to look at two small islands emerging from boiling sea. At four-thirty Vulcan exploded with a continuous roar and intermittent explosions that reverberated around the hills. People rushed to the harbour to find out what had happened, then fled as the southeast trades brought billowing volcanic smoke across the capital. Confused crowds caught in black clouds on the Nordup road panicked, then found their desperation ease as there was no heat and visibility gradually returned. A few residents spent an eerie night in the town. Vulcan roared, a rain of
fine pumice dust covered everything, and crazy lightning from an intense electrical storm lit the smoke clouds and gave momentary pictures of the absurd; Rabaul looked as though it was snow covered. Occasionally a large tree crashed under the weight of the grey pumice (Rabaul Times 4 June 1937).

On Sunday morning the Administration ordered the evacuation of the town, and just after midday Matupit, on the other arm of the harbour, exploded with another shower of pumice and mud. About 700 whites, 1,000 Asians and 5,000 New Guineans escaped from the town area, most being picked up at Nordup and being carried by boat to Kokopo. A Chinese trader, two Europeans and 438 New Guineans, nearly all from the villages of Valaur, Tavaua, Letlet and Rapolla, died (New Guinea Handbook 1937: Supplement). A special edition of the Rabaul Times was printed on the mission duplicator at Vunapope. It reported: 'Rabaul, the Garden City, has disappeared and there only remains an ugly mud-covered town' (4 June 1937). The refugees looking across Blanche Bay at the piling clouds above Rabaul and repeating the rumours of charcoal ruins were in fact witnessing the end of a way of life rather than the destruction of a town.

From 10 June, the residents of Rabaul were allowed back to help the few government officers and New Guineans already at work clearing a million tons of ash and mud from the area. But they went back without confidence. The magnitude of the disaster did not disturb the whites. Most in fact spoke in relief and self-congratulations of their escape. One wrote, 'We have to be thankful that the 2 eruptions did not kill people' (Hoogerwerff 8 June 1939). It was a brutal and easy linguistic slip: the dead were New Guineans and the mourning was out of sight and mind of the town in the villages close to Vulcan. The white community feared what would happen the next time. The government built stores out of town to feed a sudden exodus, and it advised residents to keep a suitcase and a box of provisions packed at all times. White men checked that their cars had plenty of petrol and would respond quickly to the starter or the crank handle. The crowds at the Regent pictures increased, but all carefully avoided comment on the continuing tremors and the changing colour of Matupit's smoke. People slept in their clothes, their shoes close to the bed, and one resident wrote of his irrational hesitation about taking a bath lest he be caught when least ready to flee (Hoogerwerff 25 July 1937). The Rabaul Times of 5 December carrying the results of the expert volcanologists' report had record street sales. The Australian government responded to the pessimistic report by directing that the administration headquarters be shifted from Rabaul. The gardens flourished in the top-dressing of volcanic mud, Burns Philip invested in a new store, and the administration lingered during the debate over the site for the new capital, but the old confidence had not returned before Matupit again sent a drift of smoke across the town, and the first Japanese bombs fell in January 1942.

Rabaul was the largest town in a vast area. Truk, 650 miles to the north was bigger, but it was a thousand miles to a greater concentration of white men. The European residents of Rabaul, supported by the planters of the Gazelle Peninsula and New Ireland, had the communal strength to sustain a peculiar way of life. Although founded only thirty years earlier, Rabaul had a much longer history than the rival mainland centres that had grown since the Edie Creek goldrush of 1926: Wau, Bulolo, Salamaua and Lae.
Rabaul no longer held over half the foreign population, but it still set the standards.

The statistics are readily available to give basic information about the 3,200 white people of the Mandated Territory (Census of the Commonwealth 1933). They were an expanding group, their numbers having doubled in the previous ten years. Half were born in Australia: 703 came from New South Wales, 385 from Victoria and 331 from Queensland. The smaller and more distant states were home for very few. Another 626 came from the British Isles, nearly all from England and Scotland. Although 15 per cent of the white residents were born in Europe outside the British Isles, the languages of the continent were rarely heard in Rabaul, Wau and Salamaua: most of the 326 Germans, fifty-seven Dutch and twenty-nine French lived on the Catholic and Lutheran mission stations. It was still very much a male community. In Rabaul there were three white men for every two women, and in Gasmata and Talasea it was more like six to one. Predictably it was a population aged between twenty-five and fifty, with almost all those between ten and fifteen away at school and those over sixty having retired to more temperate climates. By religion the majority were twice as Catholic, more Lutheran and less Presbyterian than their Australian counterparts. In spite of the settled appearance of Rabaul they were transitory. Ten per cent had lived in the Territory for less than a year, and half had been there under five years. Only three 'non-indigenous persons' (and they might have been Asians or Polynesians) claimed more than fifty years' residence.

Five fields dominated employment: mining, plantations, the church, state and commerce. Goldminers were now more numerous than planters, missionaries outnumbered public servants; but the largest single category was 'wives without gainful occupation' at 597. The twenty-nine aircraft mechanics and fifteen pilots were indicators of the growing importance of aviation. The white workers were, by Australian standards, much less likely to be unemployed, and more likely to be higher paid. Where in Australia only 13 per cent of breadwinners were being paid over £260 a year, nearly half of the Territory's white residents earned more. The salaries of first division public servants ranged from departmental directors on £1250 a year to District Officers with starting salaries of £618; labour overseers and storemen were paid at least £336; and the lowest were the junior female typists on £156 a year (New Guinea Handbook 1937:270-272). The Territory sustained its relative wealth in spite of the missionaries on token incomes and the planters still struggling to survive the collapsed copra market. The fact that the plantation owners were less numerous than the managers indicates that many of them had failed to retain their leases through the depression. The Australian planter was now more likely to be an employee of a trading company than a proprietor.

In one other striking way the white community of the Territory differed from the general Australian population; they were much more likely to be ex-servicemen. Nearly 500 of them had served abroad with the Australian forces in 1914-18. When the administration, the business houses and the Expropriation Board sale of plantation leases had given preference to ex-servicemen, they had helped make Rabaul 'a suburb of Anzac'. Its section of the Returned Sailors' and Soldiers' Imperial League of Australia (RSL) was granted the status of 'State Branch'.

THE AUSTRALIANS IN PAPUA AND NEW GUINEA
Still concerned about egalitarianism and individual rights in their relationships with each other, the Australians in New Guinea were also prickly about their pay and precedence in the public service, commerce, and the plantation community. They looked for an orderly society of firm, just *mastas* who invested, gave orders, and solved problems. Below them were the Chinese and mixed race peoples who were keepers of small trade stores, craftsmen and overseers. The New Guineans were the mass to labour and be civilized; they were to be both servants and beneficiaries. Rabaul's three gaols, three hospitals, three cemeteries, three sets of schools and three government wage levels were all evidence of the tiers of a caste society. But the order was continually being disturbed. The Japanese dead were classified as white; the Chinese were becoming richer and presuming to sit in the dress circle of the Regent Theatre; a visiting ship put down only one gangway forcing all passengers to jostle together; New Guineans were buying trucks; and always there were complaints that efficient, respectful servants were hard to find. The whites constantly reminded each other to be tough and just: 'Never make a threat if you are not prepared to carry it out'. 'There is only one thing to do with a flash coon - thump him!' Labour lines supposed to be controlled by the word of the stern, aloof overseer, ran on the fear and the fact of violence. But it was on the plantations that the ideal most frequently went awry. Ex-servicemen had expected to move into wide-verandahed homes giving views across the palm crowns to a distant lagoon and reef; to be attended by servants who were grateful for their improved health care, food and access to material goods; and to have a steady income allowing them to take regular leave 'down south'. In fact those that stayed were in debt to trading companies, they suffered periodic bouts of malaria, their labourers were often defiant and surly, they believed that the government harassed them over petty regulations, and they were unable to rationalize a defence of their colleagues who were so often fined and occasionally gaoled for savage bashings of labourers. The *mastas* could make the New Guinean diffident and shuffling; they could refuse to shake his hand or thank him; but they could rarely make him quick and grateful. For the Australian who wanted to be liked, who wanted to be able to joke with his labourers, who detested the role of aloof, colonial *masta*, the situation was as disturbing as it was for the *bot* who was one moment engaged in banter and the next was the target of a boot or torrent of abuse.

Most of the white community laughed at projects to educate New Guineans. They were genuinely surprised when the Rabaul police band learnt to use their instruments. The missionaries were marginally more enlightened: they set modest goals for their students, and the labourer on a mission plantation was not always able to evade corporal punishment. When the Lutheran mission criticized Australian policy or behaviour, it was seen as an attack by 'Germans' and not by 'Christians'. In general all of the mission societies except the Methodists operated as separate nodes of influence, cut off by nationality and style from the Australian planters, miners and government officers. Inevitably some *mastas*, especially those isolated for long periods on mining camps and patrols, formed close relationships with particular New Guineans. The affection, even admiration, that some white men expressed for individual New Guineans, did little to soften the caste rules that applied in Rabaul.
Fear of sudden volcanic explosion was only one source of the unease in the Mandated Territory's European community. In twenty years of Australian rule New Guineans had killed twenty white people. The dramatic and well-publicized deaths were frequent enough to convince lonely government officers, prospectors, recruiters and urban housewives that their fears were not irrational. In towns the periodic scares over rape were excited by virtually no actual cases of black men criminally assaulting white women. The hysterical reaction of so many of the white community in 1929 when the black labourers of Rabaul went on strike was in part the response of a group keenly conscious that it was an unloved, envied minority living on the edge of a land and of a people; and they understood little of either.

The Australians' unease sprang too from the feeling that they were but temporary *masters*. However stridently they might claim their sovereignty and that 60,000 Australians had died in the Great War to secure their control, they held the Territory under Mandate from the League of Nations. It was a 'sacred trust'. New Guinea was not quite part of Australia, nor of the British Empire. The Australians in the Territory feared that their interests might be sacrificed to appease a resurgent Germany; and while southern Australia might have been shocked in 1942 at the sudden thrust of the Japanese, those in the Territory were not. They had often talked of the growing power of the covetous Japanese. As the *Rabaul Times* reminded its readers on 20 August 1937: 'Japan has been steadily preparing for The Day ....' The Australians in Rabaul saw themselves as manning a vulnerable outpost, but they could not arouse other Australians either to honour them or sustain them.

The white residents of Papua were less numerous, poorer, more sober, and more firmly tied to Australia. The total of only 1,400 in 1937 had increased slowly to regain its pre-depression level. As in New Guinea over half were born in Australia; but unlike New Guinea where so many came from New South Wales, the birth place of Papuan whites coincided with proximity: Queensland, then New South Wales and Victoria. Papua was more clearly a northern frontier, and less a foreign land served by the port of Sydney. There were only 100 continental Europeans, half of them French, and nearly all isolated on the Sacred Heart mission stations on Yule Island and its hinterland. The most numerous of the non-white foreign peoples were the 'Polynesians', and except for their special role in the Protestant churches they were too few and too scattered to become an 'intermediate race'. Even the mixed race community, officially counted at only thirty-eight in Port Moresby and 212 in the whole Territory, was small (Census of the Commonwealth 1933). While to 1914 white men had infrequently registered marriages to Papuan women, now they did not. The foreigners of Papua were essentially British-Australian, and distinct.

Consistent with an older community, the Papuan whites were more widely distributed through the ages, the sexes were nearly equal in numbers, and although they were less likely to be recent arrivals, a quarter had been in the Territory for less than five years. Nearly half of them lived in Port Moresby, and another quarter in Samarai. The rest, scattered through mission stations, government posts and plantations, were almost entirely on the coast. Kokoda was the only permanent government station beyond the coastal plain. The whites knew each other. One old resident recalled that a group of them on the government boat could claim that between them they
knew every European in the Territory. The sons of early government officers were moving into positions of importance in the public service, and children that had grown up in the Territory were linking the older families in marriage.

They were less wealthy than the whites of the Mandated Territory. The total copra sales brought in only £90,000 in 1937-38, about one tenth of that of New Guinea (Amalgamation Report 1937:10). If the two or three largest copra plantations, the Sogeri rubber and the Misima goldmine were excepted, there was not much cash being generated to share among the fifty miners and 150 planters. While the Papuan planter was more likely to still own his lease, he was also more likely to be a battler, surviving by recruiting and trading to supplement the income from his few neglected palms. Even the members of the small public service of only 140 were paid less well than their counterparts in New Guinea. The resident magistrates, the equivalents of the New Guinea district officers, received £100 a year less, met their own medical expenses, paid more for worse houses, and did not even get the New Guinea boot allowance for foot patrols.

Port Moresby with its corrugated iron roofs, dusty streets, verandahed houses on high stumps, and a few struggling gardens among stretches of bare earth, looked like many other north Queensland settlements set above a wharf and a sparkling harbour. After fifty years as the seat of government Port Moresby still contained no significant public building or monument. Less troubled than the citizens of Rabaul, the white residents were still uncertain of their identity. Were they pioneers pushing Australian control further north? Were they laying the foundations for another Australian state? Or were they 'overseas', the representatives of the British in another outpost of empire? The name that some briefly attempted to impose on themselves, the 'Anglo-Papuans', had indicated a British rather than an Australian loyalty. But for now, and the foreseeable future, they were clearly resident in an Australian territory. The intense feuds among government officers, and the bitter public squabbles between officers and settlers that had divided Port Moresby for twenty years were dormant. When the Governor-General of Australia, Lord Gowrie, arrived in July 1937 the community united in self-congratulations. Sir Hubert Murray, now thirty years in office, was lauded by planters and traders; he had become an institution. His stature as a great Australian and his acceptance overseas as a progressive administrator were taken as something reflecting credit on all the whites in Papua. It was a planter and an old enemy of Murray, Arthur Jewell, who told Lord Gowrie that the Territory's 'one great achievement' was its 'native administration' (Papuan Courier, 30 July 1937). The irony was that the Papuan whites had come to share Murray's praise when his achievements were in decline. His determination to protect Papuans against brutality and blatant economic exploitation, to give them access to the courts, and to allow them modest opportunities to earn cash had been worthy aims twenty years earlier. Now his government looked benevolent but negative, and the Papuans, bound by petty discrimination, were offered little hope of change.

In both territories in 1937 humane and sensitive men deplored the masta-boi relationships, but nowhere were they forcing a fundamental rethinking of government policies. They were the ones most pleased when individual Papuans and New Guineans later excelled in war, and most distressed when villagers suffered through the vagaries of Japanese and
Allied tactics. The better educated young Australians entering the New Guinea field service as a result of the intense competition for jobs in the depression and the new cadet scheme were still a long way from determining policy in Rabaul. In 1939 the Australian government reaffirmed that Papua and New Guinea would continue under their separate administrations; no one seemed worried that the territories were apparently on separate constitutional tracks, one to be associated with Australia and the other to be independent. That was for a future so distant that it was absurd even to speculate about it. Most white residents thought that the few village councils with no greater statutory authority than debating societies were dangerously radical. There was no likelihood of either administration establishing government schools beyond primary level for a small minority. At best the two administrations aimed to do more of what they were already doing. On the frontier of contact that meant that some field officers would continue to do superb work; but villagers in areas that had known fifty years of 'government' would have further decades of dull, intermittent paternalism. The Australians at home were unconcerned about those to whom they handed responsibility for the government of 1,500,000 people. Murray was probably right to stay in office with the private rationalization that his successor, a failed politician or ageing brigadier, would be less concerned about Papuan welfare. Australian rule had reached a point where it was in need of reformation, but there was no indication in the territories or Australia where the ideas or the agents of change could be found. In fact the arc of colonies from Vietnam to Melanesia were on the edge of massive external intervention, and for many the intensity of change would bring incomprehensible turmoil.

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Like the Australians after them, the Germans believed that the villagers of New Guinea were inferior human beings, lower on the scale of evolution than Europeans, less intelligent and deserving treatment appropriate for children or even animals. The strength of this belief was illustrated by the German Colonial Exhibition of 1896, which for six months gave curious Germans the opportunity to observe the 'natives' of their colonial empire living in imitation 'native villages' in Berlin parkland and performing at certain hours of the day as if in a circus or zoo. To Kinkin, Takula, Dalanglagur, Tauluna, Tinai, To Walut and Taurangin were the seven men from the eastern Gazelle Peninsula who travelled together with the twelve year old boy To Palangat to be the living exhibits from New Guinea at the exhibition. Alongside the villages from Africa they built three houses in the New Britain style, and on the edge of the park pond the village of 'Tarawai' was constructed as an example of the architecture of the mainland coast, complete with a meeting house modelled on those of Mushu Island near Wewak. The New Guineans' job in Berlin began with a bath at 6 am in the common quarters provided for the 'natives', followed by tidying and cleaning duties. Then all 'natives' dispersed to their separate villages to be ready for the public. As the crowds filed past, To Kinkin and his friends sat making feather decorations, weaving nets or paddling on the pond in a canoe. At 10 am a few men returned to barracks for lunch rations, rice and meat or fish, which were then prepared and eaten 'before the eyes of the public'. Noon to 1 pm was feeding-time for the 'natives' at the German Colonial Exhibition. In the afternoon the men from New Britain were supposed to perform the dukduk dances of the Tolai. While in Berlin the 'natives' were taken on sightseeing excursions, to museums, the zoo and theatres, so as to learn lessons of 'respect and subservience to the "clever white man"'. The dimensions of their heads, ears, noses, mouths, lips, shoulders, hips, feet and even middle fingers were scrupulously recorded and listed on comparative tables.1

The Germans' racial beliefs had formal, legal consequences. 'Natives' were a legal category in the German colonies, made so in New Guinea by a law of 1886 which defined such persons as 'members of the native tribes of the protectorate' and 'members of other coloured tribes'.2 All New Guinea villagers in the German possession became 'natives', subject to laws and penalties which did not apply to Europeans. No European, for example, could ever become liable to corporal punishment. The legal distinction between races was extended even to marriage. First outlawed in South-West Africa in 1905 and German East Africa in 1906, marriages between 'natives' and Europeans became illegal in German New Guinea in 1912. Such unions,
said official members of the Government Council, could reduce 'the white to
the status of the natives' and were 'objectionable under all circum-
stances'; it was an issue which concerned not the individual but the
'supremacy of the whole white race'. Racism also created fear. The
Germans' abhorrence of miscegenation was matched by their fear (usually but
not always unreasonable) that New Guinea villagers were waiting for an
opportunity to kill them. A tiny band of white people living close to
hundreds of thousands of blacks, they believed their very survival depended
upon swift and violent retribution for attacks by people they regarded as
savages.

The New Guineans were on the lowest rungs of the ladder of evolution,
according to German ideas of the time, and the Asians had climbed half-way
up. Both Adolph von Hansemann and Albert Hahl, the two men who most
influenced the development of the colony, looked to Southeast Asia for the
salvation of New Guinea. They saw New Guinea as peopled by villagers too
primitive and sparse to transform a wilderness into a lucrative plantation
colony of the German Empire; such a task belonged to the industrious
Asians, the middle-rank races, who were to be encouraged to pour into New
Guinea in a great flood which would sweep the original inhabitants into a
position of utter subservience. But New Guinea did not prove fertile
ground for these ambitious plans.

Compared with other German colonies New Guinea developed slowly. The
European population numbered 271 in 1900, of whom 200 lived in the Bismarck
Archipelago. It doubled by 1907 and again by 1914, but even 1130 Europeans
were said to be too few for such an extensive territory. The Kaiser,
members of the Reichstag, settlers and Hahl himself were all dissatisfied
with the speed of German colonization, and after leaving the colony Hahl
was to reflect bitterly on the unwillingness of investors to put capital
into New Guinea ventures: he had had to 'go and collect the guests ...
before they would believe that a banquet was prepared for them'.

New Guinea lagged behind the African colonies because the Pacific
possessions did not matter to the German government and the Reichstag.
Copra, the main export of the German Pacific, provided less than 8.5 per
cent of Germany's supplies in 1910 and 1911 compared with 48 per cent
imported from British colonies and 40 per cent from the Dutch East Indies.
Politically the South Seas had long since served its purpose: Samoa in the
domestic propaganda for a bigger navy in 1899, New Guinea in Bismarck's
grab for colonies. The German government left New Guinea to the devices of
those trading and plantation companies foolhardy enough to seek profit on
its malarial coasts. Fourteen years of imperialism without rule under the
New Guinea Company were succeeded by fifteen years of skeletal colonial
administration unevenly extending control over the islands and coastal
fringes of the country. Reaching Berlin from his colony of German Samoa in
March 1908, Wilhelm Solf went straight to the Colonial Office, where he
found officials inundated with the annual task of ensuring the passage of
colonial budgets through the Reichstag: 'In the forefront of interest are
the African railways', he wrote. 'Then come the African colonies,
South-West Africa in particular. By comparison with the great territories,
the South Seas colonies are in the background and are therefore treated not
inconsiderately but rather as being of no consequence ....' Hahl could
find no considerateness in his treatment by the Reichstag and the Colonial
Yet metropolitan neglect alone does not explain the Germans' relatively slow progress in New Guinea. Melanesia was difficult country for any colonial power. Its very geography was anti-colonial, placing barriers in the way of the Germans at every turn: the high mountains, steep ridges, landslides and volcanic peaks of much of New Britain, New Ireland, Manus and Bougainville, the coastal mountain ranges of the mainland rising to the rugged heights of the Finisterres and Saruwageds in the Huon Peninsula, the mosquito-ridden mangrove and sago-palm swamps of the Sepik and Ramu deltas and almost everywhere the gorges swollen with flooded creeks after heavy rain, the tangle of exposed roots on the floor of lowland tropical forests and the huge trees blotting out sight of the sky. No wonder the Germans liked the atolls, the smaller island groups, the coasts and the eastern Gazelle Peninsula. They had to contend as well with a village population speaking hundreds of languages, living as distinct peoples, and according to experience and predilection treating the Germans as enemies, temporary allies, masters or friends. However the Germans were treated by the villagers in one place, they could be sure of one thing: their reception a few kilometres away might be quite different, and no New Guinean was in a position to take responsibility for that difference. The result was an endless piecemeal conquest undertaken by the Germans and their New Guinean allies of the moment, inching forward on a colonial frontier at a time when German troops in Africa were winning decisive battles against unified populations within a couple of years. The historic diversity of Melanesia, preserved into the colonial era, proved to be its best defence against rapid reduction to European control; that, and the anopheles mosquito, which drove the Germans from their capital at Finschhafen in 1891 and discouraged many an intending settler thereafter.

In the slow advance of the colonial state the Germans' greatest lack was information about villagers' motives, beliefs and intentions. The district officer greeted by feasting and dancing was likely to believe the celebrations were in his honour and would show his pleasure with a few token gifts. But villagers often expected to be feasted in return, on a scale which repaid the debt they had created, and meant to challenge the Germans to a reciprocal show of generosity or even to shame them. Peace-making between warring communities, attributed by the Germans to the government's stern resolve and use of force, could also arise from decisions made by people who welcomed the message of peace brought by the missionaries or were following pre-Christian custom. At the time of the balum circumcision festival held every ten years or so by the Kawa people and their neighbours along the northern coast of the Huon Gulf, for example, invitations went to all trading partners and a truce in hostilities was called for the entire period of preparation, construction of the initiates' house and feasting.

When the Germans intervened in local wars they relied on villagers to tell them what was happening. The village of Galavit in the inland Baining mountains of the Gazelle Peninsula was attacked and destroyed in February 1913 and a German punitive expedition sent to punish the guilty warriors. The sequence of events was typical of German rule in New Guinea: news of the attack was volunteered by a man called To Magaga, who said he was afraid to return home and provided a plausible account of the identity of
the wrongdoers, their evil deeds and their threats to kill his people; he asked the government to punish his enemies severely and the government obliged. His tale may have been true or false. The truth of this affair and a hundred others like it will never be known, but it is obvious that the Germans' ignorance of local languages, customs and politics left them open to manipulation by ambitious villagers. Except in the longest-settled districts of the colony, where the government had an opportunity of hearing two sides of a dispute, German officials and their police could never be arbiters; they could only be allies, placing their force at the disposal of an apparently wronged New Guinean community. The interpreters were in a key position to determine the outcome of German interventions, for they were the filters through which knowledge of the situation on the non-Pidgin-speaking frontier of control had to pass before it reached the government. In the Galavit case, the German officer in charge of the police thought his interpreters were using their position 'for their own advantage'.

The Germans adopted a colonizing strategy familiar throughout the tropics before the First World War. The government controlled but did not greatly limit the foreign alienation of villagers' land. It regulated the indentured labour system, imposed a head-tax to stimulate the flow of labourers on to the plantations, compelled villagers to build roads and appointed village officials to enforce its commands. Village life was changed but not destroyed. The colonized people of New Guinea did not become a landless proletariat with nothing but their labour to sell for survival, for not enough land was taken. Men and women continued to live from their gardens, supplementing but not replacing subsistence income with the trade-box and the proceeds of cash cropping.

The Germans' aim was a plantation colony but for as long as Albert Hahl was governor planters disagreed with him about the best way of achieving it. The planters, consumed by the desire for immediate profit, wanted unrestricted labour recruiting whatever its demographic consequences. Hahl counselled caution and patience lest the labour supply dry up from over-use. A few reforms were enacted but in the struggle the planters won more than they lost. As Joseph Meek, Sydney manager of Lever Brothers, said in 1916:

in our experience, the German administration in the islands has always been carried out with the idea of encouraging as many planters as possible to settle under their administration. They went to a great deal of trouble - they understood all about the costs of planting; what labour was available; they did what they could to get labour, facilitating the planter in every way; and they even went to the extent of advising planters just starting out not to pay above a given wage for labour, or else they would spoil the labour market. The administration kept in touch with the planting community around them and always referred to the planters in connexion with any legislation that was about to be initiated.

By 1914 a few old-established firms owned most plantations and had most influence with government: the New Guinea Company, of which Hahl wanted to
be a director as soon as he left the colonial service in that year, Hernsheim and Company and the Hamburgische Sudsee A.C., the successor company to Queen Emma's.

By the standards of colonies in the Pacific the Germans exacted a high price in human suffering, humiliation and death for their colonization of New Guinea. Among the 26,000 or so indentured labourers employed in German territories in Melanesia between 1887 and 1903 the average annual death rate was estimated by Governor Hahl to be over 28 per cent, whereas a British Colonial Office official could describe as 'ghastly' a figure of 5.28 per cent recorded for Indians in Fiji in 1895. (The Governor of Fiji was warned by London that the emigration of Indians might have to be stopped.) The highest annual mortality rate among Pacific Islanders indentured in Queensland was 14.8 per cent, recorded in 1884, and from 1886 to 1904 it never exceeded 6.2 per cent. The dysentery epidemic on the Lakekamu goldfield of Papua in 1910 was minor compared with the mass outbreaks of disease on the plantations of Kaiser Wilhelmsland. Only in the condition of Pacific Islanders in Queensland and Fiji in the early 1880s can there be found a contemporary equivalent in British Pacific colonies to the lot of the labourer in New Guinea throughout the greater part of German rule. The Germans shot more people dead in punitive expeditions than did the British or Australians in Papua, they continued to bombard villages from offshore twenty-five years after the practice had ceased in Papua and they probably administered more floggings to labourers than their counterparts in neighbouring colonies.

Yet the contrast can be overdrawn, especially between Germans and Australians. Coming from a country where Europeans were still engaged in killing the Aboriginal population, the Australians who occupied German New Guinea admired the German achievement and adopted the German way of doing things. They first abolished corporal punishment, then quickly restored it after planters protested. 'Whippings ... are effective and do not interfere with the necessary labour of the offender', wrote the Australian military administrator G.J. Johnston in 1919: 'With a native as with an animal - correction must be of a deterrent nature'. And when Johnston looked forward to a 'vital change' in the development of New Guinea during the 1920s, all he meant was a change in the nationality of the colonizers, who were to be Australians rather than Germans. New Guinea was to remain a colony for the white man.

NOTES


2 Nachrichten, 1886, p.104.

3 Amtsblatt, 1 November 1912.

5 Solf to Schultz, 26 March 1908, papers of Wilhelm Solf, vol.132, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.

6 Hahl to Solf, 28 November 1914, papers of Wilhelm Solf, vol.109, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.


8 Prey to Hahl, 8 May 1913, RKA 2995.


11 Johnston to Secretary, Defence Department, 14 March 1919, Ex German New Guinea Miscellaneous Reports, Australian War Memorial Library, Canberra.

12 Johnston to Secretary, Defence Department, 4 March 1919, Ex German New Guinea Miscellaneous Reports, Australian War Memorial Library, Canberra.
I sometimes think the differences in style and political perceptions between Dutch and Australian kiaps quite as great as those between Dutch and Indonesian administrators. I have often identified the former in my own mind by comparing a night I spent at the residence of the then District Commissioner, Morobe, glumly counting match boxes, cultural trophies of a world trip, adorning the wall of his bar in an effort to counter the tedium of an all too predictable conversation, and the following night which I spent at the residence of the Resident, West Nieuw-Guinea, at Manokwari. The latter was a concrete brick and timber dwelling, the floors ceramic tiled throughout in Dutch-Indonesian style, giving it an incongruous sense of permanency contrasted with the Australian house on stilts style. Everything was very different - trellised orchids, small fountain, carelessly stacked classical records, more or less current issues of English, French, Dutch and German magazines. The Resident's wife was certainly very different. She was Indonesian.

It was not, perhaps, so surprising on reflection. Three of the Residents (I am talking of the late 1950s) and a number of the most senior administration officers had served in Indonesia before the war, and after it, as youthful trainees and controleurs. Some in fact had been interned by the Japanese. All of them secretly hankered for the great islands to the west whose language they knew and whose cultures they valued. Despite all that had happened affection remained. On one occasion, paying farewell respects, I mentioned to the Deputy-Governor, Boendermaker, that I would shortly visit Indonesia. His eyes flew open in surprise. 'Can it be? How lucky you are. If you go to Bali please take a letter to my old friend the Agung Agung'. I did. Boendermaker, like other senior Netherlands officers, represented an important element in the diversity of Dutch attitudes towards the territory. His generation of administrators believed implicitly, I think, that a single act of wise and generous decolonization in Netherlands New Guinea was not only in itself a desirable end but would erase once and for all the Netherland East Indies image of the Dutch as '300 years of the whip and the club'.

It was a motive that the Indonesians subtly intuited and whose realization, for obvious reasons, they could not allow. The second level of the administration comprised officers ten to fifteen years younger. Some of them had served in Indonesia post war. Most had no NEI administrative experience. Quite a number had worked there or had lost a business there, or a job with a Dutch firm, and had joined the Netherlands New Guinea administrative service as a result either because they needed a
job or did not want to return to chilly Holland. Most of them were considerably resentful of Indonesia, like the Commandant of the PVK who had unsuccessfully commanded Ambonese loyalist troops in the police actions of the 1940s. It was this generation, and a younger one, which gave resolve to Dutch efforts to create the 'dynamic few', as the optimistic jargon of the period had it, who were to lead the territory to independence in 1970. The younger generation of *kiaps* were mostly fresh out of university or technical college, energetic young men who liked the bush, adventure, exotic places and the money. Even among them were some who had been born in Indonesia and had ended up in West New Guinea following the general evacuation of the Dutch in the 1950s. Many of them, like the older generation, were anti-Indonesian but for different reasons. They loved New Guinea and its people even though all but the very naive were increasingly pessimistic about a successful outcome of their labours. All were intensely sceptical of Australia's political support. By 1959 recruiting for the administration, a graduate service, was becoming difficult. Nevertheless despite rapidly increasing uncertainties the Dutch ran not only an efficient administration but one which was a good deal more dedicated than might have been expected. Its most attractive features derived from a combination of Dutch style and the need to make urgent decisions about a wide variety of social, political and economic issues. Most of the Dutch were notably a good deal better educated than the majority of their Australian counterparts. Politically they were a great deal more sophisticated. They had to be in order to force a pace of political development which found no favour in Australian New Guinea. I remember Sir Paul Hasluck shaking his head in mixed disbelief and disapproval when I told him of the lectures being given Papuans in urban centres such as Merauke on subjects like 'Colonialism and the UN' or 'The political development of independent African states'. Most of the *kiaps* I knew were multilingual graduates in arts or law. It was rare to meet an educated Hollander who did not have English. A number were anthropology graduates who found it more than convenient to work as *kiaps* on short-term contracts in places like the Baliem, the Ok Sibil and the Asmat - these were still the golden days of first or very recent contact in a large number of places. One Resident was an academic prehistorian while the Government's chief adviser on cultural affairs (Adviseur voor Bevolkingzaken) was the noted anthropologist, and famed 'Jungle Pimpernel' of 1942-44, Victor de Bruyn.

There was a notable absence among the Dutch of any overt racism accompanied by determined efforts, where possible, to force the pace of Melanesian social integration. At a time when native drinking was prohibited in Papua New Guinea it was not uncommon to see the Director of Native Affairs, Velkamp, drinking with Papuan *kiap* trainees in the bar of the Noordwijk or to see Papuans drinking at Government House receptions. I think that if I were to search for a single word to describe Dutch attitudes towards the 'Papoeas' at almost all levels it was that of encouragement. In many ways Dutch efforts were massive considering that they started virtually from scratch in 1950. In 1958 when little more than half the territory was under control Papuans occupied about 38 per cent of lowest grade administrative jobs. In 1961 when the administration claimed to control two-thirds of the territory, Papuans occupied 51 per cent of all administrative posts. These were mostly in the lowest echelons but among their number were several HPBs and some twenty patrol officers.
Nevertheless to all of this, including the crash programmes in primary and secondary education, political instruction and job training, there was a desperate, makeshift quality. Over the years Holland had spent very large sums of money (and was due to spend even vaster sums in future years) in building a very effective coastal infrastructure of wharves, towns, roads, airstrips, power generators, cold storage chambers, hospitals and houses, but relatively little on interior development. Hollandia had a surprising network of roads but in 1962, when the Dutch began to leave the territory, there wasn't even a single jeep track in the Baliem. Except for the Kingstrand aluminium huts of the central administration block at Wamena, the strip and some empty paddocks where they had tried breeding cattle, the Dutch left nothing to indicate that they had ever been there. In the end the Netherlands was caught in a situation over which it had increasingly less control, one in which the faster it forced the pace of Papuan decolonization, the more it was forced to spend and the greater became its involvement. That decade led to terrible consequences, as we all know, for perhaps 12,000 urban Papuan labourers, minor to middle ranking officials, teachers and apprentices of a dozen kinds, who became all too used to living in European houses, buying expensive imported European goods on artificially maintained high wages and who looked to a comfortable subsidized ride to independence. For that generation (of which perhaps 2,000 may have been killed) now in its forties, there was real tragedy in the Dutch departure and in the Indonesian takeover. This, in fact, was no less traumatic for those Irianese, quite large in number, who welcomed incorporation into the Republic for one reason or another.

By the same token it was also traumatic for the incoming Indonesians who had to contend with the effects of ten years of determined Dutch spending which General Nasution aptly described to me as the 'Dutch time bomb'. The one enjoyable irony of the takeover situation nevertheless was to see visible evidence that a decade and more of relentless irredentist propaganda was not proof against rapid Indonesian disenchantment with Irian Jaya's people and rugged terrain. What were they like, those first Indonesian kiaps? Those who came in 1963 were mostly nationalistic carpet baggers, 'Old Order' flotsam and jetsam, in search of subsidized rice rations and hardship salaries.

Nevertheless, there was an immediate and fundamental difference between the aims of an Indonesian administration and those of the Dutch and the Australians. While we and the Dutch were preoccupied with the development of the two New Guineas as eventual autonomous entities, the Indonesians were involved in the administration of a new but permanent part of Indonesia. The years 1963 to 1966 were rather desperate and despite an enormous effort in the field of education the emphasis was, in Dr Subandrio's phrase to me, on 'getting them down out of the trees even if we have to pull them down'. Operasi Koteka had its origins in that phrase and the Indonesians have still to learn that only softlye, softlye catchee monkey. If there is one sight more depressing to an Indonesian than that of the national flag hung upside down from a penis gourd it is a Dani wearing one beneath a tightly buttoned pair of jeans stretched to tearing point.

After 1966 there was considerable improvement in the qualities of the administration although here one has to distinguish between the civil administration and the army. Although administration and policy making
power is legally vested in the Governor and provincial assembly, an advisory group, Muspida, comprising the Panglima, and top local army and police officers is the real decision making body. Muspida can overrule the civilian kiaps right down to village level especially in any matters involving political judgements or activities. The military presence in Irian Jaya is not large, probably not much more than 3,000 to 4,000 altogether - possibly double this number during the Vogelkop Arfak insurrections of the middle 1960s - but in carrying out its \textit{dilfungsi} role its influence is all pervasive. The Indonesian administration can justly claim to have made genuine efforts to reach the whole of the Irianese population, not just the relative handful affected by the Dutch, in education, vocational training and in agricultural cash cropping. It has been at its most successful in education which has been vastly expanded at all levels. One spin off has been the rapid expansion in the use of Indonesian. This has meant that large sections of the population in remote areas like the Eastern Baliem and the Eastern Asmat now have a \textit{lingua franca}. One of the major objectives of the education programme has been to force the pace of acculturation. Its success depends on one's viewpoint. In mine there has been mixed success. In most of the towns too many Melanesians have been forced into kampongs unable to compete with ubiquitous Buginese in selling fruits and vegetables. It is marginal living. In most towns the Irianese are being rapidly outnumbered by unsponsored migrant arrivals, a situation which creates a good deal of tension. But by the same token Melanesians in a parallel experience are being educated in the main stream of Indonesian social and political values, are competing for jobs and are entering in increasing numbers into Indonesian life. Increasing numbers of students obtain scholarships to Indonesian and foreign institutions and increasing numbers look to preferment within the Indonesian administration structure, not least in the Indonesian armed forces and police. But the pace of Indonesian social and economic acculturation of the Melanesian is very uneven. Attempts to 'civilise' the Dani overnight have been markedly unsuccessful. In towns like Manokwari and Jayapura too many Melanesians are relegated to jobs as garbage collectors and parking police or are being pushed out to fringe kampongs. On the other hand there are several very large scale mixed race agricultural pilot projects like the one at Nabire which are a tribute to Indonesian ingenuity and insight. At Nabire there is a mixed coffee, pepper and cocoa project involving several thousand Melanesians and similar numbers of transmigrasi, mainly Javanese, living and working together in adjacent kampongs. The Bupati (District Commissioner) at Nabire has also managed to do something the Dutch only talked about - that is drive a kiap road from Nabire over the range to Enarotali, a feat comparable with the first jeep track over the Kassam Pass, which will lead sooner or later to opening up the central highlands to vehicular traffic, something which has been desperately needed for a long time.

Finally, a word on Indonesian kiap attitudes. Most of those I have seen at work in Irian Jaya are, I believe, conscientiously concerned with improving the Melanesian's situation, especially in the bush areas. While individuals vary I have noted a good deal of good natured banter between tutelary kiap and unwilling apprentice. There have been major policy mistakes - Operasi Koteka is one - and there have been savage reprisals where the Indonesians, ever paranoid about questions of sovereignty, have confronted anti-government activities, e.g. the Arfak uprisings of the 1960s and the (Free Papua Movement (OPM) activities of the late 1970s. The
Indonesians are determined to make Indonesians out of the Irianese and will try to achieve in Irian Jaya over the next fifty years what it took the Javanese, in a sense, 1,000 years to do in the rest of the archipelago. It will be a painful process, especially in the middle period, but an irreversible one. And if it's any consolation I have seen as many Indonesian kiaps, as I have Dutch or Australian, scratch their heads over the unfathomable ways of the Melanesians.
THE BRITISH IN FIJI

Deryck Scarr

If we may believe that Rupert Brooke was an authority on anything besides honey and small corners of the earth that are forever England, then

... The Englishman strikes roots, imagines he's in a story by Kipling, and elects himself perpetual vice-consul . . . . My country! My country!

He was writing of Levuka, Fiji, the South Seas Islands group where the English have most congregated. Only very rarely, though, did they call themselves Mista there; and then it was on the plantations where, in the thirty-odd years following the establishment of a resident white community some 2,000 strong around the year 1870, they had to communicate in a form of pidgin with labourers imported, in particular from New Hebrides and the Solomon Islands towards the heart of Melanesia.

Among Fijians, Melanesianized Polynesians as the present state of knowledge would seem to indicate, the Englishman—Scotsman, he was quite as likely to be, more rarely Irish or Welsh—was not unhappy to be called Turaga, like a Fijian chief. A chief, say, such as the one who addressed the Defence Club in Suva one evening during 1938, differentiating by country of origin the Europeans whom his people had encountered since whalers came through in the late 1790s—and before whom, it had been confidently expected Fijians would wither away.

If this was not what had happened following Fiji's cession to Britain in 1874 the credit did not lie with rule from London. The Colonial Office expected pretty much a re-enactment of the New Zealand scene: seizure of land, suppression of culture in the name of 'uplifting' and assimilation. Chance prevented this in Fiji. Chance brought there in 1865 a London-born seaman, more recently shipwrecked botanical collector, who almost succeeded in making Fiji viable long-term as an independent kingdom under the assembled Turaga presided over by the Vunivalu of Bau as Tui Viti; and chance saw arrive, again, as first resident Governor, the Scottish aristocrat Arthur Hamilton Gordon, a son of Queen Victoria's Prime Minister Lord Aberdeen, who found all to admire in what J.B. Thurston, the castaway, had done, and nothing admirable in the aspirations of the settlers.

Bankrupt cotton planters, over-extended small merchants, they held that now Fijians were British subjects they must be changed from communal, kin-oriented beings into atomized 'individuals'; not merely enabled to
sell their land and labour as freely as cheaply, but actually forced to do so by pressure from a tax in cash; though not necessarily be allowed to sit in the Legislative Council, and only exceptionally permitted to enter European clubs.

When Governor Sir John Thurston died in harness at the beginning of 1897, the one time castaway had been the single most influential European in Fiji for over thirty years, during which time Fijians had preserved land and society through a produce tax and the semi-autonomous Fijian Administration; while from 1878, as seat of the Western Pacific High Commission, Fiji had exported to the other Islands of the region where no civilized power ruled - as none did in Melanesia, except for the French in New Caledonia - a necessarily watered down version of the policy followed there.

In the Solomon Islands and New Hebrides, this meant the British were averse to encouraging white settlement by registering deeds to land - New Hebrides' land purchases, in particular, were often patently absurd; and it meant refusal to facilitate plantation development by granting licences to recruit labour. If you were British - as most of the few score Europeans at large in central Melanesia were, outside New Caledonia - and you wanted to grow coffee on Efate or deal Melanesia-wide in the staple of the Islands trade like firearms, alcohol, dynamite, you had to do it under the French, American, German, Norwegian, or some other flag of convenience.

Otherwise, you risked interference from a British naval commander operating as a Deputy Commissioner under the Western Pacific Orders in Council, or even from the High Commissioner himself when he visited the Solomons in 1894 to inaugurate the British Protectorate under which these disabilities were to be extended to all foreigners.

New Hebrides ran on in the old vein, until the powers most involved with the group, Britain and France, agreed on joint administration in 1906; and then anarchy was institutionalized there because, with very little interest in New Hebrides at all - the handful of planters and traders who were not French were mostly Australian, as were the noisy Presbyterian missionaries, and the gentlemanly Anglicans of the Melanesian Mission were more concerned with the Solomon Islands - Britain let France get away with a weak, barely existent central administration which left the French Residency free to press its own nationals' considerable, if in equity dubiously based, plantation interests. And anyway, in the British Solomon Islands Protectorate, land was being declared waste by a British Resident Commissioner who was all for plantation development, on the assumption Solomon Islanders were a dying race.

There was a harder, more pragmatic edge among the British in Melanesia after the turn of the century. It appeared among officials in Fiji too, from Governor Sir Everard im Thurn downward, in their desire to make Fijian land available for white settlement. The late nineteenth century position was impossible to shake, though, with some 83 per cent of land - not the best land, admittedly - firm in Fijian hands. And some continuing contrast in attitude between the British in Fiji and the powers-that-were, say in Papua, appeared when Lieutenant-Governor Sir Hubert Murray wrote from Port Moresby while planning his White Women's Protection Ordinance, to ask the Fiji Government what exceptional measures its far longer experience had
proved necessary. None, he was told; and could have been told how Sir John Thurston had hauled into court a planter's wife to explain herself after she fired her revolver upon an intruder fleeing from her bedroom.

If you had asked the Fijian who spoke to the Defence Club in 1938, he would have been likely to say European womanhood was too frail and angular to appeal much - though it was understood he had not been unsuspectable up at Oxford, before the Great War carried him away to win the Médaille Militaire in action with the Foreign Legion during the Battle of Champagne in 1915.

Lack of gallantry was not common with this Turaga - Ratu J.L.V. Sukuna, high chief of Bau and Lau, District Commissioner, Member of Legislative Council, Secretary for Fijian Affairs after 1944, Ratu Sir Lala from 1946; but on this occasion, in the Defence Club, when he compared the British with other Europeans, he was not speaking as himself. Inspired, by something racially provocative from a European friend, to tell his white audience what Fijians thought of them, he took on the guise of a qase, an elder, back telling his fellow villagers what he had seen in town - where this humorous old man had concluded you should not be surprised if told Europeans had conquered death.

He knew the different breeds: ruggedly independent Australians, with their thin, shrill, displeasing accents, their free swearing, perpetual hurry after money - they were principally involved with the big trading firms or the Colonial Sugar Refining Company - and their habit of holding aloof from Fijians; the New Zealanders, mostly bank clerks, who aped the Englishman, had made a mess of colonial administration in Western Samoa, and took nothing so seriously as Rugby football; the American, who was either a filmstar or a millionaire; and the British themselves, administrative officers, who had to be looked at through a film of respect because Fiji had been ceded to their country, though in person they were cold and remote; they seemed to like Fijians but, impervious to other's needs, would not dream of giving you ten bob, and however much you admired their shirt would never hand it over.

They were fresh-faced, neatly dressed, never flurried, speaking with an exaggerated drawl. Their professional application was more than adequate, their personal inclination curiously proprietary: 'He picks up our language quickly enough' - says Ratu Sukuna's qase of the typical young British official - 'though he frequently speaks it as if he owned it'.

There were no castaways among British officials by the late 1930s when Ratu Sukuna was mocking them, not castaways in the literal sense anyway. Two generations earlier, former planters had been taken into the Fiji government; in this one, local European families more commonly merged into the Australian-cum-New Zealand business world, when they had no plantations or businesses of their own (and these were likely to be taken over by some Sydney giant, or rely upon an Australasian bank); and though a few European locally-born did rise in the colonial service this century, preference was for just those youngsters Ratu Sukuna described.

They were chosen to fit the mental image of Aucionarius - otherwise Sir Ralph Furse, appointments secretary at the Colonial Office, who felt it appropriate to call himself after this supposed bird-limer in classical
mythology from his task of snaring for the Empire young graduates he called sahibs; ideally, sahibs with third-class honours.

District Officers in their early twenties, they needed to be all-rounders; witness the official diary of the D.O. Labasa for May 1956. One morning he is haranguing an assembly from the back of a lorry; a whole day is spent in the office 'tying and untying the marital knot'; and another is devoted to:

The Indian Advisory Committee who seem to regard the District Officer as a sort of elevated Government Storekeeper with an unending supply of culverts, road-making equipment, traffic signs and lavatory pedestals. The meeting lasted for eight hours but mercifully the evening fell and we have no lamps.

Kipling apart, there was in Melanesia even into the 1960s something of a Sanders of the River touch about the British role; though the difference in Fiji was that District Officers had no direct authority in the affairs of Fijians themselves; after Ratu Sukuna re-established the Fijian Administration in 1943-44, the provinces were ruled by Fijian Rokos Tui, the districts by Fijian Bulis, Fijian Regulations were applied by Fijian Magistrates.

Not much of this was greatly to the taste of the British, who were at heart for district rule; and just as there was no Thurston to storm at backsliding Fijian officials - their deficiencies could in some degree be traced to lack of experience since his death - so there was no ready return to the nineteenth century's central marketing system for Fijian produce. Not even Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna, intimate of Governors, for Fijians their god, could turn back the clock.

The very fact that Melanesia had a 'native' who had gone to Oxford so early as 1913, eaten his dinners at the Middle Temple, and spoke immaculate English, might indicate that the British had dropped their customary reserve. He was the only one, though; local equivalent of how many Indian princes. His namesake and predecessor. Ratu Josefa Lalabalavu, the Tui Cakau, Thurston's adopted son, had not been accepted in many European households when he came back from school in Sydney in 1880. And Ratu Sukuna, thirty years later, owed his higher education to his own people, not the British. He fought in the Foreign Legion because the British Army would not have him.

Anglo-Saxon exclusiveness was manifested at the Suva Grammar School, where Fijians were normally not accepted and only a sprinkling of part-Europeans were allowed entry; in the Levuka Public School, part-Europeans excluded Indians and Chinese. And the British rulers joined hands with locally born Anglo-Saxons to keep it so. That would have been no surprise to Rupert Brooke, poet on his travels in search of the romantic, who found Suva a much civilized place where the rules of etiquette were strictly observed; in the streets and offices, where Fijians, Indians, Europeans moved together without mingling, it was
So queer, seeing the thin, much clothed, ancient, over-civilized, silver bangled, subtle Indians, and these jolly, half-naked, savage children of the earth, working side by side in obedience to the Clifton and Trinity, or Winchester and New College, men, with his 'Doesn't do to be too friendly with these niggahs, you know. You must make 'em respect you'. That is empire.

REFERENCES


Noumea was built by levelling a hill to drain a marsh, a project which took twenty years. The traces of this have disappeared along with the convict camps but the great stone public buildings remain – Government House, the law courts, the infantry barracks, the old military hospital, the artillery barracks, the cathedral. They are signs of a convict past, and an attitude to public spending, unique in the South Pacific.

Another feature of Noumea is that until the nickel boom ten years ago, whole suburbs were unchanged since the 1890s. The era of colonial expansion was the convict period, from the colony's foundation in 1854 until roughly 1900. Governor Feillet's decision in the 1890s to halt transportation and wean the colonists from their dependence on supplying the convict system was premature. The colony stagnated until World War II, with Asian contract labourers merely replacing convict numbers.

This paper examines the colonial masters in New Caledonia's formative period, but also the way in which the convict era gave New Caledonia a different experience from other Melanesian colonies.

THE CONVICT COLONY

Noumea was founded in 1854 and for the next thirty years naval officers governed the colony. Their object was not to conquer the forty to sixty thousand Melanesians but to create a few completely secure areas in which convicts could be introduced as early as possible. Troops were concentrated in Noumea and Canala and the administration's interest in the tribes diminished with their distance from these two points. The half of the main island north of Wagap and Kone was of little interest, the Loyalty Islands still less. Tribes near the convict enclaves of the south felt the full weight of a very large and powerful European presence.

There was a thorough preparatory period before convicts were introduced in 1864, and from 1867 the colony, which numbered two thousand five hundred Europeans in 18641 was able to absorb on average one thousand convicts each year. The prison population reached twelve thousand in 1876, then stabilized at this level until the end of transportation in the 1890s. As an indication of the scale of transportation, and the feat of administration it was to feed, house and supervise these numbers, it should be remembered that there were never more than three thousand convicts in Australia at any one time.
In 1877 the total European population was just under seventeen thousand. Nearly three-quarters were convicts, time-expired convicts and political prisoners. Three thousand were military and civil service personnel and their families. Only two thousand seven hundred were colonists.

Most prisoners were kept in gaols close to Noumea, only a small proportion being sent to the prison farms of Canala, Bourail, Teremba, Fonwary, Koniombo and Ouegoa. During the 1870s four thousand political prisoners were transported, mainly to the Isle of Pines. Only a few hundred convicts were assigned to the road gangs or to private employers.

Noumea in the 1870s had a non-convict population of four thousand of whom only about one thousand were free civilians, with about eight thousand convicts and political prisoners nearby, supplying the town with labour and controversy.

The 'colonial masters' of New Caledonia were the civil servants and military officers of Noumea. The clergy were the victims of petty bullying by a usually anti-clerical civil service. The free colonists depended for their livelihood on supplying government contracts and this, combined with rigid censorship under the naval governors, kept them in line.

The civil servants and military officers were on two year postings in New Caledonia. Normally the Infanterie de la Marine regiments spent two years in a colony, then two years in France, then on to the next colony. Military and naval officers, and the civil servants not of the penal administration, could expect to meet up again in Indochina, Africa, one of the Caribbean colonies, Reunion or Tahiti. For them reality was their service, the colony a backdrop. Politics in the European community was the politics of the civil service, a vicious struggle between clericalists, who were conservative as well as Catholic, and Freemasons, nominally more liberal.

It is customary to contrast British and French colonial administrations, by saying the British used a few highly paid Europeans and many lowly paid non-Europeans, whereas the French exported an army of badly paid European fonctionnaires. European public servants in New Caledonia were not badly paid to begin with, but had subsidized or free housing, food and medical treatment. If the European bureaucracy was about fifteen hundred and the military establishment - a full regiment, an artillery company, a gendarmerie company and three or four naval vessels - was about the same, there was also a Melanesian police force of one thousand, and three to five hundred Melanesian postmen, sailors, dockers, interpreters and others.

Concentrating the convicts in Noumea simplified security, but it also made life more agreeable for an all-powerful bureaucracy. The only proper road in the colony until the mid 1880s ran down to the picnic spot at Anse Vata. Settlers had difficulty obtaining convicts, but each officer had two or three convict servants.

Spending on public works in Noumea was lavish. Noumea had saltwater distillation plants in the 1860s, water piped by convict-built aqueducts and a secondary school in the 1870s, gaslight in the 1880s, horse-drawn omnibuses in the 1890s and, briefly, a railway. The gracious homes on the
Boulevard Vauban belonged not to merchants, nickel barons or graziers, but to departmental heads. Symbolically the cathedral stands at one end of the Boulevard, the Masonic lodge at the other.

Beyond Noumea the administrative structure in the 1870s and 1880s was a mixture reflecting the varying degrees of interest and control from district to district. At Bourail, Teremba and Canala there were district officers, usually seconded from the regiment. The more settled areas, between Noumea and Teremba, were divided into two gendarmerie districts. Outside these areas, even in mining sites such as Thio and Houailou, NCOs and the Melanesian police provided what contact the administration wanted with the tribes. This chaotic arrangement was held together by a telegraph line, which after 1874 linked every post with Noumea. All decisions of any consequence — including, one is supposed to believe, the decision to counterattack warriors attacking the telegraph office — were taken in Noumea.

Although New Caledonia exported gold, copper and antimony in the 1870s, and nickel was exported regularly in the 1880s, exports counted for little in the colony's economy. Until the 1880s the administration's annual contract for beef was worth more than all exports combined. The European colony was devoted to producing or importing goods for the convicts and their guards. The attempt to export sugar foundered on the high costs for land and, ironically in a prison colony, labour. Instead, sugar and rum were the second and third largest government contracts, keeping the sugar mills operating but producing below capacity until the 1880s when the industry collapsed. For the small farmer - Alsace Lorraine refugee, retired soldier, clerk or gendarme - there were many lesser contracts for maize, vegetables, pork and coffee.

After the disruption of the revolt and the repatriation of four thousand political prisoners in 1879, the price of beef halved and runs were bought up and consolidated by a new wave of colonists who arrived in the 1880s with capital. After these economic upheavals it was just feasible to supply tinned beef to the French army, but the colony's cost structure still kept New Caledonia uncompetitive with Australia for beef and other commodities. The transformation had a social cost to the free colonists. The social composition of the graziers - the richest settler group - changed between the 1870s and the 1880s. Until the 1878 revolt they were for the most part retired shopkeepers and NCOs, or English and Irish immigrants who in Australia would have been small farmers. Local lawyers and merchants also owned properties, but these too were small scale - under 500 ha in the settled districts south of Bourail.

A DIFFERENT COLONIAL EXPERIENCE

New Caledonia today is unique in the South Pacific because a high proportion - one third - of the population is European. As in Fiji indigenous Melanesians are less than half the population. That New Caledonia joins Fiji and New Zealand in having an extensive immigrant population is not the result of its history as a French convict colony, but of the absence of tropical diseases, helped also by the presence of mineral wealth. It is safe to say that if the French government had not taken possession of New Caledonia, Britain eventually would have, either to
pre-empt the Australian colonies, as in Fiji, or on their behalf, as in the far less promising colony of Papua. One can even speculate that the immigrant population would have been higher than under the French because the convict colony imposed economic limits on settlement.

As it was the settler population was kept artificially large first supplying the convict system, then exporting beef at above world prices to the French army. New Caledonians were not, however, faced with an onslaught of European settlers, as the Maoris were. The settlers never found a readily exportable crop whose fluctuations on the world commodity market might drive them to bankruptcy but which made large scale immigration and investment periodically attractive.

Other differences created by the convict experience are very important to an understanding of nineteenth century New Caledonia but did not leave a permanent mark.

Unlike other South Pacific islands New Caledonia was not brought under formal colonial authority for reasons arising from existing European contacts such as the need to protect missionaries, to regulate labour recruiting or to systematize the plantation economy. New Caledonia was taken over to be a prison colony, a reason unconnected with the French missionaries and English traders who were the permanent European population before 1853. Until the 1890s there were to be two New Caledonias: a South Pacific trading economy of isolated trader/planters, missionaries and prospectors, and the archipelago of prison camps surrounded by the European farmers and graziers who fed the convicts, soldiers, warders and administrators. The two halves met when the European economy required land and labour, and the settlement was a market for large quantities of coconut oil, pork and chicken supplied by the trading networks along the coast.

When the French administration approached the question of governing New Caledonia, it did so within an overall plan not of conquering the tribes or establishing control over them within a definite period, but of establishing the convict system as quickly as possible in a few secure areas. By Pacific standards they had enormous military and financial resources available to do this. As an illustration, Governor Jean Saisset arrived in 1859 with a company of troops, doubling the garrison but his orders were to retreat; to withdraw the French outpost at Balade in the extreme north and to concentrate on two settlements, Noumea and Canala. Again, the early 1870s saw a rapid expansion of the garrison (from between eight and nine hundred in the late 1860s to sixteen hundred including dependents in the mid 1870s) as the convict system grew. Yet forts in the northern - South Pacific - half of the island were abandoned.

If the strategic objective was not to conquer the tribes the military administrators were tempted to use troops where civilian administrators would have regarded resort to force as an admission of failure. The governor best known for his military intervention beyond the settled areas is Charles Guillain, who in the course of an eight year governorship in the 1860s came to use military assistance in tribal wars to acquire Melanesian allies. His policy developed a crazy momentum of its own until he was recalled in 1870 because he was fighting a campaign in the extreme north out of all proportion to French interests in the area. His successors in the 1870s brought military effort back into line with overall policy.
The net effect of the military administration was to prolong tribal warfare for at least a generation longer than necessary. The administration was not concerned with establishing a civil administration over Melanesians; it was generally preoccupied with the settled areas. There was no attempt even at that simplest of colonial devices, indirect rule. The administration did not consistently support its tribal allies and the military assistance it did give was rarely decisive in tribal wars. During the early 1870s several at least of the favoured sons of the mid 1860s—the Poya and Baye tribes of the Wagap valley and coastal Howailou—took a thrashing from their enemies without the French administration intervening.

The military administration deepened the division, which arose from the pre 1853 contact history, between coastal tribes surrounding a trading port and tribes opposed to them living along the coast but without access to a port. The latter tended to accept missionaries while the port tribes at best were unenthusiastic. Anticlericalism in the administration played its part in maintaining the division, but the administration's support for the large port tribes was probably inevitable given the administration's need for powerful allies. As a result New Caledonia was quite unlike other South Pacific islands, where the new order was more or less united, with the powerful chiefs or leaders who attracted traders being pressed to adopt Christianity and obtaining in return military or naval assistance to back their rule where necessary. New Caledonian coastal tribes divided into Christianized tribes which were generally weak, and powerful warlike pagan tribes which controlled the trading ports and were supported, albeit not consistently, by the administration.

NOTES

1Sydney Morning Herald, 12 January 1865.

2Annuaire de la Nouvelle Caledonie, for 1878:72, 165.
THE JAPANESE 1942-1945: A NOTE ON THE SCALE OF THE DYING

There is no doubt when and why most foreigners went to Melanesia: they went between 1942 and 1945, and their purpose was to make war. Moving south from their bases in Guam and Truk the Japanese of Major-General Tomitaro Horii's South Seas Force began going ashore in Rabaul before dawn on 23 January 1942. With little opposition the Japanese later advanced to the north coast of mainland New Guinea and down through Bougainville to the British Solomon Islands. From mid-1942 a series of battles fought on the Coral Sea, on the Kokoda Trail, at Milne Bay and on Guadalcanal marked the southward limit of Japanese expansion. American and Australian forces drove the Japanese from the central Solomons and from Papua, then island-hopped through the mass of the Japanese troops to fight in the Philippines, Borneo, Tarawa and other islands leading to Iwo Jima and Okinawa. But the fighting did not cease in Melanesia. In 1945 there were probably more Australians in New Guinea than at any other time. It is impossible to calculate the total number of Australian servicemen who went to Melanesia during the war, but over 550,000 Australians served overseas, and nearly all of them at some time were in 'the islands'. The Americans, particularly during the build up to the invasion of the Philippines, had gathered more massive forces of combat and support troops in their Melanesian bases. Somewhere in excess of one million uniformed Americans saw the south Pacific.

David Sissons of the Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific Studies, generously agreed to use his knowledge of Japanese sources to supply figures on the numbers of Japanese servicemen who fought in Melanesia. Not only do the tables give the magnitude of the Japanese commitment to the area, but they provide a stark indicator of the experience of those who went to the 'South Seas'. Of 392,800 Japanese and auxiliaries who went to Melanesia, 237,500 died there during the war and another 8,800 died before the survivors were repatriated. That is, over 60 per cent of the Japanese who went to Melanesia during the war died there. By contrast about 9,000 Australians died in the island campaigns, and the Australians did most of the ground fighting for the Allies. The most appalling loses suffered by the Japanese were in Lieutenant-General Hatazo Adachi's XVIII Army which fought on the mainland of Papua New Guinea: 13,263 men surrendered from a force once 120,000 strong. In four years more Japanese had died in Papua New Guinea than all other foreigners before or since.

This note does not attempt to assess the Japanese as māstās: it is intended to measure a disaster, the scale of which is rarely grasped even by those with a scholarly interest in the area.

H. Nelson
ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF JAPANESE IN MELANESIA
IN WORLD WAR II

Japanese Ministry of Welfare Estimates

The following figures produced by the Japanese Ministry of Welfare (the Department responsible for repatriation and for pensions) are quoted in the official history of the Japanese Army Health Services in World War II published in 1970.

The right-hand column (J + K) gives a convenient guide for the minimum number of Japanese to have been in these areas. The actual numbers would have been higher; because the figures given take no account of troops transferred out of the area to other theatres during the course of the war. (For example, it seems that in 1943 most of the 3,400 troops that escaped from Buna and regrouped at Hopoi were progressively repatriated to Japan.) Similarly, of the troops evacuated from Guadalcanal, although most went to Bougainville and thus remained in the area, a division went to the Philippines and a brigade to Burma.
### Table 1

**Japanese Killed and Survivors - by Areas**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H)</td>
<td>(J) (K) (L) (M) (J)+(K)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strength to Total</td>
<td>Deaths after Total</td>
<td>Deaths after Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15.8.45</td>
<td>15.8.45</td>
<td>15.8.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Guinea</td>
<td>30,200</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bismarck Archipelago</td>
<td>57,500</td>
<td>15,900</td>
<td>3,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomons</td>
<td>12,300</td>
<td>62,300</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. The figures include Formosan and Korean levies.
### Table 2

**Strength Returns Furnished to Australian Surveillance Parties after the Armistice (Incl. Army, Navy, Civilians, and other auxiliaries)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Figures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australian New Guinea (mainland)</td>
<td>13,263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Britain</td>
<td>97,446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Ireland</td>
<td>12,411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Solomons:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buin and adjacent islands</td>
<td>18,628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kieita</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numa Numa</td>
<td>1,635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buka</td>
<td>3,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (Solomons):</strong></td>
<td>23,493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dutch New Guinea:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorong</td>
<td>8,943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarmi</td>
<td>5,516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manokwari</td>
<td>6,662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moemi</td>
<td>1,407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babo</td>
<td>937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kokas</td>
<td>836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fak Fak</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaimana</td>
<td>1,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kekwa</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (Dutch New Guinea):</strong></td>
<td>25,926</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Except where indicated to the contrary these figures are taken from *Advanced AMF Weekly Operations and Intelligence Report No.1* (to 12 October 1945), Appendix Bii (Australian War Memorial, 423/11/168).

2. Signal from Australian Liaison Party at Buin to 2 Australian Corps, 10 September 1945 (Australian War Memorial, Savigny Papers, 158/1, 'Surrender Commission').

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL LINKAGES

Social Organization and Trade

The effects of scale on social and economic organization

R. GERARD WARD

Pre-contact trade in Papua New Guinea

JIM ALLEN

The persistence of traditional trade and ceremonial exchange in the Massim

MARTHA MACINTYRE AND MICHAEL YOUNG
THE EFFECTS OF SCALE ON SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION

R. Gerard Ward

One of the key characteristics of Melanesia is the relatively small scale of most of its component units - islands, physiographic units, states, villages, linguistic or other social groups. Scale is not a simple linear characteristic, and change of scale brings qualitative as well as quantitative alterations in many phenomena. In a region such as Melanesia, the qualitative aspects are often much more important than the quantitative. We make frequent use of the phrase 'economies of scale' but we might also talk of the 'sociology of scale' or, as Dr McArthur indicates in her paper in this series, the 'demography of scale', or of the 'insurance of scale'. This paper outlines some of the qualitative aspects of small scale which, in the particular context of Melanesia, underlie many of the issues and problems which are addressed in other papers in the series.

The effects of small scale are often increased exponentially by insularity or isolation, either physical or social. A small state like Liechtenstein may exhibit some of the features of small scale units, but place that population on an island five hundred kilometres from its nearest neighbour, or isolate it by barriers to linguistic, social, political or migratory contact, and the range and intensity of the characteristics of small scale will be massively amplified. This has been the situation in parts of Melanesia in the past although some of the diversity which stems from such isolation has been reduced in particular areas. The process continues. The ridges and valleys of the diverse cultural landscape are being smoothed by the erosive forces of wider contact, more movement, new systems of production and administration, more universalistic systems of belief and behaviour induced by formal education, missions, media and, increasingly, the consciousness-bending operations of advertising, both public and private. Although these processes imply the spread of greater uniformity in many respects, the small scale and isolation of some parts of every Melanesian country ensure that diversity will continue. The ideals of equal opportunity which figure prominently in the national goals of some Melanesian states are unachievable for some regions in those states. With changes in the technology of shipping and air transport, in the degree of integration into a world economic and political system, and the concomitant increase in dependence on the monetary sector, scale and isolation assume greater importance than hitherto and lay down, almost deterministically, limits to the range of opportunities which people in some parts of Melanesia can hope to share. They are basic to the new divergence in opportunity which is appearing throughout Melanesia between core areas of expanding monetized economic activity and peripheral areas of stagnant
levels of participation in the monetary sector and declining subsistence activity.

SCALE IN THE ENVIRONMENT

In comparison with Polynesia and Micronesia the states of Melanesia are relatively large. The island of New Guinea is sometimes referred to as the largest in the world. The environment of the region is extremely diverse. Yet a good number of the component parts, whether islands or isolated parts of islands, exhibit many of the characteristics which stem from small scale of habitat. For example, the atolls and coralline islands of northeast Papua New Guinea share most of the same features of restricted resources as eastern Polynesia, the Marshalls, or Kiribati. Only their incorporation in a wider polity, and the escape this offers, through out-migration, counters the limits of small size and narrow resources. To a degree this is a new escape route which compensates for the restricted opportunities within a monetized economy which are offered by the restricted habitats of small islands.

It is important to note that even though the countries of Melanesia have relatively large land areas, the area of usable land is much smaller. Bleecker (1975:60-68) estimates that only 24 per cent of the total land area of Papua New Guinea is suitable for arable crops while 48 per cent (which includes the arable area) is suitable for tree crops. If low capability land is excluded from these categories the percentages are 10 and 21 respectively. In the case of Fiji, Twyford and Wright (1965:218-219) consider that only 19 per cent of the country is 'first class' land suitable for permanent agriculture without improvement, with a further 11 per cent being suitable after minor improvements. In the Solomon Islands, areas designated as 'agricultural opportunity areas' cover only a little over 12 per cent of the land area (Hansell and Wall 1976:153) and these relatively small areas have their potential utility reduced by fragmentation. The 'agricultural opportunity areas' are split into forty-three widely dispersed sections. The chances of taking advantage of significant economies of area scale are limited by this fragmentation of the better land which hinders, in particular, the provision of those services which are essential for effective participation in the monetary economy.

The disadvantages which small size of land area almost inevitably imposes apply to many parts of the region, though some advantages also accrue from small size combined with isolation. For example, the degree of natural quarantine which archipelagic areas enjoy and which, when combined with administrative action, enabled the Lau group of Fiji to escape the ravages of the 1918-19 influenza pandemic, is a case in point. Size of land area is also a form of insurance in the face, say, of hurricane damage. The zone of greatest destruction from hurricanes is usually relatively narrow. It can blanket the whole of a small island, leaving few refuges for retreat or sources for subsequent support. The larger islands do not face such risks to the same degree.
SCALE IN POPULATION AND PROVISION OF SERVICES

McArthur describes (see pp. 27-32) how small populations are inherently unstable with the likelihood of quite rapid fluctuations in size arising from the chance run of births all of one sex. The larger the size of the population unit the greater the insurance provided against such instabilities. The security which small size and isolation can provide against introduced disease must be balanced against the fact that, where communities are small and the population not widely dispersed, introduced diseases can spread extremely rapidly and may well affect a very high proportion of a population at virtually the same time. Thus small size does tend to magnify risks once the benefits of isolation are lost. For small communities which become incorporated in a wider state some of the risks of demographic instability are reduced. Migration becomes an easier means of countering such problems as a run of all male or all female births. However, when the economic advantages lie overwhelmingly in the areas of concentration and centrality, the migration will tend to be from the small and isolated areas to the larger and accessible areas.

A population represents a market. A small population, even one with a relatively high purchasing power, is likely to provide too small a market to reach the threshold necessary for the maintenance of many services or the provision of higher order goods. Herein lies one of the basic dilemmas of all Melanesian countries. Most of them have specific national goals which seek to achieve a degree of equality throughout the country. Such a goal is impossible to achieve completely and those islands or areas with small populations will almost inevitably have a lower level of services. The problem can be illustrated with any one of a whole range of services. For example, it would be impossibly expensive to provide a highly qualified doctor for every small island in Melanesia. Thus small and isolated areas must make do with a paramedical service or a clinic with a restricted capacity. Patients may be moved to higher order centres but this is costly both financially and in time. The risks are increased. In many situations even where a fully trained medical officer may be stationed on a relatively small island, the limited number of patients he will see and the limited range of conditions he will be called upon to treat are likely to result in some deterioration in the quality of his experience and thus of the service provided. This type of situation may be illustrated at many levels. Even at a national level the fact that a certain minimum is essential in the provision of some facilities means that the cost of providing a particular service may be high in relation to the demand. A jet airport requires facilities of air traffic control, fire and other services which may be used only a few times per week, yet the basic costs must still be met. In the case of education it is clearly impossible to provide secondary schools for every small community and the disadvantages of small size and isolation can only be countered by the migration of the teenage population. This in itself discriminates against the smaller communities, for the risk of losing their educated population altogether is thereby increased. Melanesian states all face the choice of either meeting the high cost of serving many small isolated communities or accepting that such communities can only receive low levels of service, and may well decline in population.

The same basic problem applies in the provision of goods. Population and buying power of small island communities are limited; local stores can only carry small stocks. Higher order goods are not economic to stock as
too much capital would be tied up in these slow moving items. The difficulties of inter-island transport (or its equivalent in unroaded inland areas) means that restocking from wholesale is infrequent, and where store keepers can order high demand goods the delay in delivery is inevitably much longer than in the case of the larger urban centres. For the resident on a small, isolated island the utility of the money he earns is likely to be less than for his compatriot in the capital city.

SCALE AND SOCIETY

In an extremely useful paper, Benedict (1967:45-55) has examined the sociological aspects of smallness. He distinguishes between a small scale society and a small territory. 'The criteria of size for territories are area and population; the criteria of scale for a society are the number and quality of role relationships' (1967:45). Most Melanesian societies are small scale either in the sense that the total social field is small, or that the society 'is composed of a series of interlocking small groups which extend through a considerable population' (1967:46). In such situations division of labour cannot proceed very far and certainly in Melanesia in precontact times it appears that the degree of specialization was relatively small. Following Max Weber and Talcott Parsons, Benedict points out that social and economic relations in small scale societies are essentially particularistic in that each member of the society has a unique relationship to all other members and these particular relationships will influence any interaction between members of the society. In larger societies where most relationships are universalistic an individual performing a particular role will treat all others with whom he comes in contact while performing that role according to certain universalistic standards. I would stress, however, that this bipolar classification does oversimplify, as particularistic and universalistic relationships coexist in almost all societies. As usual it is a matter of degree. Virtually all societies in Melanesia are particularistic to a greater degree than in Australia or other larger and more developed countries where universalistic relationships predominate in public and economic affairs. Even in Papua New Guinea, the largest of Melanesian countries, the interplay of particularistic and universalistic values pervades most political activities, from local government to national government levels. It pervades the work of the bureaucracy and the Ombudsman's report on the operations of Air Niugini clearly indicates the particularistic nature of many transactions of expatriate staff in the airline (Ombudsman Commission 1980). The nickname of 'family government' which has been used in post-independence Vanuatu is suggestive of a similar situation.

The longer term question is what forms of reconciliation can be made between the demands of the externally oriented commercial world and the internal pressures and loyalties of the small island societies. This is a question which I do not have the competence to answer, but it is clear that many of the tensions of development in Melanesia (such as the lawlessness in some Papua New Guinea towns) are related to the problems of reconciling the particularistic values of the small scale society from which people have come with the universalistic values which are assumed to be prerequisites for a 'modern' apolitical bureaucracy and for commercial or industrial activities.
## Scale and the Economy

Obviously some of the issues already raised are closely related to the operation of the economies of Melanesia and scale influences almost all aspects of these economies. In the first place, because of their relatively small scale the relationship between Melanesian states and their main trading partners are inherently unequal. This can be illustrated by the import and export figures for Australia and Melanesia.

### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Australian imports from and exports to Melanesia as per cent of total Australian</th>
<th>Melanesian imports and exports to Australia as per cent of country's total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>Exports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Caledonia</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:**
- (c) *Annuaire Statistique de la Nouvelle Caledonie 1976*, Service de la Statistique, Noumea.

Although exports to and imports from Melanesia are important for a few individual firms or industries in Australia, at a national scale they are almost insignificant. On the other hand the Melanesian dependence on Australia is very high, especially for imports. New Caledonia is the exception but that territory has an even greater dependence on France.

The lack of bargaining power which is implicit in the unequal relationship operates at many levels and has many facets. The small size of Melanesian markets limits the extent to which island importers can obtain the benefits of bulk purchasing in Australia or other supplying countries. To some extent the fact that Australian companies, such as Burns Philp or W.R. Carpenter, operate in most Melanesian countries allows them to aggregate the separate national markets and use their own vertical integration to obtain some economies of scale. The extent to which these benefits are passed on to island consumers is unclear. It must be noted, also, that these large companies control a high proportion of the Melanesian market in many goods. For example, a survey in Port Vila in early 1976 suggested that one large firm accounted for over one fifth of all the recorded food sales in the town (McGee et al. 1980:122) and a second expatriate firm probably handled another fifth. When combined with
the import monopoly such firms have of many goods through franchise arrangements, the small size of the remainder of the market means that indigenous entrepreneurs often find it very difficult to expand their share of total sales of imports.

The relatively small volumes of imports and exports of all Melanesian countries, and the very restricted amount of trade between Melanesian countries, is reflected not only in the pattern but in the ownership of external shipping services. For example, in late 1977 the New Hebrides was served by shipping lines based in France, Japan, Hong Kong, Noumea and Tonga. None was owned by New Hebridean interests. Crucial operating decisions were made elsewhere. Until mid 1975 New Hebridean copra carried to Europe was charged freight rates over 50 per cent higher than those charged for copra from other Pacific island countries and this reflected the lack of any exporters' organization and the requisite skills for freight rate negotiation in this smallest of Melanesian countries. Almost inevitably the Melanesian countries are price takers. Even their major exports contribute only a very small proportion of total world production of copra or coconut oil, coffee, cacao, or sugar, so that they can have little effect on world market prices.

Although imports make up a high proportion of goods consumed in the monetary sector in all Melanesian countries, the small absolute volumes involved limit the extent to which local industry can be fostered for import substitution. Even in the case of such ubiquitous industries as soft drink manufacture, local producers with their small runs and underused equipment often find it difficult to compete with imported goods. In Port Vila stores, for example, the value of sales of imported soft drink is over three times that of the local product (Mc Gee et al. 1980:229). Consumer preference for tinned drinks rather than bottled, the status (and possibly taste) of the imported product, and the impact of more sophisticated advertising and packaging all appear to be important. For the brands of large foreign firms, the advertising and packaging are simply spinoffs from their vast operations elsewhere. The pattern is repeated in respect of many other products and throughout Melanesia the products of multinational corporations provide a uniform overlay on formerly diverse local production.

The inevitably small scale of many indigenous enterprises and local companies makes them liable to takeover by, or severe competition from, the large overseas firms. Fiji has seen a steady process of takeover of local enterprises by Burns Philp and W.R. Carpenter (see Rokotuivuna et al. 1973), and temporary price cutting is a standard business practice which local firms with limited capital resources often find difficult to withstand. The larger, foreign companies have the advantage of diversity through spread of activities, both spatially and in terms of interests, and product range.

In the case of industrialization within Melanesia, unless the plant is part of a larger (probably foreign) organization, the chances of product diversity are slight. Furthermore, the optimum size of technically efficient plant is often such as to render the activity totally uneconomic for the restricted market of small countries (M. Ward 1975:124). Even in the case of coconut oil extraction, using one of the main products of the land, it has been argued that a coconut oil factory of the size necessary
to fit Vanuatu's copra production would be too small to be fully economic. Given that the producing areas are individually small and very dispersed, local processors must also face considerable costs in accumulating sufficient quantities of raw materials. They are also faced with very restricted opportunities of developing the forward and backward inter-industry linkages which might be expected in larger and more diversified economies. Thus even when industrial plants are established, they are often dependent on distant foreign suppliers for basic materials or equipment servicing, with consequentially greater risks of not being able to ensure continuity of production.

SCALE IN TRANSPORT

The economies of scale, vertical integration and access to new technology, which are open to large foreign firms but not to small Melanesian-based ones, are well illustrated in the transport sphere. Two important and related trends in shipping and air transport discriminate against small nations and against the smaller and more isolated parts of archipelagic states. These are the trend towards larger vessels or aircraft (which offer operators savings in fuel and crew costs per unit of cargo or passenger) and towards the handling of cargo in larger units. These trends, advantageous in the large volume and highly capital intensive situations of large developed countries, provide few benefits to small countries which are shorter of capital than labour.

Containerization and related technical changes have reduced the number of ports in Melanesia which are directly served from overseas. Incoming cargo must be broken down for onward shipment to the small consuming points, and exports bulked at some intermediate point into container units. This results in increases in total shipping or air transport costs. As vessels become larger, they call less frequently, and reduced frequency of supply imposes higher costs on retailers in the form of the need to tie up more capital in stock. It may also reduce the incentive to produce for export and limit the range of possible products to those with long storage life.

The nexus between the size of producing (or consuming) unit and distance from nearest export/import port is of great importance for small states and islands. All Melanesian states face dilemmas in providing services to small, isolated areas. In the Solomon Islands during a six month period in 1977, the Eastern District produced 10 per cent of the country's copra. Getting that 10 per cent to the points of export absorbed 32 per cent of the total ton-kilometres devoted to internal transport of copra (BTE 1980). Small island groups such as the Santa Cruz must obviously carry an inordinate load in transport costs unless some policy of cross subsidy is applied. The small Melanesian states experience the same relative disadvantage on a world scale, with subsidies unlikely to be forthcoming. Foreign aid is rarely addressed to such matters.
SCALE IN ADMINISTRATION

It can be argued that small states or divisions of states have certain advantages in that they can achieve social and political coherence more readily than large units, and that this makes social adjustment easier (Knox 1967:44). This is at first sight a very plausible assumption but it is doubtful if it can be accepted fully. Benedict points out that 'a strong network of particularistic relationships does not mean social harmony' and that the 'intense factionalism of small communities is a matter of repeated observation'. He also raises the question, alluded to earlier, of whether 'universalistic role-relationships [are] essential for economic development?' (1967:44-45). I would add the question, are such roles essential for effective administration? Benedict argues that they probably are, as large or even medium scale operations require functionally specific roles, and universalistic criteria for efficiency and performance based on achievement rather than on an individual's hereditary or non-work relationships to other members of the organization (1967:50). If this is so, then the small Melanesian states may have to expect difficulties in creating administrative systems which are 'efficient' in a 'western' sense.

Jacobs (1975) has provided a useful checklist of the types of problems which are likely to face small administrations. The list includes shortages of specialists and technicians for whom local training is not available and who, because the calls on their services are spasmodic, may be costly to employ and may have difficulty in maintaining skills. The small size of administrations may also limit life career opportunities. The cost of maintaining a basic administration is likely to be higher in a small country than in a larger one, and where the population is itself dispersed in small units this tendency is accentuated. Jacobs also argues that because individuals may have direct access to ministers, and because informal means of communication are often used, the influence of individuals and a lack of recording of decisions make administration more liable to discontinuities and maverick interference.

Clear examples of the higher cost of government for small states are seen in the realm of foreign relations. The perceived need to create a national identity abroad as well as at home encourages membership of the United Nations, development banks and a range of other international organizations, and the maintenance of some diplomatic missions. Even in Papua New Guinea the cost effectiveness of this has been seriously questioned and the Solomon Islands has attempted a unique solution by having a single roving 'ambassador at large' to represent the country abroad. It may save money but kill the ambassador! Such original solutions may also be needed in other quarters, and in the Melanesian case the building up of an international core of skilled Melanesian personnel with long experience in the region as a whole may be a way of handling some of the problems. In a sense the South Pacific Commission and the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation may be seen as initial attempts to meet such needs.
SCALE IN AID

The countries of Melanesia are all major recipients, on a per capita basis, of foreign aid. To some extent this reflects the indivisibility of certain activities or facilities and the higher per capita cost of providing some infrastructural items for small against large countries. It may also be related to the lack of diversity in the monetary sector economy and the relatively high degree of dependence on imports (see de Vries 1975 and Schiavo-Campo 1975). But the aid business demonstrates a number of the problems faced by small countries in their relations with larger states or with international agencies. (See the chapter 'Aid in Development' in Ward and Proctor 1980:461-475, on which this section is based.) Many of these stem from situations already described above.

The total professional staff employed by government in a country such as Vanuatu or the Solomon Islands is smaller than that of the World Bank, or even the Asian Development Bank. Small developing countries cannot support the wide range of specialist roles found in large and more developed countries. Thus in Melanesia negotiations with aid agencies often place a considerable burden on already overtaxed staff and divert them from other duties. Even the answering of standard requests for statistical information which emanate from multilateral or international agencies may absorb almost as much of the time of Melanesian statistical officers as they are able to devote to data collection. When participating in a survey of agriculture in the region last year we found that on occasions up to three other aid-related missions would be visiting the same professional staff on the same day. The shortage of indigenous staff often means that those negotiating for aid on behalf of Melanesian countries are themselves supported by bilateral aid. It is little wonder that per capita rates of aid are high!

When large bureaucracies with complex procedures deal with small ones, the latter are likely to be strained. This is certainly true in Melanesia where the complex tendering or project approval procedures of some agencies seem out of place and unnecessarily demanding. There is a clear need in some cases for redesigning of procedures specifically to meet the needs of small countries and in this connection the Australian Development Assistance Bureau is very advanced. Certain particularistic features of Melanesian bureaucracies, including greater dependence on face-to-face communication rather than written memoranda, also demonstrate the influence of small size and make communication with large impersonal agencies more difficult.

Lastly, two other distinctive features of aid in the region stem from small scale. First, the maximum size of a project which some Melanesian countries can absorb is often close to, or below, the lower financial limit which an agency considers to be economically worth considering because of its own fixed administrative costs. Second, the problems stemming from the lumpiness of project aid is accentuated in small countries, and the risk of short or long term distortion of labour markets or recurrent budgets by aid projects is higher than in larger economies.
CONCLUSION

Scale is not neutral. Almost every aspect of life in Melanesia is influenced in some way by the small size of countries, islands and communities. Only a selection of examples has been noted. I am sure that one could dwell at some length on the influence of scale on linguistic development, pre contact technological change, migration, or economic activities such as deep sea fishing. Enough examples have been given, however, to suggest that size of community or land area can scarcely be ignored in any consideration of Melanesia. Melanesia is not India or Indonesia writ small. In most social and economic processes some degree of qualitative change occurs as one moves towards the lower end of the size continuum. Many of these changes occur within the range of scale found within Melanesia. A number of later papers in this series deal with them and with the implications for individuals, regions and states of the change of scale now involved in the rapid widening of linkages and degree of dependence and interdependence.

REFERENCES


Trade in this paper is taken to mean the exchange of raw materials and manufactured goods and to a limited extent labour and services between individuals and groups of individuals over short and long distances. At the simplest level trade can be viewed in economic terms as the exchange of materials and goods between areas where the outgoing goods are locally plentiful and the incoming goods are locally scarce or unobtainable; but as is well known, in New Guinea this form of bartering constitutes only a fraction of the exchanges which traditionally took place in all parts of the country. It is possible to elucidate from the ethnographic and anthropological literature of New Guinea a broad spectrum of exchange transactions running from the clear cut economic example above to the ceremonial exchanges in which the social context of the exchange can be deemed to be all important. As a number of observers have noted (e.g. Strathern 1971:101; Hughes 1977:209) while these polar positions can be perceived as different, they nevertheless allow for no clear distinction to be drawn between trade and ceremonial exchange - goods in Papua New Guinea rarely change hands without some social interaction, and by the same token ceremonial prestation involves the movement of goods.

Thus trade, taken as a general gloss, can be examined either in terms of the various social contexts involved or in terms of the movements of the goods themselves; items can be designated valuables or utilitarian items; emphasis can be placed on the socio-political purposes of prestations or the subsistence requirements the goods that are exchanged may fill. What has become increasingly apparent in recent years is that few hard and fast divisions can be drawn along these lines which offer, for any one of them, a 'better' explanation of trade than any other. We can note for example that items can move from one place as utilitarian goods and assume the characteristics of valuables in another; or that seemingly non-economic exchanges, such as live pigs and dogs' teeth moving against live dogs and pigs' tusks may well have an economic purpose in reinforcing trading ties between individuals and groups and facilitating trade in other scarce items. Thus they may provide an economic buffer against localized famine when crops are destroyed in warfare or by natural agencies such as drought or crop blight.

In short, it is at least conceivable that identical exchanges between the same two individuals may, at different times, have different purposes, and that any overall understanding of traditional trade in Papua New Guinea will need to take account of the complexity of variables involved. While this is now freely acknowledged (Hughes 1977:209; Sillitoe 1979) its
accomplishment lies in the future. By far the greatest volume of research into trading in Papua New Guinea has been carried out by social anthropologists with an overwhelming emphasis on the social context and ceremonial aspects of trade; while increasing acknowledgement of economic aspects can be found in the anthropological literature, the school of economic anthropology has had little effect on basic research carried out in Melanesia. Instead, and somewhat belated, these aspects of trade have been taken up by the geographers (e.g. Brookfield 1971; Hughes 1977) and by prehistorians.

The alternate emphasis of prehistorians on matters of subsistence, environment and economics in relationship to Papua New Guinea trade is less a matter of chance than a product of the sorts of evidence with which they work. Those aspects of past social systems which are incorporated into archaeological contexts, such as armshells or graves or configurations of large and small buildings deduced from postholes in the ground do not readily lend themselves to social interpretations. Such interpretations are not empirical and are usually met with a healthy scepticism within archaeology. On the other hand many more tools are available for reconstructing past environments and economic activities of various sorts. The identification of trade and various levels of trade have been the subject of significant discussion and theoretical development in archaeology over the past decade or two. No longer is it sufficient to identify an object or the material from which it is made as exotic to the archaeological context in which it is found and simply explain it as trade. Instead more emphasis is being placed on questions of evolution, mechanism, volume, organization and regularity of trade and the devising of tests which can measure these things in the archaeological record. Such studies in Papua New Guinea are greatly assisted by the wealth of ethnographic data recorded by early missionaries, administrators and anthropologists. It is through these that we all gain, regardless of our particular disciplines, any real comprehension of the fundamental, all-embracing nature of the importance of trade in traditional Papua New Guinea society.

Thus, studies to date of New Guinea trade have reflected the central interests of the major disciplines which have undertaken them; more particularly they have reflected the limitations of those disciplines. The synchronous nature of many social anthropological studies, and particularly those centred on a single village or group have emphasized the social context of trade, with reduced emphasis both on the evolution of the institutions surrounding trade and the geographical spread of trading systems and networks. Borrowing freely from the models of the geographers, prehistorians have begun to correct these imbalances but have introduced imbalances of their own, particularly in failing to ascribe the probable social importance in the movement of material things. Notwithstanding this, to properly explain their data, even prehistorians have on occasion been forced to invoke a social dynamic which, while not immediately demonstrable from the data, can be argued by analogy to contemporary systems, where the embeddedness of the social context of trade argues well for a respectable antiquity (e.g. see Allen 1977a; Rhoads in press). Thus while the remainder of this paper omits specific mention of ceremonial exchange, its presence and importance is implicit in the discussion.
As with much of the prehistory of Papua New Guinea, the highlands on the one hand and the lowlands and coast on the other form largely separate entities. In terms of prehistoric trade this holds true, for although the two regions can be linked in terms of certain items which in the past moved between the two, there are marked differences between the nature of trade in these regions, particularly in terms of distance and organization. The major work on traditional New Guinea highlands trade was carried out by Ian Hughes, as a member of this Research School. Hughes reconstructed traditional trading patterns for a number of utilitarian and valuable items, including salt, stone axes, pottery, shells and pigments over an area exceeding seven thousand square miles in the central western section of Papua New Guinea, stretching from the Upper Ramu River and Schrader Mountains in the north to the Middle Purari River in the south. Some of Hughes' general conclusions may be summarized here.

While the large scale and famous ceremonial prestations involved the accumulation and distribution of large quantities of pigs and staple vegetables, for most of the highlands region trade was not for staple food. Rather, these socio-political occasions not only cemented kinship ties but created a demand for other valuables and prestige foods not universally available, and also to some extent facilitated their movement (although as Hughes makes clear, this should not be confused with any concept of 'market' (1977:206)). Instead, the main thrust of trade was across ecological boundaries and from areas possessing naturally occurring raw materials such as stone for axes and from peoples possessing specialist manufacturing skills such as salt and pottery making. Trade was not formalized either in terms of markets or in the presence of specialized traders, merchants or peddlers. All men took part in ceremonial exchange, and bartered on their own account as the opportunity arose. Such opportunities were facilitated by some degree of institutionalization such as the commercial use of kinsmen and the establishment of trade partners as well as the use of public occasions to negotiate private exchanges, but concepts such as middleman are not applicable. On occasion the spectacular physical barriers to movement in the highlands channelled goods through certain limited trade routes, and thus villages along these routes were better placed to develop trading activity, but Hughes found no evidence for the development of market characteristics in these villages, nor of middlemen. Only in the case of perishable consumer goods passing quickly through a village might this latter term have any value. In other instances durable goods would be used by intermediaries while in their possession.

In addition, the distance of any single transfer was very short. Trading activities often formed only one aspect of multi-purpose journeys which might also include hunting, the gathering of raw materials or ceremonial activities. Hughes (1977:203) suggests that distances involved rarely exceeded eight to ten miles in closely settled regions and only fifteen miles in the sparsely settled lowlands area of his research. The limitations to further movement were warfare and sorcery rather than physical barriers. In summary, when viewed from the point of view of the traders themselves, trade was confined to single transfer operations between small groups and individuals. A better understanding of the importance of trade is gained from the extensive distribution of particular goods and a realization of how many times these must have changed hands to achieve this distribution. Trade in the highlands consisted of complex
webs of exchange, but these webs themselves comprised fairly simple linked chains; while there is a general flow of goods away from a source, at any point the direction of the next transfer is not predictable. In this sense, and unlike coastal Papua New Guinea, we cannot speak of trading systems, and particularly closed systems. The traditional highlands trading network seems likely, in the absence of contrary evidence, to have always been open-ended. It did, however, link the central highlands with both the north and south coasts, and indirectly much further afield. A similar situation has been described for the Dani of the Baliem Valley further to the west (see Brookfield with Hart 1971:329-331 and refs).

Perhaps the most dramatic case of this long-distance movement of goods is that reported by Hughes (1977:184-202; 1978) for marine shells. These goods, as the earliest Europeans in the area were quick to perceive and exploit, formed a basis of traditional currency, and travelled huge distances. As Hughes has pointed out there was at contact a clear variation in the values of different species in different areas, and this suggests the future possibility of tracing trade routes and cultural variation as the highlands archaeological record becomes more complete. Of more immediate importance however is that marine shells have been reported already from highlands excavations which reveal a startling antiquity for this movement of seashells. At Kafiavana in the eastern highlands Peter White (1972:93) reports four money cowries which date to about nine thousand years before the present, and at Kiowa in the western highlands, Sue Bulmer reports a ground and polished fragment of black-lipped oyster of more than six thousand years of age (Hughes 1977:199). (This piece may be slightly younger. Bulmer (1975:36) states that marine shell appears in the site 'up to 5,000 years ago'.) A variety of other shells comes from subsequent levels in these sites and also from other younger highlands sites. Although in quantity these represent a trickle only, this is likely to reflect the unrepresentative nature of the archaeological record rather than the unimportance of the trade: rockshelter sites are not the most likely findspots for such decorative items, and such scarce and therefore valuable items are more likely to be deposited accidentally rather than deliberately - that is, lost rather than discarded. However, in archaeological terms, we seem to be looking at a continuous movement of shells from the highlands from at least nine thousand years ago until the present. This is by far the oldest direct evidence of trade, or more precisely the diffusion of a particular class of goods, from the coast to the central highlands. In addition, however, we can note two related pieces of evidence. The pig, an animal not indigenous to New Guinea, has been identified in Sue Bulmer's sites of Kiowa and Yuku in levels dating to ten thousand years ago, and was apparently widespread in the highlands by five to six thousand years ago (Bulmer 1975:18-19). At Kuk, near Mt Hagen, Golson has delineated extensive and intensive agricultural practices reliably dated to nine thousand years ago and has drawn attention to the plausibility of the hypothesis that at that date the plant register under cultivation could have already included the Southeast Asian staples of taro and yam (Golson 1977:613-614; Golson and Hughes n.d.). The presence of (necessarily) humanly transported non-indigenous plants and one animal in the New Guinea highlands at such an early date may either be explained in terms of a movement of peoples, for which there is no archaeological support (Allen 1977b:181), or in terms of the movement of the plants and pig without significant movements of people. While in the latter case it is not necessary to postulate trade as the prime mover (apart perhaps from
getting them across the minimum sixty-five mile water barrier) it is suggestive of lowlands to highlands communication routes being open at this time.

Thus to date, archaeological research in the highlands has been meagre and largely concerned with establishing local sequences, with questions of prehistoric trade being decidedly secondary. At present we can point only to the early long-distance movement of a few restricted items and the extensive but mainly unspecialized trade reported by European observers and the twentieth century owners of the region, and speculate that the intensity and organization of trade has not varied considerably in the last nine millennia.

Just as the interior of Papua New Guinea is enmeshed in an intricate web of short trading links, so are its coasts and nearby islands encompassed by a series of maritime trading systems which also reach out to link it with the Pacific to the east, Asia to the west and Australia to the south. As already suggested, the coastal systems and interior networks interlock at many points but the similarities between them are outweighed by their differences. In general terms the coastal systems share a number of features not found in the highlands, among them being an increased proportion of basic foodstuffs being traded, long-distance trade, specialized traders and the emergence of central places. While the systems interlock, and certain goods either 'leak' or are deliberately passed between systems, nonetheless they are much more easily perceived of as closed systems and this is reflected in the comparatively extensive literature dealing with individual systems. If an overall and extremely simplistic explanation of the differences in coastal versus highlands trade is to be found, it would appear to be related to the fact that there is no uniformly rich subsistence base along the coast and many locations lack not only sufficient space and suitable climate for an agricultural basis for life, but also a variety of other necessary raw materials. Ceremonial exchanges occur as widely, if not as intensely, as in some parts of the highlands and in both places the long-distance movement of goods cross ecological boundaries, but we see in the coastal systems an intensification of trading as an economic option which surpasses anything inland. Specialist manufacturers occur in the highlands where they possess in their territory some special raw material such as suitable stone for axes or plants for making salt. In the coastal systems there is a higher level of artificiality about the development and maintenance of specialist manufacturing activities. The Mailu Islanders for example exercised and maintained by force a monopoly on pottery manufacture in an area in which previously pottery manufacture had been a more widespread and local industry; two Motu villages likewise held the rights to shell jewellery manufacture in an area where the raw material was commonly available to another eight nearby villages. There is no ready explanation in ecological terms why this situation should prevail, except that it facilitates the movement of other goods and develops and maintains social responsibilities beyond the village which can be invoked in times of war or natural disaster. Economically, however, the cost of such specialization is in the increasing brittleness of the system: no individual or group had overall control of the larger systems and failure at any point could invoke a domino effect through the other component parts. Thus when a hiri fleet returning to Port Moresby from the Gulf of Papua with sago was forced to abandon cargo to avoid being lost in a storm, the Hula, waiting at Port
Moresby for a share of the sago, immediately took retribution against the nearby Koita, reasoning that it was their sorcery which had caused the loss of the food (Lawes 1878-79).

Whereas little archaeological research in the highlands has been specifically directed to the study of prehistoric trade, the opposite is true of the coast and islands of Papua New Guinea. Here the reflections of long and short distance transfers of goods are so more visible that much effort has been spent on developing analytical tools for the primary study of trade and exchange in the recovered archaeological data.

While human occupation of the highlands has for some years been known to date back to at least twenty-six thousand years ago, it is only in the last few weeks that any date from a lowlands or island site has approached Pleistocene age. Jim Specht et al. (1981) now report a radiocarbon date of $11,300 \pm 120$ BP from the basal layer of a cave site in the interior of New Britain. At two standard deviations we can be 95 per cent certain that people occupied this site at least nine thousand one hundred years ago and possibly up to thirteen thousand seven hundred years ago. Associated with this date are five pieces of obsidian, the nearest source of which is, in a straight-line distance, less than seventy miles away. Specht (personal communication) is of the opinion that since direct access is inhibited by a mountain barrier this material has reached the site by a much more circuitous route. Even if it came directly, however, it seems too far away to have been procured at the source by the occupants of the cave.

The likely source of this material is Talasea, on the north coast of New Britain. This is the same source which supplied obsidian to the occupants of Balof Cave in New Island at a period radiocarbon dated to $6,800 \pm 410$ BP (White, Downie and Ambrose 1978) a straight-line open-sea crossing of about two hundred miles. This distance would be more than doubled by taking the circular land route. Talasea continued to supply Balof during its subsequent history, but at around three thousand years ago a second source began to supply the Balof people as well. This source is located on Lou Island in the Admiralties group some three hundred and twenty miles to the west, most of it across open sea.

Given the paucity of the data at present at our disposal we are reduced to saying only that the Talasea obsidian source was being exploited and its material distributed widely at an early date, probably with the assistance of sea-going canoes. The later entry of Lou obsidian into the Bismarck Archipelago economy introduces one of the most intriguing puzzles of Melanesian and Polynesian archaeology, the Lapita cultural complex.

Roger Green (1979:27-60) has recently provided an up-to-date summary of this complex which is now demonstrated as being ancestral to Polynesian culture in the western portion of the Polynesian triangle. Archaeologically it is characterized principally, but not entirely, by elaborately decorated pottery now recovered from more than thirty sites stretching from the Bismarcks to Samoa and Tonga and dating mainly within the thousand years between 3,500 and 2,500 years ago. The sites exhibit many similarities including locations in coastal or offshore island situations, true villages rather than dispersed settlements and an economy which included horticulture, the domestic pig and chicken and possibly dog, and exploitation of reef and lagoon, rather than open sea resources. For the
present purpose we concentrate here on the question of the Lapita people as traders. During the last decade a number of authors characterized the Lapita people as specialized long-distance traders, a persuasive argument in terms of the nearly contemporaneous appearance of Lapita sites throughout island Melanesia and based more particularly on the similarity of pottery styles and decoration, and the presence of exotic materials sometimes extraordinary distances from their places of origin. Ambrose (1978) was quick to point out the dangers of a too facile comparison between the Lapita phenomenon and ethnographically described Melanesian maritime trading systems. Green, originally a principal advocate of the trader concept has recently (1979:37-39) modified his position and three recent papers (Irwin 1980; White and Allen 1980; Kennedy in press) have suggested, along with Green, that an alternative colonization model best fits the data. Thus White and Allen (1980:733) propose that all Lapita sites southeast of the Solomon Islands were those of highly mobile colonists who maintained supply lines back to hearth areas and between colonies. The most easterly sites, in Fiji, Tonga and Samoa were perhaps too distant to maintain such supply lines, except among themselves, for significantly they lack the exotic raw materials found in the sites of their western relations.

While this is the best-fit solution given present data it is also easy to throw the baby out with the bathwater. The fact remains that archaeologically the Lapita cultural complex reflects a relatively wide range of long-distance transfers. These include Talasea and Lou Island obsidians in sites running through New Ireland, New Britain, the Solomons, including the Santa Cruz-Reef Islands, the New Hebrides and New Caledonia (Ambrose 1978:330-331; Green 1979:38); the steady, if not widespread exchange of pots between nearer communities, and stone adzes and other stone materials over like distances and, in the case of the Reef and Santa Cruz sites a stone material possibly from New Guinea (Green 1979:38). More abstractly the high correlation and continuity of ceramic decorative motifs demonstrates the high level of interaction between Lapita groups and the exchange of ceramic information, if not the potters themselves, particularly if these were women. What other goods and ideas may have been transferred at this time can only be guessed at. It is salutory to recall that Talasea and Lou Island obsidian was moving distances of almost two thousand miles at the same time as the Phoenicians were puddle-jumping around Homer's 'wine dark sea'.

In recent years there has been increasing acceptance of the Bismarck Archipelago as the immediate homeland of the Lapita cultural complex, where it was developed by settlers from island southeast Asia. Given that now there is a clear demonstration of people in the Bismarcks for around six thousand years before this later development, and the strong suggestion that they were using sea-going canoes to transfer at least one item relatively long distances, and, to borrow from the mainland New Guinea evidence, that they practised horticulture and kept domestic animals, we can begin to question whether the development of the Lapita cultural complex requires settlers from island southeast Asia. The traits not accounted for locally are presently reduced to two, pottery-making and Austronesian language, and may be reduced still further since on present evidence nowhere in island southeast Asia can we find possible antecedents of Lapita pottery. It may therefore be realistic to explore the Lapita phenomenon as a two stage event: the first being a long-term successful
adaptation in the Bismarck region (which inter alia clearly involved trade and the gradual infiltration of the nearer Melanesian islands); with the second stage a more truly colonizing push into the remoter eastern islands. The dynamic for this 'daunting achievement' (Ambrose 1978:332) remains unclear: there is no evidence for population pressure particularly when the numbers involved in the move are considered. Explorational zeal seems lame, and a consciously organized establishment of colonies by a home-based bureaucracy far-fetched. Other factors are nowhere yet apparent in the archaeological record and more perplexing is the lack of time differential between the two areas. However a hearth area/colonies dichotomy with trade between the two does allow us to place the element of trading into a more exact perspective. Current work in the Admiralties is expected to shed further light on this general problem, since although we know that Lou Island obsidian was being deposited in more eastern Lapita sites well over three thousand years ago so far no Lapita sites have been located on Lou containing Lapita pottery, and elsewhere in the Admiralties only four distinctively Lapita sherds have been recovered, from the lower levels of Kohin Cave on Manus Island (Kennedy in press). Prima facie the evidence presently seems to me most suggestive of the Admiralties having been settled not by Lapita colonists but by contemporaneous people who put the valuable resource, obsidian, into the wider Lapita network to the east. This of course presupposes some sort of formal trading connection. This contention finds some support in the presence of other contemporaneous sites within the Lapita ambit further east. These include Lesu on New Ireland (based on my own assessment of the pottery) and sites in the Solomons, on Guadalcanal, Anuta and Santa Ana (Green 1979:47).

The final focus of this review of prehistoric trade in Papua New Guinea centres on the south Papuan coast and brings us back to more familiar territory in the sense that archaeological research in this region has concentrated upon the evolution of two well-known trading systems, that operated by the Mailu Islanders, and that of the Western Motu of Port Moresby. Here, in addition to archaeology, linguistics and oral history have provided significant evidence to aid our understanding of this evolution, although I presently concentrate mainly on the archaeological evidence.

Well-defined settlement of the Papuan coast began about two thousand years ago when pottery-making marine-oriented agriculturists swept along some four hundred and fifty miles of coast and occupied a range of coastal and offshore island locations, also in some places making inroads into the immediate hinterland. In many respects, although on a smaller scale, this spread is reminiscent of the colonizing push of the Lapita people. Firstly it was achieved with great speed: so far the basal dates from most sites cannot be differentiated, so that like Lapita we must postulate large numbers of people involved and the use of ocean-going canoes. Secondly the repertoire of tools and implements, including elaborately decorated pottery, adzes similar to particular Polynesian forms and a wide range of shell and bone tools and ornaments have caused a number of researchers to comment on the similarities to Lapita. Thirdly the subsequent evolution of these groups reflect Lapita patterns: in particular this is true of the ceramic sequences which attest to close and continuing interaction between these groups, although this must be qualified by saying this is more true of sites between Port Moresby and the Gulf of Papua than those further east. Fourthly this unity is reinforced in the archaeological record by
the presence of the ubiquitous obsidian in these sites, this time deriving from the Fergusson Island source. Again this obsidian is the best reflection of trading, despite its generally low occurrence, particularly in the most westerly sites; added to this, however, there is again some evidence for pot trading, at least to the Gulf sites where suitable pot making clay is apparently lacking (see Rhoads 1980) and the possible movement of some shell objects (Vanderwal 1973:179). Like the Lapita situation the dynamics of the movement of materials are at best vaguely perceived: in both cases there are elements of open-endedness, and chain-like transfers may be the best explanation for obsidian movement, but at the same time ceramic similarities and differences hint at developing areas of more formal integration.

This state of affairs continues along the Papuan coast for seven to eight hundred years but around 800 AD the archaeological record right along the coast reflects some sort of disruption. Around Mailu, ceramic changes take place which appear not to be evolutionary, although other aspects of material culture and settlement pattern continue. Further west similar ceramic disruptions occur with some site locations being abandoned and other new ones begun. Subsequently the archaeology of this coast may be generally interpreted as reflecting increasing local diversity in contrast to the general homogeneity of the previous eight hundred years (White and Allen 1980:732 and refs). By 1200 AD several sites at least show subsistence patterns ancestral to those recorded at the turn of this century.

Within these patterns it is now possible to discern the evolution of the two elaborate maritime trading systems recorded at European contact on this coast. Working on the Mailu system Irwin (1977; 1978; 1980) has demonstrated that two thousand years ago Mailu Island was only one of a number of centres producing pottery in the area and it was not the most centrally located site in the area. By about 1600 AD however it was a much larger village than any other in the region and the most centrally located in terms of the connectivity analysis employed. Mailu held a monopoly on pottery manufacturing and was the only village in the area possessing large ocean-going canoes, and thus extending this monopoly to long-distance trading. Pottery, the principal manufacture of the island, had become an extremely standard and commercial item traded mainly for food, in the production of which the island was not self-sufficient.

In the Port Moresby area I have argued extensively (see Allen in press for the most up-to-date summary) for the off-shore islet of Motupore having been the site of people whose economy was based extensively on trade. The long-distance factor of this trade is difficult to estimate since it requires locating recipient sites and I have avoided making any suggestion that the occupants of Motupore ranged as widely as we know later Motuans did. Working on the local evidence I have reconstructed a scenario which suggests however that because of trading activities the Bootless Bay area (in which Motupore Island is situated) became a focus of population which stressed local resources to the point where it disintegrated through local warfare. With the aid of oral history we know that some of these people resettled in Port Moresby Harbour, ecologically a more pauperate region. I have argued (Allen 1977a) that the intensification of trade under these conditions was the best, and perhaps the only logical solution to subsistence needs and that the evolution of the hiri trade which saw vast
quantities of pottery and other goods being exchanged for Gulf sago and canoes took place under this impetus.

It will be noted that both these systems, at least in their ethnographic form, have antiquities of only several hundred years. Archaeological research in other regions where similar specialized trading systems have been recorded, such as the *kula*, the Vitiaz Straight system, and the Manus system, is either preliminary or non-existent. However, indications (see Allen 1977a:396-398) are that no great antiquity is to be expected for the ethnographically recorded configurations of trade in these areas.

I conclude with some short observations. The patterns of trade along the south Papuan coast can, in my opinion, best be modelled in a cyclic fashion with the peaks growing higher and more closely spaced through time. I believe that further research along this coast will confirm a pattern of increasingly formal trade throughout the first millennium AD which peaked and disintegrated around 800 AD. The disruptions right along the coast at this time suggest that this was either a single extensive network or a series of systems sufficiently interconnected that the domino effect mentioned earlier caused successive breakdowns throughout. The next suggestion of a buildup of trade, at least in one local area, is seen in the Bootless Bay scenario. Changes in the Mailu sequence at this time are slight, and it would be pressing the data too far to posit any real connection.

The eventual dominance of Mailu as the hub of a trading system at about the same time as the Western Motu system reaches it ascendency seems less coincidental, and we can predict the archaeological recovery of a further trading centre between the two, somewhere in the Hood Peninsula - Aroma Coast region. On historical grounds and based on a survey in the region done by Geoff Irwin and myself the village of Maopa suggests itself as a likely candidate. I am suggesting here, in other words, that the endpoint in the evolution of these maritime systems, until disrupted by the European presence, was a series of systems which, while effectively closed systems, were nonetheless interdependent and interlocking, and were held together by the exchange of a small series of valuable items. Thus armshells, beginning as raw shell in the Rossel Islands reached to the Papuan Gulf. Moresby shell beads penetrated the *kula*, and axes from the *kula* system moved westwards, less as 'leaks' than as 'links'. Seen as closed systems the principal trade within was in food and utilitarian items. The long-distance passage of these other items may not only have facilitated, but been vital to the ordered functioning of the internal exchanges within systems. If this is true the breakdown of one system would affect the others, and conversely the growth and expansion of one might require similar growth in the others. Thus the contemporaneity of these systems is seen as historically related. The similarity of this overall model and the *kula* as a system within a system, where the *kula* valuables circulated around the ring and facilitated a wide range of other exchanges which moved through only one or two nodes of the ring, is obvious.

This model has recently received some confirmation from the work of Jim Rhoads working inland from the Gulf along the Kikori River (Rhoads 1980; and in press). Here the dominant settlement pattern of dispersed
settlement and seasonal movement is disrupted by the presence of a permanent riverside village for several hundred years during the first millennium which ceased to be occupied around 800 AD. It was not reoccupied on a permanent basis until about four hundred years ago. Rhoads sees the occupation of Kulpurari as a sensitive indicator of trading activity on the coast. Its occupation was viable only when trade was sufficiently intense for it to act as an intermediary between coastal and inland and highlands groups. In this sense the chronology of its occupation is striking.

Finally the contrasts between recent maritime systems and the inland networks of trade in Papua New Guinea are also striking, and it is too tempting not to attribute this almost entirely to transport. Canoe transport and the harnessing of wind energy not only made bulk carrying over long distances feasible, it also offered speedier delivery of goods and protection in that hostile groups could be more easily avoided. Canoes provided the means by which the economic systems of the coasts and islands took on a different form from inland ones. Thus, while specific differences exist between the maritime systems, their general similarities are to me more interesting. They share the development of middleman traders, the emergence of central places, increased size of trading villages or conglomerations of trading villages, the ability to settle locations where the immediate subsistence base could not, without trade, support the populations involved and ultimately the possibility of the elaboration of social institutions. Trade on the one hand fostered specialization and the cultural diversity of which Papua New Guinea is justly famous, but on the other, and more perhaps that any other single institution, it enabled traditional Papua New Guinea to move beyond that diversity.

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THE PERSISTENCE OF TRADITIONAL TRADE AND CEREMONIAL EXCHANGE IN THE MASSIM

Martha Macintyre and Michael Young

I

The study of systems of exchange in Papua New Guinea - as elsewhere in Melanesia - has been extraordinarily fruitful both for an understanding of particular societies and for the development of anthropological theory. In all their wondrous variety Melanesian societies have this in common: reciprocal exchange is an important and often dominant principle which articulates a range of social, economic, political and ritual institutions. It is the woof to the warp of the social fabric, the means to its cyclical regeneration in time. The survival of exchange systems into the present, in more or less modified form, is at once indicative of their fundamental importance to the maintenance of Melanesian societies and of their resilience in the face of colonial intervention.

Of particular fascination to anthropologists have been the coastal trading systems (such as the *hiri* and the *kula*) and the highland ceremonial exchange systems (such as the *moka* and the *te*), all of which have provided spectacular evidence for considerably wider regional interconnections of intertribal 'polities' than were enabled by local political organizations centred on the village or clan territory. Almost everywhere, internal exchange (transactions occurring within the political community) was underwritten by external exchange (transactions taking place between political communities), such that it is contentious to elevate the functional importance of one over the other. It has also proven hazardous to insist upon firm analytical distinctions between 'trade' and 'ceremonial (or gift) exchange', whether in terms of the nature of goods transacted, or according to the relationship and social distance between parties to a transaction. There is agreement that these terms represent ideal-typical poles of a continuum of exchange institutions (van Baal 1975:50; Hughes 1977:209-210).

Although there is diversity in the ways particular exchange systems responded to European contact - much of it explicable in terms of the accidents of environment and the vagaries of local contact history - some broad patterns are evident. Their study by anthropologists needs little justification, for ceremonial exchange involves a heavy investment of people's time and resources, and altering patterns of exchange are at once a reliable indication of transforming socio-economic relations and a sensitive measure of changing values.

Many New Guinea societies - particularly well-described for the highlands - responded to pacification and the intrusion of steel tools by intensifying exchange activities. As warfare lapsed, ceremonial exchange
became an increasingly important arena for group competition (Salisbury 1962, Strathern 1971, Meggitt 1974). The introduction of shells into the highlands by Europeans caused inflation and devaluation; the monopoly of 'big-men' was broken, and exchange systems took on a more democratic character leading to the expansion of exchange activities and a diversification of the kinds of goods used in prestation (Strathern 1971, Hughes 1978). 'Big-men' later regained control by pouring cash—earned from coffee-growing and other capital enterprises—into competitive exchanges; the 'money-moka' was born, in which many thousands of dollars, motor vehicles, cartons of beer and commercially-produced pigs entered the exchange system (Strathern 1976, 1979). Meanwhile, the expanded cycle had begun to disintegrate through over-extended chains of debt and increased litigation over defaulting (Meggitt 1974, Feil 1978).

Coastal or lowland regions have been relatively neglected in recent anthropological literature on exchange systems; or rather, since there is less cultural homogeneity than in the highlands, thematic parallels are more difficult to discern. Some of the maritime systems were early casualties of colonial contact, notably the canoe-bourne trade of the Torres Strait and the *hirii* of central Papua (Seligmann 1910); while others, such as the trading system centred in the Vitiaz Strait, became fragmented and lost their regional scope (Harding 1967). Uniquely perhaps, the *kula* of southeast Papua—arguably the most celebrated exchange system in the annals of anthropology—has not only survived into the present but also been revitalized.

One of the aims of this paper is to take up yet again the challenge to anthropological explanation which the *kula* offers. In what follows we focus on the Massim, and within this insular theatre of *kula* activities we compare two communities in respect of those aspects of their internal and external exchange systems which have been transformed following European contact.

Tubetube is the westernmost of the Engineer Group, a tiny island of some 400 people. Traditionally an entrepot of 'merchant venturers' in one of the most strategic locations in the *kula* ring, Tubetube's importance was recognized by the earliest ethnographers (Seligmann 1910:526, Malinowski 1922:495). It was the second island in the region to receive the zealous attention of the Methodist Mission, which had begun to spread along the sea-lanes of the *kula* from its headquarters in Dobu—another important location in the ring. Goodenough is the westernmost of the D'Entrecasteaux Group, a forbiddingly mountainous island of some 14,000 people. Traditionally peripheral to the *kula*, Goodenough nonetheless maintained trading relations with the Trobriands, the Amphletts, neighbouring Ferguson Island, and the adjacent coast of the mainland (Jenness and Ballantyne 1920:34). Goodenough received its first missionary in 1899, about the same time that it began to export labour to the mines and plantations of British New Guinea.
II

Recent anthropological and archaeological studies in the Massim have challenged the familiar conception of the **kula** (kune in the central and southern Massim) as primarily a ceremonial or gift exchange system (e.g. Lauer 1970, Egloff 1978, Irwin n.d.). Prehistorians particularly have attempted to reconstruct the precolonial trading cycles according to geographical and ecological models, focussing on the regional interdependence of particular groups which formed trade relationships in order to gain access to scarce or exotic resources. The trade between islands in the Massim undoubtedly lends itself to such an interpretation. There was only one source of stone suitable for axes and other implements, Murua; many islands lacked clay deposits from which pottery could be made; several islands bore trees from which canoes could be constructed, while others had no forest at all; Fergusson Island was the only source of obsidian; some islands were very fertile, permitting surpluses of yams and other foods to be grown, while others were stony and infertile, rarely yielding sufficient for the subsistence requirements of their small populations. There is also the relatively neglected factor of periodic or seasonal drought and consequent food shortages (see Young 1971:3, for references); though major overseas **kula** voyages seem to have only taken place during periods of plenty.

While ecological interdependence models provide a material basis for the existence of elaborate inter-island trade, they do not explain the cultural processes by which such complex systems as the **kula** evolved. This is not to discount ecological determinants, however. As Shirley Campbell has noted of modern Vakuta Island in the Trobriands: 'Kula is valued because of the opportunities for setting up trade routes to enable one Kula community to procure exotic materials from other Kula communities' (n.d.). Hence, the trade in locally-produced commodities persists throughout the Massim. Many people have no access to cash, and utility items such as clay pots, mats and baskets, as well as pigs and vegetable foods, are widely traded.

Tubetube's trade dominance in the southern Massim was directly related to its control over the distribution of stone axes. Axe blades formerly figured significantly in the second sphere of **kula** (see below), being essential for the purchase of pigs and canoes. In the early contact period some steel axes were incorporated into the **kula**, but as the European traders moved in, so the trade in stone tools declined and by 1890 they were no longer being produced. The eclipse of the stone axe has undoubtedly changed the form of the **kula**, as it used to constitute the most versatile valuable, one which was exchangeable in either direction. Today the ceremonial exchange of stone axe blades persists in the Trobriands and in the southwest Massim, but their use as **kula** objects has ceased. Tubetube people exchanged them in **kula** for pigs until recently, but in the past seven years most were traded southeast to the Sudest-Panaeti area where they are still used for mortuary payments. Tubetube received shell necklaces in exchange for axe blades and these were then re-routed on **kula** paths. The shifts in currency flows, patterns of inflation, and the debasement or devaluation of particular items of currency have been documented for the highlands (Hughes 1978); the decline in the stone axe
trade in the Massim and the resultant dislocations in the flow of other valuables constitutes a parallel case.

At the technological level, the introduction of steel tools meant that the time expended on food production was significantly reduced (cf. Salisbury '1962). Steel axes also enabled people to cultivate gardens in areas which had previously been unsuitable owing to the difficulty of felling huge trees. It has been argued that this technological innovation increased the leisure time available to men, and that this was a major factor in the expansion of ceremonial exchange or competitive feasting (Salisbury 1962, Scheffler 1964, Young 1971:255). The evidence from Tubetube does not wholly endorse this view, for although there was an increase in the volume of *kula* exchanges and in the number of people directly involved in *kula*, oral testimony suggests that the actual time spent on journeys to other islands decreased as the commodity trade declined. As this technological revolution coincided with the establishment of copra production, it is likely that the time gained by men in the area of subsistence production was redirected into production for the cash sector. Factors such as the rapid incorporation of Tubetube into the cash sector, its proximity to the commercial centre of Samarai, and the decline of its own mercantile role in the Massim must be seen as important elements in maintaining a comparatively high labour input by men.

The pattern of post-contact changes on Goodenough was commensurate with its relative isolation and its fundamentally self-sufficient, parochial communities. There was a rapid contraction of external trade and a more gradual florescence of internal exchange. Goodenough 'specialized' in little save the production of food surpluses, betel nut and pigs; it imported clay pots and inferior *kula*-type shell valuables - presumably those which were permitted to leak from the ring. The trade in pots from the Amphletts persists to the present day, but few other items of traditional wealth are still imported, though they continue to be used in restricted circulation in marriage and mortuary payments. Internal exchange - mainly in the form of competitive feasting and food exchange - was stimulated by a number of factors. Being a 'prestige' as well as subsistence activity, gardening absorbed the extra time and energy saved by the use of steel tools; Goodenough Islanders increased food production for 'prestige' purposes. This was in part a consequence of pacification, which deprived leaders of an important avenue to fame and groups of the sovereign right to engage in restitutive warfare. Developed as an alternative to fighting, competitive exchanges became a surrogate for it; peace not merely 'permitted' the elaboration of 'fighting with food' but, given the cultural premises, virtually demanded it (Young 1971). We may note at this point that Malinowski made a similar conjecture about the origin of *kula*: 'For the Trobrianders at least, the *kula* is to a large extent a surrogate and substitute for head-hunting and war' (1935:456).

As on Goodenough, pacification was effected on Tubetube by the joint efforts of the mission and the government over a period of about thirty years. At the time of the establishment of the mission on Tubetube the people were fierce raiders, and according to oral tradition, warfare between the islands was actually increasing in intensity. During the period 1885-1901 there were at least five major raids by Tubetube warriors on the mainland, Doini and Normanby islands; there were also several reprisal raids on Tubetube trading canoes. Armed raiding on Goodenough
seems to have occurred in some parts of the island as late as the 1920s, though the last government punitive expedition was in 1910.

The abolition of warfare in the southern Massim altered the social and political basis of inter-island exchange, for this had required the manipulation of internal resources and external trade by village leaders, guyau, who gained prestige not only through such exchange but also through their status as warriors and diplomats. Prior to pacification only guyau had engaged in kula on Tubetube and, apart from succession, the principal route to the achievement of full guyau status was through warfare. Colonial intervention in traditional political processes, therefore, was a major factor in the democratization of kula participation, not only on Tubetube but throughout the Massim.

The cessation of warfare also had a profound effect on the flow of shell valuables and the quantity of them available for kula exchanges. Formerly, large numbers of valuables had been required for ransom and homicide payments and peace-making ceremonies. Tubetube people believe that the origin of all kula relationships lies in the alliances made following warfare. Pwaouli, a homicide payment, was made to retrieve the skulls of cannibal victims. Each skull was redeemed by one or more high-ranking shells. These exchanges, with their connotations of headhunting, were among the very first to be suppressed by the missionaries, so the relationship between inter-island peace-making exchanges and the kula is now very difficult to reconstruct. The legendary origin of the kula on Tubetube, however, is represented as a peace-making ceremony between two guyau, one from Tubetube and the other from Nasikwabu. This political alliance was later reinforced by marriage and the shell valuables exchanged were put onto the kula road. It is notable, too, that the origin of aburu, the sumptuary competitive food exchanges of Goodenough, is said to lie in peace-making ceremonies between enemies; though latterly aburu developed into a means of humiliating rivals, and 'enemies' were even cultivated for the express purpose of exchanging food with them.

Today the kula is perceived as a system of exchange which supports and reinforces entirely peaceful alliances between islanders, but oral evidence suggests that this is a rather recent construction fabricated in terms of the pax britannica. Tubetube elders indicate that the government-imposed peace allowed them to travel widely 'looking for' pigs and shell valuables, so that in the early years of colonial rule there was an increase in kula activities and many new 'roads' were made.

In the 1890s the Methodist Mission on Tubetube negotiated peace between traditional enemies and orchestrated pwaouli ceremonies at the mission station. No skulls were used, but the transactions were otherwise similar to those traditionally practiced. One of these peace settlements had a profound effect on Tubetube's subsequent role in the kula. J.T. Field, the missionary, arranged for a Nuakata clan to pay shell valuables, pigs and rights over a small uninhabited island as compensation for their killing of thirteen Tubetube men. This island, Dawson or Koyagaugau, was later settled by the guyau Dabau, who was at the time the principal kula trader on Tubetube. The flow of kula valuables became severely dislocated, to the extent that nowadays all kula routes to the south pass through Koyagaugau, and in recent years new roads have been
established which by-pass Tubetube and the rest of the Bwanabwana region altogether.

The existence of a mission station on Tubetube, then, had a more profound historical effect than might otherwise have been the case; there are simply no parallels on Goodenough, where mission influence has been more diffuse and less decisive in instituting specific changes. There were other consequences for Tubetube arising from its relative accessibility. The sale of copra to pay contributions to the Wesleyan Mission was an established institution by 1896, which meant that when government taxation was imposed in 1919 Tubetube Islanders readily complied with the new regulations. Goodenough Islanders on the other hand began to pay tax as late as the mid-to-late 1920s. But, again in contrast to Goodenough, few Tubetube men left their island to work, and the mission actually discouraged labour migration. Both peoples, however, have had access to cash over a long period and during this time they have become increasingly dependent upon store goods. Almost all income from copra on Tubetube is spent on items for domestic consumption; taxation and nowadays school fees are the only other uses of cash. The same is true for Goodenough, with the proviso made in Section IV. Cash income on both islands is subject to the same redistributive obligations as other goods which are produced, and there is little or no accumulation of cash as capital. In spite of government encouragement, there has been no significant expansion of cash-cropping, and on Goodenough there is considerable under-exploitation of the trees planted many years ago by governmental directive (cf. Moulik 1973).

III

In this section we present a modern perspective of the essentials of the kula and a revised view of the significance of the valuables which circulate along its roads. Although the perspective is grounded in the southern Massim it is intended to be generally valid for the whole ring.

The persistence of this institution in the face of broad economic changes in the region is a problem which must be answered, finally, in terms of the overdetermination of exchange relations within each community in the kula. It is still through kula that men (and in the southern Massim women also) win prestige as controllers of people and wealth. Kula valuables are not - pae Malinowski - mere symbols of prestige, like the 'Crown Jewels'. The claim that kula items are valued as if they are 'supremely good in themselves, and not as convertible wealth, or as potential ornaments, or even as instruments of power' (Malinowski 1922:512), is contradicted by all the evidence, including that available to Malinowski himself. If one has a kula valuable, one can use it in a wide range of internal exchanges: to marry, acquire pigs, canoes or land, to pay mortuary debts and compensation for injury; to purchase magic or the services of a curer or sorcerer.

The kula today is a system of delayed exchange involving armshells, shell necklaces, pigs, canoes, feasting pots, and a few unique shell ornaments. Some items, such as decorated limesticks, boar's tusk pendants, belts of shell beads, and stone axe blades, which were all part of the
precolonial kula currency, no longer circulate. But the valuables—Malinowski's vaygu'a—are substantially the same. The participants conceive of the system as circular, not as an inter-island network. The links or roads (keda, Trobriands; kamwasa, Tubetube; ked, Muyuwa) are built between individual men and women on different islands; some roads by-pass some islands in the familiar, ethnographically-constructed kula ring, for the links are between people and not places. A 'big road' is one which links many high-ranking people and which carries many high-ranking valuables. Prominent traders know the names of all the partners on a 'big road'.

But the kula is by no means (in Malinowski's phrase) 'a simple affair' of two different valuables constantly changing hands around an imaginary ring. The purpose of kula is to forge alliances through a sequence of indebtedness and to accumulate valuables which can be used for internal exchanges. At every exchange, a debt is created which must be repaid at some later date. The object of kula is to keep a valuable in circulation, accruing 'interest' in the form of other, lower-ranking, valuables. Although a kula trader may retrieve or remove his or her high-ranking shell to deploy in an internal exchange, this is undesirable as the path would then 'die'.

A valuable which is owned by an individual but which is not in the kula (and is therefore unencumbered by debt), in called kitomwa in Tubetube (kitoma, Trobriands and Dobu; kitown, Muyuwa). Valuables are referred to as kitomwa in all other exchanges where they are used, and an owner can convert his or her kitomwa into a kula valuable by 'throwing' it on an established road. But it is as kitomwa that these valuables function as a flexible currency in internal exchanges for marriage, land transactions and mortuary payments. We shall briefly outline the spheres of exchange relevant to an understanding of kula in its present form:

1. **Kula I:**
The circulation of armshells and necklaces involving the accumulation of other valuables as kitomwa.

2. **Kula II:**
The acquisition of pigs and canoes through delayed reciprocity. The participants are often partners in a kula I relationship, and the exchange may involve kitomwa or pigs. This form of kula exists on Duau (Normanby), Gawa (Marshall Bennets), Murua (Woodlark), and the islands known as Bwanabwana (including Tubetube) in the southern Massim.

3. **Marriage and mortuary exchanges:**
The sequence of exchanges of shell valuables, pigs and vegetable food which structures affinal alliance. The shells and pigs used in these exchanges are ideally acquired in kula II and therefore free of other obligations. In practice however, inter-island marriage exchanges between guyau families or high-ranking kula men often incorporate transactions which are part of kula I, and outstanding kula debts are sometimes repaid in mortuary exchanges.
4. Inter-island commodity trade:
The exchange of pots, mats, baskets, and carved wooden utensils for yams, taro and other foodstuffs. In the northern Massim *gimwali* refers to a system of free bartering; in the south and northeast *gimwali* is a perjorative term, and most commodity exchange entails fixed standards of equivalence. In the southern Massim there are traditional trading alliances between villages and these coincide with marriage alliances.

All four spheres of exchange are constructed in terms of kin relations. *Kula* partners are ideally clan brothers (that is, men who are not consanguinely related, but who share the same totem) or sisters' husbands. The bonds between partners are represented as altruistic and enduring, and *kula* debts are conceptualized in the same terms as those incurred in marriage - where responsibility for the transaction extends beyond the two persons directly involved.

This sketch of the modern *kula* points to the persistence of at least two things: the integrity of internal exchange systems, and the structure of indebtedness which keeps the valuables moving along the roads. This is not to claim that the *kula* is the same as it used to be. It has become democratized; the volume of valuables in circulation has probably increased, and monetization has intruded to the extent that shell valuables can now be purchased and put into the *kula*.

IV

In this section we show how similar parameters of persistence and change define what is ostensively a colonial institution, but one which has been adapted to meet the need for an external exchange system. We refer to the practice of migrant wage-labour on Goodenough, which has become a surrogate for the visiting exchange expeditions of the past - themselves pale copies of *kula* voyages.

These expeditions were said to 'ask for *niune*'. This is a cognate of *kune*, the term for *kula* in the D'Entrecasteaux and southern Massim, and it can be glossed as 'a gift which cannot be retained'. With respect to any gift designated *niune*, therefore, at least three parties are involved: the giver, the receiver, and the latter's kinsman or partner who accepts (and may consume) the gift on his behalf. *Niune* gifts are given and received between parties to all major exchanges on Goodenough - from marriage to the spectacular *abutu* contests. In visiting exchange, the men of a village used to make periodic expeditions - by land or sea - to distant communities, where they would 'ask for *niune*' in the form of pots, shell valuables, mats, pigs, yams and betel nut. The leaders of such expeditions would be obliged to pass the fruits of their wanderings to their exchange partners back home. Subsequently the visits would be reciprocated and goods would flow in the opposite direction (Young n.d.). These expeditions are now almost a thing of the past, although new canoes are still sent to solicit food gifts from neighbouring villages. During the course of the century, visiting ceremonial exchange has given way almost entirely to an analogous quest for wealth: migrant labour.
The men of the D'Entrecasteaux ('Gosiagos') rapidly established a reputation for themselves as strong and tractable workers, more willing than most to endure the harsh conditions of the goldmines on Woodlark, Misima and the Mambare (Nelson 1976). Goodenough Islanders were particularly in demand. Their participation in the search for white men's wealth began in 1898, when a hurricane and a drought brought famine to the islands. At this time their recruitment was virtually a matter of survival - or an alternative to cannibalism (Young 1971:172). In 1900 as many as one thousand Goodenough men signed on as contract labourers, which must have been almost half the number of able-bodied men on the island. Except for the war years and a brief period in the late 1950s when a ban on recruitment was imposed, the number of absent workers has remained at a similarly high level. The regular exodus of young men for one or two years at a time became a common feature of community life on Goodenough (cf. Jenness and Ballantyne 1920:18).

When trying to explain their popularity among recruiters, present-day islanders appeal to their traditional value of *tobakula*, the ideal of the industrious and abstemious gardener. They define their own incentives as 'the search for wealth', the need to 'go to the trader' to 'find money' and bring it home. Just as important, they regard the wage-labour experience as an essential one for every young man to undergo in order to achieve adult status. And indeed, migrant labour quickly took the form of a classic *rite de passage*, a ceremonial 'initiation' involving phases of separation, transition and incorporation. This is all the more remarkable in that Goodenough, like most areas of the Massim, traditionally lacked puberty ceremonies or ritual initiation into manhood.

The man who departs to work abroad is designated *toyage*: one-who-embarks. He remains a *toyage* until he is homeward bound, when he is re-designated *tolautomu*: one-who-disembarks. His departure is generally sudden, ideally in the dead of night. There are taboos on grieving for him, speaking his name, or making a noise in his hamlet - proscriptions which implicitly liken him to a dead man. His return is as secretive as his departure, and he will hide on the boat if necessary and slip home unobserved after dark. The *tolautomu* then secludes himself for several days in his parents' house, working hard in his gardens during daylight hours and returning to the village after dusk. The incorporation of the *tolautomu* occurs when his father or a sibling kills the pig which they named for him on his departure. The whole community will feast, but since the pig is the new arrival's *niune* he cannot eat of it himself.

Of most concern to us here is what the *tolautomu* does with the wealth he has brought home. Nowadays it consists of bags of rice and sugar, cases of tinned fish and meat, cartons of beer and stick tobacco, garden tools, domestic utensils, blankets and clothing. All such wealth is designated *lokoloko*, the term for items of traditional wealth. Significantly, the principle of *niune* applies to this new wealth, and the young *tolautomu* will keep for himself only the clothes he stand up in (cf. Jenness and Ballantyne 1920:95). The rules which govern its distribution are quite explicit. If the youth is a firstborn son, then the first fruits of his wage-labour career should go entirely to his mother's brother. This is in recognition of the latter's 'gift' of a woman to the youth's father. (Unlike the majority of societies in the Massim, those of Goodenough are patrilineal; sons belong to their father's group and reside with it, while
daughters marry out and bear children for other agnatic groups.) Secondborn sons hand over their earned wealth to their fathers, as do firstborn sons following their second expedition. Belonging to the same agnatic line, however, a father treats this wealth as niune and distributes it widely, in theory keeping nothing for himself. Finally, we may note that if the firstborn is a girl her bridewealth should be given wholly to her mother's brother; and if this has been done it releases her own brother from the obligation to give his first earnings to the same man. Instead, the girl will rear a pig for her brother to be killed on his return, and he will reciprocate by giving her the bulk of his first earnings. This of course is her niune too, and she passes it on to her own husband for distribution. Later, this man will return a similar amount of wealth to his brother-in-law.

It will now be clear how goods acquired through wage labour are assimilated to the pattern of exchanges between kinsmen and affines. They are subjected to the same rules of niune which forbid their consumption by the producer and the immediate recipient. In this manner, modern consumer goods are poured into the local exchange system where they circulate (or are consumed) according to traditional rules. Moreover, insofar as these goods are now preferred to wealth items of traditional origin, the exchange system generates its own demand for them, thereby reinforcing the cash-earning incentive (cf. Belshaw 1955:30). Niune is a mechanism, too, by which elders maintain control over juniors and minimize the subversive effect of their unique access to the sources of money.

The catch, of course, is that although niune morally insulates villagers from the capitalist mode of production, it does not emancipate them from its general sway. By the rule of the gift, the giver must later be repaid in similar if not identical coin. So other men, too, must go away and sell their labour to meet obligations to repay niune. Here the demands of the exchange system are as relentless as the forces of capital—the difference being that the former are apprehended as the very goals which give meaning to people's lives. Nor should we forget that although the institution of migrant labour has been domesticated by Goodenough Islanders and adapted to conform to a traditional pattern of seeking wealth, it is too exploitative to them to constitute an external 'exchange system' by any objective criteria. There is symbolic acknowledgement of the worker's alienated labour, perhaps, in the 'inner dualism' of the toyage/tolautomu contextual distinction. Recent years have seen raised level of expectation for better employment, and some young men now compete—as their fathers never did—for jobs which allow them to escape the stultifying regime of menial labour. Cash is now being invested in children's education, and more rapid change will surely follow the long-scheduled opening of a secondary school on Goodenough itself.

Comparison with Tubetube, where migrant labour participation is relatively low, reveals similar strategies for the assimilation of wage-earnings. Paswe is a traditional gift-giving ritual whereby those returning from a trading voyage or a prolonged absence are required to give token gifts to all who have congregated on the beach to greet them. Paswe for a returning wage-earner can be an expensive affair. Gifts of tobacco, sweets and other small items such as combs must be provided for as many as thirty people. Most workers return during the holiday period, around Christmas, and this becomes the occasion for gifts of love, mulolo, to all
relatives. Cloth, items of clothing, small luxury items such as china cups, pocket knives and children's toys are given as Christmas presents. Most of the money that the person has saved is given to a parent or mother's brother as kwauya, a gift of respect which reaffirms the age hierarchy within the family. This money is then spent on food or other goods for the whole household. If he is remaining on the island, the returning worker usually distributes most of his personal belongings to relatives and friends of his own generation as yauya, 'sharing gifts'. Thus, the egalitarian social structure of Tube Tube requires that all the fruits of wage-labour are rapidly redistributed, and the worker's reincorporation into the community is structured around the sequence of pasuwe, kwauya, yauya, and mulolo.

Our approach in this paper implicitly confronts that of previous anthropologists who predicted the demise of traditional exchange in Melanesia once money and trade goods had entered the economy (e.g. Belshaw 1955, Hogbin 1958, Salisbury 1962). We have tried to show that economic change is determined and mediated by many factors which are not amenable to analysis in terms of the economic logic of capitalist society. While we do not deny that the Massim has been subject to pervasive changes as Papua New Guinea has been incorporated into the world economy, we stress that these changes have not produced the dramatic effects predicted by those writers whose analyses were founded on models of market forces. Consumption patterns and commodity circulation are socially constructed and historically specific. We have argued that, in spite of Western colonial contact over nearly a century, basic social formations in the Massim have remained intact and have been able to subsume new economic relations in ways which are compatible with traditional values.

Massim societies have responded to economic changes by structuring them in accord with existing ideologies of wealth and by establishing notional equivalences between the fruits of traditional labour and cash. This equivalence, however, is not primarily economic. The social component in the exchange of commodities - whether they are locally produced or bought in trade stores - accounts largely for the persistence of particular systems of exchange. The social obligations of kinship and marriage, and the economic responsibilities generated within the systems of marriage and mortuary obligations, are powerful constraints upon any individual who attempts to accumulate or consume in terms of the cash sector alone.

Beyond these intrinsic reasons for the 'inertia' of traditional systems of exchange, however, lie extrinsic factors, such that we might conclude - somewhat tautologically - that the survival of these systems is to do with insufficiently powerful forces for change. Firstly, the penetration of the capitalist mode of production has been limited, and the Massim has remained economically peripheral. The subsistence mode of production has been spared the shocks which have occurred in regions where cash-cropping or mineral development have become important sources of livelihood for local populations. Given the geographical and productivity limits of copra production in the Massim, it is not unduly surprising that the traditional mode of production has persisted with minimal structural change.
Secondly, the geographical isolation of most Massim societies must be acknowledged to be a crucial factor in their socio-economic conservatism. The Massim, after all, is an insular region. Men may leave their islands to work abroad but there are very few large, expatriate-owned plantations in the *kula* ambit; more than half the copra produced in Milne Bay Province comes from mainland plantations (Henton 1979). Wage-labour was perhaps only initially attractive to those, like Goodenough islanders, whose subsistence production was precarious. Even then, the very fact that workers migrated meant that its effects were indirect. The two modes of production were physically separated as well as morally insulated.

Thirdly, traditional economic values centred on the production and distribution of food. The value of food has not been affected by colonial intervention (though missionaries have consistently tried to influence patterns of distribution). Hence, the cultural values associated with food-production and the social institutions which impinge upon subsistence (marriage, descent, land tenure etc.) have largely escaped outside pressures for change. Distribution remains the practical task and the ideological concern of the exchange system, which, being grounded in the realm of kinship, is inherently conservative.

Lastly, when considering the 'value' of money in the Massim, it must be remembered that most islanders are a long way from markets for their produce and from stores large enough to alter consumption patterns and thereby stimulate the cash-cropping sector. Money is more useful, where it is more useful, and it is significant that cash has penetrated the traditional spheres of exchange most pervasively in those areas closest to Samarai and Alotau, the commercial and administrative centres of the Province.

We conclude with an observation concerning Massim people's own impulse to venture 'beyond diversity'. For the anthropologist, beguiled by the 'uniqueness' of the society he or she studies, it is easy to overlook the similarities between neighbouring cultures. For the peoples of the Massim, however, who share an Austronesian heritage, many if not most contemporary social practices are mutually intelligible. One of the consequences of colonial rule has been the mutual acculturation of different groups, facilitated by greater mobility and locations - such as towns, schools and plantations - where people of different cultures can meet and mingle (Chowning 1969). Inter-island marriage is becoming increasingly common. But predating the advent of the European, there were totemic clans which provided an ideological basis for a broader cultural unity - one which found expression in trade and exchange relations. Even today, when a strange boat pulls into Tubetube the visitors identify themselves by giving the names of their 'birds', and their fellow clan members offer hospitality and address their guests by appropriate kin terms. Clan obligations, then, extend to strangers who may speak different languages. In the southern Massim a clan is obliged to bury a foreign clan member who has died away from home, and the deceased's relatives pay shell valuables to the buriers. In such ways did inter-island contacts in the *kula* circuit embrace a wider range of principles and imperatives than the quest for mere economic gain.

It is an impertinence, perhaps, to characterize Massim peoples as 'conservative' and their societies as 'inert' when the sheer complexity of these ancient cultures and the intricacy of the ceremonial exchange system
which they have evolved attest to their success in reaching beyond diversity.

NOTES

1 Prehistoric ceramic evidence suggests that prior to AD 1500 Goodenough was part of a large northern Massim and mainland trading network - which could have been an earlier form of the kula (Egloff 1978).

2 These points are aptly illustrated by an anecdote. In April of this year one of us (Michael Young) was entertaining Lepani Watson in Angau Lodge, the School's transit house in Port Moresby. Lepani is an eminent Trobriand Islander, a previous Member of the national House of Assembly and a prominent man in the kula. On glancing out of the window, he noticed the doctor who lives across the street backing his car out of the drive. Lepani recognized him. 'He's Dobuan. His mother's brother is big in the kula and he's got a famous bagi (necklace) that I want. I must ring him about it.' Briefcase kula by air, it seems, is already a reality.

3 In 1978 Milne Bay Province produced only 4.31 per cent of the total amount of copra produced in Papua New Guinea (Henton 1979).

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INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL LINKAGES

Language

LANGUAGES AND MIGRATIONS

Papuan languages

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Austronesian languages

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During the seminar on the Boundaries of Melanesia in this School seminar series, it was mentioned that the Papuan languages can be regarded as languages of Melanesia *par excellence*. These Papuan languages, sometimes also referred to as non-Austronesian languages, constitute one of the two types of languages located in Melanesia. The other type, the Austronesian languages, are members of the very far-flung Austronesian language group which extends from Formosa, i.e. the aboriginal languages spoken on Taiwan, across the Philippines, parts of mainland southeast Asia, Malaysia, Indonesia, the New Guinea area, island Melanesia and Micronesia to the northern and easternmost regions of Polynesia.

The Papuan languages are generally regarded as radically different from the Austronesian languages and for that matter from all other known language groups in the world. There may only be a remote possibility of some link existing between the languages spoken by the aboriginal population of the Andaman Islands, to the south of Burma, and some Papuan language groups in the extreme west of the New Guinea area (Wurm 1975a). Steps towards the closer investigation of this possibility are at present under way, with Dr Y.K. Yadav of the Department of South Asian and Buddhist Studies undertaking detailed studies of languages of the Andaman Islands. There seem to be also some parallels in the structure of some Papuan languages and some of those spoken by the Orang Asli of peninsular Malaysia (Laycock 1975a), though the languages spoken by those people are now generally regarded as Austro-Asiatic, though of course the speakers may have taken over Austro-Asiatic languages and lost their own languages, except perhaps for some remnant features. This problem will require a lot of additional study before anything more than vague suggestions can be made.

The Papuan languages themselves, especially those of several groups, show strong to sometimes very strong influence from Austronesian languages. It has in fact been suggested that in view of the apparent presence of Austronesian lexical and other elements in such Papuan languages, the possibility of an original relationship between Papuan languages and Austronesian languages could not be rejected out of hand (Lynch 1981). At the same time, the great majority of these apparently Austronesian elements in Papuan languages seem to reflect influence from Oceanic Austronesian rather than from the more archaic western Austronesian, or perhaps influence from some other relatively late, though perhaps pre-Oceanic, form of Austronesian. This seems to suggest language influence rather than original relationship – relational links between Papuan languages and
Austronesian languages would, if they were real, be expected to go back a very long way indeed and be manifested through very archaic Austronesian forms, in view of the quite obviously vast differences between Papuan and Austronesian languages in general. However this whole problem requires careful study and such studies have only just begun.

The bulk of the Papuan languages occupy the New Guinea mainland and some of the large islands adjacent to it, such as the northern part of Halmahera and the eastern part of Timor in the west, and parts of New Britain, New Ireland and Bougainville Island in the east. Scattered Papuan languages are located along the Solomon Island chain as far to the east as the Santa Cruz Archipelago (Wurm 1975b). The possibility of the existence of a few further Papuan languages to the west of Timor may still be present, and something which may well prove to be influence from Papuan languages, perhaps as a substratum element, appears to be present in Austronesian languages of those areas. The same may well apply to some languages of the New Hebrides in the east - here again further study is needed, and some of it is under way.

The number of Papuan languages is very great. To date 738 distinct Papuan languages have been identified (Wurm 1981a). This number is of course subject to changes, be it because of the possible discovery of a few hitherto unidentified languages, and also because of the change of status of some languages from language to dialect when further studies are carried out on them. It may therefore perhaps be more appropriate, for general purposes, to speak of the existence of between 700 and 750 Papuan languages.

Some areas of the New Guinea mainland and the New Guinea Islands are occupied, as I said before, by Austronesian languages, and taking into account their very considerable number, and the number of the Papuan languages just mentioned, it seems correct to say that the New Guinea area contains about 1,000 distinct languages which consist of a very much greater number of different dialects. In view of this, the New Guinea area in Melanesia, and as a result of this, Melanesia itself, constitutes the linguistically most diverse and multi-facetted area of comparable size anywhere in the world.

The Papuan languages were originally regarded as constituting a vast conglomerate of hundreds of mostly unrelated small languages. This was mainly the result of the fact that the first contacts of Europeans with Papuan languages took place in areas in which language diversity and multiplicity reaches quite extreme proportions even for New Guinea conditions, for instance in what today constitutes the Madang Province, the Huon Peninsula area and some other regions. The impression gained from those first contacts was then extended to the Papuan languages in general, though a number of small interrelated Papuan language groups were recognized quite early.

Since the mid-1950s, a tremendous amount of work has been carried out to survey closely the linguistic situation of the entire New Guinea area, identify the languages and dialects, recognize their distribution and attempt their at least preliminary classification in relation to each other. Most of this work was, until very recently, carried out under the auspices of the Department of Linguistics of the Research School of Pacific
MAP III: PAPUAN PHYLIC GROUPS
LEGEND TO MAP OF PAPUAN PHYLIC GROUPS

A Trans-New Guinea Phylum
B West Papuan Phylum
C Sepik-Ramu Phylum
D Torricelli Phylum
E East Papuan Phylum
F Sko phylum-level Stock
G Kwomtari phylum-level Stock
H Arai (Left May) phylum-level Family
I Amt-Musian phylum-level Stock
J East Bird's Head phylum-level Stock
K Geelvink Bay Phylum
L Warenbori phylum-level Isolate
M Taurap (Boromeso) phylum-level Isolate
N Yuri phylum-level Isolate
O Busa phylum-level Isolate
P Nagatman phylum-level Isolate
Q Wasembo (Gusap) phylum-level Isolate
R Porome (Kibiri) phylum-level Isolate
S Maisin (Austronesian-Papuan) 'mixed' language
Studies in the Australian National University, and by members of the Papua New Guinea and Irian Jaya Branches of the Summer Institute of Linguistics. Some work has been done in recent years in particular, by linguists attached to various missionary organizations in the New Guinea area, and by individual overseas scholars working in the New Guinea area for limited periods on a variety of projects.

As a result of this work, the Papuan linguistic picture gradually evolved through a great number of intermediate steps over a couple of decades to what it is believed to be today (Wurm 1975b, 1981a).

In the framework of this picture, it has been proposed that a far-flung group of over 500 probably, though in some instances only very tenuously, interrelated Papuan languages occupies about four-fifths of the New Guinea mainland and a portion of the island area to the west of it. This language group which has been named the Trans-New Guinea Phylum (McElhanon and Voorhoeve 1970), very probably contains a large number of languages which may have originally not been related to other languages of the phylum or to each other, but which in the course of thousands of years, have been subjected to such strong influence from original Trans-New Guinea Phylum languages that at our present state of knowledge it is not possible for us to be sure whether their links with Trans-New Guinea Phylum languages are the reflection of an original genetic relationship, or of a pervading influence on the vocabulary and structure of these languages (Wurm, Voorhoeve and McElhanon 1975; Wurm 1981a).

Many of the other known Papuan languages which are apparently unrelated to the Trans-New Guinea Phylum languages, though some of them show quite strong Trans-New Guinea influence in their vocabulary and structure, have been grouped together into another large group which contains close to 100 languages. From its geographical location in the Sepik and Ramu Rivers basins in the northern part of Papua New Guinea, this group has been named the Sepik-Ramu Phylum (Laycock and Z'graggen 1975). The structural diversity of the languages included in this phylum is greater than that encountered with languages included in the Trans-New Guinea Phylum, but there are a number of basic structural and other principles manifesting themselves in Sepik-Ramu Phylum languages which suggest that they belong to a single group which is supported by findings on the lexical level. The inclusion of some subgroups of languages into the Sepik-Ramu Phylum has been subject to some doubt, just as this has been the case with subgroups included in the Trans-New Guinea Phylum, but further study is expected to clarify these issues.

The remainder of the known Papuan languages has, with the exception of eight languages, been included in three largish and six small language groups which are apparently not related to each other or to the two major groups named before. The three largish groups have been named as follows:

The Torricelli Phylum, containing forty-eight languages and located in the northwestern part of Papua New Guinea, around the Torricelli Mountains area (Laycock 1975b). These languages which constitute three geographically separate groups, have a rather special structure and show some typological similarity to those of the West Papuan Phylum (see below), and appear to be generally quite closely interrelated within the three groups which seems to suggest that they split from common ancestors a much shorter
time ago than appears to be the case with languages belonging to the other phyla mentioned so far. However, Torricelli Phylum language elements are found as strong substrata in languages belonging to the Sepik-Ramu Phylum and located nearby, or also some distance away. It seems therefore possible that the area in which Torricelli Phylum languages were originally located, and the original diversity of Torricelli Phylum languages themselves, were much greater before these languages may have been heavily encroached upon by Sepik-Ramu Phylum languages, with many of the original Torricelli Phylum languages disappearing in the process, and only manifesting themselves as substrata in other languages. In the course of this process, the Torricelli Phylum languages appear to have been split up into three geographically non-contiguous groups. It may well be that most of the Torricelli Phylum languages found today are the descendants of a few surviving Torricelli Phylum languages of a very similar type. Only one Torricelli Phylum language is significantly different from the other Torricelli Phylum languages in its structure. Such phenomena are known from other language areas in the world, for instance from the Turkic languages in Asia which are all very similar to each other, except for one very aberrant language existing which seems to indicate a greater original diversity of the Turkic languages than is present today.

The East Papuan Phylum with twenty-seven languages is located in the island world to the east of the New Guinea mainland, from Rossel Island in the Louisiade Archipelago off the eastern end of the mainland to the Santa Cruz Archipelago in the east (Wurm 1975c). These languages show quite considerable structural diversity though a few very specific structural features are very widespread amongst them. Phonologically, many of these languages are very simple, whereas others are extremely complex - this has been put forward by some scholars, notably Austronesianists, as militating against the possibility of interrelationship existing between such phonetically diverse languages. However it must be remembered that the same phenomenon is encountered in the Austronesian linguistic field in which some Polynesian languages belong to the phonetically simplest languages on earth, whereas others such as Austronesian languages of New Caledonia, belong to the most complex. Most of the languages included in the East Papuan Phylum have been found to show strong to very strong Austronesian influence in their vocabularies and to a lesser extent in their structures. However, much of this influence does not appear to come from Austronesian languages located in the area where these East Papuan languages are found today. Some of the Austronesian influence appears to reflect Austronesian language elements found in the southeastern portion of the New Guinea mainland and the small islands adjacent to it. Other Austronesian elements in East Papuan Phylum languages appear to belong much further west and seem to antedate Oceanic Austronesian and immediately pre-Oceanic Austronesian. This is in contrast to the Austronesian influence apparently present in the Trans-New Guinea Phylum languages which generally reflects Oceanic or immediately pre-Oceanic Austronesian influence. The origin of some of the Austronesian influence in East Papuan Phylum languages is still not clear and a subject for further study. At the same time, structural elements of languages included in the East Papuan Phylum are encountered in a number of Austronesian languages located in the general area occupied by East Papuan Phylum languages.
The West Papuan Phylum, with twenty-four languages, occupies the greater part of the Bird's Head Peninsula in western Irian Jaya as well as the northern half of Halmahera (Voorhoeve 1975a, b; Wurm 1981a). Typologically, the languages of the West Papuan Phylum show some similarity to those of the Torricelli Phylum, but there is no similarity in detail and form between languages of the two phyla. It seems likely that the area occupied by West Papuan Phylum languages was originally much larger than it is at present, because elements of what appear to be West Papuan Phylum type languages are found as substrata over wide areas, predominantly in the western half of the New Guinea mainland, and also very strongly on Timor. Of all Papuan language groups, the languages of the West Papuan Phylum show most, though numerically still very few, possible links with the languages of the Andaman Islanders. An even smaller number of such possible links is present between languages of the East Papuan Phylum and the Andaman languages (Wurm 1975a, 1981a).

The six minor groups mentioned before comprise a total of only twenty-nine languages. The groups are as follows:

The Sko phylum-level Stock, with eight languages, occupies a narrow strip of coastal and hinterland country straddling the Irian Jaya-Papua New Guinea border (Laycock 1975c). These languages have a very unusual structure which is only vaguely reminiscent typologically of the Torricelli Phylum language type, and some of them are characterized by the fact that differences in syllable tones are not only used to distinguish words of otherwise identical shape, but also differences in grammatical functions. This small phylum consists of a single stock of languages - for an explanation of this term see below.

The Kwomtari phylum-level Stock, with five languages, occupies a stretch of country in the northwestern extremity of Papua New Guinea (Laycock 1975c). Structurally, the languages belonging to this small phylum are quite simple which is in contrast to the usually very high complexity of the structures of Papuan languages.

The Arai (Left May) phylum-level Family, with six languages, is found in the area of the left arm of the May River, a southern tributary of the Sepik River in western Papua New Guinea (Laycock 1975c; Conrad and Dye 1975). With the verbs in these languages, a large number of aspects is marked with the verb by prefixes, suffixes and particles, and it seems that some connection may exist between the languages of this small phylum and some languages located in the Upper Strickland River area to the south of the dividing ranges. The languages of that area have been included in the Trans-New Guinea Phylum, but they show a strong substratum, and the multiplicity of verbal aspects characteristic of the Arai phylum-level Family languages is also found in them, along with some lexical links between them and the Arai Family languages.

The Amto-Musian phylum-level Family, with two languages, is located to the south of the Kwomtari phylum-level Stock area (Conrad and Dye 1975). Both of the languages making up this small phylum-level family were believed to be unrelated to other languages until the relationship between them was discovered a few years ago.
The East Bird's Head phylum-level Stock, with three languages, is located in the eastern and northeastern parts of the Bird's Head Peninsula in western Irian Jaya (Voorhoeve 1975b, c). The languages included in this small phylum-level stock show some typological and some very few structural and lexical links with languages of the West Papuan Phylum, but they do not seem to be sufficient to include the languages belonging to it with the West Papuan Phylum.

The Geelvink Bay Phylum, with five languages, is located in the central portion of the island of Yapen of Geelvink Bay in western Irian Jaya, and occupies most of the eastern coast and hinterland areas of that bay (Voorhoeve 1975b, c). Structurally, the languages of this phylum show some similarity with Trans-New Guinea Phylum languages, and there are also some lexical links between the languages of the two phyla. It may be possible that the Geelvink Bay Phylum languages can eventually be included in the Trans-New Guinea Phylum.

As has already been mentioned, there are eight languages, seven of them definitely Papuan, which can at this stage of our knowledge, not be included in any of the established phyllic groups. They have therefore to be regarded as isolates. The eighth language, Maisin, which is located in the tail-end of the New Guinea mainland, has been variously regarded as a Papuan-influenced Austronesian, or as an Austronesian-influenced Papuan language, though on balance, the former view may seem to have greater validity (Dutton 1971 and personal communication Lynch 1977). Of the seven definitely Papuan isolates, three are located in the northwestern part of Papua New Guinea, one in its central south, and the remaining three are found in the north of the non-peninsular part of Irian Jaya (Laycock 1975d; Voorhoeve 1975d; Franklin 1975; Wurm 1981a).

There are close to 3,000,000 speakers of Papuan Languages. Of this figure, nearly 2,310,000 speak languages included in the Trans-New Guinea Phylum, 194,000 languages of the Sepik-Ramu Phylum, 80,000 languages of the Torricelli Phylum, 69,000 languages of the East Papuan Phylum and 217,000 languages of the West Papuan Phylum. Only about 41,000 indigenes speak languages included in the minor phyla, i.e. Sko phylum-level Stock: 6,600; Kwomtari phylum-level Stock: 3,300; Arai phylum-level Family: 1,600; Amto-Musian phylum-level Family: 300; East Bird's Head phylum-level Stock: 17,000; and Geelvink Bay Phylum: 12,000. The total number of the speakers of the isolates is around 5,000 (Wurm 1981a).

Within each of the phyllic groups mentioned above, closely related languages constitute families, with two or several families of languages which show more distant, but clearly recognizable relationship, included into language stocks. The phyllic groups listed contain one, or several, language stocks which are distantly related to each other within each phylum. At the same time, the term subphylum has been introduced in Papuan linguistic classification to refer to language stocks which are aberrant when compared with non-subphyllic stock in the same phylum, i.e. with the ordinary stocks in it (Wurm and McElhanon 1975). In the Trans-New Guinea Phylum, a number of the languages included in such subphylla may well represent originally unrelated languages which had been under the influence of Trans-New Guinea Phylum languages for thousands of years, as has been mentioned above.
In classifying Papuan languages, a range of lexical and structural criteria has been resorted to. One difficulty in Papuan language classification is the very widespread presence of various degrees of influences of languages upon each other on almost all levels, with not only the lexical composition but also the structures of languages apparently having undergone quite far-reaching modifications and changes under the influence of other sometimes unrelated languages. The only relatively stable and persisting items and features in Papuan languages seem to be some verbs as lexical items, some structural characteristics of verbs and principles underlying them as well as principles underlying pronominal systems (but not to the same extent, the form of the pronouns themselves as lexical items) and also semantic traits of the grouping of lexical items (Wurm and McElhanon 1975; Wurm 1981a).

It may be mentioned that many Papuan languages show very considerable grammatical complexity, especially in their verb structure. This is particularly so with the great majority of the languages which have been included in the Trans-New Guinea Phylum, as well as with those of the Torricelli Phylum and the Sko phylum-level Stock, and also with those of some of the subgroups of the Sepik-Ramu and the East Papuan Phyla.

The intensive research work over the last twenty-five years or so has yielded many pieces of evidence making it possible to suggest the various steps leading to the probable development of the present Papuan linguistic picture through language migrations and language contacts in the past. These pieces of evidence are in part based on linguistic findings, but to a very important part also on that of corroborating findings of other disciplines such as prehistory, human genetics, cultural anthropology, biogeography, human geography, oceanography, zoology, botany, parasitology, epidemiology, etc. (Wurm, Laycock, Voorhoeve, Dutton 1975; Wurm 1981a, b).

As one piece of linguistic evidence, it may for instance be mentioned that a very major set of personal pronoun forms is very strongly present in languages of the Trans-New Guinea Phylum and in fact constitutes one of the characteristics of these languages. However, at least the second and third person singular forms of this pronoun set appear to be Austronesian loans, though the pronominal system of which they constitute elements shows decidedly non-Austronesian characteristics. At the same time, the form of the first person singular pronoun in this set is similar to the Oceanic Austronesian, not the western Austronesian, general pronoun form (Wurm 1981a, b). This seems to suggest a strong interaction between Austronesians and early Trans-New Guinea Phylum language speakers at some point of time in the past. Another interesting piece of linguistic evidence connected with personal pronouns is the presence of a widely scattered pronoun set which is strongly associated in its appearance with small phylic groups and isolates, and also with some aberrant parts and subgroups of the Trans-New Guinea Phylum and of the Sepik-Ramu Phylum (Wurm 1975d, 1981a, b). The various groups named appear to be unrelated to each other. However, the exclusive appearance of this particular small pronoun set in them seems to suggest that some remote link between these groups may be possible - these groups may perhaps constitute scattered remnants of an earlier language picture which has been largely overlaid and submerged by the spreading of other language groups.
Another interesting linguistic evidence is the appearance of far-reaching agreements in the form of subject and object markers in the verb (Wurm 1975e, 1981a, b) in a fairly narrow area which stretches westwards from the Huon Peninsula area into the Eastern Highlands and along the northern slopes of the highlands to the centre of the mainland, and further west through the highlands of Irian Jaya, with several side branches of this areal phenomenon extending into various directions from the centre of the mainland. This phenomenon gradually becomes weaker along its westward extension. It largely coincides with the area of the most conspicuous distribution of more recent Austronesian loanwords whose appearance gradually weakens westward whereas other Austronesian loanwords of a somewhat more archaic, immediately pre-Oceanic, type are found in the west. Their distribution extends eastwards, generally coinciding with the Trans-New Guinea Phylum language area.

On the basis of such linguistic and various forms of interdisciplinary evidence, it seems possible to suggest that the past language migration picture in the New Guinea area may have possibly been somehow as follows (Wurm, Laycock, Voorhoeve, Dutton 1975; Wurm 1981a, b).

The first immigrants into the New Guinea area were probably Australoids who came from the west and entered the northern section of what was then a single New Guinea-Australian continent, perhaps 60,000 or so years ago (Golson 1966a, b; Kirk 1980). They seem to have spread southwards into what is today Australia until approximately 10,000-8,000 years ago when New Guinea and Australia became permanently isolated from each other through Torres Strait coming into existence. The first Papuans, who presumably were speakers of old Papuan languages, appear to have entered the New Guinea area from the west at a time which was probably not very much earlier than that of the final formation of Torres Strait, i.e. perhaps maximally 15,000 years ago. It seems that this first Papuan migration spread right across New Guinea, and it seems possible that languages descended from ancestral language forms spoken by these first Papuan immigrants are still surviving today in the form of the isolates and members of at least some of the small phyllic groups mentioned before. Most of these are located in areas which are not in the paths of assumed later major Papuan migration routes. They may in fact constitute some remnants of an earlier large linguistic group which may have been geographically more coherent and perhaps more homogeneous than these remnants suggest today. There is a possibility that members of the East Papuan Phylum, or at least an element in them, may also be derived from languages of the first Papuan immigrants.

A few millennia later, a second Papuan migration appears to have entered the New Guinea area and spread through much of it with the languages carried by this migration overlaying the language picture brought in by the first migration. The languages assumed to have been brought in by this second Papuan migration which have very clearly identifiable structural features, seem to have in turn been overlaid in the greater part of the New Guinea area by the subsequent main Papuan language immigration which seems to have entered the area about 5,000 years ago. Surviving descendants of languages brought in by this assumed second Papuan migration are found in the far west of the New Guinea area, but traces of the presence of languages believed to have been introduced by this second
Papuan migration are encountered as substratum features in many parts of the New Guinea area today.

The languages of the Torricelli Phylum also seem to constitute archaic Papuan languages which were present in the Sepik-Ramu area before the spreading of the Sepik-Ramu Phylum languages through that area which may be estimated to have taken place at least 6,000 years ago if not earlier.

The main Papuan language migration seems to have been that which spread the Trans-New Guinea Phylum language through most of the New Guinea mainland. The present differences between Trans-New Guinea Phylum languages seem to suggest that these languages started splitting off from a common ancestor perhaps several thousand years earlier than the assumed date of the splitting up of Austronesian languages which is believed to be about 7,000 years ago (Foley 1980). It also seems that early speakers of Trans-New Guinea Phylum languages may have been living in areas situated to the west of the New Guinea mainland for several thousand years before the Austronesians arrived in that area which is believed to have happened about 5,500 years ago (Grace 1964; Pawley 1969; Wurm 1975f; Foley 1980). Subsequent contacts between these early Austronesians and early Trans-New Guinea Phylum speakers seem to have led to the adoption of a number of Austronesian loanwords by the latter. Subsequently, perhaps about 5,000 years ago or so, the early Trans-New Guinea Phylum speakers appear to have started migrating eastwards, into and through the New Guinea mainland, carrying these loanwords with them deep into the interior of the island (Wurm 1981a, b). This migration could be estimated to have taken approximately 1,000 years, and the Trans-New Guinea Phylum languages appeared to have overlaid earlier languages in much of the New Guinea mainland, with speakers of such earlier languages adopting Trans-New Guinea Phylum languages, preserving more or less apparent traces of their earlier languages in the form of substrata in the adopted languages. At the same time, the material culture and other cultural features, as well as racial characteristics, of such speakers of earlier languages seem to have remained largely unaffected in many instances. Interesting evidence for this is provided by archaeological findings showing that the builders and exploiters of the first gardens in the Kuk swamps, in the area which is today in the western part of the Western Highlands Province of Papua New Guinea, were present in that area 9,000 years ago (see J. Golson, this volume). Archaeological evidence also shows that the material culture of the area has remained stable, without displaying signs of a major disturbance a few thousand years after that date. At the same time, the language spoken in the area today belongs to one of the language families in the Trans-New Guinea Phylum, though the languages of this family show some unusual characteristics when compared with other languages of the highlands area of Papua New Guinea. The Trans-New Guinea Phylum languages are assumed to have penetrated into that area only 4,000-5,000 years ago, and it seems therefore that the original population of the Kuk swamps region adopted a Trans-New Guinea Phylum language, with some traces of its earlier language (or languages) which was presumably brought into the area as a result of the second or perhaps even the first, Papuan immigration, still present in the form of a substratum. A similar event seems to have taken place in the Kukukuku (or Angan) area, to the east and southeast of what is today the Eastern Highlands Province of Papua New Guinea. The Kukukuku people are culturally and racially different from the highlands people to the west of them, but their languages are clearly eastern
highlands-type Trans-New Guinea Phylum languages, though they also show a number of very pronounced non-highlands features which appear to represent a strong substratum in them. It seems that the Kukukuku people have taken over a Trans-New Guinea Phylum language of a comparatively recent highlands type, and lost their original language whose earlier presence is however betrayed through strong substratum features in the present-day languages of the Kukukuku people.

In the southeastern tail-end of the mainland, the Trans-New Guinea Phylum language migration appears to have displaced an earlier language group, possibly dating back to the first Papuan immigration, with this language group moving out into the Rossel Island area, but leaving behind a lexical and structural substratum in some Trans-New Guinea Phylum languages which are now situated in the southeastern tail-end area of the mainland (J. and A. Henderson 1974; Wurm 1981a). The displaced languages, believed to be the ancestors of the present-day East Papuan Phylum languages, show traces of the influence of the Trans-New Guinea Phylum languages which are thought to have displaced them. Some of their speakers appear to have migrated into the central Solomons area, presumably after they had had strong contacts with Austronesian culture which resulted in the imparting by the Austronesians, of seafaring skills to them, and with the help of favourable currents and prevailing winds (Wurm 1978). The languages show very strong influence from Austronesian languages. From the central Solomons, the languages seem to have extended along the Solomon Islands chain and apparently also to Bougainville Island. This may also have been reached by other speakers of early East Papuan Phylum languages from the New Britain area, under the impact of the Austronesian migration believed to have moved through that area about 5,000 years ago. Speakers of early East Papuan Phylum languages are thought to have reached the New Britain area well before the advent of the Trans-New Guinea Phylum speakers and of the Austronesians. It appears that languages of the East Papuan Phylum spread eastwards all the way to Santa Cruz along an Austronesian obsidian trading route extending from New Britain to Santa Cruz for a thousand years, beginning about 3,000 years ago (Green 1976a, b and personal communication).

About 3,500 years ago, an east-to-west language migration within the Trans-New Guinea Phylum seems to have originated in the Markham Valley area. It appears to have spread for some distance to the northwest and southwest, and along the northern slopes of the highlands westwards to the centre of the mainland and beyond into the highlands areas of Irian Jaya, with several side migrations radiating out from the centre of the mainland. This language migration appears to have spread relatively recent eastern Austronesian loanwords within a considerable part of the Trans-New Guinea Phylum.

The present-day Sepik-Ramu Phylum languages appear to have been introduced into, and spread through; their present area from the west as a result of a migration which may have entered that area at least 6,000 years ago or even much earlier. It seems that these languages overlaid Torricelli Phylum languages in much of the country which they entered, but at the same time their speakers do not appear to have had contact with early Austronesians, because Austronesian loanwords in them are very few – except for loanwords of obviously recent origin in near-coastal areas where Austronesians are located and for some Austronesian words which appear to
have been taken over from Trans-New Guinea Phylum languages. Contacts between speakers of ancestral Sepik-Ramu Phylum languages and ancestral Trans-New Guinea Phylum languages appear to have taken place at some later date, resulting in Trans-New Guinea Phylum influence of varying strength upon some Sepik-Ramu Phylum languages.

It seems that the speakers of Sepik-Ramu Phylum languages which are generally river people, may have been living for long periods in some river areas to the west of their present habitat, before their eastward migration began. Laycock (1973) mentions the apparent presence of some linguistic and cultural similarities between Sepik-Ramu language speakers and Australian Aborigines. Such similarities are also present on some genetic levels (MacLennan et al. 1960; Kirk 1980). Laycock draws attention to the general similarity between the phonology of the Ndu Family languages of the Sepik-Ramu Phylum and the general phonological characteristics of Australian Aboriginal languages. There seem to be also some lexical similarities between languages of the Ndu Family and some Australian languages (Laycock 1969). Interdisciplinary evidence such as the genetic evidence mentioned above, also seems to point in this direction. Laycock mentions the use of spear-throwers by some Sepik-Ramu Phylum language speakers as well as the presence of spear forms which are similar to the Australian Aboriginal spear. The speakers of some Sepik-Ramu Phylum languages have a highly developed art of painting on flat surfaces which is not unlike Australian Aboriginal bark painting, and Sepik slit-gongs used in pairs have been found to be tuned to the natural overblowing interval of the Australian didjeridu. Also, members of both sexes used to have the habit of going completely naked in some areas occupied by Sepik-Ramu Phylum speakers, which is a typical Australian Aboriginal custom, but not found elsewhere in New Guinea. All this may seem to make it possible to suggest that Sepik-Ramu Phylum speakers may constitute some remnants of the earlier Australoid population in the New Guinea area who have been strongly affected by thousands of years of contact with Papuans.

There seems to be a possibility that the speakers of the languages belonging to the Sko phylum-level Stock located in the northern coastal border area between Irian Jaya and Papua New Guinea, may be relatively recent immigrants into the New Guinea area. The special tonal systems present in these languages, the nature of their verb structure and certain consonant clusters in them are unique in the New Guinea area and the region closest to the New Guinea area in which such features are also found is in Southeast Asia in the area of the Burmic languages (Laycock 1973, 1975a, c). On the interdisciplinary level, it is of interest to note that Sko language speakers have large sea-going tacking canoes which are not found elsewhere in Melanesia - the area nearest to the New Guinea area in which such canoes are also found is again Southeast Asia (Laycock 1975a). Also the fact that Dongson bronzes had been unearthed at Lake Sentani in northeastern Irian Jaya, quite close to the present location of languages of the Sko phylum-level Stock (Van Heekeren 1958; De Bruyn 1959), is of interest in this connection. All this may perhaps suggest the possibility of some distant connection between the Sko phylum-level Stock languages and its speakers with areas located much further west in Southeast Asia.
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The Austronesian language family is the most geographically widespread in the world, with more than 120,000,000 speakers scattered from Madagascar in the west to Easter Island in the east. Austronesian languages are spoken in Madagascar, the Malay Peninsula, southern Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines. They are also spoken by the aboriginal populations of Formosa, where until about 500 years ago they constituted almost the entire population.

Austronesian languages are also spoken to the east of this area, around the coasts of Papua New Guinea, in Micronesia and Polynesia and in almost all of Island Melanesia.

All of the Austronesian languages, then, are believed to go back to a single parent language, called Proto-Austronesian. The time and place at which this ancestral language was spoken is still unresolved, in absolute terms, although it is the opinion of many Austronesian scholars that Proto-Austronesian existed somewhere between 3000-5000 BC, and that its home was either in the area of the South China coast or in Formosa. The details of arguments for and against need not detain us here. There is archaeological evidence suggesting the presence of Austronesian speakers in Papua New Guinea by 3000 BC, so an original dispersal date of 5000 BC is not unreasonable.

Before going on to discuss the subgroupings and migrations of the Austronesian languages, just a word about the relationship of the Proto-Austronesians to other Asian populations. Benedict (1942, 1975) has attempted to demonstrate that the Austronesian languages are related to the Thai-Kadai languages of mainland Southeast Asia. His claim is:

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PROTO-AUSTRO-THAI

PROTO-THAI KADAI PROTO-AUSTRONESIAN
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Even if the genetic relationship between the two is not accepted, the linguistic evidence points to ancient contacts between the two descendants of a putative Austro-Thai, and quite possibly to borrowings into Proto-Thai from Proto-Austronesian.
The subgrouping tree which best accounts for the linguistic evidence at present available to us follows Blust (1978), thus:

[At = Atayalic, Ts = Tsouic, Pw = Paiwanic, M-P = Malayo-Polynesian, WM-P = Western Malayo-Polynesian, C-EM-P = Central-Eastern Malayo-Polynesian, CM-P = Central Malayo-Polynesian, EM-P = Eastern Malayo-Polynesian, SHWNG = South Halmahera West New Guinea]

The Austronesian languages of Formosa, then, may be considered to constitute three of the four first order groups of Austronesian. This high degree of internal diversity strongly indicates long occupation. Many even prefer Formosa as the original homeland of the Austronesians. It is difficult to be too definite about the matter, however.

About 5000 BC the Proto-Austronesians began to disperse, moving south from the South China/Formosa area through the Philippines and into north Borneo and north Celebes (Sulawesi). It would seem likely that there was a subsequent migration from north Borneo, which populated western Indonesia (WM-P), and another, moving south from north Celebes (Sulawesi) (C-EM-P). This migration would have moved through eastern Indonesia, one branch of which (EM-P) was the source of the languages of Oceania, among which the Melanesian languages are the focus of this seminar.

With the exception of the Papuan languages, all of the languages of Polynesia, Micronesia (except Yap and Palau) and Melanesia east of Geelvink Bay in Irian Jaya are believed to belong to a single subgroup called 'Oceanic', and to have evolved from a common ancestor language, often called Proto-Oceanic. The wider affiliations of the Oceanic subgroup are still being studied, although as the table above suggests, it is most closely related to the South Halmahera West New Guinea subgroup. All Oceanic languages have merged certain Proto-Austronesian proto-phonemes which have remained distinctive in the languages to the west. A number of grammatical features and a significant number of vocabulary items are also shared by the 'Oceanic' languages, exclusive of the Western Austronesian languages.
Austronesian speakers are believed to have reached the northwest of New Guinea about 3000 BC, touching only marginally on the mainland itself. From northwest New Guinea they seem to have migrated directly to the New Britain-New Ireland area, from where further migrations have emanated, some westwards to the northeast coast of the mainland, and some east and south to various parts of the coast of Papua New Guinea (Wurm, Laycock, Voorhoeve, Dutton 1975). From this area the Austronesian populations gradually filtered further south, right through the Melanesian chain, reaching Fiji about 1500 BC.

Attempts at subgrouping the Oceanic languages (with the exception of the Polynesian languages which will not concern us here) have not advanced very far. The overwhelming impression is one of remarkable diversity, with the exception of one large subgroup, called Eastern Oceanic or Remote Oceanic, to which we will return later.

The Oceanic languages (the Austronesian languages of Melanesia for present purposes) fall into between twenty and thirty first-order subgroups, depending on the scholar and the criteria used. While the Oceanic languages show a certain uniformity, it is the overwhelming impression of diversity that has attracted the most attention.

Some scholars, notably Ray and Capell, divided the Austronesian languages into four coordinate first order subgroups, Indonesian, Micronesian, Melanesian and Polynesian. They denied the Oceanic hypothesis, stating that there were sufficient differences between MN and PN to accord them coordinate status. More importantly, they sought to explain the 'remarkable diversity' of the Melanesian languages as being the result of the mixing of the Austronesian language of each immigrant group (called by them Indonesian) with the Papuan or non-Austronesian language(s) of the area settled by the Austronesians. The resultant pidgin languages, then, retained a largely Austronesian grammar but a considerable Papuan vocabulary.

As Professor Wurm has pointed out, there are a number of Papuan languages in island Melanesia and in Papua New Guinea the Austronesian languages are nearly all in close proximity, geographically, to Papuan languages. Undoubtedly there has been considerable interaction between the two groups, and considerable linguistic influence as well. I shall return to this point below.

Many scholars (Grace, Pawley) do not accept the 'pidginisation hypothesis' or 'substratum theory', claiming that a number of other factors must be taken into account, such as an uneven rate of change in the lexicon of Austronesian languages, with some of the languages of Melanesia changing considerably more rapidly than the bulk of Austronesian languages. Reasons for accelerated lexical replacement have not been investigated very fully as yet, although word taboo (Keeling 1969) has evidently played a much larger part than was originally considered possible.

The lexical diversity of the Melanesian languages was pointed up by a lexico-statistical classification of all of the Austronesian languages carried out by Dyen (1965). Dyen stated that Proto-Austronesian originally split into forty first order subgroups. One of these, called the Malayo-Polynesian linkage, covered most of the non-Oceanic languages and
nearly all of the Oceanic languages belonging to the Eastern Oceanic subgroup, to be discussed below. What is significant, for the moment, is that of the remaining thirty-nine subgroups, thirty-three are found in Melanesia alone. Dyen noted that there is considerable evidence of a non-lexical kind which supports an Oceanic subgrouping, but finds it remarkable that there is no lexico-statistical support for such a classification.

Let us, then, examine the subgroupings of Oceanic and try to see if it is possible to reconcile the grammatical and phonological evidence which supports such a grouping and the rather daunting diversity at the lexical level.

The Oceanic languages (after Grace) may be subgrouped as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Languages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sarmi Coast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Jayapura-Irian Jaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sepik-Madang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Rai Coast-NW New Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Markham</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Huon Gulf</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Milne Bay-Central Province</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Northern Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Kimbe (NW New Britain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>SW New Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Tolai-New Ireland</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Admiralty Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Nissan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>N. Bougainville-Buka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>S. Bougainville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Choiseul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>New Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>W. Isabel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Eastern Oceanic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Southern New Hebrides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>New Caledonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Loyalty Island</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Subgroup 20: Eastern Oceanic, may be represented diagrammatically as follows:

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EASTERN OCEANIC

Nuclear Micronesian
S.E. Solomons
C. + N. New Hebrides (Vanuatu)

Central Pacific

W.Central Pacific
E.Central Pacific

Western Fijian
Eastern Fijian
Proto-Polynesian
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The composition of the Eastern Oceanic subgroup has altered slightly during the last few years, but is substantially as linguistic observers have sensed it to be for a long period of time. Codrington (1885) and Ray (1926) discussed it in general terms and more recently Grace (1955) and Pawley (1972). The only significant alteration was proposed by Pawley (1977), who excluded the southeast without explaining his reasons. The present writer, currently engaged in a classification of all Solomons languages, believes that the southeast Solomons should remain in the Eastern Oceanic subgroup as diagrammed. (The Eastern Oceanic subgroup has
been renamed Remote Oceanic by Pawley. For purposes of this paper we will retain the better known term, Eastern Oceanic.)

The arguments for and against the inclusion or exclusion of certain languages from the Eastern Oceanic subgroup need not concern us here. What is important is to note that the Oceanic languages fall into numerous small first order subgroups, with one exception, the Eastern Oceanic subgroup. Tryon (1976 and forthcoming) has shown that this subgroup is much larger, in terms of language numbers, than had previously been thought. The Eastern Oceanic subgroup contains approximately 120 languages, while the maximum membership of other subgroups would probably not exceed twenty.

So in island Melanesia we have a linguistic picture of numerous distantly related (first order) groups, and a single large homogeneous group which would seem considerably younger than the other groups as shown by the relatively close relationship of its members. In rough glotto-chronological terms the group could be traced back to a single ancestral language about 3,000 years ago.

Green (1976) has remarked that the Eastern Oceanic languages have been regarded as most like Indonesian languages. In view of the 'pidginisation' theory discussed above, Grace's comments could be reinterpreted as saying that the Eastern Oceanic languages are the least 'contaminated' by Papuan languages, that they are the only group to have escaped significant influence from them.

Grace draws two conclusions as follows:

If these judgements that these languages are more like the Indonesian languages than are the other languages of Oceanic are correct, then either (1) they must have separated from the Indonesian languages more recently than did the others or (2) if they separated from them as early as did the others, they must have changed less in the ensuing period of separate development (1976:108).

From what has been discussed above, it would appear that the first conclusion has more merit than the second. Indeed it is this very question which will be the subject of intensive investigation by the present writer as the Department's Austronesian Research Project develops. It seems that most scholars are not agreed that word taboo and an uneven rate of lexical replacement are insufficient to account for the lexical diversity noted in the languages of Melanesia. The influence of existing Papuan populations must have been a factor, although the degree of this influence remains to be determined. Recent work in the Solomons and the New Hebrides (Vanuatu) has shown links, tentative at this stage, between the presumed 'non-Austronesian' vocabulary of the Austronesian languages in Melanesia and the East Papuan Phylum. While it is not necessary to go as far as a wholesale acceptance of the 'pidginisation' theory, it appears more and more likely that much of the diversity in present day Melanesian languages can be attributed to Austronesian contact with Papuan populations as they migrated into the areas they now occupy.
If this is so, how did the Eastern Oceanic subgroup of languages escape the 'contamination' of the Papuans? The solution which presents itself to me is that they did not follow the same migratory route as the other Oceanic groups (i.e. along the north coast of Papua New Guinea and into the New Britain–New Ireland area), but that they were blown east past New Britain and New Ireland and into Micronesia, from whence they subsequently reached the South Solomons–Northern New Hebrides area and dispersed, perhaps as recently as 3,000 years ago. The traditions of both Malaita and San Cristobal (Solomon Islands) tell that the present Melanesian population was not the first to settle these islands.

What would have been the point of departure for the Eastern Oceanic speakers, presuming that future research confirms the migration route advanced here? Of course it is not possible to answer such a question, especially as our knowledge of the languages of Eastern Indonesia is so minimal. The eastern Indonesia area does, however, look the most likely setting off point, especially as preliminary studies by Blust (1978) have shown an Eastern Malayo-Polynesian subgroup of Austronesian which groups together not only the Oceanic languages, but also the languages of West New Guinea and South Halmahera. Grace (1976) felt that if the Eastern Oceanic languages did share a longer history with the Indonesian than the other Oceanic languages, then the Oceanic hypothesis would be false. However, this statement predated the discovery of the existence of the Eastern Malayo-Polynesian subgroup, which effectively pushes the boundary of the 'Oceanic'-type languages further to the west than has been previously known. Of course the Oceanic hypothesis is not sacrosanct, and further new ideas on subgrouping and migration theory are to be expected as the languages of eastern Indonesia become better known.

The picture in Melanesia, then, is one of great linguistic diversity. The evidence which we have suggests a great and continual movement of peoples up and down the islands of the chain, and a constant interaction between Austronesian-speaking groups, and between Austronesians and Papuans. The extent and degree of the movements in and around the islands of Melanesia has only recently become known (see also Laycock 1975); this subject will be, we hope, fully worked out through interdisciplinary approaches.

What, then, did the Melanesian make of such linguistic diversity and how did they cope in their daily lives? The responses of many are discussed in the papers on trade languages and lingue franche. For non-neighbouring groups trade languages were the response to the problem. With geographically contiguous groups, multilingualism was and is still common, any man being reasonably expected to know at least one language apart from his own, excluding the wider-ranging trade languages.

In areas where Austronesian and Papuan language groups are neighbours, the response is varied in terms of which language becomes the language of daily communication. In the Solomon Islands, for example, in the case of Roviana (Austronesian) and Mbaniata (Papuan) speakers, the Mbaniata speakers use Roviana; a little further to the north, however, Sengga (Austronesian) speakers use Mbilua (P) in dealings between the two groups. It is difficult to generalize, but experience has shown that where Austronesians and Papuans come together, it is the normal expectation that the Papuan will know the language of his Austronesian neighbour, but not
vice versa. What is interesting, and perhaps significant, is that the grammar of the Papuan languages in island Melanesia, with one or two notable exceptions, is much simpler than that which one normally encounters in the Papuan languages of Papua New Guinea proper, perhaps reflecting centuries of contact with Austronesian-speaking peoples and some accommodation to them.

The diversity remains, but the peoples of Melanesia have evolved solutions, especially very widely known lingue franche in the past 150 years. But they had also evolved solutions long before European explorers entered the Pacific.

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INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL LINKAGES

Language

TRADE LANGUAGES AND LINGUE FRANCHE

The Melanesian response to linguistic diversity: the Papuan example

TOM DUTTON

Tok Pisin: A Melanesian solution to the problem of Melanesian linguistic diversity

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The Solomon Islands and Vanuatu: varying responses to diversity

D.T. TRYON
THE MELANESEAN RESPONSE TO LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY: 
THE PAPUAN EXAMPLE

Tom Dutton

INTRODUCTION

Given the linguistic diversity of Melanesia that has been described by earlier speakers in this seminar (and which, it should be recalled, is actually promoted in certain ways, as we have also heard) it is reasonable to ask: How do Melanesians cope with this diversity since they surely cannot, and do not, remain totally isolated from each other? In other words, what strategies do they adopt for overcoming the communication problems imposed by different language boundaries?

Briefly, the answer to this question is that they do very much as anyone else does, or would do, in such situations, namely, they learn whatever languages are necessary to obtain the things they want (including to survive). In theory there are four possible strategies available from amongst which Melanesians, or anyone else for that matter, must make a choice depending on the social conditions operating at any time. These four strategies are: one can either learn the language of one's intended or actual contact,1 or he can expect the contact to learn his, or if those two solutions are not possible for some reason he can use a completely different language that is known by both himself and the contact, or failing that, he can invent a new language (with the cooperation of his contact of course).2

In practice Melanesians make use of all four of these strategies, in varying combinations, and in the rest of this paper I would like to illustrate this by referring to that part of Melanesia that I know best, notably Papua, or that part of present-day Papua New Guinea that used to be called that. Other speakers will discuss particular situations elsewhere in more detail. In so doing I will focus on the kinds of languages that are used as languages of wider communication or lingue-franche3 in Papua and which originate as a response to different social conditions there over time.

LOCAL LANGUAGES USED AS LINGUE FRANCHE

Any particular Papuan's communication problems depend, as they have always done, on a wide range of factors that have to do with the size and location of the group he belongs to, his position and status within that group, and his 'profession' (e.g. whether he is or was a trader or not). In the simplest situation where in pre-European contact times one did not
travel much beyond one's borders most Papuans probably learned at least one other language besides their own, most commonly that of their nearest neighbour, although if one belonged to a small society surrounded by several others one probably learned most, if not all, of the languages of one's neighbours. In certain circumstances one did not have much choice in the matter as one was forced to learn a second language as a matter of survival. In this situation the second language usually spread at the expense of one's first language and the first language could be expected to change quite drastically in the process and probably eventually die. There are a number of recorded examples of this having happened in Papua and probably many many more that we do not know anything about because they happened too long ago.

Take, for example, Magori, which is a small Austronesian language spoken by about 150 people in the Amazon Bay area of southeast Papua. When Europeans arrived in the early part of this century these people (and other small groups related to them) were under threat of extinction by their non-Austronesian neighbours, the Magi (or Mailu), and because of this they had all learned and spoke Magi besides their own language(s). The result of this was, and still is, that Magi is gradually taking over from Magori as the mother tongue of the community and their own language has changed so much that it now looks like some 'bush' variety of Magi. If this trend continues, and I do not see it being reversed in the near future, then the language will be dead in a generation or so's time, just as dead, in fact, as if all the Magori had been killed off by the Magi before Europeans arrived.

However, while we should not mourn the death of languages in such situations, except perhaps for humanitarian reasons, since language death is the natural outcome of a condition where a community has lost its ability to attract learners, these particular languages are extremely important because of the evidence they contain of the relationships and history of contact between different groups of peoples.

Thus Magori and the several other remnant Austronesian language groups closely related to it that have already been referred to contain important clues to what happened historically between Austronesians and non-Austronesians in the Amazon Bay area of southeast Papua. For one thing their very existence and present distribution shows that Austronesians were once more widely distributed along the Papuan coast than had hitherto been realized. For another both sets of languages contain numerous borrowings from each other's languages and a study of these shows that after Austronesians arrived in the area non-Austronesians entered into a very close relationship with them, most probably attracted by their knowledge of sailing and trading. Subsequently the non-Austronesians turned on their former 'friends' and drove them into the hills and swamps where they attempted to survive by learning the non-Austronesians' languages (amongst other things of course) (Dutton 1980c). This complete reversal in relationships between Austronesians and non-Austronesians seems to have been associated with, if not the direct result of, the rise in power of one group of non-Austronesians, notably those living on Mailu Island, who at the time of contact had a monopoly on pottery manufacture and long-distance trading in the area. What we see here is probably the end result of a situation in which non-Austronesians, having entered initially into a symbiotic relationship with the immigrant Austronesians gradually learned
the skills and techniques of their Austronesian 'friends', eventually becoming strong enough to take over their trading system from them, and to drive off their former friends and to colonize the area left vacant by them.

But so much for the simplest case in which individual local languages served as lingue franche in areas where villagers did not travel far beyond their own borders. In the more complex case where villagers did travel farther afield (for whatever purposes, although this was mostly for trading) one common solution to the communication problem posed was to learn and use a language that was known beyond the area occupied by its native speakers, or in other words to learn and use a regional language.

It is not possible to say how many native languages are, or were, used in this way throughout Papua at any one time but most probably only a small proportion of the several hundred languages available ever did. But those that were so functioning when the missionizing and colonizing European arrived were quickly seized upon by the newcomers and adopted for contact and instructional purposes. The most important of these languages, which, because of their association with missions became known as 'church languages' or 'mission lingue franche', were Dobu (used by the Wesleyan Methodist Mission), Suau (used by the Kwato Mission), Wedau and Binandere (used by the Anglican Mission), Motu, Magi, Toaripi and Kiwai (used by the London Missionary Society), and Gogodala (used by the Unenergized Field Mission).

The importance of these lingue franche declined, however, from the late 1950s onwards when the Department of Education in Papua New Guinea decided that English should become the language of education in the country and that financial assistance would be withheld from anyone using languages other than English for educational purposes. But these languages are re-emerging as important languages of wider communication since the administrative system began to change in Papua New Guinea following the introduction of local government councils and Provincial Government. Since most council areas are defined in terms of language, and since each area council is composed of members elected from that area, members tend to use the most widely known and prestigious language for council business; and since this is usually the mission Lingua franca regional languages are naturally becoming reemphasized at the expense of Hiri (or Police) Motu which was the lingua franca when Europeans and administrative servants, who came from other areas, controlled things.

INVENTED LANGUAGES AS LINGUE FRANCHE

Trade languages

In cases where travellers crossed several linguistic boundaries at one go, as in long-distance trading, and got beyond the boundary of a commonly known regional language Papuans were faced with overcoming the imposed communication problem by other means. And here the most common practice was for the incoming trader to attempt to learn the language of his contact or partner but to actually end up falling short of that goal by either simplifying it or by developing a new one based on his own and that of his partner.
The best documented cases of these are in central coastal Papua where the Austronesian-speaking Motu sailed forth on annual trading voyages to the Gulf of Papua to exchange pots and other things for sago and canoe logs with two different groups of non-Austronesian-speaking people, the Elema and the Koriki. In the process they attempted to learn the languages of the Elema and the Koriki but ended up, in the former case, developing a completely new language which we shall call the Hiri Trading Language, Eleman variety (HTL(E)), and in the other case, a simplified form of Koriki which we shall refer to as the Hiri Trading Language, Koriki variety (HTL(K)). These languages belong to the general class of languages that we call pidgins, which are special languages that are native to no one and are simplified in structure compared with the native languages on which they are based. They are also usually composed of elements from two or more languages.

Both these hiri trade languages had these features in more or less degrees. The HTL(E) was a combination of elements from most of the Eleman languages around the coast of the Gulf of Papua and from Motu in the proportion of approximately 80 per cent Eleman to 20 per cent Motu. It was nobody's first language and it was simplified in structure compared to the Eleman languages and Motu (Dutton and Kakare 1977; Dutton 1978, 1980b). The HTL(K) on the other hand contained few Motu elements but was a simplified form of Koriki. In this sense it was less of a pidgin than HTL(E) was (Dutton 1980a, 1980b).

In keeping with the definition of a pidgin, however, it is to be noted that these languages were restricted to certain social situations, notably to contact between trading partners. They were not used around the village for ordinary conversation purposes. This was not for any religious, political, economic or other reason, but simply because there was no need for them to be so used. Everyone was better off speaking his own native language. And besides, women and children usually knew little of them so that they were potentially excluded from any conversation they were used in. That is not to say that they were never used around villages by men as secret or in-group languages from time to time, for they probably were, but all speakers emphasize that they were merely languages of business—necessary instruments to achieving one's goals in trading. As such they were not taught in any formal sense: aspiring traders learned them as a matter of course and as best they could as they participated in the apprenticeship of trading as it were.

In the given social conditions it is easy to see why these languages developed, although it is not so easy to see why two developed or were necessary or survived, since presumably the trade developed from one point to another, and if so, why then was one language not spread with it, or alternatively, why did one language not die at the expense of the other?

At the time of contact these languages were quite strong and like the regional languages described above were used by the first missionary to the area, Chalmers, as contact languages in spreading the good news about the coming of the White Man (Dutton and Brown 1977). They did not survive the disruption of the trade that followed European colonization and especially that of the Second World War, however, and died along with the trade that gave rise to them and sustained them. Today these languages linger only in the memory of a few old men who were former traders. It is not likely that
they will ever be revived as the social conditions that gave rise to them are now gone and are not likely to reappear. Besides, even if those social conditions were to revive, there are other languages available that could, and most likely would, be used in their stead because of their wider currency. Such languages include Hiri (or Police) Motu, Tok Pisin and English that we will come to in a moment.

Unfortunately too it is not known how common this kind of phenomenon was - few have certainly been described or reported and it seems that that was not because those in a position to report on such things at contact were not interested in doing so, but rather because they were indeed rare phenomena, requiring special social conditions to produce them. If we can hypothesize from the cases we have just looked at the crucial condition for the development of such languages appears to be that the incoming trader had to be in a vulnerable position at the trading point, that is, being cut off from support from his home community. Distance was a part of this but it was not merely distance. Where distance was important was in having unfriendly territory or conditions interposed between oneself and one's home community. In the Motu case this involved being in a foreign port on canoes that were unwieldy and easily immobilized at the best of times, but actually dismantled for much of the time, outnumbered, and with unfriendly tribes and uncertain winds and seas between them and their homes. Elsewhere in Melanesia trade did not involve this kind of vulnerability and so few trade languages actually developed despite the large number of languages and the amount of trading that was carried on.

And that was the situation at the time of first contact.

Hiri (or Police) Motu

Accompanying and following contact a powerful new force in the form of the English language and culture was introduced into the scene which Melanesians tried to cope with in the same way as they had done in other situations. However, they were frustrated in this by the White Man himself, who, because he came with ideas about what kinds of beings black men were, how they should be addressed and treated, etc. used only simplified versions of his language with them. These languages, or trade jargons, were easily learned by Melanesians who soon developed them into a fully fledged pidgin English which spread through Melanesia in different forms. The descendants of these pidgins are today known as Tok Pisin in Papua New Guinea, Bichlamar (or Bislama) in Vanuatu (formerly the New Hebrides), and Solomon Islands Pidgin in the Solomon Islands. As the special conditions surrounding the development and use of these different varieties will be the subjects of Dr Laycock's and Dr Tryon's papers in this volume these languages will not be considered any further here. Instead we focus on what happened in Papua, or British New Guinea as it was first called.

There the response to the colonizing foreigners produced another, quite different result, notably a pidgin based on a local language, which after a short time in competition with a variety of pidgin English similar to that that developed into those mentioned above and referred to in the literature as Papuan Pidgin English (Mühlhäusler 1978), became the lingua franca of that political unit. This is the language known today as Hiri Motu but formerly as Police Motu.
It is not yet clear, and may never be, precisely how this language came into being but this is currently the subject of a major project of mine. So far I have shown that this language was not, as it was previously though to be, a continuation of one (or more) of the trade languages HTL(E) and HTL(K) used by the Motu and which I have already discussed. It may, of course, have been influenced by these languages indirectly, but it cannot be said to be a continuation of them in any real sense. There is some evidence that suggests that the Motu may well have had a simplified version of their own language which they used in their contacts with foreigners other than their trade partners in the Gulf (Taylor 1978), but more work needs to be done on this and other aspects of the language before we can attempt to say with any confidence how Police Motu developed out of this, if it did.

One aspect that I am working on at the moment and which has never been taken into account is the social conditions obtaining in and around Port Moresby where the language originated, at about the time the language appears to have really begun developing, that is, between the arrival of the first missionaries in 1874 and that of the first Lieutenant-Governor, Sir William MacGregor, in 1888. One thing that surprises me about this period and which I think probably has an important bearing on the history of the language is the number of non-European expatriate foreigners that appear to have been in the Port Moresby area at that time. Some of these came from the southwest Pacific (e.g. New Caledonia, Lifu, New Hebrides [now Vanuatu], Solomon Islands) to Port Moresby via Queensland and the Torres Straits; others came from the Southeast Asian area (but mostly Malaya and western Indonesia) by very much the same route. Most came of their own accord to fish for bêche-de-mer and shell of different kinds, and to trade along the Papuan coast. Some were brought as government servants and unofficial policemen.

Presumably these immigrant foreigners attempted to learn local languages, but particularly Motu, since most married Motu or Koita women from around Port Moresby and have descendants still there today. Unfortunately we do not know anything about the strategies adopted by these foreigners to learn Motu nor how successful they were but presumably there was considerable variation depending on background, attitudes, natural abilities etc. What was probably the most significant thing about this group, however, was that they were foreigners and that other non-European foreigners coming into the area would naturally have been attracted to them as, as they say in Papua New Guinea English today, wantoks (lit. speakers of the same language but now broadened to mean friends, anyone that comes from the same general area as the speaker, any who takes one's side in a fight etc.). And this is where, as the early name for the language suggests, the first police force came in.

In response to demands by missionaries and others that something be done to stop foreigners coming into the country disturbing the peace the colony of British New Guinea was formally and finally established by the arrival of William MacGregor in 1888, one of whose first acts was to establish an official police force. The nucleus of this force was a band of a dozen Solomon Islander constables and two Fijian non-commissioned officers whom he brought with him from Fiji. To this he added seven men from the Kiwai area in what is now the Western Province and one from what is now the Milne Bay Province. These men signed on for three years (except
for the non-commissioned officers who only signed on for one year) and were to be repatriated at the end of that time. As it turned out, however, most were not repatriated as they married local women and preferred to settle down in the Port Moresby area where the Governor gave them blocks of land in lieu of their return passage. Although it is not yet clear what the background to these men were we do know that they were recruited from coconut and sugar plantations in Fiji by MacGregor to come to British New Guinea with him. Some had been there as long as ten years, others for a shorter time, so that it is presumed they spoke Pidgin Fijian (if not true Fijian), and probably Pidgin English as well. In addition they would have known their own native languages which were all Austronesian and relatively closely related to Fijian and Motu.

When they arrived in Port Moresby my guess is that they would immediately have recognized wantoks there who would have introduced them to the Motu and their language, teaching them what they considered to be the most useful words, phrases and/or sentences. At the same time the police force was a tightly controlled group who were expected to speak English and since at least the Papuans in it spoke a pidgin English, and perhaps the Solomon Islanders did so too, I presume the lingua franca of the force was pidgin English, not proper English as officially claimed. Given then these factors, together with the fact that (a) the force was there to enforce law and order while at the same time expecting to receive certain favours from the local communities (e.g. food, women) and that (b) the Motu were experienced in getting on with foreigners and inventing new languages the stage was set for an interesting linguistic outcome. And even though it may never be possible to go beyond elaborating on this scenario in certain respects it is pretty clear that, as the early name for the language suggests, the stimulus for the development and stabilization of it (as distinct from the origin) is to be traced to the formation of MacGregor's official police force.

As already indicated this language was a pidgin language based on the native language Motu. It has interestingly enough, however, remarkable structural similarities with Tok Pisin spoken in Papua New Guinea today but naturally totally different from it in vocabulary (Dutton 1976). Indeed except for a few points which probably can be traced back to the HTL(E) and/or HTL(K) it almost looks like a relexification of that language. But as so much research still remains to be done and as no one who was in a position to do so at the time appears to have commented (linguistically or otherwise) on the development of the language in its formative period, at least not in any records I have seen to date, we cannot put forward a clear-cut hypothesis at this stage. In fact the language does not appear to have been commented on officially until some fourteen years after the formation of MacGregor's police force and then only to bemoan the fact that police (by then all Papuans) were using a 'pig Motu' that was hardly intelligible to anyone who only knew village Motu.

Nevertheless in spite of its still obscure origins after it was developed it was spread by the police and others throughout the whole region. Over time and with the help of official Government policy which promoted it in favour of what Murray called that 'vile gibberish' (i.e. Pidgin English), it gradually replaced the different varieties of Papuan Pidgin English that were spoken in parts of the area before the coming of the first policemen.
Today there are two main varieties—one spoken around Port Moresby and in coastal areas of the Central Province and one outside that area. It is the principal *lingua franca* and unofficial language of administration throughout much of the southern half of the country. It probably reached its heyday in the period between the Second World War and the early 1960s when government by patrol was still the order of the day and previously uncontrolled areas were brought under Government control. Subsequently as conditions in the public service changed (Dutton 1977) and as administration began to be decentralized, firstly into local government councils and subsequently into Provincial Governments so the need for a *lingua franca* such as Hiri Motu to communicate across many language boundaries at once declined and local regional languages came back into their own (as has already been suggested above). At the same time English was being vigorously promoted by the post-war Administration and Tok Pisin which had developed much more prestige than Hiri Motu ever had spread into areas previously the preserve of Hiri Motu. Thus there have been a number of factors working towards the demise of the language in the past two decades and their effect is evident in villages where previously Hiri Motu was spoken by everyone so that it is now difficult to find good Hiri Motu speakers amongst the youngest generation. How far this trend is likely to continue depends, as always, on the social conditions operating at any one time and at different levels. Thus as the country approached Independence in the early 1970s the language was given a boost by becoming associated with the Papua separatist movement, Papua Besena, which tried to obtain separate independence for Papua instead of being brought into an unequal union (in its view) with New Guinea as the one new nation of Papua New Guinea. The result of this action and others has been to ensure that the language is given the same official status as Tok Pisin. Since Independence, however, the Papua separatist movement has fragmented into a number of different factions and has lost power in areas outside the coastal zone of the Central Province around Port Moresby with the result that it is no longer the force it was and no longer has the supportive power of Hiri Motu that it once had. At least that is my impression. In short although Hiri Motu may be officially recognized I think there are forces at work which are leading to a decline in the use of the language as a regional *lingua franca* and which, if the social conditions do not change to stimulate a renewed need for this language, it will eventually recede into oblivion except in areas like Central Papua where it is associated with the old Papua Besena movement.

Introduced languages as *lingue franche*

In Papua (as in most of Melanesia) English is the introduced language of education and the official language of the Government. Since the end of World War II it has been taught vigorously and at great expense throughout the country but so far only a small percentage of the population is sufficiently fluent in it for it to serve as a *lingua franca* in preference to any of the others discussed above (or to be discussed in other papers).

**CONCLUSION: FUTURE RESPONSES TO DIVERSITY**

No one knows of course what the Melanesian response to diversity in the future is likely to be but one thing is certain, and that is that, as I have assumed and tried to demonstrate in the foregoing sections to this
paper, languages only survive and are used as long as they fulfil a social need. No amount of legislating or wringing of hands will keep a language alive or force people to learn and use it if it is not tied to some social or other advantage.

If we assume then that present conditions are not likely to change in the near future it would seem to be the case that at the local level Melanesians are still likely to go on learning one another's languages much as they did in the past, although if the present trend towards local autonomy continues the value of some of these is likely to decline, and some may even die, as regional languages are strengthened. At high levels, if governments continue to promote English with the same vigour as they have done in the past, and if this is tied to social and other rewards, English of some kind will probably eventually become the principal lingua franca, and other languages of wider communication that now exist, but especially Hiri Motu, will fade away and/or become restricted to certain areas to function as ancillary regional languages in competition with other native regional languages. While this may not be a very happy picture for some it is the natural and inevitable outcome of the human condition at any time.

NOTES

1 I use the terms 'learn' and 'know' in this paper to include both active and passive control or understanding of a language.

2 I include here silent communication or sign language as part of the strategy for achieving any and each of these, and so do not discuss it separately, although there are cases recorded where it is the only strategy used in trading (Harding 1976:64).

3 The term lingue franche, or, as it is sometimes written now, lingua francas, is the plural of lingua franca, which in turn is the term used to denote any language that is used as a means of communication between groups of people who speak different languages (which by definition are mutually unintelligible). There are two main possibilities: either that language will be the mother tongue of one of those groups or it will not be the mother tongue of any of them. In fact it may not be anyone's mother tongue, as we shall see when trade languages and pidgins are discussed. It is of course possible that one person may know and use several lingue franche. In fact most Melanesians do and are regarded as good linguists for that reason, in contrast to us English who are notoriously bad linguists. Note, however, that a language does not have to be written to serve as a lingua franca. Indeed most lingue franche were not written until recently.

4 It should be noted, however, that this was not necessarily as difficult as one might tend to think as most languages are fairly closely related to one another within the broad classes of Austronesian and non-Austronesian. Consequently it would be rather like a German speaker learning English or a French speaker learning Italian, unless of course one were an Austronesian surrounded by non-Austronesian speakers when the task would be more like a Chinese speaker having to learn English.
5 Probably the most famous example of all mission *lingue franche* in Melanesia comes from the northern side of Papua New Guinea. It is Kake, a non-Austronesian language originally spoken only by about 600 people living in a handful of villages in the mountains northwest of Finschhafen on the Huon Peninsula. However, even though it was originally only so small, it was spread by the Lutheran Mission right throughout that peninsula and up into the highlands as far west as Mt Hagen, so that by the 1950s it was known by about 75,000 people. For more detailed accounts of individual mission *lingue franche* see section 7.4.5 in Wurm, ed., (1977).

6 In fact only four cases have ever been reported. See Dutton 1978:352, fn.12.

7 The same could be said of German and French elsewhere in Melanesia.

8 For further details on this name change see Dutton (1976).

9 Investigation into this is continuing but is made more difficult by large gaps in the early records. I should, however, like to thank Mr P. Grimshaw, Business Manager of the Research Schools, for his help in locating some early police records for me.

10 As I have already indicated I suspect some, if not all, had had previous work experience in Queensland. If so they certainly would have spoken Pidgin English.

11 For a more detailed review of the issues and problems involved in detailing the history of Police Motu as seen in 1978 see Dutton (1978) and Taylor (1978).

12 This promotion of Police Motu at the expense of Pidgin English is often hailed as one of the great language planning success stories of all times. Clearly, however, had there not been a Police Motu already widely spread and with clear advantages over Pidgin English this policy would never have succeeded. It was already a fait accompli when Murray arrived.

REFERENCES


TOK PISIN: A MELANESIAN SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF MELANESIAN LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY

D.C. Laycock

There are at least twelve hundred languages in Melanesia, and several hundred more in the regions in which Melanesians had contacts—an incredible linguistic diversity—whose problems, nevertheless, had been solved, long before the advent of European and Asiatic foreigners, in a typically Melanesian way. Some of the reasons for the diversity have been suggested elsewhere (Grace 1975; Laycock 1980); the solutions to the diversity are not known in full detail, but the outlines are clear.

Firstly, the contacts of many of the small language communities of the Pacific were relatively limited. A problem of twelve hundred languages simply did not exist for a community whose linguistic contacts were limited to half a dozen languages, or even a score of languages. The growth of regional lingue franche (Wurm 1971; Dutton 1980), the use of silent trading (Laycock 1966; Sankoff 1977), and the extensive and intelligent use of multilingualism (Sankoff 1968, 1969; Laycock 1979) sufficed for most practical purposes in most areas.

Secondly, however, the areas of wide-ranging trading contacts were almost exclusively dominated by speakers of Austronesian languages, a group of closely-related languages whose affinities have always been apparent to their speakers, so that there was usually some uncertainty whether the speech of one’s trading partners was really a distinct language, or just a strange version of one’s own language. It was as much this linguistic network as the maritime technology that allowed speakers of Austronesian languages to dominate coastal trade from Indonesia to the Tuamotus—and, with few exceptions (Laycock 1975a:249) to force those speakers of Papuan languages who wished to participate in trade into learning the locally dominant Austronesian language.

But this situation was changed, with increasing speed from the seventeenth century onwards, by the advent of far-ranging vessels, mainly European, that carried Pacific Islanders—as curiosities, boatscrew, concubines, mission helpers, and plantation labourers—far beyond their original linguistic world.

The beginnings were slow, and allowed originally for gradual adjustments. The early Dutch voyagers, such as Le Maire and Schouten in 1616, attempted to use Malay everywhere they stopped (Dalrymple 1771); and here and there in the Pacific some cognates should have been close enough to be recognized. Cook on his first voyage carried a Tahitian to New
Zealand, and recognized the similarities between Tahitian and Maori. A more leisurely development of Western interests in the Pacific might well have led to the development of a pidgin pan-Polynesian.

But the leisurely pace could not continue. Too many Europeans, of too many different backgrounds, complicated the picture. There were missionaries, whose earnest attempts to learn the local languages were always tempered by the desire to spread education (and civilization) in English— or, in appropriate areas, in German or French. There were whalers, adventurers, and pirates, whose needs on shore could often be satisfied by minimal communication, and who found that they could spread sufficient broken English around the Pacific for this purpose. There were traders in sandalwood, *bêche-de-mer*, copra, and men, who picked up smatterings of local languages here and there, and who also found that they could not only use the pockets of broken English that were growing up, but could extend it by importing elements from the already more developed pidgin of the Chinese coast (Charpentier 1979).

But it was, in the final analysis, the Melanesians themselves who drew these various threads together— probably, as Muhlhausler (1978) suggests, on the German plantations in Samoa, in the middle of the nineteenth century. The sudden bringing together of Melanesians (and Polynesians) from many diverse areas, who had no common language except the incipient English-based Pacific jargon, forced a rapid solution to the problem of communication. It is a fallacy, as has been said many times, to see the development of a plantation pidgin in the orders given by white overseers. The pattern was for the orders to be transmitted by a trusted foreman, who would communicate with the white overseers in whatever linguistic compromise had already been established: broken or good English or German, or even Malay, Samoan, or Fijian. These orders were then passed on in the increasingly flexible plantation pidgin.

The blackbirding industry, which carried Melanesians from the Solomon Islands and the New Hebrides to Queensland, and back again, contributed greatly to the development of Pacific pidgins in general, but, because of the areas involved, coupled with the increasing differentiation of the Pacific into German, English, and French spheres of influence, the input into New Guinea Pidgin (Tok Pisin) was slight. Nevertheless, the availability of a form of pidgin almost everywhere in the Pacific must have aroused expectations in the minds of the more mobile whites that pidgin or broken English was the appropriate form of address to all Pacific islanders.

For Tok Pisin specifically, however, the road seems to lead directly from Apia to Rabaul and Madang. The fact that these were German colonies was particularly fortunate for the new language. The Germans were in no position to influence the plantation pidgin by additional English input, or to provide an English target to which the plantation workers could aspire (see Mühlhäuser 1975a). In most areas of the world where a pidgin has developed, a linguistic continuum has been formed, linking the speech of the plantation workers, through various intermediate stages, with the language of the administering elite. This happened elsewhere in the Pacific: the faster rate of development then led to the total disappearance of any English-based pidgin in Fiji, but the linguistic continuum has developed in recent times at least in the Solomon Islands,
and to a lesser extent in the New Hebrides (where the additional presence of French was undoubtedly a mitigating factor). But in German New Guinea, with the greatest linguistic diversity in the Pacific, the conditions were perfect for a Melanesian expansion of Tok Pisin, without the crushing force (in spite of the presence of fairly large numbers of English speakers) of an elite language from which the pidgin was derived. There Germans might—as they did—decry the use of pidgin in their territories, and attempt to introduce German, or even Malay; but they were powerless to stop it once the seeds had been sown, and some of them even began to take Tok Pisin seriously as a language. Their scant three decades of influence in the New Guinea area enabled them to introduce a few German words into Tok Pisin, and their Malay-speaking staff also contributed a few items; but their greatest service to the developing language was to leave it alone. And the years of World War I, and the delay in re-establishing effective control and substantial white settlement in the area until the 1920s, also assisted the Melanesians of the north coast and Bismarck Archipelago in developing the language without outside interference.

The spread and stabilization of Tok Pisin was remarkably rapid in this period. There were Pidgin words in Kuanua (Tolai) by 1900 that are still in use today. The pidgin quoted in early Rabaul newspapers (McDonald 1976a) is already recognizable as New Guinea Pidgin, and not just an undifferentiated Pacific pidgin. Also, by the time of the first substantial accounts of Tok Pisin (e.g. Brenninkmeyer 1924) the language is in all essential respects the same language that is spoken today, given a few inevitable, but relatively minor, lexical replacements in the direction of English.

It is not my intention to survey all the developments of Tok Pisin from that time on, for which Muhlhausler (1977, 1979) is the best source. Suffice it to say that it went on spreading with the further development of plantations, and the disruptions of World War II. At every stage there has been an urban elite who were acquiring some English, and feeding it into their pidgin, while at the same time Tok Pisin has been finding its way into new areas, giving rise to new Bush Pidgin varieties. Over most of New Guinea, and increasingly in the jointly-administered area of Papua, a common Rural Pidgin served the needs of most of the community. These three sociolinguistic varieties—Urban, Bush, and Rural (named and characterized by Muhlhäusler (1975b)) are still found in Papua New Guinea today. The relative proportions of speakers of the varieties must be variable over time—but this is the sort of data that is inaccessible without extensive sociolinguistic surveys.

But the history of Tok Pisin from the end of World War II to the present can best be seen as a history of attitudes (for which see Wurm 1977). From about 1955—the date of Robert A. Hall's polemic defence of Tok Pisin, in response to United Nations pronouncements that its use was not to be encouraged in Papua New Guinea—to the present, most persons actively concerned with Tok Pisin as a field of study have been involved in the Great Pidgin Debate. The debate was carried on in scores of newspaper and periodical articles in the 1950s and 1960s, with a subtle change of emphasis in the 1970s. On the one side were the linguists, who were concerned to make the point that Tok Pisin was as valid a language as any other, and capable of serving all administrative and educational purposes (with perhaps some manipulation—Laycock 1975b) in a country that was
rapidly moving towards independence. Ranged against the linguists were the administrators, the educators and many Papua New Guineans, who continued to see Tok Pisin as a makeshift hangover from the colonial period that had no future in the administrative and educative future of Papua New Guinea, and that should be replaced by English as soon as possible.

Point by point the linguists' claims were gradually conceded - all but one or two. Opponents of Tok Pisin became ready to see the language as a valid one for certain limited purposes of communication - but none were prepared to support any moves to make it a national language, and/or to attempt to develop a primary school syllabus in which Tok Pisin would play a significant part. The linguists had to shift ground, and tackle the educational problems squarely as a separate issue; the clearest case, largely on economic grounds, was put by Dutton (1976) in his inaugural lecture as Professor of Language at the University of Papua New Guinea. The reactions to this - largely a counter-blast - were collected by McDonald (1976b).

And at that point the Great Pidgin Debate came to a close. The war was over; the last shots had been fired. The many papers appearing in the volume edited by Wurm in 1977 are simply those of the war correspondents, reporting on the history of the conflict.

The reasons for the ceasefire are complex, but in 1980 it is possible to see them all as a direct consequence of the granting of independence to Papua New Guinea in 1975. The role of expatriate observers, especially those not resident in Papua New Guinea, became increasingly irrelevant. But, more importantly, any plans for regularizing the future status of Tok Pisin ran foul of the Melanesian habit of deferring decisions until a crisis developed, or until the road ahead became apparent to all. (In the case of Tok Pisin, and the associated linguistic and educational problems in Papua New Guinea, the crisis is not yet apparent to all - and it may never be.)

The third factor has been the increasing regionalization of administration. The rise in power of provincial governments has meant a decrease in the power of the central government in Port Moresby - and an increasing reluctance to pass legislation binding on the whole country of Papua New Guinea.

Regionalization has also brought about an increase in regional solutions to linguistic problems - in particular, an increased use of local languages and *lingue franche*. I estimate that within five to ten years, virtually all officials at provincial government level will be from that province, and the officials (and missionaries and teachers) in the smaller centres will be almost all local people, using local languages for their work. The need for using Tok Pisin must necessarily dwindle.

Tok Pisin in Papua New Guinea today, five years after independence, is accepted at all levels as a useful language; but it may never have any status or prestige. It carries no stigma; conversations are carried on in the most appropriate language for the subject of discourse, and for the participants, whether this be English, Tok Pisin, Hiri Motu, or one of the vernaculars. Tok Pisin is still the major language for relaxing in, in the bar or club after the day's work is over; it is still the major contact
language for outsiders of any description - government officials from other areas, and expatriates - in rural situations; and it is still the first language of a large number of households. Organizations consisting of individuals from all over Papua New Guinea, such as the police and defence forces, still run internally on Tok Pisin; but the administration, and contact with expatriates, is carried on in English. Records of village government are kept in Tok Pisin - but the increasing availability of acceptable orthographies for vernacular languages will probably mean a decline of Tok Pisin in this area also. Schools and churches use English, vernacular languages, and Tok Pisin, according to local needs. In other words, Tok Pisin continues to serve a Melanesian community in a Melanesian way: used where it is useful, and abandoned where it is not.

It is possible that Tok Pisin may be very close to reaching its maximum expansion. It is still expanding in rural areas, and among migrants from rural areas to the towns. But the townspeople are increasingly learning English, as are large numbers of rural children. The decline of an indentured labour system, or any exploitation of a labour pool which carries people from their villages into other language areas, means that more and more Papua New Guineans - except for government officials - will be staying at home in their own villages, and carrying on their daily activities in the vernacular. Regionalization has seen an increase in the use of the large regional languages. Only in areas of extreme linguistic fragmentation, such as the Sepik, Manus, Madang and Morobe, does it seem likely that Tok Pisin will continue to play a major administrative role. (And there remains the possibility that one or more of the provincial governments may give some formal recognition to Tok Pisin, if no other linguistic solution is obvious.)

Otherwise, it seems that Tok Pisin has nowhere to go but down in the future. But this will not happen as a result of contamination from English; the fears expressed by Bickerton (1975) that Tok Pisin will disappear in a linguistic continuum between it and English seem groundless, as the two languages fall more and more into distinct slots: Tok Pisin as the socializing language across linguistic boundaries, and English as the elite administering language of a government network. There is no doubt that Tok Pisin speakers at all levels will use more English words in their Tok Pisin - "yumi mas allocatim planti resources i go long dispela hydroelectric development project" is the type of phrase that can be commonly heard - but the heavily anglicized varieties of Urban Pidgin are, for most of Papua New Guinea, as dead as Tok Masta. But Tok Pisin will decline because, however appropriate it may seem as a solution to linguistic problems on a national level, there are other ways of solving the linguistic dilemma at regional levels. In a modified form, what we are likely to see is a return to the local solutions of the pre-contact era - at least until such time as English is widespread enough to serve as a truly national language.

This does not mean that Tok Pisin will die a rapid, or even an easy, death. There are still children being born who will never really acquire English; and if they move from their own linguistic areas, the only language that will serve them is Tok Pisin. But it does mean that, in perhaps fifty years' time, Tok Pisin will most likely be being studied by scholars among a small community of old men.
Since this paper is full of predictions, I venture to make another. When the decline of Tok Pisin begins to be apparent to all, I predict that there will be a revival of interest in the language - a resurgence of Tok Pisin creative writing, courses of study at the universities, and a strong vocal minority who wish to keep the language artificially alive (as has happened with Hawaiian Pidgin). But this is only likely to happen at a stage when Tok Pisin is no longer serving any useful function.7

As scholars with a soft spot for Tok Pisin, we may regret these trends, but it is no longer our problem. As expatriates, we all share a common disability - the ability to see too clearly, and too far ahead (and this paper is no exception). But what we saw in the pre-independence era was the way things should have gone in an ideal world, without taking into account Melanesian attitudes - especially the pragmatic tendency to let problems find their own solutions. A dramatic new policy on the part of the Papua New Guinea government could upset these predictions - but, in view of the Melanesian tolerance, even preference, for diversity, this seems unlikely.

NOTES

1 In a wordlist elicited on this voyage from the island of Liki, in the Kumamba group just off Jayapura, the word *sagu* is given for 'bread' - suggesting that the islanders were attempting to speak Malay even this far west. (Austronesian languages along the north coast of the island of New Guinea have quite different words for 'sago', mainly reflexes of PAN *rwnbia.*)

2 A list of loanwords from Bley (1900): *anka* 'anchor', *bok, dum* 'chest', *bol* 'ball', *buk* 'book', bulmakau 'cow', *kadel* 'candle', *komda* 'carpenter', *ki* 'key', *kogkog* (= kongkong) 'Chinese', *kom* 'comb', karit 'Samoaan mat', *la* 'crockery', *lavalava* 'loincloth', *lok* 'lock', *lotu* 'church', *mane*, *mant* 'money', *magi* (= manki) 'monkey', *me* 'goat', *melen* 'melon', *nil* 'needle', *pot* 'boat', *rop* 'rope', *tapioka* 'tapioca', *tin* 'tin', *top* 'soap'.

The asterisked forms are identified as coming from English.

3 However, one sociolect identified by Mühlhäusler - the variety known as Tok Masta - is in post-independence Papua New Guinea virtually dead. This was the fluent but anglicized variety of Tok Pisin spoken by long-resident administrators and businessmen - a group which has largely departed from Papua New Guinea. In the place of Tok Masta is a superficially similar variety of Tok Pisin spoken by the new generation of expatriate advisers and businessmen; but as this variety no longer carries any prestige, and is unsupported by a white power structure (Sankoff 1976), it is more readily characterized as bad Tok Pisin. In addition, it lacks the fluency and self-satisfaction of Tok Masta.

4 I have also observed that bars in towns like Rabaul and Lae tend to have a regional clientele, so that local languages again predominate.
But many of the first-language Tok Pisin speakers are likely to go on to learn English.

Even radio broadcasters have largely given up the extremely anglicized Tok Pisin of a few years ago, perhaps because of complaints from listeners, and certainly because of the increasing use of provincial stations. And it is only as a joke today that one is likely to hear such linguistic mixtures as 'yumi mas tok long grass-roots level nau' or 'yu no ken putim cart before the horse' - that is, as a relaxed form of speech among speakers at home in both English and Tok Pisin.

For an account of creative writing in Tok Pisin, see Laycock 1977b. Again, the beginnings were too soon, and too expatriate-dominated, and have had little follow-up. Wantok newspaper was founded in 1970, since it seemed obvious that there should be a Tok Pisin newspaper; but it is only in the last few years that it has started to circulate in the villages, away from the mission stations and schools.

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The combined populations of the Solomons and Vanuatu scarcely exceed 300,000, yet more than 170 distinct languages, nearly all Austronesian, are spoken in this area. The response to this situation, in terms of communication strategies and *lingue franche*, has differed in the two countries, largely as a result of their rather different histories.

In the Solomon Islands, Solomon Pidgin is now spoken widely, although not by as many women as men. Bennett (1979:68) estimates that Solomon Pidgin is spoken by about 50 per cent of the population. My own estimate would raise that figure substantially. Certain mission *lingue franche*, Austronesian languages, have great currency in the Western District, Roviana, Babatana and Marovo being used as languages of communication within certain evangelical areas. Nggela has wide currency within the Church of Melanesia area, while Gari is used extensively on Guadalcanal. All of the *lingue franche* which have developed in the Solomons, then, are directly linked to the colonization and evangelization of this group of islands.

When the first whalers visited the Solomons about 1800, there were probably much the same number of local languages as today, around sixty. The whalers and early traders used a kind of trading jargon, the precursor of Solomon Pidgin, visiting mainly the eastern half of the group. In the 1870s Solomon Islanders, mainly from Malaita and Guadalcanal, were recruited for work in the canefields of Queensland and Fiji. In Queensland a plantation pidgin grew up, as a response to the diverse linguistic backgrounds of the labourers. In Fiji the recruits were exposed to both English and Fijian, so many Solomon Islanders learning Fijian that there were government hopes that it would become the Protectorate's *lingua franca*. However, this was not to be, Fijian soon falling into disuse in the face of the larger number of plantation workers returning from Queensland.

After the turn of the century, plantations were developed in the Solomons and many of the returning labourers were employed on them, passing on their Pidgin to plantation workers who had not been outside the Solomons. Once again, men from Malaita and Guadalcanal made up the majority of the plantation labour. It was on these local plantations that Solomons Pidgin stabilized and developed its own characteristics.
By 1914 five Christian missions were at work in the Solomon Islands. In the western district, in New Georgia, Choiseul and parts of the Shortlands local vernaculars were used as Church languages, referred to above, while in the central and eastern districts Mota (a language from the Banks Islands, Vanuatu) was used by the Church of Melanesia until 1931. The Catholics adopted Gari, establishing a church newspaper in this language in 1911.

The only mission to use Pidgin, almost exclusively, was the South Seas Evangelical Mission, centred on Malaita.

By the 1930s Solomons Pidgin was the lingua franca of all the major recruiting areas (Malaita, Guadalcanal and San Cristobal (Chapman and Pirie 1974:234)). In other words Solomons Pidgin was known and used in all areas except the western district, where mission lingue franca remained predominant. This position has remained unchanged, largely, until the present, although English has become widely used and encouraged in the urban centres. Solomons Pidgin is now well known in the western district, also, as Solomon Islanders from other areas, especially Malaitans, have migrated there. The church lingue franca remain strong, however.

In the present-day Solomons, Pidgin is the common language between islanders of different linguistic backgrounds. However, the language of the administration is English. Solomon Pidgin tends to be the language of oral communication between Solomon Island administrators, at all levels, there being an emotional attachment to its use even between Solomon Islanders who have an excellent knowledge of English. This experience is paralleled in the Vanuatu situation.

Attitudes to Solomon Pidgin vary. After the departure of many of the old expatriate administrators at Independence in 1978, the educated elite still expressed an aversion to Pidgin, prolonging the prejudices of their colonial masters. It must be stressed, however, that most of the opposition to the official use of Pidgin comes from the urban areas. In the other districts there are no real objections to Pidgin, at least objections of the same nature as those expressed in some urban areas. In non-urban areas, where languages tend to be very closely related on all of the major islands, local languages and dialects are used between geographically contiguous groups, Pidgin being reserved for communication with people from more distant regions.

Pidgin has had two major problems in the Solomons. Although it is used in daily radio broadcasts, there is very little written in Pidgin apart from the Gospel of Mark (1976). This problem springs, in part, from the fact that there is no official standardized orthography for Solomon Pidgin. Since an official orthography implies an official acceptance of Pidgin by the government, it is not hard to see why the problem has not been resolved.

Solomons Pidgin has a long way to go before winning universal acceptance, for much of the Pidgin broadcast is heavily influenced by English, with phrases such as oli developem economic infrastructure being not unusual in news programmes. The result is incomprehensibility for rural-based Solomon Islanders, the vast majority of the population. This problem, combined with a strong attachment to local and provincial
government has tended to work against the full development of Solomon Pidgin, and to favour the continuation of the use of local vernaculars and regional *lingue franche*, even to the point where regional radio broadcasts in such *lingue franche* have begun from provincial centres.

One of the unusual features of the Solomon Islands, then, is its multi-faceted response to linguistic diversity, rather unlike the Vanuatuan situation, as will be discussed below.

In Vanuatu, formerly the New Hebrides, Bislama has been favoured since contact times by the fact that French and English were spoken by administrators and missionaries, and by the fact that apart from Mota, in the northeast corner, no local language achieved the status of a *lingua franca*.

Bislama is different from the English-based Pidgins of the Solomons and Papua New Guinea in that it has been adopted as the National Language of Vanuatu and an official language along with English and French, this in spite of the fact that no official orthography, as yet, exists for it.

The early history of Vanuatu in many respects parallels that of the Solomons. Whalers and sandalwood traders began operations here in the 1830s, encountering the same linguistic diversity (over 100 local languages) as exists today. Here again, a trade jargon developed, a stabilized pidgin not really developing until about 1900. It is likely that the earliest pidgin development in Melanesia was in Vanuatu (Clark 1977:24), the earliest 'pidgin' found so far by the present writer dating back to 1846, at Mele on Efate.

Of course the first missionaries (1839) used local vernaculars for their evangelical work, efforts centring on the southern islands until the 1860s. From that time until the end of the nineteenth century Vanuatuans were recruited as labour for the sugar plantations in Queensland, Fiji and Samoa, the first group leaving Vanuatu in 1864. In the nineteenth century there was little inter-island contact between Vanuatuans, except on the localized trading routes, the only European contact being recruiters, sandalwoode rs and missionaries. In this period Bislama cannot be said to have passed the 'jargon' stage of development.

In 1906 an Anglo-French Condominium was proclaimed, both sides attempting to impose their own language and culture. Education was entirely in the hands of the missions, nearly all of whom opted for local vernaculars for church purposes, at that stage.

By the end of the first decade of this century most New Hebrideans had found their way home from the plantations overseas. While much research remains to be carried out on this subject, it appears that by about the time of World War I a number of regionalects of Bislama had evolved, reflecting a particular contact history. The strong regional flavour of Bislama varieties is still discernible among older speakers in various rural areas today. (A study of these regionalects should be investigated as a matter of urgency.) The physical disposition of the islands, the dual administration and the lack of regular inter-island contact, to say nothing of the mutual suspicion of Vanuatuans from different islands, contributed to the isolation required for the preservation of the
regionalects. Since the 1960s, of course, communications have improved immeasurably, resulting in a more standard Bislama, at least in the administrative centres.

As stated above, the only vernacular with any currency to speak of was Mota, confined to a small corner of the group. So Bislama was the uncontested *lingua franca* of Vanuatu, a fact which was reinforced by the introduction of two competing education systems throughout the archipelago, one in French and one in English, once the two colonial powers finally assumed responsibility for education in the mid-1960s.

However, European attitudes to Bislama were predictable. It was regarded simply as a dreadful corruption of English, unworthy even to serve as a language of evangelism. (For details of attitudes see Charpentier 1979.)

By the late 1960s many factors were working in favour of the development of Bislama, among which was the emergence of politics, and a need for a vehicle of communication on a country-wide scale. The two administrations also made increasing use of Bislama to explain their policies. At the same time, the then New Hebrides Christian Council decided that Bislama was indeed a suitable vehicle in which to convey the evangelical message, news-sheets in Bislama began to appear from government agencies and broadcasting on a limited scale in Bislama was initiated.

There was, then, a great surge forward for Bislama, as the country bumped along the road to Independence in July this year, this *lingua franca* being seen as the great unifying bond between (then) New Hebrideans as they strove to attain their Independence. The fact that no standardized orthography had been developed did not deter the Vanuatuans from giving Bislama number one place on their Constitution, a symbol of nationalism and national unity.

For the time being, at least, the problem of linguistic diversity has been overcome by the use of Bislama as the national language. The future roles of the metropolitan languages will doubtless be seriously considered in the coming months, as will those of the regional vernaculars, as Vanuatu settles down to try to develop a unified and coherent education system as the euphoria of Independence gives way to practical planning.

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PEOPLES AND PLANTS IN MELANESIAN PREHISTORY

The history of cultivated plants

D.E. YEN

Kuk and the history of agriculture in the New Guinea highlands

JACK GOLSON

Irrigation in Melanesia: formative adaptation and intensification

MATTHEW SPRIGGS
THE HISTORY OF CULTIVATED PLANTS

D.E. Yen

The origins of agriculture and the domestication of plants (and animals) form a generalized equation within the wider frame of world history. However, for Melanesia, a principal prehistoric gateway for human populations in the settlement of Pacific Islands, the origins of agriculture have long been associated with the diffusion of plant species out of southeast Asia. Thus, in most collections of essays on world agricultural origins, the conspicuous role for Oceania as a whole has been its absence.

It is within the last twenty years, that the passive acceptance of this situation in this part of the world has undergone gradual reassessments. Founded on the research of ethnobotanists, human geographers and archaeologists who have turned their attention to detailed studies of indigenous Pacific production systems, basic questions on origins, domestication and diffusion are now being asked. A key area is Melanesia and a major force in re-opening these questions through the provision of data from the wide fields of enquiry has been indeed, the Research School of Pacific Studies.

I would like to begin the discussion of this conversion of attitude in terms of a simple dialectic of uniformity and diversity in considering the adaptation of agriculture in the Pacific:

Uniformity - the presumed Asiatic origin of cultigens that may be identified as the genetic component in the process;

Diversity - the soils and climates to which the adventive plants were adapted - the environmental component.

This sets up a situation of heredity and environmental interactions that are akin to natural selection; the varying ecologies of Melanesia have constituted variable screens through which adventive plants have passed, to result in species dominance. This reflects their individual, specific genetic adaptations. Within the species, selection operates to allow for the expression of individual genes and gene combinations, and mutations, all with qualities adaptive to new and sometimes unique conditions to which species may not have been exposed before. Thus the effect of the interaction between the genetic and environmental factors sets the stage for adaptive diversity.
With the intercession of man as agriculturist however, this natural model of adaptation takes on a more complex configuration, for he it is who adds what used to be called 'nurture' to the nature v. nurture argument of classical genetics in two ways:

Volitively, by modifying the environment in the direction of preference for the principal plants he is cultivating; and

In doing so, less consciously altering the directions of selection that might have resulted from the influence of the natural environment alone.

The directions in which manipulations of the environment have been applied have, therefore, the basic determinism of environment, and this determinism may be defined in terms of stress, such as excessive wetness or dryness, naturally impoverished soils (coralline atoll soils, highly laterized mountain soils); thus the obvious steps of water application (irrigation), restriction (drainage), mulching, the application of organic matter, and perhaps more commonly, combinations of two or more techniques in cultivation. In Melanesia, it may be said that the apogees of such agricultural technology were reached in prehistory, and indeed represent the highest agronomic achievements for the Oceanic world.

The social factors of environment however, such as significant production for ceremonial purposes, population pressures due to increases and group competition, class pressures in stratified societies, or the requirements of commercial market production may require the adoption of intensive techniques, e.g. the conversion of long rotation swidden to short rotation; the accentuating of irrigation. There is perhaps the inference of sequence in the adaptation of agriculture of

1. Formative adaptation dictated by natural climatic and edaphic factors, and

2. Intensification, triggered by dynamic social environments.

An alternative stimulus, however, may be the perceived deleterious effect of the initial techniques adopted, as indicated by increasingly inadequate production, with often territorial restriction on extensification of an accustomed mode of production.

Whatever the mode of environmental manipulation by man, he provides the setting for a further intensification, seldom recognized as such - the domestication of useful elements of the wild flora' - to supplement the plant rosters for which the original intensifications were designed. These may not be only food plants, but medicinal, ornamental and ceremonial, and industrial. From the minimal environmental disturbances of hunter-gatherers, through the forms of swidden agriculture, with or without burning, to the more elaborate and intensive forms of production, they provide the opportunities for the controlled reproduction of otherwise spatially wide-ranging species. The success of this control of the breeding system of plants (and animals) is the key to the process of domestication. At the same time, environmental disturbances can often provide the media in which hybridizations within and between species can occur; or in which the agriculturist can favour modes of reproduction in a
species - vegetative v. seed production; selection towards inbreeding (uniformity) or outbreeding (variability).

The more sophisticated forms of agricultural control, like the complex irrigation and drainage systems that are more fully treated by Matthew Spriggs, produce more highly specialized environments, and a trend towards monospecific cropping. In most cases, one genetic result is a large array of varieties of the dominant species grown that are adapted towards such artificial environments.

In this paper, we seek to review the history of the cultivated plants of Melanesia, and from what has gone before, we are to question the total acceptance of agriculture as a product of diffusion, and indeed, separate out the issue of domestication of plants from the origins of agriculture. I will further attempt to demonstrate that genetic selection including domestication is an agricultural intensification which has been a feature of Oceanic agriculture, continuing into the recent past, when the entry of commercialization interrupted, or changed the directions of the processes of agricultural evolution in the Pacific.

MELANESIAN AGRICULTURE AND SOUTHEAST ASIAN PLANTS - THE DOMINANT SPECIES

The indigenous Melanesian agricultures have been characterized as dominated by the field cultivation of *Dioscorea* yams and *Colocasia* taros. As staple root crops, vegetatively reproduced, these species show biological characters that are in common, but physiological adaptations that contrast, as Barrau (1965) has called them Dry and Wet, that fit them into the broad environmental variants of the islands. In most agricultural systems, however, it is rare that one crop is present in total absence of the other. Systems situated within 'wet' ecologies (riverine, stream, swamp) tend to exhibit dominance of taro, but usually there is a 'dry' component in which some yam will be cultivated. In tropical rain forest settings, however, taro may dominate the 'dry' or swidden gardens (with the absence of significant water control techniques), while yams are nevertheless adapted by elaboration of agronomy to the 'wet' conditions. The complexity of the genetic environmental relationships may be further demonstrated in the adaptation of these species, where, in the case of taro, agricultural adjustments may include the artificial supplementation of water in the building of water-retaining pondfields, or the 'drying' effects of elevation of planting surfaces in swamps above water in 'island'-like formations. With yams, elaborate soil treatments including mounding of artificially fine soil, the addition of green manure (composting), and deep holeing are variously applied, conferring drainage on the one hand, and textural conditions for roots to reach the deeper moistness for large tuber formation on the other.

If our knowledge of agricultural techniques and their rationales are fragmentary, even more rare are the definitions of origin and adaptation of varieties of any of the species to the varying conditions, natural and artificial.

But to questions of origins of yams and taros:
By cytological analysis, the *Colocasia* taro is represented by three chromosome-number forms only in India, (Yen and Wheeler 1968), and is confirmation of Vavilov's (1949-50) designation of Indian origin, not only for *Colocasia*, but for other related genera of Oceanic distribution of the aroid root crops, *Alocasia* and *Amorphophallus*. On the mainland of southeast Asia, the *Colocasia* is found in cultivation, but if fieldwork in Thailand is any indication, wild forms are rare or absent, while the narrow range of plant variation does not indicate proximity to a centre of origin.

Indeed, the Philippines and island southeast Asia exhibit incomparably greater plant variation, and may reflect prehistoric connections with India with contacts putated by Beyer (1948) in the second or third centuries BC for the Philippines; and for Indonesia, somewhat earlier. If wild forms are absent in the western Pacific, a diffusion hypothesis for the taros seems valid enough so far; but the uncertain status of the origin of feral types found in New Guinea, and more recently by R. Jones and B. Meehan (pers. comm.) in inland Arnhem Land, Australia, militate against ready acceptance. It has to be allowed that these feral types may not be garden escapees (and the Arnhem Land representatives would require a more complex explanation), but representatives of the attenuated Malaysian natural flora that is discussed later.

There are two other taros, the American *Xanthosoma* of post-Columbian introduction and found in most dryland agricultural systems as a subsidiary crop, and the swamp taro, *Cyrtosperma chamissonis*, adapted as a staple in the eastern Melanesian islands and most of the atolls of Micronesia. Wild species of *Cyrtosperma* are found pantropically in Africa, Asia, Indonesia, New Guinea and America, but the Pacific cultivated species has a narrower distribution (Barrau 1958), indicating that it is the first example that we encounter of an endemic cultigen that may indeed be a regional domesticate from within the New Guinea-Piiji confines.

The major species of yams, by contrast, are unquestioned concerning their southeast Asian origins: by taxonomic analysis (Burkill 1960), they are the domesticates there within a great range of wild species.

Cytological analysis by Martin and Ortiz (1963) has confirmed the claims of southeast Asia as the centre, in that the greatest range of chromosome numbers ($2n = 20-100+$) is found there. There do remain, however, the *Dioscorea* species of minor agricultural importance that are often enumerated as 'wild' in southeast Asia and Melanesia - *D. bulbifera*, *D. hispida*, *D. pentaphylla*. These species may represent the attenuation of the Indo-Malaysian flora, long recognized since Wallace (1869), but they are cultivated only in some Melanesian islands. *Dioscorea* supp. (note plural) forms from New Guinea which are not equatable with the known species, are often attributed as 'cultivated' or 'sometimes cultivated' by local groups. The yams of Melanesia have not been studied sufficiently. It is not in the major cultivated species that there are questions, but in the underlying minor representatives of the genus. For example, I have been unable to identify two 'semi-cultivated' forms collected among the Karam by Ralph Bulmer; the cultigen common in coastal villages called *D. monnularia* does not match up with the type specimen held in the National Herbarium of the Philippines, nor with any of the suite of species cultivated in Asia or Oceania.
The full realization that the *Metroxylon* sago palms are cultivated as a staple (e.g. Eyde 1967; Rhoads 1979) has been somewhat obscured by the great tracts of naturally occurring stands, particularly in New Guinea; thus the common characterization of the starch as an objective of plant gathering in lowland areas. The interesting feature of the distribution of sago in Melanesia is its species differentiation (Barrau 1959). In New Guinea, three species are recognized, *M. rumphii*, *M. salomonense* and *M. sago*, of which the first and last are recognized as having domesticated forms. Barrau (1958:37) noted that cultivated forms of *sago* and *rumphi* are often spineless in their petioles and leaf spathes in contrast to wild stands that vary in this character. Thus selection is an integral part of the continuing domestication process. Since, however, *M. sago* is propagated by suckers in preference to seed, the domestic form is, more often than not, a clonal population, whose genetic maintenance does not require great concentration. Other Melanesian forms like *M. salomonense* and *M. vitiense* differ in their reproductive habit, in that they are obligatory seed producers. A notable feature of domestication of these sagos is their adaptation beyond the normal swamplands to hillside in inland situations where their water requirements must be fulfilled by rainfall. Indeed in many parts of the Solomon Islands, they are good indicators of earlier agricultural activity, while in some cases, the occurrence of naturalized groves may indicate proximity to inland sites of protohistoric and earlier occupation. Selection of *M. salomonense* has produced forms that are preferred for thatch and other leaf uses rather than for food.

Bananas are virtually a universal component of Melanesian gardens, ranging from dominance as a crop in some parts of the southern New Guinea highlands, to village garden features. Although botanically banana is a herb, it reflects an aspect of Melanesian agriculture that is sometimes inadequately unaccounted for - the perennial, *aboricultural* components of production. Now, the majority of bananas in Oceania are of the Eumusa section of the genus, originating in southeast Asia. The Australimusa section, however, which spread into island Melanesia and eastern Polynesia, has been established by Simmons (1962) as a New Guinea domesticate.

Coconut palms still dominate the landscapes of coastal Melanesia and the Pacific atolls where they are a staff of life. On such restricted edaphic ecologies, they are the best adaptation, not only for food and drink, and medicine, but for wood, fiber (sinnet) and leaf materials used for building and the manufacture of utilitarian and more esoteric artifacts. The origin and domestication of the palm has been an object of debate, since the 'wild' representatives of its botanical family are found on the shores of northwest South America. Although claims for southeast Asian domestication have often been made, the most reasonable and recent hypothesis of Sauer (1971) is that of a multiple Oceanic domestication of volunteer stands, originating from accidental flotation of the fruits. The great range of variation in the Pacific species, and the distinctive local varietal groups of the islands offer some support to this hypothesis. Coconut is a rare example of local domestication that has entered the orbit of commercial agriculture, unchanged until recently by the hand of modern plant breeding.
One of the most important of tree crops in Oceania is the breadfruit, whose origin has been attributed by Burkill (1935) to the Pacific Islands. In Indonesia and in New Guinea, its status in traditional systems has been as a wild and cultivated plant. Its place in agricultural systems is minor. From this centre of variability, the domestication of this tree is seen as a kind of west-to-east cline of increasing agricultural importance, to the outreaches of tropical Polynesia. The other characteristic of this continuous process over space and time is the increasingly intensive selection for seedlessness that was accompanied by the choice of clonal reproduction as a standard procedure in planting.

Sugar cane is nowhere an agricultural dominant in subsistence systems, but is again a universal in tropical Oceanic cultigen rosters. It is considered here, because like the coconut, it has become a Pacific contribution to world commerce. Genetic analysis has placed this species as a New Guinea domesticate (Warner 1962), beyond any reasonable doubt. The continuing evolution of a cultivated species is demonstrated in the populations of sugar canes collected in Fiji. Grassl (1964) reported that atypical clones there were the product of introgression hybridization with Miscanthus; subsequent cytological analyses by Price and Daniels (1968) were to support this hypothesis.

The sweet potato is an American plant, whose introduction, generally accepted as being introduced to Melanesia in post-Columbian times, made such an agricultural impact on agriculture (Yen 1974). Probably more adaptable to the wide range of climate and soils than any other Oceanic plant, it soon dominated the subsistence systems of the highlands of New Guinea. Its increasing adoption in modern times in a wide range of settings was first noted in the Trobriands by Malinowski (1935), and in the western Solomons by Oliver (1955) in the 1920s and 1930s. With the dissolution of many Pacific subsistence systems in pursuit of cash economies, the sweet potato has expanded even more - a testament to its productive capacity, adaptability, and relative to the traditional yam-taro cultivation, lower labour inputs required. American plants have made considerable inroads into traditional agricultural systems, beginning with tobacco, which probably reached the New Guinea highlands as early as sweet potato, the Xanthosoma taro and maize being of unknown introduction dates. Manioc or cassava was adapted into island cropping in the nineteenth century, and, like the sweet potato, for many of the same reasons, is now expanding in the subsistence sector of transitional systems. In this century, development of cash farming in Melanesia has been largely dependent on two further American species, cacao and coffee. It is only very recently that there has been significant diversification of commercial cropping in Melanesia with the successful introduction of the southeast Asian rice and the African oil palm (see Table 1).

**MELANESEAN PLANTS**

From this review of the dominant plants in traditional Melanesian agriculture, two points with regard to origins are patent:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Vernacular</th>
<th>Botanical</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Modern</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coconut</td>
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<td>Cocos nucifera</td>
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<td>Philippines (breeding)</td>
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<td>PNG (hybrids)</td>
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<td>Indonesia</td>
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<td>Sugar Cane</td>
<td>Sugar Cane</td>
<td>Saccharum officinarum</td>
<td>New Guinea</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
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<td>Rice</td>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>Oryza sativa</td>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
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<td>Cocoa</td>
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<td>Theobroma cacao</td>
<td>America</td>
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<td>Coffee</td>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>Coffea arabica</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Coffea canephora</td>
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<td>Chili pepper</td>
<td>Chili pepper</td>
<td>Capsicwn spp.</td>
<td>America</td>
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<td>Rubber</td>
<td>Rubber</td>
<td>Hevea spp.</td>
<td>America</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oil Palm</td>
<td>Oil Palm</td>
<td>Elaeis guineenis</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Malaysia, Indonesia</td>
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<td>Pyrethrum</td>
<td>Pyrethrum</td>
<td>Chrysanthemum cinerariaefolium</td>
<td>Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ginger</td>
<td>Ginger</td>
<td>Zingiber officinale</td>
<td>India</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
The central role of New Guinea in domestication of plants: those now definitely assigned; those which could be domesticated there.

That these domesticates as a whole, virtually cover the range of environmental adaptations within Melanesia. And it is notable that among these a number of them were staple domesticate species for swamp, coral islands, coastal, inland and mountain environments.

Tables 2 and 3, demonstrating these adaptations, are compiled with the assistance of the recent comprehensive ethnobotanical enumerations for New Guinea by Powell (1976), for Malaysia by Burkill (1935) and for Indonesia by Ochse and Bakhuizen v.d. Brink (1931).

Since the determinations of New Guinea origins for sugar and Australimusa banana, there have been further examples noted of endemic cultigens, that by their very exclusiveness, or limited dispersal and the existence of wild forms, cannot be denied. These, including the now well-known vegetable plants of the highlands, are incorporated in Table 3.

Recent studies in the Solomon Islands have indicated that indigenous intensification or technological change was not in crop agronomy intensification (control of environment), but in a genetic direction of selection in trees, fruit and nut producers (Yen 1974b). One result has been the gigantism of plant parts consumable as food. A further example has been domestication of some tree species. The primary example that is the subject of further research is the Canarium nut of the species harveyi var. nova-hebridense. This species, one of the largest, if not the largest fruited Canarium over the southeast Asian, Chinese (South) and western tropical Pacific distribution of the genus, is limited to the eastern Solomon Islands and the Banks Islands. The interpretation of this distribution is that domestication occurred after any role the eastern Solomon Islands may have had in the prehistoric movements of populations towards nuclear Polynesia and eastwards. It should be noted that this area is the centre of distribution of Lapita sites (Green 1976), of considerable importance in considering human dispersals in Polynesian prehistory. Further, the established domesticates such as taro, yam, breadfruit, etc., are shared throughout Melanesia and Polynesia, and are regarded as the accompaniments of the spread of human populations in the Pacific.

As may be seen from Tables 2 and 3, the selective emphasis on the putatively Melanesian domesticates has been somewhat towards the vegetative mode of reproduction, where facultative seed production was a biological alternative. The Canarium example, like coconut and some of the sago palms, did not present the clonal option. It is an interesting example of the influence of the effect of variability due to the outcrossing breeding system on plant varietal naming. On the island of Santa Cruz, there are names for Canarium, largely descriptive of variable nut characters. However, on the testing of seven informants, the consistency of naming of eight trees was so poor that coincidences could be assigned to chance, there being a total of nineteen names given. On Vanikoro, another eastern Solomon Island, there is no effort given to naming of Canarium, in contrast to yam, taro and even sweet potato varieties (all clonal and thus true breeding).
Table 2

The Traditional Staple Plants of Melanesia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Vernacular</th>
<th>Botanical</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Adaptation</th>
<th>Reproduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taro</td>
<td>Colocasia esculenta</td>
<td>As Swamp/Riverine</td>
<td>Mountain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yam</td>
<td>Dioscorea alta</td>
<td>As Coast/Mountain</td>
<td>Clonal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; esculenta</td>
<td>As Coast</td>
<td>Clonal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; bulbifera</td>
<td>As Coast/Mountain</td>
<td>Clonal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; pentaphylla</td>
<td>As Coast/Mountain</td>
<td>Clonal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dioscorea spp.</td>
<td>M(NG) Coast/Mountain</td>
<td>Clonal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banana</td>
<td>Musa section Eumusa &quot; Australimusa</td>
<td>As Coast/Mountain</td>
<td>Clonal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M(NG) Coast/Mountain</td>
<td>Clonal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sago</td>
<td>Metroxylon sagus &quot; memphi&quot; &quot; salomonense &quot; vitiense</td>
<td>M(NG) Swamp/Riverine</td>
<td>Clonal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M(NG) Swamp/Riverine</td>
<td>Clonal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M Swamp/Low Montane</td>
<td>Seed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M Swamp/Low Montane</td>
<td>Seed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swamp Taro</td>
<td>Cyrtosperma chamissonis</td>
<td>M(NG) Swamp/Coastal</td>
<td>Clonal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breadfruit</td>
<td>Artocarpus altilis</td>
<td>M(NG) Coastal/Low Montane</td>
<td>Clonal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coconut</td>
<td>Cocos nucifera</td>
<td>O Coastal</td>
<td>Seed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweet potato</td>
<td>Ipomoea batatas</td>
<td>Am Coastal/Montane</td>
<td>Clonal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manioc/Cassava</td>
<td>Manihot esculenta</td>
<td>Am Coastal/Low Montane</td>
<td>Clonal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3
Some of the Traditional Supplementary Plants
(Food and Industrial)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Agricultural</th>
<th>Botanical</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Adaptation</th>
<th>Reproduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vernacular</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pueraria lobata+</td>
<td></td>
<td>As</td>
<td>Coastal/Montane</td>
<td>Clonal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dryland taro</td>
<td></td>
<td>Alocasia spp.+</td>
<td>As</td>
<td>Coastal/Montane</td>
<td>Clonal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nicotiana tabacum</td>
<td>Am</td>
<td>Coastal/Montane</td>
<td>Seed/Clonal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Screwpine</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pandanus odoratissimus</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Coastal</td>
<td>Clonal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; julianettii +</td>
<td>M(NG)</td>
<td>Montane</td>
<td>Clonal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; brostmos +</td>
<td>M(NG)</td>
<td>Montane</td>
<td>Clonal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; conoides +</td>
<td>M(NG)</td>
<td>Coastal/Low Montane</td>
<td>Clonal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; dubius</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Coastal</td>
<td>Clonal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Taro</td>
<td></td>
<td>Xanthesoma sp.</td>
<td>Am</td>
<td>Coastal/Low Montane</td>
<td>Clonal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ti plant</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cordyline fruticosa +</td>
<td>M(NG)</td>
<td>Coastal/Montane</td>
<td>Clonal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barringtonia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Barringtonia procera +</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Coastal</td>
<td>Clonal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; novae-iberniae</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Coastal/Low Montane</td>
<td>Clonal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papaya</td>
<td></td>
<td>Carica papaya</td>
<td>AM</td>
<td>Coastal/Montane</td>
<td>Seed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar Cane</td>
<td></td>
<td>Saccharum officinarum</td>
<td>M(NG)</td>
<td>Coastal/Montane</td>
<td>Clonal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- (vegetable)</td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; edule</td>
<td>M(NG)</td>
<td>Coastal/Montane</td>
<td>Clonal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- (vegetable)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Setaria palmifolia</td>
<td>M(NG)</td>
<td>Montane</td>
<td>Clonal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- (vegetable)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rungia klossii</td>
<td>M(NG)</td>
<td>Montane</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winged bean (vegetable)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Psophocarpus tetragonolobus</td>
<td>M(NG)?</td>
<td>Montane/Low Montane</td>
<td>Seed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceamic Lichee</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pometia pinnata</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Coastal/Low Montane</td>
<td>Seed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nali nut (eastern Solomons)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Canarium harveyi var+</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Coastal</td>
<td>Seed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>nova-hebridiense</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As = Asian
Am = American
M = Melanesia
O = Oceanic (including Melanesia)

M(NG) = specifically New Guinea
? = possibly domesticated in Oceania
* = Present status of 'supplementary'
+ = Potentially of 'main' or staple status in the past
The *Canarium* of the eastern Solomons represents then, an eastern extension of the domestication process that we recognize in New Guinea. In the Pacific, however, this is not the ultimate extent of the process (Yen in press). Among other domesticates are the *Pandanus* spp. developed from naturally occurring species of narrow range on atolls of Polynesia and Micronesia (Stone 1963), the purposeful planting of *Sorpus* reed on Easter Island gardens, the cultivation of an endemic genus *Touchardia* (Urticaceae) in Hawaii (Kamakau 1976:44-45) — and there are questions of the wild status of a range of New Zealand plants at contact — *Phormium* flax; the karaka berry (*Corynocarpus*); *Cordyline australis*, the cabbage tree.

Oceania, as the attenuation of the distribution of the Malaysian or Indo-Malaysian flora, and as the recipient of human populations from southeast Asia, presents a situation of extended opportunities in the past for further, remote domestication of new ecotypes. Particularly is this so if the human component were horticulturally/ agriculturally based; in other words, with the expected diffusion of agricultural ideas with agricultural plants.

We have thus arrived, in a circular way, back to the diffusion hypothesis, by isolating consideration of Pacific domestication of plants from the issue of agricultural origins.

**THE ORIGINS OF MELANESSION AGRICULTURE**

At this juncture, I would like to state the alternative hypothesis, poorly disguised, I think, in what has preceded: that agriculture independently evolved in Melanesia, specifically in New Guinea. A suite of plants was domesticated that included basic staples, vegetable and fruit species that were able to sustain human populations in their settlement of diverse and foreign ecologies from beginnings of hunting and gathering, and was a continuing process. However, this continuity was interrupted by further colonists out of Asia this time with agriculture and transferred domesticates, which were to dominate, in many cases, the earlier evolved cultivation of indigenous domesticates: these to become secondary, in Barrau's phrase (1965), 'witnesses of the past'. The prehistorical correlates for such an hypothesis are well-known; the settlement of the Sahul continent by hunter-gatherers from 40-30,000 years ago, and the implied endogenous succession or evolution to agriculture in the northern part; and the arrival of the agricultural Austronesians at 4000 BC.

In the face of the traditional hypothesis, this alternative, rarely considered, would remain as such, were it not for the work of Jack Golson (Golson 1977 and in press; Golson and Hughes in press) in the Wahgi Valley. Most of you are familiar with the interrupted sequence of agriculturally associated drainage systems that date back 9,000 years. At this antiquity, the timing, at a period of ameliorating climate corresponding with rising sea levels and the major division of the Sahul continent, could be said to be fortuitous for a significant development in production modes at former marginal (and beyond) environments. Such a development could be the domestication of useful parts of a hunting-gathering flora. It will be noted that I have been careful to term this 'development' rather than 'origin'. The source of this caution is that the process of domestication may have begun, and would have been a
more logical sequence of events, earlier than drainage manipulation of the environment. As we have already inferred, drainage means the tailoring of one particular feature of the environment to the requirements of a species or suite of species. Thus, domestication may have begun in the variable ecologies of mid-altitude regions, to develop simpler regimes of swidden modes of agriculture that followed the long hunter-gatherer 'phase' in Papua New Guinea.

I hope that I do no violence to the interpretations of Golson in converting his data to my own conceptual ends, in what follows.

The evolutionary nature of the drainage systems

The increasing complexity of these systems of environmental management through time appears as an evolutionary sequence of intensification of production mode, in addition to successive methods of coping with a naturally marginal but dynamic medium for agriculture. Recognizable is increasing 'specialization of environment' signalling the earlier accommodation of taro as a crop, and later, the American sweet potato. The major question regarding the earliest part of the sequence is: from whence is it derived? A local endogenous development born of increasing ethnobiological knowledge translated into methods of environmental control? A result of diffusion of ideas (and crops) and from where? In our southeast Asian work, we are still grappling with the controversy of agriculture v. non-agriculture in the late manifestations of the Hoabinhian technocomplex.

The evidence for plant domestication in New Guinea, and the overview of the evidence for New Guinea man's manipulation of the environment endues that continental island with the possibility of the application of the classical model of hunting-and-gathering to agriculture by internal development. But having built this case on plant origins, and having used Golson's researches in a summary way where they fit, it is only fair to transmit to you something of our continuing dialogues on two further points of interpretation.

The early place of taro in the sequence

One current opinion is that taro was the vehicle on which drainage development occurred in the highlands. Elsewhere, I have ventured the opinion that the soil imprints in the early phases could represent the traces of domestication, or, more safely, the early cultivation of highland domesticates, e.g. Australimusa banana, Saccharum, Setaria, etc. - an agriculturally formative period.

The general wisdom is that taro (with yam) came into the Pacific with Austronesian speakers at c. 4000 BC (Pawley and Green 1975). The discrepancy with the Wahgi interpretation is obvious, but if direct evidence can be obtained for taro (e.g. pollen) at early levels, this wisdom may need revision in its agricultural aspect.
The place of pigs in the sequence

In the early part of the sequence, Golson interprets the basin-like soil imprints as indications of pig wallowing, and calls on evidence from other archaeological sites for the presence of pigs in the highlands as early as 10,000 years ago. The agricultural connection is, of course, that pigs (not indigenous to New Guinea) form an inevitable association with plant husbandry. I am inclined to agree.

CONCLUSION

If the evidence for taro and pig at early time levels in New Guinea (or indeed, Melanesia) can be affirmed in the expanding archaeological record, where does it leave the alternate hypothesis for endogenous agricultural development? Exploded, probably.

But out of the ashes would arise the southeast Asian phoenix. Melanesia, and specifically, New Guinea would be responsible for the impetus to rewrite the agricultural section of southeast Asian prehistory, to tighten the ring of diffusion around the necks of recalcitrants like myself.

To partially salvage the shattered pieces of an unimpeccably based hypothesis, the distinction of survival goes to the second element in this treatment of cultivated plants in Melanesia:

That domestication was a form of genetic-environmental manipulation that continued in prehistory as an alternative mode of intensification - a part of the agricultural template that was to reach the far corners of the Pacific.

In prehistorical studies of cultivated plants, we have gone beyond observations of the diversity of environmental screening of founder plant species - and begin to see something of the biological inventiveness of Pacific man.

REFERENCES


Golson, J. and Hughes, P.J., in press. 'The Appearance of Plant and Animal Domestication in New Guinea', *Journal de la Société des Océanistes*.


This contribution is in the nature of an extended commentary on what Yen's article has had to say about the implications for issues in the history of Oceanic agriculture of the 9,000 years-old agricultural sequence investigated over the last decade in the swamps of Kuk Agricultural (formerly Tea) Research Station at 1,550 m in the upper Wahgi valley near Mount Hagen. I refer the reader to a number of publications which supply details of the Kuk investigations, including changing emphases in their interpretation as the gathering of data and the thinking about them have progressed: Golson and Hughes 1976; Golson 1977, 1981a, b, 1982. Here I wish to take up two particular questions within the framework which Yen's paper has established: the origins of agriculture in New Guinea, and the processes of agricultural intensification in highlands agriculture to which much attention has been paid in interpretations of the Kuk evidence to date.

THE BEGINNINGS OF AGRICULTURE IN NEW GUINEA: WHAT, WHEN AND WHERE

Yen discusses the possibility that the origins of agriculture in New Guinea were independent of the Southeast Asian plants which form an important component of agricultural systems there today. He points to the central contribution which plants indigenous and sometimes endemic to New Guinea have made to the Oceanic suite of agricultural crops. He emphasizes the environmental range represented by these domesticates and their inclusion of basic energy-supplying staples, vegetables, fruits and nuts able to sustain human populations over that environmental range.

I

The relevance of the Kuk investigations to this issue is that they have produced evidence for agricultural operations 9,000 years ago, substantially earlier than the first firm indications of agriculture in Southeast Asia (on which see Yen 1977; Gorman 1977). They have not been illuminating on the question of what plants were being grown in the dry-land and wet-land environments under early agricultural management of Kuk. Nor could it have been otherwise, given the absence of remains of the appropriate plants and the nature of the evidence on which the presence of agricultural activity itself is argued (Golson and Hughes 1976). This evidence falls into two categories: one, the nature of the sedimentary record at Kuk, specifically the interpretation of the onset of accelerated
deposition in the swamp basin at 9,000 years ago was due to accelerated erosion in the dry-land catchments of the swamp resulting from the beginnings of forest disturbance by shifting agriculture; and second, the contemporary presence of cut-and-fill features in the swamp basin itself thought to be more consistent with human activities by way of drainage and cultivation than natural processes of stream action and water scouring.

Yen asked us some years ago to consider the possibility that the imprints in the 9,000 year-old horizon in the Kuk deposits were due to cultivation of New Guinea plants. At the time, however, we were attracted to the proposition that already we were in the presence of Southeast Asian domesticates, including, indeed especially, the water-tolerant taro, then accepted without question as a foreigner on the New Guinea scene. The reason for this, despite the large questions it raised for the history of cultivation in Southeast Asia, as Yen has reminded us again in his paper, was the recent claim by Susan Bulmer (1975:18-19, 36) for the presence of a pig tooth in a 10,000 year-old level in a highlands rock shelter. The argument was that the pig is not an animal native to New Guinea, that it is hardly likely to have made its independent way across the water barriers of eastern Indonesia, that it therefore probably came into New Guinea as a husbanded animal and that, such is the nexus between pigs and agriculture in traditional New Guinea and Oceanic systems, its appearance implies the simultaneous arrival of Southeast Asian cultivated plants.

Each link in this chain of reasoning required substantiation. A matter of particular debate became why, if pigs were in central New Guinea 10,000 years ago, they had not reached Australia before the rise in world sea levels caused by the melting of Pleistocene polar and high mountain ice sheets finally separated New Guinea and Australia at Torres Strait probably between 6,500 and 8,000 years ago (Jennings 1972:37). Consideration of this issue involved questions about the behaviour of pigs under husbandry and in the wild and an appreciation that in conditions of bush-edge farming, as well documented for the pioneering era in Australia (Pullar 1953), pigs are well adapted livestock, able to forage for themselves, and if restrained by a little regular hand-feeding, do not readily go feral. For New Guinea Ralph Bulmer (1968:304, 313) has argued that the preferred habitats of feral pigs are forest edge, disturbed forest and mixed ecological zones containing grasslands, gardens and some secondary bush, all environments associated with agricultural man. Morren (1979:6-7) has recently challenged Bulmer's generalization by pointing out that amongst the Miyanmin of the West Sepik Province living between 600 m and 900 m feral pigs inhabit primary and old secondary forest during the seven drier months of the year, when they feed off the fallen fruits of certain trees. Even so, the pigs congregate around Miyanmin gardens and settlements for the remaining five months. In other words, it could be argued that the closeness of the relationship of pigs with people is sufficient to explain why pigs belonging to early bush gardeners in the New Guinea highlands did not reach Australia before the water barriers formed.

It may be that the argument will prove to be unnecessary after all. The claim for early pig remains precisely that and has not been confirmed by the published evidence of other excavated sites, of which there are admittedly very few. Kuk itself, a specialized site of drainage and gardening, has produced no bones of any kind. What it does contain, inter alia, in its 9,000 year-old levels, is a number of shallow basins, which,
under the influence of Sue Bulmer's report of early pig, I interpreted as fossilized pig wallows (Golson and Hughes 1976). If I do not press this interpretation as much today, it is not because it is an unlikely explanation of the features in question — our observations of pigs wallowing at Kuk today clearly show the contrary — but that there are other possible explanations. There are similar basins in the 6,000 year-old level at Kuk which are more likely to have been made by pigs: in contrast to the earlier hollows, these are associated with stakeholes; the interpretation here, preferred by our workmen immediately the first one was discovered, is that a pig had been secured to a stake at that spot. About 6,000 years ago, moreover, pig bones are reported for a number of highlands rockshelters (Bulmer 1975:19). There are also gardening systems of the same age in the Kuk swamp which possess features interpreted as indicating that taro was one of the crops grown there (Golson 1977:616). Is all this support for 'the general wisdom' of which Yen speaks, that the Southeast Asian elements in New Guinea husbandry came with the arrival of Austronesian speakers in the Pacific? Wurm (Wurm et al. 1975:318319) recognizes the term for pig in a number of New Guinea highlands languages as an Austronesian loan word.

II

In his paper, Yen suggests, on theoretical grounds, that the manipulation of the environment by drainage evident in the earliest agricultural levels at Kuk presupposes an earlier stage that saw the development 'in the variable ecologies of mid-altitude regions of simpler regimes of swidden modes of agriculture'. The timing of the agricultural beginnings at Kuk also recommends that we look downhill for their origins.

The researches of biogeographers and geomorphologists over the last two decades have established in broad outline the major climatic and ecological changes that have affected the New Guinea highlands during the past 30,000 years (Bowler et al. 1976:361-366, 388-390; Hope and Hope 1976; Hope 1980; Hope in press, on which last this paragraph is based). In the colder climates of the first 20,000 years of this timespan glaciers formed on the highest mountain peaks and the treeline was depressed by from 400 m and less to about 1,700 m below its present level of 3,900-4,000 m, depending on fluctuations in the temperature. Though the effects below this on the composition of the forest do not seem to have been very marked, beech (Nothofagus) appears to have been widespread between 1,500 m and 2,100 m, indicating persistent cloudiness and mist. The most extreme climate was experienced between 20,000 and 15,000 years ago, after which the temperature gradually rose, bringing a complex suite of changes in its train, including the freeing of the main highlands valleys from their prevalent cloud and mist and the consequent diversification of the regional forest. Climates similar to the present had become established in montane areas by 9,500 BP. The beginnings of agriculture follow so closely on this that, given the fact that the crops which are candidates for planting in the early gardens, whether of New Guinea or Southeast Asian origin, are today almost all within 600 m or so of the ceiling on their productive growth at Kuk, it is hard to believe that they had been established for any length of time anywhere in montane New Guinea. The implication is that agriculture came into the highlands from lower altitudes in step with rising temperatures and the elevation of daily cloud formation.
Recent work by Garrett-Jones (1979) on the sediments of Lake Wanum in the lower Markham valley has provided the first vegetation history anywhere in lowland New Guinea and some of the changes he sees there he is inclined to ascribe to disturbance by man. The first indications, spanning a period of some hundreds of years around 8,000 years ago, consist of increased values for woody non-forest pollen associated with an increased influx of carbonized particles, which result from fire in dry-land vegetation in the vicinity of the lake. As this period is supposed to be more humid than the preceding millennium during which no such evidence of burning is found, Garrett-Jones’ conclusion (1979:279-280) is that the agency is likely to be human. Immediately following this episode of vegetation disturbance is the first peak of inorganic sedimentation in the deposits (Garrett-Jones 1979:246). Although consistent with agricultural practice, the evidence is equally consistent with the use of fire as a management strategy for plants and animals by hunter-gatherers (cf. for Australian Aborigines, Jones 1975:25-28). We may simply note the occurrence in these early levels of the Wanum sediments of two pollen grains tentatively identified as *Colocasia*, the genus to which taro belongs (Garrett-Jones 1979:386).

**INTENSIFICATION IN HIGHLANDS AGRICULTURE: HOW AND WHY**

**I**

The story reconstructed from the swamp deposits at Kuk is one of continuous agricultural use of dry land from 9,000 years ago, associated with episodes of drainage of the swamp for purposes of cultivation. The emphasis of the investigations has inevitably been on the episodes of swamp drainage, since in contrast to the dry land the swamp is an environment where agricultural operations require the digging of archaeologically discoverable channels and ditches, which are differently spaced through the accumulating deposits according to their varying antiquity.

Six phases of swamp drainage have been defined and are tabulated below, with their (rounded-off) radiocarbon dates Before Present:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Radiocarbon Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>250-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>400-250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2,000-1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4,000-2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>6,000-5,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each phase has its own special characteristics, but it is possible to generalize (Golson 1981b; 1982). During phases 1-3 the drainage works necessary to make the wet land fit for gardening consist of a single major disposal channel, while the gardening features themselves are quite varied and have been interpreted as indicating the simultaneous planting of different crops. During phases 4-6 the drainage works are more elaborate,
as though the wet land had become progressively more difficult to manage, while they are also more coordinated, as though it was necessary to have a larger area within the system at one time. The garden structures now consist of a repetitive pattern of straight ditches joining at right-angles, which are thought to mean the cultivation of a single crop, for which taro is proposed for phases 4 and 5 and sweet potato for phase 6. It is not difficult to view this distinction, between phases 1-3 on the one hand and phases 4-6 on the other, in terms of Yen's 'inference of sequence in the adaptation of agriculture: formative adaptation dictated by natural climatic and edaphic factors, followed by intensification triggered by dynamic social environments'.

It is important to appreciate the dialectical relationship which exists between the various elements involved in the sequence. As this relationship is seen in reconstructions from the Kuk evidence for the highlands generally, the continued practice of agriculture modifies the environment in ways which progressively alter the balance between the various elements making up the subsistence system and throw increasing emphasis on the agricultural sector. The path which the environmental modification follows calls repeatedly for developments in agricultural technology and determines the form which agricultural intensification takes as the demands on agricultural production increase. This increasing demand is due both to the disappearance of other resources as the environment becomes transformed and to the proliferation of social needs discovered in the course of that transformation and developed as a result of opportunities presented by it.

These processes are at work over millennia of highlands' history in virtual isolation, given the separation of the montane populations from the lowlands valleys and coasts by steep, climatically unfavourable and thinly inhabited mountain flanks. Perhaps the most important external inputs were new plants. Yen suggests that plants out of Southeast Asia like taro, particular species of yam and some types of banana may be arrivals after the agricultural process got independently under way in New Guinea, as we have discussed. I have pointed to some archaeological evidence that might support such an arrival, together with the pig, by about 6,000 years ago. But the evidence for neither the event nor its effects is clear. On the other hand, we are learning to recognize in the record the consequences of the introduction, within the last few hundred years, of the tropical American sweet potato, which is the current staple of New Guinea highlands economies (Golson 1982).

Let us briefly particularize the generalizations made above: the details are set out and fully referenced in Golson 1981a, b, 1982.

1. The open landscapes of garden, grassland and managed regrowth which are characteristic of the New Guinea highlands today have been created out of environments which palynological research shows were once forested. Since climatic factors have been of minor importance since the end of the Pleistocene 10,000 years ago, it is generally accepted that the agency of this transformation has been man by way of clearance for agriculture. The effects of this clearance, reflected in the depressed ratio of forest to woody non-forest taxa in upper Wahgi pollen diagrams, were so marked by 5,000 years ago that they have been described (Flenley 1979:122) as providing the most striking pollen evidence of recent years for early
clearance, speaking on a pan-tropical or even world scale. Amongst the factors responsible for this degree of impact, two are relevant at this point. The climatic and vegetative evidence reviewed earlier in this paper shows that clearance for agriculture was beginning in the upper Wahgi valley at a time of ecological change at the end of the Pleistocene and it may be that in these circumstances the forest was particularly sensitive to disturbance. In addition to this, certain characteristics of forest growth at altitude suggest that New Guinea highlands forests were at all times slow to recover once disturbed. The primary factors are lowered temperatures and diminished amounts of photosynthetically active radiation, which decrease stature, biomass and productivity (Grubb 1977:102-103).

2. This vulnerability of the montane forest to disturbance was compounded by the fact that because disturbance was due to agriculture, it was repeated. Shifting agriculture of the kind common throughout the tropics, which is inferred for the early stages of highlands New Guinea agriculture, depends for its performance on the regeneration of the forest on the abandoned gardens which have been created by its clearance. Such regeneration reestablishes the nutrient store which has been used up, and rehabilitates the structure of the soil which has deteriorated, under previous cultivation. Since, as we have seen, regrowth of montane forest is retarded by the effects of altitude, early agriculturalists in highland New Guinea must have had to make extensive use of country to allow regeneration to proceed. However, such extensification of agriculture, to use Yen's term, was a finite option in the New Guinea highlands, since the productive growth of tropical cultigens was largely confined within an altitudinally and therefore, because of the topography, laterally restricted zone, with limits set above by cold and cloud (at about 2,000 m before the sweet potato) and below (at about 1,400 m) by climatic and environmental disabilities of various kinds (cf. Brookfield 1964). These limits once reached, the agricultural process was turned inwards and repeated clearing of the same land at shorter intervals would have upset the orderly succession of forest regeneration on which the agricultural system depended.

It is the results of this process which are picked up when the upper Wahgi pollen diagrams to which we have referred begin about 5,000 years ago, and they chart increasing environmental impact for a further thousand years. At this point the archaeological and palaeobotanical record registers a number of developments which have been interpreted (Golson 1981b:60; 1982) as reflections of and responses to the problems posed to the agricultural system by the environmental changes for which its own operations had been responsible. Amongst such developments was the large-scale and long-lived reclamation of land for cultivation represented by phase 3 at the Kuk swamp. The upper Wahgi pollen evidence suggests that this and other reclamations in the region met with a measure of success, allowing some forest regeneration on the valley sides while permitting their continued agricultural use (Golson 1977:621). By 2,500 years ago, however, according to our interpretation of the sedimentary sequence at Kuk, the environmental end-point was being reached in the central valley, with the replacement of degraded secondary growth by grassland. Environmental modification was in the process of becoming environmental transformation, with the most radical of consequences.
3. The montane forests of New Guinea provide plant and animal resources that allowed hunter-gatherers to inhabit the central highlands from early on in the settlement history of the Greater Australian landmass (the earliest published date of New Guinea, of 26,000 BP, is from the Papuan highlands) and are important today in the subsistence of small communities of bush-dwelling gardeners and pigkeepers on the highlands fringes (e.g. Dornstreich 1977; Morren 1977). The progressive alteration of the forest cover brought about by shifting agriculture in the ways described must have had effects on the distribution and availability of those resources in ways about which we can only speculate at present. It is certain, however, that as secondary growth in agriculturally exploited areas became more widespread and more degraded, bush resources became fewer and less varied. Today agricultural communities in such circumstances but with access to the treeline (at around 4,000 m) on the highest New Guinea mountains use it as a favoured area for plant gathering and especially hunting (Hope and Hope 1976: 39-41) and it may be that widespread evidence for treeline disturbance by fire from 5,000 years ago (Hope and Hope 1976: 49-51) is evidence for the beginnings of such exploitation as a direct result of resource impoverishment in the agricultural zone. With the appearance and spread of grassland, bush resources disappeared altogether and were not replaced. The grasslands contain few plants of economic importance, while they only support a limited range of small animals, mainly bandicoots and rats. The hunting of these with fire was one mechanism by which the grasslands once established were maintained.

In these circumstances what was lost in the bush had to be replaced from the gardens. In his paper Yen talks about the agricultural intensification represented by domestication of useful elements of the wild flora to supplement original plant rosters and gives New Guinea examples of the process. The sort of environmental modification of which we have been talking would provide an appropriate context for this to happen. We have no evidence whether this in fact was the case, except very generally for the mountain or nut pandanus. This information comes from the work of the late Ole Christensen at the Manim rockshelter near Mount Hagen. Following the lead given by him (Christensen 1975: 24), we can now say that charred pandanus drupe fragments found there in large numbers in levels older than 6,000 years belong exclusively to a non-domesticated form, the drupe fragments of domesticated trees appearing at a later but as yet unknown date.

In the same way the place of the disappearing forest fauna came to be filled by the domesticated pig. The central importance of the pig in traditional New Guinea highlands societies has its origins in the ecological transformation which made it the only substantial and reliable source of meat. Morren (1977: especially 311-313) has clearly shown the nexus that exists in New Guinea between the degree of environmental impact, the level of pig husbandry and the amount of labour devoted to it. In heavily impacted environments functioning boars are kept in the settlements because there are no feral boars, as elsewhere, with which village sows can be let out to mate. In such environments there is limited opportunity for the animals for forage, so that the expanded herds must be partly maintained on the produce of the gardens and extra labour invested for the purpose. Because pigs have become such expensive animals, their use is subject to strict regulation. They are the currency of important
transactions at every level of community life and as such the substance and symbol of wealth and power.

4. The destruction of the forests and their progressive replacement by increasingly degraded secondary growth and finally by grassland not only make agriculture by far the dominant sector of the economy in the ways described; they call for radical developments within the technology of agriculture itself, since the practices of shifting agriculture are not effective in the changed environment.

The techniques by which highlands farmers achieve successful gardening in grassland have been well described (summarized and referenced in Golson 1977:603-604): the grassland sod is broken up and turned; the soil is tilled and worked into garden beds of various sorts; and seedlings of quickly growing trees are planted or protected on cultivated land going into fallow for extended periods. We think we can recognize these innovations in the archaeological and palaeobotanical record, so that the dates we can give to their appearances become markers for the progress of the environmental transformation which is the key to the developments we are considering. Soil tillage makes its appearance at Kuk 2,500 years ago; tree fallowing may be inferred from the pollen diagrams 1,200 years ago; and raised bed cultivation is being practised at Kuk 400 years ago (Gols on 1981b:60-61, 1982).

In addition, this combination of techniques was able to achieve higher yields, for increased labour inputs, and to allow more continuous cultivation of the same plots of land. With their possession the highlands farmer had the means not only of coping agriculturally with a deforested environment but also of meeting the increased demands which that deforestation placed upon agricultural production.

5. The adoption of the sweet potato into highlands agriculture a few hundred years ago, following its introduction into island Southeast Asia by Iberian explorers of the sixteenth century, was to increase the effectiveness of the measures already taken to meet the problems of agriculture in a montane environment. Its initial attraction for highlands agriculturalists may well have been, as Watson (1977) has argued, that it was unequalled as fodder for pigs, which have a great liking for it and eat it raw. Subsequently, however, its other advantages over the traditional staples of highlands agriculture (Yen 1974:70-74) became manifest, so that it came to dominate in agricultural production for humans as well as for pigs. The sweet potato matures more quickly and gives higher yields at altitude than the older tubers and will do so at higher altitudes; it is more tolerant than they of naturally poor and agriculturally impoverished soils; and its productivity lasts longer than that of taro, and much longer than that of yam, since its shallow rooting allows partial harvesting of individual plants, the roots left behind continue to grow and prolific secondary rooting takes place, with the development of new tubers and the possibility of harvesting for up to two years. Together these factors allowed the sweet potato to effect what Clarke (1977:161) has called a 'spatial and temporal expansion of garden production': spatial through its ability to yield at higher altitudes and on poorer soils, temporal because its tolerance of poorer soils and its longer productivity allow it to perform the role of a follow-up crop in a rotational system.
Elsewhere (Golson 1982) I have assembled the evidence resulting from the actual operation of these factors. It consists of palynological indications of sustained agriculture at 2,500 m; geomorphological evidence of increased rates of sediment deposition in lake basins as a result, it is thought, of intensified land use in their catchments; and a marked contraction of the area of the Kuk swamp under drainage, testifying to a shift in the focus of agricultural activities to dry land. All these developments begin about 2,500 years, which at Kuk is the beginning of phase 6. There is no direct evidence of the effects in the society at large. It is highly probable, however, from what we know of the potential of the sweet potato and the limitations of the crops which it replaced, that gross inequalities in productive capacity under the old regime were to some extent evened out and that it became possible for more people in more areas to undertake pig husbandry and to share in the benefits which ownership of pigs conferred (Golson 1982).

The populous societies unexpectedly met with by the first Europeans to penetrate the highlands fifty years ago were still in dynamic adjustment to the arrival of the sweet potato a few hundred years previously. Their essential character, however, had long been established as a result of the complex interactions between highlands societies and their environment which I have tried to make explicit.

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IRRIGATION IN MELANESIA: FORMATIVE
ADAPTATION AND INTENSIFICATION

Matthew Spriggs

Pour donner une idée de l'industrie de ce peuple, que certains voyageurs ont dépeint sans religion, sans culture aucune, comme vivant dans la sauvagerie la plus profonde, je décrirai la façon vraiment ingénieuse avec laquelle une tarodière est installée sur le flanc d'une montagne ... (Glaumont 1888).

On 19 May 1568 Spaniards of Mendana's ill-fated expedition came upon irrigated gardens while on a reconnaissance on Guadalcanal Island in the Solomons:

On our return we saw many villages up in the hills and many plantations of food on the slopes, arranged very well so that they could irrigate them, which they did. It was well laid out; and by each there was a stream of water (Amherst and Thomson 1901 (II): 306).

This was the first European account of irrigation in Melanesia, a practice which also attracted the attention of Cook and other early European visitors to the region. Many were obviously impressed by the technological sophistication of the irrigation systems, and in their (sometimes grudging) enthusiasm clearly expressed their own feelings of racial and moral superiority. De Rochas, speaking of the Balade area found there,

une sorte de monument de cet art ingénieux, et qu'on est étonné de trouver avec une telle perfection chez un peuple sauvage. C'est un aqueduc de 8 à 10 kilomètres de long, conduit sur la croupe des montagnes, avec un habileté que ferait honneur à un peuple civilisé (1862:170).

Erskine who visited an area thirty miles southeast of Balade, on the river Kalaut observed that,

From all we see it is evident that this part of the country is not generally fertile, but a degree of pains seems to be taken in its cultivation that I never expected to see among savages. The face of the hills above the river is covered with rectangular fields, surrounded by channels of irrigation, which as far as
can be seen from below, is conducted on a careful and scientific system ... (1853:355).

Anderson, again speaking of New Caledonia is slightly more grudging in his praise,

The idea of irrigating the plantations by this means is, perhaps, one which would occur to the most uncivilized savage; but a certain amount of skill displayed in cutting the channels on the side of the hills, which are sometimes wooded, oftentimes rocky, and also in constructing them at a constant, very gradual descent, imperceptible to the naked eye, is sufficient to alter any previously assumed notion that the Melanesian is a know-nothing specimen of the 'genus Homo' (1880:229-230).

Some were sceptical however that the work could have been carried out by Melanesians, for instance Brenchley:

It would appear ... that a more advanced Civilization must have at one time existed on this island. Remains of ancient aqueducts are to be found, one eight miles in length .... It is evident that the skilful irrigation which has so surprised those who saw it, must be a practice that has been transmitted from better times (1873:347).

This was a sentiment echoed by other writers (such as Inglis, 1882:xxii-xxiii), but the Reverend James Copeland on seeing the irrigation systems on Aneityum in Vanuatu refused to be impressed whoever had built them, commenting that there are:

aqueducts for the irrigation of plantations which, though extensive, come far short of that which now unites Glasgow and the Highland Lochs (1860).

The term 'irrigation' is often loosely applied and I will deal mainly with true irrigation, that is diversion of water from source to fields. Related techniques include the management by ditching of freshwater swamps, and the digging of pits to tap the water table beneath atolls and other low islands. True irrigation is associated in Melanesia almost exclusively with the growing of the root crop taro (Colocasia esulenta) and is found in parts of New Guinea, the Solomons, Vanuatu, New Caledonia and Fiji. Irrigation is practised in Melanesia under two conditions. Firstly in areas with significant dry seasons to create conditions allowing the growth of crops which require considerable amounts of water; secondly in areas where rainfall is usually sufficient to promote growth, 'supplemental' irrigation is used as a safeguard against occasional drought but more importantly to promote higher yields. This corresponds to Yen's inferred sequence. The former condition is equivalent to his formative adaptation dictated by natural climatic and edaphic factors, and the latter 'supplemental' conditions can be seen as examples of intensification, triggered by dynamic social environments. If we use Brookfield's (1972) division of agricultural production into subsistence, trade and social
components then intensification, in this case by the expansion of irrigation, could be a response to the factors outlined by Yen in his paper: population pressure (however defined or perceived), the requirements of production for trade or for ceremonial purposes, competitive feasting, or class pressures in stratified societies.

The extent to which irrigation is mainly a response to natural climatic factors can be examined by comparing the distribution of true irrigation systems in Melanesia with that of mean annual rainfall and mean rainfall during each third of the year (data from Brookfield and Hart 1966 and for Papua New Guinea from McAlpine, Keig and Short 1975). In many cases irrigation is practised in areas with less than 2500 millimetres of yearly rainfall, and a marked dry season from about July to November, as pointed out by scholars from Rivers (1926), to Bellwood (1978:147) but this easy environmental generalization is by no means the full story.

In Papua New Guinea the supplemental aspect of irrigation is important certainly on Mussau Island, and in the Solomons it would appear to be important on New Georgia, Rendova and Kolombangara. On Aneityum in Vanuatu are found some of the most highly developed irrigation systems in the Pacific, but climatic variables examined suggest that irrigation would only occasionally be necessary to ensure adequate crop growth over much of the island, a supplemental use as insurance against occasional drought. The scale and ubiquity of such systems there seems to relate more to the pre-missionization social system which involved competitive feasting between districts under different chiefs. The first missionary stationed there, John Geddie, in a letter published in the Missionary Register for January 1852, wrote:

Feasts are common, and in the estimation of the natives, are events of great importance .... One district gives a feast to another, and receives one in return - but the two parties do not eat together .... It is neither more nor less than an exchange of food. As the importance of a chief is judged of by the quantity of food collected on such occasions, the common people are most heavily taxed in order to support his dignity ... much that is collected spoils before it can be eaten.

In his journal of 14 July 1852 (Miller 1975:135) Geddie also mentions feasts, noting that 'Pigs, taro, bananas, sugarcane, coconuts, etc. were all tabued for this purpose', and again stresses 'there was such an abundance of food that much of it was wasted before it could be used'. This sort of behaviour was of course anathema to the dour Nova Scotian and Scottish Presbyterian missionaries, but goes some way to explaining the extreme development of irrigation systems on that island.

New Caledonia is a dry country and irrigation of taro is to be expected, but as noted by Curry (1962:51-52) it is found not only on the dry west coast, but also in the central mountain chain and the wetter east coast. On the east coast in the present commune of Canala were quite elaborate trade systems to exchange the irrigated taro of the inland clans with fish, turtles and crustacea caught by the coastal inhabitants (Doumenge 1965:64-65). At least in this area the stimulus of trade to the
expansion of irrigation systems seems important. Writing of Lakeba Island in Eastern Fiji, Muriel Brookfield (1979:134) points out that:

Despite their small area, the swamps and other wet areas are capable of yielding far more taro than is required by the resident population. This enables the Tui Nayau, other chiefs and islanders to extend hospitality to visitors, and to send food to other islands in time of need. Lakeba was traditionally regarded as the 'food larder' of central and southern Lau, and this is one reason for its pivotal place in the Lauan political system, and in linkages with Tonga and the Fiji island groups to north and west. The Lakeba wetlands are a resource envied by the people of other less-favoured islands.

In island Melanesia some of the most politically stratified societies of the recent past were found in New Caledonia, on Aneityum and in parts of Fiji, areas where irrigation was more highly developed than elsewhere. In Pacific stratified political systems, there is often a stress on feasting, food pretation and exchange, with chiefly power based in part on ritual control over agricultural production. An association with irrigated taro agriculture is perhaps thus not unexpected; given the high yields, all year round production (unlike seasonal yam and breadfruit crops), and the relative permanence of terrace and canal systems, irrigated taro where environmentally possible is clearly a very suitable crop to be at the basis of such societies (cf. Earle 1978:173).

There is thus no need to invoke Wittfogel's (1957) 'hydraulic hypothesis' of management requirements of irrigation systems necessitating a centralized despotic government; there is no mechanical link between technology and political power. Maurice Godelier has put the point well:

If modern anthropology has confirmed the argument that the relationship between the development of productive forces and the development of social inequalities is not mechanical, it has on the whole shown that social competition in class societies provides the major incentive to surplus production and, in the long term leads indirectly to progress in productive forces (1977:110-111).

In the areas of Melanesia where the presence of irrigation is not solely explained by climatic and edaphic conditions, it is precisely this incentive to surplus production which has led to the development of systems which, even if not on the scale of the aqueduct which united Glasgow and the highland lochs, so impressed most early European visitors.

I will now go into more detail about the techniques actually involved, and examine the causes for some of the variation in techniques found in Melanesia, some of the diversity behind the uniformity. Let us start at the water diversion point from the river or stream. Dams are usually of loose boulders so that surplus water can easily percolate through. Mud and brushwood can be used to make the dams less permeable in drier periods of reduced river flow. After heavy rain the water flows over the top of the
IRRIGATION IN MELANESIA

Dams may even wash it away entirely. The dams are usually no more than one metre high to permit easy repair or reconstruction and are located where rivers are shallow even if wider at such points. Dams up to one hundred metres wide have been recorded in Milne Bay Province, Papua New Guinea. The impermanence of the dams is a safety feature to ensure that excess water does not damage the canal or cause damage to plants in the garden. Overflow devices along the canals are often a further safety measure.

Sometimes water is turned almost directly from a stream into the garden area, but often unlined (or stone lined) canals up to several kilometres in length are necessary. In parts of Melanesia canals are found up to five kilometres in length, with one exceptional example in New Caledonia twelve kilometres long.

Found in association with such canals or in place of them are pipelines of bamboo, pandanus, or tree fern which again may be some kilometres long. The advantages of pipelines are that seepage and evaporation losses can be avoided, the water is more easily controlled and a greater degree of flexibility in garden siting is possible. In addition weed growth, which is often a problem in unlined canals, is avoided. Such pipelines are however inevitably fragile and short-lived whereas the canals are a relatively permanent feature.

Methods of water application to the crops traditionally practised include simple flooding, flowing sheets of water on levelled surfaces ('paddies' or 'pondfields') and channels round the perimeter of rectangular beds (a variant of 'island bed' systems), and corrugation or furrow irrigation. In simple flooding water is led to the upper edge of the garden and then circulates down, usually with simple wood or stone barriers to slow down the flow. This acts to control erosion and trap sediment. In some cases rough 'terraces' are constructed directly in small stream beds. Simple flooding is essentially a highland Papua New Guinea practice being found in Enga, Madang, Western Highlands, Eastern Highlands and Morobe Provinces, and irrigated garden areas are generally small.

Pondfield systems, widespread in island Melanesia and Polynesia and similar in many ways to techniques found associated with wet rice in southeast Asia, have been reported in Papua New Guinea only from Mussau Island, but they are found also in the Solomons, Banks Islands, Northern Vanuatu, New Caledonia and Fiji. The planted area is an artificial pond through which water is kept constantly flowing.

The 'island bed' system consists of water led around the perimeter of usually rectangular beds and it resembles the 'island bed' systems found in swamplands. It is used along a thirty kilometre strip of coast in Milne Bay and is also found in New Caledonia and Fiji.

In corrugation or furrow irrigation water is applied to the ground in small, shallow furrows from which it soaks laterally through the soil wetting the area between the corrugations. I have only seen this system in use on Aneityum in Southern Vanuatu. Descriptions of irrigation practices in the Damal area and near Lake Sentani in West Papua, in West New Britain and Bougainville in Papua New Guinea and on Malekula in Vanuatu do not give information on methods of water application.
Figure 1

True Irrigation Systems in Melanesia

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<th>Simple Flooding</th>
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<td>Full references will appear in 'Taro Irrigation in Melanesia: Descriptive Catalogue and Annotated Bibliography', Department of Prehistory, Research School of Pacific Studies (in preparation).</td>
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Yields of taro under these different irrigation techniques are generally much higher than under dryland conditions, although the number of yield figures collected are few and far between. For simple flooding systems in Papua New Guinea, yields from Awa groups (Eastern Highlands) are 18.4 to 21.8 mt/ha/yr (corms only) and at Patep (Morobe) 37.6 mt/ha (growth period unknown). Dryland taro yields at Patep were given as 12.5 mt/ha, while from elsewhere in Papua New Guinea and the Pacific, yields are from 2.5 mt to 15 mt/ha/yr, with sometimes exceptional yields of 30 mt being recorded for pure stands. From Fiji island bed figures recorded were 16.6 to 21.0 mt/ha/yr, and for pondfield systems in Vanuatu my own calculations suggest yields of 40-65 mt/ha/yr. Commercial Hawaiian farmers (mostly using fertilizers) obtain yields of 22-50 mt/ha/yr from pondfield systems.

We have examined the distribution of true irrigation in Melanesia in terms of climatic data, but how do we account for the distribution of the particular techniques of irrigation found in the region. One common sequence of techniques in Polynesia is a change over time in one plot from pondfield to island bed methods, followed by a fallow period and then a reactivation of the pondfield. This is one response to declining yields experienced because of soil exhaustion with continuous cultivation. Drying out the pondfield and then turning the soil over to form a raised bed or mound within the plot causes aerobic conditions allowing rapid decay of organic materials and thus increased nutrient availability (Earle 1978:117). One might expect to find permanent island bed systems in areas of poor soil fertility. In Milne Bay Province, Papua New Guinea, the soils of the coastal plain appear fairly poor and the short fallow period generally in use (only four years between taro plantings) exacerbates this (Kahn 1979). This necessitates turning over the soil of the island beds to maintain fertility. A pondfield regime here would perhaps not allow sustained production on these soils. In addition, the terrain on the plains may be unsuitable for pondfield agriculture. On near level ground, flow would be sluggish and water temperature would perhaps increase to levels where *Pythium* corm rot would occur (cf. Parris 1941). In New Caledonia and Fiji, island bed systems are found in valley bottoms or plains and appear to be a response to similar factors, especially in poorly drained areas where periodic draining and aeration of the soil is not possible.

Simple flooding is very much a New Guinea highlands phenomenon. It is the least intensive of the irrigation techniques and would seem to reflect four hundred and fifty years. Evidence from the highland valley floors shows periods of intensive use starting at least six thousand years ago with wet taro as a probable staple grown in the swamps. These alternate with periods of abandonment, in explanation of which Golson (1977) has suggested a series of technological innovations allowing more intensive use of dryland gardens, such as tillage, *Casuarina* fallow and finally the sweet potato. For at least the final period of abandonment prior to European contact Gorecki (1979b) has suggested the abandonment not only of swampland agriculture but of habitation on the valley floor at large, due to fear of sickness. He further suggests that this may have been a factor in abandonments prior to the final one. If this were so, when people left the valley floors for higher altitudes they may have tried to recreate land suitable for the cultivation of wet taro in primary forest and hillslope environments. Thus hillslope irrigation of taro could have been a more important and widespread component of highlands agricultural systems before
the introduction of sweet potato (Gorecki 1979a:119). Simple flooding may thus be a highlands innovation albeit an ancient one. It is only found within the area of the Trans-New Guinea Phylum of Papuan languages, and an antiquity of more than six thousand years is possible (cf. Gorecki 1979b). On this basis it could be predicted that irrigation techniques in the Damal area of the West Irian highlands (Ellenberger 1962) and perhaps also those reported from near Lake Sentani (Moolenburgh 1904:180) would be of the simple flooding type.

Corrugation or furrow irrigation has been reported only from Aneityum in Vanuatu (see Spriggs 1980, for photograph) and would seem to be a local adaptation. The soils on Aneityum are generally of very poor fertility and unstable and thus prone to erosion. Modern furrow irrigation is generally used in areas where the land surface is moderately steep and irregular, and on fine-textured soils. It ensures uniform wetting and limits erosion on steep lands (Cantor 1967:33).

This leaves us with pondfield techniques, whose distribution reveals some suggestive patterns when compared to linguistic groupings. It has already been noted that simple flooding techniques are found only among speakers of languages within the Trans-New Guinea Phylum of Papuan languages. There is an equally strong association of pondfield irrigation with the distribution of Oceanic Austronesian languages. There is a total absence of pondfield irrigation techniques from the island of New Guinea and other parts of Melanesia where non-Oceanic languages are spoken. There is in particular a significant relation between pondfield irrigation and areas where the East Oceanic languages, forming a major sub-group within Oceanic, are spoken. These areas are Polynesia, Fiji, North and Central Vanuatu, Nuclear Micronesia and possibly the southeast Solomons.

As already mentioned, pondfield systems are widespread in Polynesia and Fiji. In Vanuatu they occur only in areas of one out of six sub-groups of the Vanuatu languages, Central and North Vanuatuan, and this is the one sub-group that is within East Oceanic (Tryon 1977, and this volume). Thus, while pondfields are common in West and Central Santo, they are not found in East Santo, the languages of which are not East Oceanic. From the southeast Solomons we have the report of the Spanish explorers of pondfields from Guadalcanal, possibly an East Oceanic area. In Micronesia, pondfield taro systems are known from Ponape in the Eastern Carolines (Ayres 1978; Ayres et al. 1979:110), again an East Oceanic area and also from Palau (McKnight and Obak 1960). Palauan is a non-Oceanic Austronesian sub-family, more related to northeast Indonesian and Philippine languages. The association of pondfields with Eastern Oceanic languages in Melanesia is complicated by the presence of pondfield systems in New Caledonia, on New Georgia, Rendova and Kolombangara in the Solomons, and on Mussau north of New Ireland, all areas of different Oceanic language sub-groups.

The majority of linguists see the Oceanic languages as being descended from a single ancestral language community which entered northwest Melanesia from eastern Indonesia (Pawley and Green 1973, but see Tryon, this conference) and so perhaps the origins of pondfield irrigation in the Pacific lie in island Southeast Asia. Yen (1973a:83) has previously suggested that the Melanesia-Polynesia border region was a centre for the development of irrigation technology independent of Southeast Asian developments. This suggestion was based on the supposed lack of irrigation
from the New Guinea area but the distribution of methods of true irrigation are now seen to be much wider than Yen had supposed. Certain irrigation techniques may well have developed independently in New Guinea or island Melanesia, but the similarity in pondfield morphology and techniques between Oceania and island Southeast Asia suggests a common origin.

In Southeast Asia, pondfield systems are most commonly used for the growing of rice but there are examples of taro being grown in pondfields either as an intercrop with rice or as a monocrop. In Southwest Sulawesi pondfields planted solely to taro are found among the ricefields (Ian Glover, personal communication). In the northern Phillipines taro is sometimes intercropped with rice in the pondfields or planted on its own in small flooded plots (Conklin 1974; 1980). Taro is also planted in pondfields in Java (Ochse 1977:55) while on Botel Tobago, an island between the Philippines and Taiwan, large-scale pondfield systems are found and rice is absent (Kano and Segawa 1956). Pondfield systems for taro probably also occur elsewhere in island Southeast Asia.

If one were to postulate a movement of pondfield users from the Philippines/Indonesia area, through the Solomons, Northern Vanuatu, Fiji and into Polynesia one would have to ask why the plant involved was taro and not rice. The most parsimonious explanation would be that rice as a crop in pondfields in the Philippines/Indonesian area is a late development postdating the presumed dispersal of Oceanic speakers about five thousand years ago (Pawley and Green 1973; Tryon, this volume) (cf. the discussion in Chang 1970:183). Rice may well have replaced taro as a staple there because of ease of storage and transport, making it a convenient form of tribute in expanding polities. Taro does not generally store for any length of time once it has been harvested. Godelier (1977:194) has noted just such a situation in South America where in its conquered territories the Inca State encouraged an expansion of maize agriculture for tribute rather than the traditional tuber staples. Maize, like rice, is a plant easily stored and transported.

All of these linguistic (and by extension cultural) correlations are perhaps far-sought and on a level with Riesenfeld's Megalithic Cultures of Melanesia (1951) or even perhaps hark back to Perry's Children of the Sun (1923) and other extreme diffusionist extravaganzas. They will remain so unless direct dating evidence from archaeological investigations is forthcoming. At present such evidence is sparse. One problem is that once pondfield or island bed systems are constructed they are usually permanent features unless buried in landslides or by flood deposition. The soil in them is constantly being turned over and mixed and although charcoal for radiocarbon dating can be found in them, the material which is dated will often only belong to the latest period of use. Simple flooding techniques, with their minimal alteration of soil or slope and often fed by bamboo pipelines, may well be archaeologically invisible and therefore of course undatable.

The use of swamplands for agriculture in the New Guinea highlands has been dated to nine thousand years ago, or more certainly six thousand years ago, when the swampland equivalents of island bed systems were in use (Golson 1977). Archaeologists have until recently tended to ignore agricultural remains, partly because of a focus on obtaining basic artefactual sequences and partly because of a lack of suitable
methodologies for examining such remains. This is now changing, much of the initial work being done in Polynesia. In various locations in Hawaii pondfield systems have been found buried by alluvial deposits. The earliest are dated to about seven hundred years ago (Green 1980) but this is unlikely to date the initial use of irrigation systems in those islands. Kirch (1975 and 1976) examined buried pondfield systems on East Futuna (Huorn and Wallis Islands) and suggests an association of pondfield agriculture with the earliest Lapita settlers in the latter half of the first millenium BC on the basis of site location in relation to early occupation sites. Direct dating evidence, however only exists for the last four hundred or so years. On Kolombangara in the Solomons, Yen (1973b:40) obtained a date of AD1720 ± 90 years for what was judged as close to the early level of agricultural use of one pondfield terrace. On Aneityum there are considerable problems in locating early sites. The northern coastal plain where many of the largest irrigation systems were located is a very recent product of man-induced erosion of the hillsides and so early systems may be very deeply buried. Thus we have no firm dates for irrigation there more than a few hundred years old. As far as I am aware, no attempts have yet been made to date canal-fed systems in Fiji, New Caledonia or New Guinea.

It is perhaps time to abandon speculation and move on from examining why they were where they were, when they were there, and where they were before they were there, to consider why they aren't there anymore.

We have seen that highly productive traditional irrigation technologies have been used in the past in Melanesia and yet in many areas there has been a marked decline or even total cessation of these very productive strategies over the last hundred years. The reasons are many but include substantial population decline through European diseases, and more recently, local population disruptions because of migration to urban areas or to work on plantations. The general change in the region to an increasing reliance on cash crops such as coconuts, cocoa, tea, etc., has competed directly with traditional agricultural pursuits for land and labour. In some areas alienation or outright seizure of land by European interests has been important. The breakdown or transformation of traditional patterns of leadership, which may have had a role in the organization of intensive agricultural systems may also have been important. In Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands in particular taro disease problems have been significant.

Do these traditional systems of management and manipulation of freshwater resources have a future in Melanesia and the Pacific? Agronomists in the Pacific region have been lamentably slow to realize the extent of such systems or the fund of technical expertise and environmental knowledge embodied in their operation, as I have pointed out elsewhere (Spriggs 1980). The need for basic agronomic research on traditional water-aided agricultural systems in Melanesia cannot be overstressed. Irrigation to alleviate seasonal crop shortfall could be a partial solution to some of the food problems experienced in Melanesia and it is likely that traditional techniques adapted to the region and conceived at an appropriate level of technology will be more useful than any imported technologies might be.
There are encouraging signs that in some areas of the Pacific traditional irrigation and wetland agricultural techniques are picking up again. On Kolombangara in the Solomon Islands, pondfield systems unused since World War II are being brought back into commission (Miller 1979:148). In the Cook Islands there are plans to encourage greater production of wet taro for export to New Zealand. I will give an example of this kind of project which may have wider relevance. It comes from my work for the Vanuatu Department of Agriculture on Aneityum Island where an aid project has recently been started to encourage the growing of wet taro for supplying urban and possibly export markets using traditional methods such as canal-fed corrugation irrigation and swampland island bed systems.

In 1978 and 1979 I was engaged in field research examining prehistoric remains and traditional irrigation technologies on Aneityum. As I have already mentioned the island is covered with the remains of ancient irrigation and wetland systems in the form of a permanent infrastructure of stone-faced terraces, canals, and ditched swamps (Spriggs 1979 and 1980). The techniques were only known to the older inhabitants of the island, and although several swampland systems were in use in 1979 only one very small canal-fed system was in operation and so there was a very real danger of these highly productive techniques being lost. Following European contact the population was decimated by disease and the population decreased from nearly 4000 people in 1854 (after two previous epidemics of unknown mortality) to below 200 people by the late 1930s. The population has risen since this low point and now stands at about 460 people. The aim of the pilot project is to give the initial 'push' to the development of taro as a cash crop and to ensure that the younger generation has a chance to learn the traditional techniques for its production. Project funding is available for two years to provide money for paying people to undertake the major initial tasks such as dam and canal reconstruction, forest clearance and the cleaning of swamp ditches. Tools such as crowbars, spades, forks, pickaxes, etc., have been provided and the Government has undertaken to arrange the marketing of the taro. Why do people need this initial 'push' and cash incentive? One important reason is the decline in the power of the chiefs as organizers of the labour force. They can no longer command people to turn out for communal labour as in the past. Although the people are genuinely interested in growing taro as a cash crop, they would not invest time and effort in such labour-intensive tasks as digging canals for two main reasons: firstly most people on the island had never made the canals before and were sceptical that they could complete the task. When paid, they would at least attempt the task and thus realized the comparative ease with which such work could be accomplished. Secondly, without help in finding a market they felt that any taro they produced they would not be able to find a market for. There was thus a vicious circle to be broken. Many people had no faith that the canals could be brought back into operation, and the chiefs and old men who had made such canals in the past no longer had the power to coerce the community to help them in redigging them. Paying for the initial heavy reconstruction tasks has broken this circle. The people do not have the required expertise in negotiating for buyers and ships to transport their produce, hence, they were discouraged from planting. On the other hand commercial buyers could see no evidence that sufficient quantities of taro were being or could be produced and so had not come forward to negotiate for the purchase of taro that had not yet been planted. Government help in their field has again been crucial in getting the project going.
The project was only initiated in August 1980 and so comments on its degree of success are perhaps premature. At the first of the three population centres on the island work started immediately, and regularly over thirty men, women and children turned out every day to work. A canal over half a kilometre long was repaired, and the first fifty metres of its course and the take-off dam were rebuilt, having been completely washed away. There is no-one now living who has ever seen this particular canal-fed system in use, and it has lain dormant for the last one hundred years. Under the dense forest however the subsidiary stone-lined channels, terraces and beds remained. A large area of forest was cut and will be left to dry for a few months before being burnt off and planted.

In the same area, directly behind the main village, is a large swamp behind a sandbar of consolidated beach rock. This was never traditionally used to grow taro because there was no outflow and so the water level in the swamp could not be regulated. Just before World War II a timber company then operating on the island employed the people (using metal tools) to cut a channel through the sandbar and dig drainage channels within the swamp for controlling mosquitoes. Since that time the drains have been allowed to silt up. Areas on the edge of the swamp have been used since then to grow taro; results are encouraging, but the uncontrolled water levels have prevented extension of planting into the middle of the swamp. As part of the aid project, money was provided to clear the swamp channels and outflow and to plant experimentally some island beds in the middle of the swamp to assess whether the whole swamp (over five hectares in extent) can be brought into production. Traditional techniques (albeit with metal tools) have been used throughout as well as community organized labour, representing an extension to a new location of traditional swamp management practices. Elsewhere on the island, other previously ditched swamps and former canal-fed systems are also being brought back into production. The return for labour appears very good and I see no reason why in such circumstances traditional techniques and traditional organization at the village level cannot be utilized successfully in cash cropping.

In the past, government agricultural officers have almost completely ignored these highly productive agricultural techniques. There is a degree of ethnocentric bias and paternalism involved here, a view that 'development' is something people undergo in a passive manner, something they accede to, a package they are handed rather than a process which their own traditional knowledge and expertise can inform. One reason for the great danger we face that this expertise may soon become lost, is precisely because governments have consistently undervalued and ignored this traditional knowledge with the result that the people themselves have come to undervalue it as well, and have come to believe in their passive role. It is perhaps not they but the agricultural officers and planners who need to adopt a more humble and unaccustomed role, and learn from this expertise. They will then find out, as pointed out to me by a very old Aneityumese man when water started to flow again along an old canal never used even in his lifetime, 'those old fellahs knew a thing or two'.
IRRIGATION IN MELANESIA

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DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

Subsistence and Cash Cropping

Changes in subsistence cropping

R. GERARD WARD

Plantations and the plantation mode of production

D. EVANS

The introduction of cash cropping to the Western Highlands: some evidence from Enga

R. LACEY
Production for their own consumption forms a large part of the output of most Melanesian farm households. The actual proportion varies from virtually 100 per cent in a few isolated areas or on individual farms, to almost zero on specialized holdings oriented to export production. Yet even where the 'subsistence' component remains dominant, the farming systems have almost always been modified in important ways. Many of these modifications are related to changes in the valuation of time (by the farmers or others who now control time allocation), land, and different types of produce. These, in turn, are closely linked to the incorporation of cash cropping into the agricultural systems and to the availability of alternative means of support, such as wage employment in rural or urban areas. Other changes, such as the replacement of taro by sweet potato in the Solomon Islands and Bougainville, result largely from the spread of plant disease.

Other papers in this volume (e.g. Yen, Golson, Spriggs) have demonstrated the great genetic, environmental and technical diversity of agriculture in Melanesia in the pre-contact and early contact periods. This paper tells of decline in that diversity. Diversity in agricultural systems has great advantages in dominantly self-sufficient economies such as those of pre-contact Melanesia. Planting of a wide variety of crops (and of varieties within one species) provides means of spreading production over an extended harvest season; of insurance against fungal or viral disease; of countering seasonality or unreliability in temperature or moisture conditions; and, generally, of creating a robust agriculture. Once self-sufficiency ceases to be a prime goal, specialization to meet the requirements of outside markets becomes an increasingly important organizing principle, the consequences of which flow back through the whole system. Thus, a basic theme of this paper is that as Melanesian communities became less self-sufficient, the degree of diversity in their agricultural systems declined.

THE NEW CONTEXT OF SUBSISTENCE PRODUCTION

The essential aspects of post-contact change are well known. Explorers, whalers, sandalwood and bêche-de-mer collectors, traders, planters or administrators sought supplies of root crops or meat for their crews or staff. By their preferences they gave new values to some products but not to others. They provided new tools and other goods as barter for the produce which, in the main, had hitherto only met local subsistence or
social demands. Salisbury (1962:108-109) has argued that the change from
stone to steel tools in Siame reduced the labour requirements of
subsistence from 80 to 50 per cent of a man's activity time. This may be
too generous an estimate but there is no doubt that the effect was marked
despite the fact that the adoption of new tools was selective. Fijians,
for example, fitted their digging sticks with an iron blade, but the
European spade was less popular because 'it cannot, without pain, be driven
into the ground with the bare foot' (Thomson 1908:339). Other new
materials were also adopted, such as corrugated iron troughs in place of
pipes of hollow tree-fern trunks for taro irrigation in Fiji (Thomson
1908:339). The availability of cotton cloth, reduced the importance of
paper mulberry, the source of tapa, as a crop. Manufactured building and
other materials have replaced the products of local plants. The purchase
of such materials obviously has entailed some redirection of labour and has
displaced local production.

The employment of Melanesians on ships, at mission stations or on
plantations both removed some of the agricultural workforce and brought
familiarity with new forms of labour mobilization and reward which were
disruptive of former systems. In Fiji, commoners were reported unwilling
to plant food gardens for native officials and Roko Tui Kadavu complained
that 'young men ... steal off to Suva, or elsewhere when ordered to meet
for housebuilding and remain away until the time for such work is over.
During [their] absence they support themselves by work on the wharves or
any chance labour, and when they return they bring with them enough money
to pay the fine' (Jackson to Chamberlain, Cd2240, 1905:446-447).

Cash crops and wage labour provided the means for purchasing new
foods. Experience on plantations where rice and tinned meat were often the
main foods provided for labourers helped, in time, to change tastes and
alter the status of indigenous food crops. Thomson (1908:338) notes that
in Fiji about the turn of the century, 'Preserved meats, biscuits, bread,
tea and sugar are used by many of the richer natives, but always as
luxuries'. They attributed their teeth decay to the sugar, and 'it was
lately possible for an American dentist to realize a considerable sum by
selling sets of false teeth to the native chiefs' (Thomson 1908:338). Such
statements are equally true elsewhere in Melanesia seventy years later but
tend to underestimate the social and economic advantages of foods such as
rice, tinned meat or fish and flour. Ease of preparation, storage
qualities and often lower cost per unit of kilo/calories or grams of
protein or fat (McGee et al. 1980:254) give advantages to such foods over
traditional root crops in many situations.

The newcomers brought new animals and crops. Captain Eagleston
brought the first cattle to Fiji from Tahiti in 1834 (Eagleston
unpub.:29). By that date goats had already been introduced. Pumpkins and
pineapples were being grown by Fijians in Vanua Levu in 1809 (Davies
1925:145). Cassava was introduced before 1860 and, although it was 'not
much relished in Fiji' (Horne 1881:87), within a few years it was
increasing in importance relative to yams as it required less labour inputs
(McGregor to Thurston, C5039, 1887:203). Cassava continued to spread
throughout Melanesia and a century later it was being grown in Enga
Province, Papua New Guinea (Lea unpub.; see also Thaman and Thomas 1980).
In addition a range of 'European' vegetables was introduced and these were
incorporated into subsistence systems. Cabbages, for example, were
reported in interior Viti Levu by Horne (1881:87) and by the late 1970s the Kalam of the remote Simbai area of Madang Province had incorporated pumpkin, cabbage, potatoes, beans and choko foliage into their subsistence system (Bulmer 1980a). Other introductions may have been less obvious to outsiders but today Fiji calls Xanthosoma, dalo ni tana (Tannese taro) while in Vanuatu it is taro Fiji! Melanesian travellers, whether indentured labourers, seamen or, later, individual migrants, actively spread varieties of root and other food crops around the region as mobility became easier.

Cash crops, and especially tree crops, promoted by missions or governments, or adopted following the example of plantations, were also integrated into Melanesian agricultural systems in addition to the traditional crops now also grown for sale. As Lea points out, 'It is becoming increasingly difficult to say what is cash and what is subsistence. All subsistence crops [in Enga Province], including most European vegetables may be sold in local markets' (Lea unpub.). In Fiji, German New Guinea and Papua, government policy required the planting of cash crops by Melanesians. Their impact on the subsistence food component of the agricultural systems was often much more wide-ranging than expected. Bonnemaison (1978:32) reports Melanesians in Vanuatu as saying, 'We abandoned the rod blong kastom for the rod blong mane - that of the whites. Thus one day we killed our pigs and made fewer gardens, and instead we planted coconut palms'. Even when the tree cash crops were not grown on any significant scale by the Melanesians themselves, sale of land to (or dispossession by) European planters who did grow them, meant a reduction of land area for Melanesian food gardening. Furthermore, land could now be used to earn cash (via sales, rental or agricultural production) and thus acquired new forms of value which placed new stresses on older systems of allocation and use.

Missions and governments established points of conversion and control to which some Melanesians were attracted. Others were forced to relocate, as in the Sigatoka Valley of Fiji after the 'Little War' of 1876 when, 'orders were given that those of the towns which had been burnt which were situated on hills or in positions difficult of access should not be rebuilt, but that the reconstruction of those on the low grounds should be at once commenced' (Gordon to Carnarvon, C1826, 1877:220). The colonial governments of most Melanesian countries encouraged or forced people to move into larger and more permanent villages. Such moves were sometimes designed to ease accessibility for government control or collection of cash crops, but made access to certain types of land or resources more difficult and time-consuming for subsistence use. The consequent concentration of people on a smaller proportion of total land increased gardening pressure on some areas, leading to reduced fallow, greater use of those crops which are less demanding in terms of soil quality, and in some cases obvious erosion. Urbanization has increased gardening pressure around many Melanesian towns with evident impoverishment of the land and its covers.

LABOUR

Locational change made maintenance of diversity more difficult for some Melanesians. At the same time decline in the available workforce resulting from selective migration for paid employment or from rising death
rates stemming from new diseases, altered the man-land ratios of many villages and made retention of the full range of traditional foodstuff more difficult. Parallel with this, of course, the change from a relatively closed to a relatively open economic system made such retention less essential for village sustenance.

In most Melanesian societies, labour was relatively unspecialized. Although division of labour occurred (including a very important sexual division in many agricultural tasks), in the main each adult took some part in gardening, housebuilding, ceremony, manufacture of artifacts and other activities. Through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries new activities were added and some old ones became more, or less, important. Crafts, such as stone tool or pottery manufacture, largely disappeared and their products were replaced by bought goods, paid for by different forms of labour. Local defence requirements generally absorbed much less of men's time than formerly, but work for government or mission was added and, above all, cash cropping or wage labour became standard periodic or permanent activities. Throughout the 'more developed' parts of Melanesia the net result was a withdrawal of male labour from subsistence activities. Sometimes this was selective, sometimes total. The relative importance of the contribution of women in subsistence increased, but for social reasons women were not always able to replace all the labour inputs of men. This non-substitutability of labour is an important element in the decline of some agricultural systems and in changes in crop choice.

THE CHANGES

The diversion of labour to new tasks, the lightening of tasks through the use of new tools and the ability to mobilize labour through the use of new tools, and the ability to mobilize labour through the cash system as an alternative to the kinship system, have meant that tasks which formerly were performed by larger units in the society are now performed by smaller units (for example the nuclear family or household) or by individuals (Ward 1964:486). When associated with the opportunity to purchase a proportion of subsistence needs, this change opens the way for specialization in agriculture at the household or individual level. It also opens the way for individuals to opt out of communal obligations whose demands were often irregular and in conflict with the imperatives of commercial activity, and to seek alternative, often individual, routes to greater wealth or status.

The detail of the resulting changes in subsistence agriculture systems varies greatly from place to place and what follows is a very generalized description. Brookfield (1972:38) argues that Pacific agricultural systems embodied three forms of production - 'production for use', or 'the satisfaction of basic needs'; 'social production' for use in presentation, ceremony and ritual; and 'trade production' for barter and exchange. The latter 'may be indistinguishable from social production in many societies'. The social production element was often the first to decline. Missionaries discouraged it, governments regarded it as wasteful, and Melanesians turned to cash as an alternative more amenable to new patterns of time allocation. Thus some food crop production could be replaced without immediate loss of daily food supplies (Lea 1967). In the Abelam area of the East Sepik Province long ceremonial yams are grown in special gardens and although 'not important in terms of diet' they were the basis for acquiring fame and
leadership. Since the early 1960s less time and attention is devoted to ceremonial yams which may no longer be accorded separate gardens (Lea 1972:267-269). Bonnemaison (1978:28) points out that in Vanuatu the ceremonial crops of taro and yams were viewed as having a hierarchy of status and each of the eighty odd varieties of taro and fifty to eighty varieties of yam recognized had a particular 'cultural weighting'. Generally the fleshiest varieties 'with the greatest growth potential are accorded the highest place in the traditional classification, and are thus planted in the best parts of the garden'. With rice, tinned meat or cash supplanting traditional goods in prestation, these larger varieties are now grown less frequently. Similar changes can be documented in every Melanesian country.

Brookfield (1972:41), quoting Allen (1968) and Bonnemaison (1970), describes how in part of Aoba, Vanuatu, coconuts were used to feed specially-bred tusked pigs which were kept in walled enclosures. The enclosures, heavily fertilized by the pigs, were then used to grow yams, the staple crop. With mission disapproval of the pig ritual and encouragement of coconut production for copra, the food source was diverted, and the social production - and much of the subsistence production - collapsed.

If some labour is diverted from subsistence gardening, adjustments will be made in the allocation of the remainder so as to maximize returns. Those crops which demand more labour at key phases in their growth cycle, or which are cultivated for secondary needs which can be filled more readily by substituting bought foods, will be dropped or cultivated in smaller quantities. Where men have withdrawn from subsistence agriculture the clearing of forest becomes more difficult for the community. Crops such as yams or (to a lesser extent) taro, which prefer the higher fertility and better soil structure of newly cleared land, tend to be replaced by those, such as sweet potato or cassava, which will continue to provide reasonable yields from more depleted soils and which allow the life of swidden gardens to be extended. Reduced labour supply may also be a cause of the widespread abandonment of irrigated taro cultivation. For example, the irrigated terraces of Saliadrau, Viti Levu, were damaged by flood and abandoned in about 1930. In 1957 villagers recalled that the amount of labour involved in terrace reconstruction and maintenance was too great in proportion to the return, in comparison with dry taro cultivation, which had lower male labour inputs. In New Caledonia the large yams and taro beds are now rarely made. Barrau (1958:84-86) points out that the coffee harvest of western New Caledonia clashed with the time for building the yam ridges and by the 1950s yams were planted later and with less care than formerly, and Xanthosoma and bananas became relatively more important. Lea suggests that taro cultivation in general in Enga is falling out of fashion because it is a male crop and men 'prefer diversions such as politics, card playing and modern sector activities while women do most of the routine gardening work (Lea unpub.). As Yen (1974:132) points out 'the elaborate adaptive technology of cropping, in giving way to other values, takes on an aspect of a much more elemental agriculture'. Similarly, techniques for processing foodstuffs which require relatively large amounts of labour are now used less frequently. These include sago preparation in Papua New Guinea, the fermentation of starchy crops, and the prolonged washing of wild yams in order to remove toxicity.
The change to the 'rod bong mane' and the planting of coconuts (or coffee, cacao, bananas and other cash crops) also required reallocation of land. Throughout Melanesia, land which formerly carried root and other food crops has been planted in permanent or semi-permanent cash crops or devoted to cattle pasture. Although there is sometimes intercultivation, food crop gardens are often displaced to areas more distant from the farmer's residence.

Smallholders rarely establish commercial tree crops on newly cleared forest land, but rather on former food garden land. In a sense this extends the life of the swidden indefinitely - though it then ceases to be a swidden. Such land can no longer be recycled after fallow into food crops and the tendency is to force food crop gardens further from the village. As food gardens must be visited frequently, the increased travel time is a common source of complaint, and a burden which falls disproportionately on women. The cash crops and cattle, frequently male preserves, gain locational advantages. The importance of 'travel', much of which is to and from gardens, is illustrated by average figures for activities for five Papua New Guinea villages. Of 8.9 and 9.2 hours per day devoted to socio-economic activities by males and females respectively, 2.5 and 2.9 hours were taken up by 'travel' (Lea 1969-70, and unpub.). Any increase in this share clearly cuts into other time requirements. Grossman (1979) has described the cycle which emerged in the Eastern Highlands of Papua New Guinea. Cattle pastures are located close to the village; the food gardens are moved further away; the women are reluctant to visit gardens as often as in the past because of distance and the increased risk of sorcery in places far from the village; they weed less frequently and men repair fences less frequently; yields fall and loss of tubers to feral pigs increases; food supply becomes less assured and dependence on cash increases. Similar effects have been documented from Fiji and the Solomons, as well as elsewhere in the Pacific and these locational changes obviously accentuate the trends ascribed earlier to changing labour conditions.

The introduction of permanent cash crops also causes other changes in the land allocation. One of the great advantages of swidden cultivation with mixed species gardens is that a very wide range of soils and slopes can be used. Steep slopes, where freshly weathered material lies close to the surface, are often very productive, provided they are cultivated for only a short time and quickly returned to bush fallow. But they may not stand up to continuous use for permanent arable or tree cash crops. Thus, the major cash crops tend to be much more specific in their site requirements and land which can be used under a long-fallow swidden system may not be suitable for commercial crops. Furthermore, the permanent commercial crops may require the best land if productivity is to be maintained over the life of the crops. The subsistence component is thus again pushed aside in terms of land quality as well as location, and the range of gardening environments which is used is narrowed.

A similar relocation often stems from the access requirements of the commercial crops. Although the coastal location of coconut groves is partly due to the environmental requirements of the palm, it is also related to the need for ready access to beach or other loading points, or to roads. What Brookfield (1978:71) has called the 'coconut overlay' has covered much of the coastal alluvial plains of Melanesia and occupied
CHANGES IN SUBSISTENCE CROPPING

former food garden land. Thus the processes of concentration which in early years were fostered by missions and governments have continued as a response to monetary sector opportunities and today, even in remote parts of Papua New Guinea (e.g. in Simbai, Bulmer 1980a), concentration of population is leading to pressure, from both cash and food crops, on the soils around settlements. Access to the outer world increases the value of and pressure on some areas; lack of access has the opposite effect.

Two other features of land allocation may also be mentioned. When diversity is sought, and when mixed-crop swiddens are used, there is advantage for a household in having several swiddens of varying age scattered on different soils. Once the crop range is narrowed, and especially when it is restricted to one commercial crop, a fragmented holding becomes a disadvantage. Advantage now lies in concentrating on the best available soils, minimizing travel time between plots, having a consolidated holding, and sometimes in living on the plot rather than in the village (see Ward 1964; Frazer 1964). The process of change towards consolidation of holdings is quite advanced in parts of Fiji and will undoubtedly continue elsewhere in Melanesia.

The second change stems from the new value which land acquires once it can be used for cash cropping (or for leasing). A study conducted twenty years ago in three villages in Fiji shows that in the least commercialized village land was still allocated in a very flexible manner and registered title bore little relation to use. In the most commercialized village 'the would-be farmer ... [could] no longer ... obtain free use of the unused land of another i tokatoka' and, even though some villagers needed land for food gardens, land lay idle because the traditional system of allocation had broken down (Ward 1960:54). The process of change in land tenure arrangements has gone on very rapidly in Fiji since that time but always towards systems suited to commercial rather than subsistence agriculture.

The access to the outside world which is a prerequisite for commercial agriculture is usually assumed to be essential for 'development'. Yet better access is not an unmixed blessing. In the case of subsistence agriculture the spread of taro blight through much of the Solomon Islands and island Papua New Guinea since 1945 (Connell 1978), and the recent introduction of plant diseases of taro (both Colocasia and Xanthosoma), pit pit (Saccharum edule), sugarcane, and sweet potato in the Keironk and Asai valleys (Bulmer 1980b), probably stem from breakdown of the natural quarantine which isolation, insularity, or ritual prohibitions (Bulmer 1980b:5) formerly provided. A mix of costs and benefits is also evident when easier access allows communities to obtain new forms of insurance against environmental risk. Damaging hurricanes in Fiji, the Solomons or Vanuatu, earthquakes and landslips in the Solomons, and drought and frost in Papua New Guinea have all been followed by large amounts of foreign aid for immediate and longer term relief. The disadvantages of this form of insurance are less obvious but no less real. In earlier times the community carried its own insurance in the form of maintenance of crops such as Alopecosia and Cyrtosperma whose tubers would withstand storm damage and keep in the ground for long periods, the cultivation of varieties with a degree of frost or drought resistance, and by detailed knowledge of wild foods which might be gathered in times of hardship. The loss of such knowledge, and even of plant varieties, when reliance is placed on external aid may be irreversible and is one contributor to the decline in diversity
in subsistence systems and to increasing dependency (Waddell 1975). Brookfield and Hart (1971:209, 262) have argued that Melanesian agriculturalists are essentially risk minimizers. One key element of the strategy was to maintain diversity in agriculture. When the risks are insured against from outside, diversity ceases to be so necessary.

The adoption of new tools by Melanesians has been mentioned above. Initially this was usually selective and involved relatively simple substitutions. The consequent changes in agricultural systems were usually minor although metal spades made cultivation of sod-bound grassland (itself often a product of earlier cultivation and subsequent repeated burning) easier than with digging sticks and hands. More important changes are now occurring with the greater use of mechanization, or even with ploughing using animal power. With hand cultivation of multi-crop gardens, variation in size or variety of planting material matters little. Ploughing to a uniform depth and planting in rows, techniques which are now used in food gardens in some places in Melanesia, make uniformity in planting material desirable. Harvesting by any mechanical means makes this even more necessary. Thus new criteria for selection of planting material are introduced and the whole tendency is away from diversity, towards uniformity. Food production in other regions has long since followed this route and it seems inevitable that it will be followed to some degree in Melanesia (Yen 1980:215-220).

The imperatives of marketing have parallel effects. Export markets in particular impose uniformity of product size, quality, shape, maturity and other characteristics as desiderata for produce, but the same requirements are emerging in local markets. In mixed subsistence-cash systems the market component is often grown in the same gardens as that destined for home consumption and the requirements of the former will inevitably affect the latter. Selection for the characteristics required for the market tends to narrow the crop range and variety range in food gardens. Brookfield notes that on Lakeba older taro varieties have been abandoned and three of the varieties now common are from Samoa and are amongst the most popular commercial varieties (UNESCO/UNFPA 1977:157). Bathgate (1978:12-14) points out that of two villages studied in western Guadalcanal, that which concentrates more strongly on production for the market now grows only four traditional crops compared with the eight still cultivated in the less commercially-oriented village. This pattern appears to be widespread elsewhere in Melanesia.

In many parts of Melanesia today the subsistence component of the mixed subsistence-cash crop mode of production is in a precarious state. In general, pressures are towards greater cash crop production. Yet, although the need to maintain subsistence production on oil palm, rubber, coconut or coffee smallholdings is often stressed in official documents, the reality is that malnutrition in rural Melanesia is sometimes worst on these planned commercial smallholdings (Ward and Hau'ofa 1980:39-44). There are calls for improving the subsistence component, which, by many measures, is now a depleted version of that which was practised a century ago. Whether the changes are reversible, or whether it is desirable to reverse them, remain open questions, the answers to which lie deep in the broader issue of what type of society and economy Melanesians wish to have in the future. If the answer is increasing involvement in the outside world, then the decline in diversity will continue. If greater insulation
from the outside were to be sought then some of the older diversity could still be regained.

NOTES

1 It is important to note that the commonly made distinction between the subsistence and commercial elements in Melanesian smallholder agriculture is far from clear. Indeed it is now an artificial distinction. The same crops may be grown for own consumption as for sale; the produce actually sold may have been originally intended for own consumption, or vice versa; the same techniques and land may be used for both components. In most cases the present smallholder systems must be regarded as 'mixed subsistence-cash cropping systems' (Yen 1980:73).

2 In his journal Captain J.H. Eagleston (unpub.) describes how he arrived at Rewa on 22 September 1834, from Tahiti, with the chief Cokanauto ('Phillips') on board. 'The cattle are now the great attraction and wonder of all and as I had presented two to Phillips many kind expressions of gratitude were expressed by all for my generous gift to Raver [Rewa]. Having some little difficulty in expressing name of each to the natives I classed the two in one and called them "Bula ma Coro" which was very readily taken up by the natives whose curiosity was centered on the strange and wonderful Tie Papalonge Bula ma Cow. ... [Phillips went ashore in a suit and sword] to craze the heads of all Raver with the sight and landing of first Bula ma Cow ever introduced among the Fijis'. Presumably this is the origin of the word bulmakau in Melanesian pidgin.

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PLANTATIONS AND THE PLANTATION MODE OF PRODUCTION

D. Evans

INTRODUCTION

Agriculture has traditionally been a major source of foreign exchange earnings in Melanesia. In recent years copper in Papua New Guinea, tourism in Fiji, and timber and fisheries in the Solomons have assumed greater importance, but agriculture still contributes significantly to exports. In 1976/77, it accounted for more than 58 per cent of exports from Papua New Guinea, although it had fallen to as low as 20 per cent with the high copper prices of 1973 (Densley 1978a). Sugar provided over 69 per cent of primary exports from Fiji in 1979 (Fiji Bureau of Statistics 1980), and farm produce comprised almost 50 per cent of exports from the Solomons in 1978 (Solomon Islands National Development Plan 1980–84).

Because of the importance of agriculture to Melanesian economies, governments are constantly looking to expand this sector. A second reason for expansion is that agriculture has been seen as a major vehicle for increasing indigenous participation in the cash economy. However because there is continual pressure from competitors on the world market for agricultural products, it is necessary to ensure that any extra output is produced efficiently. In the first part of this paper, consideration is given briefly to the types of developments that are likely in the agricultural sector in Melanesia. What has been termed the 'plantation mode of production' seems to be gaining popularity, and attention is focused on some of the economic aspects of this system in the remainder of the paper.

PLANTATIONS

Commercial agriculture in Melanesia began largely under plantation production. The dominance of the plantation sector has declined in recent years to the extent that it provided only about 50 per cent of the agricultural exports of Papua New Guinea in 1976/77 (Densley 1978a) and 60 per cent of those of the Solomons in 1978 (National Development Plan 1980–84). In Fiji cane production on plantations was replaced by a smallholder system beginning in the 1920s (Gillion 1977); today only about 2 per cent of cane is produced on estates.

Only in the Solomons does large scale commercial agriculture with little local participation in decision making appear to be part of national development plans. There, the latest development plan stressed the need to 'encourage development of viable, large scale commercial agricultural
activities'. Three such enterprises currently are operating - with rice, oil palm, and coconuts/cattle/cocoa - and although they are theoretically joint ventures between expatriate firms and the government, they appear to be very similar to the old plantations. Farming decisions seem to be made by the expatriate firm on a commercial basis and the local residents are not involved in the decision process.

In Papua New Guinea and Fiji this type of development does not figure highly in national plans. In Papua New Guinea there are doubts about the economic viability of plantations (Densley and Wheeler 1978; Wheeler et al. 1978) especially since the large increases in statutory minimum rural wage rates (Wheeler 1978). Gordon (1976) in fact argues that viability of the plantation system required colonialism and will not survive in its absence. In neither country is it politically feasible to encourage more expatriate dominated plantation agriculture (Connell 1979; Yen 1980). Even in the Solomons the government is stressing the need for increased smallholder production and the development of communal estates. It appears therefore that traditional plantations will play but a small role in the future agricultural development of Melanesia.

THE PLANTATION MODE

A number of possible alternatives to plantation production can be considered. Most involve smallholder production. However, large scale production of the Solomons variety, and communal estates, are other possibilities. Smallholder production can occur with only limited outside help, as it evolved in many areas of Papua New Guinea for example, or with extensive services provided. Examples of the latter system are sugar production in Fiji and nuclear estate developments such as the Hoskins oil palm project in Papua New Guinea.

Initially after independence Melanesian governments chose to concentrate on smallholder production with few centralized services (Yen 1980). However, there are possibilities for significant economies of scale in the production of many smallholder crops, notably cocoa (Densley and Wheeler 1978), coconuts (Wheeler et al. 1978) and sugar cane. For this reason the output produced by smallholders often is not competitive with the output of large scale commercial agriculture. A lack of management and processing skills among smallholders also has contributed to their relative inefficiency compared to plantation agriculture. In Table 1 details are provided of the outputs per hectare achieved by smallholders and plantations in Papua New Guinea.

Although these figures could have been determined partly by other factors, such as the greater availability of capital on plantations, evidence of poor management and processing skills can be found. Weed control, for example, often is of an insufficient standard in cocoa (Densley and Wheeler 1978) and the quantity of smallholder-processed copra can be low (Wheeler et al. 1978). For these reasons, if smallholder production is to compete with larger scale commercial agriculture some ancillary services must be provided.
Table 1
Yield of export crops, plantations and smallholders Papua New Guinea 1967/77

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Smallholder</th>
<th>Plantation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>1.218</td>
<td>1.650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocoa</td>
<td>0.554</td>
<td>0.336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copra</td>
<td>0.420</td>
<td>0.755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea</td>
<td>1.316</td>
<td>1.272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palm Oil</td>
<td>3.497</td>
<td>3.906</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Densley 1978b:33

This type of development has assumed increasing importance. Schemes such as the Seaqaa Sugar Development Project and the Yalavou Cattle Project in Fiji and the oil palm schemes in Papua New Guinea are examples. Under these schemes farmers do not have complete autonomy in decision making. In Seaqaa families could be evicted if their performance farming cane was unsatisfactory, while at Hoskins settlers were required to plant two hectares of land to oil palm. Extension services usually are provided and the marketing and processing of the product are taken out of the farmers' control.

The alternatives to controlled smallholder production - community estates and joint enterprises - give varying degrees of power to indigenous decision makers. The Plantation Redistribution Scheme in Papua New Guinea is an example of the former; the Bellavista Vegetable Project, and the cattle schemes reviewed by Connell (1979) are others. The first two illustrate that this style of development is not simply imposed by planners but can also emerge in response to pressures from below.

An advantage perceived for these alternatives to traditional smallholder development is that economies of scale in production, processing and marketing can be reaped. However, significant economies of scale in production are unlikely to be realized in the Fijian cane industry where the government will not allow machines to be imported. Extension services for smallholders are designed to supplement the limited management skills of smallholders thereby ensuring efficient farming practices.

Thus two types of production systems are being considered for future agricultural developments in Melanesia - large scale plantation type enterprises with some local decision making, and production based on smallholders who are provided with a number of ancillary services. Both systems can be considered as elements of the plantation mode of production. Although the plantation mode is the basis of a number of existing and proposed schemes, the enthusiasm with which it has been espoused has varied widely. On the one hand is the enthusiasm of the Department of Lands in Papua New Guinea, reported by Connell (1979:594-595):
The aim of encouraging developments on traditionally owned land consolidated into a single enterprise is believed, especially by the Department of Lands, to be a significant change in development policy that could foreshadow a variety of economic projects at a large scale but with a traditional basis in land tenure and local participation.

In contrast to this response, Yen has argued that the traditional smallholder systems might be unable to meet the requirements of efficient commercial production and that 'production through larger-scale management systems seems likely to fill the role of the growth sector, if only by default' (Yen 1980:99).

ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR UNDER THE PLANTATION MODE

Given that the plantation mode is likely to be important in the future economic development of Melanesia, it is necessary to gain some understanding of economic behaviour under this system. Two types of organization will be distinguished. Economic behaviour is likely to differ between schemes which are based on smallholder production but where there are some imposed constraints on decision making, and those where there is group participation in decision making. This dichotomy effectively ignores joint ventures like those in the Solomons which appear to seek to maximize profits in the same manner as more traditional plantations.

Since the pioneering work of Fisk (1962, 1964, 1971, 1975), economists have gained increasing insight into the motivation of smallholders in Melanesia and the factors influencing their economic behaviour. The literature is large (e.g. Shand and Straatmans 1972; Shaw 1973; Philp 1976) and will not be discussed in detail. Generally, the decision making unit is assumed to be the family. Economists argue that families are motivated by the desire to consume various commodities, one of which is leisure. In order to consume they must decide how best to allocate their resources, including time, between competing activities. This choice is constrained by such factors as the availability of land, labour and other inputs, and the need to meet minimum requirements for certain commodities.

Various complications can be built into this basic model. For example, it is not easy to divide time in Melanesian societies neatly between labour and leisure. Social or community activities could be introduced directly as a goal (the desire to consume 'prestige' or the desire not to consume 'social alienation') or as a constraint on the time available for either leisure or 'productive' activity. Also, the way in which people trade one goal for another could vary according to family background. For example, it has long been argued that Indians are more willing to trade leisure for cash in Fiji than are Fijians.

This type of model is not supposed to be a perfect description of reality with all its complications. It does not, for example, rule out the possibility that aspects of economic behaviour will be influenced by goals other than those that have been mentioned. A case in point is that relevant to much of Melanesia is that behaviour can be influenced by the desire to gain or retain control over land. But despite this type of goal,
these models are useful means of examining the response to economic stimuli.

With the greater sophistication of such models has come the conclusion that families react in a manner consistent with standard neo classical theory. They may not be profit maximizers, but if the price of one crop rises with respect to others, for example, there is likely to be a shift in emphasis to the more productive pursuit. This is likely to apply whether or not the desire to retain land is a dominant motivating factor. Numerous examples of 'rational' behaviour can be found. Tobacco and tea have not been accepted widely as smallholder crops in Papua New Guinea because they have been less profitable than competing crops, mainly coffee (Munnull and Densley 1978). Densley and Wheeler (1978) reported that families devoted less effort to cocoa and switched to other methods of providing consumption when cocoa prices were relatively low. Indeed, Philp (1976) applied a quite complex econometric model to handloom weavers in Papua New Guinea who were also subsistence gardeners, and concluded that there was nothing perverse about their response to economic incentive.

The question arises therefore whether these responses are altered by the additional services provided to smallholders operating under the plantation model. To the extent that some coercion is placed on farmers, policy makers have more control over decision making. In the Seaqaa scheme, settlers could be evicted if they regularly failed to produce a satisfactory cane harvest, and the degree to which they could neglect cane in favour of other activities was limited if they wished to retain the land. However, in a recently completed study of this scheme (Evans 1980) I concluded that a modification to the basic neo classical model provided useful insights into the response to economic incentive in this situation. The project administration had instituted a set of incentives and disincentives designed to encourage participation in the commercial sector and the model considered changes in labour inputs to cane in response to these measures. Although the model could not be quantified it provided predictions consistent with observed behaviour. Certainly the particular socio-political environment had to be considered, but the goal of maximizing consumption subject to certain constraints remained. Thus at the micro level there appears to be no reason for thinking that families react to economic stimuli in a different manner when producing as smallholders under the plantation mode. They simply have more constraints imposed on their decision making.

At the macro level, any economies of scale under this system would enable total production to occur at a lower point on the long run average cost curve. Extension services should ensure that more suitable agronomic practices than before were used, thereby raising the production function facing individual farms. The combined effect of the two would be to make the output more competitive on the world market. Evidence about whether the plantation mode does in fact create these two effects is scarce. In Seaqaa there was weak evidence to show that as unskilled farmers gained experience with cane the yields they obtained increased, but it was not possible to prove that yields were better if the recommended farming practices were carried out than if the family followed its own path. This might have been due to data problems.
Figure 1

Possible labour inputs under group decision making
GROUP DECISION MAKING

Neo classical economic theory does not say a great deal about group decision making. In Figure 1, AR and MR are the average and marginal returns respectively from some farming activity. OC is the opportunity cost of labour, here assumed for simplicity to be constant. Three possible group decision making processes are described.

(a) Profit maximization. If the community seeks to maximize the net benefit flowing to the group from this activity, it would choose the normal profit maximizing solution. This occurs at L₂ where the MR curve cuts the OC curve. For this situation to be feasible, the group must be able to coerce members to provide at least L₂ units of labour, but must also be able to prevent them applying more than L₂.

(b) Maximization of the returns to the workers. L₁ units of labour would be provided if the group initially working in the project could restrict entry and decided to maximize the return to themselves only. They would maximize the difference between the return per worker (AR) and the opportunity cost. Less labour is employed than in the profit maximizing situation.

(c) Unrestricted entry. If the group could not prevent members from working whenever they desired individuals would provide labour if the perceived return from this activity (AR) exceeded the return available elsewhere (OC). Only when L₃ is reached will no extra labour be provided. More labour than the profit maximization solution is provided, and the net surplus available to the community is zero.

Few studies of group decision making in Melanesia exist, and it is not obvious if any of these decision processes are applicable. The communal nature of society in many areas probably rules out the second, with equilibrium at L₁, and this possibility will not be considered further. In situations where it is difficult to restrict the activities of society members, L₃ would be more likely. In an attempt to discover if either L₂ or L₃ is likely to emerge from group decision processes in Melanesia, the Plantation Redistribution Scheme in Papua New Guinea will be considered briefly.

Most of the plantations that were returned to the traditional land owners were not subdivided but were kept as plantations (Densley 1978b). After a period, many were placed in the hands of a National Plantation Management Authority (NPMA). Profits and productivity were lower than under expatriate management and there is some evidence that labour inputs fell (Densley and Wheeler 1978).

If it is assumed that expatriate owners generally attempted to maximize profits (L₂), the observed decline in productivity is consistent with a movement from L₂ to L₃. However this would have implied an increase in labour inputs which apparently did not occur. This dilemma might be explained by the fact that the curves in Figure 1 may have been altered by the change in plantation ownership.
The AR curve might have been influenced in two ways. First, the fact that the NPMA was constituted suggests that the new landowners lacked management skills. They would therefore not have been able to attain the same output as achieved by the expatriate owners even when employing the same inputs. Assuming constant prices, the AR curve would have shifted downwards.

Secondly, Connell (1979) reported that groups often take longer to reach decisions than individuals. For crops requiring the precise timing of inputs, the effect of delays in decision making is the same as that of poor management - the AR curve falls.

It is likely, however, that the AR curve facing individual plantations was falling for a number of years prior to the change in ownership. This would have occurred had the expatriate owners allowed the stock of capital (including perennial crops) to decline in anticipation of expropriation, as suggested by Densley and Wheeler (1978). Indeed it is possible that the new owners allowed the rundown of capital to continue either because they had relatively short time horizons or because they could not obtain access to the funds necessary to restock.

It will be assumed that the expatriate owners had been operating at the profit making maximization point L2 but that the AR curve was shifting downwards because the prospect of expropriation had reduced their time horizons. In this case both labour inputs and productivity would have been falling before the change in ownership. With the change, the AR curve would have shifted further downwards for the reasons mentioned above. Had the new owners attempted to maximize profit they would have been observed to apply less labour and to attain lower returns than the previous owners, which appears consistent with what actually occurred. However, the observed reduction in labour and its productivity is also consistent with a change in decision processes from profit maximization (L2) to unrestricted entry (L3) if there was a large enough fall in the AR curve.

These conclusions are not altered by the observation that the change in ownership was likely to have shifted the OC curve upwards. Many plantations in the colonial era had to rely on imported rather than local labour. An implication is that local people were not willing to work for the same real wage which attracted labour from other areas; their opportunity costs were higher. Those redistributed plantations that attempted to use the labour of the owning group would therefore have been confronted with a higher OC curve than that which the previous owners had faced. Even those which continued to hire external labour would probably have faced higher wage demands from workers expecting better conditions under indigenous ownership. An increase in the OC curve has the same effect on labour inputs and productivity as that of a downward shift in the AR curve.

The model which has been proposed does not therefore allow firm conclusions to be made about the type of decision making employed by groups which obtained plantations under the Plantations Redistribution Scheme. The little information which is available on the scheme is consistent with the new owners attempting to maximize profits. On the other hand it is also consistent with a change from profit maximization to unrestricted entry if the changes in the AR and OC curve were large. It can be
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concluded, however, that if the new owners continue to allow the capital stock to run down, both labour inputs and productivity will fall further, regardless of which of the two decision processes is followed.

The possibility that neither of the two decision processes is relevant must also be considered. Tamilong (1979) emphasized that a major aim of the traditional landowners in one case was to regain control of land that had been alienated. Considerations related to current consumption possibilities were of minor importance. This conclusion is supported by the recent problems with Giligili and Gumanch plantations. There, pressure for redistribution was not great until the expatriate owners tried to sell to indigenous companies. If this had occurred, the Plantation Redistribution Act would no longer have applied and the land may never have been returned.

If group motivation was totally unrelated to the desire for current consumption, no resources would be applied to the plantation, and the constraint imposed by the necessity to meet loan repayments would become operative. In fact, poor loan repayment performance was one reason why the NPMA began operations.

However, in other relatively land short areas, pressure to return alienated lands was related to the need to provide cash earning opportunities for indigenous people. Yet there appears to have been a serious rundown of yields in these areas too (Densley and Wheeler 1978). In these cases, the decision processes outlined in this paper deserve consideration.

CONCLUSIONS

Although the example of the Plantation Redistribution Scheme does not allow firm conclusions about the nature of group decision making in Melanesia, it reveals a number of costs of this form of the plantation mode of production. If management skills are lacking and decisions take additional time to be made, both labour inputs and outputs could fall. The former problem might perhaps be overcome if the extension services provided to smallholders were extended to group developments. However, it is possible that such costs could outweigh the benefits of the plantation mode which were outlined earlier, at least in the short run. In fact the scheme illustrated that there can be conflicts between two of the major goals of national planning. The desire for increased indigenous control of the commercial sector can be inconsistent with the desire for increased efficient agricultural production.

It appears that the plantation mode of production is gaining in popularity without detailed knowledge of how groups in Melanesia make decisions. Until this understanding is gained important questions such as whether groups are responsive to the same sort of incentives as individual households must remain unanswered. If, for example, communities were motivated by desires unrelated to the need to provide current consumption opportunities, governments would gain little from introducing the usual economic incentives.
If on the other hand, groups made decisions in accordance with one of the processes that have been outlined in this paper, they would be expected to react to economic incentives in the same manner as households, even if their reactions took longer. For example, an increase in the price of the product or a reduction in the cost of inputs would raise the AR curve and labour inputs and outputs would be expected to increase. Given the current emphasis on communal type developments in both Papua New Guinea and the Solomons, it is essential that further research on the nature of group decision making in Melanesia be undertaken.

REFERENCES


THE INTRODUCTION OF CASH CROPPING TO THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS – SOME EVIDENCE FROM ENGA

R. Lacey

CONTEXT AND FRAMEWORK

The cultivation of agricultural produce for export has been one of the principal and more permanent characteristics of the colonial economy in Papua New Guinea since the 1880s. Gross production and export figures for the recent postwar decades show that an expansion and diversification in cash cropping has been one of the most marked features of this period. Two trends are apparent: the expansion of the smallholder segment as a proportion of total production and the development of cash cropping in the Highlands region. Recent surveys reveal that, by the 1970s, 76 per cent of 29,951 ha under coffee were being cultivated by smallholders and that 29 per cent of the 79,399 ha under cocoa and 56 per cent of the 248,207 ha under coconuts were also in the hands of smallholders (Densley and Dick 1978). This was in contrast to the situation in 1940 when smallholders produced only 3-4 per cent of the total agricultural output for export (Shand 1963:47). One indication of the postwar growth of commercial agriculture in the highlands is found in coffee production figures. In 1946/47 48 tons of coffee valued at approximately $A7,536 were exported, while in 1974/75 36,136 tons (of which 87 per cent came from the Highlands region) valued at $A33,501,000 were exported (Munnall and Densley 1978:26, 27). This paper will explore aspects of the Enga experience with cash cropping as part of this postwar expansion of smallholder production in the Highlands region. But, because that expansion came late in the colonial chapter, it needs to be placed in its historical context. It will be argued that this was particularly so for Enga producers who entered the cash economy only in the 1950s, in the last generation of colonial rule.

Any study of transformations and adaptations in the lives, economies, incomes, perceptions and values of the villagers of Papua New Guinea, particularly in the postwar era, would need to take account of the growth and expansion of both plantation and smallholder cash cropping. Their significance and influence would need to be balanced against the expansion of mining, fishing and timber milling, together with other extractive, trading and manufacturing activities by multinational corporations, and the growth of towns and cities as places in which village migrants have found alternative means of gaining incomes. Postwar social and economic change at the local level is a varied and uneven part of wider regional and national strategies and trends. Hence expansion or decline in smallholder production is not simply a pattern of change in village economies, or a product of initiatives, experiments and choices by villagers, either as individuals or groups. Because crops were produced for sale in local or
regional markets, or for export and sale in international markets, these activities inevitably became woven into larger regional and national systems and policies. Local experiences need to be seen as part of these larger patterns and trends, because smallholder activities cannot be isolated from wider structures and trends. Earlier experiments in prewar Papua, to induce villagers to produce a variety of cash crops for export, failed. One major cause of the failure of these experiments was that they were ill-timed. Crops were ready for marketing just as world prices were falling. The large influx of cash into coffee producing areas of the highlands in the 1970s, as a result of spiralling world prices, is the opposite side of this coin. Studies in cash cropping need to balance local, regional, national and international perspectives and forces and take account of their interplay and interdependence.

There have been relatively few studies of smallholder production and enterprise. The prewar phase has been barely touched upon, though studies by Firth (1972, 1978), Miles (1956), Reed (1943), Salisbury (1970) and Shand (1963) reveal some of the relevant sources and point to some major trends. In the studies of postwar patterns numerous approaches have been taken. One is found in local ethnographic or micro economic studies. These show local forces at work shaping the responses of producers to new economic opportunities and the development of ties between these producers and government extension agents who disseminate new seeds and plantings as well as technical advice, but who also implement government 'development programmes' (Brookfield 1973; T.S. Epstein 1968; A.L. Epstein 1969; Salisbury 1970; Shand and Straatmans 1974; and many of the early New Guinea Research Bulletins).

Another approach has been to explain the growth of cash cropping in terms of the behaviour and motives of dominant middlemen and beneficiaries, those entrepreneurs whom the government encouraged and favoured in the 1950s and 1960s. The most stimulating example of this approach is Finney (1973), though Salisbury's study of Vunamami closes with a review of the achievements of six successive innovators, who became transformed in the villagers' view into 'traditional leaders' (1970:313-333). These men played a key role in the early copra trade, the moves to consolidate smallholders' groves, the push for locally owned and run copra driers in the 1930s and the experiments with and expansion of cocoa production and cooperatives from the 1940s. Two other approaches are allied closely with this focus upon entrepreneurs. One is the study of that generation of innovators whose consciousness was transformed by their experiences in the Pacific War but who were born too soon to be able to achieve any of the radical changes in their own and their peoples' lives which they desired. There have been too few studies of these men, their reform movements and their place in the growth of cash cropping. Maher (1961) and Oram (1967) demonstrate in their studies of Tommy Kabu and the Purari Kompani how this returned serviceman planned to wean his people away from their dependence on the cash incomes they earned as plantation labourers, by initiating a scheme to transform them into independent producers of sago for marketing in Port Moresby. Their thrust into cash cropping failed in the 1950s for a number of reasons, including a lack of managerial skill among Kompani personnel; the scarcity of adequate transport links to Port Moresby when their jointly owned cargo vessel was destroyed; strained relations between Kompani officials and government officers, and the lack of a clearly defined policy by the colonial government for relating to and assisting
self-help projects such as these. Out of the ashes of the Purari Kompani came policies to assist the formation of cooperative producer societies in the 1950s and 1960s.

The second approach, allied to the focus on entrepreneurs, is exemplified by a detailed study of the flow of information and the diffusion of innovation in the East Sepik (Allen 1976). This concerns rice growing schemes in the 1940s and 1950s and more recent experiments in economic change. Allen shows the relevance of the ideas, experiments and schemes of men returning from the war; but these activities also demonstrate how policies for 'development', formulated at the centre, are diffused and filtered through communication networks into local arenas, where producers implement them in their own terms.

Each of these approaches to cash cropping focuses primarily on the local level. All are based on the assumption that cash cropping is a mode of production different in form and purpose from preexisting subsistence modes. All demonstrate that the introduction of this new mode, whether at the hands of local reformers, or entrepreneurs, or government agents (local or expatriate) opens the possibility of raising living standards and incomes through production and marketing of crops in return for cash. These changes also generate conflicts within village communities and between villages. All, whether explicitly or implicitly, apply models to analyse and interpret the confusion and complexity of evidence. This is true for the most recent approach towards analysing and explaining the processes and impact of cash cropping, namely the debate about the 'peasantization' of Papua New Guinea societies. Some of the contributions to the debate are Connell (1979), Donaldson and Good (in press), Fitzpatrick (1979), Gerritsen (1975), Howlett (1973, 1977) and Meggitt (1971). It is not my purpose here to assess the outcome of this debate. Though each is focused upon local transformations, all apply models from analyses of changes in rural economies and societies elsewhere and, in so doing, point up some of the consequences and impact of cash cropping. At an early stage, the shift from the subsistence mode of production to a dependence upon cash ushers in an era in which labour is exported into the plantation economy and the new smallholder mode of production begins. This shift creates changes in the social relations of labour in the village economy. Men who act as mediators between village and colonial enclaves gain access to new forms of wealth, new tools, seeds and cuttings for commercial crops. As producers of food crops which they barter with and then market to members of the growing foreign enclaves in their midst, then as the earliest experimenters with export crops, these men begin to mobilize their dependents as an informal workforce. As their holdings grow, this workforce increases and becomes transformed into a rural proletariat, working for cash wages. Differences in scale of production, income and access to colonial power and wealth begin to emerge and spread as cash cropping spreads. Inputs of labour into subsistence are in competition with those into cash cropping. As colonial institutions spread, their influence on the lives of village producers increases; colonizers become the agents of 'law and order', the providers of roads and markets and of education and welfare agencies. Thus villagers become more fully peasants, producing to secure stable cash incomes from which to pay increasing taxes for these services and to acquire the consumer goods which have become necessities of life. Since the push towards cash cropping, particularly in the highlands, was so constant in the 1950s and 1960s, and
earnings from export crops (subject to price fluctuations on the world market) were a major source of income, these newly dependent peasants have been seen as caught in a process of 'terminal development', which favours the few rich and threatens the many who make minimal incomes from their cash crops. The immediate prospect is that such divisions, based on access to wealth, political influence and the productive sources of income, will become hardened into class structures within the rural peasantry, while the mass of smallholders will slip into a backwater after the temporary and easily consumed benefits of the current coffee boom have passed away. One final possibility is that garden lands and coffee plots will stabilize while population increases, so that land disputes will increase.

HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS

Despite its bleak analysis and the sense of foreboding it creates about the future, the 'peasantry' debate blends and balances local, regional, national and international forces. That is an important contribution towards understanding of the meaning and consequences of postwar cash cropping. A further perspective needs to be added: the historical perspective gained from a review of what occurred before and during the Pacific War.

One writer noted a physical legacy from early experiments in Papua carried over into the postwar era:

[While] there was not much to show for all this effort in 1940, in post war years the coconuts which natives had been forced to plant ... have been the basis on which considerable economic development has been built. Nearly every co-operative society in Papua today has been made possible by the copra produced from these trees. Nor were some of the unsuccessful experiments entirely without value .... [The] cacao in the Northern Division which is still growing wild provided information which assisted the development of cacao as a crop in the Rabaul area (Miles 1956:326).

In New Guinea, in the islands and along the coast where plantation and small holding activities had their heaviest concentrations, this physical legacy from prewar experiments did not often survive the ravages of the Pacific War. One feature which did have a direct bearing upon cash cropping, particularly in the highlands, was the attempts made in New Guinea to test and disseminate a variety of new food plants and to engage in agricultural extension. Under the vigorous experimental policy laid down in 1923 by Dr. G. Bryce, the first director of agriculture in New Guinea, and followed by his successor Mr. G. Murray, three stations were set up in Morobe District at Sangan, Wau and Lae, as testing places for cotton, maize, tobacco, legumes and other plants and as centres of diffusion for commercial and food crops for surrounding villages. This was followed by the foundation of Kerevat station in the Gazelle peninsula, first as a training institution for local field and extension workers and later as a demonstration plantation in which new strains of plants were tested. The Morobe stations closed in the late 1920s but their pattern and that of Kerevat were applied when a new station was founded in the late 1930s at
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Aiyura, in what became the Eastern Highlands. From this station spread new
ideas and seeds which formed the basis of most cash crops and new varieties
of food crops in many postwar economies (Radford 1979).

These legacies, however fragile or small in scale, underline the need
to discover and analyse some of the major trends in cash cropping in its
preshar phase. Studies by Firth (1972, 1976 and 1978), Hempenstall (1978),
Reed (1943) and Salisbury (1970), as well as the evidence from official
reports (Sack and Clark 1979) and foreign observers and residents
(Whittaker et al. 1975), remind us that, before a policy to encourage the
growth of an expatriate plantation economy was launched in German New
Guinea, a vigorous copra trade developed between village growers in the
islands of the Bismarck archipelago and numerous foreign traders. With the
spread of mission, trading and government stations and then plantations
along these coasts, strategically placed villages produced food crops for
barter and sale to the members of these enclaves. This meant that even as
late as 1909, when 8,650 tons of copra were exported from the colony, '[by] far
the biggest proportion ... is trade copra i.e. copra produced by the
natives and then bought from them by traders' (Sack and Clark 1979:313).
Already a process of differentiation and 'peasantization' was at work in
the areas where production for the copra trade was operating. So vigorous
was the competition between traders, that producers 'know the precise value
of copra and obtain very good prices when they sell it'. In consequence,
this report noted that there were some chiefs who had 'a regular monthly
income of up to 300 marks from copra'. So vigorously had some of these
coastal communities participated in the expanding copra trade that the
German authorities had found it necessary to pass some earlier decrees: one
of 1900 prohibited traders from purchasing whole coconuts from
producers to force villagers to prepare their coconuts for sale; others of
1900 and 1901 banned the use of shell money (tambu) as a medium of exchange
in transactions between Tolai and traders, especially in the copra trade
(Sack and Clark 1979:200, 217). The spirit of this legislation is captured
clearly in the comment made in the Annual Report for 1900-01:

The use of shell money ... has been a great handicap
to the development of trade. It was often very
difficult for the European firms to obtain the shell
money required to purchase copra etc. In this respect
they were completely dependent on the natives, and at
times the exchange rate for shell money was forced up
absurdly high .... Doubtless shell money will continue
to maintain its role in transactions between natives
for a considerable period. But as it will not be
possible after 1 April 1902 to obtain European goods
for shell money, the natives will be compelled, in
order to obtain such goods, to devote their labours to
the production of really useful goods, suitable for
export, such as copra etc., instead of to the
acquisition of shell money. This will promote commerce
as a whole (Sack and Clark 1979:220).

After the failure of early attempts to extend plantations beyond the
islands to the mainland, the new economy took hold, so that, by the end of
German rule, a substantial proportion of copra exports (which had increased
in value eightfold between 1903 and 1913) came from the foreign
plantations. The area planted expanded from 4,470 ha in 1900 to 34,190 in 1913 (Firth 1978:45). Meantime, field officers patrolling out from the network of new stations, which were established to 'pacify' selected new areas and open up their populations to supply a constant flow of labourers for the plantations, were advised to 'persuade' people in these areas to engage in the production of commercial crops. The response to new opportunities in some newly opened regions was so vigorous that the government thought of placing extension workers in the field to assist villagers with technical advice. Thought was also given to measures for quality control in copra production and to the setting up of driers in some villages (Sack and Clark 1979).

Even allowing for official bias in these glowing reports, it would seem that both smallholder and plantation modes of production were solidly entrenched in some areas by the end of German rule in 1914. There was growing tension and potential conflict of interest between the rising demands for plantation labourers and the labour needs of those villages attempting cash cropping. In this context the German administration did not see the need to implement forced planting ordinances, though clearly they were given to exercising 'persuasion' on their subjects, to ensure there was adequate cash for the payment of taxes.

The relationship and tension between smallholder and plantation production under the subsequent Australian administrations has been outlined:

When the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force administered the Territory ... there was no definite policy formulated or followed with respect to native development. There was ... some interest in Murray's plan for enforcing planting but this apparently waned before there was much application.

Estimates of the later native contributions to exports ... are very fragmentary and inconclusive. The 1929/30 Annual Report states that for the most important area of New Britain native sales of copra 'probably exceeded' 1,200 tons [In German times total small holder copra production was 1,350 tons in 1884, 2,280 in 1896 and 5,000 tons in 1913]. In the description of other districts it did not suggest any other sales of importance. In 1937/38 there was an estimate of 22,200 acres of native coconut groves in bearing for the whole of New Guinea (as against 253,235 acres bearing for plantations). [By the following year that total acreage showed a slight increase, and in both years New Britain's acreage represented about 33% of the total.] If we take the average native yield for that year in the Rabaul District and apply it to the acreage for the whole Territory, a total production estimate of only 2,666 tons is obtained [while the total quantity exported was 73,716 tons in that year] .... Evidence seems to support the view that, with the exception of the early period up till the end of the 1914/18 War, there was only a small proportion of
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Native-produced copra in the total for the Territory, and in particular during the years of low prices (Shand 1963:50, 51).

This represents 3.6 per cent of total production which goes close to the estimate of smallholder production at 3 to 4 per cent in both Papua and New Guinea in the decades prior to 1940. Australian policy strongly favoured and encouraged copra production by plantations from 1914 and the gross figures show the resulting expansion (Reed 1943:191-200). But within this framework the enlightened and experimental policies of Dr Bryce for the development of village commercial crops took shape. A consequence was the series of agricultural stations, culminating in Aiyura and Kerevat, and the attempts to launch a training scheme for extension workers. Little remains in the official reports to record how viable or effective that scheme of education and extension was (Firth and McKillop, in press). The policies on 'native agriculture', proposed by Bryce and Murray, were based on the view that most subsistence systems were devoted to 'shifting cultivation' which they saw as being 'on the whole ... very backward'. This required, for its reform and development, changes to a more stable crop-rotation system producing better varieties of root crops in rotation with maize, cotton, legumes and tobacco. Thus they envisaged a combination of subsistence and commercial production for marketing.

In Bryce's mind this grand design for agricultural reform was linked intimately with the growth of the plantation economy:

One of the most striking features on plantations is that the labour force is fed on exotic ... [imported] foods .... Issues of rice and tinned meat are made, and these are in a few cases, varied by local purchase of sago, taro or maize, or by distribution of food stuffs such as manioc, sweet potato or maize grown on the plantations (New Guinea Annual Report 1923-24:41).

His solution was the rapid and widespread distribution of maize seeds to villages near plantations, along with the provision of extension services to launch the first stage of crop rotation. He also sought to improve plantation exports by breaking the dominance of coconut planting. By the late 1930s, these experiments were bearing fruit. This is shown by rising exports of coffee (63 tons valued at £A2,060 in 1940), cocoa (315 tons for £A11,340 in the same year) and rubber (119 tons for £A13,328 also in that year) (New Guinea Annual Report 1939-40:72). There were direct lines of continuity between a number of the policies and practices developed in New Guinea in the prewar phase and what happened in the Highlands region in the early postwar years. Aiyura continued to be the testing ground for subsistence and commercial crops. Patrol reports from the Enga area in the 1940s and 1950s show the continuity of disapproving attitudes by some kiaps to subsistence cultivation at the same time as their dissemination of new varieties of commercial plants. There are also hints that some new plants could have entered the region along trade routes, before the arrival of the first patrols (Lacey 1979a).

The contrasting trends in British New Guinea and Australian Papua compared with those in German and Australian New Guinea are of significance. In British New Guinea and then in Papua attempts were made
to induce village producers to enter the cash economy by the force of government decree. One legacy of this policy was the laying down of a foundation for postwar copra cooperatives. In German and Australian New Guinea there were a number of stimuli inducing village producers to grow crops for trade: the pressure from competing traders offering goods, shell currency and later cash, in return for their products; the growing presence of expatriate plantations which induced villagers to provide food for their labour force, but which also brought transport and marketing facilities for those who wished to produce for export; the continuous pressure and intervention of field officers (later from a department of agriculture) who even without formal legislative force demanded improved output for commerce and for the payment of taxes. No history of trading has been written for Papua. F.R. Barton's argument in 1906 against enforced planting of commercial crops by villagers, because it would expose them to the corrupting effects of those 'undesirable parasites', the petty traders, reflected a more widespread view among administrators about the role of trading in economic life (Miles 1956:319). In his recent study of the mining frontier Nelson (1976) has revealed that, in its early stages, much of the energy and policy of the British New Guinea administration was devoted to supporting the growth and development of gold mining. This did not necessarily mean that the administration favoured mining; on the contrary it was responding to the presence of a large group of prospectors. In 1892 the lieutenant-governor, Sir William MacGregor, instituted a policy of forced planting to encourage villagers to become contributors to the money economy (Joyce 1971). At that stage there were few traders and many more gold prospectors; in fact in some cases villagers were making steady incomes as providers of food from their gardens for labourers and prospectors at mining camps. In a situation where subsidies and bounties were provided to support mining, the plantation economy began late and developed slowly, so the stimuli to production, as well as the infrastructure and marketing facilities provided by the presence of plantations, were long in coming.

With the aim of turning villagers into independent producers, and providing them with resources for the payment of their taxes, the Native Plantation and Native Taxation Ordinances of 1918 were launched. As in the case of German New Guinea, many official statements and reports of this scheme have survived. One study of its failure has been written from these reports (Miles 1956). There is a need for other studies based on evidence from surviving station and patrol reports. For instance, a preliminary survey of reports from the Gulf Division, founded in 1906, reveals a number of pertinent issues. By the time of tax census patrols in 1920, there were quite extensive coconut groves in many beach villages, which had been planted over previous decades as a result of field officers' urgings in accordance with MacGregor's original decrees. There was also, from 1911, an expansion of trading. This provided producers with some outlets. By the early 1920s, some local entrepreneurs were seeking government advice and assistance to help them compete with traders for a share in copra marketing. Into this situation, under the new ordinances, was injected an experiment in rice cultivation, without clear plans for its processing and marketing. The response among villagers was almost wholesale resistance; many choosing gaol rather than launching into what they saw as a useless venture. Two additional results were a flight of youth into the labour force, which they had sedulously avoided previously, and signs within some
beach villages of upheaval and social disorder (Kerema Patrol Reports 1906-40; Lacey 1979b; Williams 1923, 1934).

These well intentioned, misconceived and ill-timed plans by Sir Hubert Murray to induce improvements in village production and to launch the people into the money economy by legislative force we now know, with the clarity and wisdom of hindsight, were doomed to failure. The scheme was timed for implementation at a crisis point in the world economy. It was implemented also at a crisis point in the development of the Papuan economy. Income from mineral exports had dropped in the years after Australia assumed control in 1906. In 1901 gold represented 66 per cent of the total value of exports; by 1918 it was 15 per cent. In the same years, plantation products were 7 per cent and 48 per cent respectively of total exports (British New Guinea/Papua Annual Reports 1901-18). The rise in the output of copra and rubber came as a result of a policy to encourage plantation growth by the application of liberal land and labour legislation. A by-product of this policy was a continued growth in output and earnings into the 1920s. But, as in the earlier attempt by the Germans to found their colony with an influx of German yeomen settlers, the Australians failed to attract a significant number of planters. So in the 1920s and 1930s, when the scheme for 'native agriculture' was being implemented, a point of stagnation was reached in the growth of the Papuan plantation economy.

Miles has isolated a number of factors responsible for the failure of the 1918 ordinances to stimulate the growth of cash cropping. Compulsion and the threat of imprisonment produced resistance and non cooperation in cases other than the Gulf. In many instances, because of the absence of a plantation economy or the strictures on government spending, few communications, transport or marketing facilities existed. Thus attempts to stimulate cultivation in remote though fertile areas meant that produce could not be readily brought to market. In one case a special regulation was passed to force inland villagers to carry the crops, which they had been forced to produce, to an accessible marketing point on the coast. With a limited budget to be supplemented by tax proceeds, which, in turn, were to come from planting and sale of crops, there was little chance to develop a fuller department of agriculture with extension services, as had been possible in the richer economy of New Guinea. The severe lack of capital meant that, in the restricted and difficult pricing and marketing situation of the 1920s and 1930s, growers could not receive interim payments for their produce. No wonder they soon lost enthusiasm for what they saw too often as 'government work' (Miles 1956:327, 328). In the case of the Mekeo, who, like the people of the Gulf, were induced to plant rice, there was a temporary boom. But they finally went the way of others when their rice scheme collapsed in 1935. Recent research based on local records and oral testimony has revealed the reasons for failure as being primarily 'because [the scheme] could not support the expense of the manager's salary and the costs of running a truck' (Stephen 1974:129; see also Hau'ofa 1976). So these plans to force Papuans to become independent producers foundered. What began in reality was a process of transforming these villagers into peasants who had few alternatives for choice.
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The legacies from these experiences in prewar Papua and New Guinea profoundly influenced policies and attitudes towards smallholder production in the immediate postwar years. This is particularly evident in the multiplicity of cooperative copra producing ventures which sprang up along the coast. It could be argued that differences between these movements in Papua and New Guinea were largely the result of what had gone on before in the 1920s and 1930s (Snowden, in press). Another dimension to the growth of these movements and their relationship to newly evolving postwar government policies and structures was provided by the Pacific War itself.

This involved the exposure of many young men to the complex technology and organization of modern warfare, their experience of new places in their own country and beyond, and their awareness of promises for change and the possible means to bring that change about. Among the survivors who returned home after the war were a whole generation of restless, energetic and questioning potential reformers. Nelson has caught the sense of urgency, restlessness and dreaming which stirred this generation:

In the 1950s some Papua New Guineans could look back to the war as an awesome disruption that brought few permanent changes. But for many, there was no return to the 1930s. Communities on Manus, in Madang, the Sepik and the Gulf of Papua took their own initiative. Paliau, Yali and Kabu were revolutionaries who conceived plans in varying degrees of knowledge about the economic situation that they hoped to change. The soldiers returning to Toaripi had been aware that the foreigners had power not just through wealth and knowledge, but through organisation. The Toaripi were determined to do more for themselves by combining into larger units and drawing on more manpower and capital (Griffin, Nelson and Firth 1979:99).

A second legacy from the war concerned the role of government in agricultural administration and policy. One primary objective of the joint military-civilian structure (ANGAU) set up in 1942 was the provision of essential supplies (copra and rubber in particular). Under one of its wings, the Production Control Board, resources and manpower were mobilized to such a degree that by 1944/45 the output of copra and rubber from its Papuan plantations had reached 9,239 tons valued at £A284,196 and 1,856 tons valued at 377,493 respectively (Stanner 1953:83). In the case of copra this output was a little less than the prewar peak and in the case of rubber it exceeded that peak. At first the board assumed control over existing plantations in Papua, but, as areas of New Guinea were taken from the Japanese, plantations there were taken over and returned to working order. The success of the board demonstrated what could be achieved when government assumed centralized and efficient control over productive resources. It could also lay down and repair transport facilities where needed and it established the precedent for postwar marketing boards to control and stabilize prices for export crops. These patterns of central administrative control persisted beyond the war.
A third legacy was the 'new deal' policy; one stressing the primacy of 'native welfare and development'. This not only borrowed heavily from new policies which had currency in the aftermath of the war. It was based on an injection of expertise from a vanguard of Australian intellectuals who were given a structure within which to rethink Australia's postwar colonial policies. The cooperative societies and the push to encourage other forms of smallholder production flowed from this new thinking (Stanner 1953; Griffin, Nelson and Firth 1979). It was significant that the first postwar administrator, J.K. Murray, was one of this group, as well as being a prominent agricultural scientist. The tensions which grew between the Purari Kompani and both field officers and central administrators in the newly emerging cooperatives division was typical of this period. In the turmoil of reconstruction, when faced with a multiplicity of new ideas and movements for local initiative in development, colonial officers, many of whom had been in the prewar administrations, sought to establish order before development. They also worked to fit these local experiments into the emerging framework of central control. Producers also faced the consequences of fluctuating world prices for exports as their energies and initiatives were contained within administrative moulds.

It was into this world of the 1950s that Enga producers came, as the postwar administration extended its control and 'pacified' them from Mt Hagen, Wabag and other posts. Like other highlands populations, their entry into smallholder production and marketing came from growing food for mission and government stations. First they bartered these goods for shell currency and steel tools. In this phase they participated in what Hughes (1978) saw as a highlands-wide inflation in shell currencies, beginning in the 1930s. Labouring on 'public works', for instance, the construction and maintenance of government and mission posts and the cutting of 'roads of peace' through their valleys to link these posts into networks then became an alternative source for earning new valuables. From the start, because of the habits and perceptions of missionaries and kiaps who sought 'chiefs' through whom they could negotiate with new populations, a small circle of kamongo (rich men) or young 'would be' kamongo, soon seized opportunities to control the distribution of the new wealth. Precedents were already established for this behaviour by kamongo, particularly among communities in central and eastern Enga regions, where they and their fathers were 'holders of the way' in the cycles of exchange which ebbed and flowed along roads of alliance traversing these valleys (Lacey 1979c; Meggitt 1974). New possibilities for differentiation through access to and manipulation of wealth were in the making and the flow of shell currency, steel tools and new strains of pigs in exchange for food and labour quickened the transition from old to new.

Then in the early 1950s came coffee and Australian currency to add further dimensions and complexities. Meggitt, in his study 'from tribesmen to peasants' (1971), drew on evidence from Wabag station reports. In 1955 the government had imported into the district, for distribution through kamongo, who were now bosbots and luluais, the following commodities: 1,568 axes, 2,012 machetes, 614 pearl shells, 38 bailer shells and 256 lb of large and 112 lb of small cowries. While they used items of shell currency increasingly for transactions with trading partners out on the edge of central valleys, to draw more in pigs for their exchange cycles, the central Enga themselves moved into the money economy. This movement is
shown by the growing volume of cash being paid to them by *kiaps* in return for timber, food and the new cash crops, particularly coffee. The following figures, compiled by Meggitt (1971:203) from station reports, record this rise in the flow of cash:

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (£A)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957/58</td>
<td>10,790</td>
<td>1962/63</td>
<td>23,750</td>
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<tr>
<td>1958/59</td>
<td>12,410</td>
<td>1963/64</td>
<td>32,200</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959/60</td>
<td>19,420</td>
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<td>57,350</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960/61</td>
<td>18,180</td>
<td>1965/66</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961/62</td>
<td>19,730</td>
<td>1966/67</td>
<td>150,000</td>
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By 1966/67 the effects of income from a new cash crop, pyrethrum, were also showing in these payments. This first stage of coffee production saw consolidation by missions and government, through the establishment and spread of facilities like schools, hospitals, agricultural stations and trade stores. This was followed by the beginnings of local government councils (1963) and the establishment in 1964, by the Lutheran Mission, of a diversified consumer-producer cooperative, WASO (Fairbairn 1967). In consequence part of the people's earnings was taken up in taxes and other payments for services and there were consumer outlets for spending. At this stage, *kamongo* old and new continued and expanded their transactions in the *tee* exchange, which now embraced in its orbit new communities and provided roads to influence and prestige for a larger number of exchange partners within its traditional boundaries. Some were also investing their own and their clan's new wealth in trade stores and trucks as well as buying shares in WASO, which provided marketing facilities for the coffee and vegetables which they were growing as cash crops (Freund 1971; Lacey 1973; Meggitt 1974).

It is not clear yet by what process coffee was adopted and spread as a cash crop among Enga producers. One agricultural officer has suggested that, in the early days when Enga were searching for opportunities to gain the new wealth, one man in an eastern Enga clan, through his links with government officers, obtained and planted coffee seedlings in his garden. This man claimed to his clansmen that he had been told that he could sell the fruit of these trees for money. They treated his claim with scepticism but watched and waited to see what might happen. When the coffee trees matured a few years later, he gathered the beans and brought home cash, which he spent on consumer goods. He also planted more trees. It was now evident to his fellow clansmen that this man had found a road to wealth with trees, so they followed his example and coffee planting spread rapidly in their area (N.A. Robinson, personal communication 1972). When I met that man in the early 1970s he was a councillor, the owner of a trucking business and of several trade stores: a new *kamongo*. His career is reminiscent, on a smaller scale, of those of the Goroka entrepreneurs studied by Finney. Perhaps the blend which he described for the Goroka men was also part of the process in Enga. In Goroka it was made up of these ingredients: preexisting value systems and structures which favoured the rise of bigmen as vigorous manipulators of wealth; a government policy which encouraged cash cropping and which promoted coffee production through the distribution of seedlings, accompanied by sympathetic care and advice from extension workers; opportunities for these men to mobilize a dependent labour force cheaply, to extend their plantings on clan lands and
to benefit from the assistance of key sponsors in colonial society; opportunities to diversity their capital investments beyond cash cropping when the government curbed coffee planting and withdrew its earlier support (Finney 1973:83-122).

Recent studies show that coffee growing expanded rapidly in the Highlands region, exhibiting the pattern noted at the beginning of this paper: a growth in export production from 48 tons valued at $A7,536 in 1946/47 to 36,136 tons valued at $A33,501,000 almost thirty years later in 1974/75 (Munnill and Densley 1978:26, 27). But that overall boom needs to be adjusted in scale for Enga coffee production: in the year 1975/76 a survey of estimated production (in terms of bags of green beans), revealed that the total for Enga was 18,643, 2.6 per cent of a total of 717,229 for all provinces. Within that total the five highlands provinces dominated, with 87 per cent. The highlands provinces, in terms of their total production, were ranked as follows: Western Highlands 259,960; Eastern Highlands 224,811; Chimbu 112,262; Enga 18,643; Southern Highlands 4,584. In other words, Enga ranked fourth, contributing only 3 per cent of the total highlands production in that year (Munnill and Densley 1978:27).

Unlike the Eastern Highlands, Enga province has not had any expatriate-owned plantations with which the smallholders could have developed symbiotic relationships as they began planting their trees. In Goroka, the growth of partnerships and sponsorships enabled the entrepreneurs to gain their headstart. A recent census of coffee trees in three census divisions of the Wabag district revealed that of 473,345 trees counted a total of 398,360 (84 per cent) were mature and only 70,069 (16 per cent) immature. In addition, there were only fifteen nurseries where seedlings were being cultivated (Carra 1979). These figures, if they are typical of the pattern in Enga, suggest that coffee cultivation, begun in the early 1950s, has by the 1980s reached its peak.

Two further dimensions can be added. Within the boundaries of the present Western Highlands Province lies the area of highest coffee production for the Highlands region. It represented 42 per cent of all highlands production, compared with 3 per cent from Enga, according to the 1975/76 estimates. The spread of coffee into Enga belongs to that era before 1973, when it was part of the Western Highlands. But there were then real constraints upon its spread. It could not be cultivated above certain altitudes. Those areas in which it could be planted were regions with the highest population densities. Poorly developed modern infrastructures on this rugged fringe of the Western Highlands meant that facilities for marketing were limited, even with the development of WASO from the mid 1960s. There do not seem to have been instances of innovative coffee growers pushing for the building of roads to open up marketing possibilities, as was the case among Fore growers in the 1950s (Sorenson and Gajdusek 1969). Hence the beneficiaries of the coffee boom have always been those Enga who live at the appropriate altitudes in valleys in the east of the province, thus creating a pattern of uneven development. The recent census among a section of them reveals that less than 10 per cent of the growers had more than one plot (Carra 1979). Perhaps the opportunities to consolidate production, which were seized by the Goroka entrepreneurs, were not available to the Enga kamongo because of the ecological and demographic constraints. In many ways it seems that the coffee age has come and gone and that most of the Enga have been passed by.
For those Enga living in higher valleys to the north and west of Wabag, another age of cash cropping came. That is part of the pyrethrum story. In the late 1950s pyrethrum seeds from Africa were tried at Aiyura station, and later at Tambul, as an alternative cash crop to coffee, particularly for higher altitude dwellers. Agreements were reached between the Australian government, the Papua New Guinea administration and international chemical companies about the processing and marketing of pyrethrin extracted from the dried flowers. A factory was to be built at Mt Hagen for processing, on the understanding that certain output targets would be reached. The days of forced planting seemed to have returned and an integrated, highly orchestrated pyrethrum 'push' was launched in the mid 1960s. The recipients of this extension programme were predominantly Enga. In 1963/64 15,000 kg of dried flower were produced, of which 5,000 kg came from the Western Highlands, within which Enga was still contained. By 1966/67 production had reached its peak and a total of 590,000 kg was produced, of which 398,000 kg (68 per cent) was from Western Highlands. In 1969/70, the year in which a further large push took place, the overall production was 461,000 kg, of which 296,000 (64 per cent) came from Enga, listed by then as a separate production area. The production continued to decline, until it had reached 201,000 kg in 1976/77, of which 191,000 kg (95 per cent) was produced in Enga. More detailed local figures from purchasing centres reveal that the regions serviced by the Laiagam centre produced 28 per cent of the total output in 1967/68 and 68 per cent in both 1974/75 and in 1976/77, making it the largest producing area of this crop in the country (Anderson 1978). A study of a sample of producers from the Laiagam area revealed that there was a high degree of resistance to the cultivation of pyrethrum. Some of the reasons given by growers were: that women and children did most of the picking in the gardens, but received only a small share of the income (this was in contrast to the cultivation and marketing of food crops at local markets, where women could gain steady and independent, though small incomes); that men could not invest in trade stores, pigs for sale at markets, or trucks and beer, or other conspicuous assets from pyrethrum production, because the income per unit day was so low; that it was difficult to expand the income base because required garden sizes were restricted and therefore producers needed a multiplicity of plots (Scouller 1973).

Yields never reached expected or required targets once the peak production began to drop. Hence the major push organized in 1969, involving the gathering together of more than a hundred agricultural field officers from all around the country. Unwittingly this push repeated the pattern of the Papuan experiments in rice, coffee, copra and other crops in the 1920s. It was concentrated upon high altitude areas which were struck by devastating frosts in 1971/72 (Waddell 1975). Despite a few minor upswings in output in the mid 1970s in the Laiagam region, one of the most severely hit by the frosts, production has been on a downward path ever since 1972.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Any farmer worth his or her bread or kau kau knows that much clearing and preparation is necessary before he or she can make and plant a garden. Much of this paper has been spent in building frameworks and historical perspectives prior to launching into a study of cash cropping in Enga. One
reason for this is that, in the colonial era, Enga were at the end of the road - latecomers to the scene. In the 1930s and 1940s the colonial frontier was only beginning to move along the major Enga valleys. In the 1970s that great and ambiguous artery through the centre of the country, the Highlands Highway, was still being upgraded, smoothed and extended only halfway into what was formally constituted as one of the last districts in that colonial era. Everything that happened in the short colonial generation in Enga happened somewhere else in the country before. That is true of those two major cash crops, coffee and pyrethrum. Remoteness, being at the end of the road, and high altitude have meant that coffee development came to comparatively few. And perhaps, for good or ill, for those few Enga, the coffee generation now seems to be passing. Pyrethrum had been tried in other fringe, high altitude areas of the highlands, but its main victims were non coffee producing Enga and in the 1960s they had visited upon them the revived ghost of forced planting, followed by ravaging frost. Some older men and women may have recalled from their youth the ways in which the arrival of the Taylor and Black patrol was followed in 1939-40 by devastating frost and famine then by killing diseases which struck down people and pigs. These disasters were followed by cries from prophets who bade their parents kill what pigs remained in order to become renewed. These older people must have thought twice about pyrethrum in the early 1970s.

Though remote according to the perspectives of the colonial era, the Enga experience with cash cropping, like the whole postwar surge towards village commercial production, did not occur in isolation. This long view of the process is an attempt to demonstrate that. In any search for broad patterns of change and transformation in the village economies of Papua New Guinea it seems clear that the documentation and interpretation of early trading relations are of great importance. It also seems that the recruitment and siphoning off of younger men from villages to serve as labourers in growing colonial enclaves was often the essential cutting edge of a moving colonial frontier, particularly under German and Australian rulers. But this paper has begun to show that an inquiry into the evolution of the smallholder mode of production, and its tensions and ties with patterns of change in the plantation economy, could enlighten our understanding of the dynamics of colonial and village economies. The move from subsistence cultivation and exchange transactions to a mixed economy, in which some goods are grown for sale in local, regional or overseas markets, clearly begins complex processes which need close analysis and explanation.

This paper, like the heated debate on peasants which went before it and ended in thoughts about 'terminal development', hopefully lays to rest one ghost which persisted, for both colonials and cultivators, throughout the ninety years of the colonial era. Many saw that cash cropping was a panacea, that it opened the door to improvement and real progress. It now seems apparent from this review of the historical context that this often became a false illusion, except for those few who emerged as beneficiaries, the entrepreneurs or 'big peasants'. The challenge remains that other alternatives for gaining improved living standards among village people need to be sought out. One of these may be to look away from the small scale side of the equation towards the large scale model provided by the existence of the plantation economy. That has recently been suggested by
one Pacific islands scholar, who argues that the perceptions which came from the peasant model may well be false for the region:

... the aspirations for material goods and for services among the Pacific peoples are already so high, and rising, that rural development, as presently conceived and executed, is not able to meet them. Pacific Islanders aim not for a rise from poverty, which in general they do not have, but for a shift from one form of relative affluence to another. Agricultural development based on semi-subistence/semi-commercial smallholdings will lead, as it has begun to do, to a decline in relative levels of living. The indigenous peoples of the Pacific have never been peasants and do not have attitudes to labour and life born of centuries of struggle for survival. To introduce models of smallholder-labour-intensive commercial agricultural development devised elsewhere for true peasant societies is tantamount to introducing a programme for trapping people in rural poverty (Hau'ofa 1980:485).

For the Enga, to whose territory expatriate plantations never came, perhaps an alternative would be ventures which consolidate holdings within clan corporations, to produce vegetables, the crops with which they entered the cash economy in the 1950s.

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DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

Transportation

Air transport and telecommunications in Melanesia

CHRISTOPHER C. KISSLING

Domestic shipping: ownership, organization and control

ANNE C. DUNBAR

Roads

M.W. WARD
AIR TRANSPORT AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN MELANESIA

Christopher C. Kissling

Throughout the 1970s international and domestic civil aviation in Melanesian countries underwent extensive reorganization. Small airlines based in the region have attempted to participate on international routes in direct competition with the carriers of major metropolitan powers. Newly independent island governments have experienced the difficulties of negotiating favourable air rights agreements with their more powerful neighbours. They have inherited from their former colonial masters vastly differing civil aviation infrastructures and face the formidable task of acquiring the capital to finance both aircraft purchases and the upgrading of airport facilities to meet their international and domestic needs.

Civil aviation has been of growing importance in the region. Early links were established more to meet trans-Pacific demands of developed Pacific-rim countries. If Melanesian countries were fortunate to be strategically located along these routes they benefited as way ports, but schedules and connections were tailored to meet the constraints of external demand rather than the miniscule needs of the intermediate transit locations. Additional regional feeder routes were introduced more for political and strategic reasons than in the expectation of favourable commercial developments.

Most countries in Melanesia have experienced relatively poor communications facilities but again, because of strategic location, some have been more fortunate than others to be located athwart major submarine cable links. The eastern and western margins of Melanesia have fared best. Fiji ties into the COMPAC cable (since 1963) on its route from Sydney via Auckland, Suva and Hawaii to Vancouver. Papua New Guinea also ties into the Australia-Asia (SEACOM) cable (since 1967) at Madang. Prior to 1975 the remaining Melanesian countries were reliant upon high frequency (HF) radio systems which many saw as handicapping their existing economic activity as well as prejudicing national development goals. Major changes in international telecommunications in the region have been taking place since 1975, commencing with the opening of a new Intelsat Standard A satellite earth station in Fiji in 1976. Papua New Guinea gained another cable link to Australia early in 1976, emphasizing that the favoured status of Papua New Guinea and Fiji is being continued relative to other Melanesian states.
When the International Telecommunication Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT) reduced their space segment charges for use of small dish Standard B earth stations in June 1976, the prospects for international telecommunications via satellites immediately became brighter for a number of small Pacific island states. Aid monies were negotiable from the EEC, under the Lome Convention, as well as from more traditional sources in the region for financing regional telecommunications facilities. Besides this, international telecommunications companies were keen to provide facilities on a franchise basis somewhat more quickly than could be achieved following the normal processing steps associated with government to government aid-funded projects.

The race to catch up has been epitomized by the Solomon Islands. Aid finance was made available at the time of independence, prompting the formation of SOLTEL, a company jointly owned by the government of the Solomon Islands and Cable and Wireless Co. Even before a national trunk network has been established, like Tonga and Western Samoa the Solomon Islands has joined the ranks of nations which can be linked by satellite communications, thus vastly improving links between the outside world and a single capital city but leaving unsolved the problems of satisfactory internal communications.

Both in the provision of air services and in telecommunications, the small island countries of the South Pacific have been very reliant upon assistance from external sources. In colonial times they had little influence on the decisions on what was to be provided, where or when and little chance of ensuring continuity of services as technologies altered operational environments encouraging extra-regional demands to be met in different ways. Even as independent states, they are still dependent upon imported knowledge and technology besides the aid capital to finance investments of any size. Their scale of economic activity precludes opportunities to direct research and development specifically tailored to meet their particular needs.

MARGINALIZATION

Brookfield (1978:60) has discussed the notion of marginalization which has plagued developments in the Pacific islands. Marginalization can be seen as a condition of social and economic dependency wherein a single outer island or a whole group of islands may become marginalized

... by the spatially-differentiating forces of economic development, social and political change. It has by definition lost at least a large measure of independence as a decision-making unit; its economy may retain a varying measure of autarky from a subsistence point of view, but its cash economy depends on trade controlled elsewhere; in most cases, the major part of its transport to and from the markets is also provided from elsewhere.

The development of air services across the South Pacific illustrates the concept of marginalization. Early postwar routes at first utilized
flying-boats. Their limited range encouraged 'milk-run' type route structures connecting island groups. However, land-based planes quickly supplanted the ageing flying-boats as they offered better returns and higher speeds. Not all flying-boat bases had ground landing strips nearby. Not all the hastily prepared landing strips from the war years were suitable for continued civilian use or conveniently located to act as refuelling points on trans-Pacific routes. Some quickly became redundant as aircraft performance improved and they could be overflown because local demand was insufficient to warrant a transit call. Now it is possible for flights to completely omit stops en route between city-pairs on opposite sides of the Pacific rim.

Through time, only a small proportion of airports in the South Pacific has been able to upgrade facilities to match the rising standards of service required to meet the needs of ever larger aircraft, and fewer are needed to mount the trans-Pacific services which are of greater commercial concern to the external metropolitan powers. Yet air services have become an essential element in regional patterns of travel. Vast ocean distances separate states, and islands within states, encouraging aviation developments especially for passenger movements.

Even in Papua New Guinea, the largest Melanesian country in terms of land area, aviation is supremely important for internal communications because of the tremendous difficulties encountered when constructing surface roads over inhospitable terrain. Factors of geography have thus lent impetus to the development of civil aviation in Melanesia out of proportion to the state of general economic development. Aviation is vital to much of the tourist traffic and tourism is of central importance to places like Fiji. Consequently Fiji continues to grant generous fifth freedom traffic rights to foreign airlines in an attempt to discourage them from overflying her territory. Plant (1979) has pointed out that definitions of 'development' invariably are 'core' oriented, the Pacific islands epitomizing the characteristics of the 'periphery' within the modern world system. International air transport, like telecommunications, has tended to tie island states more firmly to the control of the 'core' states. Industries that are very reliant upon both air transport and telecommunications are likewise heavily dependent upon decisions made in the economic 'core' areas. Britton (1979) illustrates this fact with respect to tourism and related activities.

TOWARDS AN INDEPENDENT CAPABILITY

It has been a difficult task for the smaller island nations to wrest favourable bilateral air rights agreements from their more powerful neighbours. Fiji's case is illustrative. Air Pacific's first international routes were largely confined to linking island states like Western Samoa, Tonga, Vanuatu (New Hebrides), Tuvalu (Ellice Is.), Kiribati (Gilbert Is.), Nauru and the Solomon Islands to the transfer point at Nadi, hub of South Pacific trans-Pacific routes flown by the metropolitan powers. The desire of island nations for direct access by their own carriers to Australia, New Zealand and North America was largely frustrated by the relevant authorities and commercial interests in those same metropolitan powers. Their airlines had pioneered the route systems and were
understandably reluctant to relinquish any of the business they had strived to develop.

Consequently, Air Pacific's first through service to Australia was forced to follow the circuitous route from Nadi via Port Vila and Honiara to Brisbane. French influence in the then Condominium of the New Hebrides vetoed the possibility of more direct services via Port Vila to Sydney as such a service would inevitably have affected the seat loadings on UTA via Noumea. No Fiji-Australia direct services were granted to the island carrier and, anyway, Air Pacific did not have the equipment to fly direct schedules. Its BAC 1-11s could, however, make the direct flight between Fiji and Auckland, but the New Zealanders were not about to share their near monopoly of direct services between the two countries. Fiji was offered routes to New Zealand via Tonga or via the New Hebrides (Vanuatu), New Caledonia and Norfolk Island with Norfolk Island a mandatory stop if the rights via New Caledonia were exercised. Significantly, all these routes required the acquiescence of third parties, especially France and Tonga. Norfolk Island could not accommodate the BAC 1-11 jets and Tonga's airport would require payload restrictions until coconut trees were removed from the glide paths and/or the runway was lengthened. Other route possibilities offered by New Zealand in the early 1970s further emphasized the regional flavour expected of Air Pacific.

In return for New Zealand and Australian generosity in granting such rights to the Fijian carrier, New Zealand retained the rights to operate from New Zealand to Nadi and beyond to the Cook Islands, Honolulu and points in the USA and Canada, and additionally from New Zealand to Nadi and beyond to Guam (Marianas), Japan, China, and Hong Kong. Australia was permitted to operate from Australian ports to Nadi and beyond to Honolulu and points in the USA and Canada, Tahiti, Mexico and South America. Seen in retrospect, these exchanges of air rights can only be viewed as discriminatory.

Subsequently Qantas withdrew its Brisbane-Nadi services in favour of Air Pacific when Fiji gained rights to operate to Australia via Noumea. New Zealand has gradually yielded to Fijian insistence on a more equal sharing of the traffic between their two countries. Leverage for a direct Suva-Auckland service by Air Pacific came from Tonga's curfew on Sunday flying. More recently, Air Pacific is leasing space on Qantas B747s for direct Nadi-Sydney sales, foreshadowing the day when they will fly their own equipment on that route.

THE SINGLE AIRLINE CONCEPT

Air Pacific was once considered the primary candidate as the South Pacific island states' single jointly owned carrier, the idea being that island countries in the region could share in the development of a single regional carrier whose primary objective would be to act as a feeder/distributors airline for the major trunk route carriers of the metropolitan powers. After Qantas acquired the airline from Harold Gatty in 1958, and with the entry of Air New Zealand and British Airways as major shareholding partners, management and control of the Board was very much external to island minority shareholding interests. Operations were conducted with a
view to helping solve the region's civil aviation problems, especially essential communications with dependent territories.

The concept of a single regional airline was doomed to failure for both political and social reasons, even though most expert opinion agreed that the idea was technically feasible and commercially sound. It was essential for the airline to enjoy full support from the various island nations if its poorly patronized east-west sectors were to be sustained. Unfortunately, basing the airline in Suva, from whence all services commenced and finished, did not meet the aspirations of other island governments to acquire expertise in all facets of airline operations. Hopeless telecommunications, night restricted operations, weight restricted runways, and other technical difficulties all conspired to present to intermediate ports of call most unsatisfactory levels of service. The net result of island dissatisfaction was for the various independent governments to attempt to develop their own capability and for Air Pacific to become identified as a truly Fijian carrier. Nauru, with the backing of phosphate revenues, vigorously challenges other established carriers in the Melanesian region, leaving little room for regional empathy.

Even so, international air services between Melanesian countries have mostly remained in the hands of Air Pacific because Air Nauru has not secured traffic rights at intermediate stages. One of Air Nauru's recent route expansions connects Nauru via Honiara and Port Vila to Auckland, but it can only sell seats on journeys to or from Nauru. Travellers from Nadi in Fiji to Honiara in the Solomon Islands are provided with the same plane service by Air Pacific with full traffic rights en route at Port Vila. Vanuatu travellers had, in the past, the option of travelling via Honiara or Noumea on Air Pacific services. Provided the traveller is willing to take a little longer and face the possible inconvenience of changing planes at Nauru, then Air Nauru offers relatively cheap travel between Melanesian ports, and between those ports and Melbourne or Auckland.

Whether or not the very recent independence of Vanuatu and the short independence experience of the Solomon Islands will see a dramatic restructuring of air services remains uncertain. Both Air Pacific and Air Nauru wish to consolidate their positions and act on behalf of their less affluent neighbours. Air Nuigini has not evidenced expansionary aims within Melanesia itself leaving the field to the other two carriers.

Vanuatu could represent a key pivot in the regional airline system for Melanesia. Before independence it was denied the opportunity for direct air services to Australia and New Zealand. French control of the New Hebridean Condominium's air traffic rights meant that the UTA hegemony on the Noumea-Port Vila sector was not compromised by diversion of traffic from Noumea.

Just as the larger carriers of the metropolitan powers established routes using intermediate fifth freedom traffic rights, so Air Pacific and any other regional carrier face the problems of having to share the traffic they develop with whatever carriers emerge in the newly sovereign states of Melanesia. All that has changed is the scale, for now the more developed of the Melanesian states act as the external suppliers of air transport capacity for their less developed neighbours. Inevitably, time will see
the phasing out of indirect routeing and the introduction of direct services flown by or on a charter basis for the independent island states.

Air Nugini management relations with the Papua New Guinea government have not been exactly smooth. This may account for the apparent disinclination to expand regional Melanesian services and to concentrate on domestic operations alongside a few long distance international services. Jet services were introduced domestically after the acquisition of four F28 jets from Air Nauru. This has dramatized the disparities in services between domestic airports, for only a few of the towns have airports capable of receiving the F28s. The qualitative capacity gap between the turboprop F27s and third level domestic carriers was large enough. The deployment of F28s domestically highlights the lack of trunk route airport facilities at all provincial centres, limiting the possibilities for phasing out the F27s or increasing the opportunities for multi-destination schedules for flights out of the capital Port Moresby. It is where large scale investment projects take place that the airport infrastructure is most likely to be improved. The process of marginalization or increasing disparities in transport facilities is thus likely to become more pronounced in Papua New Guinea as development takes place.

Each new assertion of national sovereignty has made the political climate less receptive to the single airline concept and reduced the likelihood of concerted multilateral efforts to overcome the region's long list of aviation woes. Newly independent countries are often fiercely nationalistic. They wish to be free not only politically, but economically. Hence, having shed themselves of colonialism they find it irritating when they must remain dependent upon outsiders for the provision of much of the goods and services needed to advance their development, air services included. As they strive to overcome excessive external controls, they are not inclined to obscure their fresh blooms of independence in wreaths of regional cooperation.

IMPROVED PROSPECTS FOR COOPERATION

Dillenbeck (1980) suggests that whatever the reasons for past inability amongst the regional airlines to join forces in order to achieve economic, operational and commercial large-scale benefits, the present situation is so desperate that they have no other alternative for survival than to enter into massive cooperative projects in all possible fields of activity and once and for all bury national prestige.

A single regional airline incorporating the international carriers of the various small states in the South Pacific is likely to remain a dream of centralist planners until such time as the states in the region decide upon the formation of a unified economic community after the manner of the European Economic Community. That is not to suggest, however, that the airlines of the region will not take earlier evolutionary steps towards forms of cooperation that will enable them to retain their identities at the same time as realizing the benefits from interlocking strategies, standardization of equipment, integrated spares and maintenance programmes, joint advertizing, joint timetabling, joint sales and ground staffing, joint training, and in specific instances the pooling of traffic rights.
Cooperation on virtually any worthwhile scale was unthinkable in the 1970s. One of the major obstacles was undoubtedly inequality. The internal tensions between the very unequal shareholders in Air Pacific, first candidate as the single regional airline, were such as to reduce that airline very rapidly to one whose objectives were unashamedly Fijian. The island participants could not contribute equally either by way of infrastructure, business, or cash. Accordingly, the services that were operated distributed benefits quite unequally. Lesser members of the consortium contrived to establish their own rival carriers with mandates to promote, naturally enough, their own nationalist interests.

Although central to Melanesia geographically, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu remain very much a part of the periphery in an economic and organizational sense. Their international air services are provided by 'foreigners'. Concerning international air services, therefore, Fiji and Papua New Guinea are closer to the 'core' than the 'periphery' when compared with the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. Yet Fiji and Papua New Guinea themselves are associated more with the periphery than the core in the context of relations with Australia, New Zealand and other major powers. Change the scale of focus and Australia and New Zealand can be seen as members of the periphery in contrast to the USA. No matter at what level we focus, it is evident that the people concerned wish to obtain a larger measure of control and less dependence upon outsiders for providing such things as air services. This is reflected in the desire to have their own carriers.

Mistrust has not been abolished in the southwest Pacific. However, the 1980s pose a very different situation to that prevailing throughout most of the 1970s. Air Nuigini, Air Pacific and Air Nauru, the three main regional carriers operating international services throughout Melanesia, have all gained much experience at the bargaining table and confidence that they can win a greater share of the traffic involving their own and other island countries. It is obvious that they cannot now be considered simply as feeder/distributor airlines for the other major trans-Pacific carriers. Even so, each of the regional airlines lacks the resources to mount, package and promote convenient schedules independently of outside assistance, particularly in their major foreign markets, and they cannot expect their metropolitan rivals to place island interests first. It therefore makes sense for them to act in concert on the promotional front after eliminating duplications and other inefficiencies between their own networks.

In the 1980s, Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Nauru are far better placed to enter any cooperative ventures as near equal partners with corresponding guarantees of equal benefits. Their airlines have all acquired jet status, with indications that commonality of aircraft type is a distinct possibility. Air Nauru has Boeing 737 and B727 jets and Air Pacific appears to be seriously considering replacing its third BAC 1-11 with a B737, leasing one until it takes delivery of its own. Air New Zealand also operates B737s and one of the Australian domestic carriers, Ansett Airlines, is to acquire them as well. This will increase the potential pool of spare parts in the region and the opportunities for shared maintenance facilities if necessary.
It is pertinent to note that the island governments in Melanesia and their national airlines may not have much time in which to build their position as the providers of small jet services to the region. Australia has not yet sought to match the regional airline links between Brisbane and Honiara, Brisbane and Noumea, or Brisbane and Nadi. However, pressure has been mounting in Australia for changes in both domestic and international civil aviation policy. The USA has two of its carriers, Pan American and Continental, flying into Australia in competition with Qantas. Australian domestic carriers, Ansett Airlines, TAA, and East-West Airlines, all would welcome the opportunity to fly internationally, particularly to adjacent countries. Qantas would like the opportunity to fill empty seats on the domestic sectors of its international routes in the interests of airline economics and national fuel economy.

If the two government owned airlines, Qantas and TAA, eventually merge for their mutual benefit, and Ansett Airlines are allowed to develop regional international links, this would provide Australian carriers with ideal equipment for shorter regional services in the southwest Pacific. Regional carriers based in the islands would face stiff competition from operators based in Australia because of the Australian carrier's exceptionally well developed sales networks at the source of much island tourist traffic. Before this scenario can become a reality, it is in the regional carrier's interests to consolidate their position by collectively strengthening their marketing system and/or seek pooling arrangements with an Australian or New Zealand carrier.

PHYSICAL OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS

Another major obstacle in the way of the formation of a single regional airline in the 1970s was the inadequacy of many countries' airport facilities. Short runways (always a problem in tropical climates), sub-standard runway strengths, complete absence of instrument landing systems (ILS) and other modern navigational aids, glide-path obstructions in the form of coconut palms or fringing hills, cramped terminal facilities for passengers and freight, questionable fire-fighting and related emergency equipment, and hopeless communications, all compounded management headaches and ensured that productivity levels for aircraft and aircrew were abysmal.

Again, it was a picture of very unequal capacity to participate and a recipe for frustration and charges of favouritism that led certain states to seek their own solutions rather than rely upon the uncertainties of possible development in neighbouring territories.

Some of the most pressing physical obstacles to international civil aviation operations in the region have been alleviated as operations enter the decade of the 1980s. As far as communications are concerned, the widespread introduction of earth satellite stations has marked the end of that depressing era when it was a complicated and time consuming process for operator and client alike to try and confirm any bookings for intermediate locations let alone try and change them at the last moment. Computer assisted reservation systems are gradually appearing at the major regional nodes and providing on-line interrogation of international
connections. Unfortunately, domestic communications in most of the island countries have not improved in step with the international linkages. Information transfer at the local level remains as frustrating as ever.

Runway lengths have been extended or are in the process of being extended. Navigational aids are making a welcome appearance and emergency equipment is being upgraded. Night flying support at regional airports is essential if greater aircraft utilization is to be achieved. There is evidence of gradual improvements, but restrictions at intermediate points can halt all night flying as the aircraft do not have the range to overfly such problem spots. Even in daylight, they must still fly close to their maximum range over water and carry sufficient fuel reserves to reach alternative airports which are seldom nearby.

The net result of improvements in regional international aviation facilities is that airline fleets are becoming jet oriented, reducing the need to retain turboprop equipment like the HS748 simply because of physical limitations at some airports. Domestic aviation in the islands is, on the other hand, experiencing the necessity of obtaining aircraft suited to local operations as the jets used on regional routes are inappropriate. Unlike their major metropolitan neighbours, the island states cannot expect economies from the merging of their domestic and international operations as the facilities available are so different. In fact, it would appear to be in their best interests to divorce their international and domestic operations since the equipment and air crew requirements are becoming so dissimilar and the political and social pressures are likewise incongruent.

One factor which probably will hasten the day when more outer islands are equipped with airstrips for use by domestic air transport, is the growing need for the island states to mount adequate surveillance services to police their two hundred nautical mile economic zones. The programme of airport developments in Fiji appears to be partly a response to this need. Once equipped with flying facilities, the outer islands may find their domestic shipping services will decay all the more rapidly as passengers transfer to the faster mode, but only if they can afford the rising fares. Unless advantage is taken of the freight capability of the aircraft to move such items as fresh or chilled fish to the Suva market, all that the introduction of air transport may achieve is the easing of travel for administrators from central government and the hastening of the one-way migration of outer islanders to the primate city. Domestic air services that leave domestic shipping without sufficient business to survive, pose a very real problem to island governments unless the air services themselves have a significant freight capability. It is also most useful if that freight capability eases the transfer problems between domestic and international services.

FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS

Island nations in the South Pacific are likely to be persuaded to make greater efforts to cooperate in civil aviation matters more by problems of rapidly escalating costs and the need to find the necessary capital to acquire efficient aeroplanes than by any other single factor.
Unfortunately, it is seldom possible to acquire exactly the right amount of capacity to service customer demand even given the absence of seasonality factors. Limited route networks merely serve to compound this problem by reducing the possibilities for schedule adjustments. In such circumstances, leasing extra capacity on a temporary basis is a more attractive solution than owning aircraft which must stand idle for excessive periods. It also presupposes that the appropriate aircraft are available and the owner airline has insufficient work itself for them, indeed welcoming the opportunity to increase the aircraft's productivity.

Traffic potential on some South Pacific sectors, especially those on an east-west axis linking small island states, is too small to justify more than two flights per week with aircraft of B737 capacity and in some cases even two flights is excessive; but at least two flights per week is necessary for customer convenience particularly if alternative routeings are either non existent or grossly circuitous. If more than one operator holds rights over such sectors or near parallel sectors, and they all wish to exercise their rights, each individual airline may find even one flight per week to be uneconomical and difficult to market attractively. It will often impose operational difficulties in positioning relief crews without leaving them grounded longer than is necessary from a safety standpoint.

In the past, Air Pacific overcame a problem of temporary excess capacity by leasing one of its BAC 1-11 jets to Air Malawi until route developments to New Zealand and Australia necessitated its recall. Subsequently a third BAC 1-11 was purchased, but now management feel there is insufficient regional work for three BAC 1-11s and it would be prudent to sell one and obtain leased B737 capacity for specific services, particularly as several neighbouring airlines appear to have excess B737 capacity available. Whereas the BAC 1-11 cannot normally service the Nadi-Brisbane sector non-stop in either direction, the B737 can, reducing the need for a technical non-traffic stop at either Noumea or Vila en route. As there is greater demand for Australia-Fiji services than there is for intermediate points, overflying the intermediate points on some services becomes attractive.

Three airlines with excess B737 capacity could be approached by Fiji. Air New Zealand provided such a service to Polynesian Airlines before delivery of that airline's own B737. Also, Air New Zealand is finding it economically necessary to reduce frequencies on some domestic services which may release more B737 capacity for regional operations that could be on its own account or on behalf of others. In fact, Air New Zealand is strategically well placed to provide intermittent extra capacity for other regional operators as its domestic services provide the cushion to ease the scheduling problems when short lease periods are contemplated.

Polynesian Airlines are unlikely in the short term to have enough work for their one B737 jet. They need to find other markets for their surplus capacity. That market may be Fiji. The third potential supplier of B737 or B727 capacity to Air Pacific is Air Nauru. It certainly has available capacity to lease, but whether the differences between the management of the two airlines can be smoothed sufficiently for such an arrangement to be negotiated is a moot point. UTA, Air Tungaru and Polynesian Airlines have all chartered Air Nauru capacity.
Chartering is a role to which Air Nauru is well suited in that its own population is so small and tourist attractions so limited that it does not itself generate much traffic and must rely upon servicing other countries demands for much of its revenue. Air Nauru is the willing provider of air services to states which cannot afford their own international airlines. Those states can provide the necessary traffic rights at intermediate points on Air Nauru's far flung network. Regional cooperation is essential if Air Nauru is not to remain a highly subsidized public relations enigma. One can expect Air Nauru to continue to offer attractive leasing deals in the region, and Air Pacific may yet be a customer.

It is a very encouraging sign in the South Pacific that more joint ventures are making their appearance. Dual flight designators are not uncommon, for instance FJ/UT, PH/UT and QF/FJ. More are foreshadowed in the 1980s. It is a means by which routes with insufficient capacity for more than one operator can be flown with the costs and revenues shared by the partners holding traffic rights. It also benefits from joint promotion by the airlines concerned, and when traffic eventually grows often leads to pooled operations as management realizes the value of continued cooperation.

RESTRICTURING POSSIBILITIES

Just as Tonga, still without an international airline of its own, has been able to attract more frequent air services than its small isolated population warrants, so Vanuatu, also without its own international airline, is placed strategically to take advantage of its mid Melanesian location. It may become a hub of regional international air movements in a manner which New Caledonia has never really exploited. Noumea does act as a gateway for UTA/JAL flights from Tokyo, but Nadi can now challenge that role especially as aircraft will fly Tokyo-Nadi-Auckland. Other long distance UTA flights focus upon Noumea, but Noumea is the target with little regard for regional redistribution of traffic. Thus independent Vanuatu in the 1980s can offer the possibilities of non-stop services to New Zealand and Australia for its own nationals besides one-stop through plane services to the same destinations from other island states.

Most of the island states in Melanesia desire direct or same plane through services to Australia and New Zealand. Since control of their own air traffic rights came with independence, they are now able to encourage the development of these services. A glance at the map will show that both New Caledonia and Vanuatu are ideally located to act as cross roads for such services either on the Australia-Fiji axis, the Nauru-Australia axis, or the Papua New Guinea/Solomons/Nauru-New Zealand axis.

Figure 1 displays the international air services which operated in 1974. By 1979 they had evolved to those shown in Figure 2. The political, technological and physical background to these services is given in Kissling (1980). In the 1980s, we could expect further restructuring as both the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu decide how their respective air rights agreements with Australia and New Zealand are to be operated. One possible restructuring of Melanesian international air services involving the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu is set out below (see also Figure 3).
Figure 1
Figure 2

AIR SERVICES - SOUTH PACIFIC

MAY 1979

*No Rights . technical only
Air Pacific would cease to operate any of its Brisbane services via Honiara in favour of the more direct Nadi-Vila-Brisbane route now feasible following Vanuatu's independence. It would continue Nadi-Noumea-Brisbane services as well, probably in conjunction with UTA on the Noumea-Nadi sector as now occurs. Twice weekly schedules via Noumea and via Vila could be augmented by twice weekly direct Nadi-Brisbane schedules, provided Air Pacific lease the appropriate B737 equipment from one of its neighbouring airlines. Indications are that Air New Zealand is to be the supplier, but Polynesian Airlines could offer the attraction of providing through plane connection to Apia in Western Samoa if its B737 was leased by Air Pacific for direct Nadi-Brisbane services. Fiji's rights into Sydney may have to be flown via leased cabin space in Qantas B747s until Fiji decides upon replacement aircraft for its BAC 1-11s. At least the cooperative arrangement gives Air Pacific the chance to market the sector itself rather than see its share of the traffic distributed amongst 'fifth freedom' operators like Canadian Pacific, Pan American and Continental.

The gap created by Air Pacific's withdrawal from the Nadi-Vila-Honiara-Brisbane sectors could be filled very neatly by Air Nauru flying on behalf of both the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu in conjunction with its own rights between Nauru and New Zealand and Nauru and Australia. At the present time it operates a once weekly service Nauru-Honiara-Vila-Auckland but does not hold intermediate point traffic rights. Provided the various bilateral agreements can be made to permit Air Nauru to operate on behalf of other island states, and they can pool their rights, it would seem to be a very sensible means of ensuring necessary east-west connections as part of north-south services, for it is the latter which generate the most traffic. Only minimal deviation would be required. Air New Zealand could be expected to reciprocate at least on the Auckland-Vila-Honiara sectors if traffic out of New Zealand warranted it, and in so doing increase the New Zealand presence in the region which is otherwise dominated by Australia.

Until Solair is suitably equipped, the Solomon Islands will continue to require outsiders to provide the Honiara-Brisbane services. This is the Solomons Islands' most important route. If Air Nauru is contracted to provide Solomon Island entitlements rather than Air Pacific, and if these entitlements can again be flown in conjunction with those held by Nauru, a cooperative venture between Nauru and the Solomon Islands could see them linked by a through service Nauru-Honiara-Brisbane-Melbourne with full traffic rights except on the Australian cabotage sector Brisbane-Melbourne.

Neither Honiara nor Vila airports are of the necessary standard to accept B727 aircraft on a regular basis. This limits Air Nauru to using Noumea as its staging point for bringing its B727s from Nauru to headquarters in Melbourne, again without traffic rights on the Noumea-Melbourne sector. Should either Honiara or Vila manage to upgrade their airports to accommodate larger aircraft of the medium size like B727s or their expected replacements in the next generation of aircraft, then direct Melbourne services would become a distinct possibility, further reducing the demand on the short Vila-Noumea sector. This latter sector is mainly flown on a charter basis by Air Nauru for UTA along with Noumea-Wallis Island services. Chartering capacity from the various regional airlines would seem the best means of ensuring the link is maintained without the necessity of keeping specialist equipment and aircrew just for that job.
Air Niugini's intentions in the region are not clear. It would appear that apart from links to immediate neighbours when traffic is sufficient, i.e. the Solomons Islands and Indonesia but not Nauru, Air Niugini seems intent upon concentrating on longer haul connections to places like Kagoshima, Manila, Hong Kong and Honolulu using B707 aircraft rather than deploying its F28s in a purely regional role even though the F28s are quite suited to that role. It is unlikely that Air Niugini could hope to divert much island traffic via Port Moresby when Noumea and Nadi offer equally good connections and Air Nauru offers a cheaper alternative to places like Hong Kong and Kagoshima. A far more attractive proposition than an island-hopping route to Auckland would be direct services tied in with onwards services to Hong Kong or Jakarta, but such 'sixth' freedom endeavours as attempted by Nauru do not meet with the approval of the countries at either end who naturally resist the erosion of their 'third and fourth' freedom traffic potentials. Until Papua New Guinea as a destination generates enough traffic to support several carriers over the same routes, then it is unlikely that Port Moresby will be used as a means to bypass Australia to reach places like Fiji or New Zealand.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND COOPERATION

Telecommunications technology in the form of earth satellite stations offers island nations a far better chance to participate than has been their experience with international civil aviation developments. They can telescope in time the development process and all enjoy a similar standard of service, something that, had submarine cable remained the only alternative, would not have been the case. No capital city is likely to be left out of these developments or bypassed in future developments since satellite communications can have such a wide footprint, simultaneously covering the whole of Melanesia and beyond.

It is interesting to note that implementation of telecommunication developments has followed closely upon the investigatory work done by the International Telecommunications Union/United Nations Development Project (ITU/UNDP) in the South Pacific. Usually projects of this nature involve a considerable time lag before any recommendations become a reality, especially considering the relative poverty of the countries concerned, but in this instance the right technology became available at favourable prices at the opportune moment. It also meant that certain countries like Australia, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea could pass on some of their redundant equipment at very favourable rates to island countries which still needed such equipment for developments in their domestic networks.

Paradoxically, the relative ease of participating in international telecommunications, compared with air transport, does not mean that domestic telecommunication services will likewise be mounted more simply than domestic civil aviation. The gulf between domestic and international capability is far wider for telecommunications than for civil aviation. External interests in both instances have been more concerned with establishing the external links, with the responsibility for the domestic reticulation resting firmly with national authorities. In the case of civil aviation, those authorities had more time to marry the external/internal components. Not so in the case of telecommunications.
The sudden upgrading of international communication links has meant that few of the countries in Melanesia have the local experience and expertise to handle modern telecommunications equipment. Some have resorted to franchising as a means of obtaining that expertise, others have recruited overseas and linked training of local people to the temporary importation of expertise. South Pacific Forum countries, through the coordinating functions of The South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation (SPEC), have access to a training centre. Even so, it will be several years before the technical expertise is available locally. Meanwhile expectations of improved levels of service which satellite communications can offer will remain the preserve of main centres of population until rural communications networks are greatly improved.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Melanesia</th>
<th>Type of access</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>SEACOM cable to Sydney/Guam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomons</td>
<td>Standard B Earth Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>Standard B Earth Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Caledonia</td>
<td>Standard A Earth Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>COMPAC cable to Auckland/Hawaii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Standard A Earth Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Samoa</td>
<td>Standard B Earth Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>Standard B Earth Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>Standard B Earth Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>HF radio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nauru</td>
<td>Standard B Earth Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallis and Futuna</td>
<td>HF radio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokelau</td>
<td>Limited HF radio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fed. States of Micronesia</td>
<td>HF radio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niue</td>
<td>HF radio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cook Islands</td>
<td>Standard B Earth Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Samoa</td>
<td>Standard B Earth Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Polynesia</td>
<td>Standard A Earth Station</td>
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</table>

There has been mounting political, social and economic pressure for improvement of domestic telecommunication deficiencies as a direct consequence of the dramatic advances in international links. With the exception of the Federated States of Micronesia, all but the smallest South Pacific countries either have obtained or have under construction efficient and modern telecommunication facilities (see Table 1). The question is now being asked whether or not satellite rather than terrestrial solutions can be used to solve rural telecommunications deficiencies. A paper prepared by ITU (project RAS/78/048) on behalf of SPEC, canvases the prospects and makes comparisons with the technical solutions to Australian outback telecommunication needs.
None of the small states in the South Pacific could contemplate having its own satellite. Even if they all joined forces in a cooperative venture, they still could not afford their own satellite. However, as the ITU paper notes 'the thrust of history is for countries to join together to create a common pool of demand for implementation of high total cost/low unit cost technologies. In international forums this has resulted in dramatic cost reductions over recent years in both actual as well as constant price terms'. Because of the region's geography and historical affinity with Australia and New Zealand, the paper suggests that the needs of the small island countries could be incorporated within a larger regional system, in fact could be served by association with the proposed Australian domestic satellite system.

Perhaps one of the most exciting aspects of satellite rather than terrestrial solutions to domestic communications in the Pacific island context is that the introduction of high technology need not necessarily result in marginalization of communities. In fact the reverse could well be the case, for isolated corners of archipelagos that have never had much by way of communications could enjoy much the same standards of service as urban communities. This is because of the relative insensitivity to distance of satellite costs compared to conventional terrestrial links. A second advantage of satellite systems is that they permit flexibility to combine small needs on both permanent and intermittent bases.

Most compelling of all would seem to be the relative costs. The ITU paper stresses that 'there is no way with existing technologies that any combination of terrestrial systems for rural telecommunications can be made competitive with a shared usage satellite solution'. When satellite terminals are produced in large quantities, costs per unit fall and if common to a regional system, spares and maintenance facilities can be pooled. Allocation between countries and within countries can also change easily through time as developments take place and supplementary terrestrial systems become economically justified. Many of the Australian outback communication problems mirror those encountered in South Pacific island contexts; the ITU consultants do not see the need for system planners to do anything particularly exceptional for the islands.

If the footprinting of the Australian domestic satellites can be such as to offer scope for South Pacific island participation, and the in-orbit spare can be positioned with possible island use subject to preemptive recall, then a relatively low cost solution to rural telecommunications problems in Melanesia and throughout most of the South Pacific island communities is a distinct possibility. Australian influence in the region would be enhanced by such a positive cooperative gesture, the costs of which would be relatively small but the benefits to the islands conversely enormous.

Unfortunately, it seems that footprinting of the Australian domestic satellite to give general coverage of the South Pacific islands is not likely because of power and other technical considerations, though some beams may be directed to the South Pacific. Antenna dishes would need to be somewhat different than envisaged for widespread deployment of rural stations. Some of the potential users of the Australian domestic satellite system will require instantaneous backup should normal circuits cease to
function. For instance, Transport Australia needs real time communications for air navigation and air traffic control purposes. If the in-orbit spare satellite was temporarily out of position and not immediately available because it was being used for Pacific islands coverage, unacceptable breaks in communication within Australia could occur. Much of the insurance value of the in-orbit spare satellite would be lost. Any preemptive uses of spare capacity on the Australian domestic satellite are thus likely to be confined to domestic operations. Repositioning is out of the question should priority users suddenly need to capture circuits from functions taking low cost advantage of the system's insurance capacity.

If Australia does not provide the leadership in the Melanesian telecommunications field as far as satellite solutions are concerned, then it may not be too long before Japanese or other powers step in instead. For the present, a technically and economically attractive development for island nations as a spin-off from the needs of users in the more developed neighbouring countries is unlikely to eventuate unless they develop the political will in those developed countries to give foreign aid considerations greater weight, or somehow align domestic commercial needs and foreign policy factors. Unlike transport, telecommunications technology gives prospects for complete coverage of island communities even if island governments must continue to wait for external sources of aid. Undoubtedly the new age of telecommunications in the South Pacific lends a new dimension to regional development and regional cohesion.

BEYOND DIVERSITY?

Access to air services is unlikely to exhibit much uniformity in Melanesia. On the international scene, there are definite signs that each country will be served by direct connections to major foreign markets rather than via indirect routing. There is also a growing commonality in aircraft types. However, uniformity on the international front is not matched by similarities in service levels within the domestic networks of individual countries. Marginalization at the domestic scale remains a difficult problem.

There is the potential for geographic isolation to be minimized so far as telecommunications are concerned. In this field, modern technology does not necessarily bring benefits to a few specific places. It can enable a widespread enjoyment of reliable communications. But if the most modern satellite solutions to rural telecommunications are not embraced, then the gap in quality between international and domestic services will grow rather than diminish, with some communities remaining peripheral in more than a geographical sense.
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DOMESTIC SHIPPING: OWNERSHIP, ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL

Anne C. Dunbar

INTRODUCTION

A substantial body of literature now exists on small-island development and the inherent issues of isolation, marginalization and fragmentation. Within this, a subset of studies has emerged dealing explicitly with transport and, more particularly, with inter-island shipping (Couper 1965, 1967, 1979; Baker 1972, 1974; Brookfield, 1978, 1979, 1980; Dick 1978, 1979; UNESCO/UNFPA 1977; UNCTAD 1978; et al.). In addition, individual island governments have commissioned detailed reports on the status of their own island shipping linkages (e.g. Papua New Guinea Department of Transport 1971; McNamara and Perkins 1980 (Solomon Islands), and various national planning office studies). In recognizing the key role of effective transport services in the realization of their long term development plans, governments are now having to face the prospect and implications of much greater and more direct intervention in the operations of the commercial shipping sector.

The seemingly late arrival of such concerted interest in the national-scale organization and operation of internal shipping largely reflects the laissez-faire attitudes which prevailed during the colonial period. Although the administrations attempted to maintain a presence throughout the scattered islands of the archipelagos for political reasons, the commercial trading companies (which had quickly dominated the transport and marketing sectors of the plantation-based economies) were under no obligation to provide any form of welfare service to outer islands, nor indeed perceived any such need. Company shipping, with various individually operated trading vessels working on its periphery, was observed to perform the required functions of collecting copra from plantations or villages and of distributing imported goods. Thus, the administrations saw little cause for government-level involvement and, given the apparently chaotic mix of vessel types, route patterns, freight charges and operational goals which developed in the 'free enterprise' fleets, no doubt preferred to let the principles of 'survival of the fittest' hold sway in island shipping rather than meddle with forces and structures which were imperfectly understood. Only when the colonial powers began consciously preparing for independence was there any overt recognition of the scale of the spatial inequalities created by concentrated company activity in high production/consumption areas. It is the reality of this situation with which newly independent governments now have to cope. They are faced with a population which, in varying degrees, has become locked into the world cash economy and which, despite vast
differences in level of accessibility to central port-towns, expects to receive the goods and services associated with this changing lifestyle. It is here that the lack of accumulated experience, amongst both expatriate planning 'experts' and indigenous decision-makers, is so telling in the archipelagic environment.

Much of the contemporary work on island shipping systems has tended to gravitate towards finding responses to changing maritime technologies (Maxwell Stamp Associates Ltd 1978; Brookfield 1980) and away from the descriptive categorization of domestic fleets into formal/informal sectors, expatriate/indigenous ownership patterns and government/private control systems. Useful as all these approaches and contributions may be, there must be some clearer identification of the policy options which may be open to island governments, and of their structural and spatial implications. The debate on new vessel designs and cargo-handling systems tends to overshadow the more fundamental questions pertaining to the ownership and control of this new technology, and to isolate shipping as an element in the infrastructure rather than integrate it into the full complexity of economic, social and political relations of which it is a part. The aims of this paper are therefore to identify the nature of the 'island shipping problem', to suggest a schema of possible policy options, and discuss their implications in relation to specific Melanesian archipelagos.

THE NATURE OF THE DOMESTIC SHIPPING PROBLEM

Unless the products of the soil and sea can be delivered to island ports for shipment, the whole programme of economic development from the 'grass roots' collapses (National Transport Survey, BSIP 1976).

Such is the nature of the problem. Without an effective inter-island transport system the whole basis of small-island participation in the cash economy breaks down and severe developmental imbalances occur between those islands with access to the pivotal points in the system (the international ports) and those without. Increasing diversities in levels of social and economic opportunity intensify the core-periphery structure of the archipelagos and so lead to further concentration of shipping services in the areas of greatest economic activity. Caught in this downward spiral, the marginal regions must face the prospect of isolation from the cash economy and a drastic modification of their development aspirations. The fact that domestic shipping is unable to meet the demands of island populations throughout the archipelago essentially constitutes the problem; the set of factors which combine to produce this problem, however, are very complex and varied and must be understood if government is successfully to embark on policies to control the situation.

The factors of relevance to the archipelagic shipping problem relate to obvious geographic constraints (long sea distances, small volumes of cargo, difficult coastlines and the lack of suitable sites for wharves), historical legacies of the colonial era (domination by expatriate trading companies, polarization of the space-economy around the international ports, and concentration of shipping activity upon those areas of greatest copra production which are in closest proximity to these ports), and a
whole range of technical and organizational constraints which stem not only from ongoing internal processes but also from changing external developments. The common denominator in all these factors is that of cost, or, more precisely, that of rising operating costs which must eventually be passed on to the consumers of the service. Whereas consideration of the physical problems of distance and the specific technical problems of small ship operations have received much attention in the literature, the intention here is to look more closely at the way in which expatriate company operations have affected the subsequent development of island fleets and so to view the 'problem' more as a progressive phenomenon than a set of discrete issues. In this way it is possible to stress the deep seated structural impact which company domination of island trading achieved and the legacies of this which are apparent in contemporary domestic shipping systems.

The pervasiveness of the expatriate trading company system throughout Melanesia is well known (see Brookfield with Hart 1971:249-51). As the principal engines of commercial colonization, the metropolitan-based companies have been major forces shaping the space-economy not only of the wider region but also of individual archipelagos. Having originally opened up the islands for commercial agriculture, and, as part of the political colonial machine, having won the covert support of the colonial governments through their strategic command of the all important sea links, the expatriate trading companies achieved a high degree of domination from the outset. Through their vertically integrated operations, a small number of large companies (notably Burns Philip and Co. Ltd., W.R. Carpenters, Steamships Trading Co., Morris Hedstrom, and la Maison Ballande of Noumea), was able to control not only the key strands in the internal trading networks but also those linking the island economy to its overseas markets. With their economies of scale and their ability to cross-subsidize between various fields of activity when their shipping operations suffer temporary losses, the companies have tended progressively to squeeze out private traders or merely absorb them into their own network.

Whereas in the early years of colonial occupation company vessels tended to operate directly from their bases in Australia or New Caledonia (in the case of Messageries Maritimes) to selected anchorages within Melanesian archipelagos, the increase in vessel size and the use of steamships rather than sailing vessels on the long haul runs meant that break-of-bulk ports grew up in the islands and that differentiation between external and internal services occurred. Thus intra archipelago trading by international vessels progressively ceased and a new pattern of company operations became established. The growth of the port towns and their development as the bases for branch company activity saw a progressive polarization of economic activity. The company vessels working internally operated on routes radiating out from these locations and, understandably, preferred to conduct as much business as possible close to the import/export centres. As expatriate traders pulled out of the islands under the threat of financial ruin (often having got into serious credit difficulties with the companies) so the colons with plantations on the periphery of company operations found themselves increasingly marginalized. Indeed, as early as the 1930s, colons in Vanuatu were demanding (unsuccessfully) government subsidies to upgrade shipping services to their small plantations in what had become, by reason of the superimposition of a
tightly controlled company power structure, the 'outer islands'. What had previously been a relatively 'open' trading system, with miscellaneous vessels tramping freely throughout the archipelagos, had become a 'closed' system with the establishment of international ports and the designation of official ports of entry.

Control of port operations was the next obvious step, and indeed, until as recently as 1972, the two trading houses in Vanuatu owned the only available wharves in Vila and so charged wharfage on all goods (imports, exports, and internal cargoes) passing across them. Couper (1965:97) notes a similar development of company power in Fiji during the early decades of this century, with a gradual division of the archipelago into the core areas served by merchant company vessels and the outer areas which were left to the small 'freight earners' (mainly traders who still maintained trade stores there). Couper suggests that the company interests in the port town of Suva were no doubt behind the successful resistance to scheduling of any more ports of entry, especially on Vanua Levu, which might have weakened their dominant position. The situation developed rather differently in Papua New Guinea where, until 1967, overseas vessels carried nearly all the cargo between 'main ports' within the territory, leaving locally registered vessels to serve outports, plantations and mission stations. After 1967, specialized shipping companies on the Australia-Papua New Guinea run introduced unit-load vessels which were restricted to fewer main ports than the conventional vessels they replaced (Rimmer 1972). However, as will be discussed later, this has had the effect of handing inter-main-port trade over to Papua New Guinea based companies and so radically altering the pattern of local shipping.

The core-periphery structure was therefore gradually strengthening and those areas offering the prospect of larger profits to shipowners were becoming more clearly defined, so making the outer areas even more unattractive. After the Depression, when many expatriate plantations were abandoned throughout Melanesia, the companies proved themselves flexible enough to capture the trade of local, indigenous producers. As local production grew (by 1948 over half the copra exported from Vanuatu was being produced by villagers), the villagers became increasingly dependent on the services of company ships which not only purchased their copra but also brought consumer goods to their doorsteps. This inability of islanders to provide for their own transport needs, and yet their desire to participate in the cash economy (and moreover their preference for company ships with their stores stocked full of tempting imported goods), has essentially made for a process of 'power amplification' (Baumgartner et al. 1976) favouring and reinforcing the power of those controlling the trading linkages. In Vanuatu, it may be argued that such control effectively precluded the development of indigenous middleman-entrepreneurial activity until the companies found themselves threatened by impending political independence. Since the copra economy is basically littoral, the producers can each negotiate directly with the ships calling at their nearest anchorage. Thus, owning the principal means of distribution (the ships themselves) the companies are in a position to act as middleman as well as supplier and exporter and opportunities for indigenous entrepreneurship have been largely restricted to the village level (usually as store-keepers). Only since the mid 1970s have ni-Vanuatu begun entering the domestic shipping scene in any numbers as commercial vessel owners, a time
which relates to high copra prices, growing political awareness (and an associated frustration with company domination), and a weakening in the company monopoly as rising operating costs forced a contraction of services.

In Vanuatu, indigenous participation in island shipping represents diversification from their store owning and taxi running enterprises - and many of these owners know that if their shipping ventures fail they always have their other businesses to return to. Such attitudes constitute a major problem for any grand design of establishing a fully fledged indigenous shipping industry, for the level of investment in maintenance and repairs of the vessels tends to be very low. Lacking capital and accumulated expertise, village *kompani* or individuals have bought old, often unsafe vessels which, needing to make quick profits in order to pay back the bank loan as soon as possible, are run on the core routes in competition with the company ships. The outer areas, for which such vessels would appear to be ideal, remain isolated. The lack of navigational skills amongst their skippers, the unseaworthiness of the craft and the long, open sea distances often involved, mean that such voyages are rarely attempted. Thus, the increase in local shipping operations does not appear to have increased the tonnage capacities, or even the frequency of services to outer islands, but, as has occurred in Fiji and the Solomon Islands, has led to overtonnaging in the core areas.

In all the archipelagos, the company response to increasing indigenous competition has frequently been to form *de facto* cartels whereby freight rates can be manipulated (e.g. Baker 1974). Rate undercutting by companies means that the less efficient, less capital-secure shipping enterprises are either driven out of business or forced to operate on the periphery of company activities, usually in the outer islands. Since these vessels are indeed less efficient and often maintained to a less competitive standard, the outer islands find themselves double disadvantaged. Not only do they not have the benefits of big-ship company services, with the full range of consumer goods (the purchase of which is generally the motivating force behind village copra production), but the vessels which do occasionally call can only provide a poor quality service at a relatively high cost.

In very general terms, domestic fleet development has tended to polarize into a core of a small number of larger, relatively well maintained, expatriate owned vessels dominating the most profitable routes, and a broad periphery of older, unreliable, and considerably smaller vessels having to work in the outer areas or in the interstices of company operations and operating on a variety of scales of commercial activity. Nevertheless, the island shipping problem does not end here. A number of changes can be identified which are affecting all sectors of shipping regardless of ownership structures, and which, being superimposed on this deeply polarized pattern of activity, add yet another dimension to the situation facing independent governments today. The most fundamental problem is that of steadily rising operating costs. In part this stems from the general ageing of the domestic fleet and a subsequent increase in maintenance costs. (In 1971, almost half the cargo carrying fleet in Papua New Guinea - some 109 vessels - was over twenty years old and, in Vanuatu, almost two thirds of the fleet fell into this category in 1979.) Reasons
for the absence of fleet renewal are complex but obviously relate to falling profitability of the business. In the high risk island trade, a new ship, while having lower maintenance costs, has higher capital costs. As Dick (1979) points out, it is more attractive to import an older ship and finance the maintenance outlays from current revenue than to import a new ship and have to bear the higher interest costs on the investment. Also, as companies pull out of island shipping (as Burns Philip, Morris Hedstrom and W.R. Carpenters have done in Fiji), so the responsibilities of domestic services fall increasingly on the old, inadequate vessels of indigenous entrepreneurs who have none of the capital support to buy newer vessels, or on government services which have yet to determine the degree to which they are to be involved in commercial freighting/passenger work.

In addition to rising maintenance costs, all operators have been faced with rising fuel costs, wages and the costs of meeting new safety standards imposed by governments. Against all these costs, the level of freight rates has remained too low to allow any margin for the replacement of capital equipment. Although, as will be shown later, various governments have attempted route subsidies and freight subsidies to try to induce operators to run ships to outer islands, the lack of infrastructural investment there (in the way of cleared channels, passage markers, navigational beacons and wharves) makes such voyaging particularly hazardous and unattractive. A further factor is the increasing modal split, whereby passengers increasingly travel by air while cargo goes by sea, resulting in a loss of revenue to shipowners for whom passengers constitute a profitable 'cargo' - one which Brookfield (1980) aptly describes as being able to load and discharge itself quickly and without costly handling equipment.

At present then, it appears that domestic fleets are heading for almost certain obsolescence unless some means of regeneration or complete restructuring can be found. The island shipping problem, as identified in these general terms, is one rooted in the circular causation process of marginalization, itself rooted in the inherent spatial inequalities of colonial company trading and the realities of geographical fragmentation. So as to escape from further, somewhat dangerous, generalizations about domestic fleets, each archipelago will now be briefly considered in terms of its own particular problems and its own particular responses (both governmental and technological).

DOMESTIC FLEETS IN ISLAND MELANESIA: A COMPARISON IN ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL

Papua New Guinea

The larger scale of economic activity and population in Papua New Guinea make comparisons with conditions in the Solomon Islands, Fiji and Vanuatu rather difficult, and the complex set of local-shipping hinterlands at each main port creates a very different pattern of linkages. Furthermore, the government has been much involved in trying to build up a strong local-shipping industry, currently regulated by the Office of
Figure 1

Concentration of main ports in Papua New Guinea
Transport. With the introduction of unit-load, overseas ships to a select number of main ports (Port Moresby, Lae, Rabaul, Madang, Kieta and Kavieng), considerable reliance has been placed on the inter-main-port coastal fleet to redistribute unitized cargoes around the islands to ports with suitable wharf facilities. The Commission of Inquiry into Coastal Shipping (Papua New Guinea Department of Transport 1971) declared that this fleet, which comprised nineteen general cargo vessels over 150 grt, was obsolete and should be replaced. A large part of the problem has been over tonnaging on the inter-main-port routes, which eventually resulted in the Administration establishing a Coastal Licensing Authority (Rimmer 1972). This restricted the entry of additional vessels of over 200 grt into the coastal trade and imposed route restrictions on new licensees where necessary. Because of the ageing structure of the fleet, however, shipowners subsequently demanded permission from the Administration to raise their freight rates (a 30 per cent increase on some routes was demanded by some operators - Rimmer 1972:54). Aware of the contradiction between supporting the operators while necessarily neglecting its responsibilities to the wider community (on whom the increased costs would fall), the Administration appointed the aforementioned Commission of Inquiry to consider ways in which this 'industry' could be regulated so as to provide modern and efficient methods of operation at reasonable prices. However, despite the Commission's recommendations on licensing of vessels and companies and on rate increases of 5 and 10 per cent on certain long distance routes, the inter-main-port routes were still overtonnaged by as much as 50 per cent (National Planning Office, Papua New Guinea 1978:73).

Away from the inter-main-port routes, great reliance is placed on the government fleet for the provision of services. The Final Report of the Investigation of the Government Fleet (Papua New Guinea Office of Transport 1977) states (p.13) that 'whereas commercial shipping enterprises both coastal and overseas provide for the import and export of essential commodities, the Government Fleet services the remote and developing areas of the country to the benefit of the Community'. Such services are not intended to compete with private enterprise already operating, but are focused on areas where, for economic reasons, commercial craft will not venture. However, costs of operating the government fleet increased from K1.28 million in 1973/74 to K2.46 million in 1976/77, in spite of the fact that high priority has been given to replacing obsolete vessels to reduce maintenance and operating costs. By the end on 1978 over K4 million had been spent on a vessel replacement programme (many of the vessels had been the original surplus Allied vessels which formed the nucleus of the government fleet after World War II), and alternative ways of operating the fleet were being considered. Amongst these were suggestions that commercial enterprise be invited to take on the entire functions of the government fleet on a tender basis, that private firms be subsidized to carry out government functions, or that all assets and complete control of provincial fleets be handed over to their respective governments. The last suggestion was the one which gained highest recommendation.

It might be argued that the introduction of unitized cargoes has had a differential impact on regional development. Those regions with pivotal ports offering direct overseas services tend to be favoured at the expense of regions served by 'feeder' services, which, as Rimmer (1972:109) states,
DOMESTIC SHIPPING: OWNERSHIP, ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL

Figure 2

Solomon Islands: location of main ports and wharves
creates the 'classic dilemma of trying to balance the welfare interests of Papua New Guineans against the premium placed on economic growth' (and transport efficiency). The government's national development strategy, outlined in a white paper in 1976, heavily stresses the importance of rural development and decentralization of economic activity. The 1978-81 National Public Expenditure Plan states that, in a bid to provide a more equal distribution of economic benefits, 'shipping services will be upgraded and extended to improve communications, and hence development opportunities, in coastal and island regions, and to reduce dependence on air transport' (National Planning Office, Papua New Guinea 1978:101). With the government fleet in serious difficulty, it is not easy to see how such 'upgrading' will be effective even in the short term without consideration of the underlying causes of shipping's failure to deal equitably itself with all areas. Furthermore, without a concept of a 'total transport system' (Couper 1979:4) the government would appear to be committed to a policy of subsidization for eternity.

The Solomon Islands

As in Papua New Guinea, the government fleet in the Solomons plays a major commercial role in outer island areas. Although its main raison d'etre is to provide cargo and passenger services which, because of the lack of private sector interest would not otherwise be available, the fleet has been criticized for its tendency to compete with private shipowners. Because it is highly subsidized, it can set low freight rates (as can mission-run ships), but this tends to attract cargoes away from commercial shipping concerns which, if they are to compete, must similarly offer lower rates and suffer a reduction in earnings. This has resulted in low private investment in shipping and 'less than efficient' operations (Special Committee on Provincial Assembly, Solomon Islands 1978). As the same report goes on to state, 'it is becoming increasingly clear that indigenous shipowners do not have the capital or the expertise to efficiently operate the inter-island and inter-province shipping links', an observation which makes the recent withdrawal of many Chinese traders doubly regrettable. It appears that high running costs relative to freight rates, ageing vessels and captains, political uncertainty and the high costs of new vessels, all contributed to their decision to leave the trade (Ward and Proctor 1980).

Because there are as yet no route licensing schemes, the bulk of private shipping activity is concentrated on prime routes in the main island chain. Proposals for licensing had been made as early as 1971, but there was difficulty in establishing which routes or areas should be subsidized and by how much and the proposals were not pursued. Given this lack of central control it is not surprising that the outer areas are almost totally dependent upon government services. The introduction of container services from Australia and New Zealand has meant that the number of international ports has been effectively reduced from three to two; Gizo has lost its direct connections with these countries and its goods must now be transhipped at Honiara (with a consequent rise in freight costs on goods destined for Western Province). As the transport task shifts from overseas vessels on to higher cost internal services, so the pressure on the domestic fleet can be expected to intensify. As Ward and Proctor (1980) indicates, the time must be approaching when the government has to
Figure 3

Fiji: geographical allocation of freight rate subsidies (SF per tonne)

Source: UNESCO/UNFPA (1977) and Saggar (1978)
make serious, long term decisions about the level and nature of future investments in shipping, and particularly with regard to the adoption of appropriate technologies for transshipping unitized cargoes within the archipelago.

Fiji

Until relatively recently government involvement in domestic shipping had been limited to that of regulation of safety standards and control of freight rates and route subsidies. Following the withdrawal of a number of private, conventional steel-hulled vessels from the trade during a recession in the late 1960s (notably those of Burns Philp, Carpenters and Morris Hedstrom), and the phasing out of vessels on the less profitable routes, the government was forced to review its policy on non commercial involvement. By 1977 the only shipping companies still operating were Williams Shipping and Rabi Holdings, and the manager of one of them estimated that an initial outlay of $5-6 million would be necessary from the government to find suitable replacements by 1980 (Pacific Islands Monthly October 1977). The government has therefore embarked on a programme of building and operating a fleet of steel landing craft with loading ramps. Furthermore, the trend is for the carriage of cargo in barges towed by tugs which operate to Levuka and Vanua Levu, and less frequently to Taveuni. Nevertheless, as the UNESCO study of eastern Fiji (1977) shows, the island services are generally deteriorating with only those centres close to Suva still maintaining regular and frequent services.

Again, rising operating costs are the cause of the breakdown in outer island services. In 1972, the government began subsidizing commercial operators in a scheme which involved the division of the archipelago into eight zones. The subsidies on cargo (copra and general) covered all freight costs above an inward rate of $F7/ton and an outward rate of $F11/ton outside the main island (Viti Levu). Between 1972 and 1977 the scheme cost the exchequer over $F1.5 million (Saggar 1978), but yet there was evidence to suggest that price differentials between inner and outer islands had continued to widen (Brookfield 1978:77). For this reason, freight subsidy schemes ought perhaps to be seen only as short term measures and not as a substitute for a more rigorous investigation of the underlying causes of outer island problems. The UNESCO report (UNESCO/UNFPA 1977) does in fact assess a number of different strategies, in each of which radical restructuring and integration of all strands in the transport network form the key elements. In Fiji it is intended to create a number of 'central trading points' similar to those suggested by Couper (1965), undertake restrictive licensing of vessels on specific routes, and rely increasingly on government services in non commercial areas.

Vanuatu

Having only just achieved political independence, Vanuatu is still in the process of ascertaining the nature of its shipping problems and indeed of working out its longer term development strategies. Government
Vanuatu: Concentration of inter-island shipping activity

[Map showing the concentration of shipping activity in Vanuatu, with areas highlighted and labels for different districts and islands.]
regulation of domestic shipping under joint colonial rule was negligible and until the mid 1970s the commercial fleet was dominated by the company ships serving the more profitable areas close to Vila and, more particularly, Luganville. The ships of the three administrations (French, British and Condominium) largely fulfilled a non-commercial role, although certain French Residency vessels would carry private cargoes and passengers at commercial rates where necessary and one steel vessel was seconded to work specifically with the French cooperative organization, SCAF.

The most concerted effort to break the now familiar pattern of concentrated shipping activity in the core areas came with the introduction of a cooperative shipping service aimed at serving all the anglophone cooperative societies on a nationwide system of operation. To achieve this, a commercial shipping company was formed (a joint venture between Sofrana-Unilines of Noumea and the Co-operative Federation, called Vanua Navigation) using two chartered steel vessels. The two established expatriate companies held the advantage in that, in the absence of route licensing schemes, they could still concentrate on the inner areas while the cooperative ships were away in the outer islands fulfilling their obligations there. Furthermore, the two companies formed a de facto cartel in which freight rates (uniform throughout the group) have been kept at an artificially low level. Vanua Navigation is understandably anxious that freight rates should be increased for it is estimated that for every one tonne of copra carried the company loses almost $A20 (mainly on account of having to take on unprofitable voyages to remote locations). Indeed, early in 1980, the government stepped in and gave the Co-operative Federation a grant of $A125,000 to cover its losses. Such a gesture is indicative of the now independent government's attitude to the expatriate companies and it is not unreasonable to suppose that domestic shipping will ultimately be restricted to ni-Vanuatu ships and companies only. If such a plan is adopted some massive programme of fleet renewal and training of both seamen and shore staff must be developed in the near future.

The bulk of the commercial fleet is made up of small, ageing vessels working on routes which are already overtonnaged. For most of the indigenous operators shipping is merely a short term venture which will cease when the vessel sinks or the business becomes too unprofitable. However, nearly all these vessels fulfil local social roles and it is clearly inappropriate to assess them in purely economic terms. Without some form of decisive government intervention, it is probable that the fleet will rapidly degenerate as these poorly capitalized shipping ventures collapse and the ships fall into disuse. Following the recent political disruptions and the subsequent withdrawal of most expatriate, small scale shipping concerns, and given the possibility that both Burns Philip and CFNH might be prevented from operating (despite the fact that Burns Philip has agreed to offer half of its branch company shares to locals), this would seem to be a uniquely opportune time to consider options for complete restructuring of internal linkages on what is, to all intents and purposes, almost a clean slate. It will be interesting to see what sort of 'choice' the government will in fact have - the demands of an electorate used to having its own, unregulated village ships and to being offered a wide range of consumer goods from the company ship-board stores might stall any radical government plans for a centrally controlled shipping system. The degree to which islanders have been absorbed into the cash economy and have
adopted western style materialist attitudes might well be the most fundamental constraint on the range of options open to the government.

A spectrum of possible options, not necessarily related to the situation in Vanuatu, is considered below.

A GENERALIZED SCHEMA OF GOVERNMENT POLICY OPTIONS AND THEIR LIKELY IMPLICATIONS

Free enterprise

The basic assumption involved here is that non regulation of the shipping sector would allow the free play of market forces to produce the most competitive cost-effective system of operation. Adoption in full of such a policy implies that a government is prepared to abandon its economically unprofitable, peripheral regions and give full rein to the polarizing forces already at work. If expatriate companies gain the monopoly on operations, with the strength of a vertically integrated business network behind them, the question will ultimately arise as to how free the host government is to plan its own space economy, for control of transport essentially means control over the direction of internal development projects. Furthermore, such companies will only remain while profits warrant their presence; the government is therefore very vulnerable - if the companies pull out the internal network of commercial linkages collapses. Where long term operation is envisaged the dominant companies may invest in high technology systems and so stimulate the growth of a whole new set of industries and services. Alternatively, the pattern of activity arising from a free enterprise policy may merely follow a path to stagnation or decline, particularly where the economy is still tied to the production of a single export staple and cannot, on its own impetus, stimulate new forms of economic activity. This might be the result in Vanuatu if the government were to permit the companies to remain. While copra continues to produce high earnings on the world market, the shipping system will tend to be self-regulating in the long run, with the most efficient vessels gaining control of the most profitable cargoes. During times of falling world copra prices or after certain catastrophes (severe hurricane damage or prolonged droughts), even the strongest shipping operators may prefer to cut their losses and pull out completely. Clearly, for newly independent nations consumed with the ideal of self-reliance and self-determination, such a policy of unregulated competition can hardly be considered a valid option; being identified with the laissez-faire capitalism of the colonial period (Dick 1977) it has strong overtones of exploitation and can scarcely be viewed as a safe political stance for a new government.

Regulated, private ownership

Under this system the government controls vessel registration and licensing, freight rates and route licensing, with the assumption that 'controlled' competition between private operators will ensure efficiency and a greater equity of service. The spatial implications will depend on
the efficacy of the route licensing/freight subsidy scheme. Some degree of polarization will be inevitable but outer areas should receive at least the minimum of commercial services in addition to government social and administrative visits (although obviously the inhabitants must not expect to have a high level of participation in the cash economy). Since freight rates are centrally controlled, competition will be based on the differentiating factor of service quality. Some operators might be prepared to invest in new equipment and more modern vessels (for example, second hand landing craft or, if the system required it, vessels adapted for carrying containers between main ports) in order to win a greater share of the trade. In general terms, this type of policy offers the possibility of establishing a 'shipping industry' based on local entrepreneurship, characterized by a range of vessel types and levels of organization (formal and informal) with designated government bodies acting as overseers. The government fleet would maintain responsibility for social welfare services, clearing channels and installing navigational aids, and providing training for seamen. This appears to be the option most island nations are already heading for since it conforms to schemes for decentralization and the desire to integrate transport systems with rural development projects. The outer areas cannot be expected to flourish dramatically, nor can there be any expectation of an equal spread of development investment.

A cooperative controlled system

This option relies on the establishment of a nationwide system of cooperative societies which hold the monopoly on all internal trading and overseas marketing. Through a licensing scheme, no private commercial shipping activity would be permitted since this would undermine the whole basis of cross-subsidizing routes. (Private operators would cream off the bulk of the profits themselves by concentrating on the low cost/high density routes.) Government acts indirectly through the copra board and is responsible for providing the necessary infrastructure (wharves, navigational aids and feeder roads, for example), but not for operational decision making which lies entirely in the hands of the cooperative managing body and its regional/local branches. In spatial terms, the aim is to provide an even distribution of service throughout the archipelago to all cooperative societies (which essentially incorporates all rural economic activity). The use of warehousing in all islands, linked where possible to land-based feeder roads or 'speedboat style' local sea links, would permit the bulking of produce and would also act as a reservoir of consumer goods. Although the intensity of commercial interaction would be greatest in the core areas, the outer regions would still be offered the same level of trading opportunities despite their smaller scale of production and consumption. It may further be expected that the sites of the island warehouses (analogous to central trading points) would develop into secondary centres and so create a hierarchy of rural service centres.

With regard to technology, the ships serving the key warehouses ought to be modern, purpose-built vessels equipped with efficient cargo handling gear to ensure a fast turnaround in the international ports, and with specially designed boats for fast ship-to-shore transfer of cargoes in the islands (for example, mini landing craft with protected inboard engines for negotiating surf). It is probable that most warehouses would be in the
vicinity of wharves but such structures should not be relied upon as permanent fixtures since they tend to suffer badly from hurricane damage.
The feeder vessels working from the warehouses are likely to be more conventional, unless funds (from government) permit a fleet of landing craft or similar special purpose vessels, and although owned by the cooperative organization would be manned, maintained and repaired by local islanders. On this account, the technology ought not to involve complex sets of machinery and highly specialized operating skills because it then becomes too vulnerable to breakdowns and delays in repairs.

As a national shipping network, this option permits a much greater degree of integration between islands of the archipelago and therefore must be politically advantageous given that most governments are currently striving to achieve some degree of national unity. Furthermore, since it is intrinsically non governmental in its operations, it should have much greater appeal to islanders who see it as belonging to them and its success or failure as depending on their efforts. This level of identification is rarely found in government-run schemes where the recipients of the service are alienated by decision making. Perhaps the most serious criticism of the cooperative scheme is the implicit assumption that political and social differences between village groups can be surmounted and that 'cooperation' can indeed occur. This scheme also demands that villagers work together rather than as individuals each seeking his or her own personal wealth and it is likely that those who are frustrated by their inability to run their own trading operations will either move to the urban centres or try to operate illegally.

Government nationalization

Depending upon government development strategies, nationalization could involve either a spatially polarized service or an equally distributed one. In either case the essential fact is that government holds total control, both operationally and organizationally, with only local, informal services (i.e. those fulfilling social roles) remaining in private hands. If a nation has severe resource constraints in some of its islands the government might decide to concentrate all its investment efforts in those areas which will show some return and to stop draining money away in 'persistent loss' islands. Alternatively, the government could adopt a system aimed at providing 'adequate' shipping services throughout the archipelago (as, for example, if the Marine Department took on the responsibility of organizing all voyages using its own vessels). Complete government control offers the opportunity of supervising a renewal and revitalization of the fleet, perhaps with high technology sea transit systems or simply with second hand barges, tugs and landing craft.

However, as a centrally controlled monopoly system, there is a great danger of suboptimal performance. It may be that the equity principle eventually proves too costly to maintain and that, since only a relatively small proportion of the electorate live in the outer areas, the government feels 'safe' to begin cutting back on these services. It may be that the end result of an equal distribution policy will be that of the polarized growth option, although achieved at greater cost owing to heavy initial outlays in welfare services and failed development projects.
A variant: direct subsidization

A variant with applicability to the last three options (private, regulated enterprise; cooperative organization; government nationalization) is one in which the charges levied for all individual services, irrespective of who runs them, are based on actual operating costs. On paper, the high density routes would show lowest costs; the outer islands, high costs. However, by negotiating direct subsidies, perhaps paid from consolidated government revenue, the differentials are reduced in keeping with welfare and decentralization policies. These subsidies are agreed before voyaging over a period commences and thus operators have to strive to keep within their allotted budgets, and by so doing ensure an efficient service. The operators do not have to cross subsidize their routes. Local communities or sub regional government operators can thus run their own services secure in the knowledge that, after a season's trading, they will receive the subsidies previously negotiated. This level of participation engenders a degree of self-reliance and an awareness of the true costs and difficulties involved. Unlike centrally controlled systems, it also allows services to be tailored to suit specific route requirements. Each operator would be obliged to keep audited accounts of his voyages and would thus be kept informed of his performance. This would also allow planning officers to monitor any improvement or worsening in the outer island situation.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

In general terms, it would appear that Melanesian governments are drifting towards the 'compromise' option of private ownership under government control. However, this appears to be a forced response to the pressure of (worsening) circumstances rather than a conscious policy decision. The ownership, organization and control of shipping in archipelagic environments is of such fundamental importance to the population that it cannot fail to be a political concern. The prospect of grappling with the problems now facing domestic shipping (and hence the problems facing the majority of the population) are particularly daunting for newly independent national governments. Shipping is the life blood of almost every community in island Melanesia; if overt government action were to further disrupt services, albeit unintentionally, perhaps by trying to restrict vessel ownership to nationals when in reality indigenous owners are seriously ill-prepared for assuming such a heavy task, the government cannot fail but to be criticized and even ousted. Whereas it is politically 'safe' to keep on building wharves here and there and to add new vessels to the government fleet so as to provide better welfare services in the outer islands, it is by no means 'safe' for a government to commit the nation to a particular transport strategy when external factors beyond its control can, at any time, bring about a very different (possibly detrimental) result. Seen in this light, many governments will prefer to appear to be doing a little while in fact doing nothing.

In Vanuatu, for example, it would seem that the government would be justified in expanding the cooperative system of operations into a fully fledged national organization with all the necessary infrastructural supports. However, whether this is compatible with villagers' changing aspirations (and hence whether it is a dangerous move for the government to
make) is a crucial question, particularly since many islanders have already shown discontent with the cooperative services by helping to buy a trading vessel for their own village. For islanders in less remote areas, the flexibility and social status of running their own trading vessel is clearly preferable to being obliged to bulk their cargo and wait for a cooperative or government ship to come and collect it. Such considerations may perhaps be viewed as being indicative of the contradictions set in motion by increasing immersion in a 'western style' consumerism which prizes individual endeavour and personal gain above social and economic cooperation. It is therefore possible that a policy involving a centrally controlled system of operations or the superimposition of an alien, exclusive technology could be defeated by the nature of the aspirations and expectations of the people it is supposed to serve.

In summary, this paper has sought to address the domestic shipping problem not only in terms of the structural inequalities inherited from unregulated competition in the colonial period, but also in terms of the position from which independent governments must now attempt to deal with them. Whereas shipping studies have traditionally focused on the problems of changing technologies, rising operating costs and the relative merits of different regulatory policies, for example, it is argued that such 'discrete' treatment must give way to a broader investigation of the working of the political economy in which shipping operates and in which governments must make their decisions. The ownership, organization and control of domestic fleets is increasingly becoming the direct concern of governments and any attempt to assess the changing fortunes of shipping and the outer areas necessarily requires consideration of purely political constraints as well as the more obvious economic ones.

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The pidgin word *road* has the English meanings 'track', 'path', 'road', 'way', or 'course'. Any one of these is indicative of the importance of the road in the social, economic, and perhaps even political life of people, whether they live in Melanesia or elsewhere, and whether we think of present, past or future time. Roads, in one form or another, are an integral part of peoples' lives. They influence the ease or difficulty (sometimes expressed as time or cost) with which people, goods and ideas can move from one place to another, and have done throughout the greater part of human history. Despite major external changes, such as escalation of oil prices in the 1970s, personal mobility appears to be highly valued by people, in developing as well as in developed countries. It seems, therefore, that roads and their influences for good or bad are likely to stay with us for a long time.

This paper has two sections, the first a brief history of roads in Melanesia and the second an examination of the effects of roads on the economic and social life of the area.

ROAD DEVELOPMENT IN MELANESIA

Pre contact

It is a truism to say that there have been 'roads' of a sort in Melanesia for almost as long as there have been people. Rivers, and more particularly river valleys, may have provided the initial routeways inland from the island coasts. Today's population distribution maps show that Melanesian settlers penetrated far beyond areas accessible by canoe, eventually leaving only the least hospitable areas unoccupied. Hughes (1977) and others have shown the farreaching traditional trade links which existed in pre-contact Melanesia, and which presuppose some form of recognized overland path and right of way, even if it consisted of a series of discrete lengths. Within group territories, recognized and often well worn walking tracks existed, both in pre-contact times and at present. The track network facilitated fundamentally important economic and social exchange, and still does (Brookfield with Hart 1971:chapter 13 passim).
1870-1950

With the advent of Europeans road development in a more modern sense began. The most significant differences from the earlier era were that the orientation of roads changed, the physical width and surface quality of land routes improved, and the degree of security on roads sometimes increased. In the first eighty years of the European territorial presence (to about 1950) the main purpose of road building in Melanesia was to provide inland access to ports. Early European settlement was in the coastal lowlands, often focussing on a harbour or anchorage where people and goods could be exchanged between larger and smaller vessels. Examples are numerous: Port Moresby, Samarai, Rabaul, Alexishafen, Madang, Suva, Noumea, Luganville, Lautoka, Salamaua, Kavieng. European-organized agricultural activities spread first along coastal lowlands accessible to service by small vessels and the first mining ventures were either on offshore islands (e.g. Sudest (1888), Misima (1889), Woodlark (1895) – see Nelson 1976) or relatively close to the coast, as in the case of the first nickel mines in New Caledonia (Brookfield with Hart 1971).

Road building during this period progressed outward from the port towns until physical difficulties or lack of economic incentive defeated the technology of the day. (For completeness we should include railways under the heading of roads here, the prime example being the construction of narrow gauge systems serving the sugar industry of Viti Levu and Vanua Levu in Fiji, completed by 1920 and still in use.) The classic example of road building in this era is what is now called the Bulominski Highway southeast from Kavieng, named after the German administrator who directed its construction in the first decade of the century. It was the first modern road of significant length in Papua New Guinea and its coronus surface provided German planters along the northeast coast of New Ireland with horse-and-cart access to the port of Kavieng, and German administrators with access to coastal villages.

Other roads in similar locations were constructed for similar purposes during the period. Examples include the circumferential highway around Viti Levu built between 1921 and 1938, the basis of a road system built by convict labour in southern New Caledonia before 1900 (Brookfield with Hart 1971) and, in Papua New Guinea, the road north from Madang to Alexishafen (Sek harbour) and a little beyond, the cart road connecting the government station at Old Rigo and small port at Kapa Kapa with the European plantations fifteen miles away on the Wanigela river, and some of the network of roads connecting plantations on the Gazelle peninsula with Rabaul.

In summary, the roads built in Melanesia during the long prewar period were of small total length, generally 'port-feeder' roads, and were built largely by low technology methods with consequently low design standards. The traffic they carried was light, initially horse and cart but later small numbers of motor vehicles. These roads were intimately linked with the growth of exports and the firm establishment of the colonial economy throughout Melanesia. They served mainly the expatriate community and any benefits to the indigenous populations were largely incidental.
Nevertheless these early roads marked the beginning of changes common throughout those areas of Melanesia which they touched. Traditional societies were disturbed to the extent that physical movement on land was now easier, quicker and cheaper for both Melanesians and expatriates. The latter had clear objectives - to facilitate the utilization of the resources which they perceived, namely agricultural, mineral, forest and human. For the Melanesians new economic opportunities arose, and the transition to a cash economy commenced, but at the cost of the loss of some part of traditional exchange systems and pertaining social values.

1950-1965

In the history of roads in Melanesia as well as in many other ways, the second world war marks the great point of change. Technology took a great leap forward with the bulldozer, and its usefulness was demonstrated in Melanesia in the building of wartime airfields, roads (vehicle tracks) and other earthmoving activities. Attitudes also changed, about administration, economic and social relationships, and responsibilities. The revealed existence of the large populations in the interior highlands of Papua New Guinea posed a new challenge to administrators and potential entrepreneurs. The potential of aircraft in Papua New Guinea had been ably demonstrated by the servicing of the Wau/Bulolo goldmines in the 1930s and the next two decades were to see an unparallelled exercise in the 'opening up' of a country by the use of aircraft.

The first inland road penetration of length in Melanesia was the road from Lae to Bulolo and Wau completed by the first bridge across the Markham about 1948. Road networks centering on the main ports were gradually extended further, but some of those roads which had been built for war purposes were allowed to decline, as for example the Bulldog Track. In Vanuatu over a hundred miles of roads and serviceable bridges on Efate and Santo were a legacy from the war, and tracks passable for motor vehicles were maintained on other islands (HMSO 1953:3, 32). It was not until the later 1950s that a significant programme of road construction was begun in interior Fiji.

The main development of communications in Papua New Guinea in the 1950s and early 1960s was in the building of airstrips, and following them the construction of roads focussing on airstrips, first to provide access for the administrators, and later to carry the cargoes generated by the increasing interest in commercial production of exportable crops, in particular coffee from the highlands. Thus, in the New Guinea highlands a pattern of 'kiap roads' developed, focussing on the airports (which were located at the administrative and missionary centres) and eventually linking these centres together. By the 1960s the most urgent need for surface access was to link the highlands with a port, and this was achieved with the completion of the Kassam pass about 1965.

The road map of Papua New Guinea about 1960 comprised a dozen or more very small networks feeding the main ports and a wide scatter of short lengths of road in the interior, focussing on airstrips. In the highlands a rudimentary network existed but with significant gaps between the major basins. Some relatively intense networks of local wartime roads remained,
but were dying from lack of traffic. None of the other main islands of Melanesia experienced the use of light aircraft to the same degree, hence roads remained focussed on ports.

In Papua New Guinea, and elsewhere in Melanesia, the postwar surge of economic and social development, coupled with the great rise in availability and use of motor vehicles for land transport, brought about strongly increased demand for roads and motor transport. Melanesians recognized that effective access to towns and markets was necessary for their own economic benefit, and hence stimulated strong new pressures for road building at a local level. In Papua New Guinea they showed themselves willing to devote their own labour and money to the construction and improvement of local service roads often on locations approximating those of preexisting walking tracks. Self-help construction was undertaken elsewhere in Melanesia also, as in southern Malekula in Vanuatu where 20 km of road was built by local people in 1972. Melanesian ownership of motor vehicles increased, though the life of individual vehicles and Melanesian-owned transport enterprises was often short.

The process of change from traditional to monetized economies continued apace and simultaneously social horizons broadened. The presence of ever increasing lengths of road helped stimulate internal migration, the spread of ideas, and perhaps even political consciousness.

1965-1975

The last decade of the colonial era was marked in Papua New Guinea by, first, greater coordination and effectiveness of transport planning, and, secondly, emphasis on fostering national unity.

The World Bank's Report on the Economic Development of Papua and New Guinea (IBRD 1965) led to the establishment of an Office of the Coordinator of Transport (later to become the Directorate of Transport, and eventually the present Department of Transport and Civil Aviation). One of the first major tasks of the office was to conduct a comprehensive survey of the transport needs of the whole country, the findings of which are encompassed in the UNDP Transport Survey (Halcrow and Partners 1969). This survey laid the basis for national transport planning, and set transport needs in all modes and in all areas in a national context for the first time.

The official policy towards roads in Papua New Guinea at this time (1968) was that they should support national development, as the following summarized extracts from a policy statement of the Directorate of Transport show:

**Broad Policy Objectives:**

(a) To develop at least a minimum system of inter-regional land and sea communications  
(b) To make cost reductions and improve capital efficiency  
(c) To service planned developed schemes  
(d) To service planned and expected urban growth  
(e) To service and stimulate diversified rural development  
(f) To support the air transport industry.
In addition four corollary requirements were stated:

(a) Provision of secure, reasonably efficient land or sea transport links to all major population groups
(b) Improved servicing of existing traditional agricultural development
(c) Servicing of planned land settlement, village concentration and forestry development schemes
(d) Servicing of the expected growth of new industries such as tea or cattle in newer areas where economic development had to date been marginal.

At this time over one third of the Administration's budget was devoted to transport, and about one quarter of all the budget for capital works and maintenance was spent on roads.

The document concludes:

In the planning of road development, especially of major highways, careful consideration is required of their wide regional and other effects, extending well beyond the few Districts which may be immediately affected and influencing other areas and industries throughout the Territory. Few other investments are so important for nation building as the development of a sound road system and the planning and financing of national highways must be assessed in relation to their effects on the country as a whole (extracts from Territory of Papua New Guinea Directorate of Transport 1968).

When translated into action this policy placed emphasis (so far as roads were concerned) on the development of a moderately high quality main road network designed to link the major towns on the larger islands of Papua New Guinea, hence supporting the building of national unity at the time of independence. Since long lead times are involved in the design and execution of major road projects the carrying out of this policy still continues. International financial assistance was sought and obtained for the upgrading of the Highlands Highway from Lae ultimately to Mendi. (By 1979 this road continued as far west at Lake Kopiago.) The Sepik Highway linked Wewak to Maprik and now reaches Lumi in the Sandaun (West Sepik) Province. The Hiritano Highway was completed westward from Port Moresby to beyond the border of Gulf Province and will ultimately form part of a trans-island road to link Papua with the highlands and Lae. East of Port Moresby the Magi Highway continues to be extended towards Alotau. Madang is now linked to Lae and there is an almost completed road connection to Wewak. In New Britain a road will ultimately link Rabaul with Kimbe.

In other parts of Melanesia in recent decades some expansion of road networks has occurred and standards of existing roads have been improved.
Post 1975

In Papua New Guinea since independence emphasis in road planning and development has moved yet again, this time towards regional development. Devolution of central political powers and some financial resources to the twenty provinces together with a national development policy which emphasizes rural development and greater equality of opportunity have contributed towards a greater emphasis on regional development. Thus there is now increased recognition of the need to improve access to hitherto marginal areas, and administrative machinery has been developed to permit provinces to allocate some resources to this within their own areas. Obviously for some provinces the development of sea transport or other alternative forms of transport is equal or greater in importance than the development of roads, but the planning and construction of new roads and the upgrading of existing roads, together with improved maintenance continue throughout the country. For example, in Morobe Province since 1975 the Slate Creek-Aseki, Finschhafen-Sialum, and Lae-Boana roads have been completed, a Wau-Garaina road examined in detail, and a coast road from Lae to Finschhafen mooted. In Madang Province the north coast road now reaches beyond Bogia to East Sepik Province, the Ramu Highway provides an overland link to Lae, and a road from Madang to Simbai is the highest priority provincial development project.

In Vanuatu the national unity theme blends with that of regional development. The expressed aims of road development in 1978 are: 'To link communities so that they can benefit from common facilities such as health and education; to permit the transportation of products for marketing or transshipment; to open up new areas for agricultural or other development'. It is intended that both peri-urban and rural roads will be improved and 'the rural programme will be drawn up with the aim of integrating existing communities, strengthening their economic and social potential and integrating them into the national communications network' (Government of the New Hebrides 1978).

The following table summarizes the available information on road lengths in five countries of Melanesia about 1975.

The largest country, Papua New Guinea, has the largest length of road, but New Caledonia possesses the densest network of roads and also the greatest length of road per capita. Papua New Guinea has the longest length of road per vehicle. Because of an estimated low number of vehicles as well as a low length of road the Solomon Islands also shows a fairly high length of road per vehicle ratio.

The demand for roads is still strong, despite increasing fuel costs and criticism from some quarters that roads enhance urban problems by permitting easier migration which in turn deprives rural areas of people who might otherwise play an active part in rural development.

In the last hundred years Melanesia has experienced a change from a situation where there were 'roads' only in the form of paths or waterways to one in which a large proportion of the population is within reasonable distance of, and dependent on, a trafficable road. People and goods traverse the main roads at volumes, speeds and comparative costs which would have been hard to predict a few decades ago. For better or worse the
Table 1

Roads in Melanesia, c.1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Main</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>1000 sq km</th>
<th>1000 people</th>
<th>1000 vehicle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>1,139</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>817</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2,443</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Caledonia</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>4,710</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea (1)</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>17,241</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea (2)</td>
<td>4,779</td>
<td>12,556</td>
<td>1,016</td>
<td>18,351</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands (1)</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands (2)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>964 + 800</td>
<td>1,864</td>
<td>93</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>355 (est.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) bitumen surfaced  (f) 'main' including sealed and unsealed
(b) unsealed          (g) government
(c) stone surfaced    (h) private plantation and logging roads
(d) tracks            (i) 'motorable' road
(e) highways or trunk roads (j) excluding private roads

Sources: Europa Publications 1979, for Fiji, New Caledonia, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea (1) and Solomon Islands (1)
Solomon Islands (2) - Solomon Islands 1979:163
Papua New Guinea (2) - Papua New Guinea Department of Transport and Civil Aviation 1975
sudden cessation of transport by road would be felt in the lives of almost all Melanesians, in terms of their monetary incomes, the food and drink they consume, the clothes they wear, the tools they use, their social contacts, and their awareness of and contact with the world beyond their village.

EFFECTS OF ROADS IN MELANESIA

The theme of this series is Melanesia—Beyond Diversity. I take this to imply that beyond diversity lies similarity. It can be argued that the development over the last century of a modern network of roads (or more specifically a modern system of transport and communications) has had similar effects throughout Melanesia, as indeed in other parts of the world. Certainly the history of road development has been broadly similar in Papua New Guinea, Fiji, the Solomons, Vanuatu and New Caledonia, although there are differences in detail in the scale of the undertakings and the degree of completion or stage of the process so far achieved. The differences are less in the purposes of the exercise than in the results.

The effects on the movement of people

How have roads affected the movement of people in Melanesia? There seems little doubt that the movement of people has increased, both in distance and volume. A hundred years ago we can assume that individuals usually moved over only relatively small distances overland. Salisbury (1962:25) set a limit of 16 km for a Siane villager in the Eastern Highlands of Papua New Guinea; the grandchild of that villager today would think nothing of catching a ride on a passenger vehicle to go 200 km to Lae for the weekend. Personal movement has become a commonplace event in Melanesia.

There are several reasons for this. One is that the road has become recognized as 'neutral ground'. Everyone is free to move safely along it (safe at least from attack by human enemies, if not from the risk of being killed in a motor accident). A second is that there is now some incentive to move. At the end of the village road lies a town, maybe an inland town with a weekly market and shops selling rice, tinned meat or fish, lollywater and beer, bread, western clothes, kerosene, and so on, and with government officers and some services that one might want to utilize, and people with whom one might want to exchange news. Further down the highway is the port city, with its certainty of the presence of wantoks and the reputed chance of a job, or at least the perceived opportunity to make money in one way or another. A third reason is that it is comparatively easy to travel: vehicles are numerous and the cost is fairly small. In 1979 it cost K5 to travel from Wau to Lae (4 Australian cents per km), and it took about half a day, with a choice of perhaps twenty to thirty public motor vehicles (PMVs). In the 1920s one could fly from Wau to Lae in an hour or so for £35 (SA70); today the air fare is about K20 (SA25). Before the air link was established one had to face a minimum of three days hard walking to Salamaua and a boat trip to follow if one wanted to go to the Markham river mouth.
The volume of movement has increased out of sight. Of course all of Melanesia has experienced dramatic total population growth over the last century, and with it urban growth. Where there were formerly no towns there are now scores, the largest of them cities of over 100,000 people. The presence of roads has been one contributing factor in the urban migration which has created them. But the movement to towns has not only been a permanent or long-stay migration. At the present time shorter term or circular migration is a common feature in Papua New Guinea, with people visiting towns for periods of weeks or months, a freedom of choice which is facilitated by easy road travel. As well, regular daily commuting from the peri-urban regions has become a realized possibility. When I studied the Rigo road in 1968 daily commuting to work in Port Moresby occurred from Tubusereia (about 36 km) and weekly commuting from Gaire (about 65 km). A decade earlier some people were commuting up to 40 km to Suva, and a similar situation exists in New Caledonia with movement to Noumea.

Access to the use of vehicles has now become within the reach of virtually every Melanesian. The following table presents some statistics on vehicle numbers in Melanesia at the present time.

### Table 2

Numbers of vehicles in use in Melanesia, c.1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Passenger cars ('000)</th>
<th>Commercial vehicles ('000)</th>
<th>Total vehicles ('000)</th>
<th>Total vehicles per 1000 people 1970</th>
<th>1976</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Cal.</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNG</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sol.Is.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td></td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The case of New Caledonia is exceptional in Melanesia and reflects both the high proportion of its population which is non Melanesian, and the relatively small non-monetary sector.

Figure 1 traces the growth in vehicle numbers between 1967 and 1976 in four countries of Melanesia, discriminating between passenger cars and commercial vehicles. New Caledonia has the largest number of vehicles, but also (in 1976) a ratio of 2.7 passenger cars to every commercial vehicle, a discrepancy which may well reflect the dual society and economy of that country. In Vanuatu, the number of vehicles is very small but the ratio of passenger cars to commercial vehicles is even higher at 3.3:1. In both cases the ratio is increasing. In Fiji the total number of vehicles is less and the ratio of passenger cars to commercial vehicles was 1.8:1 in 1976, having declined from a high of 2.6:1 in 1972. Papua New Guinea has gone even further along this road. The number of passenger cars reached a peak in 1972, declined with the exodus of expatriates before independence,
Figure 1

and was overtaken by the numbers of commercial vehicles in 1976, when the ratio was 0.9:1.

Statistics of vehicle registration always carry some doubt as to their accuracy and it would be wrong to draw too much out of these comparisons, but the relative proportions are probably a reasonable indication of the existing situation and do seem to imply a relatively smaller proportion of Papua New Guinea's resources being consumed in the form of cars and petrol by the richest section of society and a greater share going towards commercial carriage of freight and passengers than was the case a decade earlier.

Among the undesirable effects of roads and widespread use of motor vehicles must be included death and injury due to accidents. Detailed statistics are not readily available but it is an unfortunate fact that the incidence of accidents involving motor vehicles has risen steadily in Melanesia as elsewhere and now forms a significant cause of death and hospitalization in most countries of Melanesia.

Effects on the movements of goods

Simultaneously with the development of roads in Melanesia there has been a vast growth in the movement of goods, and at the same time a reduction in the time and cost of their movement overland. National statistics for volumes of production and for exports and imports measure the development of the national economies of the Melanesian countries in terms of developed world criteria. It is impossible to attribute an exact proportion of the overall production which has been made possible by roads but it is obviously a very significant share.

More amenable to indicative measuring is the reduction in transport costs and vehicle operating costs which can be directly attributed to the construction of roads and their continued upgrading. Table 3 and the ensuing discussion give some examples for particular roads in Papua New Guinea.

Expressed in terms of constant (1971) prices freight rates on the longest road haul in Papua New Guinea fell dramatically between 1967 and 1979, but have begun to rise again in the late 1970s, presumably due to fuel price increases. In 1977 actual freight rates for the 480km between Lae and Mt Hagen ranged between K55-58 per tonne (i.e. 11.46 toea/tonne/km) whereas the maximum approved rate was K75 per tonne (i.e. 15.6 toea/tonne/km) (Papua New Guinea Department of Transport 1977:60). The difference reflects competition between subcontractors. These figures refer to freight charges from Lae to Mt Hagen. The return freight charge for coffee over the same distance was 6 toea/tonne/km.
Table 3
Changes in freight rates on the Highlands Highway, 1967-1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Freight rates between Lae and Mt Hagen (toea/tonne/km)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actual prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>11.3&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>8.5&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>8.5&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
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<td>1980</td>
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Sources: (a) Papua New Guinea Department of Transport 1973.
(b) Highland Freighters
(c) World Bank 1980 (using deflator developed by Lam 1977)

Freight rates in 1980 on other main roads in Papua New Guinea are of the same order, but show some interesting local variations, for example: from Lae to Bulolo (125 km), where there is no sea competition, the rate is 20 toea/tonne/km; from Lae to Madang (338 km) the rate is 8.3 toea/tonne/km. The freight charge by sea on this route is K30 per tonne, and the road operators have to price at K28 per tonne to compete. On the Hiritano and Magi highways west and east of Port Moresby, where there is sea competition, freight rates are 10 toea/tonne/km.

It is worth noting that in 1967 the distance from Lae to Mt Hagen by the old Highlands Highway was 520 km, but in 1980 this had been reduced to 480 km through relocation and upgrading of the highway. The effect of road improvement on transport time is dramatic: whereas in 1967 it could take a truck several days to make the journey from Mt Hagen to Lae, in 1980 the time was reduced to about twelve hours.

Even more dramatic changes are brought about when road replaces air as the transport mode. After the Highlands Highway became reliable in the late 1960s air cargo through Madang airport fell from 28,295 tons in 1965-66 to 7,658 tons in 1968-69, and was a mere 438 tons in 1979 (Taylor and Partners 1972, and Air Niugini).

From Lae to Boana in the Huon peninsula the air freight was formerly K50 per tonne. By road in 1980 the rate is K20 per tonne. The return freight charge for coffee from Boana to Lae was formerly K35 per tonne by air and is now K20 per tonne by road. From Lae to Pindiu by air the freight rate was formerly K90 per tonne. Today freight sent by sea from Lae to Finschhafen and by road from Finschhafen to Pindiu costs K40 per tonne. The comparable return rates for coffee are K60 per tonne by air and K40 per tonne by land and sea.

The reductions in freight costs to the consumer reflect the reductions in operating costs to the road transport operators brought about by road improvements. The calculation of vehicle operating costs is complex since it must take account of many factors, including the physical parameters of
the road, vehicle characteristics, speeds, fuel, maintenance, crew costs, depreciation and overheads. The calculation has been undertaken several times for Papua New Guinea. It will suffice here to say that the better the road the lower the operating costs, and to indicate the range of costs with a recent Papua New Guinea example: operating costs for heavy commercial vehicles range from K1,040 per 1,000 km on very steep roads with very rough unpaved surface, to K642 per 1,000 km on flat roads with smooth, paved surface. These costs decline to the lightest class of vehicle (Rendels Economics 1979, Tables 50 and 53).

The volume of traffic using roads in Melanesia has increased spectacularly with road improvement and with population and increasing incomes per capita. Unfortunately traffic volume statistics are very sparse. Some recent data are available for two points near Lae: a twelve hour count taken at the Markham bridge on the Lae-Wau road in July 1979 found an average of 120 vehicles per day to Lae and 128 vehicles per day from Lae over six days. Of these 32 per cent were cars and utilities, 26 per cent light trucks, 12 per cent 4-wheel drive vehicles, 8 per cent heavy trucks, and 6 per cent buses (Department of Transport count). A twelve hour truck count taken at Lae weighbridge on 20 November 1979 (not during the main coffee season) observed 256 trucks, of which 103 stopped. Of these 57 per cent came from or went to the highlands, 41 per cent to the Wau road, and 3 per cent to the Markham valley. The main freight being carried was plywood and timber from Bulolo to Lae, and foodstuffs (mainly rice), fuel, construction materials and equipment, agricultural produce, drinks, tobacco. (Privately collected data.) In the coffee season coffee to Lae would be a major part of the freight flow. Very much higher volumes of traffic flow occur on main urban roads and on certain main roads close to large towns in Melanesia, such as Suva-Nausori and around Noumea.

Effects on the movement of ideas

Passengers and goods are not the only items which move along roads. Ideas and information also travel widely, as do other less desirable things such as venereal disease. The spread of information has been examined in some detail for an area in the East Sepik Province of Papua New Guinea by Allen (1977:332-338). He found that while the existing formal systems of information dissemination were relatively ineffective, the informal systems in which information moves with people were much more effective. The presence of main roads and feeder roads, together with the movement along them of village-based trucks and the village people they carry from day to day, provides a structure over which information travels with surprising speed. Allen traces the spread of information about and membership of the Peli Association, a political-religious movement which attained wide support in the East Sepik between 1969 and 1972. Information spread rapidly through the East Sepik along the main road from the east and then down feeder roads, and finally diffused to villages not on roads. The spread of earlier innovations before the presence of the road was much slower, took place on a broader front, and depended on dissemination by walkers along local track networks.

In the case of Papua New Guinea it can be argued that the road building programmes of the late 1960s and early 1970s contributed directly to the building of national unity before and after independence.
Provincial governments are now using the provision and upgrading of roads and other forms of access as a tool of regional development, and indeed as a tool of political influence.

Even though a significant proportion of the population still does not have close access to roads, the propensity to travel seems to be fairly high. There can be relatively few villages remaining from which some men have not made their way out to the road systems and along them to the centres of information of the towns, and then back to their village. As Allen says, 'the stimulus of improved communications upon internal tourist traffic cannot be overlooked' (1977:335). Experience in other countries where the road and public transport systems are rather more advanced, such as Indonesia and Thailand, shows a very high level of internal movement for social as well as economic reasons. Provided escalating fuel prices do not cause fares to rise beyond the reach of villagers it must be expected that the level of personal movement will continue to rise in Melanesia, as it has elsewhere in the developing world.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

The criticism is often made that the main beneficiaries of improved road systems are the middlemen, the transporting agents, and the importers and distributors of manufactured goods; not the primary producers (McCall 1977). This probably is to some extent true throughout Melanesia, as elsewhere in the world. Bouchard's study of the impact of roads in the Okapa region of Papua New Guinea found that road improvement did not increase prices paid to coffee growers by middlemen (Bouchard 1972:87), who were thus presumably capitalizing on the road improvement benefits. On the other hand Bouchard (1972:89) suggests that the new roads increased the utility of money for producers. Another study examined the distribution of benefits on the Rigo road (Doulman 1977) and found that the greatest part of the benefits went to village producers of vegetables now able to market in Port Moresby. Obviously overall generalizations cannot be made.

A broad view over a long time in Melanesia must allow that the gradual extension of a dendritic road pattern has created opportunities for cash cropping far more widely distributed than was the case without roads. New opportunities for business activities in the form of road transport and trading operations have arisen, and at least some of these have been taken up by Melanesians, although outsiders (that is, either non-national companies, colons, or non-local Melanesians) have also been quick to utilize them. Counter measures in the form of discriminatory regulation are available, but governments are often reluctant to use them.

Another criticism often made is that although roads are claimed to enhance the effectiveness of government-directed social services (e.g. health, education or agricultural extension), they do not in fact do so. Again, this criticism may well be true in part for Melanesia as elsewhere, but the fault surely is not so much with the presence of roads as with the organization of the services.

More serious is the accusation that the extension of road systems in developing countries has the long term effect of inevitably tying the existing systems of rural production and way of life into the national
economy and hence the world-wide capitalist system. It seems to me that this is of course true, but equally true is that at the present time this seems to be what a majority of Melanesians, along with a large proportion of the rest of the world, wants. In my experience in Melanesia, limited as it may be, people living in remote areas without roads recognize that the coming of a road will bring with it many things which may be socially deleterious, yet the assumed economic advantages outweigh these disadvantages in their assessments.

It is a truism to say that neither places nor people are equal in their natural endowments. It may be that while 'development' efforts should still be directed towards improving the lot of the poorest, nations increasingly will have to recognize that inequalities will persist. Melanesia is fortunate in that the extremes of wealth and poverty are much less widely separated than in many other countries, and all reasonable policies should be directed towards maintaining this situation (or reducing the gap).

CONCLUSION

The first part of this paper endeavoured to show that there has been a broad similarity in the development of road systems in the island countries of Melanesia. Ports and shipping services were established first, but gradually coastal and inland roads have replaced feeder coastal shipping services, and, in Papua New Guinea, the expensive air services. The process still continues, but shipping connections and some air services obviously will remain essential links in the transport system of island nations.

The development of roads aided other aspects of development, particularly export-oriented agriculture and the transition to a monetized economy. But as well as permitting a flow of produce and people away from the rural areas, roads also permit return flows, of money, store goods (which many see as in part deleterious to health and society), and ideas.

I believe that these effects are common throughout Melanesia, though the stage reached differs from place to place. Increased personal mobility ('seeing things with ones' own eyes') brings a wider appreciation of what is happening in the rest of the country, the Pacific region, and the world. This, and the word-of-mouth transmission of experience, things seen, and ideas heard and discussed, which follows from the use of roads, contributes to a wider perception of changes occurring. The future of Melanesians, as of people elsewhere in the world, is by now inextricably interlocked with externalities over which they have little control. We, and they, may not like this, but the alternatives do not offer much comfort to the peoples of Melanesian nations.

Over the last few decades Melanesians without roads have made the demand for access probably their most strongly expressed desire, even though they recognize the deleterious effects a road may bring to their way of life. There is as yet no sign of this demand slackening in the remoter parts of Papua New Guinea, although it may have lessened in New Caledonia and Fiji. The 'rot', both literally and metaphorically, appears to have been chosen as part of the modern way of life in Melanesia.
NOTE

'I am indebted to Dr D. Townsend of the University of Papua New Guinea for providing the freight rate data used in Table 3 and subsequent paragraphs.

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DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

Social Change

Contradiction, mediation and hegemony in pre-capitalist New Guinea: warfare, production and sexual antagonism in the Eastern Highlands

MIKE DONALDSON

Urbanization and inequality in Melanesia

JOHN CONNELL AND RICHARD CURTAIN

Development and dependency: divergent approaches to the political economy of Papua New Guinea

JOHN CONNELL
CONTRADICTION, MEDIATION AND HEGEMONY IN PRE-CAPITALIST NEW GUINEA: WARFARE, PRODUCTION AND SEXUAL ANTAGONISM IN THE EASTERN HIGHLANDS

Mike Donaldson

INTRODUCTION: BEFORE AND AFTER THE SWEET POTATO - MODES OF PRODUCTION AND THEIR ARTICULATION IN THE EASTERN HIGHLANDS

The bulk of the Eastern Highlands Province comprises hills and small mountains more than 2,500 metres high, pocketed by alluvial valleys. These run almost at right angles to and eastwards from the large, well drained alluvial plains and fans of the Markham valley, which provide a corridor for the flow of peoples, ideas and products.

Following this path the main migration of prehistoric peoples into the highlands moved progressively from east to west and the well forested region supported a non agricultural people for thousands of years (Bulmer and Bulmer 1964).

Of the advent of horticulture, little is known except that, like the hunters and gatherers, it came along the Markham with taro-growing peoples who moved into the lower highlands valleys (below 1,600 metres), and by at least six thousand years ago intricate systems for the growing of crops had begun to develop along with permanent settlement (Sorensen and Kenmore 1974; Eglloff and Eglloff 1978). The appearance of agriculture was accompanied by dramatic changes, not only in the objects of labour (i.e. new crops), but in the means of labour, intensive horticulture depending on efficient tools for chopping, cutting and scraping, for bush clearing and garden fencing, and for the building of substantial dwellings. Some stone axe manufactories existed in the Eastern Highlands, notably at Kafetu, but it is likely that the bulk of the stone tools was traded in from the Western Highlands (Bulmer and Bulmer 1964).

The displacement of hunting and gathering by the new taro horticulture was slow and uneven. Food collection and hunting would have remained a significant aspect of the pre-ipomean mode of production in certain areas long after it had ceased to be so important in others. In the dialectical and uneven process of merging and replacement, conservation and dissolution, the key political and ideological elements of the hunting and gathering mode were perhaps conserved in the horticultural. Male initiation and the men's house probably had their origins in the pre-horticultural period, their form remaining largely unchanged but directed perhaps toward a new object, the need to appropriate surplus product which could be traded so that the means by which the mode of production itself was reproduced could be obtained.
The introduction of the sweet potato into the highlands about four hundred years ago had the effect of carrying through, accelerating and consolidating the transition to horticulture. This is not to say that sweet potato was responsible for the introduction of horticulture; on the contrary, it is apparent that intensive cultivation in the highlands is at least five thousand years old. Sweet potato enabled higher levels of garden production and greater population above about 1,800 metres altitude, at which height taro does not grow well (Watson 1965; Bulmer 1973).

The 'core' areas of sweet potato cultivation in the Eastern Highlands seem to have been Gahuku, Bena Bena, Yagaria and Kamano in the north and northwest and the 'marginal' areas, Gadsup, Awa, South Fore and Auyana to the south and southeast (Sorensen and Kenmore 1974; Brown 1978). The marginal areas were slow to receive the sweet potato, perhaps because of physical barriers, or to accept it, perhaps because the dominance of the horticultural mode had not been established over the hunting and gathering mode. The people on the margins lived 'on the edge of the forest', between the 'retreating edge of the forest and the advancing edge of abandoned grasslands' (Sorensen 1976). Sorensen and Kenmore report that among the Awa and southernmost Ta'irora sweet potato had only begun to replace taro as the staple within one generation prior to contact; so too with the South Fore (Sorensen and Kenmore 1974; Sorensen 1972). The population densities in these areas were generally in the range of 25-75 people per square mile, rather less than the 50-125 people per square mile that characterized the core areas (Brown 1978).

Sweet potato, the archaeological evidence indicates, did not bring about a change in the means of labour but the effect of its introduction was nonetheless dramatic, not so much in displacing the existing mode of production but in intensifying its contradictions. The most immediate result of the adoption of sweet potato was to increase the human and pig populations, leading to a more rapid reduction of forest to grasslands, in turn increasing the demand for the provision of domestic protein and cultivated, rather than gathered, plants and vegetables (see Watson 1965).

That men's house and male initiation existed in areas of both fringe and centre, in both taro and sweet potato areas, perhaps suggests that its origin is in neither, but that it might derive from the earlier hunting and gathering mode. Expanding populations certainly put more pressure on land, leading to a change in the nature of warfare, away from struggles of individuals or very small groups towards pitched battles of considerable duration and intensity. On the margins, 'hostility was typically aimed against particular individuals or small groups of associates' (Sorensen 1976:40). This was not the case in the centres. The sweet potato users may have had a military advantage over those groups which were reluctant to adopt the new crop. In the struggle for space and security the size of the village was crucial, and for size and population concentration a crop of high yield in relation to effort and area would have been distinctly advantageous (Sorensen 1976; Watson 1965).

The village communities on the margins were characterized by 'low density, small hamlets, and frequent movements to collect varied food sources' (Brown 1978:32). Communities perhaps shifted every few years, with the resultant inability to maintain large pig herds which anyway are not fond of uncooked taro (Watson 1965).
The presence or absence of 'structural looseness' in the highlands is a product of the process of articulation of a hunting and gathering mode of production with a horticultural one. The introduction of sweet potato helped swing the balance in favour of 'dissolution' and hunting and gathering declined in importance. The 'conservation' of elements of the pre horticultural mode and, in particular, the maintenance of the men's house as the key political entity and male supremacy as the dominant ideology, is surely connected with the increase in women's workload occasioned particularly by the sweet potato. Increasing human and pig populations required larger areas of food and fodder, the transportation of heavier backloads for longer distances up steeper slopes, and more time spent in keeping track of pigs, feeding them and caring for them.

In addition, the consolidation of the bigman as the centre of the men's house was intimately linked to the increasing importance of women's work. As Watson argues, a rising demand for female work would have led not only to increasing the intensity of work but also to an increasing competition for women. The supply of women would have fallen increasingly into the hands of those who controlled the largest quantity of pigs and bridewealth. Men became indebted to other men and bigmen became increasingly powerful. In turn, the 'pressure on ambitious men to marry additional women [might have become] keener ..., magnifying the economic differences between monogamous and polygamous men as the labour contribution of women [rose]' (Watson 1979:67).

In the core areas, the transition to horticulture, accelerated by the sweet potato revolution, intensified female subjugation and led to increasing economic and political inequalities among men. This provides the focus for this paper; I am concerned to explore a particular place, the Eastern Highlands, over a particular time, that period after the onset of the 'ipomean revolution' and prior to European intrusion, mindful of the fact the period is not distinct - for horticulture, sweet potato and the Europeans impacted in the region unevenly and with sometimes dissimilar effects.

This particular period in the history of the Eastern Highlands has been selected not so much for its own sake (absorbing and entertaining as it is) but to cast light on the present political and economic condition of the province. (A study on the articulation with the capitalist mode is nearing completion as this goes to press.) Thus, just as it is necessary to consider the mode of production prior to the sweet potato in order to understand this period fully, so it is necessary to understand this period in order to comprehend contemporary events. That the Eastern Highlands Province did not exist during the period of time that concerns this paper is, given the propensity of colonialists for drawing arbitrary lines on maps, of concern. Of course the Eastern Highlands Province did not constitute a political unit, and the studying of it (rather than, say, the highlands as a whole) is justifiable mainly (but not entirely) retrospectively. But in fact it has been common for ethnographers to draw distinctions between the eastern and the western highlands, between the east central and eastern language family areas and the rest. The Eastern Highlands Province encompasses those two language families and was in addition characterized by a high degree of social and economic homogeneity - in horticultural practices, residence patterns, warfare, polygyny, the nama cult, the men's house and the bigman institution. Elements of all
these were found throughout the highlands but (with very few exceptions) all were found together throughout the Eastern Highlands.

This paper relies upon evidence collected by a handful of anthropologists and medical researchers who were active in the Eastern Highlands in the 1940s, 1950s and the first years of the 1960s. The anthropologists in particular have almost precluded the development of a broader view, locked in as they were to a method which stressed small-scale study through participant observation and which insisted that kinship was the social structure. Since politics was a priori a function of kinship, it followed that the village (where people lived) was not where political action was, because the Eastern Highlanders who lived together were frequently not related by blood ties. Before the solution had been found as to what was the basic political unit, the search was on for the largest. Kin ties were of little help here either and the conclusion drawn by ethnographers was not that this approach to explaining political action was inadequate but that the 'fault' lay in reality itself. Highlands' societies were characterized by 'structural looseness'.

The same problem arose in attempting to explain political power within the village. Since the village was not central to the anthropological enterprise because it was not amenable to kin analyses, the men's house and the bigman institution, central to village politics but not determined by kin relations, were once again overlooked. Along with 'structurally loose' societies the anthropologists saw 'acephalous' societies - headless societies, a term suggesting again that something was lacking, that reality was at fault.

Nonetheless, it is now too late to obtain first hand knowledge of post-ipomean, pre-European life in the highlands. Instead, the task remains to confront the painstaking, detailed, hesitant, non-judgemental, and in its own terms (there is no other word for it) generally excellent descriptive work of the early ethnographers. The reworking of this literature is a task that demands serious attention, for no adequate understanding of the contemporary political economy of the province can be gained without it. Unless the preexisting institutions, forms of political action and economic exploitation - in short the contradictions - can be grasped in their dynamic totality, then any understanding of the present must remain inadequate. The Third World was created; global capitalism impacted on something. World capitalism came to a living, vibrant, changing social order, possessed of its own stresses, strains and motive forces. And it came unevenly, affecting different parts in different ways, over different periods of time, with dissimilar results.

THE VILLAGE IN THE EASTERN HIGHLANDS

Ethnographers of the highlands of Papua New Guinea have generally considered the descent group as the key political unit in the pre-contact period, but even within the economically and culturally homogenous area of the Eastern Highlands Province there arose considerable terminological confusion. What Read called a district unit and sometimes a sub-tribe, Berndt called a district, Salisbury a phratry, Newman a phratry, Watson a local-group, Glasse a clan-parish. Langness initially used the term tribe, but later changed his mind and referred to the same unit as a district.
Within these groups there apparently existed what Berndt calls a village or clan, what Read calls a local clan or village, and what Salisbury calls a clan or village and sometimes a clan-village. Within these again, existed a patrilineage (Berndt), a lineage/sub-clan containing polysegmentary lineages (Read), or wards containing lineages (Salisbury) (Langness 1968:181; R. Berndt 1964, Table 2).

Some Eastern Highland ethnographers seem able at least to agree to call a village a village, and this analysis makes it the basic unit, following the example of the first ethnographer in the Eastern Highlands, Fortune (1947a, 1947b), who unlike most of his successors considered the village 'independent and sovereign' and suggested that location was a principal determinant of economic and political activity. Salisbury (1962b) did likewise but combined the spatial metaphor with kinship terms, referring to the village as containing the significant social group, a patrilineal virilocal clan, which was normally the largest effective unit in Siamese society and the main unit of warfare.

The village (hamlet, house-place, settlement) was situated on high ground or adjacent to some other physical feature which gave greater safety in time of war - a forest, stream or cane-swamp. The area occupied by the structures themselves was comparatively small and the 45-200 inhabitants worked in the surrounding gardens, which sometimes covered more than twenty acres, and in the nearby forest and grasslands (Chinnery 1934; Read 1954a, 1966; Salisbury 1962a, 1962b; Newman 1965).

The dwellings, from twelve to one hundred of them, were frequently surrounded by a stockade, a precaution made particularly necessary in the Eastern Highlands by the grassland stretches covering formerly cultivated slopes; the communities lacked the protection and seclusion of natural forest or large casuarina groves enjoyed by their neighbours to the west (Read 1952, 1954a, 1955; Sorenson and Gajdusek 1969; Chinnery 1934; Newman 1965; Brown 1978; Salisbury 1962b). The majority of the dwellings were shared by females, young males and pigs. In their midst and/or at both or either end of the village stood the men's house(s), the focal point in the village (Read 1954a, 1954b; Salisbury 1962b).

WARFARE

The location and fortification of the village was necessitated by constant warfare - a way of life for Eastern Highlanders at least since the ipomean revolution (and probably before it) and up to the establishment of 'Pax Australiana' (and occasionally following it). Male children were reared by the warriors and the warrior men and their pupils inhabited the men's house (Chinnery 1934; C. Berndt 1966; R. Berndt 1962). With enemies as close as fifteen or thirty minutes' walk away the task of the warrior was onerous, necessitating round-the-clock vigilance. From vantage points the men guarded the women at work in the gardens and kept watch over the village at night (Read 1954a, 1954b; R. Berndt 1954-55). With its strategic location within a village itself strategically located, the men's house was 'a nerve centre and clearing house for the affairs of a settlement' (Watson 1967:80), as well as being a citadel from which its occupants allocated guard duties and maintained the roster (Read 1954a; Watson 1967; R. Berndt 1962; Sorenson and Gajdusek 1969; Sorenson 1972; Salisbury 1962b).
In a situation of virtual hand to hand combat, the victor on the battlefield was the side with the numbers, with manpower and its effective mobilization more than any other factor determining the outcome (Watson 1965). Fortune (1947b:110) records a winning alliance outnumbering the losers by ten to one. Thus, although homicide by ambush was common and raids to assassinate particular individuals were frequent, pitched battles (which were often of considerable duration involving many casualties) determined the day. A particular fight might last for two or three days but the struggle might continue with very little respite for several weeks (Watson 1967; Fortune 1947a, 1947b). Ronald Berndt (1962:236-239, 263-265) records in detail several wars and from this record it is possible to derive some basic data. One struggle lasted for twenty-one days with twenty-two killed, another for about a month with the loss of about eighteen people. Over time, casualties could be heavy. In the Kogu area near Kainantu, containing five villages, about one third of the men were killed in warfare between about 1900 and 1950 (R. Berndt 1970:343). Mick Leahy commented in his diary in February 1934,

... the death rate in this area alone [the Bena Bena valley] from fighting is appalling and every day we are getting particulars of more deaths of people we knew when we were here before [three years previously). We are also being continuously invited to go with a friendly mob and wipe off another crowd whom they are at war with, the rewards held out to us being plenty of pigs and marys [women] (quoted in Langness 1968:14).

In the attempt to gain numerical superiority, the leaders of the men's houses entered alliances with other leading men, and groups of villages with other groups (Watson 1967). Such alliances were fragile; the norm was their breaking (Read 1954a; R. Berndt 1962) and bribery was commonplace (Fortune 1947b; R. Berndt 1954-55, 1962, 1970; Watson 1967; Glasse and Lindenbaum 1969).

With numerical strength the determining factor, and with military alliances unstable, numbers would have been more assured with recruitment and absorption (Watson 1967; R. Berndt 1964). Whence came the new recruits? Certainly mainly from villages laid waste. With no possibility of survival outside a village, and surrounded by foes and uncertain allies, the defeated warrior, his wives and children had no option but to take up residence in another's village. Frequently, but not always, the warrior would settle in the village of his wife's father or brother or in the village of a pig-exchange partner. But the refugee might seek help from a powerful man in the area, thus adding to the bigman's strength and reputation. The 'major political achievement' of the famous bigman and warrior, Matoto of Tairora, was 'the recruitment of a sizeable group of refugees' (Watson 1967:55). While the more usual occurrence was probably the recruitment of single families, the success of Matoto was not uncommon. Newman (1965) records the story of LuBiso, a bigman of the Gururumba of the upper Asaro valley, about twenty miles from Goroka. LuBiso was a warrior whose reputation was known not only in the Asaro valley but in neighbouring areas as well, such that families from Gende and even Chimbu came to settle with him. Not only did LuBiso succeed in attracting families but he succeeded in establishing an entire Chimbu village next to his own. The men had initially come down to fight as battle allies of LuBiso (for what
reason is unclear) but so impressed were they with him that they decided to stay.

It was Berndt's (1962:250) opinion that 'movements of displaced persons [took] place fairly frequently' and he records instances of refugees seeking refuge among those who had dispossessed them. Read (1952) records instances of the victorious calling on the vanquished to return. To what would they have returned? A small dispersed group, unable to return to its gardens and plundered of its main items of wealth, was very much dependent on the kindness of others. And, comments Berndt, this kindness had to be paid for. The fate of at least some of the conquered, some of the time, was absorption by the conquerors.

Numbers was the key to military success and the size of the village was increased by the absorption of those who were dispossessed through warfare. Nor was this absorption of refugees halfhearted. The Chimbu villagers who settled near LuBiso were quite 'foreign' in language, dress and some customs to the Gururumba, and yet at the time Newman was in the area two sons of a Chimbu immigrant were well on their way to becoming bigmen, and had even established their own men's house (Newman 1965).

Kinship terms were extended to all persons who lived in the village, regardless of their reasons for doing so, and the newcomers were no different from those of local descent in the rights and duties accorded them. 'Brotherhood' depended as much on alliance and friendship as kinship. If a warrior lived in the village and acted like a 'brother' he became one, and in no respect was he different from a 'real' brother (de Lepervanche 1967-68).

Descent was a means of conceptualizing residence (Glasse and Lindenbaum 1969). The attempts by anthropologists working in the province to explain political action by analyses of kinship, were misplaced. Political relationships often preceded kin relationships and were then cemented by fictive kin ties: 'politics play[ed] a prior role' (Watson 1967:70); 'the sources of integration [were] much more in the power structure than in the kinship structure' (Newman 1965:59). 'Structural looseness', 'genealogical shallowness', 'structural flexibility', so frequently commented on by highlands ethnographers, is explained not only by hunting and gathering remnants but also by the pattern of warfare which crucially determined, and was determined by, village size.

It was usual to present the migrant with generous gifts of pig, fowl and vegetables; gifts that in time would be reciprocated. It was usual also to provide the migrant with fertile land - the admission of outsiders necessitated it and land was used as an inducement to attract new recruits. Eastern Highlanders had a keen eye for numbers - the admission of outsiders necessitated it and land was used as an inducement to attract new recruits. eastern Highlanders had a keen eye for numbers, on the ability of a village to survive. Read (1954a, 1966) records the acerbic comments of a tultul of the Gehano, who scoffed at a neighbouring village pointing out that its numbers were so small that if fighting had not been proscribed it would have suffered complete annihilation or would have had to rely on the superior strength of a neighbouring village to survive.

Although in the absolute sense land was short in few areas in the Eastern Highlands, the province is the driest area in the highlands, receiving 200 to 250 cm of rain per year in most places compared with 250
to 300 in Chimbu, Western Highlands and Enga (Brown 1978). The margin between a successful crop and food shortage was a slim one, with the Korofeigup people of the Asaro valley forced to trade in salt and pigs to meet seasonal food shortages (Howlett cited in Brookfield 1964). Optimal conditions for the cultivation of sweet potato were rare and, in Brookfield's opinion (ibid.:38), the widespread occurrence of conditions that verged on the marginal placed a premium on the best land. The settlement of new recruits in the interests of military protection, strength-in-numbers, would have increased the need to acquire more land. In a province where drought was a problem and the best land at a premium, the acquisition of fertile land through conquest would have given further impetus to warfare.

**PRODUCTION: SEXUAL DIVISION IN THE TECHNICAL RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION**

The most visible social and economic feature of Eastern Highlands life in the 1950s was the sharp sexual division of labour (Langness 1974).

The most important crop was sweet potato, which provided 70 per cent or more of the diet of most highlanders (Langness 1974; Brown 1978:78). Reid and Gajdusek (1969:334-337) surveyed Moke Village in North Fore in 1957 prior to 'significant change in dietary and gardening practices'. They found that a woman provided 6.3 to 8.5 kg of sweet potato daily and 4.9 to 8.3 kg of other vegetables and fruit (pitpit, taro, corn, sugar cane, banana and greens) for the evening and morning meals. These estimates may have been conservative: at the time of the study 'most of the younger men' were in gaol for engaging in warfare. Salisbury (1962b) estimated that each adult consumed nearly 2 kg of sweet potato a day and about the same quantity by weight of other foods. In the twice-daily meals, more than 70 per cent of the calories were derived from sweet potatoes, the remainder coming from other vegetables and fruit. Only about 2 per cent came from meat. Similarly the majority of the protein intake came from vegetable sources: about 40 per cent from sweet potato, 20 per cent from leafy greens, 35 per cent from other edible plants, and less than 5 per cent from meat (Laut 1968:95).

The gardens in which the women worked varied not only in number but also in size, from about 0.3 to 0.6 acre. The intensity of labour in the highlands as a whole varied from about 165 woman-days to 200 woman-days per acre (Brown 1978). The yield also varied. Glasse (cited in Sorensen 1972:349) suggests yields of 5 to 21 tons per acre, and Salisbury (1962b) recorded 4.2 tons and considered 8 tons per acre high. Brown (1978:82-83) suggests that about 7 tons per acre was high, and concludes that there can be no doubt that permanent and intensive gardening required much labor per acre of land, but that it also produced more food for the area than extensive systems which used more land and required less preparation, weeding and other crop care. This increased production, especially when population pressure felt, justified the higher labor input. Further, it prompted permanent settlement, improvement of housing, trees and orchards, while
reducing convenient supplies of wild products and animals.

While intensive cultivation provided the bulk of the nutritional needs of the Eastern Highlanders, what small proportion came from animal protein was overwhelmingly provided by the labour of women. To women fell the task of pig husbandry. They took pride in the animals, named them, slept in the same house as them, fondled them when small. Sometimes a woman even allowed orphan piglets or those of large litters to share her breasts temporarily with her children (Vayda 1972; Sorensen and Gajdusek 1969). The importance of pigs in ceremonial nexus has been noted repeatedly by highlands ethnographers. What has been less appreciated has been their importance as a source of protein compared to hunting. Hunting of wild game by men was an extremely energy intensive form of protein acquisition. A recent experiment among the Siane Komonku indicated that 25.1 man-hours of effort were expended for each kilogram (bag weight) of possum, cuscus or rat obtained. More than five man-hours were expended for each kilogram (bag weight) of flying fox (Dwyer 1974).

Although there is evidence of the domestication of pigs in the highlands between 5,000 and 6,000 BP (Bulmer 1973), the introduction of sweet potato in the area about 400 BP made possible an increase in the size of the pig herds (Sorensen 1972; Watson 1979). Much of the sweet potato crop - nearly two thirds in some places - was used for fodder. The acceptance of the sweet potato as both a staple food and a fodder unquestionably increased women's work, in cultivating larger areas, transporting heavier backloads of tubers, and in watching, feeding and caring for pigs (Watson 1979).

In the forms of production summarized above - cultivation, pig husbandry, and hunting and gathering - the contributions of the two sexes are unequal in terms of subsistence derived as well as input of labour time. This is doubtless because of the male warrior role which was vital in a society in which 'warfare was an accepted feature of social living' (R. Berndt 1964:183). The warrior role, the hunting of men, merged with the task of hunting for food but the bulk of the food was produced through the labour of women. As Read (1954b:866) commented, on women fell 'a disproportionate share of both the drudgery and the heavy work'.

In addition to direct forms of production of goods, there were other kinds of labour activity which entailed the transformation of a product into another more usable or more desirable form. These secondary forms of production included craft manufacture, food preparation and trade (O'Laughlin 1974). There was a substantial sexual division of labour, not only in the production, but also in the transformation of products. Men were responsible by and large for the construction and maintenance of bridges, and houses which needed rebuilding every three or four years. Women were responsible for the never ending task of transforming the inner fibres of vines, shrubs, bark fibres and roots into cord, which was then fashioned into netted hats, aprons, skirts, lashings, pig-tethering ropes, belts, armbands, and most importantly, string bags in which all produce was transported. Mats were also made from pandanus leaves plaited into rectangles and used for rain capes and bedding. And women obtained and maintained the bamboo cylinders which were used as cooking utensils,
containers and carriers for water, oil and other fluids (Read 1966; Brown 1978).

Although the sexual division was pronounced in these activities, it was even more so in the manufacture of salt. Some villages which had access to rich forest land and plentiful firewood undertook the production of salt made by the burning of reed or cane and the extraction of water soluble salts from the ash. Salt-making secrets were carefully guarded and certain aspects of the production process were restricted to a few men only (Sorenson and Gajdusek 1969).

The trading of the salt was in the hands of men, as was trading in general. Sometimes barter was man to man, and involved hazardous travels through hostile territory. Sometimes it took the form of group exchanges but always it was invested with political importance, not the least of which would have been military - an attempt either to win potential allies or at least to ensure a possible 'safehouse' in the event of a military setback.

The sexual division of labour was as strictly defined in the process of the transformation of products as it was in simple production. Production was the sphere of women and their life of hard work marked them physically. A woman returning from a garden might have carried a load of 25 kg or more (Salisbury 1962b) which caused 'hollows in her back, large enough to contain [two] fists ... the stigmata of her lifetime of carrying' (Read 1966:40). In most aspects of Eastern Highlands production the sexual division of labour was culturally, not biologically, determined. With the exception perhaps of the felling of larger trees and warfare, there was little a man did that a woman could not have done. Or to put the matter the other way, men most certainly could have performed the tasks that women did, but did not. Furthermore, in the transformation of products strength was not an issue, and yet the sexual division of labour manifested an even greater rigidity there than in simple production. Women were not allowed even to look upon the site of salt production. The economic subordination of women to men was not technologically determined, and in order to explore male dominance it is necessary to turn from technology to the organization of production.

SEXUAL ANTAGONISM AND THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION: THE CONTROL OF LAND AND THE MEANS OF LABOUR

Jural rights to the use of land for cultivation were obtained through residence in the village. Although no individual had rights to special consideration in the allocation of land, certain areas were associated with particular patrilineages. The older men in the lineage at their retirement allocated the land to their sons, at their sons' marriage. In effect, this sometimes meant that the advantage lay with the eldest son, since his age cohort was the first to obtain wives and thus require land. All Eastern Highlanders were in theory able to claim land in the village of their father. In practice, men who left the area for a prolonged period or took up residence in another village often forfeited their right to land unless they were strong enough to assert it. The control of land was far more directly related to residence and power than it was to kinship.
This was even more clearly the case with women. Langness, who in 1964 reported that women retained land rights in their father's village, wrote five years later (Langness 1969:55):

Although it has been widely reported for the New Guinea highlands that women retain rights in their natal groups after marriage ... it has never been made clear just what this means .... I would suggest that such statements are often misleading in the extreme, they imply a significance to descent group membership which does not in some cases exist, and they give an erroneous impression as to the position of female agnates.

The lack of real female control of land was expressed through the rules of exogamy and virilocal residence: at marriage women left the village of their father and joined that of their husband. Theoretically, women remained members of their father's village even after marriage, thus maintaining their right to land; but with a rule of virilocal residence they were seldom in a position to claim that right. Women had right of usufruct over land, dwellings or patches of forest, but not right of disposal. This rested with men. Men exercised the ultimate control over land and the usable products on it (Newman 1965).

The absence of individual rights of ownership of land was often confused by ethnographers with the presence of egalitarian rules of property assignation. But the real relations of production in the Eastern Highlands were marked by asymmetry of age and, more essentially, sex. This inequality of access was present not only in the key object of labour - land - but also with relation to the main means of labour.

Cutting, scraping and butchering implements when made of bamboo were simple to obtain and manufacture. Sharp pointed tools were made of the long leg bones of cassowaries, pigs and other animals, and needles were made of other bones. Tools made from animal bones assumed only the existence of the means to catch them and all villages had the ability to make these, if not up to a standard that the men might have preferred. Asymmetrical relations to the means of labour were noticeable in the access to and/or control of three key tools: digging sticks, bows and arrows, and axes or adzes.

Digging sticks, by far the easiest tools to obtain, came in a variety of sizes but all were fire-hardened or shaped tree limbs, and in this respect were dependent upon the existence of the axe. Although most intimately associated with women's work, they were not exclusively so; men also cultivated a narrow range of crops which required planting and some care. Bows were made of hardwood and arrow heads were attached to the reed shaft by binding and gum. Favoured materials - black palm and gum - when absent or in short supply were obtained through trade. Access to weapons was strictly forbidden to women and it was considered among the Gururumba at least a punishable offence for a woman to touch a man's bow. Like weapons of war and the hunt, the axe was the preserve of men. As far as is known, the only axe or adze-head manufacture in the Eastern Highlands existed in Kafetu on the Asaro river. Every man needed a work axe, which he carried with him most of the time and used daily (Newman 1965; Brown
1978). For most villages, this meant that the vital axes could only be obtained through exchange. Production in the Eastern Highlands required a limited stock of tools, but the most basic tool, that which was used in the preparation of others, could on the most part be obtained only by trade.

ECONOMIC SURPLUS AND THE REPRODUCTION OF THE CONDITIONS OF PRODUCTION

A mode of production contains not only a set of productive processes, but also the conditions of its reproduction. The mode of production prevalent in the Eastern Highlands, once it had reached a stage in its articulation with the hunting and gathering mode in which horticultural production was dominant, required as a condition of its continued existence an ability to produce a reasonably regular surplus. A surplus was essential because the climate made settled agriculture something of a risk in some parts of the province; because the most basic tool in the Eastern Highlander's kit bag, the axe or adze, generally had to be obtained by trade; and because, apart from natural increase, labour, in the shape of new recruits tempted by gifts or women obtained through bride price, could be replenished only through the production of surplus.

Surplus in its most basic form was surplus of sweet potato provided primarily through the labour of women and transformed into a more durable form by feeding a substantial portion of it to pigs. As Sorensen (1972) has pointed out, only villages having an output in excess of their needs could raise pigs. Pigs were repositories of an otherwise unpreservable surplus (Vayda 1972). Sweet potatoes, produced with female labour, were not as valuable and could not be exchanged. They obtained exchange value in their transformation into live protein; but in this very transformation they moved out of the control of women and into the hands of men. While the care of the animals resided with women their disposal rested unquestionably with men.

The key political problems confronting a village in the Eastern Highlands were twofold. On the one hand, to survive the predacity of its neighbours it required strong fortifications, an alert and capable force of warriors and a reliable system of alliances. On the other, the regular production of an agricultural surplus was necessary for its physical survival. To obtain axes and wives, tradeable products were required and the two key exchange goods produced in the natural economy were women and pigs. Women were explicitly recognized as sources of valuables. The vagina was 'the road along which pigs and shells came'. But the distribution of women was related directly to external issues and problems of a military nature, and was not always under the control of the village polity. The regular production of a surplus was the key internal political problem. As Langness (1974:205) has observed, 'To survive in the New Guinea Highlands, and especially to survive well - to have many large gardens and many pigs - it [was] necessary to control the labour and, indeed, the actual bodies of women. They must do what [was] required of them - and when it [was] required'.
THE SOCIAL RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION - SEXUAL ANTAGONISM

The existence of the men's house undoubtedly sharpened sexual antagonism but men also had military reasons for avoiding women. In theory, an Eastern Highland man or woman's 'first responsibility and duty [was] to the war making unit, the paternal village' (R. Berndt 1954-55:51). Wives, coming as they did from outside the village, came also from and owed their loyalties to enemies or potential enemies. In this respect the sharpest feature of Eastern Highlands social relations, sexual antagonism, was reinforced by military necessity (Langness 1974; R. Berndt 1954-55).

The marital relationship was characterized by distrust and antipathy, with the husband approaching the wife (and not vice versa) principally for sex (R. Berndt 1954-55). Women were, in Langness' (1974:201) words, 'second-class citizens' and Berndt claimed that a husband had complete right of disposal over his wife. But women's awareness of their own powerlessness did not necessarily imply acquiescence. An encounter by Read (1966:50) neatly encapsulates the prevailing quality of husband-wife relationships:

She replied in the slightly injured, querulous voice I had heard so often that I began to expect it as a woman's natural form of expression. The tone barely recognised a man's right to command and thus asserted a woman's own will even while complying with his demands.

But the resources that women controlled were few, and their capacity to manipulate them was thoroughly circumscribed by the dominant male ideology and male physical power.

Perhaps the only real recourse women had was to leave their husbands entirely. Among the Gururumba, the first wife of 63 per cent of the men and the second wife of 40 per cent deserted their husbands (Newman 1965:26). Among the Bena Bena, Langness (1969:45) estimated that between 35 and 50 per cent of new brides attempted to escape at least once. Such high instability reflected not only the antagonistic nature of male-female relations but also the tensions between neighbouring villages.

If a woman and man enjoyed a relationship of trust or sympathy it was probably only within the sister-brother bond (R. Berndt 1954-55). In such a case it would have been assumed (by other men) that the married sister was passing on information to her brother or father of activities in her husband's village. Conversely, while a man did not entrust his wife with details concerning village welfare or raiding plans he expected his sister to provide such details from her husband's village. Control of information did not provide women with much leverage, for each wife was a sister and each sister a wife. The woman who traded information to a brother was also the woman who betrayed her husband. For the men, the situation was one of balance - each man's sister was another's wife. For the woman, the situation was one of powerlessness and isolation, for power was located in the village in which she lived and worked, not in her village of origin.
SEXUAL ANTAGONISM AND THE REPRODUCTION OF LABOUR

Sexuality may have provided women with some small leverage, but fertility control perhaps provided women with a greater degree of power. The number of men a village contained was a source of strength and pride; Read (1966, 1954a) records Helekazu of the Ozahadzuha near Goroka boasting that they were stronger than others because their men outnumbered their women. The retention and absorption of new settlers, crucial as it was to the very existence of the polity, was fraught with danger. Sometimes even the kinship framework proved insufficient to contain new members of the village community and there were instances of refugees turning on their erstwhile hosts, often in response to bribes by enemies of the host group. The only sure method of recruiting a larger and more effective fighting force was through natural increase and the intensive socialization of male offspring.

To obtain control over the fertility of women and the early relationship between mothers and sons, men tried to make it impossible for women to practice contraceptive techniques or abortion or to have undue influence over their sons (Langness 1974). Not only was it the case that men believed that women had the ability to prevent conception and/or cause abortion (Read 1954a, 1966), but there is evidence that women did in fact possess pharmacological remedies to obtain these effects (Langness 1974; Read 1954a, 1954b). In childless marriages the woman was always blamed, for a man was not considered fully a man until his wife had borne a child and it was considered impossible for men to be sterile (Read 1954a, 1954b; Langness 1974). That fertility control was practised by women is evident by the low fertility rate. Although some had as many as six children, the average among the Gahuku-Gama was only two (Read 1954a). (Elsewhere, Read (1954b) suggests that average family size including husband and wife was just over three.) The attempt by women to retain control of their fertility, even in the face of severe sanctions, may have been an attempt to balance the demands of the mothering role with the heavy duties placed upon them as the primary producers and processors of food. It may also be seen as an attempt by women to retain some power in a situation where they were powerless.

The social relations in the post-ipomean and pre-European Eastern Highlands required for their reproduction an education which taught the child to become a warrior and at the same time instilled in him the virtues of male pride, male superiority, male solidarity, and antagonism to females. With women's allegiance to their fathers and brothers, with women's unreliability and guile, how would it be possible for a man to have trusted his son? Breast milk was an important part of the child's diet for three or four years, and the care of young children was women's work, demeaning to a man and contrary to the aggressive virtues required in a warrior. Women, of biological and social necessity, undertook the first years of child socialization. This was a potential danger to male hegemony.

To counter this threat, male children were 'forcibly' removed from their mothers and the company of other females on at least four different occasions. On the first two experiences of separation, at ages five to six and seven to nine, the male children were taken away from the community and physically marked (Langness 1974). As time passed the children were
increasingly warned of the dangers of association with females: their skins would be no good; they would contract sores; they would become ill; they would be weak; they would die as young men; they would become 'rubbishmen' rather than 'men with a name' (ibid.). For a boy, the achievement of manhood and superiority was a process fraught with danger, the novice learning that his safety and survival depended on having as little as possible to do with women (Read 1954a). This was expressed by the physical removal of the young man at puberty to the men's house which remained the centre of his daily life ever after.

The reproduction of labour involves not only biological reproduction but also the socialization of individuals into their productive roles. Given that labour was the scarcest factor of production, those who controlled its reproduction could be expected to possess some power. This was not the case, and here rests a central contradiction of the system. Women had the primary responsibility for both biological reproduction and the socialization of children, but control over those reproductive rights was vested entirely in men (O'Laughlin 1974).

The 'extreme tension, even antagonism', the 'inherent antagonism', characteristic of male-female relations, was rooted in the village political economy, in the struggle for control of the factors of production and reproduction (Read 1954b; R. Berndt 1965). Land, labour, and fertility, the means of production and reproduction, gave rise to a set of fiercely antagonistic social relations within and between villages. The sharpness of these contradictions within the village in the form of male-female antagonism, and between groups of villagers in the form of warfare, has been noted by all ethnographers of the province. Given the intensity of these internal and external strains, what prevented the collapse and/or transformation of these formations? What mediated the contradictions?

MEDIATION AND CONTROL

Instances of spontaneous action by women against an infringement of their rights by men are rare in the literature on the Eastern Highlands. Shirley Glasse (1964) records what appears to have been an institution among the Waniabe of South Fore, which involved a mass walkout by the women of the village if one of their numbers was affronted by a male. Men too walked out en bloc if shamed by a wife. Read (1966) also records an incident at Gohajaka when women en masse physically attempted to prevent a brideprice settlement.

In order to produce a system of social relations that either contained, or was grounded in, contradiction the society mediated these contradictions within politico-juridical superstructures and/or ideological representations (O'Laughlin 1974).

More regular ritual mass-action by women centred around those times when male control of their productive and reproductive effort was most obvious. When a young woman left her village to take up residence with her new husband, ritualized forms of female aggression occurred. So too when pigs were taken out of female control and set for a pig exchange and when
young men left the care of women and passed through the final stage of initiation into the world of male adulthood.

When pigs were taken out of women's control, when young men became adults, when a young woman became a wife, these were times when the role of women as reproducers was clear, as was the fact that they could not control how that role was to be enacted or to what end. Read (1966:196) comments that these were rituals of opposition, graphically symbolizing the cleavage between the sexes. They belonged to 'that broader category of custom in which the subjects of a sacred king engage in ritual rebellion - a licence granted on one day of the year - abusing and insulting an office beyond the reach of normal criticism'.

Such ritual releases illustrated the strength of female opposition, yet were only possible within an ideology that strongly expressed and reflected male hegemony. The male and female roles and the power relations involved in them were reinforced as part of daily living through moral exhortation, and parables such as those recorded by Read (1955), which are similar to parables found among the Kamano, Usurufa and Jate (R. Berndt 1962). Education within the men's house was even more direct and was based on a series of positive and negative admonitions. On the one hand the young man was instructed to be strong, to be ready to fight and kill. He was to listen to his elders, help his father and his father's line, and attend to his wife's garden and the maintenance of the stockade. He was not to commit adultery and as far as possible was to avoid any association with women (R. Berndt 1962).

For more general consumption, among the Kamano, Usurufa and Jate such moral precepts were incorporated in a series of parables (kinihera) which were 'part of the texture of living' and 'mirror[ed] everyday life' (C. Berndt 1966:270). Catherine Berndt (1966) recorded 536 of these tales, which dealt mainly with the problems of living in a hostile or potentially hostile environment and with relations between men and women, and drew attention to moral issues or laid down moral rules.

The admonitions to women were more casual in the telling. Usually shortly before marriage a young woman was directly instructed by other women in what she had to do. She was told three main things: stay with your husband; do as you are told; avoid sexual relations with other men (R. Berndt 1962). Newman (1965:91-92) recorded a speech on an evening of instruction to a girl prior to marriage; it was delivered by the women of her village in the seclusion of a woman's house away from male ears:

When you get to [place name] there will be many things to do. You will be told to work in the garden, to weed, to plant, to bring firewood. You must look after the pigs and bring water when you are told. You will carry heavy loads, and if they are too heavy to carry you just make two trips. You cannot ask someone else to carry part of it for you. You will give food from your garden to your husband's father and his brothers when they call out for it. When you have pigs you will give these also, even if you have suckled them at your breast ...
The security of the system of male socialization, male supremacy and female submission rested ultimately on the exercise of physical force. The beating of women was an accepted part of life. Read (1966:188) records a meeting of the Nagamidzuha:

As he concluded a woman's voice from the sidelines shouted an angry criticism of men who had no feeling for their daughters .... Kimitohe turned in fury toward the source of the interruption. He had a long cane in his hand, and in one stride he reached the woman and lashed her bare shoulders repeatedly, telling her to keep her place while men were talking. Mutterings of dissent and resentment among the other women were quickly silenced as he wheeled to face them with the cane ready to descend.

More usually, men disciplined their wives; it was the 'right of husbands to beat their wives' (Read 1966:69) although as the example above suggested, it was not unusual for any male to beat any woman of his village if she behaved in a manner that he found sufficiently aggravating. Informants of Langness (1969) agreed with each other that of thirty Korofeigian males that Langness named, eighteen were known to beat their wives often, and twelve were said never to have beaten their wives.

Besides non formalized and apparently not usual beatings, women were subjected to formalized physical violence, which combined elements of terror with that of theatre. A young woman of the Gahuku-Gama who was unfortunate enough to be approached by the man to whom she was betrothed, violated the taboos requiring strict avoidance. This was considered an affrontery to the man's agemates who sometimes retaliated by urging that she be returned to her parents or by killing her (Read 1954a, 1954b, 1966). A woman suspected of adultery had sticks thrust into her vagina, or stripped of her clothing was tied to a post while men threw dirt and urinated on her (Read 1954a, 1955). Among the Bena Bena a defiant wife was punished with serial intercourse by the husband and other men of his group (Langness 1974). Read (1954a:23) records that a common punishment for less serious offences involved beating across the breasts and shoulders. 'The man selected to carry out the punishment perform[ed] a dance while he belabour[ed] as many as six woman in one go'.

Formalized physical coercion is the ultimate response of dominant groups always and everywhere to direct or indirect challenge of the basic social relations by those whom they control. Adultery, particularly with a man from outside the village, and the refusal to work were actions which struck at the heart of a social system which depended for its continued existence on the close control of women in the processes of production and reproduction. The power necessary for this control was located in the men's house.

THE MEN'S HOUSE

As well as being crucial for the military protection of the village the men's house was an information centre, a decision-making centre, ritual centre, and a school house (Newman 1965). It 'formed, in effect, a
"corporation" whose "estate" included land, sacred symbols, and women' (Read 1966:181). In the men's house male superiority and solidarity on the one hand, and the subordinate dependence of women on the other, found its most formalized expression.

So strong were male bonds of solidarity within the men's house that even an adulterous husband was not expelled (although the wife was punished). Berndt (1962) suggests that among men who shared a men's house adultery was even condoned but is sure that at least it did not have serious repercussions for the men. Langness (1974:194) recorded several cases occurring within the Nupasafa of Bena and noted 'although this kind of adultery [was] morally condemned, it caused[ed] little overt hostility between clansmen or between fathers and sons'.

The training the young men received emphasized the ideal of male solidarity and the essential opposition of men and women. Their duties were primarily concerned with serving their elders in the men's house. Among the Bena Bena and Gahuku-Gama, boys initiated to the men's house together formed a group known collectively as 'agemates' and their common submission to and dependence on their elders led to the development of close bonds between them (Langness 1969, 1974; Read 1955). A similar relationship, although not one formed exclusively within a specific men's house, existed among the Kamano, Jate, Usurufa and Fore in what Berndt (1954-55:50) called the male nenafo bond.

The agemat and nenafo bonds often overrode (other) kinship bonds and the relationship was probably even closer than that between brothers, who were supposed 'to stand as one' within the village. A deep under-current of hostility and fear underlay the fraternal relationship, however, because brothers were in direct competition for control over specific means of production and reproduction. A father invariably left the larger gardens to his eldest son when he attained social adulthood and on the father's death his remaining possessions were divided according to age. In addition, the elder brother usually had the right in taking a wife to disregard any previous attachment formed by a younger brother (ibid.).

Male solidarity forged in the men's house was the principal and dominant ideological force exercised in the struggle for retention of land in intervillage warfare, and in intravillage life in the control of fertility, socialization and labour. Male hegemony, sometimes reinforced with kinship ties, was also broader than them and at times more durable. It was articulated above all in the cult of the sacred flutes (Read 1954a, 1954b), the nema cult found among virtually all the Eastern Highlands language groups - the Siane, Gururumba, Kafe, Yavi-Yufa, Yagaria, Gimi, Labogai, Fore, Kamano and Bena Bena (Langness 1974). The nema flutes, the supreme symbol of male hegemony and male unity, were central in a secret male cult involving the validation of beliefs about male superiority, violent male initiation rites, the total exclusion of uninitiated males and of women under threat of death, and ritual feasting on pork (Read 1954a, 1955; R. Berndt 1962; Newman 1965; Langness 1974). Male initiation at puberty covered a period of weeks, a period of extreme anxiety, danger and physical pain, culminating in the revelation of the flutes to the initiates and the explaining of their secrets. Not only through the feasting on pork
was the theme of appropriation raised through the ritual, but the flutes were regarded as initially the property of women and the women made direct donations of food to the *nama* (C. Berndt 1966; Langness 1974).

Most of the ceremonies that took place in the men's house were 'directly or indirectly concerned with demonstrating and securing the dominance of men' (Read 1954b:866). Male dominance and solidarity, while secure enough, was constantly tested in that the majority of quarrels and fights in the village were directly provoked by cases of adultery, elopement and abduction (R. Berndt 1962). Men were in a position to give and enforce orders to women without necessarily specifying reasons and it was this aspect of the male-female relationship which was specifically dealt with and validated in mythology (R. Berndt 1965). The flute tune, usually the property of the men's house, stood for the 'continuity of [the] group and the inviolate character of its bonds and associated attitudes, internal harmony, mutual support, and solidarity before the world at large' (Read 1966:118). And yet the *nama* cult was an expression of male control not only over labour and reproduction, but also over land, for the possession of a particular tune was like having a deed and through it a man validated his claim. When a warrior made a gift of his flute tune to another from a different village (a rare occurrence), it meant that he had offered rights of residence (Langness 1974).

The men's house was not only linked to production as the mediator of contradictions arising from it, although that and its role in warfare were its key significance, it was also involved actively in production as a working unit. The men who lived in the men's house worked together to rebuild it every three or four years and often made up a work team and jointly cleared and fenced the village's gardens (Brown 1978; Salisbury 1962b).

The men's house was the most important political institution in the Eastern Highlands; through it were resolved the two key political problems that confronted the village: survival in warfare and survival in the reproduction of the means and social relations of production. The men's house brought together those with effective military, economic and political power in the village and kept them apart from those whose surplus they controlled. It embodied power, separation and solidarity by its very existence; as well it housed the symbols of that power, the flutes, and was the locus of the enactment and transmission of male rituals. The *nama* cult, centred on initiation and preparation of boys for warfare, was also the supreme expression and justification of men's solidarity and unity and their control of fertility, land, and labour, the means of production and reproduction.

**BIGMEN**

While men stood in a relationship of superiority to women, it was not the case that relationships between them were of equality. Within the men's house only men who were of age could expect to have influence. 'Coming of age' in the Eastern Highlands involved social and economic correlates as well as physical ones (which, as has been demonstrated above, were themselves fraught with uncertainty). Coming of age demanded military and matrimonial success. A youth was not a man until he had married (Read
1954b). And he was not able to marry until he had passed through initiation and betrothal, had made salt (in some areas) and had killed in battle (R. Berndt 1954-55). Even marriage, killing, and the making of salt were insufficient in themselves. Only those free of debt could have expected to wield any influence at a political gathering, and initiation and marriage ceremonies involved the incursion of debts. A man was not fully recognized as an adult until he had repaid the contributions which fellow clansmen had made. After his marriage the man's energies were almost entirely devoted to 'the interminable attempt', 'the pressing need to break even' (Read 1959, 1966).

Wealth in the Eastern Highlands comprised fowls, shells, arrows, waistbands, axes, feathers, armbands, and, principally and most importantly, pigs. The control of land was necessary but not sufficient to establish a name. Similarly garden surplus, dependent on the control of land beyond subsistence requirements, was insufficient to establish a name and yet was a precondition of it (R. Berndt 1954-55). Sweet potato surplus became wealth only in its consumption by pigs, and pigs were the main item of exchange in the acquisition of other goods, either instruments of production (axes) or stores of value (shells). In this crucial sense Salisbury's (1962b) emphasis on demand/exchange and his delineation of four separate 'demand circuits' is inadequate and misleading. What was overlooked was the production and reproduction of goods through labour and the transformation of products from one 'category of goods' into another. This reconsideration is crucial, particularly in relating what Salisbury regards as the separate spheres of 'subsistence' and gima (pigs and shells). Without 'subsistence' production there was no gima, for it was the sweet potato surplus which allowed the pig herds to exist. The feeding of the surplus to the animals conserved it, removed it from the ownership of women and transformed a product produced simply for consumption into a product produced primarily for exchange.

The production and reproduction of surplus product, in the form of sweet potato or pigs, was crucially dependent on the labour of women. The control of women's productive ability was a crucial factor in obtaining and demonstrating bigman status. Except perhaps among the Siane, bigmen were always polygynous, their polygyny being both a cause and symbol of their wealth and power (Watson 1967). Watson (1967:81) says of the bigman Matoto of Tairora, that 'the economics of his position ... were centrally focused upon the large number of women he had as wives, and whose production he could consequently command'. Matoto had sixteen or more wives; LuBiso of the Gururumba had twelve (Watson 1967; Newman 1965). Less powerful bigmen had three or four. The proportion of polygynous males varied directly with the size of the pig herds and the density of the population. Among the South Fore about 3 per cent of the men born before 1939 had more than one wife; among the more populous Gururumba the proportion stood at 10 per cent; and among the Bena Bena 25 to 30 per cent (calculated from R.M. Glasse 1969 Table 3; Newman 1965; Langness 1969). A long series of payments was set into effect by marriage. Obtaining the wealth to maintain the obligations for several marriages was a considerable achievement (Watson 1967), suggesting that once a man became non monogamous he could become increasingly polygynous.
The bigmen not only had control over more of the village's female labour but also directed the work of the males of the village and the men's house in clearing tasks, in rebuilding the men's house, and (among the Siane at least) in building the houses of their wives (Salisbury 1962b).

The wealth of a village's bigmen and its security were intimately related, wealth and warfare standing in a complementary relationship. A village survived if it increased the number of its inhabitants and/or was able to enter political alliances with other villages. In both instances the bigmen played a key role. Such decisions were taken in the men's house and the bigmen had a powerful influence on the decision. Berndt (1962) argues that although alliances between villages were important, reliance upon the strength of the village itself, and on the bigman in particular, was even more important. When a campaign was to begin and how long it lasted depended a great deal upon the attitude of the bigman of the village. As the careers of Matoto and LuBiso illustrate, there can be no doubt of the importance of the bigman in increasing the size of the polity, for the bigmen were precisely those who attracted supporters and maintained a following. Part of earning a name was attracting adherents (Read 1959). It was the bigman's control over wealth, and specifically pigs (Salisbury 1965:54), which enabled the essentially dependent personal relationships to be developed and cemented. A bigman 'bound people to him economically'. Because his economic resources were greater than anyone else's, he was able to use them to support the exchange activities of others. When one man repaid the support given the wealth could be used to support someone else. Men became tied to the bigman by debt, by dependence on him as a controller of resources (Newman 1965).

The attraction of new residents was dependent upon the availability of land. Because the bigman was able to use more, through the labour of his wives, he had more to give. A bigman among the eastern Gahuku-Gama was able to 'buy' rights to land in return for pigs and shell valuables (Read 1954a). In addition, allies were frequently purchased for payments of pigs and valuables, as were the services of assassins. The extent to which outsiders could be induced to kill an influential enemy leader, the extent to which men from other villages could be persuaded to join the battle on the right side, or at least remain neutral, were a function of the wealth that the bigmen possessed.

The economic and political power of the bigman was also reflected at the level of morality. Bigmen were marked by the ability to 'rise above the rights of those they offended', to 'override legitimate procedure' (R. Berndt 1962:176). Makis of Susuroka's second wife was a member of his 'clan', a 'sister'; he married her in flagrant breach of customary morality. Gumae, his third wife, came from a village allied to an enemy—Makis professed unconcern and disinterest (Read 1966). Matoto of Tairora 'frequently saw a woman to whom he felt attracted at the moment and without a word would motion the others, often including her husband, to continue on their way. Then he would take her into the grass to enjoy her sexually. These demands of Matoto evoked no challenge' (Watson 1967:77). Watson (ibid.:78) suggests that the violation of other men's rights, the offence against morality and the disregard of convention, established Matoto's immunity to the restrictions that bound ordinary men. Politically and economically the centre of the men's house, the bigman made it clear...
through his flouting of morality that he did not need what it taught, that he was stronger than it.

Much has been made in the anthropological literature of the reciprocal and redistributive nature of gift exchanges. The assumption has been that because the exchanges were reciprocal they were *ipso facto* redistributive. As Watson (*ibid.*, 101) has commented, 'it is clear that reciprocity in the form of giving and receiving goods offer[ed] little embarrassment to ambitious individuals in concentrating power in their hands'. The recipient of contributions to initiation, marriage or funeral payments was placed under an obligation to the donor. The gifts had to be repaid, and until they were the debtor had to 'act circumspectly' towards his creditor, or risk ridicule (Read 1959:428, 429).

By binding men to himself the bigman increased the possibilities of political alliance if the debtor came from outside the village, or attracted men and their families to the village, or strengthened cohesion within the village itself. In addition, the standing of the village in the large pig exchanges depended on the wealth of the village's bigmen. Among the Bena Bena the exchanges were held (ideally) in connection with male initiations and were not only organized by bigmen but were carried out between individual men (Langness 1974). The killing and distribution of a large number of pigs led to the creation of temporary imbalances, favours owed, debts incurred, political alliances made or reinforced.

The political weight of a ceremony such as the *idza nama* of the Gahuku-Gama depended on the number of pigs available to be slaughtered. This in turn was a function of two other related conditions, the size and security of the community. The bigmen who organized a successful exchange were not only making or maintaining political alliances but were also making a clear military point. What was exchanged was always displayed; display revealed the village's capacity to be productive (Newman 1965), which in turn depended upon its ability to be secure in a world of enemies. The display of wealth was a statement of the village's military strength; so too was the military capacity of the village dependent on its wealth and at the centre of both stood the men's house and the institution of the bigman.
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URBANIZATION AND INEQUALITY IN MELANESIA

John Connell and Richard Curtain

But they have had a taste of the technology system. They have drunk water out of a tap, ridden in a P.M.V., used electric light, bought lolly-water and other things in a store, attended a second-rate picture theatre somewhere, probably bought a new set of clothes, drunk in a tavern, played billiards, listened to a string band, stood outside a big store and looked at all the unreachable cargo in the display counters, acquired a cigarette lighter .... So, when they go back to the village, it is not the same as when they left it (Kokare 1972:30).

Early studies on urbanization in Melanesia, particularly in Papua New Guinea, stressed the importance of towns as centres of economic development and social change. Thus, for Papua New Guinea, Marion Ward wrote that 'towns are the crucibles of nationhood' (1970:58) and R.G. Ward argued that 'urbanization should be facilitated and encouraged' (1971:81), whilst, from Fijian experience, Watters argued that 'rather than regard rural-urban migration as a deleterious process that is steadily undermining the cultural vitality of the villages and threatening their very existence, we should see it as a major characteristic of the process of modernization and seize upon it as a stimulus towards industrial expansion in the cities' (1969:191). In the Papua New Guinea context Conroy (1973) disputed these arguments; questions were also raised about future housing shortages, the erosion of traditional life, and increasing inequalities between urban and rural areas (cf. Oram 1976). For one small part of the Third World the debate over whether cities are cancers or catalysts (cf. McGee 1971) had become localized. The sort of debate which has been carried on in Papua New Guinea (cf. May 1977), however, does not seem to have taken place elsewhere in Melanesia.

This paper attempts to reexamine these and related issues in a wider Melanesian context. Among the distinctive characteristics of the independent countries of Melanesia (Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji), are their small size of population, their internal fragmentation due to extensive linguistic and cultural variations (all are multiple-island countries where secessionist threats have been significant), and their relatively short experience of monetary exchange economics (cf. Fisk 1976). These characteristics suggest that the experience of urbanization and inequality in Melanesia will be different from elsewhere in the Third World.
This paper stresses the issue of inequality over other aspects of development in the belief that inequality is one of the more neglected yet more crucial issues in development. Seers earlier drew attention to inequality as being one of the three key issues in development, alongside poverty and unemployment (Seers 1977). Inequality is an issue which is amenable to state intervention and it is one which is crucial to the emergence of Melanesian nations in areas of hitherto 'nationless nationalism'.

URBANIZATION IN HISTORY

The most distinctive characteristic of urbanization in Melanesia is its recency. There is no evidence of urban development in pre-colonial times, despite evidence of both state formation in the Fijian islands (Brookfield with Hart 1971:240), and possibly elsewhere, and extensive trading networks including the Lapita trade and, in recent times, the well-documented kula ring of the Trobriand islands and the 'stone-age trade' of the New Guinea highlands (Hughes 1977). Even the most extensive trading links apparently did not produce significant 'central places' and the recognition of central places in traditional Melanesian societies (Callen 1976; Allen this volume) is both tenuous and suggestive of only the lowest order of specialization. Effectively there were no significant functional specializations beyond village level. In contrast there is archaeological evidence from both Polynesia and Micronesia of some precontact urban inflorescences (e.g. Bellwood 1978:289-292).

Related to this lack of pre-contact urbanization was the absence of a traditional state, as existed for example in West Africa and Southeast Asia. There was instead a proliferation of tenuously linked small-scale societies. Hence there was fragmented resistance to colonial changes and minimal insulation against its impact. There were no pre-colonial institutions of regional significance that might counteract post-contact urbanization, whilst the pre-contact economy has been fundamentally transformed. Consequently, although there is a significant residential segregation based on race and ethnicity within Melanesian cities there is no 'dual city' like those that exist elsewhere in the Third World. Urban history in Melanesia is colonial history.

A second general characteristic of Melanesian urbanization is that until quite recently all Melanesian towns have been located on the coast and have functioned as trading and administrative centres. The capital cities in all four countries remain on the coast whilst the capitals have changed coastal locations in at least three Melanesian countries - Papua New Guinea (from Rabaul to Lae, in New Guinea before administrative unification, and then to Port Moresby), Fiji (Levuca to Suva) and the Solomon Islands (Tulagi to Honiara). In the prewar era goldmining towns were established inland - Wau and Bulolo in Papua New Guinea and Vatukoula in Fiji - but it was not until the postwar years that less narrowly specialized inland towns emerged (in the central highlands of New Guinea). The coastal location of towns emphasized the dominance of external trade links, with the towns themselves being poorly integrated into the nearby regions. This was even true of Fiji where the Colonial Sugar Refining Company, through the distribution of its workforce, was the 'main force behind the evolution of Fiji's secondary urban centres' (Britton 1980).
The earliest townships in Melanesia, the beach communities of the nineteenth century and the administrative centres of the twentieth century, were expatriate creations and expatriate centres. They were whitemen's (and sometimes whitewomen's) towns. There were however some differences in spatial form. In Papua there were the town and house styles of northern Australia; indeed the colony itself was a northwards extension of Australia - at its extreme, Samarai was a by-product of the decline of the Queensland mining town Cooktown, houses being literally transplanted from Cooktown to Samarai (Nelson 1980). By contrast New Guinea was part of the German empire between 1889 and 1914 and colonial housing was substantial, palatial, and in an imperial tradition. The ending of the German era resulted in the dominance of Australian forms and the parallels between the cities and suburbs of Queensland and the towns of New Guinea became more rather than less apparent.

As R.G. Ward has noted in referring to the general pattern of urbanization in the Pacific:

The urban area frequently developed a dual form. A segment was laid out for expatriates, on a regular grid of land holdings and streets, with buildings little different from those of the metropolitan country. In many respects the development of the expatriate segment was a faithful model of the pattern of urban areas in the Western world though industry was usually lacking .... The nearby indigenous villages coexisted uneasily alongside the expatriate town .... The dualism which thus developed was paralleled in administrative policy towards urban areas. The town was administered by expatriates, for expatriates, and according to expatriate models. Public health, public order and the maintenance of so-called 'standards' required, it was thought, an element of insulation from the indigenous population (R.G. Ward 1973:366-367).

These standards may have become more important with the arrival of a significant number of European women (cf. Rowley 1965; Ralston 1977; Inglis 1974). Different measures were devised by the colonial authorities to ensure the continuity of what Griffin, Nelson and Pirth (1979:55) describe as 'urban apartheid', a division that was much more rigid than the more casual race relations of rural areas. These measures included controls over residential development, curfews, and other measures to maintain the colour bar. Such distinctions were emphasized in different ways throughout Melanesia by regulations over native dress, restricted access to some 'public' buildings (including, of course, hotels) and so on (Wolfers 1975; Mamak 1978).

In these circumstances the ideology of an elite urban life style readily became established. The ideology was emphasized by Papua New Guinea administration regulations still in force in the early 1970s, such as that which stated, 'a "foreign Native" [i.e. someone away from his "tribal area"] who does not give a good account of his means of support to the satisfaction of a Court when called upon to do so, may be ordered by the Court to return to his tribal area' (cited by R.G. Ward 1973:368). As well, until the mid 1960s Fijians and Solomon Islanders required
administration permission to leave their villages (John Nation, personal communication 1980 and Chapman 1969). Thus the colonial towns were largely places where Europeans could work, live and enjoy the social amenities but where Melanesians had only a tenuous connection via their workplace; '... the towns were toeholds of an alien society at the same time as they were bases for alien control' (Brookfield with Hart 1971:390).

The early history of urbanization in Melanesia indicated the rationale of 'urban apartheid': the objectives of early planners and their 'achievements' in removing Chinese and Melanesians to their allocated areas of residence in Rabaul, which was not atypical, have been well described (Varpian and Jackson 1976). In Suva there was local opposition to attempts to establish a white township but the town was established and was thought of as 'white man's land' (Mamak 1978:24). An Indian section and, rather later, a Fijian section followed. A European Reservation ordinance was proposed in 1912 which sought to ensure residential segregation (cf. Mamak 1978); although this never became policy, a combination of ordinances enabled its practical establishment. Throughout Melanesia the practice of segregation was directed as firmly against Asians as it was against Melanesians. Consequently racial segregation was firmly established in Melanesian towns, giving them a tripartite form, and this segregation was maintained in practice if not in legislation into the 1970s. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the relatively small town of Honiara where postwar urban development was almost entirely under government control:

... there is very sharp segregation. On the flat land by the shore are the port, commercial centre, government offices and other institutional and functional buildings. Further east are a closely built Chinatown and a separate "village" for the Fijian community, then beyond that the main labour barracks, some industry and other institutions, and a shanty settlement euphemistically termed "Fishing Village". In recent years some "low-cost" housing for Melanesians has been built in valleys running inland. Almost the only Europeans living on the flat are single staff, who occupy apartments, and the High Commissioner, who has more palatial quarters; most others live in widely dispersed houses scattered over the pleasant and relatively cool hills behind the town. This contrast between "white highlands" and "black lowlands" - only now beginning to become blurred - is particularly stark, but Honiara is not unrepresentative of post-war towns, or of suburbs in larger towns [of Melanesia] until very recent years (Brookfield with Hart 1971:397).

At the same time there were in Port Moresby three quite distinct areas of white occupancy: Tuaguba Hill in the old town, Boroko/Korobosea laid out in the late 1950s, and Gordons Estate laid out in the 1960s (Jackson 1976). Segregation was generally incomplete since all large government houses, until 1968, were provided with domestics' quarters.
The coastal colonial towns of Melanesia rapidly and readily became identified as centres of elite, colonial affluence but places, nonetheless, where there were opportunities for employment, though minimal opportunities for access to urban housing and urban society. The towns, whilst simultaneously offering some forms of economic development, established and regularized an ordered and intransigent inequality.

CONTEMPORARY TOWNS AND CITIES

Urban primacy

A general feature of Third World urbanization has been the rapidity of urban growth, a function of both rural-urban migration and natural increase. In Melanesia, where urbanization is recent, migration has continued to make the most substantial contribution to urban population growth. Although the urban proportion of the total population is substantial only in Fiji, that proportion is generally increasing (Table 1) though there has been a significant recent decline in the urban growth rate in Papua New Guinea (Skeldon 1980a) and indications that the same sort of decline is occurring elsewhere in Melanesia. Thus although urbanization has been extremely rapid it has nowhere reached the level of the now-rich countries.

In each of the four Melanesian countries under discussion, the population size of the capital is at least double that of the next largest urban area. Honiara and Vila in the Solomons and Vanuatu respectively are primate urban centres with populations three to five times the size of other urban areas. In Fiji, Greater Suva, is four times the size of the next largest urban area, Lautoka. The position of Port Moresby as a primate city is less clear. Jackson (1975b) has demonstrated on the basis of the 1971 Census figures that the rank-size order of Papua New Guinea's towns was close to that of a tiered hierarchy, with Port Moresby only twice the size of Lae and Lae only twice the size of the third-order towns. But Jackson cautions that this does not reflect an underlying pattern of evolved urban functions as a rank-size order represents in a western setting. It is much more the result of the imposition of colonial administrative and economic exigencies. Skeldon (1980a:275) has claimed recently that despite the growth of medium-size towns, Port Moresby is still growing relatively rapidly and its primacy above the other towns is becoming established. However, the 1980 Census indicates that Lae, with a population of 61,682, has grown at almost exactly the same rate as Port Moresby. So despite the claim that Lae '... is the undisputed national centre of coastal shipping, of road transport and of telecommunications as well as being Papua New Guinea's only real manufacturing centre and only true regional centre' (Jackson 1979a:9), Port Moresby has retained its dominance.

The Melanesian capital cities are their countries principal political centres. And it remains to be seen whether the increasingly significant regional politics of Papua New Guinea and the Solomons can reverse this apparent trend to primacy (cf. Skeldon 1980a:276). As well, the capital city is the centre of intellectual, cultural and, to a lesser extent, economic influence. The universities and other tertiary educational institutions tend to be located there (although there has been decentral-
### Table 1

Urban population and largest towns in Melanesia*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban Population</th>
<th>% of total Population</th>
<th>Rate of Increase per Annum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>394,486 (1980)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10.8 (1966-71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Port Moresby - 122,761 (1980)]</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.0 (1971-80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13,947 (1970)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.4 (1970-76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25,656 (1981)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6.0 (1976-81)¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Honiara - 21,334 (1981)]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12,369 (1967)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2.1 (1967-79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16,663 (1972)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22,151 (1979)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Vila - 14,801 (1979)]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>147,685 (1966)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4.5 (1956-66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203,313 (1976)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3.2 (1966-76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Caledonia (French Dependency)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34,990 (1963)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>6.7 (1956-63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80,901 (1976)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.8 (1963-76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Noumea - 57,000 (1970)]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irian Jaya (part of Indonesia)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54,000 (1961)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Jayapura - about 100,000 (1980)]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torres Strait (part of Australia)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>about 2,300 (1971)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Thursday Island - about 2,300 (1971)]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This table is concerned only with urbanization within Melanesia; there are Melanesians in most of the towns and cities of New Zealand, Australia and even Indonesia. There are variable classifications of what constitutes a town in Melanesia (cf. Brookfield with Hart 1971:387-388). Thus unincorporated townships are included in the Solomon Islands but excluded in Fiji whilst in Papua New Guinea an area must be 'urban in character and with a population of 500 or more per square mile', which therefore excludes large villages, like Tubesereia near Port Moresby which has a population of perhaps 3,000.

¹Growth rate 1976-1981 for Honiara only.

URBANIZATION AND INEQUALITY IN MELANESIA

Urban primacy is accentuated by the entrepôt functions of the primate city, whose location has been determined by colonial administrations for their convenience rather than as a central place for an emergent nation. It has been suggested that 'in a country of fledgling unity such as Papua New Guinea it may be that primacy and the concentration of services and administration in one centre is the pragmatic road to development, if by that we mean holding the country together as an economic and social and political unity' (Skeldon 1980a:276). This proposition, in itself, is debatable; certainly the tendency towards greater primacy makes political decentralization extremely difficult.

Migration: dual dependence with and without urbanization

Apart from traders, whalers and missionaries, for many Melanesians the earliest contact with the colonial economy was through 'blackbirding': the forcible, but eventually peaceful, transportation of migrant workers, especially from Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands, to the plantations of Fiji, Samoa and Queensland (e.g. Corris 1973). It was an inauspicious start. In the twentieth century in Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, this gave way to more ordered migration movements within each colony's boundaries. In the case of German New Guinea, the colonists quickly rejected the more demanding plantation crops of rubber, coffee, cocoa and tobacco in favour of the coconut because the latter was particularly suited to cultivation by an unskilled and irregular labour force (Brookfield 1972). As villagers living close to the plantations soon found other means of acquiring cash the search for other sources of labour began.

This demand was mostly satisfied in Papua New Guinea, the Solomons and Vanuatu by the establishment of a specific set of regulations dealing with the recruitment, employment and repatriation of labourers from an expanding labour frontier. The migrant labour system operated within a broader colonial context to limit severely the growth of a permanent proletariat. A number of Chinese, Vietnamese and in the case of Fiji, Indians was also introduced as contract labourers. Many of these labour migrants eventually remained, with their families, in Melanesia.

The migrant labourer and his family were forced to cultivate a 'dual dependence' (Burawoy 1976) on both the home village and the wage economy. This came about because, on the one hand, alternative sources of cash income were restricted and wage labour was presented as the only means of earning money. But at the same time, the migrant labourer's dependence on the wage economy could only be temporary. Bachelor wages, the provision of single men's quarters, compulsory repatriation after a maximum period of employment, restriction of occupational mobility and the denial of
political rights, including the rights to organize and strike, made it necessary for the worker and his family to maintain a long term dependence on the rural village economy.

These sets of regulations controlling the employment and mobility of wage labour against the background of a colonial society based on a colour bar and denial of citizen rights profoundly affected the conditions under which the indigenous urban workforce was employed and accommodated (Curtain 1980b; Bellam 1970; Bedford 1973). The necessity to maintain a dual dependence meant that most urban employees in the colonial era in Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu were young men, unaccompanied by wives.

It is clear that the unbalanced age and sex structure of the indigenous community [of Honiara], and in particular the absence of family life for many townsmen with all that this implies, is largely due to the wages paid and the housing provided (Bellam 1970:92).

The urban male to female sex ratios, even towards the end of colonial rule, reflect this. In Port Moresby in 1966 the ratio was 185 males per 100 females; in Honiara in 1970 it was 206 to 100 and in Vila in 1972, 137 to 100.

Even with the change to so-called 'casual' labour (employment by verbal agreement) after the Second World War in Papua New Guinea, the conditions of employment were such that workers were still forced to maintain a long term dependence on their home economy. The master-servant contract relationship in law made it illegal, until the early 1960s, for workers to organize among themselves to press for more secure terms of employment, better pay and conditions. 'Casual' workers who had been employed for less than six months could be dismissed without notice. Low bachelor wages were paid to all but a few public servants until 1972, mainly because the newly formed unions under tight government control were largely ineffective.

Rowley, speaking about Papua New Guinea in 1958, saw the existing arrangements as only encouraging a high turnover of an urban unskilled labour force:

... there is no action which the emergent wage earner may take to improve his lot except to add to the instability by repeated trials by different employers and to add to the labour shortage by returning in discouragement to his village (Rowley 1958:542).

In addition, the majority of employers provided single men's quarters only. The accommodation situation facing Papua New Guinean urban employees in Rabaul in the mid 1960s is described by Polansky (1966:45-46):

Since employers are legally required to provide accommodation for their workers, there has been some reluctance to employ married men. When an employee marries he has the choice of leaving his wife in her village, staying with relatives who have a house (in
most cases already overcrowded) or of building a
dwelling for himself in one of the shanty towns ... 
insufficient accommodation for married Papuans and New 
Guineans is the greatest social problem with which 
Rabaul has to cope.

Chapman (1969), Bellam (1970), Bedford (1973) and Bonnemaison (1977) 
describe a similar situation for Honiara and Vila respectively in the 
1960s.

The legacy of this legal requirement of employers to provide 
accommodation for their urban employees remains today. In 1977 in Port 
Moresby and Lae respectively some 69 per cent and 56 per cent of all 
private dwellings were owned by the government or private employers (Papua 

The continuing high degree of controlled or 'directed' migration 
(which refers to the posting of government and private sector employees to 
particular areas) in Melanesia means that employees, particularly the 
better paid, are heavily dependent on employers for accommodation (which is 
now mainly married quarters) and are provided with fares for regular return 
visits home. For example, over 30 per cent of migrants in Port Moresby 
were 'directed' migrants (Papua New Guinea Bureau of Statistics 1980:40). 
The conditions of employment, including the provision of accommodation, are 
largely the result of similar terms being provided to expatriate employees. 
Thus for many urban employees today, except in the case of Suva (see 
below), the towns remain merely centres of employment with little security 
of tenure over accommodation. The conditions of employment, including the 
regular return fares to the home village, reinforce a strong cultural 
attachment to the rural village economy. Bedford's (1973:117) conclusion 
about the indigenous population of Vila in the late 1960s is still largely 
true for the majority of the contemporary urban populations of Papua New 
Guinea, the Solomons and Vanuatu:

To talk of a "committed urban proletariat" is, as yet, 
misleading. In evaluating commitment to urban 
residence the importance of the village as a source of 
income and social security must not be overlooked, even 
for those in skilled or semi-skilled employment in 
town. New Hebridean urban migrants are not a wage-
dependent proletariat yet; they have vested interests 
in property and security in rural areas.

The Fijian situation was very different. A migrant labour system was 
not set up to regulate the movement of villagers to the plantation and 
mining enclaves. Sir Arthur Gordon interpreted the Deed of Cession in 1874 
to mean British responsibility for the conservation of Fijian society at 
all costs. To this end, he placed a strict prohibition on outmigration 
from the villages, especially to work on plantations (Gillion 1977). In 
contrast to colonial New Guinea where head tax was to be paid in cash and 
hence was used as an inducement to wage labour, Fijian villagers were asked 
to pay their tax in produce only.
Gordon turned to Indian indentured workers as an alternative source of low cost labour. Under the terms of the indenture the Indians were required to work for their importing employer for five years; for a further five years they could work for another employer or for themselves. Thereafter they were entitled to choose between a free return passage to India or remaining as permanent settlers. Family migration was encouraged and to this end a minimum proportion of forty women to every hundred men was insisted on by the colonial authorities (Gillon 1977). The scheme ended in 1920 after a total of 62,837 people had emigrated to Fiji in this way.

The colonial state's prohibition of Fijian labour on plantations meant that the precapitalist economy was not used to subsidize a temporarily absent migrant labour force. The state imported indentured labour and hence assumed responsibility for the full costs of reproduction of the labour force. Acceptance of these costs for the Indian population allowed both a settled and permanent proletariat and a petty bourgeoisie to establish themselves in Suva from the early 1920s (Mamak 1978).

Indian labourers employed by the Public Works Department in Suva went on strike in 1920. Their major complaint was the high cost of living (Gillon 1977). By the early 1930s the Indian population in Suva had begun to agitate for a system of a common electors' roll and equal representation in local government elections (Mamak 1978) - thus showing signs of having become an established urban population.

Although Fijian labour was used in the early days of Suva, and settlements were established to accommodate migrants from various provinces, the colonial administration from early in this century imposed an absentee tax on all Fijians who were absent from their villages (Mamak 1978). The tax was not lifted until 1966 but in practice it was not imposed beyond the early 1950s. This limitation on rural-urban migration for the Fijian population has been seen as partly responsible for restricting their general socio-economic advancement.

This policy also afforded success only to a small group of Suva-based Indian Fijian elites and and constituted an important source of class division among these sections (Mamak and Ali 1979:64).

Urban commitment?

Migration to urban areas grew in Papua New Guinea from the mid 1960s as job opportunities expanded greatly. More recently, high levels of unemployment among the unskilled have encouraged short term circulation to urban areas for those with little or no formal education but the demand for more highly educated job applicants continues to encourage high levels of urban migration and residence among those with secondary education and above.

Nevertheless many urban employers; significantly the more prestigious (including the Public Service and Bougainville Copper Limited) provide biannual return fares to the home district for their workers. This practice must emphasize the rural origins of urban migrants and their
responsibilities in the rural sector and may well therefore tend to
discourage any tendencies towards permanent urban residence.

Other characteristics tend to discourage permanent urban residence.
First, there are few social security or welfare systems which provide for
urban living when an individual is unemployed or has retired. Secondly,
many urban workers are in 'tied' accommodation, where the accommodation is
associated with the job. In 1973-74 about 26 per cent of urban households
in the major towns of Papua New Guinea were in tied accommodation, and
about 25 per cent in rented (see p.9). Thirdly, many migrants live in
squatter settlements where their occupation of land is without formal
tenure (hence temporary tenure may be rescinded). For example, in Port
Moresby in 1977 less than 30 per cent of the residents of migrant
settlements owned the land on which their houses were constructed (Papua
from Kengava's (1979) study of Choiseul migrants in Honiara, where their
rights to land are 'limited and temporary'. Fourthly, until recently urban
wages were minimal and were typically calculated to support only a single
man, on the assumption that his family remained in the rural area (Curtain
1980b). Before 1972 urban wages in Papua New Guinea were paid on this
basis; in that year the assessed needs of a married couple were accepted
as the basis of a new minimum wage in Port Moresby. In 1974 the Urban
Minimum Wages Board recommended that the minimum wage should be based on
the living cost of a family comprising man, wife and a child (Lepani 1974).
At this time urban minimum wages in Honiara (of $8.28, without
accommodation) were still calculated according to the requirements of a
single man (Prazer 1976). Fifthly, the heterogeneity of urban life
(including migrants from a variety of traditionally opposed language
groups and regions) contributes to some degree of insecurity, especially
where unemployment, violence and crime also occur. This tends to be less
true of Fiji where urbanization has also been longer established.

On the other hand, several factors, including the decline in creation
of new urban job opportunities and low turnover in employment, tend to
encourage a stabilized urban workforce. First, urban conditions have
improved substantially as urban wages and the provision of married
accommodation have increased, social activities have diversified and
governments have encouraged home ownership for some elite workers (cf.
Skeldon 1980a). Secondly, in a number of rural areas cash-earning
opportunities have declined thus encouraging long term outmigration
(especially as cash cropping and land alienation have 'frozen' some areas
of land), for example in some densely populated areas of Papua New Guinea
including parts of the East Sepik, Gulf, Central, Simbu and East New
Britain Provinces (Garnaut, Wright and Curtain 1977), in some of the
smaller islands of the Solomon Islands, including Sikaiana (Teu Tao 1979),
Anuta, Tikopia and parts of some larger islands, and also in many of the
eastern islands of Fiji. Sevele (1979) has also noted the substantial
rural-urban income differential for Fiji, The Solomons and Papua New
Guinea. Thirdly, migration has resulted in intermarriage across racial and
ethnic groupings. The partners of such marriages often have fewer
opportunities in rural areas (depending on the structure of land tenure),
experience some social problems in the home area of either partner (as ties
become divergent and conflicting) and produce children with very few ties
(and no emotional ties) to rural areas. Thus in the Bougainville (North
Solomons) towns half of all households containing Siwais were intermarried
A quarter of the children born in the large towns of Port Moresby, Lae and Rabaul have never visited their 'home villages' (Garnaut, Wright and Curtain 1977). In Fiji, even though urban unemployment has increased in the urban areas, migration from the eastern islands has also increased. It has been argued that this is essentially because agriculture there and elsewhere in the Pacific has been losing status and prestige (Bedford 1979).

Migration continues to provide the bulk of urban population increases in Papua New Guinea though in Fiji natural increase is more important (Chandra 1980). Increasingly migration is of families rather than single males, whilst independent female migration is becoming important in some areas although its impact is unclear (Connell 1980); female and family migration to the urban areas is assisting in balancing sex ratios in most towns, including Port Moresby where the masculinity ratio (males per hundred females) fell from 185 to 139 between 1966 and 1977. Similar changes were recorded much earlier in Fijian urban areas where the sex ratio is now very evenly balanced (Census of Fiji 1979). It is only in the mining towns that the sex ratios remain extremely lopsided. Hence natural increase in Melanesia as elsewhere (Preston 1979) is becoming more important as a determinant of urban population increases.

The most obvious category of permanent urban residents are the inhabitants of villages now incorporated into urban areas, such as Hanuabada in Port Moresby. Secondly, there are migrants and their children from some of the poorer rural areas, for example the seemingly permanent urban residents from parts of the East Sepik Province (Curtain 1980a) and from the Gulf Province (cf. Morauta and Hasu 1979) in Papua New Guinea. Thirdly, there is a number of bureaucrats and other elite workers who have skills that are inappropriate in rural areas and social expectations beyond the capacity of rural areas, who may well remain in town and are being encouraged to do so. In Fiji, where there have been urban centres and a tradition of rural-urban migration for a much longer period of time, permanent urban residence is more readily identifiable (e.g. Bedford 1979), although return migration remains important (Chandra 1980).

There is now a differentiation between those permanent urban residents who are usually relatively poor (including some urban villagers and the migrants from poor rural areas) and the bureaucrats and others who are relatively well off. It is only this latter group who are relatively mobile and in Melanesia as elsewhere (Gutkind 1974) it is the least mobile migrants who tend to be the least successful. They lack capital for travel, cannot distribute money and gifts in the rural areas and must retain their precarious urban commitment. Thus unemployed men in Papua New Guinea are less likely to send home gifts or cash (Garnaut, Wright and Curtain 1977). The pattern of migration consequently has implications for the growth of an urban dispossessed group (Morauta 1979; Curtain 1980a).

Urban ecology and housing

In most Melanesian towns, other than 'company towns' like Arawa and Panguna, there are clear expressions of ecological segregation following earlier racial segregation. This has been examined in some detail for Port Moresby and Lae where there is an inverse relationship between ethnic group size and segregation (Jackson 1976). Unplanned settlements are primarily
based on ethnic groupings; for example, 'most of the smaller no covenant settlements (there are over forty in Port Moresby alone) consist of people from one particular area or even one particular village. The large ones are usually internally divided on quite clear lines into separate village groups' (Jackson 1976:63). Such small groups often function in many ways as 'urban villages', albeit with significant economic ties to the urban area, and tend to reinforce rural-urban ties rather than assist in the establishment of social ties to the wider community. Even in many employment situations migrants from the same area work together (cf. Oram 1976; Rew 1970).

New migrants to the city are generally housed and fed by their kinsfolk (for example see Strathern 1975 on Hageners in Port Moresby), at least initially, and may also be assisted in the search for jobs (Rew 1974) to the extent that employment in many firms and stores is controlled by workers from particular areas. This assistance necessarily places the new migrant in a dependency relationship with his kin. Thus Ryan (1968) notes how Toaripi migrants in Port Moresby shared housing, food, money and services because of obligations incurred as a result of kinship ties and help given and received in the past. Inevitably, then, kinship is expressed in residential patterns, patterns that are emphasized by historic political/administrative controls, restricting individuals of particular races to particular areas, and economic controls, which limit residential choices especially of new migrants.

Although kinship ties are likely to develop eventually into formal and informal associations, which cut across traditional affiliations, this may not affect residential locations and associations may well coexist, or be superimposed upon, traditional ethnic ties (cf. Oeser 1969). This is particularly true of both church groups and sports associations throughout Melanesian towns there are regional associations that encourage group identification and rural ties (as described for Papua New Guinea by Skeldon 1980b). Generally townsfolk are recognizing ethnicity in geographically wider terms; thus migrants in Port Moresby may be clansmen or villagers in one context, Hageners in another and highlanders in yet another. Similarly in Queensland towns migrants from the Torres Strait often, and increasingly, identify themselves as Torres Strait islanders rather than Badu or Saibai islanders (cf. Cromwell 1980). Evidence from a number of other places in Melanesia, for example for Gilbertese in the town of Gizo in the Solomon Islands (Knudson 1977) and for Kapauku in Nabire in Irian Jaya (Pospisil 1978), indicates that there is a gradual decline in ethnicity marked, for example, by a greater degree of intermarriage between ethnic groups, though there is little evidence of the formation of cultural associations or other kinds of ties.

Contacts at workplaces are likely to result in friendships and allegiances outside kinship groups. This is particularly true for the better educated, as shown, for example, among the Hula in Port Moresby (Oram 1968), Chimbus in Port Moresby (Whiteman 1973), some migrants from Buka in Bougainville towns (Bedford and Mamak 1976) and both Fijians and Indians in Suva (Mamak 1978). In the case of Buka migrants, they are conspicuously more involved in town council activities and in associations, including trade unions. The establishment of trade unions might be expected to foster intergroup relations since trade unions both cut across ethnic boundaries and directly encourage solidarity across such boundaries.
The early unions in Papua New Guinea, such as the Lae Workers' Association and the Madang Workers' Association, were largely ineffective because of high rates of circular migration, rigid control by the Department of Labour, and discouragement by employers (Lucas 1972; Stevenson 1968). By contrast, in Fiji unions were established earlier and were more effective in achieving gains for the workforce (Mamak 1978) because of the more stable urban population. Townsend suggests that in the two largest cities of Papua New Guinea a sense of disadvantage may cut across ethnic and regional origins; thus 'signs of a fusion of class and ethnic consciousness are to be found amongst the Gulf and Goilala people in Port Moresby and the Chimbu in Lae' (1980:24) yet he does not indicate how this is expressed.

Table 2

Racial composition of Melanesian capitals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Port Moresby</th>
<th>Suva</th>
<th>Honiara</th>
<th>Vila</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Melanesian</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indo-Pijian</td>
<td></td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual population</td>
<td>76,507</td>
<td>63,628</td>
<td>11,191</td>
<td>12,541</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Census of Fiji 1979; Solomon Islands 1976; Bonnemaison 1977; Papua New Guinea Census 1971.

The extent to which residential segregation is suggestive of other kinds of inequality is far from clear; the evidence is scant. Investment in service provision in the unplanned settlements is of a limited extent. Street surfacing and lighting is often restricted to elite areas, as is the provision of water and electricity. In Port Moresby at least, adequacy of water supply and toilet facilities in 1977 was significantly different in four distinct residential categories; for example 24 per cent of households in unplanned settlements had an adequate water supply compared with 95 per cent in formal housing areas (Papua New Guinea Bureau of Statistics 1980). This disproportionate investment is also matched in the provision of public urban facilities, such as health centres and hospitals (Curtain and Ziggs 1978).

Despite the relatively low density development of urban areas in a number of places there is an acute shortage of land for housing; land shortage is so acute in Rabaul that other sites for the town have been considered (To Mutnaram 1979) and in Port Moresby traditional ownership of land within the city boundary has prevented its use for urban development and made service provision in adjoining areas more expensive. This is also the case for Suva, which is developing an urban sprawl. Land shortage is
also marked for other Fijian urban areas such as Nadi, Lautoka and Sigatoka (S. Chandra, personal communication 1980). Both of these factors tend to exacerbate spatial inequalities.

Ecological variations within towns are in part determined by and in part reflected in the availability and provision of housing. Within the towns and cities there are enormous variations in residential standards according to the race of the occupant; for example in Port Moresby, from the K200,000 homes of Tuaguba Hill, through low-cost National Housing Commission buildings to the flimsy plywood constructions of shantytowns whose 'marginal' housing reflects their status: illegal or barely tolerated and hence insecure. Yet even between the shantytowns there are enormous differences. The provision of finance for housing is a political issue and funds are scarce; some shantytowns are populated by groups who are believed to be 'trouble makers' and their claims on finance for residential improvement, through service schemes and social amenity provision, are less likely to be met. In Port Moresby settlements with service provision are much more likely to be those of migrants from the Papuan coast.

National housing policies appear nowhere to have been able to cater adequately to the needs of the urban poor (granted there are arguments against this form of provision in any case). They have, in practice, tended to discriminate in favour of middle and upper income groups (as Stretton (1979) has shown for Papua New Guinea). In Suva the Housing Authority has attempted to lease better quality land at above development costs to the relatively wealthy and use the revenue to provide housing at cost for those purchasing its houses and at below cost for sitting tenants who 'need' to be removed to enable more intensive development and for those occupying rental flats. Because of numerous problems (including regulations demanding high standards and high costs) some 80 per cent of housing applicants could not afford the cheapest houses (Walsh 1979b). Simultaneously there were substantial social problems at Raiwaqa, the oldest and largest Housing Authority estate, because of unsuitable housing and poverty. Inappropriate and inadequate housing has been offered to tenants and no housing has been provided for the majority of the urban poor (Walsh 1979b). In Vanuatu the provision of low-cost housing was frustrated by the peculiarities of the colony's legal restrictions and by the early 1970s almost nothing had been achieved (Bedford 1973). It would seem that housing authorities give preference to those best able to pay. In Fiji, racial balance in the allocation of housing is also an important factor for the Housing Authority to take into account.

Moreover To Mutnaram, writing in 1979, recorded that there were in Papua New Guinea over 5,000 applicants waiting for National Housing Commission houses and this represented only a fraction of the real demand (To Mutnaram 1979:2). And this was despite the fact that only four out of ten Papua New Guineans living in towns could afford to rent the cheapest house constructed by the Housing Commission (Norwood 1977; Jackson 1978). In Fiji much the same is true. At the end of 1976 some 8,207 households, 22 per cent of the total number of urban households in Fiji, were on the waiting list of the Housing Authority (Chandra 1979). There is also a critical housing shortage in Honiara (Diana Howlett, personal communication 1980). Access to the limited amounts of national housing stock is necessarily restricted and, however straightforward and egalitarian
application procedures may appear in theory, in practice access to housing is unequal and an elite is established. This may be an elite comprising those who can speak English or it may be an elite which happens to have wantoks in the Housing Commission. Whichever it is, it renders meaningless the idea of queueing for access to housing (Bryant 1977). But even though formal housing is occupied by an elite the National Housing Commission has problems of rent arrears (Aldrich and Greenshields 1979).

Even access to squatter settlements may be controlled. Thus in Honiara any person wishing to live in a squatter settlement must apply for a temporary occupation licence. An applicant for a licence, valid only for twelve months, must be employed before he can be given permission to construct a house (Kama 1979). In Suva most urban land is nationally owned and Indian squatters believe themselves to be less secure than Fijians; until recently those on private land could be evicted without compensation (Walsh 1979a). In these kinds of situations residential insecurity is obvious.

Despite the general acceptance of 'site and service' schemes for squatter settlements in Papua New Guinea (where the government surveys blocks, grants leaseholds and provides minimal services such as running water), there is little evidence of such schemes in Fiji. There the gradual removal of squatter settlements from central city locations, in the guise of rationalizing land use, has been viewed as no more than an attempt to organize 'urban space as an instrument for the perpetuation of class and other sectional interests' (Walsh 1979c:9). Inevitably this rationalization is at the expense of the urban poor who are decentralized away from inner city employment opportunities, especially in the informal sector, and are denied decentralized employment. In Suva squatters constitute one fifth of the labour force and make a significant contribution both to the city's food supply and to the production of tourist artefacts (Walsh 1979c).

'Site and service' schemes, however, are not without their critics. McGee (1977) and Burgess (1977, 1978) argue that such programmes merely ameliorate the conditions in existing squatter settlements and institutionalize poverty. Although it helps the poor this is without any major threat to the affluent so that the structural inequalities in society cannot be removed by such schemes. The practical implications of this kind of approach, which demand nationalization of all housing (and the 'upgrading' of most), have been criticized in Papua New Guinea by Oram (1976, 1979). Oram (1979) argues that it is doubtful if any poor country could, under any political system, achieve a degree of equality of incomes or affluence which would enable it to dispense with policies towards informal housing.

The arguments for and against the sale of high-cost housing in Papua New Guinea, especially in Port Moresby, have been debated (Curtain and Blæxter 1978). It can be argued that where the owner has a committed stake in the maintenance of property values he or she will have a greater sense of environmental and community awareness. It has therefore been recommended that the concept of home ownership should be promoted by stressing the concept of a house as a transferrable commodity (Aldrich and Greenshields 1979; Stretton 1979). Whether this would generate permanent
housing inequalities through the creation of landlords and/or contribute to the stability of an urban workforce is difficult to determine.

Throughout the housing sector there are inequalities both in access to housing (owned or rented) and land for construction (legal or illegal), and in the availability of services within the different parts of the housing sector. Moreover the provision of urban housing for some workers can be viewed as a form of urban bias. Melanesian governments provide some form of housing (usually at a subsidized rental) to public servants and some employers provide the same amenities in the private sector. (This, of course, does not occur for those outside formal employment in urban or rural areas.) All expenditure on urban housing and service provision (especially when there is no expenditure on rural housing) constitutes a subsidy to the urban sector. Recently it has been argued (by two town planners in Port Moresby) that 'urban administrators cannot expect the Government to continue to subidize the capital costs of urban development, or facets thereof, when such extreme disparities exist in the comparative physical and economic welfare of the rural dweller versus the urban dweller. This view is held by the Department of Finance and the National Planning Office' (Aldrich and Greenshields 1979:6).

The urban economy

Large cities, and especially capital cities, have obvious advantages for industrial and commercial development: the size and diversity of the labour force (which, in Melanesia, is particularly limited in terms of available skills), the existence of a large market, and access to local politicians and other decision makers. The resulting industrial concentration is further emphasized in the Third World by the fact that many industrial innovations originate overseas whilst many industries and commercial establishments are branches of overseas corporations and are therefore located in the capital cities for ease of access to the metropolitan headquarters. All this is demonstrably true of Melanesia.

This kind of location strategy, where industrial and commercial development is generated and sponsored by metropolitan interests, has resulted in the metropolitan orientation of a number of significant linkages, such as trade flows (and therefore transport links), airline routes, telecommunications links, tourist flows, and so on (cf. Britton 1980). These integrate Melanesian economies with the metropolis rather than with each other and may benefit metropolitan economies rather than domestic or Melanesian regional economies. The external orientation of the Melanesian economies, dependent as they are on the export of only partially processed natural resources, alongside a transport system that is designed to assist these movements rather than encourage national integration, inevitably has resulted in the external orientation of the towns and cities of Melanesia.

The urban economy of the Third World is typically tripartite: an administrative and service sector (which is characteristic of all towns, was the principal reason for the establishment of many Melanesian towns, and is often almost the only real contemporary economic function of the smaller towns), a 'western', business-centred manufacturing sector, and the 'bazaar economy' of traditional shopping and service industries which merges into the 'informal' sector. Alongside the transition from colonial
towns to Melanesian cities (cf. Oram 1976) has gone the diversification of the urban economy. Nevertheless the lack of traditional urbanization means that there is no 'bazaar economy' in Melanesian towns and, perhaps surprisingly, an almost complete lack of an 'informal sector' however defined. This is especially so in Papua New Guinea (Conroy 1973; Truc 1979) although there are some workers involved in such activities as window cleaning, shoe polishing, lawn cutting, bottle collecting, wood carving and prostitution. (See Jackson 1976, Williamson 1977 and Mark 1976 on Port Moresby and Oliver. 1975 on Suva.) In part this is due to restrictive legislation (Fitzpatrick and Blaxter 1975) and in part to a relatively low consumer demand for services, but it may also be due to the relative affluence of the rural subsistence sector which can support many rural poor (Conroy 1973; Williamson 1977). It may also be that a number of 'informal' sector activities (for example, sandal and shoe manufacture and repair) demand skills that Melanesians have not yet acquired.

The most significant feature of the urban male workforce in all Melanesian towns is the high proportion of those with full time wage employment. In Port Moresby and Lae in 1977 some 79 per cent and 74 per cent respectively of all males aged 15 years and over had full time work. In Fiji, the 1976 census showed that 74 per cent of males 15 years and over were 'economically active' in the urban areas. Vila in 1972 had 71 per cent of its males 15 years and over in wage employment (and if short term visitors are excluded this proportion rises to 82 per cent). A similarly high proportion of males in wage employment seems likely for Honiara. Conversely the proportion of males who were recorded as actively seeking work is quite small. Among males 10 years and over in Port Moresby in 1977, 8 per cent wanted more work and had looked for it within the past month. This figure is the same as the proportion of males 15-44 years involuntarily unemployed, identified in 1973-74. The 1976 Fijian census recorded that 8 per cent of urban males 15 years and over were 'unemployed' (Census of Fiji 1979, Vol. 3:21).

The employment rate for women is the reverse of that for men. In Port Moresby and Lae in 1977 only 22 per cent and 17 per cent respectively of the female population aged 15 years and over were in wage employment. The level of urban female employment in Fiji was 21 per cent. Moreover the proportions wanting work and actively seeking jobs were low: 3 per cent in Port Moresby and 5 per cent in Fijian urban areas. Thus there has been a transition from a socio-economic system in which women had considerable control over the means of production, to a situation in which in the urban areas they are often dependent on their husbands for survival, creating a new and uncertain role for them (Kidd 1978; Dalton 1979:92-93).

Recent years have seen a declining rate of urban job creation in most of the cities of the Third World; again Melanesia is no exception. This decline has been documented adequately only in Papua New Guinea (Truc 1979; Howlett 1980). A shortage of development capital has slowed the creation of new industrial employment opportunities. After the establishment of some basic import-substitution industries (especially for foodstuffs) there has been little expansion; domestic markets are small and extremely fragmented in these island nations, export markets are protected, and domestic urban wage levels are too high, compared with Southeast Asian countries, to attract multinational manufacturing industries. Secondly, bureaucracies have not grown at the same speed as in the post-independence
years. These trends might have been expected to have resulted in the expansion of the 'informal sector' especially as towns, and therefore markets, have continued to grow; but this has not generally occurred.

Despite the declining rate of urban job creation the evidence of high levels of male participation in full time wage employment in the urban areas, alongside the small numbers recorded as actively seeking work, indicates that there has not been greater urban unemployment, at least in Papua New Guinea (Garnaut 1979:10; Curtain 1979).

It is possible to assess the broad characteristics of formal employment in some of the major towns of Melanesia (Table 3). Three of the urban areas shown in Table 3 are capitals with a large proportion (over 30 per cent) employed in government and semi-government bureaucracies. Lae, as the only non capital, has a proportionately larger manufacturing and commercial sector, in part reflecting its populous highlands hinterland. The urban areas of Melanesia remain essentially service centres.

Table 3

Formal urban employment in Melanesian cities

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building and construction</td>
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Sources: Port Moresby and Lae: Papua New Guinea Bureau of Statistics 1980
Honiara: Solomon Islands Yearbook 1979
Fiji: Census of Fiji 1979

The official classifications have been adjusted slightly to give greater comparability; this may affect the fifth and sixth categories. We have been unable to obtain comparable information on Vila although it is clear that urban employment structures are broadly similar (cf. Bonnemaison 1977:16).

Declining job opportunities in urban areas necessarily emphasize the differences between those with jobs and those without jobs and thus emphasize increasing urban inequalities. Even in some of the more affluent urban areas of Melanesia there may be a reverse flow of remittances to the towns; this has been recorded in such diverse areas as Arawa and Panguna in the North Solomons, for Rotumans in Suva and in the East Sepik (Connell 1980). Urban unemployment is often subsidized by the rural areas.
Moreover the ability to send remittances is, in part, a function of success in the city; those with better paid urban jobs tend to remit more, ensuring that they retain an economic and social position in the rural area. Thus it is possible to conclude, as in Papua New Guinea, that the flow of remittances 'may have had the perverse effect of maintaining village options best for people who were well off in town' (Garnaut, Wright and Curtain 1977:73).

Urban unemployment varies significantly between different racial and ethnic groups within Melanesian towns; thus there are great differences between the Chimbu and the Hula in Port Moresby and more generally between highlanders and coastal people (e.g. Levine and Levine 1979). This kind of variation in urban unemployment may well emphasize existing inequalities in rural income (cf. Garnaut, Wright and Curtain 1977:182). With reference to Port Moresby it has been argued that unemployment levels in shantytowns are generally higher than in other parts of the urban area (Norwood 1979:79); however Jackson (1978) argues that this is by no means general, even within Papua New Guinea. That there is some correlation between recent migration and joblessness is more readily apparent. A further correlation between urban crime levels and recent migration is one that is frequently suggested (e.g. Potterton 1979) but which lacks convincing evidence. Available surveys show no evidence of a correlation (e.g. Sition 1977; Papua New Guinea National Planning Office 1977). Nonetheless the belief that there is such a correlation has led recently to proposals to close the major towns in Papua New Guinea to those who are not employed. In August 1979 this was an issue in Port Moresby and in Rabaul; in Rabaul a provincial government committee was preparing a list of East Sepik s who wanted to return to their province or who should be sent home (cf. Denoon 1979). Earlier, in 1977 and 1978, squatters had been repatriated from the North Solomons to the Southern and Eastern Highlands and Chimbu (Talyaga and Olela 1978). As Denoon (1979:1) has observed, 'The attraction of closed towns is very obvious .... With one bound we rid ourselves of poverty, ignorance and disease; modern towns shed their nasty reminders of underdevelopment .... Closed towns are the millennial dream of the property-owning, rate-paying middle class'.

Income differentials are reflected in consumption patterns. Perhaps the most critical index of this is nutrition; a variety of evidence suggests that urban nutrition is often inferior to rural nutrition, following the replacement of traditional foodstuffs by imported foods (Parkinson 1977; cf. Thaman 1979). Imported foods have contributed both to a decline in urban nutritional standards and to the decline of the traditional agricultural system; an urban-based nutritional shift has had important implications throughout the Melanesian economies (Bathgate 1978; McGee 1975; Ward and Proctor 1980).

The extent of a proletariat

Conditions that favour the emergence of an urban proletariat include improved urban wages, security of employment (or welfare/social security), urban home ownership or security of tenure, and the activities of unions in support of urban workers; they also include changes in the rural economy such as growing stratification, the individualization of land ownership, and the resultant emergence of landless villagers. Despite high wage levels in Melanesian towns, relative to many Third World urban centres
urban standards of living do not compare favourably with standards of living in rural areas, hence the tendency towards long term participation in the urban wage economy has not been marked, even in Fiji (e.g. Nair 1980). Consequently the emergence of a proletariat (wage workers without significant ties to the rural/traditional economy) has been restricted (Curtain 1980a; Bedford and Mamak 1976).

Unions are not particularly important in Melanesia. Where they exist they tend to be associated with either the small but slowly growing proletariat or the bureaucracy. The exception to this is in Fiji where the trade union movement is both rural and urban as well as multiracial; the workplace 'promotes the development of crosscutting ties between members of different sections with similar socio-economic status' (Mamak 1978:175) and these ties are strongest at the bottom and the top of the socio-economic hierarchy with the emergence of shared elite and working class consciousness, especially in relation to political parties. Urban unskilled wage labourers are not as well organized and have little bargaining power although they do have more power than either workers in the informal sector or rural agricultural workers.

In African cities there are clear indications of the emerging significance of class relations, and not only for the more privileged, articulate and easily organized classes. One indication of this is the variety of associations created and sustained by ordinary people to protect specific economic interests; these include the obvious case of trade unions, the landlords' and traders' associations of the petty bourgeoisie, the trade associations of the artisans and market traders, the usually ephemeral associations of job seekers, and even clubs and associations catering for such elements of the lumpenproletariat as beggars and prostitutes (cf. Sandbrook 1977). In Melanesian cities these elements are almost entirely absent. Similarly the emergence of a class terminology, even among people whose traditional vocabularies lack such terms, is apparent in parts of Africa (ibid.) but is scarcely in Melanesia. Only the Pidgin terms pasindia, from Papua New Guinea, and liu, from the Solomon Islands, with their connotations of 'urban - yet rootless - unemployed' fill this kind of gap.

The close ties that are maintained with rural home areas by many long term urban residents are well known and have been discussed in detail elsewhere (e.g. Curtain 1980a, 1980b; Kengava 1979; Bedford 1973). These ties, it is argued, are not merely of sentimental value but stem from the migrants' intentions to return eventually to the home village because of the bleak prospects for access to housing, security of urban land tenure, and meagre, if any, pension payments or health benefits after retirement from wage employment. This is not, however, to suggest that a permanent proletariat is not developing. High levels of unemployment among migrants from the poorest areas of the country suggest evidence of a group which remains in the urban areas despite low informal sector income (Curtain 1980b; Morauta 1979).

A recent study of a group of four hundred rural-born Fijians in Suva has shown marked differences between indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians in their commitment to permanent urban residence (Nair 1980). Two thirds of the Indo-Fijians interviewed claimed they would remain permanently in Suva while less than a third of the Fijian migrants surveyed said they would do
so despite the greater number (three quarters) of Fijians sampled who had spent more than half their working lives in Suva. This difference between the two groups was also shown in the fact that only 30 per cent of migrant Fijian heads of household owned a house in Suva while a further 29 per cent owned houses in both Suva and their home village; in contrast, 61 per cent of Indo-Fijian household heads owned their houses in Suva and only 13 per cent owned houses in both Suva and in the rural area. Also, compared with Indo-Fijians of rural origin, more Fijians visited their rural place of origin, remitted money and contributed to rural projects. The key factor in explaining the differences is that ownership of rural land is open only to the Fijian migrants.

For Fijians in particular, urban centres are regarded as locations of employment and modern amenities, and rural communities primarily as locations that offer opportunities for a better social and cultural life and the chance of a peaceful retirement.... It is conceivable that fewer Indo-Fijians would reside for long periods in the city and more would wish to return to rural settlements if land were available for cash cropping, since many indicated this was the reason they went to Suva (Nair 1980:75, 77-78).

The original relationship between the people and the land, established by the colonial authorities over one hundred years ago, remains an important factor influencing the very different degree of commitment to permanent urban residence. Many Fijians remain linked closely to the rural peasant economy while many Indo-Fijians see little or no alternative to becoming part of a permanent urban proletariat. Thus the Indo-Fijians of Suva exhibit some similarities with the poorest migrants in Port Moresby; yet the extent to which either of these two groups can genuinely be considered as a proletariat remains small. Although there are also indications of class conflict, notably in the strikes of organized workers, it seems more appropriate to use the terms 'social differentiation' or 'stratification' rather than 'class formation' in Melanesian towns until there is stronger evidence of the emergence of class identification rather than ethnic affiliation, especially as mobilized through rural linkages.

In practical terms the significance of the continuing strength of ethnicity is that the urban poor are not yet in a situation where they can cooperate to defend their interests. The fact that most urban migrants remain in a situation of dual dependence indicates that the emergence of an urban proletariat has not yet occurred. Thus, in Vila, the capital of Vanuatu, Bedford (1973:117) noted how, despite some stability of residence in the town, most migrants saw the village as an alternative source of income and a source of social security so that 'to talk of a "committed urban proletariat" is, as yet, misleading'.

Urban bias?

The existence of towns, which necessarily extract food and manpower from the rural areas, implies some kinds of urban-rural differentiation and inequalities in favour of the urban concentrations. But how such inequalities are articulated remains a complex question.
The existence of spatial inequalities at regional level in Papua New Guinea has been discussed in a number of recent papers (Treadgold 1978; Jackson 1979b; Berry and Jackson 1978; Lester 1979) and in an earlier paper by Wilson (1975). Because of the unavailability of recent data at district (rather than province) level, 'the powerful strand of rural-urban inequality highlighted by Kent Wilson is necessarily blurred' (Berry and Jackson 1978:127) in subsequent papers. Berry and Jackson concluded that although progress has been made towards equality in the provision of services, there was no apparent progress towards the equalization of incomes which were, in any case, highly unequal (1978:128-129). They analysed the impact of government expenditure in four principal forms - the capital works programme, the rural improvement programme (cf. Jackson 1975a), Development Bank lending, and the new allocations of the National Public Expenditure Plan - showing that none of these significantly favoured the poorer provinces (Berry and Jackson 1978) and hence that, on the basis of existing policy, inequalities were unlikely to diminish in the future. At the local level inequalities are maintained and exacerbated by the local, regional and urban bias of government policy. Thus in Morobe Province, Lae is particularly favoured in the allocation of capital works expenditure and Development Bank loans and the Huon area (which contains Lae) for rural improvement programme expenditure (Polume 1978). Casual empiricism suggests that this is also true in other provinces, and perhaps true outside Papua New Guinea.

To counteract these 'normal processes' of centralization both Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands have placed a strong emphasis on decentralization. The third of Papua New Guinea's Eight Aims is concerned with decentralization of decision making, via provincial governments and ultimately community (or village) governments. Obviously decentralization is a crucial issue in development given contemporary concerns with redistribution, independence and self-reliance (cf. Seers 1977). It is recognized, for example in the Solomon Islands National Plan:

No commercial activity has been deliberately located away from Honiara so far, except for those which could not be located in Honiara anyway such as logging, fisheries and cattle farming. There is a widespread assumption that all manufacturing and processing activities will take place in Honiara; continuance of this trend would run against the governments' overall objectives. It is clear that deliberate government policy, backed by public funds will be needed if decentralisation of economic activity, and a wider sharing of its effects, is to be a real feature of development during this plan (Solomon Islands 1975, Vol. 1:19).

Similarly Papua New Guinea's National Public Expenditure Plan (1979-82) emphasized the earlier Eight Aims by stressing that the main objectives were 'rural development and particularly development of the less developed areas of the country' (National Public Expenditure Plan 1979-1982:3) which was implicitly directed to the reduction of inequalities.
The Solomon Islands National Development Plan (1975-79) stressed the necessity for decentralization and a more even development, including:

- handing over greatly increased resources and responsibility to local Councils and by them to Area Committees ... incentives and direction of most new investments to planned new locations; and disincentives and controls on the growth of Honiara ... levelling up the countrywide coverage of government services; giving greater weight to the employment aspects of decentralisation in industry and services (Solomon Islands 1975, Vol. 2:2).

The extent to which these plans can be translated from rhetoric to reality remains unclear yet Berry and Jackson's (1978) conclusions suggest that, at least in Papua New Guinea, little is now being achieved, and the experience of other Third World countries with the decentralization of development is not encouraging. Fiji's Seventh Development Plan (1976-80) emphasized a continued redistribution in favour of the outer islands, but the extent of such redistribution cannot easily be quantified (UNESCO/UNFPA 1977:323, our italics). By contrast the Vanuatu five year 'development plan' of 1971 allocated 16 per cent of development expenditure to the 'outer islands', 6 per cent to projects in rural areas of the two main islands, Efate and Espiritu Santo, and no less than 59 per cent to projects in and around the two towns, which have only 20 per cent of the population compared with 69 per cent in the outer islands (Brookfield 1975:67). All indications are that attempts at decentralization are distorted by regional and urban biases.

The distribution of services such as education, health and housing is to some extent divorced from the operation of the market economy; their distribution is almost entirely controlled by government intervention. Where the operation of the market economy is significant and where profits are involved, government appears to be even less willing to attempt, and less capable of achieving, a more equitable distribution of growth and development. This is apparent in the continued existence of regional inequalities which can also be differentiated, if less clearly, between urban and rural areas. Thus, in Papua New Guinea at least, the Department of Business Development has tended to favour urban businesses whilst even the Village Economic Development Fund, designed to counteract urban bias, allows significant urban shareholdings in rural enterprises (Amarshi, Good and Mortimer 1979). Increasingly the distribution of resources from the Papua New Guinea Development Bank has favoured urban over rural areas (Connell 1979).

The urban bias in the distribution of services is readily apparent where data are available. As elsewhere in the Third World (Sharpston 1972; Lipton 1977), the distribution of medical services is particularly biased. Thus in Papua New Guinea, between 1973/74 and 1976/77 expenditure on hospitals and urban health services increased at about twice the rate of increase in expenditure on rural health services, despite the existence of a National Health Plan in which the opposite intention was claimed (MacPherson 1979:16). In Fiji in 1975 the Central Division, which contained Suva and Nausori, had half the doctors and dentists in the country, giving a ratio of one doctor to 1,674 people and one dentist to
12,504, compared with the national averages of one to 2,590 and one to 20,531 respectively (Fiji Central Planning Office 1975:192). There are no available data on comparative health standards in urban and rural areas in Melanesia, other than the observation that infant mortality in Papua New Guinea is significantly higher in rural areas (Papua New Guinea 1974:27), to indicate whether this particular basic need is best met in town or country and consequently where, on the basis of equity and efficiency, subsequent expenditure should be directed. However the present distribution is generally considered to be a problem to the extent that national plans have emphasized alternative distributions favouring rural areas. Post colonial governments have been unable to rectify distributions and distribution systems established in colonial times; as Jackson phrases it (1979b:175), 'the ideology of decentralisation is mismatched with the practice of spatial concentration'. The same is almost certainly true of education and other components of social welfare provision.

That some resources must be distributed unevenly is inevitable. Expenditure on housing provision (either for public servants and some workers, or via site and service schemes) throughout Melanesia is almost entirely urban-based; assistance with housing and the provision of water supplies is almost nonexistent in rural areas (outside Fiji) and the latter especially are not always readily available in village situations. This bias in distribution may be inescapable (although it can be compensated for) but it may also represent an indirect inducement to further rural-urban migration.

It is thus widely established that, as in Papua New Guinea, 'urban areas have received a disproportionate share of the national wealth and any guidelines that are drawn up for future urbanisation must deal with a need to reduce expenditure per head on urban dwellers' (Papua New Guinea National Planning Office 1977:12); it is less well established that 'not all urban dwellers benefited from the expenditure' (ibid.). Overall public sector expenditure is heavily concentrated in urban areas yet two groups particularly have received a disproportionate share of government expenditure: expatriates, in both the public and private sectors, and national public servants who, following expatriate 'models', have been able to secure government housing at heavily subsidized rentals. Unequal access to housing is matched, and emphasized, by uneven access to transport services and other social and commercial amenities.

There are significant rural-urban income differentials in Melanesia but the continued importance of the subsistence economy (alongside some urban unemployment and informal sector employment) makes it virtually impossible to quantify such variations. Interregional differences must also be taken into account. Thus, although it is argued that in Fiji there are substantial and increasing urban-rural income differences (Ody 1973) it is doubtful whether available data exist to prove such an assertion. In a recent review of the evidence of income inequalities in Fiji it is said that rural incomes were substantially lower than urban incomes and that between 1953 and 1970 average urban incomes grew more than six times faster than average rural incomes (Chandra 1979:25-26). In Fiji this poses a particular problem in that a change in the rural-urban income differential 'tends to increase the income differential between Fijians and the other ethnic groups' (Ward 1973:365). For the Solomon Islands, on the other hand, it has been noted that in the early 1970s falling real wages and
rising copra prices meant that the urban-rural income differential, although continuing to favour the urban sector, was declining (Solomon Islands 1975, Vol. 1:25); however the trend in favour of the rural sector may not be general or longlasting.

That there are significant cost of living differences between urban and rural areas is apparent. At least in Papua New Guinea, this is recognized in formal wage differentials between these areas. Thus the minimum wage for rural labourers is K11.93 per week, that for urban labourers K28.20 per week; there are also differences between the larger 'Level One' towns and the smaller 'Level Two' towns, based on anticipated differences in living costs between these towns. How incomes correspond with relative costs of living, and the role of unions in maintaining income differentials, remain unknown.

One factor that keeps urban costs of living high is the limited availability of locally produced food in urban markets (cf. Fisk 1978). Urban gardening opportunities are few and even where locally produced food is available prices are high (occasionally higher than imported processed and/or frozen commodities). Consequently pressures to limit the importing of foodstuffs have been resisted, especially in Papua New Guinea, because of the fear of a rapid increase in food costs.

There have been pressures to control the prices of commodities sold in urban markets. In Lae in 1978 city councillors forced down by 50 per cent the price of some basic commodities brought in by rural producers (Townsend 1980). The effectiveness of the few market forces that operate against urban bias may therefore be restricted. Similarly some rural development policies, notably the establishment of cattle ranching in Papua New Guinea (Connell 1979), are designed in large part to provide urban markets with cheaper food rather than to provide higher prices for rural producers. The issue of food prices tends to cut across conventionally defined classes to give a unity of interest to the whole of the urban population (cf. Lipton 1977). In this context at least the terms of trade between urban and rural products are deliberately biased.

There appears to have been no general study of the terms of trade between urban and rural sectors in Melanesia. However Townsend has shown how, for parts of the central highlands of Papua New Guinea where coffee is virtually the only cash crop, even at a time of very rapidly rising coffee prices the consumer price index (CPI) kept pace with this increase (Townsend 1977). In the subsequent period, despite further coffee price increases, it is probable that the CPI has accelerated faster than coffee prices, especially since there have been further increases in oil prices and hence the cost of imported commodities in rural areas. The nature of the problem is indicated in Papua New Guinea where national policy has subsidized prices of petrol (and kerosene) at outlying urban centres so that they have been no more than 20 toea per gallon above Port Moresby and Lae prices (Seiler 1976). Provincial urban centres were thus paying more for petrol whilst rural supplies were even more expensive. Seiler (ibid.) argues that this subsidy has contributed to economic decentralization. If the CPI could be differentiated for urban and rural areas it is probable that the rural CPI would be rising faster than the urban CPI. This is certainly the case in the eastern islands of Fiji where prices are 10 to 40 per cent higher than in Suva for goods which are necessities or 'only
intermediate luxuries' whilst the rate of inflation has been greater in the outer islands than in Suva (UNESCO/UNFPA 1977:276-281).

The extent to which intangible components of 'development', such as self-respect and power (cf. Seers 1977), are also maldistributed is unclear. Urban life styles are undeniably different from those in rural areas; the potential for social interaction is much greater (even if, in practice, unrealized) and social activities are less restricted by the relative rigidity of rural social structure and traditional authority. Cities, relative to the countryside, are places of change and excitement. Real relative advantages of the urban culture are everywhere enhanced by the formal educational system and the radio (cf. Peet 1979) which emphasize the use of English and the consumption of the imported commodities that are primarily available for purchase in the cities. In cultural terms too there is an urban and international bias.

In this kind of context it is therefore possible to detect various elements of urban bias in Melanesian national development, although the mechanisms through which the bias is established and maintained are not always adequately elaborated. At a time when Honiara was still small, Bellam (1970:93) noted 'the generally parasitic, both directly and indirectly, effect of Honiara on the rest of the protectorate'; such attitudes to Melanesian urban centres may now be elaborated into more formal statements. However urban poverty exists amidst rural affluence and rural societies remain stratified, often becoming increasingly so. There are certainly mechanisms through which urban elites exploit the rural poor but in Melanesia, as elsewhere in the Third World, they are not the only mechanisms in operation. The existence of provincial governments in Papua New Guinea and the Solomons represents a challenge to regional if not urban bias as these governments tend to emphasize the traditional and ethnic characteristics of their region (while also providing employment) in opposition to the dominance of the core.

CONCLUSION

Melanesian urbanization undeniably follows a Third World pattern. The visible characteristics that typify dependent urbanization - the tendency towards primate cities, the lack of a continuum in a functional urban hierarchy, the failure (because it remains peripheral to the bulk of the population), to develop an integrated urban network, the visual if not functional 'dual city', and so on - are marked throughout Melanesia. However the external factor of dependency alone cannot explain the process of urbanization, which must also be related to the dynamics of the internal processes of capitalist development (including demographic change and migration) in the various countries, and specifically to the nature of the colonial/post-colonial state. The Melanesian town has gone through a period of colonial bureaucratic domination to one of commercial capitalist domination yet the third stage in Castells' sequence (Castells 1977), the city defined by imperialist industrial-financial domination, is nowhere realized; indeed it may never be realized here.

The institutional response (or lack of response) to urbanization has also been similar to that in other parts of the Third World. Despite the almost universal concern for managing urbanization alongside a focus on rural development, there have been few attempts in Melanesia to constrain
urban development. The economic options available to Melanesian governments include increasing expenditure on rural development, changes in the rural-urban terms of trade, and wage and housing policies. Social options include control of the natural increase in population and 'appropriate education'. Political options include 'migration passes' and repatriation. It is perhaps significant that despite some economic policy orientation towards rural development, expenditure in urban areas is quite disproportionate to urban population sizes. It is only the exceptionally crude 'last resort' repatriation of some highland Papua New Guineans from the coastal towns of the North Solomons that suggests some measure of determination to stem urbanization. Yet without rural incentives such draconian political measures are of limited utility and merely create dissent.

What is perhaps surprising is that policy formation directed to lessen urban bias has not been successful in conditions where most politicians have extremely strong rural economic ties (especially in Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands), where an alienated urban-born elite is not yet apparent, where migrants are at least as conservative and poorly organized as elsewhere in the Third World and where there is little international business pressure for a supply of cheap labour. Nor are there the implicit anti-agricultural biases of the import substitution policies that exist elsewhere (cf. Beier et al. 1976:387-388). Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that the various spatial dimensions of inequality are likely to increase rather than diminish. However while ethnicity prevails over class, unions are weak and localized, and there is a declining rate of urban employment creation, urban wages are unlikely to rise quickly.

In Melanesia, as in the west, the town-country relationship is quite central to the transition to capitalism. The separation of production and consumption that has followed rural-urban exchange was the cause of a 'revolution' whereby the self-sufficiency of the rural economy was undermined by urban and international consumption patterns (cf. Merrington 1975). Crudely, there has been a division of labour that has assigned intellectual work to the towns and manual work to the country; 'the greatest division of material and mental labour is the separation of town and country' (Marx and Engels 1947 trans.:43). Thus the growing urban centres of Melanesia act as nodes for the appropriation of rural surplus: 'dependent urbanism arises in situations where the urban form exists as a channel for the extraction of quantities of surplus from a rural and resource hinterland for purposes of shipment to the major metropolitan centres' (Harvey 1973:232). It is therefore untrue that urban centres operate only for their own benefit or that they are able to control the spatial redistribution of the surplus within the nation; although towns and the cities have a role in exploiting the countryside they are no more than a part of an international urban hierarchy within the international capitalist economy. This approach to Melanesian urbanization then

... involves the notion that powerful corporate and national interests, representing capitalist society at its most advanced, established outposts in the principal cities of Third World countries for three interrelated purposes: to extract a sizeable surplus from the dependent economy, in the form of primary products, through principally a process of 'unequal
exchange'; to expand the market for goods and services produced in the home countries of advanced monopoly capitalism; and to ensure stability of an indigenous political system that will resist encroachment by ideologies and social movements that threaten to undermine the basic institutions of the capitalistic system' (Friedmann and Wulff 1974:13).

Spatial inequalities are inevitable yet the spatial inequalities that exist in Melanesia suggest 'a distinct, functional and maintained pattern of spatial inequality [that] is inherent in a capitalist mode of production' (Britton 1980:2) and that this system is global.

The urban legacy of colonialism has proved to be an inadequate basis for achieving the objective of economic development and national (or regional) integration in Melanesia because it has provided for the development of an entrenched, structured inequality. Independence resulted in a radical change in the racial composition of those with political power, but little impact on the mechanisms that maintained a small group's dominance - patterns of government expenditure, the freedom of foreign companies to locate in the towns, and a narrow stratum of expenditure by a high-income elite superimposed on a base of limited mass consumption. The open economies of the new Pacific nations and the attractions of the Pacific area, for strategic reasons, primary resource extraction (including fishing) and tourism, make the growth of externally oriented cities even more likely in the future. Existing inequalities may worsen.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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NOTES

1 This paper generally excludes New Caledonia (principally because of its maintained colonial status, but also because of its unique urbanization characteristics, especially its minority Melanesian population), Irian Jaya and Torres Strait (since both are only part of a much larger country and their history and contemporary experience is quite different, and since neither author has had an opportunity to visit these two areas). The availability of data and personal experience has resulted in a bias towards Papua New Guinea in this analysis. This bias is not merely arbitrary. The urban population of Papua New Guinea represents well over 50 per cent of the total urban population of independent Melanesia. The amount of published research on urban areas reflects this distribution of the urban populations.
Consequently as late as the 1970s attempts were made to establish an articulated network of central places in the central highlands of New Guinea to serve as the basis for an administrative and marketing system (Ward et al. 1974); there have also been movements of old administrative centres to more appropriate regional centres, such as Sohano to Kieta and Samarai to Alotau (Ward 1968).

Migrant Labour Systems were formally instituted to enable control by the colonial state over the movement of labour in German New Guinea from 1888, the British Colony of Papua from 1888, the British Solomon Islands Protectorate from 1897, and in the New Hebrides from 1906. For further details of the operation of the Migrant Labour Systems in Papua New Guinea see Curtain 1980b:38-120; for the Solomons, see Hogbin 1939:245-298; for Vanuatu, see Bedford 1973:30-43.

But wage employees in Fiji contribute to a retirement fund called the National Provident Fund. Similarly, for permanent officers of the Papua New Guinea Public Service there are two schemes, with some 30,000 members in 1978.

Or, as Levine (1979:1) phrases it, in conceptualizing ethnicity, there has been 'a movement away from a rigid internally oriented and reified cultural determinism towards a realization that ethnicity is a dynamic multifunctional sociocultural factor best understood as a facet of concrete social action'.

Recent work in Lae by Marion Ward leads her to conclude that the proportion of males not in full time employment is much higher than the 26 per cent suggested by the 1977 figures (Marion Ward, personal communication 1980).

The extent of retail price maintenance is not known; however there have been pressures on market vendors elsewhere to reduce prices, as in the case of North Solomons markets in the late 1970s and in Honiara (cf. Bathgate 1978).

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URBANIZATION AND INEQUALITY IN MELANESIA


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DEVELOPMENT AND DEPENDENCY:
DIVERGENT APPROACHES TO THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA

John Connell

Dependency theory emerged in a Latin American context towards the end of the 1960s. Much of the early work was carried out by local scholars, but subsequent theoretical reformulations and refinements, especially via a Marxist perspective, have been undertaken largely in the northern hemisphere. Perhaps the only reference to Melanesia in early literature relating to modernization and dependency is Aron's statement, in opposition to Rostow's concept of the traditional, that all past societies are put into this single category, whether they be the archaic communities of New Guinea, the Negro tribes of Africa or the old civilisations of India and China. But the only feature they have in common is that they are neither modern nor industrialised (Aron 1967:30).

Thus the societies of New Guinea were seen as 'polar types' of non-development - places, therefore, where dependency theory would be least likely to apply directly and immediately. At that time Papua New Guinea remained a colony, as did many of the other Pacific nations, and until the 1970s there was little indication of an early end to colonial status. In this colonial context Australian scholarship was relatively remote from radical influences; dependency theory has only recently been applied to Melanesia and specifically Papua New Guinea.¹

It was however readily apparent that 'development' was constrained by external power systems. This is a primary determinant of the fact that development takes place at all, of the structure of existing development and of the direction taken by development schemes. Much of the 'drive' for development and almost all that is coherent in the process derive from the external authority, from the representatives or imitators of its culture (Stanner 1951:2-3).

Two decades later the situation was beginning to be seen in a new light by academic commentators, although popular perceptions were sometimes different. For some Europeans, within Papua New Guinea, the area was no more than
a human sink where ten thousand years or more of independence had left a miserable sprinkling of people battling against disease, cannibalism and fearsome Mother Nature they could not tame (New Guinea Bulletin 1971, cited by Sharp 1972:43).

The first major work reevaluating the consensus on development in Papua New Guinea was that of Rowley, whose influential study The New Guinea Villager (1965) - a title which disguised the breadth of analysis and vision - was the forerunner of a series of more radical critiques of development and colonial policies in Papua New Guinea. The latter includes Howlett (1969), Brookfield (1972), Sharp (1972), Thompson (1973), Waiko, (1973) and Zable (1973); at the same time Ogan (1972, 1973) used 'dependency' in a more political-psychological context in relation to the Nasioi of the North Solomons. Yet few of these studies, other than some articles in the journal New Guinea, received much circulation or comment.

Of the writers who had begun to consider the possibilities of what had yet to be called the 'dependency paradigm', Thompson, Brookfield and Zable all found theoretical formulations from elsewhere of some value. Brookfield (1972:176) refers to Furtado and others but suggests that it is not improbable that the literature on post-colonial issues which Melanesians will find most stimulating will include such works as those of Nkrumah, Dumont and Frank, all of which strongly criticise development through externally-controlled capitalism, and maintain that underdevelopment is a creation of capitalism.

Zable, in a surprisingly little-known paper, considered the relevance of Marxist analysis, including Lenin's theory of imperialism and unequal exchange, but fell short of attempting to apply any of this in a Melanesian context, merely expressing concern with all models in the social sciences. His conclusion, that 'the categories of analysis were beginning to take over and assume a life of their own, the people with whom I began were disappearing' (1973:430), might serve as an early epitaph for much that was to follow.

As in Latin America the new paradigm suggested radical, if not revolutionary, changes in Papua New Guinea and, minimally, a rapid transition to political independence (cf. Cooper 1966). Few radical policies had been formulated within Papua New Guinea, but rather by Australian academics; hence the link between theory and practice, beyond the level of pressure for independence, was almost absent with the significant exception of some Bougainvillean students in the late 1960s (cf. Griffin, Nelson and Firth 1979:152). Meanwhile development policy, as formally set out, was changing almost as rapidly as academic reevaluation. In December 1972 the chief minister, Michael Somare, announced a set of eight aims (The Eight Point Plan) based on the principles of equality, self-reliance and rural improvement. These were given support by the Faber Report (Overseas Development Group 1973; see also Hart 1974) which argued for much greater local control of the economy, especially through a reduction in dependence on foreign aid and foreign capital investment. Simultaneously some academics were beginning to consider the possibilities
of 'socialist' objectives as reflected in the experience of Tanzania (Clunies-Ross 1973) or with an Asian orientation. In theory and in practice the start of the 1970s witnessed the emergence of a critical phase in the history of economic development in Papua New Guinea.

The scrutiny, criticism and refinement of dependency theory that went on elsewhere (cf. Connell forthcoming) had little impact upon academic studies of Melanesia until the last couple of years. This is remarkable, given both the extraordinary increase in academic interest in Papua New Guinea and the ready recognition that the country shared - even personified - the characteristics suggested in general terms by Lall (1975). For example: first, income distribution is skewed and getting worse (cf. Connell and Curtain, this volume). Secondly, the consumption patterns of the elite in Papua New Guinea are influenced by those in Australia, especially perhaps in terms of the consumption of alcohol (Conroy 1980). Thirdly, the technology utilized for industrialization is unadapted from the centre (this is especially true of Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) and, to a lesser extent, of other transnational corporations (TNCs) in Papua New Guinea). Fourthly, there is a strong foreign presence in the shape of transnational corporations, foreign aid, foreign loans and trade with the centre. This is apparent in the dominant role of BLC, the probable significance of Ok Tedi, and the existence of a number of Japanese, United States and Korean TNCs involved in fishing, construction and forestry. Moreover the contribution of Australian (and other) aid provides an extremely high proportion of the national budget, a situation that has interested and concerned many (e.g. Berry 1977; Conroy 1980). Trade is primarily with the major industrial nations, to the extent that in 1975 Japan and Australia supplied 64 per cent of imports and purchased 40 per cent of exports (Donaldson 1980a:77). These trends amplify Lall's point that 'there is no indigenous technological advance of economic significance'. Fifthly, foreign influence is apparent in cultural, educational, legal and political spheres; the role of English as the principal means of communication amongst Papua New Guinean elites reflects the maintained dominance of Australian educational, legal and political institutions. Lall's final indicator, that the 'ruling elites ... perceive an identity of interest, at some level, with the economic interests of the rich capitalist countries' and that there are 'some internal forces which make for an increasingly capitalist mode of production and for a long-term integration with the world capitalist system' (1975:801), is reflected in one account of political change in Papua New Guinea up till the end of 1978:

The economy remains aid and trade dependent. State power is in the hands of a political and administrative elite, or in class terms, shared by a loose alliance of an educated petty bourgeoisie and a rich peasantry. The rhetoric of redistribution is still current but the essentially accommodative political and governmental style ultimately works in the interest of those with the most economic and political clout. Internal crises are managed in ad hoc fashion, the key to their resolution being political expediency and the dispensation of patronage (Hegarty 1979a:110).
By 1980 there was, not surprisingly, little evidence that this had changed significantly. Elite conflict is over access to spoils and patronage, rather than over ideology (despite some evidence of polarization in the debate over the leadership code); the bureaucracy is divided in the same way by the search for political and economic patrons; cultural nationalism is not a cohesive force, and problems of management of the 'dependent economy' have increased (Hegarty 1980). Despite the egalitarian aims entrenched in the main ideological statements of the government, the post colonial state has pursued policies that are fundamentally similar to those of the colonial administration, remaining characterized by a heavy reliance on private enterprise and virtually unimpeached free trade, with the more productive sectors of the economy, which are privately owned and dominated by foreign capital (Berry 1978), giving Papua New Guinea an unusually open economy with all its attendant problems (Lam 1979). Undoubtedly Papua New Guinea exemplifies the characteristic, and to some extent measurable, features of dependence.

In a more superficial manner the variety of characteristics that are often seen as indicative of Third World economies and societies, but are even less amenable to measurement and comparison than those described by Lall, have also been apparent in Papua New Guinea: corruption (see Standish 1980b), an apparent decline in law and order (cf. Strathern 1979), conflict between government and judiciary, shantytowns and urban crime waves (although not necessarily correlated), the threat of secession movements, elitist students, and so on. By contrast there have been a strong currency and a low inflation rate, with a reserve stock that cushions the economy against drops in commodity prices (although not against drops in revenue from BCL), a peaceful and orderly change of government early in 1980, and a policy of political cooperation with neighbouring Pacific states so that, even with its problems, some would argue that it is 'by Third World standards, a model of government efficiency and probity' (Standish 1980a:94). But all this is highly subjective and open to debate and dispute.

By 1980 too the concept of dependence, and its related terminology, had become parts of the reality, or at least the rhetoric, of Melanesian politics. Thus in 1978 Father Momis, the minister for decentralisation, in the debate over the leadership code, argued that the country's economic and political structure was characterized by foreign monopoly and influence; he later extended this critique to recognize 'the beginnings of a comprador class which provides a convenient bridgehead for the continued onslaught of foreign capital' (Momis 1979) and consequently argued that a new leadership code was necessary to demonstrate that the government identified with the local people, was responsive to them, was restrained in advancing its own interests, was not sated with power, and was not subject to foreign influence. However, at much the same time, Iambakey Okuk, then the opposition leader, was both criticizing the government for being 'socialist' and 'Marxist', and outlining a policy of state assistance to national capitalists, joint ventures between foreign capital and the state, and the establishment of a manufacturing base (cf. Hegarty 1979a:106-107). At the end of 1978 an underlying theme of politics in Papua New Guinea was a concern for the country's post colonial economy and politics (and the leadership code, with its explicit criticism of elitism and of the emerging comprador class, was the most obvious manifestation of this), but by contrast, the opposition was effectively arguing 'that the creation of a
state-assisted bourgeoisie had been restrained by the government's emphasis on "redistribution" and that the capitalist road to "development" had been obstructed by a restrictive investment policy' (Hegarty 1979a:109-110). These divergent attitudes revolved around various assessments of the impact of economic change.

THE EMERGENCE OF CAPITALISM

The expansion of capitalism within Papua New Guinea has been considered in some detail in a number of places (notably Amars hi, Good and Mortimer 1979 and Griffin, Nelson and Firth 1979; see also Jonas 1979; Gregory 1979). Although the details and significance of particular events and particular historical periods remain open to discussion and all are of significance in the establishment of the contemporary political economy of Papua New Guinea, only some themes can be considered here.

Merchant capital initially entered Papua New Guinea in the nineteenth century in two significant forms: through the operations of metropolitan trading companies and through the recruitment of labourers for plantations outside Papua New Guinea. Formal colonization of New Guinea followed the expansion of German trading and settlement interests and was followed by British annexation of Papua. Plantation capital required cheap labour power to generate profits; indentured labour was recruited in conditions 'really rather like slavery' (Fitzpatrick 1978) and it is now generally accepted that the village economy subsidized the wages of plantation workers (Belshaw 1957:244; Rowley 1965:110) to the extent that even subsequent rural-urban migration streams may be seen as occurring in situations of 'dual dependence' that were far from unique to Melanesia (Curtain 1980a), a reflection of the fact that 'unlimited supplies of labour' did not exist (Gregory 1979:391) and that merchant capital did not seek to transform productive relations but attached itself to existing social and economic relations. Plantation capital began to face a crisis towards the end of the 1960s, a crisis which coincided with the labour frontier having moved inland until, by the early 1970s, the supply of cheap labour was exhausted; plantation capital was expatriated and a process of transfer to national ownership began (Gregory 1979). Government regulation of population movement in the colonial period, through tax enforcement, labour laws and the opening and closing of recruitment areas (even in German times), laid the basis for an elaborate and potentially powerful state (Barnett 1979:777; Curtain 1980b). The argument that the expanding world capitalist economy first articulated with the peripheral economies by creating a class of merchant capitalists who organized the transfer of commodities from poor countries to rich countries but did not themselves engage in or organize the production process (Kay 1975; Amin 1976; Rey 1973), has limited validity in Melanesia where settlers took on those functions.

Mining capital entered Papua in the 1880s. There were two early waves of mining capital in the country (Nelson 1976) and a third wave, the most intensive, began with the establishment of BCL and is currently extending to the mainland. In each wave profit was expatriated directly or through the distribution of excess profits to shareholders as dividend payments (cf. Gregory 1980:103). The entry of plantation and mining capital, aided
and abetted by the state, thus transformed labour power into a temporary commodity (Gregory 1979:401).

A critical phase in the transformation of the national economy of Papua New Guinea was the emergence of primary commodity production for export on smallholdings. Again the state played an active part through the disincentive to stability of taxes and the incentive of advice, some pressure and infrastructure improvements. The particular significance of this transformation was in the extent of economic differentiation within villages and local regions that initially followed different planting rates (and access to land) and subsequently resulted from the consolidation of some smallholders as businessmen.

The final and most significant phase of the expansion of capitalism into Papua New Guinea was the entry of corporate monopoly capital exemplified in the relatively recent and rapid establishment and consolidation of TNCs, and especially BCL. If BCL is by far the most important TNC in the country it is certainly not the only one; the largest building in central Port Moresby is a part of the Travelodge world hotel chain; foreigners have substantial shares in Air Niugini and large sectors of natural resource exploitation are foreign owned. Foreign ownership is particularly evident in the relatively new and rapidly expanding fishing and forestry industries (Jonas 1979; De'Ath 1979), where Japanese interests are involved, but it is also evident in the cement industry, where there are South Korean interests, part of the construction industry, and much of the agricultural industry, including cash crop plantations, some cattle ranches and the emerging sugar and tobacco industries of the Markham valley. With the exception of the road haulage industry it remains difficult to find significant elements of the economy that are wholly national-owned. The extent of foreign ownership up to independence has been partially documented in two separate monographs (Utrecht 1977; Donaldson and Turner 1978) that have drawn attention to the substantial Australian control in all sectors of the economy, the interlocking directorates within the major Australian companies, the nature of incentives offered to foreign companies, the role of the Papua New Guinea Investment Corporation and especially the continued significance of the principal merchant trading companies.

The consolidation of the TNCs has produced a wealth of critical comments, directed less to the impact of the TNCs on national disintegration and more to the emergence of a comprador bourgeoisie, including those directly employed by TNCs, public servants involved in their activities, a range of businessmen who service their activities, and the opportunities that this allows for possible corruption (Zorn 1976). Thus, for example, Utrecht argues that the Investment Corporation is an instrument of the TNCs in that it creates a 'social class of corporate compradors' and subjects the interest of nationals to that of the TNCs (1977:44). The extent to which criticisms of this kind are valid, and at what level, cannot be resolved in a summary statement, especially given the extent to which emotion (see; for example, Hannett 1975) plays a part in this evaluation and where a single TNC plays such a critical economic role. Thus before independence in 1975 there was almost no manufacturing or service industry wholly, or even partly, owned by nationals and the centrepiece of the economy was a single TNC (BCL), with whom the government had negotiated a revised financial relationship, resulting in a situation
of 'negotiated dependency' (cf. Lubeck 1977). Subsequently the state has been the main initiator and financier of development, including agricultural development; hence access to and control over the resources of the state take on a particular significance in Papua New Guinea. If TNCs play a more extensive role in shaping the nature of policy formation within the state, they may contribute increased resources to enable other state policies to be put into practice.

PRE-COLONIAL ECONOMIES AND SOCIETIES

Although dependency has been considered in general terms by numerous writers, and although there has now been a number of studies of class formation, peasants and, to a lesser extent, the nature of the colonial and post colonial state and the role of TNCs in Papua New Guinea, there have been relatively (and surprisingly) few attempts to understand the operation of pre-capitalist, or non-capitalist, economies before the intrusion of capitalist forces (but see Donaldson 1981). Of course this is not easy; as Gregory notes 'almost nothing is known about the pre-colonial societies of PNG for the simple reason that, except for Miklouho-Maclay, no anthropologist has ever studied one' (1980:108; see Connell forthcoming). This does not excuse the fact that such societies 'are largely viewed as a homogeneous group of politically simple, socially undifferentiated and economically self-sufficient units' (Boyd 1980:3) which were essentially stable and static. However 'warfare, trade and marriage meant external relationships of hostility and alliance, relations of antagonism and dependence, the opposite of isolation and self-sufficiency' (Dalton 1978:150) so that 'a subsistence economy must not be confused with a self-sufficient economy' (Boyd 1980:5). The extensive trade exchanges, over long distances, in Melanesia are well known (e.g. Hughes 1977) and have existed over long time periods (Connell 1979:107-108). A failure to understand historical changes in such societies, or stratification within them, serves only to set the advent of colonialism and/or capitalism as a single starting point for the historical analysis of development.

The principal approach to pre-colonial societies - emphasizing the existence of 'incipient social classes' and 'exploitative relationships' - has been criticized as reductionism: an attempt to transform non-capitalist societies into 'pre capitalist societies' which distorts the essence of small scale societies and ignores the diversity that exists among such systems (Boyd 1980:3). Given the variety of pre-colonial societies in Melanesia there are obviously grounds for this criticism. By contrast, the use of the label 'pre-capitalist' in Melanesia has been criticized because activities in pre-colonial societies may have been the product of capitalist development (Gregory 1980:108). There is therefore no consensus over the use of the term 'pre-capitalist' in a Melanesian context.

Boyd notes that a 'criticism of dependency analysis is the emphasis on the similarity of response by non-capitalist societies to the intrusion of capitalist forces' and especially 'the assumption that external capitalist forces determine the nature of changes that occur in village economies on their incorporation into the capitalist world system' (1980:3, my italics). The considerable lack of uniformity of response within Melanesia has been a feature of change that has puzzled and fascinated scholars for decades;
Melanesian villagers are certainly far from passive respondents. There is, for example, an important debate over the extent to which Melanesian societies were 'pre-adapted' to change in that the aggressive and competitive style of traditional leaders provided the basic model for contemporary businessmen (see Finney 1973) and consequently enabled what Good called 'significant inbuilt inequalities' (Amarshi, Good and Mortimer 1979:103) to be transferred almost intact into the contemporary era. Alternatively new leaders emerged who were more competent to manipulate business and political affairs in a wider arena and who eroded the 'traditional' authority of the bigmen. It is apparent that both trends occurred throughout Melanesia.

A second example of this diversity must suffice. The significance of maintained lineage ownership of land and the maintenance of production for gift exchange suggested to Gregory that the category 'natural economy' is inappropriate and that, following Mauss, a more appropriate concept is that of 'gift economy', where gift exchange establishes relations of domination in lineage/clan based societies, and hence between relatively egalitarian social groups (Gregory 1979:404-405). However the extent to which there has been a genuine efflorescence of gift exchange, and particularly the extent to which this has resulted in either maintained or increased production for gift exchange, must remain debateable. Gregory uses the analogy of Shan and Kachin 'trade' in Burma, where Kachin 'trade', involving mainly goods of no ordinary economic value (cf. Leach 1954) becomes his model for gift exchange; yet he does not comment on the existence of both 'Kachin-like' and 'Shan-like' systems in the highlands and the limited existence of 'Kachin-like' systems in parts of the lowlands of Papua New Guinea. Once again generalizations on Melanesian trading systems, and hence on the ubiquity and significance of the 'gift economy' as a Melanesian version of the 'natural economy', are impossible.

More detailed analyses of early post-colonial societies have at least largely clarified two deeprooted misconceptions. The first of these is that there was a static, traditional, unchanging society. However, that change has always occurred is not yet generally recognized; thus Brown, commenting on recent (and substantial) changes in Simbu believed she was observing 'the beginnings of social stratification, as well as diversification and specialisation' (1979:247). The significance of the pre-colonial transition to sweet potato production in large parts of highland, and also coastal, Melanesia is a clear example of this kind of historical change (cf. Good 1980; see also Lacey 1977). The second misconception is that pre-colonial society was egalitarian and communal. Whilst there was a certain communalism and even relative equality in pre-colonial societies, there was nevertheless inequality in circumstances where individuals had little opportunity for migration. The communalism that did exist was often closely linked with authoritarianism, and pre-colonial societies in Melanesia may have been rather closer to the model described by Dening (1980) for the Marquesas: 'integrated it is true, but largely by sorcery and human sacrifice; filled with fear and with an ordinary violence to one another which seems extraordinary' — and this in Polynesia, the land of the 'noble savage'. One suspects that the contemporary visible effects of disruption have assisted in the romanticization and generation of utopias in the historic Pacific (see for example Valentine 1979:98-99). What Cliffe (1970) has described in the
Tanzanian context as 'the myth of traditional cooperation' is hard to dispel.

Many Melanesian societies, but certainly not all, seem to have been characterized historically by 'bigman' forms of leadership and political organization and it is in these societies that the transformation of the pre-colonial economy is of particular interest because of the apparent continuity of a number of structural aspects of 'bigman' economic organization. The supposed general characteristics of these are well known, although any example presents some discrepancies from the stereotype. Areas where bigmen exist or existed have no permanently viable political units, lack centralized authority and no concept of office. The leaders, the bigmen, usually achieve authority through personal ability rather than inheritance, descent or supernatural sanction; leadership is therefore achieved, and maintained in competition rather than ascribed. Increasingly the discrepancies from the model are seen to be more general. For example, hereditary leadership in Melanesia is much more widespread than hitherto imagined (Standish 1978; Grant 1980) while some Melanesian societies are stratified (Good 1980). The extent to which the inheritance of power and prestige is allied to the inheritance of wealth is less clear. Certainly Fitzpatrick produces convincing evidence that, at least in contemporary times, little inheritance of wealth has been possible (1979:26-27).

The leadership of bigmen was usually temporary and their importance as individuals not easily differentiated from their role as group representatives or leaders. Often, as in Enga, all men share the same ideals of renown and wealth (Feil 1978:228) so that 'bigness is a matter of degree in a society where every man gives some feasts ... and many descent groups have no clear cut big-man' (Keesing 1976:354). Thus the model of power and prestige, especially as formulated by Sahlin's (1963), is based on the examples of leaders like Soni in Siuai (Oliver 1955) whose power was quite atypical and based on despotism rather than democracy; as a result the economic importance of bigmen has been overemphasized at the expense of the lineage (or other) group in whose ambit they operated. Yet however transient and however open to competition is the bigman's leadership there are always some who have become successful long term leaders, achieving significant status and income differences which may enable some degree of inheritance.

The materialist basis of a number of Melanesian societies in the immediate post-colonial era (which thus suggests its pre-colonial extent) has been widely observed (Connell 1979:109-110) and is typified in Read's account of the Gahuku, who are described as materialists to the point of exhaustion with the acquisition of wealth and its distribution in a never-ending series of competitive exchanges. They lose interest in ideas and measure the good life in terms of worldly success, bestowing prestige on those who have acquitted themselves conspicuously in the pursuit of riches (1965:60).
Subsequently much analysis has been directed to the nature of acquisition and distribution of property and wealth in such societies. Bigmen had to be able to make the transition from production to finance systems and to obtain more land and labour than others; how individuals gained wider support is rarely clear, but there is much evidence of despotic behaviour, exploitation and violence (Standish 1978; Connell 1979). In the present context two general conclusions can be drawn from bigmen societies: first, that, as Keesing (1976:353) argues for the Kwaio of Malaita, 'a big man in a descent group is a more successful capitalist than his fellows - the visible capital being string shell beads and pigs and the invisible capital being prestige', if only in the sense that his material wealth is greater; secondly, that the extent of the unequal relationship between bigmen and their followers, which may be inherited, has suggested that 'models of economic activity derived from class analyses of capitalist societies might not be inappropriate' (Strathern 1975:354; cf. Good 1980) although perhaps a model of feudalism might now be considered more appropriate. Both these conclusions remain open to considerable debate.

In the context of lineage-based, segmentary societies, like those of Melanesia, Meillassoux characterized a mode of production as 'cultivation of the soil, self-subsistence, the use of very short term production techniques and of human energy as the main source of power' (1964:89). Yet this refers only to the technical forces of production and not the social relations of production. Elsewhere I have argued that in bigmen societies the bigmen established the social relations of production, that is, 'the set of social relations which determine the internal rationality of the economy, the specific use to be made of the means of production and the distribution of total social labour time and product' (Friedman 1975:162, cited by Connell 1979:116). Apart from land, Melanesian lineage-based societies own property but only as moveable prestige goods which are disposed of through distributive feasts as part of a cycle of conversion of surplus into prestige. Land does not enter this circulation sphere and therefore cannot be accumulated like other goods. Because of the variety of lineage organization within Melanesia, the segmentation of lineages, and the structure, fission and fusion of local groups, it is impossible to go as far as Friedman in tracing the logic linking surplus production with genealogical proximity to the gods and hence the conversion of bigman status into chieftaincy. Nevertheless, further analysis in this context may help to explain both the emergence and consolidation of leaders and the variation between hereditary and non hereditary leadership in Melanesia. It seems clear that, as in Kachin, the tendency towards the hierarchicalization of society is a result of the use of 'surplus' by lineage leaders (bigmen) to transform and routinize their position and that this transformation is frustrated by the limited productivity of the agricultural system (even in the presence of some trade) from which this surplus is extracted. There are therefore clear limits to political expansion that preclude state formation and through which bigmen invariably die poor.

At this stage few of the social and economic relations of production in Melanesian societies have been elaborated in such a way that it is possible to compare the similarities between Melanesian formations and those of other societies; this remains a possible future task that might further elucidate the historic basis for the generation of inequality
within Papua New Guinea. Economic growth in the pre-colonial societies of Melanesia may have been ubiquitously slow, suggesting that some combination of communication constraints, low population densities and technological limitations may have been generally responsible. The ability to dominate trade (cf. Connell forthcoming) may have been crucial.

Necessarily, this form of analysis of pre-colonial modes of production is merely tentative; the extent to which there were classes in pre-colonial times, the transience of classes, the role of leaders (as individuals or group leaders) are all issues of contention and, at the very least, substantial regional variation. What is perhaps most disappointing here is that Godelier, who has worked on Marxist theories relating to economic anthropology and with the Baruya of the Eastern Highlands relatively soon after colonial contact, has chosen to write so little about their pre-colonial mode of production and the impact of capitalism on this mode (see Godelier 1972, 1977). There seem to be two principal reasons for this: one is that amongst the Baruya religion and magic played an extremely important role, beyond that which existing theories supposed; the second is that circulation and exchange (especially of and with 'salt-money') also played an important role, especially in a context where subsistence requirements could be produced relatively easily. The significance of ideology and exchange amongst the Baruya, which Godelier's field work demonstrated, resulted in his own increased emphasis on these issues; for example he suggests the hypothesis that

relations of domination and exploitation, to have arisen and reproduced themselves durably in formerly classless societies, ... must have presented themselves as an exchange, and as an exchange of services (1978:767).

These reconsiderations have also resulted in his suggestion that it is 'an abuse of words to speak of classes and the State in hierarchic, precapitalist, ancient or exotic societies' (1978:768). Despite the emergence of an extraordinary volume of anthropological writings on Papua New Guinea some debates have scarcely begun.

PEASANTS, CLASSES AND CAPITALIST TRANSFORMATION

There is however generality in the processes of capitalist transformation in poor countries. Thus within Melanesia there has been, first, the role of taxation in providing wage labour in the early part of the twentieth century; secondly, the destruction of intertribal warfare; thirdly, the 'ideological invasion' of evangelical religious conversion, and, fourthly, the gradual introduction of commercial relationships stimulated by the trading of manufactured commodities (cf. Bradby 1975) accompanied by settler colonialism. All of these have been significant in altering pre-colonial social relations of production in situations where resistance had to be broken down by a combination of violence and ideological coercion (since the pre-colonial formations were nowhere passive or formless). Marx argued that 'one of the prerequisites of wage labour and one of the historic conditions of capital is free labour and the exchange of free labour against money' (1964 trans.:67). Thus a social formation which maintained social relations of production (and gave
usufructuary rights to land) could not be expected to result in capitalism until those social relations were destroyed (and until there was a separation of producer from means of production). The pre-capitalist modes are therefore conserved (cf. Rey 1973:82-87) and their reproduction is guaranteed through their being articulated into the cycle of accumulation of the dominant capitalist mode; they are however changed to fit into this new capitalist accumulation cycle. Thus petty commodity production is transformed as wage labour grows in the economy (cf. Kahn 1974) and forms of local production, other than that of cash crops, are destroyed. It is in this kind of context that the emergence of a peasantry and the formation of classes have been more readily recognized. It is only relatively recently that the concept of a peasantry has had much utility in Melanesia. The history of the emergence of the term has been discussed elsewhere (Connell 1979); since then the literature on the possibility of a peasantry in Papua New Guinea has expanded substantially (e.g. Good 1980; Fitzpatrick 1979; Howlett 1980; Amarshi, Good and Mortimer 1979).

The establishment of cash cropping has both failed to sustain the development of productive forces, in part because of its peripheral integration into the world economy (cf. Howlett 1973), and has encouraged and contributed to the consolidation of social and economic differentiation throughout the country. Thus 'it is the disruption of ... complementary relations of interdependence between village societies and the establishment of exploitative relations of dependence with international capitalism that characterise an integral phase of the process of dependency' (Boyd 1980:5). Where self-sufficiency and the diversity that can resist hazard are destroyed, time becomes scarce and village settlements become dispersed and less cohesive. Despite the important linkages between metropolitan markets and rural folk, exemplified in Mitchell's observation of the Nagovisi of Bougainville, that 'the Chicago Board of Trade located not 500 miles from where I am writing is a larger factor in their lives and world, some 12,000 miles away, than it is in mine' (Mitchell 1976:148; see also Mitchell 1980; Townsend 1980), and the unequal exchanges inherent in this relationship, even those who have commented on these trends remain able to comment on Papua New Guinea's 'highly dualistic society' (Berry 1978:101) or to observe that 'PNG remains a dualistic economy with no immediately foreseeable prospect of integrating its modern and traditional sectors' (Griffin, Nelson and Firth 1979:265). Yet it is certainly unreal to speak of a dualistic society or economy in Papua New Guinea; even the most inaccessible rural areas are inextricably a part of the national and international economy.

The emergence of 'big peasants', a rural elite that has gained control (rather than ownership) of significant resources and monopolized access to government services (Howlett 1980:196) has been widely documented, especially in the Eastern Highlands (Gerritsen 1975; Donaldson and Good 1978; Amarshi, Good and Mortimer 1979) but virtually throughout Melanesia (cf. Connell 1979:122). Inequality within and between rural areas is now entrenched and seems to be increasing (Howlett 1980:196) at least at a regional scale (cf. Connell and Curtain, this volume; Connell 1979:122-123), whilst locally this is being emphasized by the operation of certain government agencies, as in Simbu (cf. Howlett, Hide and Young 1976:249-250) and elsewhere (Connell and Curtain, this volume). Thus elites have emerged, and in situations of limited and increasingly scarce resources their control over resources may deny access to others.
Land-short, and possibly landless, groups are now emerging; some of these may be employed by the elite. The growing significance of rural wage labour has been recognized in a number of areas (Connell 1979:123-126; Howlett 1980:199-201). In some places pressure has grown for individual ownership and inheritance of land and there have been individual purchases of land in some rural areas (Connell 1979:125) yet the process of transformation of land into a commodity has barely begun (Gregory 1979:403, 1980:109-110). Because of these trends Good argues that 'the rich peasants and the rural bourgeoisie' (or the 'petty bourgeoisie') as a class have collaborated in the establishment of cash cropping (Amarshi, Good and Mortimer 1979:118) and may even be regarded as a particular kind of comprador bourgeoisie (cf. Townsend 1977:422). There is a general consensus that social and economic inequalities are emerging on a scale and to an extent that was not apparent in pre-colonial or early post-colonial societies and, moreover, and much more subject to debate, that some of those groups who have benefited most from the establishment of commodity production are collaborating to maintain and expand their interests. The extent to which such groups exist and are reproduced as classes can be considered in more detail, although again many questions are still unanswered; thus Fitzpatrick (1979) notes how he is unable to resolve the issues of whether there is a peasantry and whether a peasantry is a homogeneous class (or a class at all), and therefore cannot explore the implications of differentiation within the 'peasantry' for class alliances and especially for links between the peasantry and the proletariat.

The debate over class formation in Papua New Guinea is now substantial, although most would probably agree with Berry that

Class formation is still in an extremely embryonic state. Capitalism is still relatively new on the scene in Papua New Guinea and is yet to fundamentally transform traditional social relations. Therefore while it has undoubtedly provided the means whereby a privileged expatriate and national elite have been able to monopolise the benefits of development, it has not yet developed on a scale to give rise to opposing social forces (1978:102; see also Townsend 1980:3).

Although Keesing has suggested that 'the gulf between [bigmen] and the ordinary men widens so that incipient class systems begin to appear' (1976:354), and others provide occasional indications that class action has gone beyond the formative phase (e.g. Townsend 1980:3; Valentine 1979:97), for some, recognition of class is almost a knee jerk reaction. Thus Barnett speaks of a 'small urban working class' and 'urban classes', the (single?) other class apparently being state employees, and also of a 'rural business class involved in trade, cash-crop production and transport' (1979:771), whilst the members of the House of Assembly 'form the basis of a rural entrepreneurial class' (1979:781). Donaldson and Good however have characterized class formation in terms of large (or rich) peasannies, small rural and urban working classes and most recently the production of a small educated petty bourgeoisie (1978:1). Yet, despite Good's assertions (Amarshi, Good and Mortimer 1979:118-119), there is no evidence of class action outside the towns and little within them.
Good and Fitzpatrick note that 'the formation of the working class in Papua New Guinea is at present at a preliminary and indeed critical stage' (Amarshi, Good and Mortimer 1979:123) because of the lack of a national labour market, the absence of a total dependence on wage labour, the fragmentation of workplaces and communication links and the particular form of foreign investment. Trade unions are of limited significance, and are most evident in the Public Service Association and the Bougainville Mining Workers Union, where workers are relatively privileged and affluent (see also Plowman 1979). If the proletariat is defined in Marxist terms, of both its freedom from traditional or feudal obligations and its 'freedom' from possession of the means of production, then it is clearly unimportant throughout Melanesia; there are few individuals who are either free from traditional obligations or without some 'ownership' of the means of production (especially land).

None of this is to say that peasantry, classes and proletariats are not emerging in Melanesia, or that they can be easily defined and demarcated elsewhere, but an analysis that gives them prominence, relative to ideology, ethnicity (and other elements of the superstructure) is incorrect for contemporary Melanesia. Good himself notes that 'precapitalist tendencies are so strong that class and even party politics are relatively embryonic' (Amarshi, Good and Mortimer 1979:114). It is these 'precapitalist tendencies' that remain the key to understanding changes in the rural areas; moreover tribalism cannot be relegated only to the sphere of ideology (or, even, 'false consciousness') since to do so would be to lose sight of its specific foundation in material activities. Regional differences (including separatist movements), ethnic and linguistic cleavages and the absence of any sense of nationhood among most Melanesians are one dimension of the lack of internal integration. A second dimension is that just as Papua New Guinea is poorly integrated internally, some parts of the country are closely integrated with the metropoli of advanced capitalism. Where classes or proletariats appear to be emerging they tend to be highly localized, and classes do not exist at the national level.

These provisos have not prevented classes from being recognized even in the most improbable situations and the alliances, or hypothesized alliances, between them examined to assess the elite stranglehold over the functions of the state. Thus Gerritsen (personal communication 1980) has suggested that the big peasants, the salariat (the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' or the 'administrative petty bourgeoisie' (Gordon 1979)) and the working class are three parts of a privileged elite and are closely linked. The assumption of linked interests between big peasants and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie is more common (e.g. Amarshi, Good and Mortimer 1979). Nevertheless the bourgeoisie is divided, has no political power and minimal unity; the establishment of provincial governments has tended to further divide this bourgeoisie, through decentralizing power, which has also blunted emerging rural-urban inequalities. Thus links between the classes, that are themselves at best in the process of formation, are tenuous and of limited efficacy in containing power; hence the extreme fragmentation and limited class solidarity of the French peasantry, that led Marx to characterize them as 'a sack of potatoes', is replicated more strongly in Papua New Guinea (especially where peasants are fighting each other); this is reflected in Howlett's comment that Papua New Guinea peasants may prove to be no more than a 'sack of sweet potatoes' (Howlett
1980:208). What Polly Hill (1968) has termed the 'myth of the amorphous peasantry' is not entirely mythical in Melanesia. Opposition to colonization itself was common and has been recorded in numerous places in Papua New Guinea and elsewhere in the Pacific (Connell forthcoming). Yet oppositions of various kinds have not resulted in the crystallization of classes or the consolidation of political movements in wider rural areas.

It is apparent that economic growth has occurred in Papua New Guinea, especially following the establishment of BCL, even to the extent that the notion was current in Port Moresby, at least in 1976, that in the not too distant future Papua New Guinea would be 'one of the richest countries in the world' (Australian 16 September 1976, cited by Sundhaussen 1977:309). This is a form of 'dependent development', under the domination of monopoly capitalists, but it is limited in its extent, especially in its ability to transform production relations. It is fostered by the alliance of the state and foreign capitalists (without the participation of local capitalists, who are conspicuously absent) which, despite the lack of mass participation, may, by its provision of revenue, be in the interests of most of the population. It is in this context that the questions raised by Amarshi, Good and Mortimer, and others, are almost identical to the questions raised by Leys (especially 1975) and others on development elsewhere. Can a commercial capitalism, dependent on state protection and foreign capital, transform itself, or be transformed despite itself, into a dynamic productive capitalism? Can Papua New Guinea continue to finance from primary exports (where production increases have been small), the imports on which society increasingly depends? If not, can the increasing power of the state, and especially of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, be protected in the face of inflation, shortages and a decrease in opportunities, without increasing coercion? (cf. Williams 1978:220). More might be added and, as always, time and further analysis may enable these questions to be answered while simultaneously raising further questions. What is clear is that the historical circumstances of development in Papua New Guinea are quite distinct and, although the questions may be similar, the answers must be different.

CONCLUSION: UNITY OR DIVERSITY?

The emergence of radical perspectives on economic development in Papua New Guinea was, in a sense, crystallized in the publication of Amarshi, Good and Mortimer's Development and Dependency (1979). It is in the responses to this book, rather than in the book itself, however that the divergence of responses to development in Melanesia is best revealed. Thus Gregory, arguing from an essentially neo-Marxist position, finds the book essentially lightweight, without originality and necessitating further theoretical refinement throughout. He even suggests that 'the only original idea in this book is the invention of the term "ultra-periphery"' which does no more than put Papua New Guinea in a class of its own (Gregory 1980:101). Donaldson also notes 'that it provides a fresh beginning and a new direction. For Marxists in Melanesia it will provide a starting point, somewhere to begin' (1980b:30). The authors themselves similarly claim that it is 'an introduction to the political economy of Papua New Guinea' (Amarshi, Good and Mortimer 1979:xiii). By contrast, in so far as more liberal reviewers have reached firm conclusions about the significance of the book it is certainly not as a starting point. Hastings is relatively
enthusiastic: '... it is full of stimulating ideas and observations' and unique as a Marxist analysis (1980:18). Lunn sees it almost entirely in terms of its relationship to Somare's political style to the extent that, although he appears to accept the possibility that their conclusions may be accurate, hope for the future rests in the rise of a prime minister who is opposed to corruption and has Australian support (1980:14). Gunther too sees it in similar vein, to be tested against its explanation of the fall of Somare and the rise of Chan; however he is weary of terms like 'petty bourgeoisie' and 'proletariat', disputes any significant peasantry and claims that the authors are out of touch with the social scene in Papua New Guinea: 'They follow a Marxist line. Socialism as they know it cannot succeed in a country where people can say land was the only thing worth "living, working, fighting for"' (Gunther 1980:61). So for these liberal reviewers the book is idiosyncratic, although much of it 'cannot be contradicted' (ibid.), perhaps irrelevant but, above all, it does not contribute to policy formation and hence is harmless.

For Garnaut criticism is of an altogether different order. This is then 'an important bad book (but) ... it should be taken seriously because of the continuing influence of these ideas in Papua New Guinea and Australian universities' (1980:1). Garnaut sets out to examine the degree of success of Papua New Guinea in achieving its national aims (in opposition to the claim of Amarshi, Good and Mortimer that it has been unsuccessful), establishes part of the case, and consequently argues that even in a small country national policies need not be subservient to the wishes of foreign interests and that a country can win for itself considerable freedom to implement national policies (1980:14). His conclusion is at considerable variance to those of Amarshi, Good and Mortimer:

... the neo-Marxist model offers no alternative to close contact with the international economy for a small, poor developing country: a substantial part of the resources for broad-based development must necessarily come from abroad ... 'dependency theory' ... in Papua New Guinea ... has encouraged students to be cynical about Papua New Guinea politics .... The best Papua New Guinea leaders have been denied some of the political support that they might otherwise have received in their attempts to establish a national economy in difficult conditions (Garnaut 1980:18).

Thus Garnaut seeks a renewed emphasis on, and a practical commitment to, the current directions of Papua New Guinean development policy. Yet in his own discussion of the eight aims he recognizes some of their failures and limitations (1980:5-8) without suggesting possible alternative reformist strategies. Underlying this analysis, and to which Garnaut surprisingly makes only passing reference, is the extent to which Amarshi, Good and Mortimer are providing a critique that offers any opportunity for a redirection of policy that would better incorporate the current national aims or other viable objectives.

Garnaut argues that there is no inevitability that governments in poor countries be either weak or corrupt and that the extent of power which can be exerted by the Papua New Guinea government, where elite ideologies and
values are changing rapidly, must be an open question. The areas in which
the government is powerful are primarily in the areas of 'foreign
relations' that Garnaut emphasizes, notably control over transnational
corporations (especially via renegotiation of the Bougainville Copper
agreement in which Garnaut was an important figure) and even Pacific
diplomacy; but internally, for example in balancing regional policies and
rural development, consistent operation of power is less apparent.
Hinchliffe goes so far as to argue, with reference to conflict between
decentralization and the reduction of interprovincial inequalities, that
'the government appears to have regarded its position as being so weak that
national unity could only be preserved at the price of maintaining
provincial inequalities' (Hinchliffe 1980:838). Indeed there is something
of a consensus about the fragility of the political system, resulting from
the absence of mobilized popular support, and hence the increasing tendency
to rely on expediency and patronage as means of conflict resolution
(Hegarty 1979b). Yet however powerful the government was and is and
however consistent were its development policies it is clear that there can
be no consensus between Garnaut and Gregory; in attitudes to one book on
one small country there is a world of difference.

What is significant, yet unsurprising, about Marxist analyses is their
invariable conclusion that further analysis of yet another nexus of
relations or further precision is necessary. Gregory's paper is typical of
this genre in that he concludes: 'The task now is to understand the
complex interrelationship between commodity and gift, class and clan
and state and church' (1979:405). Why is this necessary? Gregory does no more
than leave the reader to assume that this must be to better understand the
emergence of commodity production in Papua New Guinea. Marx's dictum of
changing the world, as much as understanding it, is not in evidence.
Moreover the differences between most forms of academic inquiry and
practical politics can be even more revealing. Good notes the existence of
an 'Uncle Tom Cobbley collection of resident but transient expatriates [but had] an increasingly
explicit pro-capitalist outlook' (1979:346). By contrast a Financial
Review correspondent in Port Moresby at the same time recorded a rather
different view: 'The country is run by long-haired expatriate pseudo-
academic public servants who under the guise of humanitarianism are
experimenting with their own particular brand of development to the
detriment of the PNG populace, who just want a good measure of capitalism
and materialism' (Ryan 1978:15). Similarly, and most recently, the
minister for foreign affairs, Noel Levi, has strongly opposed what he
called the 'selfish experiments' by expatriate 'experts' in the country who
were 'testing their theories for developing countries' at Third World
expense before moving on (MacKillop 1980:34). Whatever else is achieved by
the neo-Marxist paradigm, exemplified in Papua New Guinea by Development
and Dependency, it is not a contribution to the refinement of development
practice. Attempts by small countries like those of Melanesia to devise a
strategy of development separate and distinct from the evolutionary
strategies of the west, whether these were based on liberal or 'Marxist'
philosophies, have had little chance of success because of the limited
development of the forces of production, the high dependence on
metropolitan centres and their distinctive socio-economic and cultural
heritage. Obviously 'catching-up' is impossible; hence the only result
that can be achieved is an imitation of the superficial (and negative) in
western culture and an economy that must increasingly be one of 'negotiated
dependency'; moreover the choice between rapid capital accumulation with associated inequalities and relative social justice was one that was not experienced in the west in the form and to the extent that it is now expressed in the Third World.

Any effective solution to problems of development in Melanesia cannot be sought in the existing structures of western countries, but must place a high priority on the political and economic autonomy of the majority of Melanesians and be related to an analysis of the specific forms of underdevelopment occurring within Melanesia.

Yet the few conclusions that suggest viable strategies other than more extensive capitalism or all-embracing socialism suffer from retreats into idealism (cf. Mouzelis 1978:153-154). Thus Pettman (1977:278) comments on the Solomon Islands:

> Perhaps between skewed development at the hands of transnational forces beyond its capacity to contain, and a revolution with all that entails (unlikely), is a self-reliant control strategy that can avoid the worst problems and all the visible deficiencies that emerge from the development process today. There are precedents but they cannot be uncritically applied.

Whatever these elusive precedents may entail for a Solomon Islands' strategy at least his next and final sentence is realistic: 'And anyway there is probably no such thing as development without pain' (ibid.). As Berry notes: 'the problems faced by contemporary Papua New Guinea cannot be resolved in the context of traditional social relations of production' since an 'increasing proportion of economic activity is based on large scale enterprises using advanced technology' so that appeals to a supposedly traditional 'Melanesian way' produce merely confusion: 'half of the people who use the term believe traditional Melanesian society to be capitalist, while the other half believe it to be socialist. In fact it was neither' (1977:159). The failure of any political leaders to develop a coherent political ideology or even a significant commitment to nationalism (cf. Sundhaussen 1977) has produced 'a confused nationalism with many conflicting strands' (Barnett 1979:781), a situation in which any firm control on the direction of the economy or polity is impossible.

In terms of practical politics, debates will continue around the necessity for a greater self-reliance ('progressing with the past' or 'transformation through tradition'), stressing different elements of economic and cultural nationalism, balanced against and competing with a better form of dependency (through better commodity prices, more stringent control over TNCs and so on). But the probability of a socialist transformation or cultural revivalism (as in Iran) appear most unlikely to transfer the ideology of development into a different arena. In this context dependency theory and its successors are likely to remain a form of academic titillation rather than a contribution to the debate over development. Perhaps what is even more obvious is that despite the increasing interest in Marxist analyses of peripheral capitalism the internecine disputes, even (or perhaps especially) over extremely detailed and restricted issues that are often esoteric and obscurantist to others, suggest that for the foreseeable future there can be no Marxist consensus.
on theory let alone practice. The paradox is that the ever-increasing refinement of intellectual tools, which is partly demonstrated in the writings of the French Marxist anthropological school, is likely to produce analyses that are more likely to satisfy the searching demands of those who criticize the neo-dependency school for inaccuracy, as opposed to its sweeping generalizations, but at the same time is certain to withdraw even further, especially in Melanesia, from practical problems. The gap between 'high theory' and empirical studies of development will continue to increase so that although, in a general sense, Amarshi, Good and Mortimer have provided a new critique which will be disputed, disowned and disproved, in whole or in part, its generalizations can only result in factions in both theory and practice.

At a time when paradigms are in ferment, Marxist theory has many analysts (and hence interpretations, especially in less developed countries); those who have related theory to concrete situations of dependency, such as that of Melanesia, are far fewer. Here too the emergence of paradigms in development studies seems to have followed a situation in which intellectual breakthroughs have generated new, or resuscitated old, paradigms so that after a very short period of time these new paradigms are criticized for an inadequate command of or respect for the facts in the primary context to which they have been applied and/or for their inadequacy for reapplication elsewhere (hence the criticisms of the mechanistic, reductionistic nature of such paradigms). That generalizations are therefore impossible and that a particular form of practice cannot be generally acceptable are equally inescapable. Where development strategies and choices rest not only upon technical considerations but upon moral judgements and where any strategy leads towards an empirically uncertain future, conclusive comments on the applicability of particular paradigms in a Melanesian context are quite impossible.

NOTES

1 This is a revised and much shortened version of the paper presented to the Melanesian Seminar in December 1980. The original paper has been rewritten and published separately (Connell forthcoming). I am indebted to Richard Curtain, Ron May and others for comments on the early version. Almost all debate over dependency and related themes in Melanesia has been concentrated in Papua New Guinea, principally because of the large number of academics who have worked there in the past decade. Studies made in other parts of the Pacific are examined in Connell (forthcoming).

In similar vein Jonas has commented (1979:130) that the existing structure of the timber industry (where Japanese ownership and investment is considerable) was facilitated and encouraged by the colonial government and the World Bank (IBRD) so that since its introduction the industry has been 'operated and controlled by a foreign bourgeoisie' before and after independence.
For example, amongst the Abelam Gorlin (1977) found that ownership of wealth was correlated with body size. The poor are poorly fed and therefore more likely to get tinea; the disease rate is highest amongst women in peak child-bearing years when nutritional stresses are highest. Largest clans have low rates of tinea as do families of large pig owners. Males with tinea find it harder to get wives, partly due to discrimination against such men for plantation work by Europeans. Plantation workers have wealth and can get wives more easily and their wives are unlikely to have tinea, so that it is not reproduced in their children. There are, therefore, massive links between infectious disease and social differentiation or class formation that have been accentuated by contact. The same kinds of conclusions have also been observed by Lindenbaum (1979:136).

A number of scholars has noted that in many parts of the Pacific (cf. Hamnett 1979; Connell 1980) communities have achieved a degree of dependence from which they do not wish to retreat, nor indeed is this always possible without a loss of security. For these places at least an independent future, however negotiated, has minimal meaning or value. The consciousness dimension is reflected in the plea of Bernard Narokobi, former director of the Office of Village Development in Papua New Guinea, 'to decolonise our minds' (Narokobi 1977:6). Narokobi's own subsequent disillusion with the probability of achieving this reflects the problems involved.

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OUTLINE

From the late 1960s radical groups among the Melanesians of New Caledonia began to campaign for independence. By the mid 1970s three Melanesian political parties championing independence held seats in the Territorial Assembly and in 1977 the multi-racial Union Calédonienne also opted for independence. The French government has recently sought to meet the situation with a wide ranging programme of economic and social development. Central to the programme is a renewed réforme foncière aimed at returning substantial areas of land on the main island - the Grande Terre - to Melanesian ownership and control. There is considerable agreement that this is urgently necessary. But there is considerable disagreement about the extent and location of the land to be affected, the terms on which it will be acquired and the manner in which it should be reallocated among Melanesians. These matters underlie current New Caledonian politics and strongly affect the independence issue.

COLONIAL ORIGINS

Several authors (notably Douglas 1972; Saussol 1971, 1979; and Roux 1974, 1977) have documented the impact of colonization on Melanesian land and society. As in Australia the resistance of the indigenous people of the Grande Terre was overcome by force of arms and they were pushed onto reserves - in the policy of cantonnement - to make way for settlement and the Territory's reserve of domaine land. The Loyalty Islands were, however, made a réserve intégrale, as was the Isle of Pines in 1913 after the end of convict settlement there. The Grande Terre reserves - less than one tenth of the island and much of it poor - were vested in artificial collectivities called tribus (tribes), usually comprising several adjoining clans bundled together on the traditional territory of one or other of them. The tensions among the clans added to the demoralization due to loss of land and independence, and the balance of individual and family rights under the old clan structure was destroyed. The reserves were not held in true proprietorship but were octrois (donations) of the state, the boundaries of which could be modified - and were, as the Melanesian population declined. The tribus were controlled by officially appointed chefs working under the supervision of the gendarmes. Traditional maîtres de la terre retained at best a precarious authority. The tensions and demoralization on the reserve were reflected in alcoholism, violence and sorcery. This degradation, as among the indigenous victims of colonization elsewhere, underlies the strength of political reassertion today.
Although there was little chance of economic development on the reserves, in the 1930s particularly coffee planting rapidly expanded and provided cash income. However this took much of the scarce valley land previously directed to subsistence agriculture and increased the tensions between 'host' and 'stranger' clans on the reserves.

Before the Pacific War the Melanesians were subject to the indigénat, a code of summary regulations enforced by the gendarmes which forbade free movement from the reserves, imposed compulsory labour on roads and public works, and (through a personal tax) obliged Melanesians to work as exploited labour for settlers. Among themselves Melanesians regulated life by a form of custom administered by the chefs, under legal provisions authorized by the French Constitution and referred to as the statut particulier, upholding droit coutumier as opposed to the droit commun or French 'common law'.

POST WORLD WAR II DEVELOPMENTS

Occupation by Allied forces in the Pacific War caused the effective collapse of the indigénat and in 1946 it was formally abolished. The Melanesians acceded to civil liberties and the rights of free labour. From 1951 they were effectively enfranchised. Because the Christian missions had brought some genuine amelioration of conditions on the reserves, some education and some defence of the reserves against further encroachment, it is perhaps not surprising that the first organizations mobilizing Melanesians politically were mission-based - the Union des Indigènes Calédoniens Amis de la Liberté dans l'Ordre (UICALO - a Catholic organization) and the Association des Indigènes Calédoniens et Loyalistes Français (AICL - Protestant). The multi-racial Union Calédonienne formed in 1951 around the deputy Maurice Lenormand drew heavily upon these groups and captured most Melanesian support in the elections to the Territory's Governing Council (soon to be succeeded by the Territorial Assembly and the Council of Government).

The defence of the reserves and their enlargement immediately became a key policy of these organizations. This was partly a response to rapid demographic growth and urgent economic need. But it also related to a demand for the recovery of traditional clan territory, the return of uprooted clans to their ancient village sites and the easing of tension between clans on the reserves. What are often referred to as the 'economic' claim and the 'psychological' claim were mixed from the beginning of the resurgent Melanesian demand.

There followed what Saussol calls the era of the agrandissement des reserves, as they were enlarged by transfers of domaine land, repurchased private estates and land sequestrated from Japanese nationals during the war. Saussol (1979:377) gives the following figures for the total area of Grande Terre reserves:
Thereafter the aggrandisement of reserves slowed. In 1979 they still totalled only 162,536 ha. Although it relieved the pressure on some reserves, at no time did the process keep pace with the Melanesian demographic explosion; indeed Saussol calculates that the overall figure of hectares per head of population on Grande Terre reserves fell from 7.61 in 1912 to 4.8 in 1969. (The Loyalty Islands and Isle of Pines total a further 209,372 ha.)

But the aggrandisement of reserves was not the only mode of returning land to Melanesians. It had revealed many weaknesses as a method. The aggrandisements had been given to the *tribu* as a collectivity - the only Melanesian group recognized by the Territory law - and the internal subdivision of the land was frequently a matter of contention and dissatisfaction among the member clans. The contradiction between the claims of the traditional owners of the land concerned and those who had by now lived on the reserves for several generations was heightened. Sometimes the land lay idle. The maldistribution between clans in some cases intensified.

Moreover many Melanesians hoped for better economic opportunities outside the reserves. In the 1950s and more especially with the nickel and industrial boom of 1969-74 they sought salaried employment in towns and in the mines. Remitted salaries rapidly overwhelmed agriculture as a source of money on reserves.

In the 1950s entrepreneurial Melanesians themselves began to acquire land on lease or share-cropping arrangements from settlers, or occasionally even by purchase. Responding to the demand, and hoping now to assimilate Melanesians better into the introduced economic/social/legal system, the administration developed two means of transferring land to Melanesians in individual title outside the reserves and under the *droit commun*. These were *locations domaniales* and *concessions domaniales*. The *locations* were leases with a promise of sale after a certain term of years and improvement of the land. They were favoured by the Melanesians both as a mode of acquiring individual titles and as effectively adding to reserves, on the margins of which they were often granted. Saussol calculates that 196 *locations* totalling 18,861 ha were granted in the period 1958-63, greatly exceeding formal aggrandisements of reserves in importance during that time.

The second method, *concessions domaniales*, were grants of domaine land available first to returned soldiers (of any race) then to *enfants du pays* (persons born in New Caledonia). Free grants (*concessions gratuites*) were normally 25 ha each but could be added to a *location* or to a *concession* involving progressive payments (*titre onéreux*). The *concessions gratuites* were given in provisional title for five years. These were made definite when improvement conditions were met. Widely granted to European
applicants, they were made available to Melanesians increasingly in the 1960s and eventually overtook locations in importance as a means by which Melanesians acquired land. They were often, but by no means always, on the margins of reserves. The system of concessions was suspended in 1974, partly because Europeans were acquiring them for hunting and recreation purposes around the margins of Melanesian reserves in the mountain chain, and partly to allow the Service du Domaine (Lands Department) to catch up with the survey and paperwork generated by a backlog of applications. (Roux, verbal communications 1979-80.)

During the industrial boom also, Melanesians began to acquire lots de village - urban concessions in new Noumea suburbs and other townships.

Other modes of land transfer analyzed by Saussol reflect an interest by French administrators in trying to adapt customary Melanesian social organization to modern land development. These included an early (1958) experiment with a cooperative at Nassirah which failed, as cooperatives have failed elsewhere in the Pacific, because of rather naive European assumptions about the collective nature of Melanesian society and economics. But later experiences with 'sociétés civiles agricoles' (agricultural cooperatives) were organized around existing Melanesian entrepreneurs and regulated within a framework governing such societies generally. These have been much more successful and have received loan finance from new state credit organizations designed to foster rural development.

Internal subdivisions of reserves, by which the appointed and customary authorities formally recognize 'a permanent right of possession and enjoyment' (though not of alienation) in a particular parcel of land by an individual or family, may also be registered by the Service du Domaine and form the basis of personal loans. This practice has been used on some reserves to foster individual enterprises (Saussol 1979:423-431).

Another significant experiment in the Tchamba valley involved the subdivision of a former Japanese proprietorship into thirty-two lots and their allocation under droit commun after public discussion involving the clans of the adjacent reserve (whose land it formally was) in the ratio of seventeen lots to the traditional claimants and others linked to them, to fifteen to Europeans and Melanesians having no relationship with or consent from the locals. The evidence of improvement of the land by the traditional claimants and failure to improve (or even reside on) the land among the stranger Melanesians is considered by some French analysts (notably Guiart 1961, 1974) to show that without the consent of the customary authorities Melanesian landholders are not well motivated to improve their holdings, whatever rights the droit commun gives them. Saussol surmises that where they hold under both the droit commun and the approval of traditional authorities the former rights will in time supplant the latter in importance (Saussol 1971:120-121).

Whether this is so is a moot point, because there is a tendency for individual holdings on the margins of reserves to be drawn into the property rights system of the clans. This is partly a function of the customary law of succession, which, depending on origin and circumstance, may favour the older brother or nephew of a property holder rather than his
children or his widow. Since only a few hundred Melanesians have opted for the statut commun their inheritance rights are governed legally by the statut particulier. Pressure for a customary devolution of land has been therefore in effect supported by the law, even though the incidents of title may be those of the droit commun.

It is clear then that the French authorities have, of recent decades at least, made some effort to return land to Melanesians and have evolved several forms of title, of transfer, of rural credit and of adapting customary organization to modern exigencies. In some ways they have been more adventurous than their counterparts in adjacent anglophone states - if only because they have at their disposal the category of domaine land, ruthlessly acquired by their predecessors.

But precisely because it raises fundamental questions of the form of society to evolve in New Caledonia, and of who should control that society, the land reform question has evoked more and more controversy.

LAND AND POLITICS

Very early on, in the 1950s, sections of the Union Calédonienne (UC) began to consider the piecemeal aggrandisement of reserves to be altogether too limited, and to contemplate a much more thoroughgoing transfer of land based on new powers of preemption and expropriation (of unused or underused settler land) to be taken by the Territory. The grands colons were already anxious about the threat to their primacy apparent in the success of the Melanesian backed UC, and by the adoption in New Caledonia of the loi-cadre developed by a Socialist government in Paris mainly for the African territories. Under the loi-cadre ministers selected from the UC-dominated Governing Council were appointed to direct the various departments of government, and further constitutional evolution - at least to full internal self-government - was foreshadowed. Now came the threat of land redistribution based on expropriation. The settler reaction was formidable. In 1958, encouraged by De Gaulle's accession to power in Paris, armed settlers from the west coast descended on Noumea and menaced Lenormand and some of his colleagues. Following the civil unrest which ensued the authorities abrogated much of the loi-cadre, reaffirming the authority of the high commissioner and appointed officials. In 1963, having been implicated in further disturbances, Lenormand was deprived of civil rights for ten years. The UC remained influential, with the Melanesian elder Roch Pidjot taking over much of the leadership responsibility, but Lenormand subsequently charged the conservative parties with pursuing land reacquisition in only lukewarm fashion. The shift of political power also largely explains why, for some years, aggrandisement of reserves (which the conservative parties regarded as wasteful and perpetuating Melanesian backwardness) was largely replaced by locations and concessions under the droit commun as the modes by which Melanesians acquired land.

The political spectrum changed sharply again in the late 1960s with the emergence of an explicit Melanesian nationalism, led by the educated younger generation which was beginning to emerge from the lycées and even tertiary institutions in France. The humiliation and exploitation of the indigénat, the day to day reminders of European paternalism and racism,
have given rise to a legacy of bitterness, reflected in the attitudes and demands of radical groups like the Foulards Rouges, Groupe '78 and Jeunesse Calédonienne. Their demands included the wholesale return of ancestral land, a demand which, as Saussol wrote in 1971 had "more and more the appearance of a "battle-horse" crystallizing all the resentments of Melanesians and, by consequence, the reaction of the settlers. Under this heading one can affirm that now the question of land is the major, if not the only problem in the rural bushlands of New Caledonia". He urged that it must be defused before a confrontation on the land became unavoidable (Saussol 1971:112).

In the early 1970s, though rapidly increasing, Melanesian demands for the return of lands were still limited to fairly specific areas - points of land where there were ancient cemeteries, old gardens or fishing sites. But these tended to be concentrated in the lower river valleys where some of the grands colons were still living and farming, even though their sons and daughters had often joined the movement to the towns (Guiart 1977). Unfortunately (as it now appears) with conservative parties in office in Paris and predominant in Noumea bold measures were not taken systematically to buy large areas of the land from settlers and transfer the land to Melanesians ahead of demand. The administration tended to condemn the demand as neither 'economic' nor 'psychological' but 'political', stimulated largely by the UC bidding for the Melanesian vote. For the most part the administration went ahead with the granting of concessions and locations to individuals.

In the mid 1970s a more systematic land reform was constantly talked of in the various Commissions of the Territorial Assembly. In 1976 the Assembly voted in favour of a 'plan de relance rurale', but plans for revitalizing the rural economy immediately came up against the question of land tenure and land redistribution. To confront this problem the high commissioner set up a commission to study Melanesian land problems. This group, dominated by business-minded Europeans and entrepreneurial Melanesians, proved unsympathetic to adding more land to reserves and leaned towards support for the Melanesian seeking to farm under French legal titles. Misconceptions of the report indeed led to the charge that the administration intended to suppress the reserves - a highly emotive charge, evoking the spectre of a further assault on Melanesian culture.

Meanwhile general political developments had produced a number of Melanesian political parties, which emerged from the young Melanesian movements of the late 1960s. Led in 1974 by the Front Uni pour la Libération des Kanaues (FULK), the party of Yann Celène Uregei, these parties embraced the goal of independence, and more especially an 'Indépendance Kanak' recognizing the Melanesian people as the legitimate people of New Caledonia. In these circumstances the questions of land tenure inevitably became of even greater importance politically. In early 1977, moreover, the UC led by Maurice Lenormand (again active in politics), also agreed to support the goal of Indépendance Kanak.

Perhaps in response to the pressure, the administration stepped up the granting of concessions to Melanesians, of loans from new funds to the holders of individual titleholders and to sociétés, and the repurchase of private estates. (In 1977 31 million francs CFP - about $310,000 - was available for the last purpose.)
The whole issue was raised in May 1977 by the Union Progressist Mélanésienne (UPM), a moderate Melanesian group in the Territorial Assembly led by André Gopea. This party tabled a lengthy proposal for a 'réforme agraire', a systematic rather than a sporadic redistribution of both private and domaine lands that were uncultivated, abandoned or 'insufficiently exploited'. These were to be attributed either as aggrandisement of the reserves or to individuals (especially but not exclusively Melanesians) for exploitation under new and more productive systems of agriculture. A new 'Commission territoriale de réorganisation foncière', which included the customary authorities from reserves adjacent to the land from time to time under consideration, was to supervise the process. Proprietors were to be given reasonable notice but if land was not then improved it was to be expropriated by the state under a 'right of preemption'. Compensation was to be paid by the Territory, which would have the power to determine the price of the land. All existing leases were to be reviewed by the new Commission (Procès-verbaux 25 May 1977:29ff).

The UPM motion embraced both the so-called 'economic' and 'psychological' (or 'customary') claims and was flexible as regards reallocation of the land. However, immediately, and with Gopea's foreknowledge, Lenormand, for the UC, proposed a motion which focused on the 'customary' claim:

Considerating the people despoiled of their ancestral lands and welcomed by other tribes following the cantonnement, the Assembly demands that in the repurchase of lands priority be given to the urgent problems of returning Melanesian families to their ancestral land with respect for the status of reserves and the right to free choice of individuals and invites the Governing Council to deposit a text instituting the necessary organisations and structures (Procès-verbal 25 May 1977:32).

Lenormand said that for twenty years the UC had been asking for the Territory the powers of preemption already possessed by the departments of France. Both motions were referred to the Commission for Agriculture to study.

Soon afterwards a number of cases arose which indicated the serious obstacles to the effective transfer of land under the existing legal framework. A classic case concerned the property of the settler Mazurier in the Houailou valley. There the tribe Nessakouya contested the boundary; their existing settlement, moreover, was flooded annually. Twenty years before, in 1958, a local leader had asked for the return of ancestral land for the group but nothing had been done and in 1977 the group was again asking for the restoration of about 50 ha of their traditional land. Mazurier at first would not sell more than 11 ha for a price of CFP 7 million but eventually the administration got an offer of 38 ha for CFP 5 million. Even this was a price much above the average for rural land—perhaps five times as much—but the area was a tense one, Melanesians having encroached on Mazurier's land and Mazurier allegedly having fired shots at them. With some reluctance, and fear of increasing the already high asking prices, the Assembly approved the expenditure at the price demanded; a sharp difference of opinion then broke out as to
whether the land should be allocated as aggrandisement of the reserve (the view of Lenormand and the UC) or as individual lots (the view of Roger Laroque and the rightwing Réassemblément pour Calédonie dans la République (RCPR)). The Melanesian elder M. Parawi-Beybas (RCPR) was very critical of the control of reserved lands by certain powerful individuals in the tribal community, and the consequent frustration of young Melanesians. In the end the Assembly agreed that the attribution would be left for discussion and decision by the services and the tribu (Procès-verbal 7 December 1977: 14-24).

Meanwhile other 'hot points' had remained unresolved because of the high demands by settlers, and in some areas, especially on the east coast, young Melanesians, generally organizing themselves under the new political group PALIKA (Parti de Libération Kanak), led by Nidoish Naisseline, began to encroach on the land and menace settlers in a deliberate campaign borne of what they considered to be years of inaction and frustration as regards the key areas of valley land. Old arrangements between colons and Melanesian elders began to break down in a climate of tension, covert violence and virulent hatred. (See, for example, 'La Vallée D'Amoa', France Australe 10 June 1977.)

In this context, in June 1978, the report of the Commission examining the UPM and UC motions, Report No.81, was tabled in the Territorial Assembly. Given the nature of the Melanesian demand and the tension on the land itself, the report was not only conservative but provocative. The preface adumbrated two principles: first, the need to proceed with 'great prudence' because of the sensitivity of the question to Caledonians of all races - meaning especially in this case the Europeans; secondly, the need to give financial aid to the scheme with a view to the improvement of the land for commercial agriculture. Three types of operation were proposed:

1. urgent redistribution and improvement of land to the benefit of tribes where the land was contested among them and with settlers (the relief of so-called 'hot points' near reserves);

2. the setting-up of a small peasantry (familiale);

3. the establishment of modern forms of commercial agriculture.

With reference to all of these, including the first, the report spoke of the aspirations of young people, notably young Melanesians, to move outside the reserves and set up modern small farms. The report leaned strongly in favour of that aspiration and looked to the improvement of unexploited land within the reserves as well as outside them and by the 'stranger' clans located there during the cantonnement as well as by ancestral claimants. The report proposed the allocation of Territory funds in the order of CFP 43 million for the repurchase of land which would be redistributed with improvement conditions and some payments (titres onéréux, not titres gratuites which were to be suppressed) (Procès-verbal 21 June 1978:1ff).

In essence the policy was a revitalization of the existing programme of granting locations and concessions of domaine land favouring not the recognition of customary 'clanique' claims, but the creation of Melanesian small farmers. In urging the development of new peasant communities
adjacent to reserves and near existing villages within reserves the report indeed implied an attack on the structure of the reserves themselves.

Yet Report 81 embraced the recommendations of a special commissioner from Paris, M. Garrigou, and at last proposed that the state (the French government and legislature) be requested to grant the Territory new powers, adapted from the French Code Rural, of a right of preemption and a right of expropriation of unexploited and underexploited land. Local measures were to include a tax on unexploited land. To consolidate the position of individual Melanesian peasants and householders against the claims of traditional kin, a new succession law was proposed to permit Melanesians, still personally under the statut particulier but acquiring farms or urban lots outside the reserves and under the droit commun, to follow the French rules of succession rather than customary succession.

Minutes of the debate in the Agriculture Commission show that the report was unlikely to satisfy the real protagonists, the Melanesian political leaders and the settlers. Settler members like M. De Villelongue of the Hienghène valley had wanted no special regard for the 'political' aspect and no special favour for any race (that is, Melanesians) in land allocation. M. Tjibaou (Union Calédonienne), on the other hand, said that the political aspect of the problem was inescapable and that first and foremost the Melanesians wanted space in which to practice their customary lifestyle. At the heart of Melanesian society the presence of 'stranger' clans was an obstacle to effective functioning of the society. He looked to a much larger plan of land redistribution than appeared to be envisaged in the report. The issue of credit was also debated, Tjibaou objecting that while it was readily available for developments outside reserves it was not readily granted for developments within them.

In the Assembly itself the report was immediately denounced by UC, PALIKA and FULK speakers as the charter of a new colonization - a colonisation noire on the land of others, denying the Melanesians the right to make a repartition of the land in terms of their own custom and forcing them, by the improvement conditions, the conditions on credit, the emphasis on titles under common law, and the proposed succession law, into Europeanization. M. Machoro (UC) recited the historical spoliation of Melanesian land and demanded that it must be returned, at the state's expense, to the original clans without intermediary. Priority should be given to the restitution of traditional land to those clans living on reserves as 'strangers'. Europeans should not interfere in the determination of this purely Melanesian matter. M. Burck (UC) feared the creation of smallholdings, as in the time of Governor Feillet, which would again fall and fall into the hands of big accumulators. M. Lenormand also doubted the worth of creating small holdings (very marginal for European farmers) and stressed the value of traditional agriculture as a means of assuring an ample subsistence and genuine independence and dignity which was not available to peasants on the margins of the capitalist economy. (This indicated how far the UC had shifted from its earliest statements which had spoken of a possible subdivision of reserves into individual and family holdings) (Saussol 1979:371).

PALIKA speaker M. Gohoup criticized the administration for its 'collaboration with the local haute bourgeoisie and certain local political parties, notably the intervention of the colonial forces of order in the
face of actions to recover lands stolen from certain tribes'. He instanced Balade, Touho, Poindimié, Poneirihouen and Thio. He recalled the PALIKA policy of 'the total and unconditional recovery of the lands', in accord with ideas of the (1975) festival 'Melanesia 2000' and the demands of the Foulards Rouges of 1969 for the recognition of the Kanak identity.

Pro-administration speakers denounced the UC and PALIKA for denying young Melanesians, in the name of custom, access to property, responsibility, wealth and a place in modern culture. They replied that a basis of customary ownership did not preclude entry (from a secure base) into the market economy (but did not go into detail about how the adaptation would be made).

At the conclusion of a three and a half hour debate the UC declined to vote on the report until the Assembly had recognized the Kanaks' 'right to live in their own homes, on their lands, following their mode of life, taking into consideration the history that they have lived and in conformity with the statut particulier recognized by the Constitution, following the principle of the right to be different'. They tabled a motion of urgency on the point. Right and centre speakers denied that the principle was in question - the reserves would continue to be respected.

Only the first motion of the report - concerning urgent operation for the benefit of tribes on contested lands - was accepted, the UC and Melanesian parties having quit the chamber. Next day the Assembly did allow the UC to put a motion stating, inter alia, that

considering the programme of operations envisaged in report number 81 is entirely oriented towards the attribution of individual lots and considering that the maintenance of the reserves and their aggrandisement are the sole means of assuring the safety of the Melanesian culture and the adaption of Melanesian society to a modern rural economy [the Assembly should demand a reform] to the benefit of the Melanesian collectivities which permits the aggrandisement of reserves and guarantees to the Kanaks the free choice of status of property (Procès-verbal 22 June 1978:2).

A further two hours of debate disclosed the same polarization. Speakers like Jean-Pierre Aifa, a former UC member and now chairman of the Agriculture Commission of the Assembly, angrily denounced the motion as denying individual property to Melanesians - already well advanced with urban blockholders in the Noumea suburbs of Montravel, Logicoop and Rivière Salée, and supported by the local tribal authorities in recent rural repurchases such as that of the Mazurier estate. The UC and PALIKA speakers argued that they merely wished to correct the bias of Report 81 and to hold out the prospect of some form of development other than the western capitalist one. The UC motion, however, was lost by seventeen votes to thirteen, right and centre parties voting against the independence parties.

The unfortunate result of Report 81 and the extended debate on it was to polarize and politicize views on the land question even more strongly than before, just at a time when economic circumstances and considerable
irritation in the administration with the colons' high asking prices might have enabled some agreement to be reached, at least on the judicial means of recovering the land. By coming out so strongly on the question of the modes in which the land should be redistributed Report 81 excited a contrary reaction from the main Melanesian parties at a critical time.

Meanwhile the nationalists were also bringing pressure to bear on the land itself regarding the form of redistribution. The agreement the administration believed it had reached with the hierarchy of appointed chiefs and Conseil des Anciens regarding the Mazurier property soon broke down, the supporters of the 'customary' claim blocking those Melanesians who were with the administration in thinking that the land should be available for Melanesians from all adjacent clans who had a need, especially the young men. In 1980, three years after the acquisition, the land remains effectively an extension of the reserve with a few scattered cultivations.

The same is true for other 'hot points' in the Amoa, Tiwaka, and Néoua valleys, with the added complication that old traditional rivalries between 'customary' claimants have been revived. The surveyors have been able to complete little work on the east coast. In the Territorial Assembly right and centre speakers have in consequence become reluctant to vote funds to buy land at speculative prices, only to produce contention on the ground.

It was this bunch of nettles that the new secretary of state for overseas territories, Paul Dijoud, tried to grasp in the second half of 1978. His statements in Noumea, that the land reform would be treated as a matter of first priority and the recommendation that the Territory should indeed assume the powers of preemption and expropriation, caused great concern among some sections of settlers. So too did M. Dijoud's tour of reserves later that year, when he invited the chefs to tell him frankly what lands they wanted in addition, and to lodge claims with the administration. However, the official policy was clarified in a press conference by the then high commissioner, M. Eriaou, on 31 October 1978 (France Australe 31 October 1978). M. Eriaou recited the principal statistics of landholding at that point: 950,000 ha of domaine land (mostly mountainous); 372,000 ha of réserve autochtone, 163,000 ha of it on the Grande Terre (24,000 Melanesians live on this area); 380,000 ha of propriétés privées, all on the Grande Terre. He could have referred, also, to about 100,000 ha of locations and 40,000 ha of concessions provisoires also granted to settlers from domaine land, plus 110,000 ha of mining concessions. This (with the 380,000 ha of propriétés privées) makes a total of 630,000 ha held by non Melanesian settlers and miners. Only about nine hundred settlers and their families are actually living on farms, with a further two thousand (approximately) in ancillary and service occupations in rural areas outside the townships. Eriaou added that in his term as high commissioner, 5,500 ha had been added to the reserves (800 ha of it having come from former private properties, the rest from domaine land); another 5,630 ha had passed to Melanesians outside the reserves as locations or concessions. He noted that Melanesians had registered demands with the Chefs de Subdivision (the Territory equivalent of sub-prefects) for a further 120,000 ha. Eriaou then subdivided the land claims into those 'which have a political motive in the sense that New Caledonia ought to return to the Melanesians because it was their ancestral territory'.
'Such', he said, 'is the point of view of certain extremists'. In view of the presence of the 40 per cent of Europeans and 20 per cent of other minorities in the Territory - the Wallis Island, Tahitian, Indonesian and Vietnamese migrants and their locally born descendants - this claim was not realistic and could not be satisfied. Next came the claims 'claniques'. Some were reasonable; he understood well that Melanesians would want back the village sites from which they had been dispossessed between 1878 and 1917. The third category of claims were 'economic', where the tribus were closely confined; it was essential to satisfy these.

Referring to the Melanesian claim to the large uncultivated estates of Europeans he said the belief that the acquisition of space as the way to a better lifestyle was illusory. What was much more important was to improve the land. Nor would the matter be resolved quickly. It would take five or ten years and require close collaboration between the state and territory, especially for finance. There was no reason for the Europeans to panic. He congratulated the minister for approaching the matter frankly. Indeed Dijoud was the first minister to do so.

In February 1979 Dijoud's long term plan for economic and social development in New Caledonia was published and adopted (against the opposition of the independence parties) by the Territorial Assembly (Plan de développement). The chapter on land reform stressed the urgent necessity of returning much more land to the Melanesians and introducing the powers of preemption and expropriation for the purpose. But it also spoke of safeguarding the rights of settlers who live in the bush to continue to live there in security. It also referred to economic development and population growth. Dijoud, in debate, spoke of proving independence to be but a vain dream (Procès-verbal 21 February 1979:14-15). The basic line of the plan Dijoud is clear: New Caledonia will remain a French Territory and a multi racial society, open to possible further settlement. Indépendance Kanak and the Indépendantiste's "political" demand for virtually all the land to be returned to the original clans is rejected. The Dijoud strategy received a form of endorsement in the July 1979 elections for the Territorial Assembly, which returned a 65 per cent majority in favour of a continuance of the relationship with France; of those voting (there was a 73 per cent turnout of voters) a majority of Melanesians voted for independence. The right wing Rassemblement pour Calédonie dans la République (RPCR) and the centrist Fédération pour une Nouvelle Société Calédonienne (FNSC) formed the 'Governing Majority'. The various Melanesian parties and the UC, which had come together before the elections to form the Front Indépendantiste (FI), are in opposition.

Within the framework thus established Dijoud's intervention has nevertheless produced a number of shifts of policy on the land question. The Commission D'Études des Problèmes Fonciers set up in late 1978, though justifiably somewhat sceptical of the attempt to establish a finite picture of traditional clan distribution, is attempting to reestablish their location as at the beginning of colonization, using the researchers of ORSTOM (Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique Outre-Mer) to systematically determine, from aerial photographs and old maps, the traditional distribution of taro and yam cultivations and village sites throughout the Grande Terre.
There has also been more flexibility on the modes by which land has been redistributed. In September 1979 the Territorial Assembly approved purchase of thirteen parcels of land totalling 1,250 ha, mainly acquired from the Catholic Church, for a total price of CFP 25.5 million (about $A283,000) (Procès-verbal 11 September 1979). Of these only three were specifically stated to be for subdivision into individual lots; two were for tribal groups organized as agricultural societies; seven were for various clan or family groups who in some cases already occupied them, outside the reserves; one was expressly for aggrandisement of a reserve and destined for subsistence agriculture. All were paid for by a grant from FIDES, a fund which had hitherto been used strictly for lands being commercially improved. The hardline demands of the RPCR and Report 81 that the land be returned only in individual titles under the droit commun have thus been modified.

Mid 1979 also saw the organization, under M. Frank Wahuzue, of the Commission for the Promotion Mélanésienne, part of the larger long term reform programme developed by M. Dijoud. The land section of the Promotion supported both a systematic location of old clan territories and a survey of the claims with a view to determining greatest need. It was noted that considerable difficulty might be expected in locating the true 'maîtres de la terre' of any lands, given the confusions of the last hundred years. The Commission debated at length the issue of whether land should be attributed as aggrandisement of reserves or in individual European style titles and proposed a new alternative. Declaring (like the Indépendantistes) that customary landholding was no necessary barrier to development of individual enterprises, it called for the legal recognition of a propriété clanique - something between the titles of the droit commun and the tribu and much more traditional. Conseils des Clans consisting of the family heads (both of 'ancient' and 'new' families in a given locality) should regulate land matters, with Conseils des Chefs de Clan and a Conseil des Grande Chefs for appeal and inter clan disputes. This was an effort to establish some kind of Melanesian authority in land matters to replace the French-created official chefferie et Conseils des Anciens in which confidence is no longer reposed (Commission pour la Promotion Mélanésienne 1979). In some of these key principles the Melanesians of the Promotion were quite radical and held views in line with those of the Indépendantistes. Though described in the rhetoric of the latter as a French puppet, Wahuzue is in fact fearful of the divisions opening up among Melanesians as a result of confused and overlapping land claims and wants them sorted out under French auspices as a necessary precondition of any later political evolution.

Finally, in March 1980 an avant-projet of the law to grant the Territory the powers of preemption and expropriation of underused land was leaked in the Noumea press. Not surprisingly, in view of the strength of their reaction in 1958, the settlers again reacted strongly to the introduction of such measures - this time by their erstwhile protector, the French state. Divisions opened among the governing majority, the FNSC generally favouring acceptance of the measures as necessary and many of the RPCR being bitterly opposed, especially to expropriation. A delegation went to Paris to seek modifications and Dijoud returned to Noumea for a discussion in camera with the Territorial Assembly. The terms of the avant-projet, revised slightly in the settlers' favour, were republished on 30 May.
The preface acknowledges that, in the context of general agrarian reform and revival, the Melanesians have a special need. It specifies that the reserves will not be affected, and affirms the right of choice of Melanesians to live under the droit coutumier or the droit commun. Article 1 affirms support for the development of uncultivated or insufficiently exploited lands, notably through the constitution of family enterprises and for food production; and for the transfer to Melanesian collectives, family groups or individuals of enough land to enable them to satisfy their needs, their custom and their 'organisation particulière'. Articles 2 to 4 provide that the state, the territory and, where appropriate, the communes, are to collaborate for the purpose of acquiring the necessary land, if possible by agreement. An incentive for this will be the provision, under Article 5, of compensation and pension arrangements for farmers sixty years of age or more who cede their land to programme. Article 6 provides that when proprietors voluntary offer an estate the Territory has a three months' right of preemption; where there is failure to agree on price, the price will be fixed by the court of first instance. Article 7 gives the high commissioner in council power to declare an estate abandoned or uncultivated; the proprietor will be given time in which to improve the land. Article 8 provides that where agreement is not reached the Council of Government may issue a declaration of public need and expropriation; an inquiry will then follow by a commission presided over by a magistrate and including representation of the state, the territory, the commune, the Melanesian authorities and rural proprietors and farmers; if this commission recommends affirmatively the declaration will be promulgated by the high commissioner. Article 9 provides that if the land so acquired is not used within three years for the purposes defined in Article 1, the former proprietor may apply to have it ceded back to him. Article 10 states that lands acquired will be attributed under modes defined by the Territorial Assembly, either under the droit commun or the droit coutumier (Les Nouvelles 30 May 1980).

The proposed law continued to be bitterly opposed by settlers. Expropriation seemed to some 'a death blow' and there was some fine rhetoric by members of the MovementPour l'Ordre et la Paix (MOP) and a new association called RURALE (Rureaux, unis pour une réforme agraire libérale et équitable) about 'dying for Caledonia'. But Jean-Pierre Aifa and Gaston Morlet, settler members of the FNSC, strongly defended the reform in a series of public meetings. Frank Wahuzue of the Promotion Mélanesienne also defended it against attacks by his more conservative colleagues in the RPCR.

From the FI point of view the reform is far too limited in scope and too administration-directed; since late 1979 they have boycotted all official commissions or committees dealing with land and have attempted to set in motion their own land reform based on systematic demands by all clans for return of their former lands, without condition. They would, in turn, undertake to protect genuine settlers, but they believe that a land reform controlled by the administration and Territorial Assembly will continue the colonization of Melanesian lands. This issue was sharply revealed in mid 1980 when the administration proposed to allocate a repurchased estate near Dumbea to Wallis Islanders, the prolific Polynesian migrants of the postwar years, notoriously short of land. There was a strong response from the FI, focussed on a public letter by Madame Pidjot, claiming the land on behalf of the clans dispossessed in the colonization.
The avant-projet for the réforme foncière went to the Territorial Assembly on 2 September 1980 for its opinion and after furious debate was approved by eighteen votes (of the governing majority) to fourteen. The FI voted against, as did M. Guillemand, a most determined settler opponent (two other members of the governing majority abstained). During the debate settler members crowded the chamber, chorused objections against the speakers of their own party who were supporting the proposed law, and afterwards gave Guillemand a hero's welcome. In December it went before the National Assembly in Paris and was passed, against some opposition from the extreme right and the Communists.

A week after its approval of the avant-projet, the Territorial Assembly rounded out the legislative framework of land reform by passing a law on succession which gives Melanesians holding land outside the reserves the choice between customary succession rules or succession under the droit commun. In theory this should assist those Melanesians, still generally living under the statut particulier, to keep individual farms within the nuclear family (if they so choose) rather than see the encroachment of clan control at point of succession. If they do not exercise the option, however, customary succession prevails.

THE OUTLOOK

There is no doubt that the new laws will introduce a much needed and long overdue flexibility into land reform. There is little doubt that 100,000 ha of land will now be purchased from the settlers over ten years at something less than the speculative prices recently demanded. For some settlers on the east coast and mountain chain especially, there will not be much regret. In some valleys Melanesian pressure in the form of cattle theft, incendiaryism and menaces have already made life uncomfortable. In response to complaints by the MOP that Melanesian encroachments are not being met by adequate law enforcement the high commissioner has publicly acknowledged that, with the forces at his disposal, complete deterrence is not everywhere possible all the time (Les Nouvelles 21 January 1980).

But the police forces certainly are strong enough to prevent widespread occupation of land and - given the repeated statements of both M. Dijoud and the present high commissioner, M. Charbonniald - they would be so used. Recovery of land from settlers will generally be directed within the legal channels. The goals of the land reform clearly do not go far enough to satisfy the FI but, despite the occasional rhetoric of some of the extremists, it is hard to conceive of them gathering enough support for a direct trial of strength with the French authorities over the recovery of the full extent of the 'customary' claims.

But a trial of strength is already in progress over the redistribution of the land. This is largely a struggle between Melanesians: between those who claim as traditional proprietary clans and those who claim on the basis of several generations of residence - since colonization - on or near the land; and between those who see the recovery of land as part of the resurgence of Kanak culture and self-determination, and those who want title under the droit commun for individual or family farming enterprises. Of these last there are about 2,000 on titles formally outside the reserves. Efforts by the administration and the official chefferie to
establish more have not infrequently been checked by pressure from sections of the Indépendantistes. The tension and bitterness among Melanesians is inevitably increased by land redistribution and is a heavy burden for them to bear.

An unpredictable feature in the situation is the Promotion Mélanésienne under Frank Wahuzue. Despite FI denunciation Wahuzue is not simply an administration stooge. He represents the policy of choice for Melanesians, and has equally promoted a revived legal/administrative recognition of the clan and arrangements which encourage the individual entrepreneur. Introducing the new law on succession he said:

The Melanesians find themselves in a state of evolution. It is not timely to put them into a single, fixed system. It is suitable to emphasise more and more the propensity of the young to become individualist. It is necessary then to leave the Melanesian the voice, a certain option between the evolving customary system and an adapted modern system, prompted by the provisions of the Code Civil (Les Nouvelles 9 September 1980).

A second unpredictable factor is the reaction of the immigrant minorities, particularly the Wallis Islanders. So far they have not had much success in getting land from the administration, in the face of fierce FI resistance. Many Wallis Islanders have respect (however grudging) for the Melanesians' customary claims, as well as of their strength in rural areas - including their sorcery. The FI - whose policies in the first decade of political nationalism have been fairly unsubtle - have begun to develop more detailed strategies and to consider the kinds of rights they would give to non Kanaks in an independent state. They might conceivably persuade some Wallisians and Tahitians that their fortunes - in terms of land rights - could be better as clients of Melanesian clans than of the French administration.

A third feature of the situation - an interesting irony of the recent political struggle over the avant-projet - is that the FI and many of the settlers opposed the official land reform for precisely the same reason - that it is too paternalistic and prescriptive. Spokesmen of both groups at times said that direct negotiation between Melanesian buyers and broussards (bush settlers) over particular parcels of land would be best. There was even a moment when the broussards' committee of defence went to see the FI leadership about the issue.

Meanwhile the official land reform will proceed, gravely weakened by the fatal politicization of the land issue which has caused the FI and the Melanesians behind it to be excluded - and to exclude themselves - from close participation in the work. This, and other divisions among Melanesians, and between Melanesian and Polynesian migrants, will leave the redistribution contentious and difficult. In many respects some kind of determination among the real protagonists - the settlers and the Melanesians - to take the responsibility and direction of land reform would indeed be the best possible outcome for New Caledonia. But it is blocked by the two fundamentally different conceptions of ultimate goals - Indépendance Kanak (with Melanesian primacy) versus a multiracial territory
of France. Modification of both of these competing goals, towards a genuine Indépendance Calédonienne, would be the precondition for much fruitful development in New Caledonia, including land reform. Perhaps out of the politics of mutual frustration and stalemate something like this could occur. Indeed Gaston Morlet of the FNSC, exulting in his success with the approval of the avant-projet by the Territorial Assembly, took a full page advertisement in the daily paper to celebrate 2 September 1980 as the day of political maturation of New Caledonia, and spoke of an indépendance réelle. But he was thinking of Tahiti as a model. For his part Frank Wahuzue also speaks of the necessity of reinforcing ties with France. Clearly the sense of dependency among New Caledonian settlers and some Melanesians remains strong. The onus of steering some kind of course in land reform will remain in the immediate future in the paternalistic care of the French authorities. The next few years in the complex politics of New Caledonia will depend in part on the detailed politics of land: in struggles in remote valleys between rival clans over various ancient territorial claims and new claims based on occupancy and use; in questions of access to rural credit; in the success or failure of pastoral societies and growers of the new strain of coffee on individual title; in the arrangements made by new clanique proprietors and individuals holding leases from them; and in obscure struggles over succession to rights in land.

NOTE

This paper is a part of a larger work in preparation for the Department of Political and Social Change, Australian National University. Some of the details of law and statistics are provisional and subject to checking by work now in progress.

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The Anglo-French Condominium of the New Hebrides became independent, as the Republic of Vanuatu, on 30 July 1980. It thus gained its independence at a late stage for the South Pacific and in political conditions which had not existed elsewhere. Among these was the reluctance of the French (in Paris, Noumea, Vila and Santo) to leave a colonial possession; this was exemplified by their refusal to lower the flag in public. The British, who have already lowered the flag almost fifty times in this century, did so at a now conventional ceremony, complete with a royal representative. But the French refused and held a private ceremony attended only by French citizens. At the very last moment, then, the differing approaches of the two administering powers were still only too evident.

The special political circumstances which Vanuatu inherited include:

- the heritage of two administrative colonial systems based on different concepts and traditions;
- two very recently amalgamated police, education, health and general administrative systems;
- a bilingual education system and a constitutional obligation to preserve tri-lingualism;
- no armed forces;
- several secessionist movements, all at various times encouraged by local French citizens and by the French administration;
- a national political party which had used both constitutional and unconstitutional methods to assert its hegemony over the entire republic;
- no effective local government system or agreement on methods of devolution;
- bitterness and hostility leading to bloodshed and armed intervention against secession.
No other society in the South Pacific had to start out as an independent state with such problems, superimposed on the classical Melanesian pattern of localism, ethnic and cultural diversity, linguistic variety and the mixed blessings of economic colonialism and mission Christianity.

**SOURCES OF FRAGMENTATION**

The sources of the fragmentation which manifested itself in the fullblown secessionist crisis in the New Hebrides from May to September 1980 are complex, reflecting the complexities of the colonial experience in the New Hebrides. Significantly, the crisis which threatened the unity of the new nation was resolved only after the withdrawal of the colonial powers and their peacekeeping troops, which in fact had presided over continuing disunity.

**Francophonie**

The colonial inheritance in the New Hebrides included the division of the population into Francophone and Anglophone groups, educated in the competing educational systems. From the mid 1970s the French government poured massive amounts of aid into upgrading the French education system (at least five times the British expenditure on their system) and were able to provide free primary school education, in contrast with the fee-paying English language schools. Consequently the French created a significant Francophone constituency concerned over their future career prospects or those of their children. In 1980 the French estimated that 60 per cent of the student population were within the French system (Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes 28 July 1980).

The dominant Vanuaaku Pati had (in February 1979) only three Francophones out of its eighty local level political commissars. Philibert de Montgremier (born 1911), the most important of these, has been a longstanding party organizer in Luanville, and was elected in the 1975 national elections for the New Hebrides National Party (the pre 1977 name of the Vanuaaku Pati). He was subsequently defeated in the by-election for Luanville or Santo Town on 25 October 1976. In July 1980 his house was blown up by secessionist rebels and he retreated to Aore.

In 1979 the Vanuaaku Pati took some steps to improve its representation of New Hebridean Francophonie, particularly in relation to the young Francophone community. Alei Saurei, a new graduate of the University of Paris, was made an assistant editor of the party organ, Vanuaaku Viewpoints - which subsequently contained a French language section as well as its Bislama and English components. (The Pati also produced a Bislama newssheet.) In the same year Saurei was made a member of the Pati kabinet.

Despite these gestures towards Francophonie, and the renewed commitment by the Vanuaaku Pati to bilingualism in the 1979 election campaign, the Francophone community remained uneasy about their own and their children's future. On 25 June 1980 the French Teachers' Association
organized a demonstration in Vila in support of bilingualism. Estimates of
the numbers participating ranged from 500 to 1,000 (Radio Vanuatu 26 June
1980) to about 2,000 (Nabanga 1 28 June 1980).

On 25 July 1980, the eve of independence, the chief minister, Walter
Lini, reiterated that: 'We want higher and better opportunities for
Francophone students, we want more opportunities for them to obtain
professional qualifications as lawyers, doctors, engineers and so on
through university training. We certainly don't want to see just
Anglophones in the professions and civil service and just Francophones in
the private sector and technical skill areas' (Radio Vanuatu 25 July 1980).

On 12 August the parliament (i.e., the Vanuaaku Pati majority and the
members of the Independent Opposition) elected Maxime Carlot, an
independent Francophone member for Vila, to be speaker of the parliament.
This was another gesture towards Francophonie, and Carlot as speaker would
stand in as head of state during absences of the president. Originally the
Vanuaaku Pati had looked favourably on the idea of a Francophone president
of Vanuatu, the obvious candidate being the Francophone ex chief minister
(1978-1979) and respected politician, Father Gérard Leymang. However the
embitterment among Pati supporters over the French involvement in the
May-September secession precluded this step. Instead the popular Vanuaaku
Pati leader, George Kalkoa, was elected on 4 July and subsequently assumed
his chiefly name of Ati George Sokomanu. In general the policies of the
French residency in the pre independence period militated against the
influence of the bloc of three Francophone members (Leymang, V. Boulekone
and Carlot) who were playing a responsible role as a loyal 'Independent
Opposition' in this period.

Despite the genuine fears by the Francophone community over their
future under an Anglophone government the following points should be kept
in mind: first, as has been pointed out by Professor Jean Guiart, who was
involved in the founding of much of the French educational system,
Francophonie is essentially fragile in Vanuatu. Before the enfranchisement
of the Melanesians the French expatriate community did not support the
founding of French schools. Even in North Malekula, where the French
school programme has been longest established, a large part of the adult
population speaks Bislama or English (Guiart 1980:2). This is also true of
Tanna, where the French schools had great difficulty in establishing
themselves. On Efate, many parents in the 1970s split their children
between the (free) French schools and the English-medium schools which
seemed to provide greater career opportunities in the more indigenized
British administration.

Independent Vanuatu is destined to be oriented towards regional
centres which are Anglophone, rather than towards the old metropolitan
colonial powers. The continuance of the French education system will be
completely dependent on French aid, and the long term continuance of such
aid is problematic. The 1980 aid agreement has been delayed as part of the
French protest against the deportation of its citizens involved in the
rebellion, and at some stage French aid is likely to be withdrawn
completely as a result of independent Vanuatu's prominent role in the
regional movement against the French presence in the Pacific. The
September 1980 congress of the Vanuaaku Pati reaffirmed the foreign policy
priority it gave to the independence of New Caledonia (twelve representatives of the New Caledonia Front Indépendantiste attended the congress).

In the short term, the belated creation by the French of a large Francophone student population in the 1970s remains a potentially divisive influence. The fears of this Francophone community have been exploited by the French for the political objective of weakening the Vanuaaku Pati.

Custom

In its emergence as the only genuine nationalist movement in the New Hebrides the Vanuaaku Pati heavily utilized the preexisting organizational networks (both national and international) of the Presbyterian church. This was both a source of strength and a source of distrust on the part of some elements of the New Hebridean population. Francophone Catholics, whether French, Vietnamese, mixed-race, Wallisian or indigenous Melanesian, inherited a suspicion of the 'Anglo-Saxon' Protestant churches dating back to the colonial rivalries of the nineteenth century. Historic suspicion of the secular ambitions of the Presbyterian church has hardly been allayed by the presence of four Presbyterian pastors in the nine-member Vanuatu council of ministers, leaving aside the Anglican priest, Walter Lini.

Local Melanesian custom movements also had deep seated suspicions of a nationalist movement emerging out of the Presbyterian church. Non Christian custom followers form a majority of the population on the densely populated island of Tanna, and about a quarter of the population of Espiritu Santo. Despite the reapprochement the Christian churches (except the Seventh Day Adventists) in the 1960s and 1970s with custom practices, there remains a vivid memory of the vigorous attempts by the Presbyterian missions, in particular, to suppress custom earlier in the century. In many islands this suppression was so successful as to cause considerable embarrassment to the present efforts to codify custom practices as part of the reassertion of indigenous culture.

The Vanuaaku Pati has made a determined effort to identify itself with custom, which is seen as a source of a non European cultural identity. This has meant the incongruous (to some) spectacle of Father Lini, as Pati leader, participating in pig-killing ceremonies. It has also meant the integration of kava drinking into all public ceremonies and the encouragement of custom dancing (now usually in conjunction with the more recent phenomenon of string band competitions). Despite the imported instruments and musical style, the string bands have become a genuinely domesticated cultural phenomenon, the lyrics expressing local issues (Tonkinson 1980). Custom symbols such as namele (cycas palm) leaves have been deployed by the Vanuaaku Pati as the insignia of peace-making and of the role of the custom chiefs, as in the Mal Fatu Mauri. The new national flag incorporates namele leaves and a pig's tusk, while the motto of the new republic is Christian ('Long God yumí stanap').

Nonetheless the manipulation of custom symbols by the nationalist movement has not been sufficient to erode distrust of the Christian clergy and laymen which form its leadership at both national and local levels.
The religious factor (which builds on traditional intra village rivalries) has been particularly strong in the secessionist tendency in Tanna 1979-1980. The John Frum cult on Tanna, dating from World War II, was based on a rejection of the European missionaries who had failed to bring cargo to the native population (hence the reversed red crosses of the John Frum cult). John Frum was to act as an intermediary in the transmission of cargo from the US via the Yasur volcano. The John Frum movement has a long-standing grievance against the Christian church, as do the custom people of the 'middle bush' area of Tanna, who have formed a constituency for the Kapiel party. (The latter party was founded in 1975 by Charles Nako; it takes its name from a sorcerer's stone.) The middle bush people believe in the power of sorcery and their hostility to the Presbyterian church was exemplified by an incident in January 1979 when they trussed up and detained at their village of Lamlu the Presbyterian pastor and Vanuaaku Pati commissar, Willie Korisa (now minister for social affairs).

During the period of Tanna Law from 1906-1912 the Presbyterian church acted as the civilian authority on Tanna and imposed severe penalties for custom dancing or kava drinking, or even the transporting of kava roots along the island paths. Kava drinking is once again universal on Tanna, whether among Christians, pagans or European anthropologists, and has resumed its function as an integral part of Tannese social life. However the suspicions bred by the Tanna Law have been reinforced not only by the traditional village rivalries which play a role in the credentialling of 'big men', but also by more recent commercial rivalries. The Australian, Bob Paul, who owned the trade store at Lenakel and was a founder of Air Melanesia was heavily identified with the Vanuaaku Pati and with the local Presbyterian villages. His efforts to develop the tourist industry, arranging tours to Yasur volcano, were opposed by the John Frum who were jealous of access to their volcano and who supported a rival commercial venture by the Vila-based Francophone politician Guy Prévot (since declared a prohibited immigrant).

Many of the older leaders of the John Frum movement are unable to play an effective role in national politics due to their lack of education (reflecting the earlier boycotts of mission schools). However the voting power of the John Frum and other custom movements has been assiduously courted by the French, and local political figures have been groomed and encouraged to emerge onto the national scene. For example, Alexis Yolou, the most notable 'custom' politician from Tanna, was born in the John Frum village of Louanatum but was educated first at a Catholic mission school and later on Efate. He joined the French police in Vila and was a foundation member of the Francophone party UCHN (Union des Communautés des Nouvelles Hébrides) in 1974 and became a member of its executive committee in 1975. In that year he was elected a member of the Vila Municipal Council. Only in 1977 did he return to Tanna, in time to be 'elected' to the Representative Assembly as a Kapiel member. In 1979 Yolou stood for election to the Representative Assembly as a John Frum candidate and topped the poll on Tanna (a five seat constituency).

Charles Nako, the founder of Kapiel, was of a similar age to Yolou (they were born in 1949 and 1950 respectively) and had followed a similar career pattern. He was born in the middle bush village of Lamlu, but also moved to Vila for further French education after Catholic primary school on
Tanna. Nako joined the French agricultural service but also rapidly became absorbed in UCNH politics. He was elected to the Representative Assembly as UCNH member for Tanna in 1975, the same year he founded his middle bush custom party, Kapiel. In 1977 he became Kapiel member in the Representative Assembly and was again elected as Kapiel member in the 1979 national election (third in the Tanna poll).

Both Nako and Yolou had been led to believe that their parties (grouped as 'the Moderates') would win a majority of seats in the election to the Tanna Regional Assembly, which was held at the same time as the national election. When they narrowly lost the Regional Assembly election (gaining seven out of fifteen seats, 49.3 per cent of the vote) the inevitable reaction was accusations of electoral malpractice. Both Nako and Yolou attended the founding ceremony of the secessionist Vemerana Federation on 11 January 1980 in Luganville. From then on the Tannese custom leaders were firmly set on the secessionist path and boycotted the meetings of the Representative Assembly in Vila.

In March Yolou and Nako went with a delegation of 'Moderates' to Paris, to discuss their grievances concerning the government. On Tanna there was mounting violence between the custom followers and Vanuaaku Pati supporters, connived at by the local French gendarmerie. This culminated in the death of Yolou in an armed skirmish on the morning of 11 June 1980. Despite the fact that Yolou had a long history of involvement in violent incidents (he had been named in the judicial inquiry into violence on Tanna as far back as February 1979) the French press depicted Yolou as a martyr. The Nabanga front page read 'Alexis Yolou assassiné. Pourquoi? Par Qui?' (16 June 1980). In Luganville Boulevard Higginson was renamed Boulevard Alexis Yolou.

Meanwhile on Espiritu Santo custom opposition to the Vanuaaku Pati was manifested in Jimmy Stevens's Nagriamel movement which was founded in 1964. Nagriamel differed from the custom movements on Tanna in that it combined custom with Christianity (if of an unorthodox type) and many of its members were nominally members of the Church of Christ. Nagriamel began as a strong assertion of Melanesian identity against the appropriation of land and culture by the Europeans. Custom practices and dress were adopted and Stevens enjoyed the traditional chiefly prerogative of polygyny. At the same time Stevens and Abel Bani, the Church of Christ pastor on West Aoba who worked with Stevens, conducted an active church-building programme for their independent Nagriamel church (going under various names).

The Nagriamel movement (known as the Vemerana Federation from 1980) has also differed from the Tannese custom movements both in its charismatic leadership and in the kind of collectivist work and lifestyle established at the movement's headquarters at Vanafo from 1966-67. Followers from other islands such as Aoba and Paama were encouraged to spend periods at Vanafo, engaging in collective work and the daily life of the community.

One aspect of Nagriamel's stress on custom has been suspicion of the new urbanized elite lifestyle which is identified with Vila and a lack of understanding for 'Man Santo'. After the 1977 national 'election' when Nagriamel/MANH were allotted twelve seats Stevens outraged the new chief minister, George Kalsakau, by appearing in Vila with his 'half-naked
bushmen'. (For further details of the political adventures of Nagriamel see Jupp and Sawer 1979 and Sawer and Jupp 1980.)

Stevens's own claim to embody custom was somewhat invalidated, however, by his mixed-race background (only one quarter Melanesian) and his involvement with dubious business ventures, sometimes in conjunction with foreigners. On his arrest on 31 August 1980 he is alleged to have admitted that he had usurped the authority of Paul Buluk, the 'true' custom chief of the Vanafo area, with whose help Stevens had established the movement (Radio Vanuatu 17 September 1980). He also blamed French involvement for the violent turn taken by his secession movement and admitted receiving American money. Hence although custom remains a divisive force rather than the unifying symbol the Vanuaaku leadership would like it to become, this reflects not only endogenous cultural divisions but also their exploitation by exogenous interests.

French political objectives

In 1971 the French were confronted by the emergence of the Anglophone New Hebrides National Party (NHNPNP), apparently under the tutelage of the British residency (or its political secretary, Keith Woodward). Through the networks of the Protestant churches and the British Co-operative Federation the NHNPNP soon gained a firm hold on rural villages throughout the New Hebrides. In answer, the French residency and the French and Vietnamese commercial ventures sponsored a series of parties and party groupings, all characterized by their urban nature and lack of solid organizational structure. These included UPNH (Union de la Population des Nouvelles Hébrides) (1971), MANH (Movement Autonomiste des Nouvelles Hébrides) (1973, Luganville), UCNH (1974), Tan Union (1977) and the Federal Party (1979). These ephemeral parties suffered from their identification with non Melanesian commercial interests, and depended for support on the ethnically diverse urban communities. They were not sufficient to impede the gathering strength of the NHNPNP/Vanuaaku Pati. Consequently the French residency looked to the custom movements as providing a mass Melanesian base for the political opposition to the Vanuaaku Pati. To many this alliance appeared incongruous, as the Melanesian custom-followers whose lingua franca was Bislama were the antithesis of the sophisticated French or mixed-race urban community which predominated in the Francophone parties. However the assiduous cultivation of the Tannese custom movements through the grooming of selected leaders has already been noted. The provision of material inducements became most blatant during the 1979 election campaign, when the French resident commissioner, Inspector-General Robert toured the island supplying 'handouts'.

On Santo, despite the initial hostility to Nagriamel land claims, the local French district agent began courting Jimmy Stevens in earnest in 1974, and a road, a dispensary, and other aid was forthcoming from the French residency. However the 1975 national elections indicated that even alliance with custom movements such as Nagriamel and John Frum was not sufficient to prevent a NHNPNP victory.
In 1977 French groupings such as the Federation of Independents started working towards a federal solution to the problem of retaining French influence. Regional assemblies, for example in Santo, would assume the bulk of government power, leaving a weak, indirectly elected central government. This theme was followed through with the creation of the umbrella 'Federal Party' in 1979 which characterized itself as the opponent of the 'centralizing, authoritarian and even totalitarian tendencies' of the Marxist/theocratic Vanuaaku Pati (Tru TokTok No 1, March 1979; No 6, September 1979).

In 1979 M. Paul Dijoud, the French minister for overseas departments and territories forced the inclusion of regional assemblies for Santo and Tanna in the independence constitution. There was heated opposition to this institutionalizing of secessionist foci in the new state but in the all night session of 18 September 1979 which preceded the final agreement, Dijoud made it clear that it was a condition of independence.

The subsequent failure in the elections of 14 November 1979 to win the majority of seats in the regional assemblies came as a rude shock, after so much diligent French work. The rejection of the legitimacy of the new central government by the custom parties and other pro-French groupings on Santo and Tanna was never firmly discouraged by the French residency, which instead insisted that further concessions should be made by the elected government to the desire for decentralization on the part of pro-French groups.

When open secession occurred with the seizure of the airport and town on Santo on 28 May 1980 the French colonial authorities resisted all suggestions that central government authority should be forcibly restored, despite the concern expressed by all governments in the region, including the Australian, over the preservation of the territorial integrity of the new state. The French constitutional advisor, M. Arnaud Lizop, who was appointed by the minister for overseas departments and territories, to arrange a negotiated settlement to the rebellion, instead made suggestions for running the rebellion. In a letter dated 10 June 1980 to Georges Cronsteadt, secretary-general of the Vemera Na Federation, he stressed the importance of a defence plan and of organizing a referendum. (It was hoped that the evacuation of about 1,000 Vanuaaku Pati supporters from Santo during the rebellion would at last enable Stevens to obtain a majority of the island's vote.) M. Lizop ended his letter (which was presented in evidence at the November trial of Stevens) by saying: 'Stick it out, we're onto it in Paris' (The Age 24 November 1980).

One week before independence and just after the strong support given at Tarawa to the idea of military intervention through the Pacific Forum the French finally agreed to the deployment of a joint British/French force in Luganville. (Two hundred British commandos had already spent over a month in the New Hebrides.) The joint force was to be commanded by a French officer, Colonel Vidal from Noumea.

On the eve of the arrival of the troops Inspector-General Robert made an inflammatory speech to the inhabitants of Luganville, in which he suggested that the intervention was designed purely to prevent a military intervention and 'massacre' mounted by the Pacific Forum governments, and
that the whole operation would be 'French oriented'. Robert assured the Santo people that the operation had been designed in their interests, without the knowledge of the Lini government, and that it was not clear that the Lini government would ever be coming back to Santo (Robert 1980a). 'Reprisals' for the rebellion were 'right out of the question'. In answer to a question as to whether the situation was like that of the Free France Robert replied: 'Yes, it is a bit like that. That's it. It's exactly like 1940. Although of course, I don't fancy myself as a de Gaulle'. (Robert is very short.) Another report of Robert's speech included the accusation that some British officials wanted to make the New Hebrides 'an Australian colony' before leaving and that a massacre 'would not rob Mr Bill Fisher of his sleep' (Robert 1980b). On the same day Robert assured Stevens that France was supporting him to get a 'confederation system' (The Age 22 November 1980).

The role of the French troops as a means of warding off the reassertion of the authority of the central government was confirmed by the French foreign minister, M. Olivier Stirm, on the night before independence. Stirm said that there was 'no possibility at all that the troops at Luganville would be used to make arrests of rebel leaders. They are there to protect French and British nationals' (Radio Vanuatu 30 July 1980).

When the French/British force in Luganville was finally replaced on 18 August, after a series of dynamitings by the rebels, by troops from the Papua New Guinea Defence Force, and arrests were made, much blame was laid at the foot of Inspector-General Robert. The defence counsel provided by Noumean support groups for the rebels, Maître Leder, argued in mitigation:

that those really responsible were the two metropolitan powers. When their military forces were present, couldn't they have stopped offences against law and order? Could not the two Resident Commissioners have prevented such acts by persuasion and explanation? No-one tried to explain that independence had arrived, and the rebellion finished. Inspector-General Robert bears a heavy responsibility for these tragic events (Radio Vanuatu 18 September 1980; Les Nouvelles Calédonniennes 22 September 1980).

In another defence Maître Leder explained that Inspector-General Robert had fostered the idea that the blockade imposed by the Vila government on Santo, in an effort to bring an end to the rebellion, was somehow 'illegal' (Radio Vanuatu 24 September 1980).

While Inspector-General Robert was obviously concerned to preserve a bastion of the free French in the Pacific, against the encroachments of the 'Anglo-Saxons', or the Melanesian pawns of the Anglo-Saxons, the motivation of the Quai d'Orsay is somewhat more obscure. The French have no real economic interest in the New Hebrides (the Santo plantations are not really significant at this level), and their cultural presence is a fragile growth, as indicated above. The most plausible explanation has been that the French government was attempting to 'hold the line' in relation to the much more important New Caledonia, by entrenching opposition to the
independent Vanuaaku government which might otherwise embark on an overly activist foreign policy (e.g., *Pacific Islands Monthly* July 1980:11).

The small French colony on Santo was certainly imbued with a last-ditch mentality, encouraged by relatives and associates in New Caledonia, some of whom had already been pushed out of Indochina or Algeria. Typical of the small scale French adventurer involved in the New Hebrides was Antoine Fornelli, an ex soldier from Indochina and Katanga. Fornelli bought a property at Rentabao on Efate and opposed the softness of the condominium authorities towards Melanesian land claims. He became involved in a project to set himself up as 'King of Tanna' in 1974, with the aid of the John Frum and other custom movements opposed to the colonial authorities. He was deported to Noumea but turned up again in November 1979, in Tanna, where he still had a following among the John Frum. Once again deported, Fornelli reappeared in 1980 (arriving as in 1979 by boat from Noumea) giving military training to the Vemerana secessionists at Vanafo. He was arrested when Vanafo was captured by Papua New Guinean troops at the end of August. Subsequent to his third deportation Fornelli gave an interview in Noumea, promising to continue resistance to the 'yoke of Walter Lini' (*Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes* 30 September 1980).

French adventurers were not, however, the only external elements involved in exploiting fissiparous tendencies in the New Hebrides.

The Americans and other Utopian capitalists

In the late 1960s the Hawaiian-based land developer Eugene Peacock bought extensive properties in the New Hebrides and in 1971 the Carson City, Nevada, real estate developer Michael Oliver also bought properties. Their plans for extensive subdivision and sales to American servicemen were thwarted by the joint regulations issued by the condominium authorities in 1971 and fully supported by the emergent NHNP, who were determined to put a stop to further European land alienation.

Oliver's real estate interests coincided with his ideological commitment to setting up a new country with a free enterprise constitution (i.e., with minimal government, no taxes and no interference with property or contract). In pursuit of this aim he had set up the Phoenix Foundation, which included on its board prominent US Libertarians such as Professor John Hospers, the presidential candidate of the Libertarian Party in 1972. Oliver regarded Stevens's Nagriamel Federation with its secessionist tendencies to be the most promising candidate as a free enterprise paradise, after the failure of experiments on Minerva Reef (southwest of Tonga) and Abaco (in the Bahamas). Stevens, like the John Frum movement on Tanna, was deeply interested in the possible return of American cargo, glimpsed during the Second World War. Oliver provided him with constitutions for the Nagriamel Federation, passports, flags, a radio station and other paraphernalia of nationhood. After an initial attempt at secession in 1976, Oliver and his fellow Libertarians pinned their hopes on a successful secession at the time of independence. In preparation, the Foundation produced a book-length constitution entitled *A Blueprint for a New Nation: The Structure of the Na-Griamel Federation* (Doorn 1979).
In January 1980 Stevens inaugurated the Vemerana Federation, with an office in Luganville. In April F. Thomas Eck III of the Phoenix Foundation accompanied Stevens back to the New Hebrides after a visit to Carson City, Nevada, in order to help him with a constitution for Vemerana. In May a prospectus for an 'Investment in the Vemerana Federation' was circulated at a Henry Schultz Monetary Seminar in the Bahamas (Schultz was also a member of the board of the Phoenix Foundation). The prospectus, which was signed by Stevens, included his latest constitution. This contained the same elements as all the constitutions prepared by the Libertarians—minimal government with no power to impose income tax, sound-money clauses (currency not to be a government monopoly, but to require solid backing, preferably gold or silver) guarantees of freehold property in land for expatriates as well as Melanesians (the Vanuatu constitution by contrast upholds the principle of the inalienability of land) and untrammeled individual rights. Members of the board of the Vemerana included Thomas Eck, Michael Oliver and John Hospers.

The prospectus was distributed to European residents in the New Hebrides at the end of May. Meanwhile the Phoenix Foundation had devoted considerable energy, since 1975, in attempting to gain international recognition for the legitimacy of Nagriamel's secessionist claims. The Phoenix Foundation had arranged in 1976 for Nagriamel emissaries to visit the United Nations and in 1979 it sponsored an international tour by Jimmy Stevens and prepared press brochures and influential 'contacts' for him. The material prepared, such as the Australian brochure (Moli Jimmy Tuboa Putuntun Stevens: Chief President Na Griamel Federation. Visit to Australia 1979), made various untenable claims about the Marxist and/or Communist nature of the Vanuaaku Pati, the alleged rigging of elections, and the validity of Nagriamel's own pretensions to authority over areas of the New Hebrides. Support for Nagriamel (and any future secessionist moves) was sought from all freedom loving opponents of big government and the menace of communism. The idea was promoted that a Vanuaaku Pati government would mean a Cuba on Australia's doorstep and that the Russians would immediately move in to establish a naval base (Tam-Tam 12 July 1980). In May 1980 the Phoenix Foundation Bulletin made the extravagant claim that the Vanuaaku Pati had won the 1979 election in the New Hebrides only with the help of three million dollars provided by 'Australian red run labour unions'.

The Phoenix Foundation efforts to gain international recognition for Stevens had considerable resonance among Australian free marketeers. Gary Sturgess, the research director of the Queensland branch of the Progress Party (1979-1980) was active in promoting the Nagriamel cause. Sturgess was apprehended in the New Hebrides about a month before independence, while acting as a go-between in the delivery of 1,200 Vemerana passports from the Phoenix Foundation to Espiritu Santo. Sturgess was expelled from the New Hebrides but has widely publicized the cause of the Nagriamel/Vemerana secession, 'the only country in the world with a Libertarian constitution' (On Liberty February 1980 and subsequent issues; The Bulletin 17 June 1980:97-103). The Progress Party maintained outspoken support for the 'libertarian revolt' in the New Hebrides. In August 1980 the Progress Party spokesman on foreign affairs, Mr Wal Younger, called for the suspension of Australian aid to Papua New Guinea because of the role of Papua New Guinean troops in bringing an end to the secession in Vanuatu.
Meanwhile Mr Michael Darby, the editor of the monthly *Free Market* was deported from the New Hebrides for his attempts to reach the rebels and subsequently resigned from the Liberal Party.

While the manoeuvres of the Phoenix Foundation have hardly been crowned with success, they were significant insofar as they encouraged the secessionist movements on Santo and Tanna to seek a future outside a united Vanuatu. The Americans were most active in attempting to obtain international recognition for the secessionist attempt, thus threatening the territorial integrity of the new nation. They also provided material help, such as Radio Vanafo, without which the secession could not have been organized, and a bank account opened in May 1980 at the Noumea branch of the Banque de l'Indochine et de Suez in the name of the Vemerana Federation and the Tafea Federation (Tafea being the Tanna based southern version of the Vemerana Federation). Stevens and Jean-Marie Léyé (the president of the Federal Party) were entitled to draw up to $20,000 a month on the account, and the other signatories were Michael Oliver and F. Thomas Eck III (*The Age* 22 September 1980). A boatload of arms from them appears never to have reached the rebels (Pornelli 1980).

**Ideological differences**

The sources of fragmentation already cited have to some extent been compounded by ideological cleavages. The parties based on the Francophone and custom groups have expressed a commitment to free enterprise as an absolute value which knows no colour. They have supported notions of economic individualism and opposed government controls over land or other transfers.

The Vanuaaku Pati, on the other hand, has rejected the western concept of land as an alienable commodity. It has also espoused a much more guarded approach to the patterns of foreign investment dating from the colonial period (including the lack of local equity, participation and/or control). It has been receptive towards the development of small scale rural projects based on 'appropriate technology' (many of which have been sponsored by overseas church groups and voluntary aid agencies). The Vanuaaku Pati stresses the continuing importance of the rural-based cooperative movement, and the need to improve rural amenities rather than accept patterns of investment which exacerbate economic inequalities and particularly rural/urban distinctions (e.g., Vanuaaku Pati Platform 1979).

The ideological stance of the Vanuaaku Pati reflects both its sociological base in the rural villages and the Third World identification of its leadership. Through the international forums supplied by the churches the leadership has had much exposure to the problems of Third World development. This has been reinforced by the influence of the University of the South Pacific and the University of Papua New Guinea on New Hebridean graduates.

The opposition parties have, by contrast, drawn their strength from local commercial communities which are inextricably involved with foreign business interests. Hence they have naturally opposed policies of government economic intervention in the name of individual liberty.
The ideological cleavage has been greater at the level of rhetoric than at the policy level, owing to the pragmatic approach of the Vanuaaku Pati to the overwhelming problems of economic dependence in post colonial Vanuatu.

FORCES FOR NATIONAL UNITY

While Vanuatu may seem to be uniquely fragmented, at the same time there are forces for national unity which make it quite probable that the political system will become increasingly consolidated once the secessionist movement on Santo has been completely eliminated. While there is little doubt that other local movements will continue to exist, particularly among the John Frum and non-Christian people of Tanna, the creation of a police mobile unit as a first priority of the Vanuatu government will probably discourage foreign intervention and the steady entrenching of a secessionist movement which characterized the Santo situation. The removal of the French administration, while it will not prevent a degree of potential interference from individuals in New Caledonia, will remove much of the material and ideological encouragement which Vemerana and John Frum received in the past. The dominant French official in Vanuatu is now the accredited ambassador, answerable to the ministry of foreign affairs and with no executive authority, not an executive officer of the ministry of overseas department and territories.

The unifying political forces in Vanuatu are the national movement, embodied in the Vanuaaku Pati, the constitutional system created in October 1979 and posited on a unified nation with regional devolution, and the machinery of government still being created out of the various and disparate institutions left behind at independence. Within a year or two Vanuatu should have a working ministerial system, the beginnings of local government, a unified police force trained partly by Australians and the Papua New Guinea armed forces, and a national communications system based on Radio Vanuatu and (although less likely) on nationally distributed printed media. The creation of these unifying factors depends to a large extent on the receipt of sufficient aid and expertise to make the new institutions viable. While the future of French aid is still very doubtful it is quite certain that Vanuatu will be receiving about $A30 million in aid over the next three years from Britain and Australia. In the absence of foreign interference and with reasonably favourable economic circumstances, a unified and well managed Vanuatu seems quite feasible, despite the inauspicious nature of its beginnings.

The Vanuaaku Pati

Much of the literature on 'nation building' of the 1960s drew attention to the role of a national party in bringing together and mobilizing the disparate elements of plural societies. The Indian National Congress, the Ghana Convention People's Party or (more relevant to Vanuatu) the Tanzanian African National Union, were all seen as engaged in creating solidarity and giving direction to variegated peoples who had little or no previous sense of national identity. More recently the collapse of many African party systems has tended to diminish enthusiasm for the 'mobilizing
party'. In general such parties either have not surfaced in the South Pacific or have had a shadowy existence. The New Hebrides was exceptional in creating such a party and in sustaining it from its beginnings in 1971 to its total domination of the independent government of 1980. The Vanuaaku Pati, which undoubtedly took some ideas from Tanzania in the past, has been attacked as totalitarian, communist or Maoist. Fear of its victory led to a whole series of countermovements, culminating in the Santo secession when foreign supporters of Vemerana accused Father Lini of creating a 'Cuba in the South Pacific'. Yet, in essence, the Vanuaaku Pati is simply the latest, and one of the most successful, of a long line of nationalist parties common to the Third World over the past century. If such parties do have a 'nation building' function then the Vanuaaku Pati must be seen as a force for unity despite the passionate opposition which it has often aroused among expatriate and indigenous opponents.

The early history and development of the Vanuaaku Pati has been fully described elsewhere (Jupp 1979; Plant 1977). The critical points in its rise were the creation of the New Hebrides Culture Association by Donald Kalpokas, Peter Taurakoto and Walter Lini in 1971, the winning of 59.5 per cent of the popular vote in the Representative Assembly election of 1975, and the launching of the Peoples Provisional Government in 1977. Having shown that it could win votes throughout the islands and build an effective structure under the guidance of Kalkot Matas Kele-kele, the Vanuaaku Pati was able to counteract localization and close the gap between villagers and the educated youth of Vila. What it could not do was recruit Francophone support or break out of its origins among Presbyterians and Anglicans to enrol the quarter of the population who are Catholics or non-Christians.

The Vanuaaku Pati was able to build on existing structures, particularly the Presbyterian and Anglican churches and the British sponsored Co-operative Federation. It enjoyed the covert support of the British administration although they were none too happy with the Peoples Provisional Government. Australians had close relations with the Vanuaaku Pati at the official, the religious and the individual level. These latter factors encouraged the French and their supporters in the belief that the Vanuaaku Pati was an agent of 'Anglo-Saxon' imperialism. The adoption of socialist slogans and the influence of educated activists like Barak Sope and Kalkot Matas gave rise to charges of 'communism' amongst the expatriate community and these were taken up by Libertarian supporters of Stevens in America and Australia. The Vanuaaku Pati undoubtedly represented the influence of the Anglophone and Protestant elements in the national makeup. But it increasingly used custom symbols and practices as it reached out to the rural electorate, a phenomenon common to other 'nation building' parties originating in the educated indigenous elite but reaching out to the masses. While Presbyterians could not appeal to John Frum for historical reasons, it is clear from voting figures on Tanna in 1975 and 1979 that the Vanuaaku Pati was able to reach many non-Christian voters. It also enjoyed considerable Seventh Day Adventist support and had some following in the Church of Christ, though this was shared with Stevens and Abel Bani.

The Vanuaaku Pati might be termed 'populist' in the sense of uniting better educated leaders with a rural following. As most of the modern white collar, manual and trading classes in Vanuatu are expatriate or non
Melanesian this meant that the Vanuaaku Pati reached the indigenous majority where many of its rivals were based on 'foreign' elements. The early accusations of 'racialism' against the Vanuaaku Pati reflect this firm base in the Melanesians. Most Vanuaaku Pati commissars (or local organizers) are engaged in village agriculture or in serving rural communities through the churches, the cooperatives or the schools. Only Nagriamel and John Frum have comparable claims to organize an indigenous following, and then only in specific localities.

Because the Vanuaaku Pati is so well integrated into local rural society its politicians can more correctly be termed 'grass roots' than most of their opponents. The Vanuaaku Pati has also exerted considerable influence over the chiefs, especially through Fred Timakata and the Council of Chiefs, to the point where conservative politicians like George Kalsakau (in an interview with the authors) were claiming that chiefs were unrepresentative and should be opposed by elected representatives. Most of the Vanuaaku Pati leaders are now enmeshed in the government structure and this raises problems for the party in the future as in comparable situations elsewhere. The Vanuaaku Pati needs a much stronger opposition than currently exists as an incentive to maintaining its organization at the high level of efficiency reached in 1979. The return of Kalkot Matas to study in Papua New Guinea is a serious loss to a party which owes most of its structure to his work. In recent months the Vanuaaku Pati has maintained only a skeletal office and has failed to bring out its party newspaper. This situation underlines the serious shortages of effective personnel in a society with 112,000 people and a dozen indigenous graduates.

The risk to the Vanuaaku Pati is that it might decline in effectiveness and start to expect patronage as the price for loyalty, as has happened widely in Africa. The party leadership is so engrossed in the tasks of government, and particularly in organizing against secession, that it has little time to give to the organization. The disappearance of the French, who devoted so much ingenuity to frustrating the party, in one sense lessens the urgency of keeping the organization at the highest pitch. But these are all possibilities rather than inevitabilities. The Vanuaaku Pati is part of Vanuatu society in the same ways as the major churches or the cooperatives, with which it is inextricably involved. Its membership is active and involved from the Banks and Torres to Aneityum and there are now many 'Vanuaaku Pati villages' which support the party en masse despite its fairly recent creation. The party is likely to attract those seeking a career in the rapidly increasing number of posts open to the indigenous people. Its leaders are well aware of the Tanzanian methods of maintaining party effectiveness in a one party situation, though there is no current indication that they wish to depart from the incentives to efficiency provided by regular contested elections.

The constitution

The constitution on which Vanuatu became independent was, like everything else, the product of Anglo-French discussion, disagreement and compromise. After long, often all night, sessions a constitution eventually emerged less than a year before independence. It is marked by the political disagreements which had already created two major political
forces, the Vanuaaku Pati and the 'Moderates' (or 'Federalists') who had come together into a Government of National Unity on 27 December 1978. Eventually, on 5 October 1979 the two resident commissioners for Britain and France endorsed the constitution publicly at a ceremony in Vila although it was not until five months later that the name 'Vanuatu' was adopted, against 'Moderate' objections, nor until less than one month before independence that the French resident commissioner finally and publicly accepted the date for independence.

The constitution begins with the contentious question of language and adopts the formula of 'national language' (Bislama), 'official languages' (Bislama, English and French) and 'principal languages of education' (English and French) in s.3(1). It also commits the republic to protecting 'the different local languages'. As French aid is partly dependent upon the preservation of French culture this section of the constitution is likely to be upheld despite the fears expressed by Francophones that their interests would not be maintained under a Vanuaaku Pati government whose members speak only English and Bislama. A further reflection of the preceding propaganda battles is the constitutional protection of political parties which 'respect the Constitution and the principles of democracy' (s.4(3)). This protection does not, of course, help those parties and movements actively engaged in secession, which were decimated by their failure to break up newly independent Vanuatu.

The constitution contains the normal fundamental rights and duties of which the only one currently likely to lead to difficulty is the protection against 'unjust deprivation of property' (s.5(1)(j)). Rights are justiciable, while duties are not. Another highly controversial area of great concern to mixed-race and Asian French citizens was citizenship, where a formula previously used in Papua New Guinea appeared to confine the automatic right to citizenship to those who 'had four grandparents who belong to a tribe or community indigenous to the New Hebrides' (s.9). Naturally, it was also expected that those taking up citizenship should renounce alternative citizenship, an unattractive prospect particularly for Chinese or French with a long term interest in relocating themselves elsewhere if economic or political conditions change too dramatically. However the application of the citizenship laws so far has been fairly liberal, except for those expatriate and mixed-race French citizens involved in the Santo rebellion, who have largely fled or been deported to New Caledonia. Those born in, or resident for ten years in, Vanuatu would appear to have little to worry about at present although immigration and visa laws were being drawn up in October 1980 which will make Vanuatu less 'wide open' than the New Hebrides.

The rest of the constitution describes fairly conventional arrangements for executive, legislature and judiciary, although sometimes in a rather sketchy way for potentially litigious interests. The role of customary law is enshrined (in s.49 and s.50) although no effective record of such laws exists nor is one likely to emerge for some time. Contention may arise in the provision that all non urban land shall revert to the customary owners (s.71) and fear of the loss of property was a factor in the support for secession by French citizens in Santo. However the government is working on leasing arrangements designed to protect urban and
plantation property, particularly as there is considerable dispute in some areas as to who are the customary owners.

Two areas in which there was hard political bargaining now seem much less important than at the time of constitutional negotiation. Provisions for an element of 'proportional representation' for the election of parliament were not, in fact, implemented. Whatever the system used in 1979 may be called, nowhere does the official report on the elections call it proportional representation (New Hebrides Government 1979). A European-style list system was used for the two regional assemblies in Santo and Tanna but their future is very uncertain and they have not met. While the Vanuaaku Pati felt, with much justice, that the electoral systems were designed to frustrate them, in fact this did not happen. They won enough seats to elect the president and amend the constitution, both requiring a two thirds majority.

INDEPENDENCE

The eventual withdrawal of the two colonial powers on 30 July 1980 left Vanuatu politically prepared for independence but administratively unprepared and with a major secession problem unresolved. The Vanuaaku Pati was well experienced and organized and had shown twice through elections and once through the creation of the Peoples Provisional Government that it commanded majority support throughout the new country. However its authority was still challenged in Tanna, Santo and, to some extent in Aoba and Malekula, four of the most important islands. Many French expatriates were unwilling to believe that the Vanuaaku Pati had finally come to power and they were encouraged in their resistance to the new government by ill-considered acts and words from the retiring French administration. The mixed-race and non-Melanesian citizens were left in even greater uncertainty as they had no metropolis to retreat to (except possibly New Caledonia) and were unsure about their citizenship and property rights in the new state. The Francophone and French citizens had been unwilling to accept the inevitable in many cases and were attracted to the very course most likely to make their situation impossible after independence - support for secession.

The new government simply did what the condominium authorities had been unwilling to attempt. It called in troops from Papua New Guinea to attack Vanafo, arrest Stevens and his supporters, clear up resistance in Port Olry and Big Bay and secure Luganville town and airport for the Vanuatu authorities. The immediate result was the clearing of people from Vanafo and its effective abolition as a future centre for organized resistance, the arrest of dissidents on Malekula, the exiling of expatriates to New Caledonia and the arrest of secessionist politicians including Thomas Tungu, Aimé Maleré, Alfred Maliu and Georges Cronsteadt. That these measures were justified may be gathered from the interview given by Fornelli, self-styled military adviser to Nagriamel, to the Noumea press. While denying that any arms had been delivered to Santo he made it clear that this was because the expected deliverer had 'put the money in his pocket' and disappeared. Fornelli's scheme, which Stevens refused to endorse, was simply to blast the Papua New Guinea troops as they landed at
Luganville, a strategy which would have led to far more violence and death than in fact eventuated (Pornelli 1980).

The short term consequences of the Papua New Guinea military operation and the associated arrests by the Police Mobile Unit left the new state with a mixed legacy. Nagriamel was crushed, its leaders arrested, its illegal radio destroyed and its 'capital city' depopulated. Luganville town lost nearly all its expatriate community and was reduced in population by at least one half. Entry into Luganville was still being controlled by a government permit system in October 1980. Many empty properties and abandoned businesses were already being bought up by the far sighted local Chinese, who had managed to please both sides. Thus the second town of Vanuatu and its major export port were severely affected. The Santo copra mill was destroyed though the Pekoa fish-freezing works were not damaged. In the long run it seems probable that Luganville will recover its previous population and commerce. But it may never be dominated by Francophones again.

Politically the opposition was decimated. Only four assembly members faced the twenty-six Vanuaaku Pati politicians. Maxime Carlot, one of the Francophones, was made speaker, leaving only Gérard Leymant, Vincent Boulekone and Charles Nako as the opposition. All the remaining nine were either arrested, deported, fled or dead. The very fear of a one party system which had worried Vanuaaku Pati opponents was made to come true by their own actions and their false belief that the French either would never leave or would rescue them at the last moment. While potential electoral support for an opposition undoubtedly continues in Santo, Tanna, Aoba and Malekula, this decimation of an already small political elite is hardly promising for the future of liberal democracy in Vanuatu.

The administrative structure left behind by the condominium also presented the new government with many problems. Two local government systems had been attempted at various stages: one based on French ideas of the commune, the other on British rural district councils. Little remained of this at independence and one of the two municipal councils, Luganville, was suspended during the secession. Some villages had been given meeting halls and other facilities under the commune system, particularly those like Erakor which favoured the Francophone parties. In general, however, there was no effective local government system at all other than that provided through the dual district agents or through local chiefs. By August 1980 the Council of Ministers had arrived at an agreement on a local government structure to cover the whole country, but the preoccupation with the secession has prevented this from being put to parliament. Even so, there was some ambivalence within the Vanuaaku Pati between those more attracted to its support for 'island government' or maximum devolution and those who felt that centralization was necessary both to prevent secession and to control the economy.

The proposed local government structure would divide Vanuatu into eleven local government councils, containing within them sixty-nine area councils based on the electoral wards. While the local government councils are to be elected the area councils will be chosen by consensus. Nominated members may also sit on local government councils and would include chiefs, women and youth, chosen by the minister of home affairs. At present this
would ensure the likelihood of all local government councils having a Vanuaaku Pati majority, although that is not necessarily the primary objective. The duties and powers of local government councils include school maintenance, roads and bridges, water, licensing, minor airfields, livestock control and the provision of clerical staff for village courts. Taxes and licences would be administered for the central government as would electoral, birth, death and marriage registration. Councils would be empowered to prepare regional development plans, to provide agricultural extension services and to supervise cooperative societies and the social development of women and youth.

Because of the improbability of finding sufficient funds or trained personnel at the local level, the envisaged local government system would rely heavily upon central funds and upon staff seconded from the public service. Field staff other than council secretaries and treasurers would, in due course, be seconded from relevant ministries like Education or Health. Recurrent 'untied' grants would come from central government, allocated on a formula, while capital grants would be tied to specific projects. Council revenue proposals would be approved by the minister and subject to the auditor-general. The long term objective is to reduce the staff, and presumably the powers, of district commissioners while not allowing local government councils to be more autonomous than their capacity makes desirable.

While the local government structure remains on the drawing board at least until all serious danger of secession is over, the Vanuatu government was also faced with the need to build a ministerial structure, a unified police force and defence force and an economic planning organization which could process foreign aid. Nearly all such work had to be undertaken after independence because of the inability of the condominium powers to agree with each other or with the government. Expatriate advisers remained, of course, although there was a shift from French to English recruitment reflecting both the bitterness surrounding the events before independence and the Anglophone character of the government. The new Central Planning Office had only one ni-Vanuatu at the policy making level, the rest of the small staff being English, French and New Zealander. The ministries also employed expatriates, mostly British, as 'non-executive advisers' while the prime minister's press officer, John Beasant, was brought out from England in mid 1980, having failed to win a parliamentary seat for the Labour Party in the British general elections of 1979.

This continued reliance on expatriates is hardly surprising, given the very small number of ni-Vanuatu to have completed tertiary education before independence. As in some African (but no South Pacific) cases, the ruling party has been a recruitment ground for the highest level of public servant. The existing ministerial structure frequently consists of an elected Vanuaaku Pati politician as minister, with Vanuaaku Pati activists as first and second secretary. Thus Father Lini, as chief minister, has Barak Sope, former Vanuaaku Pati secretary, as his first secretary responsible for foreign affairs. His second secretary, Grace Molisa, is the wife of Sela Molisa, a Co-operative Federation official and Vanuaaku Pati organizer from Santo. His private secretary, P. Taurakoto is, likewise, a Vanuaaku Pati activist of many years standing. Among other Vanuaaku Pati activists serving the government are Shem Rarua, who was
actively engaged in Vanuaaku Pati politics in Santo town for many years, Charles Bice, a member of the Vanuaaku kabinet, and Iolu Abbil. Thus the ministerial structure (given in the Appendix to this chapter) is largely in the hands of those who built up the Vanuaaku Pati over the years and who can be relied upon to cooperate with Vanuaaku Pati ministers. The price for such an arrangement is the running down of the once extremely effective Vanuaaku Pati machine, nearly all of whose full time activists are now involved in the government structure as politicians or public servants. There is also some feeling in the Vanuaaku Pati, expressed at the Mele conference of September 1980, that the new government is looking after its friends and relatives and becoming remote from its grass roots activists. Such a feeling is almost inevitable with the passage of former fighters for independence into the role of rulers.

The creation of a ministerial structure based so firmly on a single party should give effective solidarity to the new government as long as the Vanuaaku Pati stays united. Given the success of the party in maintaining its cohesion since 1975 the signs are fairly hopeful. While adherents to a pure 'Westminster model' may deplore the partisan character of the administration, admirers of the French 'ministerial cabinet' system will welcome it and remain unsurprised. One advantage of the dual influence of Britain and France has been that Vanuatu politicians have been freed from slavish imitation of metropolitan models. The present system ensures the policy makers have known and worked with each other for some years and share common attitudes and allegiances. Partisan patronage has not declined into nepotism or corruption nor laid the basis for a one-party system, although there are risks in all these areas. The way in which the nationalist movement developed made it almost inevitable that the Vanuaaku Pati would take control over all major positions upon independence, while the activities of its secessionist opponents made this completely unavoidable.

NOTES

1 The weekly (bi-weekly from 1979) produced by the French residency.

APPENDIX

The Basic Structure of Vanuatu Government in Late 1980.

The president and all ministers belong to the Vanuaaku Pati.

**PRESIDENT:** George Sokomanu
**Secretary:** Ruth Kaltonga

**PRIME MINISTER:** Walter Lini
**First secretary:** Barak Sope (responsible for foreign affairs)
**Second secretary:** Grace Molisa (Vanuaaku Pati activist)
**Private secretary:** P. Taurakoto (Vanuaaku Pati founder-member)
**Press officer:** John Beasent (expatriate)

**HOME AFFAIRS:** Fred Timakata (responsible for police and defence)
**First secretary:** Jimmy Simon (Vanuaaku Pati activist, ex British administration)
**Second secretary:** John Kalotiti

**EDUCATION:** Donald Kalpokas
**First secretary:** Tele Taun
**Second secretary:** Lawrence Tarisese

**FINANCE:** Kalpokor Kalsakau
**Secretaries:** Simeon Revo/Brownie Reuben (on course in Suva)

**NATURAL RESOURCES:** Thomas Reuben Seru
**First secretary:** Martin Tamata
**Second secretary:** Charles Godden

**HEALTH:** George Worek
**First secretary:** Shem Raru (Vanuaaku Pati activist)
**Second secretary:** Frederick Tau

**TRANSPORT:** John Naupa
**First secretary:** George Pakoa (Vanuaaku Pati activist)

**SOCIAL AFFAIRS:** Willie Korisa
**First secretary:** Charles Bice (Vanuaaku Pati kabinet member)
**Second secretary:** Aidan Arugonga

**LAND:** Sethy Regenvanu
**First secretary:** Iolu Abbil (former Vanuaaku Pati Assembly member)
**Second secretary:** Selwyn Leodoro (Vanuaaku activist)

**DISTRICT COMMISSIONERS:**
Northern (Santo): Job Dalesa
Southern (Tanna): Reuben Tamata
Central district 1 (Vila): Tom Bakeo
Central district 2 (Malekula): Jim Rovo

**CENTRAL PLANNING OFFICE:**
**Director:** D.S. Grundy (expatriate)
REFERENCES


From 1974, coincident with the international oil crisis and the tightening of the world economy, Britain's cooperative policy towards decolonization for its dependent territories changed into an active drive for disengagement (Allen 1978). For Solomon Islands, where a rapid series of constitutional changes had brought an elected majority to theoretical power for the first time in 1970 and a ministerial system of government in late 1974, this meant the subordination of domestic concerns to precipitate preparations for independence. After preliminary talks in London, a provisional timetable was drawn up for internal self-government in January 1976 and independence twelve to eighteen months later. The Constitutional Committee set up in August 1975 was directed to keep the number of substantive changes to the existing constitution and administrative machinery 'to the minimum necessary to achieve the overall aims' (Solomon Islands 1976:28). It was to report back to the parliament by April 1976, which allowed the government three months for follow-up action before the next elections. Despite the haste, preparations for independence in 1977 thus should have reached the point of no return by the time the new parliament first met in the second half of 1976.

The 1975 moves achieved almost unanimous parliamentary support for rapid decolonization, but made independence a major issue in the 1976 election campaign. A number of candidates, aware that the bulk of the population was nervous of independence and hypersensitive to the possibility of consequent political and economic instability, advocated delay. At the same time, many made considerable political capital of electoral grievances against colonial management and, by association, against central government.

From early colonial days central government, an imposed concept in the Melanesian context, was regarded as a foreign enclave, the legitimacy of which was sustained more by the weight of metropolitan backing and sanctions than by village need for a national authority. To many Solomons communities, whose security and survival traditionally derived from small scale autonomy and self-sufficiency, central government represented a threat. As an institution it became stereotyped as powerful but unreliable, rich but rapacious, interventionist, inconsistent and often inept. The inherent tensions caused by differences of structure and scale between national and village level were largely subsumed under the more visible aspects of colonialism. Solomon Islanders tended to operate on the
premise, a legacy of the years when a foreign power usually met the costs of concessions won from central government, that resources wrung from the centre were an unequivocal gain to the indigenous population. Self-government brought no pronounced changes to this situation, and Solomons politics during the decolonization period was strongly influenced by the dual stereotype of government as the symbol of colonial dominance and government as exploitable resource.

From a situation in which the pressures of decolonization threatened to perpetuate a system of minority government, to further polarize the legislature and the bureaucracy, and to create a vicious cycle of diminished legislative effectiveness and diminishing public support for representative government, Solomon Islands emerged in 1980 with a relatively stable polity. Though the transition period was characterized by ad hoc problem-solving, and though the general pattern was one of 'bumbling through', the result was the survival of a beleaguered minority government, the establishment of a working accord between the legislature and the bureaucracy, and the legitimation of central government. On the other hand, the pace and style of colonial withdrawal transferred a number of problems from a context of transition and change to the less mutable context of independent nationhood. Many of these problems were aggravated by situational factors.

Solomon Islands consists of seven main island clusters and innumerable smaller islands, within an estimated nautical zone of 1,520,000 km² (Ward and Proctor 1980). With a population of just over 200,000 (Solomon Islands 1979) it is a small and fragmented country by most measures, but a large and strategically situated nation in the Pacific context. Traditional political systems range from hereditary chieftainship of the Polynesian type to small scale and comparatively fluid groupings based on the acquired status of the Melanesian bigman senior landowner. Both traditionally and in their adaptive mechanisms Solomons cultural systems exhibit a strong element of pragmatism and considerable political sophistication. In modern politics this was obscured during the struggle by the colonial administration to establish the legitimacy and authority of macro level government. Colonial suppression of indigenous political movements and promotion of institutions with apparently similar aims resulted in a disproportionate concern among Solomon Islands politicians for poorly comprehended procedural matters. Modern political skills perforce were focused on forms, symbols and political gamesmanship rather than on the art of government.

One consequence of the small size of the Solomon Islands was that relations between political, administrative and economic institutions were highly personalized (see also Selwyn 1975; May and Tupouniuia 1980). This gave greater scope than in larger countries for informal checks and balances, but allowed greater distortion of formal processes by individuals. Limited numbers in the legislature and bureaucracy gave a more manageable unit size, but restricted task specialization and created a greater need for multi-skilled personnel. The mechanics of operation as a state made Solomon Islands 'top-heavy' for its size, though small size facilitated general awareness of the contraints imposed by externalities and to some extent eased the pressures on government that they caused. On the other hand, the need for a certain minimum size in some functions made
government as a whole a fairly high cost operation relative to the capacity of the population to support it and to the benefits it could provide for the average villager. Finally, the small size of the educated leadership cadre resulted in considerable overlap and high mobility between politics and administration, with consequent problems in maintenance of the separation of powers on which the Westminster system was based.

The small size of the Solomon Islands, remoteness from its metropole and from other decolonized nations, and relative isolation even within the Pacific meant that Solomon Islanders as a whole had little knowledge of decolonization precedents when the country reached self-government. As a result, the lessons of experience transferred to Solomon Islands were primarily those of its colonial power and little attempt was made to apply the theories and models used by other new nations. Nonetheless, a radical element emerged within the public service at a relatively early stage. In 1973 a number of these men moved into politics and formed a bloc which later became the United Solomon Islands Party. They found that with Britain still firmly in control, and with the committee system of government then in operation, their scope for effective political leadership was severely limited. Educated radicals complained that in the public service the 'employee's mouth was kept well shut and his actions closely circumscribed by restrictive regulations deliberately designed for that purpose' (Raraka 1973:438), and that politicians were hampered by an 'official practise [sic] of buying out promising so-called "rabble-rousers" and "trouble-makers"' (Saunana 1973:434). As Solomon Islands passed through its peak period of elite nationalism and radical anti-colonialism at a time when neither could be used to advantage, both were debased as political tools when the time for them was ripe.

The Solomon Islands position as a 'late-comer' was itself an important variable in the events of the decolonization period. Decolonization on an international scale was almost complete when the islands reached self-government. It was generally assumed that the remaining dependent territories had little to contribute to a knowledge of the decolonization process, and that their main aim should be the avoidance of mistakes made elsewhere (Hart 1974:8). By the mid 1970s the relative prosperity of the 1960s, which had allowed the relaxation of considerations of economic efficiency in the developed world in favour of equity and social justice, was on the wane. Many Western countries faced problems of inflation, unemployment and political instability at home, and were less susceptible than they had been to Third World 'assertions...about the moral obligations and responsibilities which fall on former Western colonial powers' (Harries et al. 1979:116).

In 1976 the main issue for many Solomon Islanders was governmental and economic stability. This derived largely from concern over the deteriorating situation in many developed and developing countries, from a relatively benign contact history and a strong church influence, from widespread disillusion with the then Mamaloni government, and from the belief that the country was being rushed into independence against its own inclinations and interests. Fears of instability were intensified in late 1975 and early 1976 by signs of internal unrest.
One disturbing element was the secessionist confrontation between the Papua New Guinea government and the neighbouring island of Bougainville, with which many Solomon Islanders, especially in the Western Solomons, had close ties. Though suggestions for amalgamation with the secessionist island lapsed, the Bougainvillean situation revived demands for decentralized government, which had been a recurrent political theme since the mid-1960s. These demands were particularly strong in the west, where politicians for many years had capitalized on a popular though debatable theory that the west contributed more than any other area to the national economy but received little in return.

At about the same time, unrest developed in Honiara with the calling of a general strike by the newly formed Solomon Islands General Workers' Union (SIGWU). This led to a major confrontation between the government and the newly organized union workers, led by economics graduate and ex-student leader Bart Ulufa'alu. The intransigence of the union, coming at a time when the international economic situation was unsettled, when the home countries of the bulk of the expatriate community were suffering the effects of rampant unionism, and when self-government was imminent, brought widespread condemnation of Ulufa'alu. The strike, badly handled on both sides, was followed by further unrest to which the government responded with hasty and politically ill-considered moves to curb SIGWU activities. After the second strike, Ulufa'alu was arrested. This reflected adversely on the Mamaloni government, by then in no position to take a hard line on controversial issues, and shortly before the election Ulufa'alu, who previously had stated that he would not stand, announced the formation of a political arm of the union and his own candidacy.

1976: ELECTION AND REACTION

Though competition for seats in the new House was keen, electoral support was generally lethargic (Chick 1980:21). A constitutional increase in the number of seats from twenty-four to thirty-eight operated to the advantage of some candidates and fourteen of the twenty-three contesting members were returned. Very few of the new members could claim a mandate from their electorates. Over two thirds polled less than 50 per cent of the votes cast, which, with the knowledge that few parliamentarians lasted more than one term of office, made the 1976 House acutely sensitive to electoral opinion. This was intensified by the approach of independence. As a result, parliamentary debate often took the form of a competition between opposing factions and individuals for the position of leading exponent of rural concerns. As members frequently argued essentially the same case in much the same words, this gave an appearance of parliamentary consensus on issues which was belied by subsequent actions and decisions. For much of the life of the 1976 House the common need to demonstrate conscientious representation was overridden by internecine personal rivalries. At the same time, electoral concern for stability meant that despite the popular reformist rhetoric very few parliamentarians could afford to 'rock the boat' or, more correctly, to be seen publicly to rock the boat.
One of the problems for the 1976 House was its superfluity of potential chief ministers. The reshuffles under Mamaloni had given two thirds of the previous House ministerial experience, and the highly fluid party alignments meant that approximately a quarter of the new House held or had held the status of party leader. The rivalries which this situation produced were exacerbated by an early British emphasis on who should lead the country to independence. In 1976 eight candidates were nominated for the chief ministership, which was narrowly won from Mamaloni on the seventh ballot by Peter Kenilorea, a newcomer to parliament, an unsuccessful candidate in previous elections, and a man often designated as 'an administrator - not a politician'. Unlike most of his rivals, Kenilorea had no party affiliations and previously had spoken against party politics (Kenilorea 1973:23-6). Following the election he was promptly deserted by most of his parliamentary colleagues. In a lagged reaction against colonial government the bulk of the House, including most of its experienced politicians and best-educated men, moved *en masse* into the opposition. At the first sitting Kenilorea and his cabinet of eight ill-assorted ministers faced an opposition of twenty-nine, led by Mamaloni, Western Council president Francis Talasasa Agorau, and Ulufa'alu, whose party had been the only one to achieve significant success.

In the expectation that the Kenilorea government would not last, Mamaloni declined the controversial position of leader of the opposition, which at that stage was not an officially recognized body, and the position fell to Ulufa'alu. The first sitting became a farce, with Mamaloni and his supporters challenging the new government on matters it inherited from their own term of office, and with the opposition forcing through motions which committed the government to action it had little hope of fulfilling. During this period parliamentary consideration of the constitutional report was deferred and the timetable for independence was delayed, but a motion to postpone independence for five years was narrowly defeated. While the opposition hoped that Kenilorea would resign his untenable position, it began to prepare for a vote of no confidence or, as a second line of attack, for the defeat of the budget at the November sitting.

The events of the first sitting, and the inclusion in the opposition of elements widely regarded as dangerous or unstable, threw the bureaucracy solidly behind Kenilorea. Though some public servants objected to Kenilorea's style of leadership, his administrative experience and his ties to the early radical group enabled him to maintain an anti-colonial image without alienation of powerful public service interests. This in turn enabled him to preempt the role which the Opposition Coalition Group has assigned itself, that of defender of Solomon Islands interests, and closed off the bureaucracy as an opposition resource. While Kenilorea's dependence on public service support limited his ability to initiate reforms and made his government vulnerable to charges of neo-colonialism, it quietened electoral fears of instability during the difficult transition period when the legislature was occupied almost exclusively with preparations for independence.

One consequence of the concern for stability was a reluctance on the part of many parliamentarians to employ the constitutional provisions for a vote of no confidence. The small size of the country and the disproportionate impact of personal relationships on parliamentary performance
also vitiated the mechanisms for change of government. After the first sitting a number of fringe members of the Opposition Coalition expressed concern over the inherent dangers of a massive opposition, and dissatisfaction with its erratic leadership. Ulufa'alu, aware that some of his group were wavering, refused to bring a motion of no confidence, which increased the tension between the opposition leaders. The opposition position was further eroded by its lack of official status, support staff and facilities, and by public service and church opposition to its indiscriminate use of anti colonial slogans and political gamesmanship.

The newly constituted legislature had little opportunity to familiarize itself with budget matters. Many parliamentarians, in the erroneous belief that defeat of the budget would bring all government services to a halt, were reluctant to make an issue of it. Nonetheless, the size of the opposition contingent caused widespread tension, especially within the public service, as it became evident that the vote on the budget would be in fact a vote for the country's first prime minister. The anticipated confrontation was aborted after several days of largely inconsequential debate when the speaker, a long term public servant appointed to the position in 1974, called for the vote and, on the voices, gave a quick decision in favour of the government.

During the second sitting the opposition won formal recognition from the House, but in practical terms the victory meant very little. While the government steadily improved its access to support services, the opposition had only its own dwindling resources. Dissatisfaction within the group increased and shortly before Christmas Ulufa'alu dissolved the group, offered to resign its leadership, and demanded an oath of loyalty from those who rejoined. This caused further resentment and shortly thereafter half the members broke away and formed an 'Independent Group'.

From its inception the Independent Group acted more as a political party than as an independent parliamentary body. Though its membership was fluid and lacked any real mutuality of ideas, the fact that its support was the deciding factor in every vote held the group together. During final negotiations for independence the numerical strength of the Independent Group was a direct cause of the institutionalization in the independence constitution of a tripartite system of government. Though some Independents, in belated recognition of the weaknesses of this situation, later discussed dissolution of the Group, the majority of its members were reluctant to relinquish their new status and influence. As a result the House was divided into three parts, with the Independent bloc in effect in opposition to both the government and the formal opposition, and with a consequent diminution in the capacity of the legislature for consistent long term decision making.

With the collapse of the November moves to bring down the Kenilorea government Mamaloni began to consider resignation. A month later Francis Aorau died suddenly. As suspicions that he had been poisoned spread through Honiara, Mamaloni handed in his resignation. It was followed by an upsurge of rumours that a 'Malaita Mafia' had been formed to 'get rid of good politicians and promising public servants', and that 'a politician is behind all the threat' (Melanesian Nius 19 January 1977). These rumours, publicized in a new 'independent' newspaper with which Mamaloni and one of
his ex ministers were closely connected, caused only transient agitation in
the parliament, but were taken more seriously in Mamalon's isolated
electorate. In some areas the rumours militated against the Malaitan
leadership of the government and the opposition, and revitalized old
jealousies of the Malaitan hold on the wage-earning workforce.

INDEPENDENCE: MOMENTUM AND COUNTER-MOMENTUM

The attempt by the House in its first months to secure a more reliable
mandate for constitutional decision-making, by referral of the
constitutional report 'back to the people', was largely unsuccessful. The
report was concerned primarily with the type of post-independence
government, about which many villagers felt they had little to contribute.
In addition, such consultations often had a cost for villagers, in time and
occasionally in cash or goods, which was rarely considered by the
convenors. 'They are paid for it, not us', was a frequent comment by
villagers who resented the responsibility laid upon them.

Though British officials tended to regard the independence
constitution as immutable, many parliamentarians, trained in the British
system of constitutional change every few years, were disinterested in more
than the short term implications. The constitutional debate in early 1977
provided the first real test of strength for the new parliamentary
groupings, each of which was reluctant to concede to the others. The
impasse was broken by renewed British attempts to arouse enthusiasm for
independence, one of which was the appointment of a constitutional adviser.
Due largely to his negotiating skills, agreement was reached on the
principles of a draft constitution. Though this was approved by the House,
it was a compromise to which none of the groups was totally committed and,
as their relative strength in parliament fluctuated, parliamentary
priorities for the constitution varied accordingly.

One of the central issues in this period was land. For many years the
protectorate government, hypersensitive about formal land rights, had
fuelled a belief that freehold land held by foreign interests was land
'stolen' from Solomon Islanders, and that national government, as a
'foreign interest', had no more right to land than foreign business
enterprises. This led to interpretation of the popular credo that 'all
land belongs to all the people' as implying the return of title to the
original landowners, and to the proposed exclusion of national government
from any land rights. The Kenilorea government was unable, as a minority,
publicly to oppose popular demand for the return of land, but was equally
unable, as the national government, to ignore the distributive issues
involved. When the parliament deferred consideration of a special
committee report on land and rejected a subsequent government white paper,
the debate on land was postponed until the constitutional issues were
clarified.

One of the constitutional issues was the status of Gilbertese
residents who had been resettled in Solomon Islands by the British
government some years earlier. In the aftermath of the Banaban affair and
the expulsion of Asians in Africa, the British parliament was particularly
sensitive to the situation of constitutionally disenfranchised minorities
(Hansard 19-23 May 1978). The hard line adopted by the Solomon Islands on the Gilbertese issue, originally intended to strengthen its bargaining position in the independence negotiations, quickly became explosive. Populist anti colonialism within Solomon Islands focused Solomons resentment over British high-handedness, both in the earlier resettlement arrangements and in the constitutional discussions, on the unfortunate Gilbertese. It was aggravated by the apparent British denial of what many Solomon Islanders regarded as their unequivocal right to choose their own citizens.

In May 1977 Kenilorea led a small group of parliamentary leaders, selected by the cabinet, to London to negotiate financial arrangements for independence. Dissatisfaction within the group over British handling of the negotiations, and within the Solomons parliament over the lack of consultation, made the proposed settlement of $440 million over four years a highly controversial issue. The parliament refused to allow Kenilorea to bring the settlement before the House, on the grounds that the cabinet had no mandate from the legislature for financial talks (Ben, cited in News Drum 10 June 1977), and stood firm on citizenship and land. Kenilorea, under pressure from the British to move into constitutional talks in July stated that he was prepared to let self-government continue indefinitely.

During this period British attempts to recreate the 1975 momentum towards independence alternately placed the Kenilorea government in a position which was highly vulnerable to parliamentary attack, then patched over the damage with moves which undermined articulate criticism. These moves were a significant factor in the decline of the parliamentary opposition as a political force, but also weakened the Kenilorea government. Kenilorea himself was increasingly isolated as a result of the conflicting pressures on him from the British government, from the different parliamentary groups, from the public service and from within his fragmented cabinet.

With the independence negotiations apparently deadlocked, the British government sent a 'special envoy' to Solomon Islands to discuss the citizenship and land clauses, and constitutional adviser Yash Ghai made an unsuccessful attempt to repeat his earlier achievement in uniting the rival parliamentary groupings. Caught between the British demands for concessions on the Gilbertese issue, and political turbulence at home, the Kenilorea government accepted a hastily-prepared compromise. This resulted in the separation of the issues of Gilbertese citizenship from that of Gilbertese land rights, and the displacement of any discrimination against the Gilbertese from the constitution, which required British parliamentary approval, on to the Solomons parliament and its land legislation.

By mid 1977 colonialism as a political issue was almost moribund and, with attention once again focused on London talks, parliamentary support began to swing towards Kenilorea and established power. As members became more involved in intra parliamentary manoeuvres, they were less inclined than before to appeal to the electorate. Public support for the legislature declined and, after the House voted itself a pay rise, the plan to engage the entire House in the London negotiations drew charges of parliamentary extravagance. Kausimae left the opposition and announced the formation of a new party, the Rural Alliance Party. The opposition made a
belated attempt to distance itself from the controversial London talks but in the short term its decision to boycott the negotiations acted to Kenilorea's advantage. Three members of the opposition defected and Kenilorea was able to reduce the size of the London delegation.

Though the decline of the opposition derived largely from personality factors and from its reliance on Westminster parliamentary tactics, which were widely regarded as disruptive, it was accelerated by the opposition's failure to conciliate the public service, the churches, and the increasingly influential rural councils. As a result, many extra-curricular moves to secure governmental stability focused on Ulufa'alu. In August 1977 the auditors reported a lack of documentation for over $7,000 SIGWU expenditure, and the registrar issued notice of suspension on the Union. SIGWU threatened a nationwide strike. A week after the suspension was imposed the auditors reported that the documentation had been found, but the suspension was not lifted until the chief justice upheld a SIGWU appeal two months later. The publicity which during this period was given to the implication of financial malpractice within SIGWU reflected adversely on the opposition and with the return of the London delegation in triumph the government for the first time had the upper hand.

Among the concessions won by the Solomons team at the London talks were the right of the National Parliament to elect a Solomon Islands citizen as governor-general, a slight increase in the overall amount of the financial settlement, and a large grant instead of the previous soft loan component. Though a senior Colonial Office official later commented that 'we didn't really give them that much', these changes further discredited Ulufa'alu's National Democratic Party (NADEPA), which had claimed that 'there was no way the conference could improve [the settlement's] quality which [is] quite different from increasing it, but at any rate, to increase the amount ... is almost impossible' (News and Views 15 September 1977). One concession by the Solomons team to British reluctance to appear interventionist in post independence internal matters was in the details of its provincial government proposals. (Solomon Islands 1977:15-16). As a result, electoral response to the proposed constitution was ambivalent, but it brought a loose alliance within parliament, based on mutual responsibility for the successful negotiations, between the government and the Independent Group.

Though the report of the constitutional conference received parliamentary approval at the 1977 budget sitting, difficulties with the legal details delayed preparation of the Independence Order until March 1978. In late 1977 the government began to flex its newly acquired muscle, to which Ulufa'alu responded with a motion of no confidence in Kenilorea's cabinet. The seven hour debate collapsed without a vote. In a characteristic risk-minimizing technique, the House evaded the issues raised and concentrated on the main personalities involved and their relative fitness for the prime ministership.
SECESSION: MELANESIAN VARIATIONS ON A THEME

In late 1977 and early 1978 Western resentments of central government, which were revived by the changes to the constitutional clauses on provincial government, resulted in the rapid spread of a secession movement in the Western Solomons. A number of Westerners, convinced that provincial government would not answer their problems and that central government would not meet their demands, regarded 'breakaway' as the only alternative. Divisions within the Western parliamentary contingent, which was split between the three parliamentary groups, intensified as parliamentarians voiced conflicting views on the issue and sought to reconcile their national alignments with electoral pressures. The situation was aggravated by the return to the West of an entrepreneurial ex-politician who had been soundly defeated for his Honiara seat in 1976 and had decided that Western politics offered him a new and promising future. He attached himself to the Western Council as its 'political adviser', and became the leading proponent of secession.

In a somewhat bathetic facsimile of the Bougainvillean secessionist confrontation, the Western demands reached a crescendo shortly before independence. These demands, toned down after meetings between the Council, Western parliamentarians and central government representatives, finally became:

That the Solomon Islands Government should give serious consideration at the forthcoming Legislative Assembly meeting to granting State Government to the Western Solomons with full control over finance, natural resources, internal migration, land, legislation, and administration before Independence, and if this is not granted the Western Solomons will not be participating in the national Independence celebrations and may possibly declare eventual unilateral independence.

(Western Council Minute 20/78, March 1978).

The national government moved quickly to set up the Special Committee on Provincial Government for which the Independence Order provided (Solomon Islands 1978:195), but to the West an alliance with the Committee was a 'fall-back' option. Though one of the parliamentary leaders announced in February 1978 that the movement had converted to a watchdog role to ensure that the West received full autonomy under a state government system (Talasasa, cited in News Dran 17 February 1978), the Western Council - and its 'political adviser' in particular - was not prepared to relinquish the initiative and continued to press for secession.

For Kenilorea's government, the situation was complicated by the delay in preparation of the Independence Order. Though the British government kept up the pressure with the somewhat premature dispatch in February of an 'expert in organizing independence ceremonies', the Independence Order did not come before the House until April. By that time Kenilorea had increased the financial allocation to the councils, rejected state government for the West, and improved his government's parliamentary position by the appointment of two leading Independents as ministers. Despite a walk-out by six Western members and four of the opposition, in protest
against government handling of the Western situation, the Order was passed. Fresh talks commenced with the Western Council, during which it became clear that the secessionist leaders, trapped by the expectations they had aroused and the uncompromising stance they had adopted, could not back down. Central government, also trapped by the publicity and hindered by the imminence of independence, could find no mutually acceptable ground on which to negotiate. By June, a month before independence, the protagonists were immobilized.

The pressure was eased, paradoxically, by an additional complication: the fortuitous publication in the national newspaper of an anonymous verse inimical to the West's claims and aspirations (News Drum 9 June 1978). The Provincial Government Committee, which had been warily evading the Western demands, immediately and publicly condemned the ill-timed publication. National government, slower to respond and embarrassed by the incident, which had been due to a slip by a senior member of staff of the government-controlled paper, found itself accused on all sides of irresponsibility. A week after the publication the Western minister of home affairs, whose responsibilities for local government had placed him over previous months in a politically invidious position, resigned from cabinet.

The main thrust of the West's 'Ode' campaign was towards central government culpability for the publication, which provided the West with a strong lever to press for compensatory concessions to its cause, and reinforcement with the electorate for its stance. Central government responded with a diversionary investigation into the identity of the author, which had little effect until a rumour erroneously attributed the verse to a source close to the chief minister. The possibility that the author's identity could be used against Kenilorea brought a further flurry of political manoeuvring by the Western bloc and other ambitious leaders. Non-government Western parliamentarians formed a joint committee with council representatives to negotiate compensation for the damage to provincial pride, and to further the Western claims for autonomy. With independence only weeks away central government vacillated over the issue and amount of compensation, which provided an easy way out of the dilemma despite the dangerous precedent it would set, and the delay drew further opprobrium on the chief minister.

Though Kenilorea had attempted during this period to improve cabinet cohesion by the formation of a government 'United Democratic Action Group' (UDAG), tensions within cabinet were intensified by electoral pressure on the two remaining Western ministers, by the need to decide on an uncontroversial candidate for governor-general, and by the rigid application of British protocol in preparations for the independence ceremony. Kenilorea faced an additional problem with the conviction of and imposition of a prison sentence on Ulufa'alu and Kenilorea's controversial special secretary, Francis Saemala; for a 'disorderly conduct' incident outside the expatriate-controlled Yacht Club. Shortly before independence the powerful minister for finance, Ben Kinika, resigned as deputy chief minister, ostensibly because the Independence Order left his future position unclear.
INDEPENDENCE: 'WE ARE NOW MASTERS OF OUR OWN POLITICAL DESTINY...'

The first sitting of parliament after independence coincided with the second full meeting of the Provincial Government Committee and with the failure of a high court appeal by Ulufa'alu and Saemala. This resulted in a tangled series of negotiations and shifting alliances as ambitious politicians tried to take over the leadership of both the opposition and the government. After the collapse of a move by the deputy leader of the opposition to replace Ulufa'alu, parliamentary attention focused on Kenilorea, who had refused demands that he dismiss Saemala, and on the possibility of a vote of no confidence. Aware that whoever moved a no confidence motion was likely to be accused of disruptive personal ambitions and to be scapegoated in the election for a new prime minister, potential candidates privately offered support to possible rivals, but declined to bring the motion themselves. The impasse was overcome when an unlikely contender for prime ministership was induced to sponsor the motion, but it did not reach the floor of the House. Previous experience and the equivocal negotiations made the challengers uncertain of the reliability of their allies, and in a relatively rapid volte-face they pressed their colleague to withdraw his motion.

By the last quarter of 1978 provincial government had become a political bandwagon. Parliamentarians on the Provincial Government Committee began to coalesce for parliamentary vote, and to throw their weight against the Kenilorea government. Other parliamentarians courted and deferred to Committee members, and on occasion preempted by motions in parliament decisions that had been 'leaked' from the Committee. In September the non government groups demonstrated new found strength with the defeat of the government over a motion to review the public service, a victory which some parliamentarians regarded as a de facto vote of no confidence.

After the collapse of the August moves for a vote of no confidence, Kenilorea filled the last of the vacant ministries which had attracted some independents to a more pro government stance. Preoccupation at senior administrative and cabinet level with the budget and post independence matters overshadowed the protracted provincial government issue, and by November public interest was on the wane. Leakage of some Committee decisions, an accumulation of matters on which government action was frozen pending the Committee's report, and a growing suspicion that the results would not justify the time and expense, made a number of erstwhile sympathizers impatient. Parliamentarians and cabinet members, many of whom had been directly or indirectly snubbed by the Committee over previous months, withdrew into cautious preparation of their stance when the provincial government issue came before parliament. Some Westerners attempted to focus the anticipated challenge to Kenilorea's government on the Western cause, but this took second place to the new strength of parliamentary opposition to Kenilorea personally. After the test of strength over the motion to review the public service, the alliance of the opposition and independents from the Provincial Government Committee drew sufficient numbers to reject the budget, which was passed by one vote on the second reading and defeated by one vote on the third.
The post independence reform thrust demonstrated by the defeat of the budget soon collapsed. Kenilorea, who had stated prior to the vote that he would not resign over it, moved that the ministry of finance be authorized to continue supply for the constitutional four months. The parliament, characteristically grasping the least-risk option, agreed. The ministry for finance then called an immediate halt to all planned expansion and government officials gave extensive publicity to the alleged threat of a rapid decline in rural services. This placed the opposition alliance on the defensive and enabled the government to involve its leading members in a new 'Public Expenditure Committee' to assist the ministry of finance in the preparation of a revised budget. Though the committee had very little time to review the budget, and no power to authorize changes, the token gesture was sufficient to defuse the crisis. Cabinet announced its acceptance of some of the Committee's recommendations, and the budget passed at the next sitting with no major changes either to recurrent or to capital estimates.

THE TURNING POINT

By the time the provincial government report was submitted to the minister for home affairs the country had moved into a stage of difficult distributional choices and trade-offs, where concessions to one area often had to be weighed against the resultant losses to another. The report, on the other hand, was essentially a political document and to a large extent a lagged reaction against colonialism. Many of its recommendations presaged major problems for central government. These included considerable increases in monetary and non monetary costs, complex political and administrative arrangements, a high potential for disunity, a strong bias in favour of the better-developed provinces, and severe limitations on central government capacity for economic management. At the same time, most Solomon Islanders regarded total provincial autonomy as an unrealistic goal, and by Committee fiat as well as by established practice central government retained the final say over many crucial aspects of the proposed provincial government system. In this situation it could well be argued that improvement to the previous decentralization programme required stronger, not weaker, linkages between the provinces and the centre.

The eleventh-hour distribution of the lengthy report to parliamentary members, due to debate it in the May-June session, flustered the insecure minority government. Members of cabinet, aware that the only predictable factor in the imminent debate was that the provincial government issue would be used against them, were reluctant to present the report without detailed consideration. They also knew that to withhold it would be politically unwise. Cabinet therefore decided to table it on a 'take-note' motion, a move which it hoped would provide an indicator of likely parliamentary and public reaction. The motion suggested that the parliament

await the proposals of Government regarding the adoption of a suitable system of Provincial Government for Solomon Islands to be submitted before December 1979, following detailed consideration of the report of the Special Committee.
The non-Cabinet parliamentarians, equally uncertain of the politically optimal stance, refused to be drawn and simply 'took note'. For the Committee parliamentarians, however, the implication that the government was not prepared to accept their report as 'a suitable system of Provincial Government' was a slight which intensified their hostility towards government. The motion thus did little more than commit cabinet to production of a potentially controversial alternative to the report.

In July, cabinet appointed a working party of experienced public servants, chaired by its best educated minister, to prepare a white paper for the next sitting. At the same time, government departments were preparing for the important debate on the next development plan and for the budget sitting in November. Members of parliament began to prepare for the 1980 elections, and political parties commenced their customary pre-election renaissance. In the expectation that the white paper would represent government counter-proposals to the Committee's recommendations, many non-government parliamentarians adopted the Committee report as the symbol of their anti-cabinet stance. The supremacy of political alignments over issues was strengthened, unwittingly, by the ministry responsible for the white paper. Aware of the incipient split, ministry officials kept tight security on the paper's proposals. As a result, parliamentarians had little opportunity to discuss the respective merits of the white paper and the report with their electorates, and relied more strongly on their predetermined parliamentary alliances.

In the event, the white paper was a remarkably astute political document. It disarmed much of the nascent opposition by taking a stance that was 'largely in agreement' with the report and by minimizing points of conflict, so that it preempted rather than challenged its predecessor. It used to advantage the demonstrated reluctance of many parliamentarians to 'rock the boat' or to debate unfamiliar detail and established cabinet firmly as the leading proponent of provincial government. In providing a 'least-risk' compromise of the type to which parliament repeatedly had shown itself most receptive, it won parliamentary approval for an approach which in real terms committed central government to very little that had not been foreshadowed by the 1973 decentralization programme and subsequent developments in local government. Finally, by a resolute claim to 'at least' twelve months for planning and preparation of legislation, it deferred awkward questions of implementation until well into the life of the next House.

The combination of the scheduled September and November sittings into one massive pre-Christmas session to deal with the annual budget, the next development plan and another motion of no confidence, *inter alia*, cast the provincial government debate into the shade. Members of the House, who by that stage had a considerable personal and political stake in the finalization of the issue before the 1980 elections, passed the white paper with a resounding majority. The crucial decisions on the optimal means to attain the desired ends were relegated to the bureaucracy, the body which most national and provincial politicians previously regarded as the main rival to their power and authority.
This new willingness in parliament to allow the public service a major role in an intensely political issue was an important landmark in the decolonization process. Due largely to the momentum created by the provincial government issue, by the end of 1979 much of the earlier tension between the political and the bureaucratic arms of government had been dissipated. Non-cabinet parliamentarians were less inclined to treat the public service as the cabinet's exclusive property and secret political weapon, and public servants demonstrated an increased ability to differentiate between the parliamentary institution and its personalities, many of whom they did not respect.

To a considerable extent the main hopes for the provincial government system, accelerated political development and improved local participation, were achieved by the process of planning it. More than any other event of the decolonization period, the provincial government exercise mobilized a broad spectrum of political, administrative, educated and grassroots interest and, more than any other issue, it symbolized the transition from dependency to nationhood. In particular, it demonstrated the inter-dependency of national and provincial roles, and legitimized the centre. At the same time, it strengthened local government and increased central responsiveness to provincial concerns to an extent that answered many of the problems the new system was intended to overcome.

1980: THE ACCOUNTING

With provincial government defused as an election campaign issue, the various parliamentary groups turned to consolidation of their electoral standing. Several gained an early advantage for their 1980 candidature and, if necessary, for a subsequent move into local government, by successfully contesting provincial seats. Over half the members, by that stage cognisant of the inevitability and power of party politics, joined one or other of the existing parties. Kenilorea upgraded UDAG into the United Party and Mamaloni joined Kausimae's Rural Alliance Party, renamed the People's Alliance. The core members of the parliamentary Independent Group drew up an 'independent' manifesto and, under the new leadership of Francis Billy Hilly, campaigned as a de facto fourth party.

Though the United Party had only eleven of the recontesting members, Kenilorea was in a relatively strong position for the six months prior to the election. In January, shortly after the council elections had given NADEPA control over the Honiara Town Council, the government initiated a long overdue investigation into the affairs of the difficult council, and replaced the elected body with an appointed authority. In February the government announced a record trade surplus, the importance of which was boosted in April when Britain cut its budgetary allocation to overseas aid. The other parties, with no equivalent reinforcement, tended to rely on numbers and tactics, to their own detriment.

In the run-up to the elections, which had been postponed until August 1980 due to problems with registration of voters, the entire parliament came under attack for having approved a $4,000 terminal grant to its members. Protests against the grant, largely from the educated, wage-earning cadre, were used in the campaign against some sitting members, but
outs ide the urban centres had little influence on the election results. In
the pragmatic and often sceptical rural electorates political exploitation
of central government was less important than conscientious representation
and, in particular, than a demonstrated capacity to direct government
resources to parochial needs. One consequence was that parliamentary
antagonisms to Kenilorea proved difficult to amplify into an election
issue, and on occasion told against their exponents.

While party affiliation gave no significant advantage for most of the
outgoing members, 64 per cent of whom were defeated, Kenilorea's party won
half the seats it contested. Almost 75 per cent of the new House
eventually claimed party allegiance. Unlike the 1976 election, when seven
of the nine outgoing ministers retained their seats, cabinet membership
also gave very little advantage, and six of Kenilorea's ministers were
defeated. This left Kenilorea's party with seven of the thirteen reelected
members, but only three previous ministers and none of the strong graduate
contingent. With the exception of Ulufa'alu, the only survivor from the
previous NADEPA members, the remaining reelected members were Independent.
These included the other three university graduates and Waita Ben, the
retiring minister for agriculture and lands and one of the most successful
electoral performers both in 1976 and in 1980. Though the People's
Alliance increased its parliamentary representation from one to eight, it
lost Kausimae, who had campaigned against Kenilorea in his home electorate,
and only Mamaloni achieved significant electoral success. This meant that
the new House, like the old, held considerable potential for leadership
conflict but, on the whole, a very weak electoral mandate.

While the 1980 election was, first, a 'get with the strength' vote, it
was also a vote for professionalism in politics. Seventy-one per cent of
the new House had previous experience of politics in some form, and one
third of the new members had been defeated candidates in 1976. Almost 90
per cent had worked at some stage in the public service and though eight
members represented themselves as farmers or businessmen all of them had
administrative experience. A significant element in the public image of
political professionalism was conscientious representation. All the
reelected members had shown above average sensitivity to electoral opinion
in the previous House, but at the same time most were relatively well
educated men who saw their role as more than village mouthpiece.

Though the high turnover of previous representatives indicated
widespread dissatisfaction with the performance of the 1976 House, the
voting figures show that only in seven electorates was the vote clearly a
vote against the sitting member. Twenty-six of the thirty-six recontesting
members lost votes by comparison with their 1976 performance, but in most
cases this was little more than could be attributed to a 37 per cent
increase in the total number of candidates. While the performance ranking
of 75 per cent of the old House declined, twelve of the losers scored
better than the lowest-ranking member to be reelected, and fourteen had a
higher score than the lowest-ranking new member. Three of the defeated
candidates actually held or improved on their previous numbers. This
suggests that in the eyes of their electorates most members of the
difficult 'transition' House performed far more creditably than the events
of 1976-80, and the high turnover of members, indicated. In effect, new
members were voted in but the old House was not voted out.
Whereas analysis of the 1976 House showed that a number of major changes occurred in the legislature despite a relatively low representative turnover, the 1980 House with its very high turnover showed very little significant change from 1976. The proportion of the House with previous national legislative experience jumped from 21 per cent to 42 per cent in 1976 (Chick 1980:27), but remained approximately the same in 1980. Educational levels showed only a slight decline in the number with little or no primary education. The number with university degrees, which had increased dramatically in 1976, was unchanged in 1980. One graduate who made a last minute change of electorate lost; one who had been defeated in 1976 won. The number with secondary, technical and non-degree tertiary education was almost exactly the same, though the number of teachers increased from six to nine in the new House. This was less significant than it seemed as rural teachers often were the only educated group in 1980 which had close and regular contact with rural electorates.

The age range also showed little change, with an average age of thirty-seven years in the new House as against thirty-eight years in the old, a slight narrowing of the age range to between thirty and fifty-two years, and a small increase in the number of under-forty-year-olds at the expense of the over-fifty bracket. Of the 'old guard', those who had been involved in Marching Rule a generation earlier and those who had been 'professional politicians' in the 1960s and early 1970s, none survived (though one, Peter Salaka, made a comeback as a result of his exploitation of the Western secession movement). The 1980 election could be said to have marked the real end of Marching Rule, the end of confrontation and the beginning of electoral identification with central government.

On the other hand, the 1980 elections showed no major changes to voter participation. Voting turnout ranged from over 80 per cent in two electorates to 34 per cent in North Guadalcanal (see Table 1). Significantly, the only two members of the 1976 House to show an improvement in their percentage of the vote after adjustment for changes in the number of candidates, Kapini and Tovua, came from the two Guadalcanal electorates with less than 40 per cent voting turnout. As in previous elections, voter participation often reflected the degree of dependence of the provinces on national government resources, as opposed to their own or non-government resources, for development. In the better developed provinces, West, Central and Guadalcanal, voting turnout was medium to low, while in the Makira-Ulawa electorates the lowest participation rate was 73 per cent. Only six members of the 1980 House polled over 50 per cent of votes cast and only two, Kenilorea and Mamalonu, received a clear electoral mandate from over 50 per cent of their registered voters. Approximately 75 per cent of the new parliament represented no more than 25 per cent of their eligible voters (see Table 2).

THE FUTURE: HEADS YOU WIN, TAILS I LOSE

In August 1980 Kenilorea again faced Mamalonu in the contest for prime minister, and was reelected on the first ballot with a majority of twenty-five to five votes. Though his party had the highest representation of any
Table 1

Voter participation by provincial area, 1980 elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of registered voters casting votes</th>
<th>Malaita</th>
<th>Santa Isabel</th>
<th>Makira/Ulawa</th>
<th>Western</th>
<th>Central Is.</th>
<th>Guadalcanal</th>
<th>Honiara (Eastern Outer Is.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Over 80</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 to 80</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 to 70</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 to 60</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 to 50</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 to 40</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total electorates</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
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</table>

Total registered voters

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Malaita</th>
<th>Santa Isabel</th>
<th>Makira/Ulawa</th>
<th>Western</th>
<th>Central Is.</th>
<th>Guadalcanal</th>
<th>Honiara (Eastern Outer Is.)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29,771</td>
<td>5,087</td>
<td>6,885</td>
<td>18,877</td>
<td>8,726</td>
<td>21,065</td>
<td>5,520</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table 2

Electoral support for successful candidates, 1980 elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provincial area</th>
<th>Electorate</th>
<th>No. of candidates</th>
<th>Successful candidate</th>
<th>Votes for successful candidate as percentage of registered voters</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malaita</td>
<td>North West Malaita</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Olea</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lau &amp; Mbaelelela</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Suri</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>West Kwara'ae</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>*Taki</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East Malaita</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Maetia</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central Malaita</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Bataiofesi</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>West Kwaio</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Kuka</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East Kwaio</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Pa'asifoabae</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>West Are'Are</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Aihunu</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East Are'Are</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>*Kenilorea</td>
<td>62.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Small Malaita</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Harihiru</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Malaita Outer Is.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Keyaumi</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guadalcanal</td>
<td>West Guadalcanal</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Teke</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Guadalcanal</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mangale</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East Guadalcanal</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Alebua</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North-East Guadalcanal</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>*Ben</td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Guadalcanal</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>*Kapini</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central Guadalcanal</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>*Tovua</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honiara</td>
<td>West Honiara</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>declared invalid on appeal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East Honiara</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>*Ulufa'alu</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Islands</td>
<td>Russells &amp; Savo</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ngina</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rennell/Bellona</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>John</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gela</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Harper</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Isabel</td>
<td>West Isabel</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Lulei</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East Isabel</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Evo</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>Shortlands</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Salaka</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Choiseul</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Qurusu</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Choiseul</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>*Dorolovomo</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vella Lavella</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>G. Talasasa</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ranongga &amp; Simbo</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>*Hilly</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gizo Kolombangara</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>*Wickham</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vona Vona/Rendova &amp; Tetepari</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Soakai</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roviana &amp; North New Georgia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>*Beti</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marovo</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>*Ghemu</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makira/Ulawa</td>
<td>West Makira</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mamaloni</td>
<td>67.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East Makira</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>*Kinika</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ulawa &amp; Ugi</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mamau</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temotu</td>
<td>Temotu Pele</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>*Bonunga</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Temotu Nende</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Tropa</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*retiring member of 1976 House.
group, it did not have an absolute majority. Rather than appoint his cabinet from his minor supporters, Kenilorea opted for a coalition. An eventual agreement with the independents enabled him to form a strong cabinet which included four of the parliament's five degree holders, nine of the thirteen reelected members, and all four reelected ministers. On the other hand, the need to negotiate with the independents as a group, a consequence of the influence of the old Independent Group, resulted in a severe imbalance in cabinet representation. The better-developed provinces, West and Guadalcanal, received seven of the eleven ministries for 36 per cent of the national population. Malaita, with about one third of the country's population, had one plus the prime minister, and two of the eight council areas had no cabinet representation. In addition, the ratio of six United Party to six independents, four of whom belonged to the old Independent Group and continued to act as a party, made Kenilorea's position in cabinet much weaker than his parliamentary numbers and the vote for the prime ministership indicated.

Theoretically the coalition gave the Kenilorea government twenty-two members - the twelve cabinet members and ten United Party backbenchers - against an opposition of Mamalonii and his seven new People's Alliance members. Though four of the remaining seven unaligned members, including the two NADEPA representatives, indicated that they would lean to the opposition, neither the opposition nor the independents, nor both collectively, had the number to defeat the government.

With the change to a government majority, the influence of political expediency on the independence constitution registered almost immediately. Whereas the power structure and the highly personalized divisions in the 1976 House tended to obfuscate the constitutional separation of government, opposition and independents, in the 1980 House it was clear that the old Independent Group was in fact a party grouping, distinct from parliamentary independence. One problem was that the constitution reflected the earlier political relationships and did not define the status, role or privileges of the official opposition or the independents other than for the purpose of appointment of the leader of the two groups. It therefore employed the term 'independent group' rather than 'independent members', and defined an 'independent group' as 'a group of members of Parliament whose members are independent both of the Government and of any opposition group and whose number includes a leader who commands their support' (Solomon Islands 1978:179). While it provided for a situation where the opposition or the independents were not strong enough to warrant official recognition by the appointment of a leader, and allowed an absolute majority of the parliament in effect to vote them out of existence, it did not cover a situation where the leader of one group moved into another. Confusion of the assumptions underlying the constitutional clauses with the situation in the previous House led in October 1980 to the appointment of Billy Hilly, deputy prime minister in the 1980 House, to the parliamentary leadership of the independents, most of whom had no ties with his Independent Group.
1980 AND AFTER

Though many of the problems of the transition period have been overcome by attrition if not by confrontation, and though the Kenilorea government superficially is in a fairly impregnable position, the major problems for the 1976 House have yet to be solved. Solomon Islands is still a small country with a small, relatively high-cost polity. In this situation personal relationships and internecine rivalries tend to dominate the decision making processes to an extent that makes a parliamentary majority fairly insignificant. Kenilorea's triumph at the 1980 elections, part of which was a consequence of the unusual circumstances of the previous four years but much of which must be attributed to Kenilorea himself, focuses those rivalries even more strongly on the prime minister. As previous events have indicated, victory at the polls has very little bearing on parliamentary alignments between elections. Kenilorea needs a far greater majority than he has to control the parliament effectively in the Solomons circumstances, and with the traditional fluidity of Solomons alliances even his present majority cannot be considered reliable. He now has a strong and well educated cabinet, but one which contains the strongest contenders in the present parliament for his own position. The polarization of macro and micro concerns during the colonial period, and the resultant conflict between the parliament's national and electoral roles, make the government particularly vulnerable to any mobilization of public opinion. The provincial government exercise has already indicated that the more advanced provinces are only prepared to subsidize the less developed areas when they have reached the levels of living to which their own people aspire, and that they cannot be expected to relinquish voluntarily their 'right' to the superior services they now enjoy. As a result of these advantages, their representatives now control the cabinet, and as conscientious representatives and astute politicians they cannot place an amorphous 'national interest' ahead of the interests of their own electorates. Though the first Kenilorea government had little scope for reform, the second Kenilorea government is by virtue of its position answerable for all the problems not only of the transition period, but of the entire colonial era. Kenilorea in effect has won the war, but has yet to win the peace.

NOTES

1 The term 'parliament' is used throughout to designate the legislative body, which was renamed several times during the constitutional changes leading to independence.

2 See Grocott (1975) for a brief resume of party formation and alliances up to July 1974. Grocott tends to overestimate the importance of party allegiances in Solomon Islands politics, but provides a useful insight into the background of the personal rivalries which dominated the decolonization period.
See Russell (1970), Woolford (n.d.) and Paia (1975) for the details of this system and its place in Solomons constitutional development. In retrospect, the four years of experimentation with the committee system left the Solomons parliament without the experience it needed to operate a Westminster system effectively during decolonization.

Risk minimization, as opposed to maximization of 'profit' or selection of the hypothetically optimal alternative, is a widespread feature of Melanesian decision-making. See Brookfield (1969, 1972) for a more general analysis.

The scores of successful candidates in 1976 and 1980, using a 1976 base, are given in Appendix 2.

The West Honiara election was declared invalid on appeal.
APPENDIX 1

Chronology of Solomon Islands Political Development

1893  Solomon Islands declared a British Protectorate within the Western Pacific High Commission.

1921  First Advisory Council, not more than four members.

1922  Government appointment of district and village headmen authorized under first Native Administration Regulation.

1927  Membership of Advisory Council increased to seven expatriates.

1939-40  Government suppression of pan-Solomons movement for native advisory forum.

1944  Government introduces small native councils on African model.

1946  Marching Rule disrupts development of councils.

1947  Marching Rule leaders imprisoned.

1950  Four nominated Solomon Islanders join Advisory Council.

1952  Headquarters of Western Pacific High Commission transferred to Honiara.

1958  Four official members and ten nominated members, including five Solomon Islanders, in Advisory Council.

1960  Advisory Council replaced by Executive and Legislative Councils, the latter with eleven official members and ten nominated members including six Solomon Islanders.

1964  Constitutional change provides for eleven official members and ten others, consisting of two nominated members, seven elected by electoral colleges of local government councillors, and one directly elected for Honiara.

1965  First elections of Solomon Islanders to Legislative Council under 1964 constitution, and formation of Democratic Party by Mariano Kelesi and others.

1966  Legislative Council recommends increase to fifteen officials and fourteen elected members, and makes provision for two nominated non-voting members.

1967  First general open elections in thirteen of fourteen constituencies.
Public Service Advisory Board established on the direction of High Commissioner for the Western Pacific, 'as a first step in the process of separating control of the public service from the influence of politics'.

Constitutional change replaces Legislative Council with Governing Council consisting of the High Commissioner, seventeen elected members, three ex officio members and up to six official members. First elected majority of Solomon Islanders. Committee system of government introduced. Formation of Labour Party.

Public service members withdrawn from Legislative Council. Solomons United Party (SUN) started by David Kausimae.

Special Select Committee recommends return to conventional Westminster system.

Constitutional change provides for Governing Council of three public service members and twenty-four elected members. Formation of United Solomon Islands Party (USIPA) and People's Progressive Party (PPP).

Governing Council reorganized as Legislative Assembly with ministerial system. Mamaloni elected first chief minister. High Commissioner for the Western Pacific becomes governor of B.S.I.P.

Mamaloni resigns and is reelected chief minister. Formation of SIGWU.

Internal self-government. Legislative Assembly increased from twenty-four to thirty-eight members. Kenilorea elected chief minister.


Independence 7 July 1978. Special Committee on Provincial Government established.

First elections after independence. Kenilorea reelected as prime minister and Mamaloni replaces Ulufa'alu as leader of the opposition.
### APPENDIX 2


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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* Performance ranking was derived from an index based on the candidate's percentage of the vote and the number of his votes by comparison with the average per candidate in his electorate.

**As the candidate changed electorates in 1980, no comparison can be drawn between his 1976 and his 1980 score.
REFERENCES


FIJI: POST-INDEPENDENCE POLITICS

J. Nation

'... this is one of the few matters within the range of political science in which there is complete agreement between theory and practical experience. Communal elections strengthen communal feelings because in public debate appeals are made principally to the interest of each community, and within each community the more violent and selfish spokesmen of special interests outbid the moderates and public-spirited.'

W.J.M. Mackenzie (quoted in the Royal Commission into Fiji's electoral system 1975).

'Few societies exhibit a more marked degree of institutional separation between the major sections of their population than does Fiji, yet group violence has seldom occurred - never on a significant scale.'


Ten years ago Fiji achieved independence in a fairly low-key atmosphere; it was not the culmination of a nationalist struggle and the constitution providing for independence was a compromise requiring continuing cooperation to make it work rather than a monument that would stand forever. The initiative for independence (and the self-government that preceeded it) had come from the predominantly Indian National Federation Party (NFP) which espoused nationalism but lacked the nation to make it a reality, a problem that its leaders attributed to the preservation of communal representation. Before the 1972 election they were confident that they could win a significant proportion of the Fijian vote, just as the Fijian-based Alliance had succeeded in winning some 38 per cent of the Indian vote in the 1966 elections. The NFP had attracted to its camp a number of promising Fijian leaders who combined high rank, education and political ability. The almost complete lack of Fijian support for their party at the polls in 1972 came as something of a shock for NFP leaders. Matt Wilson summed up the results of NFP attempts to woo Fijians in these terms: 'So the Fijians today will listen to the NFP; they will offer its members a bilo of yamona and bid them a courteous farewell .... They won't vote for it.' (Fiji Times 4 May 1972).

From 1972 onwards the NFP's attitude to the political framework within which it operated began slowly to change. Recognizing that attempts to win Fijian votes promised little return in relation to effort expended the NFP turned more towards winning support away from the Indian Alliance. It
started to become the Indian communal party that the constitution encouraged it to be. It also began to go soft on common roll, turning more to the position taken by the Alliance Party in 1969 constitutional talks, that a compromise with communal representation was necessary for the time being. The Alliance meanwhile had come to regard the existing electoral system as more permanently desirable.

THE CONSTITUTION

Fiji's electoral system is extremely complicated and reflects the many compromises that went into its creation. Even the majority of Fiji's citizens do not understand how it works and the full implications of its operation were clearly not realized by those who fashioned it.

The first principle of the constitution is the racial reservation of constituencies. Seats in the House of Representatives are specified as being open to Indians, to Fijians, or to General Electors. There cannot be electoral contests between members of the three major racial groups and the number of seats is fixed at twenty-two for Indians, twenty-two for Fijians and eight for General Electors.

The second principle of the constitution is that twenty-seven of the fifty-two seats are to be elected by voters as they are registered on 'communal rolls', while twenty-five are elected by those same voters as they are registered on national rolls. Communal rolls are composed of electors of the same race while national rolls include all races. Each voter therefore has his name on four separate rolls: one as a voter in his communal constituency, and one for each of his national constituencies (Indian, Fijian and General Elector). Each voter therefore casts four votes in a general election, one for the communal member of his own race, and one each for his choices of his three national members (Indian, Fijian, General Elector). Indian and Fijian national constituencies have the same boundaries and rolls because there is the same number of each (ten), while General Elector national constituencies are larger since there are fewer of them (five). The communal constituencies (twelve Fijian, twelve Indian and three General Elector) have different boundaries and different rolls.

Fiji's constitution is sometimes interpreted as establishing Fijian political predominance, a view which seems to find confirmation in the Alliance monopoly of government since 1966. Such a view, however, confuses two distinct issues, an electoral system that dictates the racial composition of parliament, and protection in the constitution of certain Fijian interests.

The first issue, that of the establishment of the racial composition of parliament, does not necessarily support the view that Fijians can always maintain predominance. Fijians can never occupy more than twenty-two out of fifty-two seats in the House of Representatives. It has been argued by Vasil (1972) that the Fijians can 'count on the backing of at least 30 (22 Fijians and 8 General) of the 52 members', but this argument overlooks the fact that fifteen of these thirty members are elected by national roll voters. As communal groups, Fijians can only elect only twelve members and General Electors only three.
The remaining fifteen members of Vasil's natural majority of thirty occupy racially reserved seats but are not communal representatives. They are, instead, elected by and responsible to multiracial constituencies. To include these fifteen members automatically with the fifteen Fijian and General Elector communal members to give Fijians a dominant position of thirty members is a mistake a political scientist might make, but one which politicians have always avoided. The Alliance government's majority has never depended simply on the thirty Fijian and General Elector members; in fact the Alliance has never held all thirty seats, and gaining them would be impossible without a very substantial share of Indian votes. To hold power under the system of racially reserved seats the Alliance has to elect Indian national members, though these Indians can be supported largely by the votes of the Fijian and General Elector voters on the national rolls. Similarly the NFP is required to use its influence with Indian voters to secure the election of Fijian and General Elector national members.

The April 1977 election, in which the Indian-based NFP gained two more seats than the Alliance, has shown conclusively that the racial reservation principle does not prevent an Indian political party from gaining an electoral victory (see appendix). 'Fijian political paramountcy', though it is not an entirely empty phrase, does not mean that the constitution provides for an electoral system weighted inevitably in favour of Fijians.

The other issues seen as an integral part of 'Fijian political paramountcy' are the constitutionally established protection of two areas of particular interest to Fijians, land and the Fijian Administration. Fijian land ownership was guaranteed by the deed of cession and safeguarded throughout the colonial period. Although many Indians depend upon access to Fijian land for their livelihoods, neither they nor their political leaders have seriously questioned since independence the Fijian right to ownership of land or to the ultimate control over its use. The Fijian Administration, a separate system of local government, was so jealously guarded during the colonial era that a defensive mentality toward it grew up among Fijians, somehow associating the Administration with their whole way of life. The Administration was in fact radically transformed in the mid 1960s and now bears little resemblance to its earlier form, but its protection is still an issue that weighs much more heavily emotionally among Fijians than the comparatively small costs and difficulties which its preservation entails, weigh among Indians. According to the constitution, legislation affecting land or the Fijian Administration requires a three-quarters majority of both houses if it is to pass, and that majority must include six of the eight nominees of the Fijian Council of Chiefs in the Senate. This does entrench in the constitution certain Fijian interests, but the protection of those interests is the maintenance of traditions long accepted and respected among all groups in Fiji.

The constitution, then, does safeguard some Fijian interests and does provide for racial reservation in parliament. Neither singly nor together, however, do those elements amount to 'Fijian paramountcy'. If many Fiji Indians feel that they lack security and are at the mercy of Fijians, that feeling arises out of fourteen years of Alliance government (itself the continuation of eighty years of colonial rule) rather than out of any injustice inherent within the constitution.
THE QUESTION OF INTERESTS

The question of whether Indian interests have received fair treatment under fourteen years of Alliance government is one that a political scientist might justifiably retreat from in the name of objectivity. It would be surprising, and perhaps contrary to human nature, if the Fijian majority in cabinet had not tended to lean a little to one side, but, in view of the generally weaker position of Fijians in the economy, it is in accordance with modern redistributive values to discriminate in favour of an economically disadvantaged group. The problem this interpretation faces, however, is that there are many poor Indians and many well-off Fijians.

In fact, Fijian interests and Indian interests overlap at many points. Fiji now has a significant degree of social and economic differentiation, particularly within the Indian community. Fijians are less internally differentiated in terms of income and occupational status, and there is also less awareness of differences because they are newer, but social change is occurring rapidly. It seems likely that in the future economic progress will bring about a highly differentiated society in which class-based interests will outweigh race-based interests. Economic progress depends, however, on political stability which is at present bound up in politics based on significant racial definition of interests.

Land remains the major area in which interests are racially defined, although, to a large extent, the constitution has depoliticized the land issue. Any alteration of the present system requires the consent of the Council of Chiefs, which is unchallenged as the official voice of the Fijian community. A protocol also seems to have grown up according to which initiative on land matters should come from the Fijian side. In 1974 a motion by the leader of the opposition, Mr S.M. Koya, calling for the abolition of the Native Lands Trust Board (NLTB), provoked an angry declaration from the chairman of the NLTB that he would henceforth sign no more lease approvals for Indian applicants (Pacific Islands Monthly August 1974). In 1979 a motion by an independent member of the House of Representatives, Ratu Osea Gavidi, to require landowner approval before 'granting or withholding consent to any dealing with leases affecting their land' did not attract a single Indian speaker, although it was supported by a Fijian member of the NFP. At the conclusion of the debate Ratu Osea thanked the Indian members for 'their golden silence', suggesting that it contributed to 'the very objective manner' in which he believed the motion to have been discussed (Hansard September 1979). Three years earlier, during a debate on the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Ordinance (ALTO), there had been a little sniping about which side, Fijian landlord or Indian tenant, should be laying down the rules for discussion. The main National Federation spokesman, Mr K.C. Ramrakha, acknowledged 'the position of the Fijian landowners', asking only that there be further dialogue and consideration of the position of the tiller of the soil, but even this had been too strong for some on the Fijian side (Hansard October 1976). Indian silence in the 1979 debate is more readily explained, however, by the potential divisiveness of the issue within NFP ranks than by a desire to defer to Fijian sensitivity about protocol. The 1976 ALTO debate had left the party divided over whether to accept the bill for its guarantee of thirty years tenure or to reject it because of its new rent reassessment provisions. Any contribution to the debate on Ratu Osea's motion would
also have been divisive. The motion was seconded by Isikeli Nadalo, a Fijian member of their party, although it offered no improvement in the position of tenants and was opposed by Alliance members on the grounds that any restriction on the transferability of a lease would reduce its value and therefore would harm the interests of both landlord and tenant.

For the next ten years or so the land issue can be expected to remain dormant. The ALTO of 1966 laid down minimum conditions for all tenants, including a minimum tenure of ten years with two renewals allowed, provided landowner needs were not greater than those of the tenants at the time of renewal. The 1976 amendment established thirty years as the minimum period of tenure and allowed for an automatic twenty year renewal of all existing leases. Leases will therefore not start to expire before 1996. Any Fijian pressures to alter this, if for example the Alliance party tried to head off Fijian Nationalist pressure, could not succeed, as the constitution requires a three-quarters parliamentary majority for any changes.

The major issue affecting Indian interests which emerged in the April 1977 general election was education. Shortly before the election it was revealed that the minimum university entrance mark required of Fijian students was considerably lower than that required of Indians, or to put it around the other way, Indian students were being required to achieve much higher marks before being awarded places at the university. National Federation Party leaders seized the issue (the timing was perfect) and appeared to gain considerable electoral advantage from it. In fact the policy to offer equal numbers of places to Fijians and Indians was an old one, to which the NFP had previously agreed. At the time at which the policy had been agreed to there had been insufficient Fijians passing the university entrance examination to fill the quota reserved for them. This, however, did little to calm Indian fears on the matter. As Ahmed Ali put it: 'education is to Indians what land is to Fijians' (Ali 1978).

The most recent issue concerning Indian interests is the allegation that the government is by-passing Indians in the selection of senior civil servants. The appointment of Mr Epeli Kacimaiwai (formerly high commissioner to Australia) to the position of secretary for education was interpreted by the NFP as a deliberate passing over of the deputy secretary on the grounds that he was Indian (Fiji Times 16 April 1980). Kacimaiwai's qualification for the job was not questioned (as he is a former educationist and already possesses permanent head status), but it was difficult to avoid the conclusion that Mr Hari Ram, the deputy secretary, had been passed over because this was the second time that this had occurred. Some years earlier a Fijian officer junior to Ram had been promoted out of Education and then transferred back in, over the head of Ram, without the opportunity to appeal. It was reported in the press that Ram had been offered promotions elsewhere but had declined them, thereby refuting the claim that he has been denied promotion per se but, if anything, lending credibility to the allegation that he is being denied the sensitive position of secretary of education.

In fact the civil service is closely regulated by law. All appointments are made by the Public Service Commission and are subject to appeal, thereby removing the possibility of direct political manipulation. At the permanent secretary level, however, all appointments must receive the approval of the prime minister, a constitutional requirement which
recognizes that the relationship between the political and non political heads of a government department has a political element. The Public Service Commission presumably bears in mind the need for appointees with appropriate qualifications to work well with their ministers, as is suggested by the fact that the prime minister has never withheld his approval of a Public Service Commission appointment (Pacific Islands Monthly June 1980).

Later, in the House of Representatives, the deputy leader of the opposition, Mrs Irene Jai Narayan, took up the question in more general terms, moving a motion expressing concern at the racial imbalance in senior civil service positions. It is already policy that there be equal numbers of Fijians and Indians in the civil service; Mrs Narayan urged that there be parity at all levels. In reply, the acting prime minister, Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau, said that the policy of parity applied only at the entry point with promotion thereafter being determined entirely by merit. He said that the suggestion that race influenced promotions in the civil service was 'cheap political propaganda of the worst kind' (Pacific Islands Monthly June 1980). If the worst kind of political propaganda is that which people believe then he is undoubtedly correct. Although there has not been, and under the law there cannot be, blatant discrimination on the basis of race, the feeling within the Indian community is that power over the civil service is in Fijian hands.

THE NFP AND COMMON ROLL

Fourteen years of Alliance government have created, or at least perpetuated, a feeling of unease among Indians, a feeling that they are somehow not fully accepted, despite constitutional assurances of equality for all. NFP leaders point to steady Indian emigration as evidence of insecurity. In this context the civil service issue, like that of educational opportunities, is fitted into the mainstream of Indian communal politics, linking up with the colonial past during which Indian cultural, religious and economic groups tended to coalesce in opposition to the CSR sugar millers, the colonial government and European privilege. Sugar, like land, affected the interests of the bulk of the Indian community, either directly as growers or indirectly as suppliers of services to growers. Since the departure of the CSR it has not been the successful rallying point that it had been and, like land, has tended to be depoliticized.5

The coalition of groups brought together in 1963-64 under the leadership of Mr A.D. Patel to form the Federation Party has successfully institutionalized itself as a party defending Indian interests. It has survived the death of Patel in 1969, the removal of the colonial regime and European privilege, and the depoliticization of the sugar industry. The goal of common roll, which was an essential part of opposition to colonial rule and European privilege, remains, although it has slipped into the background.

A weak surviving link with the origins of the party can also be found in the adherence to a number of populist themes. Although entirely non ideological, and as conservative as one would expect from a party led by lawyers, landlords and businessmen, the NFP from the beginning projected a concern for the small man. During his period as ministerial member for
social services, before the introduction of cabinet government, A.D. Patel founded the Fiji National Provident Fund, a compulsory retirement benefits scheme based on wage and salary deductions and employers' contributions. In the 1972 general election campaign the NFP promised 'immediate water supplies to all areas; the abolition of basic tax; free and compulsory education up to two years of secondary school level and at all levels if the economy permitted; free medical services; old age pensions; the creation of a social security system and a national shipping line' (Ali 1973). Alexander Mamak, apparently under the influence of these promises, was led to describe the NFP as 'the party left of centre', although, as Brij Lal has remarked, this is an unusual characterization of a party led by 'wealthy lawyers, businessmen, landlords and money lenders' (Lal 1980:124). A good example of the limitations imposed on the NFP's populism by the business interests it contains is its silence when bus fares rise.

In 1966 and 1972 the NFP attempted to characterize the Alliance as the party of the elite 'Fijian Establishment' and European vested interests. In 1965 A.D. Patel declared: 'until Fiji is in the hands of only the major races, Fijians and Indians, the situation in the colony will remain as it is' (Pacific Islands Monthly May 1965). He regarded the European/colonial presence as divisive and appeared confident that he could win the support of Fijians away from their traditional leaders who were enmeshed in the colonial system and partners in social privilege. The departure of the colonial regime, accompanied of course by localization of the civil service, has removed much of the basis of NFP populism, as has steady upward mobility in the Indian community within the expanding economy of the early post-independence period. (Between 1968 and 1978 per capita GNP rose in real terms by 36 per cent.) Echoes of the former populism can still be heard but they are muted. In 1977, for example, while speaking of the need to establish industry in Fiji, Irene Jai Narayan stressed the legacy of A.D. Patel and said that 'Our party has always endeavoured to protect our locals from exploitation' (Fiji Times 30 August 1977), but this lacks the sharp edge of Patel's struggle against colonialism.

The more general goal of defending Indian interests remains the key to the electoral success of the party. Indian opponents of the NFP are open to the charge of betraying their race, as for example in the brandishing of nooses in the House of Representatives by Mr S.M. Koya, the leader of the opposition, with the advice that the traitors in the Indian Alliance should use them to hang themselves (Pacific Islands Monthly August 1974). This outburst followed charges that Koya had been neglecting his role as leader of the opposition, in particular over the land issue, which was beginning to worry many Indians whose leases were reaching the end of their first ten years with the possibility of non-renewal. At this stage Koya was described as a moderate facing criticism by radicals (Pacific Islands Monthly July 1974). Later, when his rediscovered belligerence brought him into conflict with the prime minister, Koya was accused of promoting racial disharmony and failing to cooperate with the government for the benefit of his constituents. At this stage there was no doubt that the party was seen as basically representing the Indian community. From 1972, when, following the election defeat, Koya's leadership was first challenged, the NFP had increasingly turned inward, looking only at Indian intra-communal issues. Following the resolution of the factional conflict, when Koya was defeated, a peacemaker leader, who could give some thought to the question of attracting Fijian support, was elected. The prospects for gaining that
support, however, are not promising. The party is more than ever identified as an Indian party and stuck with the role that the constitution envisaged for it.

THE RULES OF THE GAME

I began by looking at the constitution, which obviously plays an important role in governing politics, but there are, in addition, informal 'rules of the game' which shape politics in Fiji. Ralph Premdas has summed up these rules as adherence to the principle of 'balance'. Fijians control government and own 83 per cent of the land; Indians dominate the sugar industry and intermediate businesses; Europeans dominate the very large businesses. By an informal process of *quid pro quo* Indians accept assistance to help Fijians enter industry while the prime minister, a Fijian, deliberately appoints several Indians to his cabinet (Premdas 1979). Many more examples could have been cited, some of which have been mentioned already in this paper (equal numbers of Fijians and Indians entering the university or joining the civil service, for example). Wherever the question of Fijian or Indian interests arises, an attempt is made to find balance. In the Seaqaa sugar scheme, for example, blocks were allocated to farmers on the basis of equal numbers for Fijians and Indians.

Robert Norton, the major theorist of contemporary politics in Fiji, has developed at some length the related notion of 'accommodation' as a feature of race relations in Fiji. He argues that it grew out of colonial institutions and is preserved in both the constitution and the informal rules that supplement it. The division between races, which colonial institutions preserved (some would say created -- see Mamak and Ali 1979:62-69), 'developed not as a dynamic relationship governed purely by antagonism but as a structural principle -- a regulated feature of race relations -- that sustained attention to the value that groups should accommodate their differences'. Within this framework, conciliation 'was built on the retention of symbols of racial difference and reciprocal acknowledgement of rights and interests'. With the removal of colonial arbitration, however, there had to be negotiation founded on 'the consensus that violent struggle must be avoided'. One feature of this negotiation, in addition to the principle of balance, is the recognition of the NFP by the Alliance as 'not simply an opponent to be parried but as the principal voice of the Indians who must be given continual attention in government' (Norton 1977:37-38).

The principle upon which politics in Fiji are founded is that which Reinhard Bendix has termed 'functional representation'. According to this principle 'functions', that is 'group-specific activities or rights and duties' are to be represented rather than individuals. This is distinguished from the 'plebiscitarian principle', according to which 'all powers intervening between the state and the individual must be destroyed' (Bendix 1969). Fijian social and political organization shows a marked preference for functional representation and the embodiment of this in the constitution (written and unwritten) should be traced to Fijian culture as well as to colonial policy (Nation 1978). It is sometimes said that Fiji's colonial rulers created an artificial communal system that was not genuinely traditional (whatever that might mean) but designed to serve
selfish colonial interests. It is not possible to refute this in the present context but the questions which should be asked of this interpretation are: how did colonial bureaucrats manage to achieve their purpose so well; could it be that Fijians contributed something of their own? Whether its origins are colonial or 'authentic', however, there can be no doubt that Fijian culture is a force in Fiji's politics today.

Fijian unity, which has played a crucial part in maintaining Alliance domination, can be traced to Fijian culture. It is not sufficient to explain it as arising entirely out of a perceived Indian threat. Unity (duavata) is a value of general importance in Fijian society and regarded as the norm in both traditional institutions and Fijian Provincial Councils (where there is no Indian threat). I have argued elsewhere, at greater length, that Fijian organization is not subject to factionalization; that rivalry between leaders sometimes produces fissures that do not extend down to the rank and file, rather than factions (Nation 1978).

Fijian unity has never been regarded as established merely to oppose Indians, just as Fijians have never opposed Indian unity or welcomed Indian factionalism. Striking evidence of this can be seen in the report of A.D. Patel's death in the Alliance Fijian-language newspaper Na Tovata. Entitled 'The Love of Fiji Goes with Hon. A.D. Patel', it praises him as a 'respected leader', a man 'to whom the majority of Indians in Fiji looked', 'the captain of the ship of his race and their party'. Recognition as the legitimate spokesman of his race goes much further than the recognition of a 'worthy opponent' contained in the English-language Fiji Nation (Nation/Tovata October 1969).

Fijians undoubtedly regard the NFP as an Indian party but do not see this as a bad thing; an Indian party is as natural a phenomenon as a Fijian party. Indeed the recognition of the NFP as the voice of the Indian community can sometimes go as far as explicit criticism of the Fijian's electoral allies in the Indian Alliance. The prime minister, for example, has complained that the Indian Alliance is not giving him 'the two way communication with the Indian people' which he needs. In order to get this, he said, he has to rely on the opposition party, public meetings or the rural development committees that meet under the guidance of divisional commissioners and district officers (Fiji Times 2 March 1979).

It is no accident that the Alliance has chosen in its organizational structure to preserve the organizational integrity of its three constituent bodies, the Fijian Association, the Indian Alliance and the General Electors' Association. This has not always pleased members of the Indian Alliance who found it something of a handicap when campaigning against the NFP whose organizational structure was proudly unitary and in accordance with the plebiscitarian principle which they stood for in their call for common roll. To placate Indian feeling the Alliance allowed the Young Alliance, to which all races belonged, to join the Alliance as an independent constituent body alongside the other three. Members of the constituent bodies were also brought together in committees called district councils which send delegates to a national council. Apart from this, however, the constituent bodies are distinct and discrete; leaders are chosen and policies are formulated in racial isolation.
The NFP, with a vague awareness of the Fijian preference for ethnic distinctiveness, created a Taukei Committee composed entirely of Fijians and empowered to select candidates for Fijian seats and propose policies to attract Fijian voters. This is largely windowdressing, however, as the party remains committed to unitary organization and common roll. Despite this, a number of Fijian members of the NFP in western Viti Levu once 'insisted that they were not direct members of the Federation Party but only of the National Democratic Party, which was merely affiliated with the Indian-led organization' (Norton 1977).

Robert Norton has suggested that it may be that 'only by modifying its internal structure to provide for the recognition of racial differences will the Federation, or any other party, be able to challenge the Alliance. By adopting this tactic such a party would simply be invoking a principle of social and political organization that has become characteristic of Fiji' (Norton 1977). This would not be an easy step for the NFP, however, for it goes against the philosophy of A.D. Patel, which is the main unifying ideal within the party. The potential divisiveness of the abrogation of common roll is reflected in the secrecy that surrounded the party's submission to the Royal Commission on the electoral system; many party officials who made oral submissions were forced to do so without being allowed to consult the party's official written submission and were apparently unaware that the party had for the first time proposed proportional representation under the single transferable vote system. The written submission also proposed that the system be introduced 'if its proposals were acceptable to all parties' (emphasis added) and envisaged that election under the system should be preceded by the formation of a 'government of national unity and concord which would include all political parties' (Royal Commission Report 1975). Ignoring for the moment the coalition proposal which is discussed below, the interesting point here is the conditionality of the proposal; the ideal of common roll is maintained but conveyed to an indeterminate point in the future, as in the Alliance proposal. The unqualified fight for common roll is missing. The secrecy of the submission is therefore not surprising.

In the days of A.D. Patel common roll was a right to be won from the colonial government rather than the Fijians. The origins of the demand lie in the decade before World War II when Fijians did not vote and European and Indian electors were on separate rolls. It was an emotional issue, concerned above all with the removal of racial discrimination (Gillion 1977). There is, however, another reason which might explain why Indian politicians have sought common roll. Intra-communal unity, which the present electoral system presumes, is not easy to achieve within the Indian community. In the past it has been divided by religion, culture and region (within Fiji), and is now increasingly divided by class. Such unity as has existed is to a large extent unity against the colonial regime first, and then the Fijians who replaced it. The argument put forward by NFP politicians, that communalism in the electoral system is racially divisive, is one that grows out of their own experience and is not, as many Fijians may believe, an attempt to sneak in common roll in order to achieve Indian domination. They know all too well that Indian unity, which the fear of Indian domination presupposes, is not the natural phenomenon that Fijians believe it to be. On the other hand, the NFP appears to have assumed (in the past if not at present) that Fijian unity would disappear with the introduction of common roll, and with that would disappear the compelling
need for Indian unity. As mentioned earlier the charge of 'selling out' is one to which Indian leaders feel particularly vulnerable and one that they would probably prefer to do without. The bind that Indian politicians now find themselves in is this: if they join the Indian Alliance they face the unpleasant charge of racial treason; if they stay in the NFP they are condemned to the role of perpetual opposition, for the rules of the game include the provision that the Indian party should fill the opposition benches. As Robert Norton puts it, the 'terms of inter-racial reciprocity' are 'that Fijian political power be safeguarded' (Norton 1977:168) or, in Ralph Premdas' terms, Fijian control of government must be maintained to preserve 'balance'. R.S. Milne is also clear on this point: 'The premise on which consociationalism in Fiji rests is Fijian political predominance' (Milne 1975).

The NFP victory in the April 1977 election appeared to be something of an embarrassment to the victors. Factional warfare within the party, which had been temporarily laid aside to fight the election, threatened to erupt. There was some delay in naming a leader, talk of a coalition with the Alliance and rumours that an NFP government might provoke a Fijian backlash. The Fijian Nationalists had hoped for an NFP government because it would demonstrate to Fijians that they did not hold 'power in their own land', a realization which the Nationalists assumed would bring the majority of Fijians into their fold and lead to the destruction of the constitution. Reluctance to form a government within the NFP ranks was perhaps due to the fear of playing into the Nationalists' hands, although the rival factions have each denied any reluctance on their own part. The Ramrakha/Narayan faction accused Koya of being reluctant to take office, thereby leading to the governor-general's reappointment of Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara as prime minister, while the Koya faction accused the Ramrakha/Narayan faction of secretly communicating their unwillingness to support Koya to the governor-general (Ali 1977). To admit that Fijian control of government was needed to safeguard political stability would open the way for the charge of racial treason. The informal rules of the game are therefore not only unwritten, some must also be unspoken. The Alliance is similarly silent about the question of Fijian control of government. It does not refute Fijian Nationalists' claims that the constitution fails to guarantee power for Fijians. It obviously cannot dispute that the constitution allows for the election of an Indian prime minister or the appointment of an Indian governor-general, but neither does it attempt to persuade its Fijian supporters that this is as it should be. It simply remains silent and hopes that they will accept the status quo and recognize that it is founded upon Fijian unity.

THE FUTURE: COALITION?

The constitution and the unwritten rules of the game go hand-in-hand. Both are built around the principle of functional representation. The NFP, although retaining formal adherence to the plebiscitarian principle, has come to accept its role as official voice of the Indian community which is dictated by the principle of functional representation. Politics within this framework has allowed for reciprocity over issues such as access to land for Indians and balance within the civil service and university education. Nevertheless, the system still seems precarious, particularly in view of its dependence on the unspoken, unwritten 'rule of Fijian
political dominance: that it must be Fijians who determine the terms of interracial reciprocity.

The quotation from W.J.M. Mackenzie which heads this paper makes clear the principal danger that communally oriented politics face: the politics of 'outbidding', when 'within each community the more violent and selfish spokesmen of special interests outbid the moderates and public spirited'. It seems such a natural way of gaining support that it appears inevitable that some will resort to it. It is not surprising that the charge of 'selling out' has already been levelled at leaders of both communities in Fiji. It is surprising, however, that outbidding has not provided a cheap and quick way to power for its proponents.

The Fijian Nationalists' share of the Fijian vote dropped from 27 per cent to 14 per cent between April and September 1977 and, moreover, their defeat paved the way for the restoration of Fijian power as people had known it for twelve years. The Fijian Nationalists were listened to in the first place because Alliance neglect of grass roots feeling was regarded as a threat to unity. After the April election in 1977 it became apparent that the Nationalists were, themselves, the greatest threat to Fijian unity. The vote by their leader, Butadroka, in favour of the NFP motion of no-confidence in the minority Alliance government was an act of hubris that severely undermined his credibility and made many Fijians wonder just what he was trying to do (Nation 1978).

Within the NFP both factions made accusations of selling out but it was the hardliners at the September elections, the Koya faction, who lost at the polls. Koya himself was defeated by an opponent who declared Koya's 'elimination at the polls essential to the maintenance of multiracial peace and harmony' (Premdas 1979:199).

In fact, the political framework militates against the success of the outbidding tactic. So long as Fijians are united and allied with the General Electors the Alliance will maintain its majority in the House of Representatives and, with that, the political status quo. Together Fijians and General Electors form approximately half of the population, although up till 1977 they had always had more than half of the registered voters (51.9 per cent in 1977). The Alliance should therefore expect to win about half of the National seats, which, together with the three General Elector communal seats, would give them a majority.

The incentive for unity is therefore strong, although it does not of itself explain how that unity will be achieved. One must look to Fijian culture and traditional organization to explain how unity is achieved. The personal contribution of Ratu Mara, the only leader the Alliance has known, must also be considered. His fortuitous combination of high traditional rank and modern skills has greatly assisted unity. The question of who will replace him is one that has vexed Fijians in recent years.

Up to now no one has 'emerged' as a potential replacement and it is particularly conspicuous that men of high rank have avoided entry into democratic politics. Ratu Mara, together with the other Alliance ministers of high rank, entered politics before Fijian Legislative Council members were elected, as the nominees of the Great Council of Chiefs. The democratic elective process is not one that attracts chiefs but an
additional problem is presented by the fact that many men of chiefly rank, especially those who are well educated, are civil servants unable to enter politics. It is not impossible, however, for a well qualified man lacking in rank to become prime minister. It is now common practice in Fijian provincial councils to have men of low rank who are qualified by education and occupational experience, filling the position of chairman and adopting the guise of servant to the traditional chief (or chiefs) of the province, in whose name decisions are carried out. The advantage that this system offers is that the chairman may be voted out without upsetting unity. A similar system could operate at the national level with a high chief (perhaps Ratu Mara in retirement) as governor-general and an able but suitably humble commoner as prime minister.

Traditional sentiments and organization have become increasingly prominent in Fijian life over recent years. Many provinces have resorted to traditional methods to gather funds for development. Provinces and other traditional groups have held church services in Suva. The political significance of these activities is not far below the surface, leading one observer to the conclusion that they represented 'clear signs of the development of political allegiances based on the traditional power groupings of ancient Fiji', in a word 'tribalism', and therefore 'a threat to political unity which has been essential for the continued dominance of the Alliance' (South Pacific Islands Business News Editorial May 1980).

The assumption that the upsurge in tradition will lead to disunity is, in my opinion, unjustified. As emphasized earlier, the pursuit of unity is accorded great importance in traditional organization. An examination of two recent traditional events will demonstrate this. In June 1980 a new system of fund raising was established in Tailevu province with a large gathering at Nabitu on the Rewa river, an area of strong Fijian Nationalist support in 1977. The choice of this site for the inaugural gathering was an honour for the district and a successful promotion of unity under the chiefly establishment of the province.

A little earlier, further down the Rewa river at Lomanikoro, there was a large ceremonial gathering (kau ni mata) to officially introduce the children of Ratu Mara into the home of their mother, the paramount chief of the Rewa confederation. The link between the two families is a link between two traditional federations. The large scale of the ceremonial activity was a source of pride to participants on both sides and a reflection of unity within and between the two chiefdoms. It was also a blow to the Fijian Nationalists whose base in Rewa has been built upon resentment of Ratu Mara within a section of the province.

Tradition is a powerful force for unity within the Fijian community and therefore the main prop supporting Fijian dominance of government. Since the upset of the April 1977 election there has been an increased awareness of the tradition/unity/dominance nexus, against which Butadroka and the Fijian Nationalists will have difficulty arguing. They are not a spent force, especially if they shift their emphasis from rural areas where tradition is strong to urban areas where it is breaking down, but they are being powerfully opposed by the forces of tradition. It is important to realize that it is by the indirect methods of tradition that the Nationalists will be beaten rather than by an open declaration of war which
the NFP and other non Fijian observers have thought desirable (Norton 1977).

So long as Fijian unity is maintained under the conservative leadership of the present Fijian elite the rules of the game that have developed since 1966 will tend to remain. The NFP with its growing middle class orientation will continue to play the game of interracial reciprocity. There is too much to be lost by listening to outbidders. Whether unity within the party can last is another matter, however, for, while the constitution encourages unity, the events of the split in 1977 have left scores to be settled.

A question that might soon put unity within the party to the test is that of coalition government. In 1972 and again in 1979 and 1980 the prime minister raised the possibility of coalition government. On both occasions he merely mentioned it as a personal preference, attempting neither to force a decision from the opposition nor to persuade his Alliance colleagues to accept it as a firm proposal. It remained an ideal which he believed to be based on the constitution. In 1971 the NFP firmly rejected coalition; in April 1977, after their electoral victory, they approached the Alliance only to have the prime minister turn down the proposal on the grounds that an Alliance junior partnership would play into the hands of the Fijian Nationalists (Fiji Times 7 April 1977). The coalition he has had in mind over the years is clearly a coalition with the Alliance setting the terms.

There is a number of practical problems in the way of such a coalition. The NFP would be liable to split if there were not representa­tives of both factions included in the ministry, but carrying divisions into cabinet does not seem a stable foundation on which to build. Would Alliance ministers need to step down to make room for NFP ministers? How many ministers would the NFP have? So far there has been no detailed discussion of these questions within either of the parties or between them. The NFP seems to have been particularly troubled by questions of detail, which have implications, of course, for the recently healed factional relations within the party. Who would get what and where would former leader of the opposition Koya go, in view of his probable unacceptability to Ratu Mara? At the 1980 annual convention the party leader, Mr Jai Ram Reddy, preempted further consideration of coalition, for the time being at least, by telling his party that he had not been fully consulted about the issue by the prime minister. He described the prime minister's proposal as 'very ill-defined and vague' (Fiji Times 29 October 1980). Ratu Mara promptly replied by telling the Fijian Association Convention that Mr Reddy's response had buried the proposal: the Alliance would thenceforth concentrate on winning the 1982 general election (Fiji Times 31 October 1980). The NFP similarly looked forward to the 1982 election. Until then, it seems, the coalition proposal will remain dormant, although it appears likely that, in campaigning for the election, each party will blame the other for lack of progress towards coalition.

The formation of a coalition would be a major step in the direction of consociationalism or 'government by an elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with fragmented political culture into a stable democracy' (Arend Lijphart's definition, quoted in Milne 1975:413). In 1975 Milne concluded that while it 'would be hard to claim that Fiji ranked high on a
consociational score' it had 'recently shown some undeniably consociational characteristics' (Milne 1975:429). The main shortcoming on the consociational 'score' was the absence of a coalition. Milne noted that the coalition idea had been floated but observed that negotiations did not 'progress far enough to indicate exactly what its formulation would have entailed'. An interesting point in Milne's analysis is the implication that coalition is part of a consociational package. Seen in this light, continued moves towards a coalition can be interpreted as part of a natural progression; the logical culmination of 'accommodation' and 'balance' and in accord with the principle of 'functional representation'.

The 1982 election will be the critical time. If the coalition issue is again raised both parties will need to face the voters with an answer. They will need to consider how serious they are about attempting to attract multiracial support. The NFP must decide whether it is still the universal, populist party that A.D. Patel created, ready to seek government in its own right as representative of all races, or an Indian party, the legitimate voice of the Indian community but resigned to the second best course of junior partnership in a coalition. If, as seems likely, the party again fails to win Fijian support, there can be only one course open to it. The Alliance must decide whether it still believes in functional representation, and if it does, how it can offer meaningful participation to the NFP in an Alliance based coalition.

NOTES

1 The Alliance contested only three of the nine Indian communal constituencies. The figure of 38 per cent refers only to these constituencies (Fiji Times Electoral Guide 12 April 1972).

2 A bowl of kava, a beverage made from the powdered root of a species of pepper.

3 General Electors include all people who are not Fijian or Indian. All people of Pacific island origin are included within the category Fijian. General Electors are therefore mainly Europeans, part Europeans and Chinese. See the population table in the appendix.

4 A number of different figures have been quoted as the difference in marks required. Ali (1978:150) says that Fijians were required to have 216 marks (out of 400) while Indians were required to have 261 marks for admittance to Science in 1977. The Alliance has stated that for Social Science the lowest qualified Fijian had 200 marks compared with 213 for non Fijians. The greatest difference was in Medicine where the lowest accepted Fijian had 204 and the lowest non Fijian male had 247. The rumour mill produced figures of widely differing proportions.

5 The depoliticization of the sugar industry is a result of nationalization of milling and the creation of an independent tribunal to regulate relations between growers and the Fiji Sugar Corporation.
France (1969) exposes the many arbitrary decisions that were inevitable in the change from traditional chiefdoms to a colonial administration based on a western legal framework. A careless reader of France's 'demythologizing labours' might reach the conclusion that somewhere (in a parallel universe perhaps) there exists 'genuine' Fijian tradition. Clammer, for example, believes he is able to draw a 'picture of what may honestly be said to constitute traditional Fijian social organizations when all the imported and subsequently self-generated conscious models have been cast aside' (Clammer 1973:200). France, however, has no illusions about present day Fijian tradition which he recognizes as 'a powerfully cohesive force in Fijian society'.

The racial reservation of seats means that Fijian Nationalists could only stand in twenty-two constituencies. Their unconcealed aim is to split the Alliance vote and defeat the Alliance.

Many Rewans have in the past supported NFP candidates (Ratu Mosese Tuisawau and Ro Asela Logavatu) in order to express their opposition to the Alliance.
### Population (1978 Estimate)

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### Composition of House of Representatives

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<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ind.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
a National Federation Party (previously Federation Party)
b Prior to 1972 National seats were known as Cross Voting seats
c One communal General Elector member joined the Alliance after winning election
d Fijian Nationalist Party
e Independent - Ratu Osea Gavidi

Party support

1966. Six Alliance candidates in Fijian and General Elector constituencies were elected unopposed, making comparisons of percentages of votes obtained unreliable (many Alliance voters not being able to register their support). Indian national constituencies were the only class of constituencies in which all seats were contested. In these, votes were shared between the parties as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>70,332(55%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFP</td>
<td>47,064(36%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Alliance obtained 38 per cent of the vote in the Indian communal constituencies that it contested, but it contested only three out of nine. The NFP won 43,075 votes in Indian communal constituencies, 3,989 votes less that in Indian national constituencies. This difference can be explained by the fact that national votes controlled by some communal opponents were directed to the NFP.

1972. Votes in Indian national constituencies were shared as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>100,563(59%)</td>
<td>(up 4 per cent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFP</td>
<td>66,582(39%)</td>
<td>(up 3 per cent)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each party increased its share of the vote (at the expense of independents). The Alliance contested all Indian communal constituencies and won 24 per cent of the vote. All Federation Fijian communal candidates lost their deposits, as did ten out of fifteen independent opponents of the Alliance. The NFP contested three out of five national general constituencies, compared with none in 1966. It contested all but one Fijian national constituency.

April 1977. General national constituencies were the only ones in which all seats were contested. Votes were shared as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>100,551(47%)</td>
<td>(down 12 per cent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFP</td>
<td>86,597(40%)</td>
<td>(up 1 per cent)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Informal votes amounted to 8 per cent of total votes cast. Most of these would be the votes of Fijian Nationalist voters.
The Alliance share of Indian communal votes dropped to 16 per cent. Its share of Indian votes in Indian national constituencies might have been higher as the Alliance won 87,217 votes (2,659 more than the NFP) in these constituencies, whereas the NFP polled 85,753 in Fijian national seats (6,528 more than the Alliance). It appears that some Indian Alliance candidates are able to convince a proportion of voters to vote Alliance in Indian national seats and Federation in Fijian national seats, and perhaps also in Indian communal seats.

If voters in the overwhelmingly Fijian Lau, Cakaudrove and Rotuma constituencies (in which Alliance candidates were returned unopposed) had voted, the Alliance would have had more votes in all national constituencies, but, of course, the same number of seats.

The Fijian Nationalists polled 27 per cent of the Fijian communal constituencies that they contested. They also lowered the Alliance vote by deterring Fijians from voting (see turnout figures below).

September 1977. Indian national constituencies were again the only group in which all seats were contested. Votes were shared as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes (as %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>110,596 (53%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFP</td>
<td>86,323 (42%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Fijian Nationalist vote was cut in half and formed less than 14 per cent in the electorates contested. The turnout also rose, boosting Fijian Alliance votes.

The Alliance share of Indian communal constituencies dropped to just under 15 per cent. Overall there were 7,049 fewer Indian voters than in April, most of whom were apparently Alliance supporters.

**Single member constituencies**

Apart from the obvious racial pattern in the figures shown above, the most striking thing is the dramatic change in party fortunes that can be caused by single member constituencies. In 1966, despite winning 36 per cent of the vote, the NFP failed to win a single national seat. In 1977, despite obtaining 7 per cent more votes than the NFP, the Alliance won fewer seats than the NFP.

In view of the known racial basis of voting, gerrymandering would be very easy. For this reason the NFP recommended, and the 1975 royal commission accepted, that a system of proportional representation based on multi-member constituencies should be used. In rural, parochial electorates, however, this system might not be popular.
Turnout

In September 1977 the racial composition of registered voters was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fijians</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indians</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Electors</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rate of turnout is therefore of obvious importance. In 1972 percentage turnout was as follows:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indians</td>
<td>84.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fijians</td>
<td>82.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Electors</td>
<td>83.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

in April 1977:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indians</td>
<td>75.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fijians</td>
<td>70.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Electors</td>
<td>76.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

in September 1977:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indians</td>
<td>68.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fijians</td>
<td>71.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Electors</td>
<td>70.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
REFERENCES


Royal Commission, Fiji, 1975. 'Report of the Royal Commission appointed for the purpose of considering and making recommendations as to the most appropriate method of electing members to, and representing the people of Fiji in, the House of Representatives'. Parliamentary Paper No.24.

LAWLESSNESS IN THE PAPUA NEW GUINEA HIGHLANDS

Marie Reay

Here I am not surveying the whole of the Highlands region, as the title of my paper may seem to imply, but I am concentrating on a part of the Western Highlands which has been my main field area since 1953. This is Mid-Wahgi, the core portion of the Jiwaka Division. The name Jiwaka is coined from the first two letters of the component regions of Jimi, Wahgi, and [East] Kambia. It is the name intended for the new province when secession from the Western Highlands becomes feasible. Mid-Wahgi is one of the most developed parts of the Highlands and its Wahgi Council is one of the most prosperous in the country. The Wahgi Council, established in 1965 by amalgamating the smaller councils on either side of the river, is now splitting back into two as the Minj councillors secede. At the time of the amalgamation the man who was to be the last president of the present council suggested the name 'Wahgi' not to signify the unification of the Wahgi valley but to commemorate the Wahgi river which divides it effectively into two. The movements to secede from the province and from the council parallel similar movements elsewhere in the Highlands and in the country as a whole. They are, of course, rooted in the strengthening of regional and local solidarities that began with disputes between labourers on coastal plantations and continues now with ambitions to rediscover local autonomy and restore some pride in traditional culture.

I shall be examining two kinds of lawlessness, 'raskolism' and renewed tribal warfare, in particular aspects which seem to pose real threats for the future of the Highlands region. 'Raskol' (a Pidgin word, from the English 'rascal') is a term that can cover many kinds of law-breakers but tends to refer to violent crime such as breaking and entering, robbery with violence, unprovoked assault, and malicious damage to property. Here I shall be using the term in the particular sense of a member of the organized Raskol Gang. My most detailed data come from Minj, but the organization is not limited to a single locality.

RASKOL ORGANIZATION

There is little mention of raskol organization in the literature. Robert Forster, a former kiap, identifies the Goilala raskols in Port Moresby as 'a sophisticated criminal organization', 'an embryonic Mafia' (1979:88, 89). But he is concerned with the organization of criminal activities, not with the organization of the criminals who perform them. He appears to assume that the raskols are socially undifferentiated. And yet they are continually engaged in group enterprises that require
planning. Quick decisions have to be made which cannot wait upon egalitarian consensus. The safety of the gang leaves little scope for individualism. To carry out its habitual criminal activities the raskol gang requires the discipline of an army unit and the solidarity of a traditional clan-tribe.

The clan-tribe, which is typical of the Western Highlands, is a named territorial exogamous group with a segmentary structure. Legitimate forms of organization were based on or at least took account of this arrangement of named groups and their named segments. The organization of the Raskol Gang, by contrast, transcends the clan-tribe and recruits its members from all over the Mid-Wahgi area. But, like the clan-tribe, it is itself segmented and has a hierarchy of leaders. Further, the small nuclear gangs that together form the great segmentary structure are composed of clansmen.

The grand leader has authority over the entire Raskol Gang in the Mid-Wahgi area. Subordinate to him are two major leaders, each of whom commands a few minor leaders. The terms I am using for these leaders are my own. In the vernacular all are referred to in context as kwuma ('the first'). Thus the grand leader is kwuma in respect of the entire Gang and also in relation to either of the major leaders. He is nambauan lidaman ('the first or chief leader') in tok pisin. The major leader commands a regional clustering of gangs and is also kwuma and nambauan lidaman in respect of these and the minor leaders who head them; but he is nambatu lidaman ('a second leader') in relation to the grand leader. Each minor leader has a small gang he can put to the service of his major leader. When the grand leader is planning some activity in collaboration with the major leaders he is able to select the participants from the entire membership of the organization. Thus for an operation in which gang members may be recognized he calls upon participants from a different part of the valley. In addition each of the big leaders has a small personal gang of his own. Each small gang in the organization is composed of raskols who are clansmen of its leader. Occasionally a pair of such gangs has united when their neighbouring clan-tribes have been fighting on the same side in a prolonged tribal war.

Minj people, living in the centre of the Mid-Wahgi area, are not familiar with the raskol organization of Mt Hagen. But they know the identity of the Hagen grand leader and speak of him sometimes as an alternative grand leader to the head of the Mid-Wahgi organization. This is because a Hagen major leader who commands a set of gangs near the border can be called upon to supply raskols to carry out operations planned by the Mid-Wahgi grand leader. Reciprocally, the Hagen grand leader can call upon Mid-Wahgi gangs situated close to the Hagen border. There is some evidence that similar linkages extend the raskol organization from Hagen to Enga and from Mid-Wahgi to Simbu. If this is true there is a vast underground organization spread over a large part of the Highlands, and perhaps even beyond, in a chain of overlapping raskol gangs. At present the nuclear gangs that make up the overall organization are small. I know of none that has more than seven members each in groups that number (including women and children) up to 8,000 people; and, more typically in the Minj area, it is likely to have only two or three members. But gangs are apt to recruit two or more clansmen as helpers for particular operations, for example in hiding the spoils. These men, running the risk of discovery or suspicion, may have to accept help from the raskol organization and in this event may
become committed members. Thus the numbers are growing. On issues that deeply affect not only raskols but the rural population generally, we cannot ignore the potential of the organization for mobilizing the combined raskol gangs of perhaps the whole Highlands with popular support in a concerted attempt to achieve larger, more revolutionary goals.

Politicians in the Western Highlands are conservative in their stated policies and at election time they try to be all things to all men, too wary of alienating votes to try to attract support for new or sectional ideas and approaches. It is, of course, possible that politicians in various parts of the Western Highlands may have offered the raskol leaders protection in exchange for votes: I have no data on this, but it would be consistent with the relations between some politicians and police in some centres.

The raskol organization demonstrates resourcefulness, compassion for the underdog, and ability to cooperate across the boundaries that separate wantoks. But cooperation across the boundaries in joint ventures is merely expedient. Coffee buyers, who are safe in their home areas, are fair game for raskol attacks once they venture into a different district or province. A Hagen coffee buyer operating in Mid-Wahgi is bailed up near Minj and relieved of his money and coffee; a Minj coffee buyer operating in Simbu suffers a similar loss. The highwaymen who beset coffee buyers from a different area belong to the Raskol Gang. But, as well as acting at the behest of the grand leader and/or a major leader, a minor leader and his gang carry out independent operations of their own. Most, if not all, of the hold-ups of coffee buyers appear to be independent operations of the minor gangs. But they show certain regularities which suggest that the Raskol Gang has a set of rules to govern such operations. First, the coffee buyer who is carrying, say, K2,000 in cash and five or six rice-bags of coffee is in no danger of highway robbery so long as he stays within his own area. In a peculiarly Papua New Guinea version of taking from the rich to give to the poor, the highwaymen take from the foreign rich (those who are not wantoks) and distribute the spoils in their own wantok area. But it is noticeable that the hold-ups occur well inside the foreign area, away from the border where an incident on the road could lead to fighting between clan-tribes. (Even when highwaymen wear laplap head masks in imitation of Western villains they have seen on film, anyone who knows the area well can correctly infer their clan-tribe.) Further, although the raskols immobilize the coffee buyer and his offside by tying them up and sometimes gagging them, the victims rarely suffer any bodily injury. Considering the degree of violence in traditional culture and the extent to which violent and bloodthirsty practices have reemerged in contemporary tribal warfare, it seems remarkable that raskol gangs treating foreigners from adjoining districts or provinces as fair game for highway robbery do not intentionally inflict bodily harm. The 'rules' (as I think we can call these regularities) ensure that this kind of operation stops short of inter-district or inter-province confrontation and is no serious impediment to cooperation between the raskol gangs of adjoining areas in joint ventures.

The Mid-Wahgi gang specializes in breaking and entering, though it does not confine itself to this activity. The leaders choose as their targets stores and houses belonging to persons they judge to be rich. They aim to close the gap between the rich and the poor by robbing the rich and
giving to the poor. Gang members recycle the spoils of their robberies among those they think are in need. The grand leader himself provides a model of this Robin Hoodism. When he sleeps in somebody's house for the night he gives K60 or K70 in tariff. To anyone he meets on the road who seems thirsty or hungry he gives food and drink or money.

The raskol organization has no headquarters. The leaders visit the gang members to recruit for particular jobs, and recruiting for the gang itself is similar. The leaders are on the lookout for habitual criminals who will make suitable gang members, and at any stage in a criminal's career the major leader or even the grand leader himself may visit him to learn of his plans, give him advice, and assure him of help in evading the police.

To be a full member of the gang a raskol has to be an habitual criminal who has escaped from legal custody at least once. There are virtuoso raskols who have escaped three or four times and have been wanted by the police for several years. The escapes are generally from the rumgad of the police station. Police stations are evidently understaffed, since guards are unable to summon help in time to abort an escape. They are also poorly designed to contain prisoners who are bent on escaping. Guards appear to lack training in how to protect the keys and their own persons. But the role of the police is ambiguous. Their job is to apprehend and detain the raskols, but all my informants say that the police are afraid of some of the leaders and deliberately refrain from catching them. One major leader was formerly a policeman himself and possesses a walkie-talkie which he allegedly uses to confuse and trick the police.

There is a legend of the grand leader which his raskols and other admirers delight in recounting. I shall not relate it here because some elements in the story could easily identify him. It illustrates his allegedly superhuman powers to escape from custody in unlikely circumstances and also his compassion for ordinary people. But I shall describe an activity of his gang which was a transformation of a traditional ritual.

For some years missionaries had been denouncing the konggar pig festival as the work and worship of Satan and had succeeded in banning it; but at independence it began tentatively to reappear. In the late 1970s a konggar was held near Kudjip, which is both the local headquarters of one of the missions and also a prominent centre of raskol activity. Soon afterwards a raskols' konggar manqué, in the form of a classic Black Mass, was held in the hills behind Kudjip. The raskols stole a cow and a lot of pigs and took them to the top of the mountain. They killed them as if in a konggar. They collected the blood of the cow and the pigs in banana leaves and offered it to Satan. The blood allegedly disappeared. The grand leader prayed to Satan, saying 'Many people are following God and working for him and soon there will be no room for you. But we are your workmen'. They offered Satan the spirit pork and the spirit beef and feasted on the material part of the animals themselves.

There is a parallel here with the pattern of alliance in traditional and contemporary warfare. A clan-tribe can rely on the help of the enemy's own traditional enemy. The raskols are opposed to the missionaries, who identify Satan as their own enemy and that of their powerful and punitive
God. Some extreme fundamentalists instructed their flock to be kind only to fellow Christians. For a long time they tried to insist that Christians should refuse to share food with non-Christians even in the same family (see Kaman 1975:21-30). It is little wonder that some people became bitterly disaffected with the missions and threw in their lot with Satan, the traditional enemy of the straightlaced and unfriendly God of the missionaries.

Each of the raskols I know personally has at least two brothers. His father's coffee holdings are not enough to provide a living for them all and the family had been counting on his completing school and getting paid employment. But he leaves school too early to qualify for a white-collar job and despises as 'dirty' any work he could conceivably now get. Helping his father and brothers in return for his keep involves him in exactly the kind of work he has learned to despise. He neglects it, but begins to present his father and brothers with useful objects he says he has found abandoned or has received as gifts from old school friends. He seeks some status in the community as well. An age-mate's radio or tape recorder is broken, but soon there is one to replace it.

The raskols' clansmen pity him for his landlessness, for a 'real man' has coffee, pigs, and enough vegetables to contribute to group prestations as well as supplying the needs of his own family. He needs land for all these purposes and is not likely to get a wife without it. They pity him also for his inability to complete school, which they see as the arbitrary withdrawal by the educational system of the promise of a well-paid job. Further, his helpfulness endears him to them and they turn a blind eye to his illegal activities.

Most people are either knowingly or unknowingly receivers of stolen goods. Just as one of the raskol leaders has a walkie-talkie as relic of his time in the police force, a young man who held a clerical job for a few months possesses an expensive typewriter, allegedly a gift from the government. Many houses contain odd items of furniture of recognizably government issue, gifts from friends who have been leaving government houses. People consider most of these acquisitions to be legitimate. They see the experience of having worked or lived with material equipment as conferring some entitlement to it. Further, they see some goods as being in a limbo of non-ownership. The clearest example is the money sent by mail and removed from envelopes when one of the raskol gangs raids a post office. The money ceased to belong to the sender once he had mailed it, but would not belong to the intended recipient until he received it. Obviously a failure to keep proper inventories and an unwillingness to prosecute for theft are contributing to the general lawlessness and the protection of the lawless from the once long but now amputated arm of the law. In this climate a young man may become an habitual thief and remain undetected for some years. He recruits his own small gang with one or two of his clansmen and the grand leader's organization begins to take an interest in him.

A raskol who is wanted by the police simply goes home and it should be easy enough to catch him. But the police, who are public servants, have to give up the chase in time to arrive back at the station by 4 p.m. and next morning they are usually assigned to other duties. They instruct the village magistrate and, particularly, the peace officer of the village
court, who has powers of arrest, to locate the stolen goods, catch the raskol, and deliver both into their hands the next day. The village magistrate makes a vague speech deploring the general situation. When the police have left, the peace officer instructs the assembled company to go and see the raskol's family and tell them to persuade the raskol to give himself up. They grumble that the peace officer himself should do this and nobody attempts to follow his instruction. For it is common knowledge that when raskols are captured they and their families issue threats that if they should die or suffer illness while in prison anyone who helped with their capture will have to pay massive cash compensation. Village magistrates and peace officers succumb to these threats for fear of the consequences of non compliance. The demand for cash compensation carries the threat of death if it is not paid. Threats and curses play a much greater part in the lives of these highlanders than they did at any time during the colonial period.

The village magistrate and the peace officer are both court officials, but they are the only officials in the community who are expressly concerned with the law and it is natural for the police to solicit their help. If these officials were committed to upholding the law they would not be intimidated by threats but would be prepared to charge raskols and their families with attempted extortion. But village magistrates and peace officers are not committed to upholding the law. They are among the most active warriors when their clan-tribes go to war and they take no initiatives to end the war. One village magistrate deliberately incited his clansmen to start a war in 1979. Some village magistrates twist the law to suit their private ends. The village court institutionalizes men's reaction against the substantial liberation of women over the colonial period by practising new forms of discrimination against them. There was more justice in the witchcraft trials that prevailed into the 1960s than there is in the contemporary village court.

There is still a lot of talk of witchcraft and a man who has been ill demands cash compensation from the person he accuses of causing the illness. He consults a medicine man, who asks him what he has eaten before falling ill and who provided the food. The medicine man gives him an emetic and examines the vomit for traces of the foods he has named. As the provision of vegetable food is women's work the evidence generally points to a woman, though traditionally the witch was more usually a man. Women react angrily to these accusations but generally come to accept the blame for the illness and pay up. One who continues to protect her innocence soon receives a stiff goal sentence from the village court, either for some offence she has been deliberately provoked into committing or for some charge the man and his relatives have trumped up against her.

The world in which the raskol flourishes draws no clear distinction between what is lawful and what is not. Neither does it relate law to morality. Children do not learn that it is wrong or bad to break the law. When women kill or attempt to kill their co-wives they may do so in passion but their crime is premeditated in full knowledge of the consequences for themselves. Similarly, when a traditional leader engages in tribal warfare and incites his clansmen to fight he is well aware that what he is doing is forbidden by the government and will earn him a goal sentence if he is caught. The conclusion is inescapable that the jealous co-wife and the
fight leader deem their own unlawful acts to be worthwhile incurring the consequences.

The consequences are known (although the precise length of the gaol sentence is not known) because the jealous co-wife makes no attempt to conceal her crime and although the fight leader may make feeble excuses and his relatives implore the authorities to deal with him compassionately because of his age, the fact remains that he has been caught in flagrante. There is no recognition that either of them deserves an extended gaol sentence because of the serious nature of the offence. People do recognize that because homicide and warfare and inciting to warfare are officially forbidden and regarded by the authorities with some seriousness a gaol sentence is appropriate for anyone who happens to get caught engaging in these activities. But only a short gaol sentence of, say, one month, and certainly no longer than one year. It is unfair (kab'g'ma)\(^1\), they say, to imprison an offender for a term of years. The unfairness they complain of is not so much to the offender himself as to the community that is deprived of his presence. The eight years a young man spent in gaol for killing his wife left his declining subclan short of an able-bodied member for that period. The six years a woman has just spent in gaol for killing her co-wife has left her husband wifeless and therefore dependent upon his mother and his brother's wife — for caring for his pigs, tending his gardens, picking his coffee, and cooking his meals — to an extent he can never repay. The five or ten years the fight leader is condemned to spend in prison are likely, because of his age, to be the five or ten years before he dies. It is most important to his subclansmen that he should be at home with them in these crucial years. This is the time they have to care for him tenderly, as if he were again a baby, and lavish him with gifts — not simply to demonstrate their affection for him but to so please him that when he dies his ghost will not wish to harm them. Being sorry for the old before death comes for them is being sorry for themselves — not from a realization that they too will grow old, but from their conviction that if they are not sufficiently sorry for the nearly dead, death will transform these into malicious and punitive ghosts ready to afflict them with all kinds of misfortune. It is the duty of an old person to stay at home and allow his agnates to fete him. An extended stay in prison prevents him from performing his duty towards his subclansmen and makes it impossible for them to fulfil their duty towards him. His subclansmen — and particularly his sons, his brothers, and his brothers' sons — are profoundly uneasy while he is detained and still has several years to serve. They pester the authorities from time to time to release him or at least shorten his sentence, and when a relatives dies they seek permission for him to come home for the burial. The absence of the murdering co-wife is inconvenient for the husband and any of his close kin who have to supply female labour to do her work. To her own kin her absence in gaol is simply an extension of the absence required by the rule that a woman lives with her husband in marriage. For the woman herself living in prison is not qualitatively different from living in an alien group (her husband's) and having to work unremittingly for an alien boss (her husband). But the fight leader and wife-killer consider their incarceration to be unjust (kab'g'ma), since they accord higher priority to their communal obligations than to their duty to satisfy the requirements of the law.
This discussion has entailed two seemingly conflicting propositions:

1. offenders (not habitual offenders) deem their own unlawful acts to be worthwhile incurring the consequences;

2. they accord higher priority to their communal obligations than to their duty to satisfy the requirements of the law.

The two propositions appear to be conflicting because we might expect a devotion to communal obligations to inhibit people from committing unlawful acts that inevitably earn them extended gaol sentences. But the obligation to be at home with one's clansmen and fulfil the roles appropriate to age and status is not the only communal obligation felt and answered by a Papua New Guinea highlander. An insult to the clan-tribe is an immediate call to group solidarity and it is a leader's duty to muster immediate retaliation. Leaders were hobbled when there were white kiaps who could march out with a squad of police and stop fights with summary justice; but people are well aware that the independent governments have failed to formulate a clear and consistent policy on the containment of tribal fighting. They can have little respect for the law when they see it in disarray. It appears all the more weak and confused to people who remember the white kiaps patrolling to explain all new laws and make sure that they understood them.

TRIBAL WARFARE

I speak of 'war' and 'tribal warfare', rather than using the official term 'group fighting', because the groups that fought traditionally were mini-nations sharing custom but no common government and the fighting that has broken out since 1975 is continuous with the warfare that was suppressed at the time of pacification in 1947. Fights that were then unresolved have been resumed and are again in progress. And some of the deaths that occurred before pacification have not yet been avenged.

In many parts of the Highlands there were two kinds of warfare of greater and lesser severity corresponding with two kinds of enemies. Often different segments of a large group waged a minor form of warfare with few fatalities. At Minj the minor kind of warfare was between groups that had intermarried and were usually friendly and hoped to be friendly again. The war continued until the number of dead on both sides was even, totalling from two to about ten; then an outside group would initiate peace-making. An exchange of pigs prepared the way for a new exchange of women. But warfare with a traditional enemy was total war aimed at the annihilation of the clan-tribe. A defeat was only decisive when one of the groups was driven from its territory and its surviving members scattered to find refuge with kinsfolk. Casualties were heavy: in one such total war there were more than one hundred dead on the winning side. It was commonplace for the remnants of defeated groups to fetch up in Jimi or Simbu. Everyone knows of several groups that once flourished but became extinct.

Paula Brown (1963) has characterized the traditional state of affairs in Simbu, adjacent to Mid-Wahgi, as 'anarchy'. She was using the term in the technical sense of an absence of governmental institutions; but I think it conveys to most of us a disorderliness, an absence of law and order. I myself have described the external relations of the clan-tribe as
anarchic (Reay 1959:194). The clan-tribe itself, however, formed a community which contained a legal and moral order (Reay 1974:198). Moral and legal principles did not apply to outsiders: external relations were indeed anarchic. Even when men were dealing with friendly groups, they were wary and formal, careful to observe protocol in case they should awaken hostility. Friendship was precarious. The only groups that could be trusted were those that had exchanged women, each keeping the other's clan sister as hostage.

The renewed tribal warfare that I have witnessed in 1979-80 is a resumption of a war the kiaps had stopped in 1947. It was resumed in mid 1979, halted at the end of January 1980, and broke out again in September of that year. By the end of 1979 four clan-tribes were centrally involved as groups providing separate but loosely coordinated armies ranged on two sides. Twenty-one other clan-tribes were involved to some extent: by providing one or more sub-clan battalions, a handful of warriors, or a few shields as earnest of later support. A separate war on the Simbu border had been dragging on for years and was beginning to involve groups situated closer to Minj. In the west and northwest two other fights were looming and one of these had broken out by the middle of 1980. I calculated that if deaths occurred in particular groups nearly all the clan-tribes of the Mid-Wahgi area could soon be embroiled in Wahgi World War I. By September 1980 ten armies were engaged instead of four. These supply some thousands of fighting men and I do not know how many others are involved as a subclan battalion or a handful of warriors or as reinforcements who have sent their shields ahead of them.

The weapons used are the traditional spears and unflighted arrows. The men with spears bear the brunt of the close fighting and protect themselves with shields. Meggitt (1977:57) states that by and large 'the shield has not occupied an important place in Enga fighting techniques', but it is crucial to Mid-Wahgi warfare. Archers shoot over the heads of the spearmen in the general direction of the enemy. These are the men who, because of their youth or age or general physique, are not strong enough to hold and manoeuvre the heavy shields while using their spears efficiently and performing the quick and delicate footwork needed to dodge enemy weapons. Early in the war the women of one group filled their great string bags with river stones and hurled these over the heads of the warriors. But this proved to be too effective: the men, whose wives are members of the community but not of the clan, needed to take credit for all the deaths on the other side. They were afraid, too, of the extra threat to their lives in the event of the enemy's womenfolk hurling missiles in return. The warriors are not using firearms, which have already appeared in renewed tribal warfare in Enga Province. Many of the shotguns imprudently issued for hunting are now useless through lack of attention and rough handling. In 1979 a raskol stole two rifles but his clansmen, fearful of the effects of firearms in tribal warfare, quickly recovered them and handed them to the police.

Meggitt (1977) relates that Mae Enga warriors tried using shields made of corrugated iron but discarded them because arrows ricocheted off the surface and endangered men in the immediate vicinity. The Konumbuga, one of the principal groups participating in the 1979-80 war at Minj, had tried using similar shields in a fight over a road death in 1975. They did this because they were not organized for war and had not replaced the
traditional hardwood shields the missionaries had burnt a decade earlier. By 1979 the Minj groups had equipped themselves with ample traditional hardwood shields. Early in the fighting the police Riot Squad confiscated and destroyed most of the shields.

In traditional life one of the methods the older men used to subdue the young men was to control their access to weapons. Youths had bamboo bows for hunting, but a select band of older men kept the weapons of war - the black palm bows, the slender black palm spears, and the hardwood shields - in the war-magic house, half shrine and half museum, which only they themselves as priests and curators could enter. By 1979 the older men had long lost their traditional control over the younger men, but they were now able to reexert their authority. With the confiscation and destruction of their shields they needed new ones quickly. As the experts on martial technology they taught their sons how to make the shields and use them to best advantage. By the end of the year, when the Riot Squad had destroyed more and more shields, men of thirty years of age were constructing new shields in one and a half days. Often they had to carry shields that were unusually heavy because the enemy attacked before the timber had dried. Fighting with a shield is not simply 'feinting and lunging' as Meggitt's account (1977:57) of Mae Enga warfare suggests. It required special skills involving ambidextrousness, body movements, and intricate footwork. The older men taught their sons these skills and the younger men learned eagerly, knowing that their lives might depend upon their knowledge.

The older men are repositories of all the different kinds of knowledge needed to wage a successful war. In deciding tactics and when to accept offers of alliance they draw upon their detailed knowledge of wars that have occurred during their own and their fathers' lifetimes. They know the rituals of revenge for deaths in warfare and the rituals to protect men who have killed or wounded an enemy. So long as the group is at war the older men are again the acknowledged leaders. Occasionally one of them boosts the morale of the group by announcing that he has 'a little thing' (yap kembis) that ensures a certain result: his own group will be victorious and will suffer no deaths; a particular subclan of the enemy will be exterminated; and so on. The 'little thing' is an item of knowledge from the wars from the remote past which somehow bears upon the relations between the groups now in conflict.

It may be argued that modern tribal fighting differs from traditional warfare in that it takes place in the context of the efforts of law enforcement agencies to stop the fighting. That is not how it looks on the ground. When the Konumbuga and Omngar fought over a road death in 1975 the 'law police' (as distinct from the Riot Squad) told the Konumbuga and their allies that they could fight for four days and they did so without interruption. When the Riot Squad came it concentrated on keeping the armies apart, not on dispersing them. In 1979 the law police had no power to intervene, excepting by summoning the Riot Squad. When a fight was brewing they would visit the points where the armies were assembling and stand by while the warriors trotted off to battle. They had no powers to arrest the men for breaches of the law and had instructions not to try to dissuade them from their purpose.
The police Riot Squad is called in expressly to intervene and its ostensible role is to stop the fight. Its observable role is that of a third army harassing both sides and causing hardship to both in ways that ensure that the fight continues. The fight area defined by the Group Fighting Act is not the battlefield where the fighting actually takes place but the combined homelands of the clans that are engaged in the war. Within this area the Riot Squad has unlimited powers of arrest. When the Squad raids one of the clan territories to capture the warriors the men have already heard of their approach and fled to the bush. At first the Riot Squad used to put the women in gaol in the belief that the men would then give themselves up; but the naivety of this belief was soon apparent. A few old men presented the Squad with food and one or two pigs in the hope that the police would reciprocate by leaving them alone. But soon the Riot Squad, frustrated by their inability to capture the warriors, were helping themselves to pigs and fowls and fruit and vegetables. Some interpreted their power to search all houses for the warriors as licence to take anything they might find there. They raped a number of women in two of the groups. In response to complaints the officer in charge of police refused to hold a line-up to identify the culprits on the score that 'it would be bad for the morale of the men'.

One of the cultural differences between Minj and Mt Hagen is in the style of oratory. Hageners boast vaingloriously whereas the orators at Minj impress with their wealth by being self-depreciating. Indicating the hundreds upon hundreds of pigs their group had killed, they used to apologise for having so few to kill. By June 1980 an orator was excusing a modest presentation of food in a new idiom:

I cannot see pandanus fruit or bananas or coffee or such things very clearly.
I cannot see pigs or dogs or cassowaries or fowls or such things very clearly.
The Riot Squad came and finished all our food crops
And our pigs and fowls were stolen so we have none left.
We are truly impoverished.
If I had some of these things I would give them to you.

When a warrior is killed the Riot Squad is more concerned with punishing offenders than with restoring order. For some days after the death the Squad directs its entire attention to searching for the men of the killing group, harassing their womenfolk, and plundering their territory. And yet this is not the group that is eager to continue the war: its members would welcome peace while the score of deaths is in their favour. The group that has suffered the loss is impatient to avenge it. And the Riot Squad leaves it free to carry out its rituals of revenge, renew its supply of weapons, and instruct allies in waiting to be ready to join in a fresh assault as soon as the Riot Squad departs from the general area.²

There are no effective methods of concluding a war. Local notables and educated men appeal to the provincial government to intervene and end the war by fiat. An imposing array of very important personages arrives to confer with the warring groups. In January they were unable to arrive at a peace settlement and the interim provincial government gave the groups one
week in which to do this themselves, without indicating what would happen if they did not succeed. (It would have been impractical to imprison the thousands of people occupying the fight area.) An outside group adopted its traditional role of peace-making and brought about a truce which lasted seven months. There were several reasons why the peace could not be permanent - the most important being that the numbers of dead were not even. The Ngeni-Muruka had suffered badly: several men had been killed outright and two more had died of wounds. Also the senior wife of one of their leaders had drowned while trying to cross the Wahgi River to reach her relatives with enemy archers in hot pursuit. Their allies, the Kambilika, had sustained only minor wounds. On the other side the Kugika had no war dead yet and the Konumbuga had lost only one man.

The Ngeni-Muruka, who were plainly the losers, were demanding massive compensation for the deaths in battle. The Kugi-Konumbuga, however, acknowledge no such debt. The Ngeniga, taking the attitude of the police as their example, saw advantage in arguing that killing in warfare was homicide and compensation was traditionally appropriate. Their opponents maintained correctly that groups never paid compensation for deaths they inflicted in warfare. Every warrior ran the risk of getting killed and a man who was not prepared to run that risk would have stayed at home.3 The pigs that clans exchanged at the end of a traditional war stood for the men who had been killed but were in no sense compensation for their deaths. The only acceptable compensation for a war death was a retaliatory death on the other side. The Kugika, however, were willing to make a small payment to the Ngeniga leader whose senior wife had drowned. This was not as compensation, they stressed, but simply a gesture of sympathy towards the bereaved leader.

The peace-making group was not a wholly neutral group since a few of its subclans had been fighting. Many of its traditional leaders, the men best qualified to head the peace-making operations, had themselves participated. Young educated fellows, bent on making their names before standing for the provincial and national elections, pushed themselves forward as leaders in the peace-making. Some of the procedures they followed did not satisfy the older men; but the peace-making was merely the formalization of a truce, not the establishment of lasting peace, and no one insisted on correctness of every detail.

Also the provincial election was approaching and the Minj people heeded the pleas of politicians to postpone the fighting until the election was over. The election then became a substitute for the war. The only real issue was which side in the suspended war would succeed in being represented in the provincial government. Candidates were careful not to campaign among groups that were sympathetic towards the other side. As elsewhere in the Western Highlands, losing candidates took the result as an affront. They accused voters who were on their side in the war of betraying them and voting for the enemy. They demanded a new election (one on the grounds that the people he had expected to vote for him had not done so) and there were ugly incidents. In another part of the valley clansmen of a disappointed candidate killed the brother of a leader who had allegedly promised support. Throughout the province the result of the election was greeted with unrest and often violence.
Up to the time of the clash between the Konumbuga and the Omngar in 1975 the Minj people (and indeed the Mid-Wahgi people generally) had been justly proud that although tribal wars were continually breaking out in Mt Hagen and Simbu they themselves were law-abiding. But they were all convinced that independence would put an end to the white *kiaps*’ law. Their ardent desire that independence should be delayed until their grandchildren were mature men was not a simple conservatism but a desire that pacification should continue until no one remained who had known the war dead as living persons. If pacification could last as long as that, the idea of *tol y’b*’ would become a mere artifact of the violent past.

The expression *tol y’b* has no literal meaning and no one knows its derivation. I myself think it derives from the words *tolmon*, meaning 'red paint', and *yibe*, meaning 'nowadays', giving the sense of 'red paint nowadays' or, figuratively, 'blood as a consequence of what went before'. (Blood, e.g. menstrual blood, is sometimes referred to jokingly as 'red paint'.) People define it as 'thinking of the dead and how to avenge them'. *Tol y’b*’ is the generic name for rituals of revenge and it includes rites aimed at protecting a killer and his 'small group' from the angry ghost of his victim. The war that began in 1979 revived these rituals after a gap of thirty-two years. This revival delays for more than a further generation the time when the idea of *tol y’b*’ can recede into history.

Revenge is the principle that makes war necessary and, in the absence of authoritarian control, inevitable. When a man is killed his clansmen feel it to be their bounden duty to avenge his death. His closest agnates feel this obligation most strongly, but even if they die before the deed is done the obligation remains with all those clansmen who knew the killed man as a living person. His death is not simply the death of an individual but also a depletion of the clan. An insult to a leader of another clan is an insult to the clan and must be redressed as such. The engagement of a clan-tribe in what may at first seem to an outside observer to be a clash between individuals is not a matter of 'mob psychology', as Sillitoe (1979:77) alleges for the Wola, but of duty and obligation to the group.

The Minj people can see no prospect of bringing tribal warfare to a definite end short of arranging for the return of the white *kiaps*, which many of them advocate. They point out that neither the police nor the provincial authorities are impartial, but emphasize that an authoritarian suppression of warfare is necessary. It will not be easy to eradicate the idea of *tol y’b*’ until no man in any clan has known a clansman killed in war as a living person. If warfare is to be suppressed in the meantime we must consider what kind of authoritarian control would be politically feasible, locally acceptable, and effective.

It is too late, of course, to call back the white *kiaps* to reenact the drama of pacification. But in equating the success of pacification with the rule of the white *kiaps* the Minj people are forgetting that in the heyday of pacification the *kiaps* ruled through satraps (Brown 1963) - the *lulnais* and *tultuls*, appointed local officials whose roles were more authoritarian than those of the subsequently elected officials (local government councillor, village magistrate). It seems to me that, whoever the ultimate local authorities may be, an effective suppression of warfare must involve grassroots officials, strongly supported by higher
officialdom. They would need to be answerable to the authorities on behalf of the clan-tribe, the unit that might otherwise be waging war, rather than on behalf of an arbitrarily defined constituency or village court area. There would be no need to create yet another class of officials with yet another especially designed badge. The peace officer could be charged with the duty of preventing his clan-tribe from going to war. This could be effective if the peace officer were indeed a village police officer commanded by and answerable to the police. A closer relationship between peace officers and the district law-enforcement agencies would help to restore the much eroded legitimacy of the police and help to eliminate warfare, raskolism, and the blatant disrespect for the law. The credibility of the law itself would seem to hinge on its being enforced with reasonable consistency. It also depends on the law-enforcement authorities acting as if they are confident that the law is enforceable. Neither of these conditions is present when most clansmen are imprisoned but some are released on payment of a fine in case the enemy should attack again believing that all the clan's warriors are in gaol (Balakau 1978). The destruction of weapons, which was so effective when carried out on the orders of the early kiaps, has lost its power to usher in a period of non-violence and now signifies a willingness to suspend hostilities for at least as long as it takes to make new weapons and shields.

The highlanders of Minj were once a proud and vital people living a rich community life within the broad framework of pacification and the law of the kiap. Community life is now impoverished and initiative is stifled by a new tradition that decision-making is out of people's hands and waits upon authoritative orders. There is no easy way to put an end to tribal warfare so that the people of the Highlands may, in Winston Churchill's words, 'walk together in majesty, in justice, and in peace'.

NOTES

1 Literally this expression means 'Fair? No!' I have discussed elsewhere (1974:198) the concept of kab'g' in traditional justice.

2 Curiously the riot police do not remain at Minj, handy to the battlefield, longer than a few days at a time. They have to be summoned from Banz or Kundlawa or Mt Hagen, and there is time for a battle before they arrive.

3 This argument assumes that such a choice was available to him. But a proven coward could be dragged trembling to the battlefield and hemmed in by braver warriors until it was too late for him to evade his duty.

4 Sillitoe (1979:77) says it 'supports' war. Despite the weak phrasing, he does identify revenge as the only principle that does this.
REFERENCES


POLITICAL STYLE IN MODERN MELANESIA

R.J. May

In recent writing about contemporary politics in Melanesia one frequently comes across the term *style*. The suggestion seems to be that there is, if not a unique, at least a distinctive Melanesian style (or styles) of politics. Hegarty, for example, speaks of an 'essentially accommodative political and governmental style' in Papua New Guinea (1979:110) and Quiros (1979) speaks similarly of a 'conciliatory style of political leadership' in that country. (Also see Standish 1978a:29 and Herlihy, p.575.) Melanesian political leaders themselves frequently talk about doing things 'in the Melanesian way' (for example, see Lini 1980).

This paper seeks to identify some of the elements of political style in modern Melanesia and to relate them to broader aspects of the region's political culture.

I begin by accepting that there *is* such a thing as political style; I will not, however, attempt to define the term, except to say that it has something to do with the way in which nations' leaders (and by extension nations themselves) behave within a framework set by formal constitutions and *realpolitik*. The suggestion that one can distinguish a national or regional political style implies the existence of an identifiable political culture,

though it does not deny the importance of individual personality in political style. By way of crude illustration, from outside Melanesia: I think one might reasonably argue that, say, the Ayatollah Khomeini, Emperor Bokassa, Ferdinand Marcos, Sir Eric Gairy and Bob Hawke display a variety of political styles which reflects differences in the respective political cultures from which they have emerged, and which could not be easily transferred from one political culture to another, and that the spectacle of the United States presidential elections reflects a style of politics which varies from that of even such other predominantly anglo-saxon western democracies as the United Kingdom and Australia.

The literature of political science has little to say about political style at an aggregative level, except perhaps in the field of international relations where several authors have referred to national styles as an important factor in determining patterns of international negotiations (for example, see Druckman 1977 and references cited therein; Spanier 1978:chapter 12). There is, on the other hand, a substantial literature on personality and politics (much of it contributed by psychologists), which has a lot to say about individual styles and has occasionally attempted to make the leap from the individual to the group or nation, mostly however in
the context of 'developed' societies. The anthropological literature on leadership in Melanesia is also of obvious relevance to the question of style in modern politics, but except for the work of Standish on Simbu politics (especially Standish forthcoming) and perhaps that of Pinney (1973) on bigmen and *bismis* - both of which are about Papua New Guinea highlands societies - there appears to have been little interest in the relationship between traditional and modern political styles.

In approaching the question of political style in modern Melanesia one possible method would be to compile a series of political biographies and attempt to generalize national characteristics from these. Entertaining though such an exercise might be, the prospect of deriving some stylistic equivalent of a 'modal personality' from profiles of political leaders as personally disparate as, say, Walter Lini, Iambakey Okuk, Marten Tabu, John Kasaiapwalova, Jimmy Stevens and Ratu Mara seems sufficiently daunting to suggest an alternative approach (a reaction which recent personality-and-politics studies would seem to support).

By way of alternative, it might be argued that if there is a distinctive Melanesian style of politics (or if there are distinctive styles) one might expect to locate its essence in a specifically Melanesian political culture (or cultures). Constraints of time and space prevent me from attempting to draw a comprehensive picture of Melanesian political culture. Instead I will suggest that there is a number of respects in which the culture(s) and the recent political history of Melanesia are, if not unique, at least unusual. Some of these are examined briefly in the following paragraphs.

The scale of politics and the politics of scale. An earlier speaker (R.G. Ward, pp.181-191) has already touched on the question of the relative smallness and isolation of Melanesian societies and the impact this has had on their politics. This relationship is examined in greater detail in Benedict (1967) and in May and Tupouniuia (1980). To quote from the latter:

> The relationships between individuals in a small scale society thus tend to be more intense and social transactions to be dominated by personal relationships reflecting, amongst other things, kinship, village ties and ascriptive status. At the same time, the members of a small scale society tend to be more dependent upon one another's actions than do those of a larger society. Typically, political and economic relations are dominated by series of reciprocal obligations (between equals and between patrons and clients) but it is common, also, for small scale societies to employ social pressures to ensure individual conformity to the values and objectives of the group. It is often suggested that smallness of scale promotes social cohesion, however there is little evidence for this; indeed as Benedict (1967:49) rightly points out, "intense factionalism" is a common feature of small communities (May and Tupouniuia 1980:423).
Diversity and (a little bit) beyond. Melanesia's diversity is legendary. The linguists have already commented on the region's extraordinary linguistic diversity - and have made the interesting suggestion (Laycock, pp.33-38) that this diversity is not a function of isolation but that language has been used deliberately as a means of differentiating one group from another. And the prehistorians and anthropologists, while reminding us of the extent of traditional exchange networks, have described a situation in which social units were typically small and in which intergroup relations were limited both in physical range and content. It may be, as has been suggested during the course of this seminar, that we are sometimes inclined to overemphasize the extent of isolationism in pre-contact Melanesia; nevertheless the fact remains that even compared with tribal Asia and Africa, pre-contact Melanesia was fragmented to an unusually high degree and that to a substantial extent this fragmentation has survived the colonial period.

Related to this is a provocative suggestion made by Barnes (1962:9): that

A characteristic of Highland cultures, and perhaps of Melanesia as a whole, is the high value placed on violence .... In these circumstances we might expect to find a less developed system of alliances and counterveiling forces, and less developed arrangements for maintaining peace, than we would have in a polity directed to peace and prosperity.

Bigmen and all that. A substantial body of recent writing on leadership and social stratification in Melanesia (to which the papers in this volume by Connell and Donaldson further contribute) seeks to distinguish between a stereotype of the typical Melanesian traditional society as egalitarian and communalistic, with leadership determined by competition between men of influence (what Standish 1978a refers to as the 'Big-man Model'), and the reality of socially hierarchical, status-conscious societies in which heredity frequently played an important part in the selection of leaders. Without wishing to detract from this recent emphasis on social stratification (except occasionally to query the source of the stereotype), I think it is important that we not lose sight of the essential elements of truth in the stereotype: namely, that relative to Polynesia and most parts of Africa (not to mention traditional societies in Europe and Asia) social stratification in Melanesian traditional societies was not particularly formalized and that traditional institutions such as sorcery and warfare, as well as social attitudes to wealth, were frequently used as a means of preventing forceful individuals or groups from rising too far above the common herd (cf. Moulik 1973:123-127).

The exception in this respect, it would seem, is Fiji. There, traditional societies appear to have been more formally stratified and the status ordering, having been consolidated by colonial rule, has so far proved enduring (see Nayacakalou 1975; Nation 1978).

Whatever the situation may have been, there is now a well entrenched (if not universally accepted) belief that egalitarianism and communalism prevailed in pre-contact Melanesia, and that these values are integral to 'the Melanesian way':
... our peoples are communalistic and communalism is the basis for our traditional way of life. Our values therefore must be communalistic (Gris 1975:137).

The colonial experience. With respect to the impact of colonial rule on Melanesia's political culture, I offer four comments.

The first is the unremarkable observation that the impact of colonialism has itself been diverse. Not only have the colonial masta exhibited a variety of political styles reflecting their indigenous political cultures (a theme pursued earlier in this seminar and also by Ward and Ballard 1976) but the timing of the colonial impact has been responsible for major differences in the attitudes of colonizers to colonized, and particular circumstances of physical environment and historical events (notably the Second World War) have affected the Melanesian societies in different ways. For example, Australian colonialism in the New Guinea highlands in the 1950s was a very different thing from German colonialism in coastal New Guinea at the end of the nineteenth century, partly because of differences in the political cultures of the two colonizers and partly because of differences in the circumstances of contact, but primarily because prevailing attitudes towards colonialism in the late nineteenth century were rather different from the attitudes prevailing in the mid twentieth century (except, perhaps, amongst French colons). Similarly, the impact of the French on New Caledonia might have been very different if that territory had had no nickel.

Secondly, beyond this diversity colonialism has had a universal impact in breaking down traditional isolationism, facilitating the movement of people, goods and ideas, and fostering a national consciousness within the (largely arbitrary) geographical boundaries of the colonial system. Further, the colonial powers sought to develop this wider consciousness within the framework of institutions and norms imported, for the most part, from outside. (Consider, for example, the comments of Waddell 1973 on the appropriateness of the Westminster model to Papua New Guinea.) At the two extremes of this generalization: in Fiji the British administration actively sought to 'preserve' elements of the traditional polity; in Irian Jaya Indonesian policy has been overtly assimilationist and the Melanesian political culture has been suppressed by direct political action and by heavy immigration. As in other parts of the world, however, the attempt to modernize Melanesian societies and to create national polities in the colonialist's image has been only partially successful. For one thing, like colonized people elsewhere, Melanesians have already shown a remarkable capacity for adapting modernity to tradition and tradition to modernity and for maintaining, side by side with occasional overlapping, the forms and institutions of traditional politics with those of the introduced system. For another, in Papua New Guinea, the Solomons and Vanuatu separatist and what elsewhere (May 1975, forthcoming) I have called 'micronationalist' movements have emerged to contest, actively or passively, the political boundaries of the modern states.

Thirdly, and more controversially, it might be argued that while colonialism is very seldom a pleasant experience for the colonized and although Melanesia suffered its share of forced labour, punitive expeditions and the rest, for most Melanesians the colonial impact, judged
against the broad sweep of world history, was relatively benign (Irian Jaya being the notable exception). Without wishing to press the point too far — and recognizing that in some respects this is a condemnation of Australian colonial rule: there have been few countries in which, as in Papua New Guinea, the indigenous government, elected on a nationalist platform, has sought to postpone the granting of independence. This observation and the implications of it have been elaborated by the African Mazrui (1970:56).

Until the recent interest in large scale mining enterprise, Australian indifference denied New Guineans even the advantage of a shared anti-colonial resentment. The British [in Africa], by being exploitative, were also involved in fostering cultural homogenization, some economic inter-action, some constructions of institutions for conflict resolution, and above all the beginnings of national consciousness.

By the sin of indifference, however, Australia has denied her dependency such an infra-structure for nationhood. And she has denied her own participation in modern imperialism its ultimate legitimation — the legitimation of having laid the foundations of modern statehood.

Finally, in three Melanesian territories a major impact of colonialism (and I include Irian Jaya as a colony) has been the importation of non Melanesian people. In Fiji and New Caledonia Melanesians are now in a minority of the population; in Irian Jaya non Melanesians probably account for around 10 per cent of the population (Pacific Islands Yearbook 1978:223), but they are concentrated in the administrative and commercial centres and the proportion is probably rising. Obviously this makes for a different style of national politics.

Politics, economics and bisnis. In 1971 R. Kent Wilson wrote:

When the economic history of Papua New Guinea comes to be written by an indigenous scholar, it is possible that it will be seen in part as the search for a key, a search indulged in by both indigene and expatriate, by both tribes and Administration. Exotic religion, roads, schools, co-operatives, savings societies, information services, business advice and so on, have all been interpreted in some contexts by one or both parties to the dual economy as the key to economic advancement. When frustration or imagination took over, the search was diverted to cargoism, a cult which in broad terms has not been the preserve of the indigene (Wilson 1971:525).

Nine years later the record of Melanesian business enterprises is little better than it was when Wilson carried out his survey of village industries (Wilson and Garnaut 1968); equally remarkable is the general failure of the numerous locally-based development movements which emerged in Papua New Guinea in the early 1970s. And although various explanations have been offered (e.g. Nadkarni 1970; Wilson 1971; Andrews 1975; also see Jackman
1977) the questions which plagued business development officers and development bank officials in the 1960s remain largely unanswered. Yet individual and group businesses are still seen—perhaps increasingly—as a road to development and to the acquisition of social and political status, and in Papua New Guinea provincial governments are in the process of setting up business arms, already with some unfortunate results.

In an earlier paper to this seminar Peter Lawrence suggested (pp.57-72) a distinction, in traditional societies, between 'secular or empirical knowledge' and 'sacred or "true" knowledge' and referred to the continued strength—in the face of education and material advancement—of magico-religious thinking as an obstacle to people's understanding of the operation of the modern world. Certainly what Lawrence would refer to as cargoistic thinking, and what might be more generally described as inadequate understanding and unrealistic expectations about business, provides part of an explanation for the failure, in western terms, of some business ventures; but it is also clear that Melanesians have not always seen the demise of businesses (or, indeed, their raison d'être) in the same terms as outsiders (just as Papua New Guinean lawyer, philosopher and consultant to his country's Constitutional Planning Committee, Bernard Narokobi opposed the constitutional provision for an auditor-general on the grounds that such an office was unmelanesian).

The relationship between politics and business in modern Melanesia is a complex one, especially as in Papua New Guinea where a government leadership code seeks to restrict the business activities of national leaders, many of whom argue (with Iambakey Okuk) that the accumulation of wealth is an essential element of political status.

At the national level, also, there is in much of Melanesia an element of unreality in the ideological commitment of self-sufficiency and the fact that Melanesia is, per capita, probably the most heavily aid-assisted region of the world. Commenting on this in 1970 (from the viewpoint of a political party organizer) Mr Michael Somare said:

Our people are so accustomed to getting things for nothing ... that they do not see why they should organize as political groups to express these demands (Somare 1970:490).

What sort of a picture does this leave us with and what sort of political style is suggested by these aspects of political culture?

The first generalization I would offer—which follows on from the comments about scale and about fragmentation—is that politics in modern Melanesia, even at the national level, is essentially personal and group politics. In the absence of basic social divisions cutting across the Melanesian politics (to the obvious frustration of some Marxist analysts) the bases for political support in Melanesia are typically local or personal. With the exception of Fiji, and the qualified exception of New Caledonia (where French colonial attitudes and policies have produced the sort of anti-colonial nationalist solidarity whose absence in Papua New Guinea was noted by Mazrui), the Melanesian political culture has not proved to be a fertile ground for the growth of political parties. Even in
Papua New Guinea, where in the early 1970s there appeared to be a well established incipient party system, political parties have not developed as the proponents of the Westminster model assumed they would; indeed in late 1980 the Pangu Pati machinery in both Morobe and East Sepik - probably the strongest examples of political party development in Melanesia outside Fiji - appeared to be in a state of total disarray. In provincial elections in Papua New Guinea during 1979-80 several provinces (including the East Sepik and Western Highlands) decided that they 'would not have' political parties because parties were 'disruptive'. Moreover where incipient party structures have emerged they have tended to display a pronounced regional bias. Even within the West Papuan liberation movement, personal and regional/ethnic divisions have cut across the common cause of Irianese against Indonesian rule.

In the absence of western-style parties political loyalties have tended to revolve around clan, local or ethnic divisions. This appears to have two major implications. On the one hand it makes for parochial, pork-barrel politics; on the other it ensures the interplay of traditional and modern politics, with the implications this has for the accumulation and distribution of wealth and influence for political purposes, the manipulation of kastom to political ends, and occasionally the use of violence (cf. Standish forthcoming).

A corollary of this is the growing incidence of nepotism (in Papua New Guinea, wantokism; in Vanuatu 'family government'). As several people (Melanesian and non Melanesian) have argued, there are strengths in a wantok system, but when the impact of wantokism is to entrench the position of those who for historical or other reasons have gained an initial advantage in the political-administrative system, wantokism has a great potential for exacerbating ethnic and regional tensions (cf. McKillop and Standish in May forthcoming).

A second observation, which derives from the comments about the fragmentation of traditional society, relates again to the importance of regionalism. Apart from the tendency for regionalism to manifest itself as a basis of political organization within national politics, Melanesian societies have shown a marked propensity towards decentralization, separatism and micronationalist withdrawal. This is a subject which will be taken up in more detail by Jim Griffin but I think it is worth noting that aside from such separatist tendencies as evidenced by the North Solomons, Papua Besena, Nagriamel and the western islands movement in the Solomons, the formal decentralization of political power which has taken place in Papua New Guinea and has been mooted in the Solomons is highly unusual in the experience of new states.

A third generalization concerns the inconsistency between the ideology of 'the Melanesian Way', with its emphasis on equality, communalism, self-sufficiency and consensus, and its respect for tradition, and the reality of political and social change in Melanesia which so often is characterized by social stratification, individualism, dependence and conflict (Standish 1980 uses the term 'jugular politics'), and is so frequently anxious to embrace modern, capitalist development. In part, perhaps, this is evidence of a variety of Melanesian political cultures. In part it is a reflection of the gap between political myth and political reality which exists in all political systems. But it also has something
to do with the use of ideologies rooted in a model of harmonious small societies to justify participation in a system imposed during colonial rule. And of course it should be said that 'the Melanesian Way' is not entirely myth. Melanesian politics often does reveal a concern for egalitarianism, a capacity for compromise, and (except perhaps for Fiji) a lack of respect for authority which places it apart from new states in Asia, Africa or America. I find it impossible, for example, to think of an indigenous military regime in Melanesia.

In a similar way the emphasis given to kastom or kalsa in Melanesia is in part evidence of genuine respect for tradition, but it is also a symbol manipulated by politicians (especially young politicians) to legitimate their participation in the modern system and as such, as Tonkinson (1980) has recently pointed out, can be used both as a force for national unity and a force for ethnic division.

I am aware that this paper does little to capture the spirit of Melanesian political style. And it does nothing to distinguish differential (for example, highlands as opposed to coastal) Melanesian styles. But what I hope it has done is suggest that one might be able to talk about a Melanesian political style, rooted in Melanesian political culture, and that in interpreting contemporary political developments in independent Melanesia non-Melanesian observers should be aware that in part what they are observing is the assertion of that Melanesian style (cf. Quiros 1979 in reviewing Standish 1978b). What is offered here is merely the preamble to a more serious study.

NOTES

On the concept of political culture see Almond and Verba (1963), Pye and Verba (1965), Almond and Powell (1966:chapter 3), Kavanagh (1972). This writing might be compared with the earlier literature on 'national character', of which there is an extensive review in Inkeles and Levinson (1969).

2 The personality-and-politics literature is well reviewed in Greenstein (1969, 1975). There is also an extensive bibliography in Hermann (1977). For specific comments on aggregative analyses of personality and politics see Greenstein (1969:120-140; 1975:60-68). Probably the best known study of personality and politics in 'transitional societies' is that of Pye (1962); there is also some interesting material in Legge (1973). A course on 'Personality and Political Style' is provided by the Department of Government at University of Queensland. I am grateful to Graeme Vaughan for informing me of this and providing me with a copy of the course outline and references.

3 A presentation by Griffin, 'From Vogelkopf to Fiji: fragmentation, friction and fraternity' was not available for inclusion in this volume.

4 The closest to a coherent statement of 'the Melanesian Way' which I have been able to locate is a piece by Bernard Narakobi in Post-Courier 22
October 1974 but there is constant reference to it in papers in May (1973) and Lawrence (1975) has written about it. A similar philosophy is expounded in The Pacific Way (Tupouniu et al. 1975). The Melanesian Way philosophy is, of course, embodied in the Papua New Guinea government's Eight Aims and in the preamble to its constitution. [Since this paper was written a volume on the Melanesian Way, by Narokobi, has been published by the Institute of Papuan New Guinea Studies, Port Moresby (Narokobi 1980).]

REFERENCES


POLITICAL STYLE IN MODERN MELANESIA


Melanesia is noted for its cultural diversity. This diversity is, in fact, so marked that it has caused many to question the accepted practice of grouping the hundreds of societies from West Irian to Fiji into a 'region', and of referring to its inhabitants as Melanesian, with the implication of shared characteristics that the use of such a label suggests. Whilst a strong objective basis for the 'existence' of Melanesia, in anything but name, appears to be lacking, there is nevertheless a context in which a Melanesian identity becomes relevant and therefore one in which the region can be said to move 'beyond diversity'. That context is provided by the involvement of the newly independent Melanesian states - Fiji, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu - in South Pacific regional politics. In such a context, where Melanesians confront Polynesians, Micronesians and Europeans, a sense of ethnic allegiance is promoted, which is as real and as significant as if there were an objective cultural basis for it. Such an allegiance is based primarily on shared political interests and is increasingly encouraged by political leaders who see advantage in 'Melanesian brotherhood' for domestic, regional and wider international purposes.

This paper is concerned with the involvement of the Melanesian countries in regional developments and with the implications that such involvement has both for the development of a Melanesian political identity and for the nature of regional politics. The subject is approached by examining, first, the nature of regional political activity and its institutional framework; secondly, the dominant role of Fiji in regional activity and its repercussions; thirdly, the entry of Papua New Guinea into regional politics; fourthly, the Papua New Guinea/Fiji 'alliance'; fifthly, the developing Melanesian 'alliance' under Sir Julius Chan, and finally, the grounds for talking about a Melanesian bloc within South Pacific regional politics.

THE BASIS OF REGIONAL POLITICS

The decolonization that took place in the South Pacific during the 1960s and 1970s made the emergence of regional politics inevitable. Prior to decolonization there was no regional politics as such. All of the island countries came under the administration of five metropolitan countries. The withdrawal of Britain, Australia and New Zealand from their island territories left behind nine independent states and two self-governing countries, each in a position to determine its own foreign
policy. This had important repercussions for the international relations of the region. Significantly, each of these states opted to adopt, as a priority in its foreign policy, a commitment to the promotion of regional cooperation. They have not just been concerned, then, with developments in their own countries. They have a regional view and hold the attitude that it is they, rather than outside powers, that should determine future developments in the island region of Melanesia, Polynesia and Micronesia.

The emergence of independent states committed to a regionalist view has inevitably provided the basis for political conflict because of the continued involvement of metropolitan powers in the region. The countries have their own ideas about how developments should proceed in the area and about who should determine them. This involvement is not confined to the United States and France, which still administer territories in the region. The political change in the region has also aroused the interest and involvement of other metropolitan powers which were previously denied access to the region under colonial arrangements. Such interest has come mainly from Japan, the Soviet Union, China and the EEC, and has been expressed in terms of diplomatic ties, trade links, visits and offers of economic assistance. These moves prompted an immediate response from Australia and New Zealand, who regard the South Pacific region south of the equator as their sphere of influence (Fry 1979:276-291); consequently, they became much more heavily involved diplomatically and economically in the region. Thus recent developments have moved the region from an isolated world position to one more closely linked with 'big power' strategic and resource interests. The political withdrawal of the colonial powers has not meant a lessening of external involvement. Rather, it has led to an increased interest and involvement on the part of outside powers.

Here then were all the ingredients for the emergence of regional politics: newly independent Pacific states committed to the promotion of regional cooperation and the fostering of an indigenous regional identity; a continuing American and French administrative presence in their Pacific territories; new interest from the Soviet Union, China, the EEC and Japan; and Australia, New Zealand and the United States attempting, as an ANZUS strategy, to keep the newly independent states under their influence. Each of these groups wants to influence developments in the region. Political divisions, tensions and conflicts were therefore inevitable. Moreover, the fact that the independent Pacific states were committed to practical ventures in regional cooperation dictated that regional politics would not only be defined in terms of the island countries versus the metropolitan countries. The basis was also established for political conflict to occur among the island states themselves concerning the nature, pace and control of regional ventures.

**ASSERTION OF INDIGENOUS CONTROL OF THE REGIONAL STRUCTURES**

Regional politics was, at first, concerned with the issue of control. Prior to 1965 all decisions concerning regional developments in the South Pacific were made in the distant metropolitan capitals of the colonial powers. Pacific islanders did not play a significant part in this process. From the mid 1960s, however, the Pacific leaders took a series of actions aimed at changing the regional structures which ensured this colonial power supremacy. The first action was to demand change in the power balance
within the existing regional organization, the South Pacific Commission (SPC). The SPC had been established in 1947 by the colonial powers with territorial interests in the region - Britain, France, the Netherlands, the United States, Australia and New Zealand. The stated purpose of the organization was to promote the economic and social development of the inhabitants of the Island territories. Nineteen territories were eventually included within the scope of the SPC. The assurance that absolute control of the organization would be in the hands of the metropolitan powers had been built into the provisions of the founding Agreement. Although the involvement of Pacific islanders was to be encouraged through participation in a triennial South Pacific Conference, the Conference was given only advisory powers. Control of the organization's activities rested firmly with the twelve commissioners who represented the metropolitan governments.

Although a reflection of prevailing thought in 1947, the provisions which ensured colonial power predominance were anachronistic in the 1960s, when islanders had begun to feel the impact of political change within their countries. They objected strongly to these structural guarantees of colonial power supremacy and in their reaction to them, the island leaders found a rallying point. Their attack on metropolitan power dominance took the form of a series of demands for a more prominent role for the South Pacific Conference, the body within the SPC organization in which islanders were represented. Indigenous interests became identified with the Conference, whilst the interests of the colonial powers became identified with the Commission.

Although there had been earlier isolated instances of islander dissatisfaction with their role within the SPC, it was not until the 1962 conference, held at Pago Pago, that such feelings were widely shared and articulated (Herr 1976:179-186). The mood of the meeting influenced the representatives of the colonial powers meeting in the 1964 session of the Commission who decided that the Conference would henceforth be able to make recommendations concerning the work programme. Delegates at the 1965 conference held in Lae were disappointed, however, in how their newly-won power worked in practice. This disillusionment was the immediate cause of the outspoken attack upon the Commission which followed (Langdon 1965:21). Ratu Mara of Fiji was the principal protagonist, but he was supported by nearly all island delegates. He was later to describe their joint action as a 'rebellion'. He argued that the 'confrontation' with the colonial powers was necessary because the powers seemed incapable of realising that the winds of change had at last reached the South Pacific and that we peoples of the territories were no longer going to tolerate the domination of the Commission by the Metropolitan powers. We were sick of having little to say and no authority. Regardless of what we said or did, the final decision was always in the hands of the Metropolitan powers (Mara 1974:7).

For both island participants and European observers, the Lae conference represented a watershed in regional affairs.
In subsequent conferences between 1967 and 1974, the Pacific delegates continued to press for more power. Despite the reluctance of some metropolitan powers, particularly France, to concede change, these efforts culminated in the adoption of a Memorandum of Understanding in 1974. Under the Memorandum, the Conference became the governing body of the SPC. The operation of the SPC under the new Memorandum rules did not, however, satisfy all islander complaints concerning metropolitan influence within the SPC. In the conferences between 1975 and 1979, the Pacific island representatives continued to attack what they saw as residual elements of metropolitan dominance. For example, at the 1978 conference, the Fijian delegate, Livai Nasilivata, attacked Australia for referring matters to Canberra for decision and, in so doing, keeping the rest of the Conference waiting. He asked,

How much longer are we, the island countries and, in fact, ministers representing islands peoples at this conference, to allow ourselves to be treated in this insulting and paternalistic way by some of our partners? (Ashton 1978:22)

His attack was supported by other delegates. The sensitivity to any metropolitan actions which might be construed as trying to influence unduly the operation of the SPC remains despite the structural changes which have given islanders effective control of this organization. For many islanders, the SPC will always be seen as the organization created by the colonial powers, and therefore not to be regarded in the same way as 'home-grown' institutions.

The second action aimed at asserting indigenous control of regional organization was the establishment of the Pacific Islands Producers' Association (PIPA). Significantly, it was established in 1965, the same year as the 'rebellion' at the Lae conference. This was not mere coincidence, for the two developments were related, stemming as they did from a common motive and initiated by the same group of island leaders. The creation of PIPA was particularly important because it was an action which involved moving outside the established organizational framework which was identified with colonial power interests. The establishment of PIPA was initiated by Ratu Mara, then member for natural resources in the Fiji government, who saw the need for closer cooperation among island territories supplying bananas to the New Zealand market (Elder 1971). Fiji was joined by Western Samoa, Cook Islands, Niue, Tonga, and the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. Thus PIPA really amounted to a Polynesian venture reflecting the more advanced stage of decolonization in that part of the region and the fact that the main banana producers also happened to be Polynesian. The scope of PIPA's interests widened to include cooperation in relation to other primary products and to include consideration of cooperation on all stages of production (shipping, marketing, research).

PIPA was not created merely to work on practical problems of development, though this was the stated objective. Most of the activities undertaken by PIPA could have been approached through the SPC, and yet a decision was taken to establish a new organization. The creation of PIPA can therefore be regarded as being, at least partly, an effort to take control of regional programmes. It was an exercise in self-determination. The importance of the all-island aspect of PIPA was stressed by Tupua
Tamasese Lealofi IV, then prime minister of Western Samoa. In his closing speech to the 1971 PIPA conference, he said:

This is the strength of our small body ... this is an association of islanders, created by islanders, and successful only from the efforts of such.

For Albert Henry, premier of the Cook Islands, PIPA was important as a symbol of Polynesian assertion in particular:

... for 200 years, the white man has been exploiting the resources of the Pacific, but now Polynesians are working together for Polynesians (Pacific Islands Monthly May 1971:22).

PIPA was terminated in 1973 but only because there was by then another indigenous organization of wider function that could subsume its activities.

The creation of the South Pacific Forum in 1971 was the third indigenous action to gain control of regional decision-making. It was established by the newly independent Pacific states to provide them with a forum to discuss any matters of concern to them. Its creation was spurred by the frustrations felt with the limits placed on the scope of discussion in the South Pacific Commission. The founding Agreement had limited the SPC's scope to economic and social development. Political matters had been purposely excluded. This began to annoy island delegates to South Pacific Conferences during the 1960s (Mara 1972:5). Ratu Mara of Fiji, Tamasese of Western Samoa, and Albert Henry of the Cook Islands therefore moved to create their own organization. Although the other independent Pacific states became involved, it was these three who took the initiative. They asked Australia and New Zealand to join them but excluded the other metropolitan powers. In 1972 the Forum established the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation (SPEC) as its research arm. SPEC's functions are concerned with the promotion of cooperation on trade and economic development. It also became the secretariat and coordinator for the many institutional offshoots - conferences, councils and corporations - of the Forum network, particularly in the fields of civil aviation, shipping, telecommunications and trade.

The region now has two organizational networks, one centred on the SPC and the other on the South Pacific Forum. Both institutional networks are now managed by the Pacific states. As will have become evident, there are important distinctions to be made between them. The SPC covers a wider region through its inclusion of dependent territories. It also has greater metropolitan involvement through the participation of France, the United States and the United Kingdom, in addition to Australia and New Zealand. The Forum, on the other hand, restricts its membership to the independent Pacific countries plus Australia and New Zealand. Another important distinction is that the SPC has retained its 'no politics' rule, whereas any subject may be raised in the Forum. It was possible in its early years for the Forum/SPEC organization to reach an understanding with the SPC such that duplication, and conflicts between the two institutional networks, could be minimized. The subsequent expansion of the Forum network, however, both in terms of membership and function, has prompted actions
which now threaten the continued existence of the South Pacific Commission. These actions, taken mainly by Melanesian countries, are examined below.

IMPLEMENTATION OF FUNCTIONAL COOPERATION

In their joint activity aimed at taking control of the SPC and establishing their own regional structures, the Pacific leaders could achieve a high degree of cohesion and unity of purpose. The attempts to implement regional ventures and programmes through these structures, however, began to reveal the political conflicts inherent in the regional movement - the national interests, jealousies, rivalries and tensions. The promotion of functional cooperation involves the commitment of resources, a willingness to sacrifice national interests, coping with the problems of regional management, and undertaking the hard work of evaluating regional schemes. It is in such a context that the underlying divisions and rivalries within the Pacific community have become apparent.

The Pacific states have pursued cooperation in a wide range of functional areas. It is evident, however, that although regional proposals involving a high degree of integration have often been contemplated, and sometimes attempted, there has generally been a shying away from such options in favour of options involving a lesser degree of integration. For example, the free trade area option was passed over in favour of *ad hoc* regional trade promotion and the negotiation of preferential access to the Australian, New Zealand, and EEC markets. In the case of the regional airline, the Pacific states have opted for cooperation among national airlines after a troubled experience with a regional carrier. The regional development bank proposal, which had been given serious consideration over many years, was finally passed over in favour of a joint approach to gain access to Asian Development Bank funds. Whereas early proposals for a regional shipping line involved a corporation which would acquire its own vessels, the proposal which ultimately won acceptance advocated a 'pooling' concept. Also, the regional rationalization of industrial development has not been attempted though there is provision for SPEC to examine this if the Forum becomes committed to the idea. Once again a lower level form of integration has been adopted (Fry 1979:124-178).

The evidence suggests that those ventures requiring considerable commitment of national resources and a surrendering of national sovereignty have been generally rejected at the proposal stage, have failed after establishment or have struggled on beset by difficulties. It has proved very difficult to achieve high-level integration in such areas. Examples of this type of venture include the regional airline, the shipping line, the Telecommunications Training Centre, the free trade area concept, the university, and the Fisheries Agency. As the implications for national interests of such ventures are significant, their establishment and operation have been of substantial concern to the Pacific leaders. It is in relation to such cooperative ventures that political divisions have been most evident.
IN VolVEMENT OF MELANESIAN STATES

The Melanesian states were generally latecomers to regional politics owing to the later decolonization of this part of the South Pacific. Fiji was the exception. From the mid 1960s Ratu Mara, prime minister since 1970 and chief minister prior to independence, made the development of regionalism a central concern of Fiji's foreign policy. In 1974 he described regional cooperation as the subject closest to his heart (Mara 1974:1). This commitment is further indicated in his report to parliament on the first three years of foreign affairs of an independent Fiji:

... in its foreign policy, Government has accorded the highest priority to the development of the closest possible relationships with its South Pacific neighbours and to the extension of practical co-operation to all matters of common interest (Ratu Mara, Report on Foreign Affairs for the period 10th October 1970 - 31st December 1973, Parliamentary Paper no.19 of 1974, Parliament of Fiji, p.1).

Ratu Mara has been the most prominent regional activist. He led the 1965 'rebellion' at the Lae conference and many of the subsequent attacks on metropolitan influence within the SPC. He was also responsible for the creation of PIPA, the first indigenous regional organization. Although he had an important part to play in the establishment of the Forum, he was by that time careful to ensure that he was not seen to be dominating that initiative. Fiji was not only prominent in the moves to gain control of regional structures; it also became the main supporter of many of the major regional ventures pursued through indigenous-controlled institutions. This was partly because Fiji had more resources in terms of manpower and finance than its neighbours, partly because many of the regional institutions were sited in Fiji, and partly because of Ratu Mara's commitment to regionalism. The dominant role of Fiji, and in particular of Ratu Mara, has not gone unnoticed by other Pacific leaders. It has been, in fact, one of the main causes of political tension among the Pacific states. The reaction of other leaders and its effect on regional politics is considered below.

It was not until 1973 that a second Melanesian state began to commit itself to involvement in South Pacific regional affairs. Papua New Guinea gained self-government in that year and the new chief minister, Michael Somare, indicated that his country would be identifying itself with the Pacific island states in its international relations and would be supporting regional cooperation. This commitment was reiterated by Albert Maori Kiki, the minister for defence, foreign relations and trade. In his Assessment Report on Foreign Policy, delivered to the House of Assembly in December 1974, he stated:

We feel ... that Papua New Guinea's interests are best served in international affairs by being clearly a member of the Community of the South Pacific Islands Nations loyal to this community's causes and common initiatives (Kiki 1974:2).
In 1975, the year of its independence, Papua New Guinea became a full member of the SPC and a member of the South Pacific Forum, having been an observer at two previous meetings. The replacement of the Somare government by that of Chan in 1980 has not altered this foreign policy commitment to involvement in the South Pacific. To the contrary, it has eventuated in Papua New Guinea adopting a much higher profile in the region. As the largest country in the area, Papua New Guinea's entry was bound to have a significant impact on regional politics. Its entry, its subsequent 'alliance' with Fiji and the Solomon Islands, and the reformulation of the Melanesian bloc under Chan's leadership is examined below.

The Solomon Islands, like Papua New Guinea, indicated its commitment to South Pacific regionalism prior to independence. When it became self-governing in 1975, the chief minister, Solomon Mamalon, attended the South Pacific Forum as an observer. The Solomons became a full member of the SPC and the Forum after independence in 1978. The new country's first prime Minister, Peter Kenilorea, continued the previous administration's commitment to participation in regional cooperation and in May 1980 his party, the Solomon Islands United Party, incorporated this commitment in its manifesto (Solomon Islands United Party Manifesto, May 1980:13-14). As a smaller country, the Solomon Islands has not been able to influence regional politics to the same degree that Papua New Guinea and Fiji have. It has, however, taken some independent initiatives in addition to being a firm supporter of the Papua New Guinea 'line'.

Vanuatu is the latest Melanesian state to join the regional forums. Although its foreign policy priorities have yet to be announced, it is evident that participation in regional activity will be a priority. It has already been accepted as a member of the Forum and of the SPC. As a dependent territory of France, New Caledonia has much less involvement in regional affairs than the other Melanesian states. It does not qualify for participation in the South Pacific Forum nor for full membership of the SPC. It does, however, send a representative to the South Pacific Conference. Whilst Vanuatu's independent involvement in regionalism has been a recent development, it has, together with New Caledonia, formed a focal point for much of regional politics, particularly since 1978. Thus whilst unable themselves to participate in regional political activity as such, they have been central to much of what is going on. Certainly, the Melanesian blocs referred to below have gained much of their unity from the French involvement in New Caledonia and, until recently, in Vanuatu.

FIJIAN 'DOMINATION' OF REGIONAL ACTIVITY

A resentment of what has been seen as Fijian dominance of regional affairs has created serious conflicts within the regional movement. There are several related elements underlying this anti-Fiji sentiment. First, until recently most of the regional institutions had been established in Fiji. These include the University of the South Pacific (USP), SPEC, the SPC Community Education Centre, the Telecommunications Training Centre and Air Pacific. Fiji has the advantage of being in a central location and well serviced by international transport. An added attraction is the fact that various United Nations agencies have set up their regional offices in Suva. In addition, once one regional organization had been established
there were advantages, in terms of liaison, for others to do likewise. This situation created the appearance of a regionalism centred on Fiji.

A second factor contributing to resentment of Fiji was the dominant role it had played within the regional organizations. Ratu Mara's growing reputation as the 'front man' of the regional movement has earned him the resentment of others who, perhaps through jealousy, see his actions as amounting to an assumption of regional leadership. Within Air Pacific and USP, where Fijian financial interests are predominant, there has been discontent with what is seen as Fijian dominance. The other Pacific countries feel that the way these ventures are run favours Fijian interests. Conflicts within the organizations became defined in terms of Fiji versus the rest of the membership. A third point is that Fiji saw itself as a spokesman for the region at the time when it was the only Pacific island member of the United Nations (1970-75). To a certain extent, it was regarded as such by the outside world. There was a tendency for the other Pacific countries to see this as an assumption of a leadership, rather than a representative, role.

The resentment of Fiji's role in regionalism contributed to the move towards national, rather than regional, endeavours. This was particularly evident in relation to civil aviation. Fiji's reaction to the criticism of its role has also had important implications for regionalism. At first Fiji had tried to meet such criticism by publicly claiming that it was not desiring a regional leadership role. For example, Koya, the Fijian chairman of the thirty-third session of the SPC (1970) said in his opening address:

We do not in any way claim that it [independence] gives us a special position of prestige and leadership (Koya 1970:1).

Fiji's sensitivity to such charges at this time was also indicated by Ratu Mara's suggestion that the first Forum should be held in New Zealand:

... the story was that Fiji was trying to usurp the leadership of the island region and so I thought it would be one way of avoiding this, and scotching such reports, if we met entirely away from the island region altogether (Mara 1974:11).

Stuart Inder, reporting on the Wellington Forum for Pacific Islands Monthly, observed that Ratu Mara 'continually soft-pedalled on what in fact is his undoubted leadership in the South Pacific'. He viewed this as an attempt by Mara 'to avoid a wrist-caning from his colleagues' (Inder 1971:27).

By 1975, however, it is evident that Ratu Mara had tired of the constant criticism of Fiji's role. In a statement to the press in November, he indicated considerable disillusionment with regionally-run organizations such as Air Pacific and the University of the South Pacific. He drew attention to the difficulties associated with joint management of a regional programme or institution. In particular, he objected to the fact that under such an arrangement, the 'pace of development is determined by the slowest member'. He cited as an example the conflict concerning
whether USP should have accounting and engineering chairs. Fiji supported this move because it suited its requirements in this area, whilst some other countries opposed it because this was not relevant to their needs. Ratu Mara advocated a move away from joint management of regional institutions to a situation in which the host country was responsible for the running of the regional institution. This, he thought, would ensure that 'development would be determined by the fastest'. When Mara made this statement, he had in mind the proposed Regional Telecommunications Training Project then before the Fiji cabinet. It was, in fact, subsequently established as a Fiji-run regional organization with places available for others in the region.

At first glance, Ratu Mara's revised concept of regional organization management does not appear to threaten significantly the nature of regionalism; it is just the management which would be organized in a more rational way. Ratu Mara, in fact, claimed that this new attitude would not damage the concept of regional cooperation. On closer inspection, however, it is evident that his statement presented a radically new interpretation of the concept of regionalism. It could be argued that it in fact amounts to a rejection of the main elements in regionalism. What he was advocating was the end of cooperative determination of goals, methods, pace, and direction in regional policy, and, in its stead, a 'regionalism' in which 'the pace of development', and, by implication, the direction and methods of development, is in accord with the wishes of the 'fastest'.

This was the first time that Ratu Mara had publicly criticized the concept of regionally-run regional organizations. His statement represented a culmination of the growing frustration that Fiji had experienced in trying to lead regional activity within these organizations and the growing resentment that Fijian leaders had felt against the criticism that had been levelled at their country in recent years by other island states and territories. It also reflected a feeling that Fiji's national interest had suffered through the compromises and sacrifices necessary in the cooperative process:

...I think we may have over-reached and done it [the encouragement of regional co-operation] at the expense of our own national interest.11

Some recent developments appear to have lessened the antagonism felt towards Fiji. These include the siting of new regional organizations in Honiara and Apia, the decentralization of USP, and the move by other Pacific countries to join the United Nations. Nevertheless, the tensions related to Fiji's position in the regional movement could be said to have had some lasting effects. Nearly all Pacific countries moved to more nationalistic positions. This was particularly significant in Fiji's case because, up to this time, it had been regionalism's most active supporter and Ratu Mara had been the region's most prominent activist.

PAPUA NEW GUINEA'S ENTRY

It has been claimed by several observers that the Pacific states viewed with apprehension the prospect of Papua New Guinea's participation in South Pacific regionalism,12 and further, that Fiji in particular saw
Papua New Guinea as an unwanted rival for the position of regional leader. These claims appear to have been based on two observations. The first was that Papua New Guinea was demonstrably a giant among dwarfs in the South Pacific context, whether measured in terms of population, land area, or size of economy (Sundhaussen 1974:102-103). Thus, it is inferred, its size alone gives to it a potential for domination that would concern the much smaller island states. For more direct evidence of Pacific island wariness about Papua New Guinea's participation, they cite the decision of the Forum countries not to admit Papua New Guinea when it applied for membership in 1972. This was interpreted as signalling that Papua New Guinea was not wanted in the South Pacific group of countries. In particular, it was seen as a Fiji-inspired action to keep out a potential rival. At a seminar held in 1972, Dr Reuben Taureka, Papua New Guinea's minister for health, commented:

We were refused admission by Fiji and its small neighbours to the South Pacific Commission. We have been excluded from the Pacific Forum. Fiji is afraid for us to enter the South Pacific Forum because she thinks we may dominate her (Sundhaussen 1974:110).

In a television interview in Australia in June 1972, the Fijian prime minister denied that he was trying to exclude Papua New Guinea from entering regional activity. He said he thought that 'they belong to the South Pacific and they should take a greater role in the Pacific if they become independent'. In an attempt to explain the refusal of Forum membership to Papua New Guinea in 1972, he said:

I've been misquoted that I have a complex against Papua New Guinea. I certainly put my foot down in [sic] New Guinea joining the South Pacific Forum because the South Pacific Forum is for independent countries.

In a further attempt to counter the claims of tensions between Fiji and Papua New Guinea, Ratu Mara again explained the Forum entry issue whilst on a visit to Papua New Guinea in May 1974. He said that Papua New Guinea had not qualified for membership because it did not have full responsibility for its own affairs. The criterion of entry, he said, was 'one of sovereignty and not size' (Mara 1974:11).

In 1973-74, a foreign policy was determined for post independence Papua New Guinea in which participation in South Pacific regionalism received high priority. It was in this context that Somare made a series of statements disclaiming any intention, on Papua New Guinea's part, of dominating or assuming leadership of the South Pacific states. In his Roy Milne lecture (Melbourne, July 1974), where he set out Papua New Guinea's future external policies, he stated that Papua New Guinea

... sees her role in the Forum as one of equality. We believe that the basis of this equality should be sovereignty and not size or population. We wish to meet with our island neighbours on an equal footing (Somare 1974:11).
Earlier in the year, he had given a similar assurance to the Forum meeting, the first in which Papua New Guinea participated as a full member.\textsuperscript{14}

Thus both Somare and Mara tried to dispel the claim of tensions between them over regional leadership, Mara by disclaiming any fear on Fiji's part of Papua New Guinea's entry into the Pacific bloc, and Somare, by disclaiming any intention on Papua New Guinea's part of dominating the other Pacific states. In an attempt to assure the other Forum members of their joint intentions the two leaders claimed, in a communiqué issued after Ratu Mara's visit in May 1974, that:

Fiji and Papua New Guinea have no desire to dominate the leadership in the Pacific region, but only to ensure that the best interests of each Pacific country are protected and maintained and will continue to work towards maintaining close co-operation with other Pacific countries (Mara and Somare 1974:1).

It appears that the observers were incorrect, not only in claiming Fijian fears of Papua New Guinea's entry into Pacific regionalism but also in their predictions of continuing rivalry between the two over regional leadership. Once Papua New Guinea had qualified for membership of the Forum in 1974 there was no objection from Fiji. Mara had made a special trip to Papua New Guinea in May 1974 to forge links between the two countries, a visit which was returned by Somare in the following year. Subsequent developments did not indicate any excessive conflict between the two countries. To the contrary, it was evident that they were allies on most major issues.

THE FIJI/PAPUA NEW GUINEA 'ALLIANCE'

Although Somare and Mara fostered a relatively close relationship between their countries in the years following Mara's visit to Papua New Guinea in 1974, it was not until 1978 that they emerged as the core of an identifiable grouping in regional politics. A number of factors contributed to this development. These included the facts that an independent Solomon Islands, with similar attitudes to Papua New Guinea and Fiji, entered the regional forums; that there was an acceleration of political developments in Vanuatu; that decisions needed to be taken at a regional level concerning the control of the region's most lucrative shared resources, the migratory skipjack tuna; and that Papua New Guinea decided to adopt a higher profile in regional affairs. The basis of the 'alliance' between Papua New Guinea, Fiji and the Solomons was a shared view concerning the need to control the influence of metropolitan powers in the region, a view which was at variance with that of the Polynesian countries, particularly of the new governments of Tupuola Efi in Western Samoa and Tom Davis in the Cook Islands.

The division between these two groups first became apparent at the ninth South Pacific Forum held at Niue in September 1978.\textsuperscript{15} The Polynesian group, led by Western Samoa's Tupuola Efi, supported proposals that would open up the Forum to further metropolitan influence. The first concerned the admittance of American Samoa, a dependent territory, to Forum membership; the second was concerned with admitting the United States to
the proposed Regional Fisheries Agency. These proposals were strongly opposed by the Papua New Guinea/Fiji bloc which, it appears, saw them as threatening indigenous control of the Forum, and of the region generally. American Samoa, as a dependent territory, could not make its final decisions and thus would still be referring matters to the United States. The Papua New Guinea/Fiji position is that if island countries want to join the Forum, they should first work for independence from their administering power.

In relation to United States membership of the proposed Fisheries Agency, the objection was partly that the United States does not recognize coastal state sovereignty over migratory species, which is the main resource such an Agency would be controlling. Fiji's position was made clear in the month following the Forum when, in an address to the United Nations General Assembly, its ambassador, Mr Vunibobo, stated:

We have now reached a situation where the formation of such an agency is threatened. ... The main reason for this sorry state of affairs has been due to the wishes of a dominant power foreign to the region, to join the Agency on its own terms .... We view this ... as yet another attempt to dominate our region and to dictate to us the terms and conditions in which we should run our affairs.\textsuperscript{16}

An additional objection, held particularly by Papua New Guinea, was that the United States as one of the main distant-water fishing nations should not be a member of an agency controlling the activities of such nations on behalf of the South Pacific states. The issue was not resolved at the Forum. As a compromise, it was decided to proceed with the establishment of an agency composed only of the Forum countries, leaving the question of metropolitan country membership to further discussion.

The division between the Papua New Guinea/Fiji group and the Polynesian group was deepened by conflict over who should succeed Mahe Tupouniuia as director of SPEC, the research arm of the Forum. Papua New Guinea apparently had been under the misapprehension that its candidate, Sir Albert Maori Kiki, would be unopposed. Thus Somare was offended when Tupuola Efi nominated a Samoan for the job. He reportedly withdrew Kiki's nomination in pique. Mara, a supporter of the Kiki nomination, was angered by Tupuola's unexpected move which he described as not in keeping with the 'Pacific Way'. It was evident that Tupuola was at least partly motivated by a desire to challenge what was seen as the domination of regional affairs by Papua New Guinea and Fiji. By the end of the Forum, the Melanesian states were threatening to set up their own fisheries agency and Tom Davis, the Cook Islands' premier, was talking of the need for a Polynesian alliance.\textsuperscript{17} It was clear that regional political divisions were being defined in terms of Melanesian versus Polynesian.

The rift between these two groups carried over into the South Pacific Conference meeting in Noumea in the following month. Here it was clear that Papua New Guinea and Fiji were determined to weaken the South Pacific Commission, which they viewed as being tainted with undue metropolitan influence. At the same time, it was evident that they wanted to strengthen the Forum, which was seen as having a minimum of outside influence. The
proposal for a regional environment programme was used by Father Momi, its
initiator, as a means of enhancing the Forum's power at the expense of the
SPC. Papua New Guinea had been unsuccessful at the Niue Forum in obtaining
sufficient support to make the programme a wholly SPEC-run venture.
However, its proposal for a joint SPC SPEC venture, accepted by the South
Pacific Conference, still amounted to an incursion into SPC 'territory' and
was interpreted as such. 18 A second way in which the Papua New
Guinea/Fiji position on the SPC was indicated was their decision not to
increase their contribution to the organization in the three years
following 1979. 19 This effectively meant a freezing of the budget for the
1980-82 period (and a decline in real terms) because the increase in
contributions of all participating governments is governed by the lowest
increase offered. Once again it was the Melanesian group which was
attempting to oppose metropolitan influence. As in the Forum, they were
opposed by the Polynesian group which saw advantage in having American
involvement in the region.

Immediately after the Noumea conference in October 1978 Papua New
Guinea initiated a campaign aimed at pressuring France into giving
independence to its Pacific territories. Ebio Olewale raised the issue at
the July 1979 South Pacific Forum where it was supported by the other
independent Pacific states. On the insistence of Australia and New
Zealand, however, the call for decolonization of the French Pacific
territories appeared in a watered-down form in the final communiqué. 20 In
press interviews and at an independence rally whilst in Tahiti for the
October 1979 South Pacific Conference, Olewale called for decolonization of
the French territories and attacked Australia and New Zealand for not
giving their support to the issue. 21

The new hardline Papua New Guinea attitude was not shared by Fiji,
which began to move away from the Melanesian camp as Papua New Guinea
became more outspoken. At the same time, it was evident that an emerging
New Hebrides was becoming part of the Melanesian bloc. Even the
francophone chief minister, Father Leymang, representing the New Hebrides
at the Tahiti conference, was openly critical of French attitudes in the
Pacific. Thus by the end of 1979 there were hints of a new Melanesian
bloc, one that excluded Fiji (by Fiji's choice) but which included Papua
New Guinea, the Solomons and Vanuatu, with sympathies extending to the
Melanesians in New Caledonia.

THE MELANESIAN 'ALLIANCE' UNDER CHAN

Fiji's move out of the Melanesian camp was confirmed by developments
in 1980. The first development of significance was the change of
leadership in Papua New Guinea. This spelt an end to the Somare/Mara
relationship as a basis for Papua New Guinea/Fiji cooperation. The second
development was the decision of the Chan government to send troops to
assist Walter Lini in putting down the Santo rebellion. This move
reportedly angered Fiji to the point where Papua New Guinea/Fiji relations
have become severely strained. Fiji was itself prepared to consider
sending troops as part of a United Nations force. It was very critical,
however, of Papua New Guinea's individual action. Whilst the basis of
Fiji's anger is not fully clear, there are several explanations which
suggest themselves. First, Fiji is jealous of its traditional leadership
position being usurped by Papua New Guinea. Secondly, Fiji is trying to take a much softer line on French involvement in the Pacific and would view Papua New Guinea's action as going against this. Fiji has noticeably changed its public attitude in this area in the last year. This could be based on the fact that the Sugar Agreement with the EEC comes up for renegotiation in 1982. Fiji is dependent for about two thirds of its export revenue on sugar sales to the EEC under this agreement. France is known to oppose this special arrangement. These circumstances may have affected Fiji's changed attitude. Certainly, at the 1980 South Pacific Conference, observers were surprised to hear the Fijian delegate suggest that the SPC needed more support. This attitude is a complete reversal of that held in 1978 and represents a changed public view towards the involvement of metropolitan powers in the region.

Whilst the decision to send troops to Vanuatu sealed the end of the Papua New Guinea/Fiji alliance, it opened up a new alliance based on a Chan/Lini relationship. In the aftermath of Santo, Lini and Chan are taking steps to forge much closer links between their countries. Papua New Guinea will be training 360 Vanuatuans in its police and army academies for the new Vanuatu Mobile Force. There is also talk of closer trade cooperation. Much more important, however, in terms of regional politics are the shared attitudes of these governments in relation to outside involvement in the region. The Lini government is reportedly prepared to allow Organisasi Papua Merdeka representatives and Kanak Independence groups from New Caledonia to set up offices in Vila.

There is, then, the beginnings of a new Melanesian alliance, this time excluding Fiji, but including Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands, which, rumour has it, encouraged Chan to send the troops to Santo. The sympathies of these countries extend to Melanesian 'brothers' in New Caledonia and West Irian more than they have before. This is partly due to the increased awareness on the part of these countries concerning developments in New Caledonia and West Irian, partly to the foreign policy line of the new Papua New Guinea government, and partly to the inclusion of an independent Vanuatu which is more emotionally disposed to assist other Melanesians in view of its own decolonization experience. The developing Melanesian bloc is likely to be much more radical in relation to regional politics than the Fiji/Papua New Guinea 'alliance'.

A more radical stance has already been indicated by Papua New Guinea's initiative at the twentieth South Pacific Conference held in Port Moresby in October 1980. In his opening speech to the Conference, Noel Levi, the foreign affairs minister, proposed that the Pacific states form a 'political alliance such as the Organisation of African Unity to make its opinions known in the forums of the world'. The proposal is a radical one in the South Pacific context. Papua New Guinea intends that such an alliance would include only the island countries of the region. Thus it really amounts to the present South Pacific Forum, less Australia and New Zealand. It was evident from Chan's opening speech that this was motivated by a desire to exclude metropolitan power influence on decisions concerning political issues affecting the region. In an obvious reference to the role of the United States in relation to the fisheries question and to Australia in relation to regional shipping and some other issues in the Forum, Chan stated:
We island peoples have to stick together. I do not say that aggressively, but I do say it with thoughts in mind of attempts by non-islanders to divide us for their own ends. We in Papua New Guinea could quote occasions where our efforts to achieve widespread benefits for the islands through co-operation have been frustrated by jealousies and suspicions either encouraged or initiated by non-islanders (Chan 1980:4).

During his speech, Levi made it clear that such a political alliance would be able to 'speak with one voice' on issues such as nuclear wastes and decolonization.

The new more radical Melanesian line-up is likely to polarize the region even more. This is accentuated by Papua New Guinea's new high profile in regional politics. The sending of troops to Vanuatu, Chan's suggestion of a regional police force, and the political alliance initiative have engendered the general feeling among the non Melanesian Pacific that Papua New Guinea is going too far. For Chan, however, it is the domestic implications of his regional initiatives which are of more immediate importance. The sending of the troops to Vanuatu has been a major coup for Chan in domestic politics. It was a popular move and Chan has played it up to the fullest. He promoted the concept of Melanesian brotherhood as part of the justification for sending the troops. The success of the exercise has created a type of new nationalism in Papua New Guinea which will have significant implications for Melanesia and for the wider region.

A MELANESIAN BLOC?

Although it is perhaps too early to describe the Melanesian states as a bloc within regional politics, there is considerable basis for regarding 'Melanesia' as a label of increasing political relevance within the regional context. As was demonstrated above, a shared attitude toward the involvement of outside powers in the region has formed an important rallying point for these states. In view of the extensive involvement of metropolitan powers in all regional ventures and organizations, there are many occasions and contexts in which this issue arises and therefore in which an identity of interests is developed. The identity fostered by this shared attitude is reinforced by a number of other factors which act to divide the South Pacific on Melanesian/Polynesian/Micronesian lines.

The Melanesian states have only recently enjoyed substantial constitutional development, whereas the main Polynesian states were among the first island countries to gain political independence. As a consequence, indigenous regional activity was primarily a Polynesian phenomenon until around 1973, when Melanesian states began to enter regional forums as self-governing countries. By the time they entered, one indigenous organization, PIPA, had already come and gone; the Forum and SPEC had been established; and many cooperative programmes had been attempted or studied. Thus the Melanesian states were latecomers to a movement which had been initiated and managed by Polynesians.
When they became members of the regional organizations in the 1974-75 period, the Melanesian leaders were very critical of the lack of progress made by the regional movement in the past. Somare, for example, reported that he told the 1974 Forum, at which Papua New Guinea was admitted as a full member:

Papua New Guinea senses that something was missing from our attempts to solve problems of regional importance. The Forum allows open discussion. However, it seemed that there was much talk and little action. Costly studies have been undertaken by the Forum, but few of their recommendations have been implemented (Somare 1974:12).

Solomon Mamalon, the first chief minister of the Solomon Islands, expressed similar sentiments at the 1975 Forum:

... I think, to promote this co-operation, we need to do more than just attend endless conferences which talk in marvellous phrases over cocktails about 'the Pacific Way' and then do nothing afterwards (Mamalon 1975:1).

Inherent in such comments was a criticism of Polynesian efforts. In general terms, the Melanesians have resented what they see as the superior attitude of Polynesians within the regional forums. They have felt that the Polynesians have seen them as inferior, unsophisticated, and even primitive. In 1972, Dr Taureka, Papua New Guinea's minister for health, commented:

Most of the people in the South Pacific regard us as people still sitting on top of a hill watching the aircraft take off and landing. In other words, they regard us as primitive ... (See Sundhaussen 1974:110).

A further distinction between Melanesian states and other Pacific island countries is created by differing economic interests. Their continental land forms endow the Melanesian states with a much greater land area, a wider range of resources and a larger population than the volcanic 'high' islands and coral atolls provide for their Polynesian and Micronesian neighbours. They therefore have greater potential for economic development and their economic problems are of a different nature and dimension. Melanesian identity is also facilitated by the use of Pidgin, though with some variation, in Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. For the representatives of these countries attending regional conferences, Pidgin is often the preferred language for social situations. As is the case with any language, an in-group and out-group form whenever it is used. Pidgin, then, is an important source of identity for the Melanesians, whilst providing a barrier to the non Melanesians. Educational links are also important. Some of the leaders of Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands have been educated at the University of Papua New Guinea. They tend to be the Melanesian leaders most dedicated to the promotion of a Melanesian identity.
Whilst Melanesia is culturally diverse, there is nevertheless a general similarity in comparison to the Polynesian, Micronesian, Asian and European cultures that surround them. Thus Melanesian cultural identity, to the extent that it is recognized, tends to be defined in negative terms—in terms of what they are not rather than what is strongly shared. The relative similarity in physical appearance among Melanesians when compared to these other groups is particularly significant in this respect as it encourages stereotyping and perceptions of shared identity even where little objective basis for such allegiance exists.

Fiji's 'movement' in and out of the Melanesian grouping, in the context of regional politics, demonstrates the importance of subjective perception as the basis of ethnic allegiance. Although ethnographers have identified Fiji as part of Melanesia, Fiji was seen as Polynesian by Papua New Guinea and the Solomons when they first entered regional politics in 1974-75. This perception was based partly on their view of Ratu Mara. At the same time, the other Polynesian countries regarded Fiji as part of their group, albeit a rather outspoken and radical second cousin. There was some objective basis for this acceptance. Fiji's 'chiefly' society has, in general terms, much in common with Polynesian societies. There are also very close historical links between Fiji and its Polynesian neighbours, particularly at the elite level. Tongans, for example, have had an important influence in eastern Fiji and there has been considerable intermarriage between Fijians and Tongans.

The 1978 rift, in which the Papua New Guinea/Fiji 'alliance' challenged the Polynesian grouping on the issue of outside involvement in the region, changed this perception of Fiji. At this time, the Polynesian leaders began to see Fiji as part of a Melanesian grouping. This did not, however, last for long. As shown above, developments in 1980 have moved Fiji out of the Melanesian grouping. Its changed public attitude toward outside involvement and the loss of the Somare/Mara special relationship has moved Fiji back towards the Polynesian group. It could be argued that this is Fiji's more natural 'home' although a number of factors will ensure that, as before, it is not fully accepted into the heartland of Polynesia.

It is evident that the new Melanesian grouping that is developing around the Chan/Lini relationship is more likely to stress its 'Melanesianess' than was the 1978 Papua New Guinea/Fiji/Solomons 'alliance'. This has already been indicated by the nature of the statements issued by Papua New Guinean and Vanuatu leaders concerning the sending of Papua New Guinean troops to Santo. The new Melanesian grouping, which includes the Solomon Islands, is likely to develop further as a force in regional politics, spurred on by the situation in New Caledonia and encouraged by the leaders of these countries who promote 'Melanesian brotherhood' for political reasons.
NOTES

1. The region referred to is the territorial area covered by the South Pacific Commission. The constitutional status and population of the countries within this region are listed in the Appendix.


4. Between 1965 and 1968 this organization was called the Pacific Islands Producers' Secretariat. PIPA's constitution did not become operative until 1971. See PIPA, Constitution Establishing the Pacific Islands Producers' Association. Suva, 1971.


6. The functions, purposes and structure of this organization are set out in Agreement Establishing the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation.

7. See, for example, Speech by the Chief Minister, Mr Michael Somare, at the Dinner for the Prime Minister of Australia, Papua New Guinea Press Release No.0466, 18 February 1973, p.4, and Somare (1974).

8. See, for example, Noel Levi, Statement of Foreign Policy, Port Moresby, July 1980, pp.6-7.

9. See Speech by the Chief Minister, Hon. S. Mamaloni, to South Pacific Forum held in Tonga, 1-3 July 1975; and 'The Mamaloni Interview', Solomon News Drum 28 February 1975, p.4. This commitment was confirmed in a personal interview with the author, 26 September 1975.


The Forum proceedings were closed to the public. The rift was, however, reported by journalists covering the Niue Forum. See, for example, Bruce Jones, 'US Tuna Fishing a Divisive Issue for Forum Members', Canberra Times 11 October 1978; and 'Islanders Wary of U.S. Bait', Sydney Morning Herald 24 October 1978. These reports were substantiated and expanded in discussions with some delegates to the 1978 South Pacific Conference which met shortly after the Niue Forum.

As reported in ''New Colonialism' Over Fishing: Fiji Accuses the US', Canberra Times 11 October 1978.

Based on discussions with journalists and delegates attending the Eighteenth South Pacific Conference (Noumea, October 1978).

Based on observations at the Eighteenth South Pacific Conference (Noumea, October 1978). See Fry (1978).


For the final wording of the Communiqué, see Press Communiqué: Tenth South Pacific Forum, Honiara, 9-10 July 1979.

Based on observations at the Nineteenth South Pacific Conference (Papeete, October, 1979).

Based on observations at the Twentieth South Pacific Conference (Port Moresby, October 1980).

A special report on the post-Santo Vanuatu/Papua New Guinea links was included, ironically, in the Papua New Guinea National Broadcasting Commission's regular programme, Around the Provinces, 26 October 1980.

### APPENDIX

South Pacific Countries - Constitutional Status and Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Constitutional Status</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American Samoa</td>
<td>United States Unincorporated Territory</td>
<td>30,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cook Islands</td>
<td>Self-governing in free association with New Zealand (1965)</td>
<td>18,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>Independent (1970)</td>
<td>592,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>French Polynesia</td>
<td>Overseas Territory of France</td>
<td>137,000</td>
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<td>Guam</td>
<td>United States Unincorporated Territory</td>
<td>87,000</td>
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<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>Independent (1979)</td>
<td>53,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nauru</td>
<td>Independent (1968)</td>
<td>7,300</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Caledonia</td>
<td>Overseas Territory of France</td>
<td>136,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niue</td>
<td>Self-governing in free association with New Zealand (1974)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
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<td>Pitcairn Island</td>
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<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>Independent (1978)</td>
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<td>Tokelau Islands</td>
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<td>Tonga</td>
<td>Independent (1970)</td>
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<td>Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands</td>
<td>United States Trust Territory</td>
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<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>Independent (1978)</td>
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<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>Independent (1980)</td>
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<td>Wallis &amp; Futuna</td>
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<td>9,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>Western Samoa</td>
<td>Independent (1962)</td>
<td>152,000</td>
</tr>
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</table>
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NEW NATIONS AND OLD IMPERIALISM

E.G. Whitlam

It was not till after World War II that Australians took much interest in the islands and peninsulas to their northwest. The closest and largest areas had been part of the Netherlands East Indies for two centuries before Europeans settled in Australia. There were occasional suggestions as far back as the end of last century and indeed as recently as 1950 that Australia might purchase Dutch New Guinea and Portuguese Timor. After Indonesia secured her independence there were periods of tension between her and Australia as the Dutch, British and Portuguese departed from divided islands in the archipelago. The countries to Australia's northwest have formed closer and closer associations through the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) since its formation in August 1967.

In the islands to their northeast Australians showed an earlier interest. A hundred years ago the governments of Victoria and Queensland were urging a policy of acquisition on Britain and such policies were urged by both sides of politics in the Federal parliament in the first twenty years of this century. Then between the two world wars little attention was given to Australia's responsibilities in her colony of Papua, under Judge Murray, and her mandated territory of New Guinea under former conservative politicians, Brigadier-Generals Wisdom and McNicoll. (McNicoll's appointment was particularly blatant: he resigned from the parliament on the day it rose for an election - 2 August 1934 - and was appointed Administrator the following day; parliament was dissolved on 7 August.) The Mandates Commission was often critical. It was especially critical of the savage reaction to the Rabaul strike in 1929 and the general lack of educational opportunities. The Trusteeship Council became increasingly critical in the 1960s but it was not till 1970 that Australians became much concerned with the future of Papua New Guinea. There was a sudden surge of interest in the consummation of Vanuatu's independence in 1980. There will be growing interest in New Caledonia until she also becomes independent in the mid 1980s. Most Australians have taken little interest in neighbour countries as societies in their own right; it seems to require the arrival or departure of an imperial power to arouse their attention.

The South Pacific Commission must be the starting point for any present consideration of the place of the numerous, scattered, sparsely populated and unevenly developed states of the south and central Pacific in international politics. In 1944 Australia's minister for external affairs, Dr Evatt, floated the idea of a regional organization which would strengthen international cooperation and promote the wellbeing of Pacific
people. On 6 February 1947 the Agreement establishing the Commission was signed in Canberra by representatives of all the metropolitan powers with island territories in the Pacific: Australia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. The expressed objective of the Agreement was 'to encourage and strengthen international cooperation in promoting the economic and social welfare and advancement of the peoples of the non-self-governing territories of the South Pacific Region'; an unexpressed objective may have been to deter interference in the area by powers which did not already enjoy a foothold in it. On France's insistence the Commission was precluded from promoting political advancement; its charter omitted the words of the relevant articles in the United Nations Charter. The Netherlands withdrew when she lost West New Guinea in 1962.

Whilst the Commission was composed of representatives of the metropolitan powers, there was an advisory South Pacific Conference attended by representatives of the indigenous peoples and meeting every three years. After 1967 the conference met every year. With the support of Senator Willi see at the thirteenth conference (1973), W.L. Morrison and me at the fourteenth conference (1974) and Senator Douglas McClelland at the fifteenth conference (1975), the plural voting powers of the metropolitan members were abolished and equal voting rights were accorded all delegations, whether from the metropolitan powers or the island governments and administrations. The Conference, however, is still limited to the objectives laid down in the Canberra Agreement of 1947, and to budget initiatives taken by the Commission; it accordingly is losing much of its appeal and effect.

Meantime in 1971 the prime ministers of Fiji, Samoa and Tonga and the president of Nauru, which had all become independent, and the premier of the Cook Islands, which had achieved self-government, suggested to the prime minister of New Zealand that his country should host a meeting, to which Australia would also be invited, to establish a political forum for the peoples of the region. The first South Pacific Forum was held in Wellington in August 1971.

Apart from Australia and New Zealand the Forum now includes Samoa (which achieved independence in 1962), Nauru (1968), Tonga (1970), Fiji (1970), Papua New Guinea (1975), Solomon Islands (1978), Tuvalu (1978), Kiribati (1979) and Vanuatu (1980), the Cook Islands (which became self-governing in free association with New Zealand in 1965) and Niue (which adopted the same status in 1974), and the Federated States of Micronesia (which was admitted as an observer in 1980). It is likely that the Forum will be joined by the Northern Marianas and the Marshall Islands and by New Caledonia where there are strong links between the Front Indépendantiste and the new government of Vanuatu. Hitherto, on achieving independence, every member of the Forum has become a member of the Commonwealth; this was a natural process since they had all been ruled by New Zealand, Britain or Australia. A nation can join the Commonwealth without having the queen as its head of state; four of the present members of the Forum are republics and another, Tonga, has her own monarch.

The cohesion of the developing nations in the South Pacific Forum is remarkable when one considers how recent and varied their political development has been. New Caledonia was annexed by France in 1853, Fiji by
Britain in 1874, northeast New Guinea and the north Solomons by Germany and Papua by Britain in 1884, and Nauru by Germany in 1888. Britain declared protectorates over the Cook Islands in 1888, the Gilbert and Ellice Islands in 1892 and some of the south Solomons in 1893. In 1898 Spain ceded the Philippines and Guam to the United States and in 1899 sold the Caroline, Northern Mariana and Marshall Islands to Germany. In 1899 Samoa was divided between Germany and the United States and in 1900 Tonga was proclaimed a British protectorate. In 1906 Australia accepted Papua from Britain and Britain and France established their condominium over the New Hebrides. It can be seen how often the distant powers balkanized the Pacific archipelagos. In 1914 the German colonies were occupied by the Allies and in 1919-1921 the League of Nations granted mandates over New Guinea to Australia, Western Samoa to New Zealand, the Caroline, Northern Mariana and Marshall Islands to Japan and Nauru to Australia, Britain and New Zealand. In 1933 Japan left the League and annexed her mandates. In 1946 the United Nations gave the old Japanese mandates to the United States as a strategic Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and confirmed the Australian and New Zealand mandates as Trust Territories.

Whether all the American and French possessions join the South Pacific Forum when they become independent or only some, it is now well established as the focus of the economic and political activities of the developing countries of the South Pacific. The South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation (SPEC), established by the Forum under an Agreement of 17 April 1973, has coordinated the approach of the regional states to the European Communities and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The Forum is sponsoring the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA); Australia signed it on 14 July 1980 and is contemplating ratification of it. The South Pacific Regional Shipping Line and the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency, both established by the Forum and hitherto principally financed by Australia and New Zealand, are strongly supported by the members of the Forum; Australia became a party to the Agency Convention on 13 September 1979.

The activities of the South Pacific Commission, the South Pacific Conference and the South Pacific Forum which is replacing them can be readily followed in Australian official publications. In examining the place and role of the South Pacific in international affairs I shall now concentrate on two aspects: first, the extent to which the newly independent states do or can take part in international organizations and, secondly, the lessons of the Vanuatu experience for the emancipation of New Caledonia.

Four of the new nations - Samoa, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and Solomon Islands - have joined the United Nations and most have joined the international financial institutions. In the Asia and Pacific region the most effective international financial institution has been the Asian Development Bank and its soft window, the Asian Development Fund. To the end of 1979 Papua New Guinea had derived from the Asian Development Fund 24.8 per cent of her total loans from multilateral institutions, Western Samoa 85.7 per cent and Kiribati, Solomon Islands and Tonga 100 per cent. Loans from this source, however, are vulnerable to current pressures in the United States Congress. Because the House of Representatives, with an ostensible Democratic majority, prevented the Carter Administration honouring its commitments, the Fund had to suspend operations from April to
July 1980. Initially Congress sought to prevent United States aid through multilateral institutions being given to countries which had defeated the United States in war, such as Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea and Angola. More recently it has sought to slash the amount of United States aid going to developing countries generally in the belief that they are ungrateful for the legacy of three decades of American bounty and benevolence. It must be doubted that the new House of Representatives, still with a Democratic majority, the new Republican Senate or the new Reagan administration, which is committed to a reduction in foreign aid, will augur any better for the future. The Asian Development Bank has forty-three governors and twelve directors. The governments represented by these governors and directors, especially the Japanese and Australian governments, were delinquent in failing to support the Carter administration and expose the United States Congress. Kiribati and Solomon Islands are represented by an Australian director and alternate director. Cook Islands, Fiji, Tonga and Samoa are represented by an Indonesian director and a New Zealand alternate director. Papua New Guinea is represented by a South Korean director and a Papua New Guinean alternate director. Vanuatu has applied to join the Bank. New Zealand recently indicated to the president of the Asian Development Bank that she was dissatisfied with the Bank's performance in the South Pacific. The developing states, being recent and comparatively small borrowers from the Bank, appear to believe that they do not secure sufficient attention from the Bank's bureaucracy, which is disproportionately drawn from and familiar with the wishes of original and large contributors, such as India. Australia did not support New Zealand's approach. The Bank has not responded to suggestions for a regional office. The Pacific states may well have to reconsider the nature and quality of their representation on the Bank.

The World Bank's soft window, the International Development Association (IDA), is similarly vulnerable to slow payments by the United States. Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Samoa are Part II members of the IDA, Solomon Islands has been offered Part II membership and Vanuatu has sought it. A Part II country pays only one tenth of its initial subscription in convertible currency; the remaining portion and all of any additional subscriptions are paid in the member's own currency and may not be used without the member's consent. To the end of June 1979 Papua New Guinea had derived 31.4 per cent of her loans from multilateral institutions from IDA and Western Samoa 14.3 per cent. Developing countries throughout the world are sensing that the mood in the United States is once again to use international financial institutions as a crude vehicle of American imperialism.

In other areas of international assistance Papua New Guinea and Fiji alone are members of the Colombo Plan, they and Tonga of GATT, and these three and Nauru, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Samoa of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP).

Only in recent years has Australia extended bilateral assistance to the Pacific countries other than Papua New Guinea. Before Fiji, the second largest of them, became independent Australia rejected Fijian and British approaches for assistance. She took the attitude that Fiji was a British responsibility despite the fact that Australian companies had carved out a much larger economic empire there than Britain. Australia's official development assistance (ODA) to Papua New Guinea and the South Pacific has
declined from 0.35 per cent of Australian GNP in 1974/1975 to 0.28 per cent of GNP in 1979/1980, a fall of 20 per cent, reflecting Australia's recent movement away from the international target for ODA generally. Significant bilateral assistance now comes from the European Community (EC). Fiji, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Samoa are among the sixty signatories of the Lomé II Convention which entered into force in March 1980. Vanuatu's application for accession to the Convention has been formally approved by the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group and at ministerial level by the EC. The Convention offers three principal advantages to its ACP members:

(a) trade - preferential access to EC markets;

(b) export earnings - the STABEX scheme is designed to compensate for losses of earnings caused by fluctuations in market prices or production levels of major commodities;

(c) aid - the European Development Fund (EDF) provides concessional financing, on a bilateral or regional basis, for approved development projects. The Convention stipulates that 10 per cent of the total EDF resources should be applied for financing regional cooperation projects.

Potentially the most valuable aspect of the Convention is that it does not discriminate between the members but encourages them to meet together and agree collectively on the package of development projects or programmes for the region. New Zealand's and Australia's former colonies enjoy equal rights with the former colonies of Britain, which is now a member of the EC. The special terms which New Zealand and Australia have offered to their former colonies help to perpetuate the colonial division of the Pacific. Lomé II gives a great boost to closer cooperation amongst the island states. Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, and Papua New Guinea have held the presidency of the ACP council of ministers. The Community has a physical presence in the Pacific region through its aid office in Suva and has a project officer in Port Moresby. Assistance in various forms to the Pacific Group under Lomé II is likely to reach close to $A30 million over five years.

The island states have been slow to avail themselves of the facilities available to developing countries from United Nations agencies. The Australian bureaucracy still has some inhibitions about the participation of United Nations agencies. Throughout the 1950s and indeed until 1964 Australia resolutely resisted and resented suggestions by United Nations visiting missions that the Trust Territory of New Guinea would benefit from many agency programmes. Papua New Guinea is the only one of the new nations to become a member of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), she and Fiji the only ones to become members of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and they, Tonga and Samoa to become members of the World Health Organization (WHO). All these organizations make very considerable assistance programmes available to developing nations which join them. The latest (the fifth) session of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), held from 7 May 1979 to 3 June 1979, was attended by Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Tonga and Samoa.
Marine trade and resources are of prime importance to all the Pacific island states. The expansion of the Law of the Sea, with its recognition of 200 nautical mile economic zones, has meant that the central and south Pacific, with very few interstices, fall within the jurisdiction of these newly independent states. Nowhere, however, is their imperial heritage more apparent than in the degree of their adherence to the treaties which increasingly affect marine trade and resources. Nowhere, too, are Australia's regional shortcomings more apparent than in her failure to give a lead in adhering to these very treaties. IMCO has a depositary function with respect to thirty-one conventions and seventeen amendments; of these conventions seventeen have entered into force and of the amendments five. Of the imperial powers in this region Britain is a party to thirty-five of these instruments, France to thirty-three, the United States to twenty-six, New Zealand to seventeen and Australia to a mere seven. Britain frequently chose not to extend conventions to her territories; the present position appears to be that Fiji is a party to fourteen IMCO instruments, Tonga thirteen and Tuvalu two while two apply provisionally in respect of Solomon Islands and Kiribati and a third in respect of Tuvalu. France has applied all instruments to her Pacific territories. Vanuatu is a party to none of the instruments, since none was applied by Britain or France to their New Hebrides condominium. The United States has applied only five to American Samoa, five to Guam, five (some different) to Midway Islands and six to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. The instruments to which New Zealand is a party apply in respect of the Cook Islands and Niue, since New Zealand is responsible for their external affairs. Papua New Guinea and Nauru, for which Australia used to be responsible, are parties to five instruments.

There is thus much room in the central and south Pacific to coordinate international maritime laws. Some IMCO conventions of great moment to Pacific nations have already entered into force, such as those on oil pollution casualties and damage (1969), on carriage of nuclear material (1971) and on dumping wastes and other matter (1972). Australia has not yet become a contracting state under these conventions, because the current Federal government adopts the dubious attitude that each of the Australian states must first agree. The United States and Canada, the other states which hide behind federal constitutions in relation to their international obligations, have not taken this stance on IMCO conventions; in fact IMCO is the United Nations agency in which the United States has come nearest to pulling her weight. Nor has Australia herself taken this stance on conventions drawn up by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

Australia has the capacity and, one would think, the responsibility to help her small neighbours with representation at international conferences and she ought to set a better example in implementing the fruits of those conferences. Only Fiji, Nauru and Papua New Guinea were able to attend the resumed eighth session of the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) held in July-August 1979. It is a travesty that the region which is most affected by the changes in the distribution of wealth and resources associated with the new Law of the Sea regime is also the region most sparsely represented in the negotiations determining that new regime. Australia and New Zealand have not sought to involve their neighbours in the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling although Japan adhered to it in 1951 and the Republic of Korea in
1978 and Chile and Peru, original signatories, ratified it as recently as 1979, or in the 1959 Antarctic Treaty where the six Pacific parties – Australia, New Zealand, Chile, Japan, United States and USSR – were original signatories. The neighbour states would have helped Australia's recent objectives in the former but not the latter.

Certainly financial restraints are a major reason for the reluctance of Pacific island states to involve themselves in the international community. It may be that countries as small as many in the central and south Pacific might seek some collective representation at international conferences on trade and resources. Australia should facilitate the effective representation of these states in international organizations. She should also help to persuade them that collective and effective action is not only necessary on fisheries matters but on a whole range of trade and aid issues which are being negotiated and renegotiated at an international level.

Australia and New Zealand, having strategic arrangements with the United States in the south Pacific, should be aware of regional attitudes to the policies of the United States administration, institutions (such as the East-West Center) and corporations. American political imperialism in the Pacific has in the past been mainly confined to Micronesia and parts of Polynesia, and in the former the process of decolonization is finally under way. American economic imperialism in the South Seas seems to stand in the way of negotiations on the Law of the Sea. The greatest asset of the small thinly-populated islands is the sea which surrounds them. Of the world's tuna catch 60 per cent is caught in the Pacific; of the world's tuna consumption 50 per cent is consumed in the United States. The United States refuses to recognize the rights of Pacific island states to sovereignty over highly migratory species of fish, especially tuna, within their own exclusive economic zones; the United States would not be consistent enough to forgo her own sovereignty over highly migratory species of birds above her own territory. The island states are not impressed with United States finessing on the protection of bowhead whales under the Whaling Convention, because of local pressures in Alaska, or by her insensitivity on the disposal of nuclear waste. Attempted intervention by American land speculators and tax dodgers has already muddied the waters around Vanuatu.

The other imperialist powers are adopting an approach opposite to that of the United States. They have rejected confrontation in favour of trying to win the hearts of the Pacific island governments. The Soviet Union, with the world's greatest fishing fleet and its ambitions for Antarctic krill, has attempted to gain favour in the Pacific though with limited success. China has established embassies in three Pacific Forum capitals and has offered aid in return for influence; she has no fleet that would wish to exploit the Pacific waters. Taiwan has such a fleet, however, and has managed to persuade the governments of Nauru, Tonga and Tuvalu to recognize Taipei rather than Peking, for an unknown consideration, and thus to complicate the administration of a common Forum fisheries policy. Japan, as the world's second greatest fisheries power, is examining means of establishing close links with Pacific countries following her fleet's rebuff at the hands of Papua New Guinea.
No doubt each of the maritime imperialists sees the status quo in the Pacific as being in its interests, since the island states will have difficulties in enforcing their fisheries policy. It behoves Australia and New Zealand, then, as the countries which have some resources to do so, to take initiatives for the negotiation and conclusion of a Pacific Fisheries Convention which would involve all the maritime powers from the USSR and United States southwards, and all the island states in the conservation and exploitation of Pacific fisheries. Such a convention would be in the long term interests of both maritime powers and island states, as it would recognize the legitimate interests of both while ensuring the maintenance of stocks for future generations.

The ratification of ILO conventions might appear less urgent for the developing states of the Pacific than for the countries of Southeast Asia with their burgeoning industries. ILO conventions will become increasingly relevant in the Pacific island states as workers in these states realize their common interests, particularly in dealing with multinational corporations or overseas governments. This realization has already occurred at the points of international contact - the ports and airports. Hence, on more than one occasion, Fiji has expressed displeasure with the actions of Australian and New Zealand trade unionists concerning industrial conditions at those places. More recently port workers throughout the Pacific have appeared ready to ban Japan's ships and goods if her proposed dumping of nuclear waste takes place. Here again they are being led by Australian and New Zealand trade unionists. The experience they gain in fighting this insensitive and overbearing policy will assist them in learning to deal with economic or political imperialism by other governments or corporations.

Under the ILO constitution imperial powers can apply to their non metropolitan territories only such ILO conventions as they themselves have ratified. Our seas are therefore studded with anomalies flowing from the degree of responsibility shown by Paris, London and Washington. France, always a leading protagonist of the ILO, with 102 ratifications, has applied sixty-eight conventions to French Polynesia and New Caledonia. Her sins lie in other directions - the alienation of land and the infiltration of aliens. Britain, with seventy-three ratifications, had applied twenty-nine to Solomon Islands, twenty-four to Kiribati and twenty-three to Tuvalu. Once more France and Britain could never agree to apply any conventions at all to their New Hebrides condominium. The United States, which withdrew from ILO from 1977 until George Meany died three years later, has ratified seven conventions - only seven nations have ratified fewer - and has applied one to her Trust Territory; it dates from 1936.

Papua New Guinea and Fiji have ratified none of the thirty-two ILO maritime conventions. Australia has ratified ten and New Zealand seven. There are, moreover, eleven ILO conventions which are considered to concern basic human rights: freedom of association or forced labour or discrimination. Of these seven apply in French Polynesia, New Caledonia and Kiribati, six in Tuvalu, five in Solomon Islands, and none in the American Trust Territory or, of course, Vanuatu. Papua New Guinea has ratified five and Fiji four; the latest of them was adopted in 1957.
There are nineteen human rights conventions in respect of which the United Nations secretary-general performs depositary functions. These conventions are an important means of changing international debate about human rights from imperial rhetoric about the poor morality of developing countries to a potential basis for consensus in this area of universal need. United Nations records show that Fiji has ratified or succeeded to eleven, Tonga two and Samoa one, but Papua New Guinea none. On becoming independent Fiji retained Professor D.P. O'Connell to advise on current treaties to which she should adhere; she has ratified no subsequent ones. The situation of Papua New Guinea is due to the fact that before self-government in 1973 Australian governments had not applied these conventions to the Territory and that between self-government and independence in 1975 the Australian government acted in international affairs on behalf of the Papua New Guinea government at that government's request. The position of the other newly independent nations is somewhat obscure. The general principle is that, unless a different intention appears from a treaty or is otherwise established, the treaty is binding on each party in respect of its entire territory. France, in respect of all eleven conventions which she has ratified, and the United States, in respect of four of the five she has ratified, applied the conventions to all their Pacific territories. Britain, however, excepted Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and sometimes Tonga from some of the conventions which she ratified. Consistent with their performance in IMCO and ILO, Britain and France never agreed to apply any United Nations human rights conventions to their New Hebrides condominium. They have never left another territory with so little international experience and infrastructure. If there is one thing worse than distant powers dividing an archipelago it is their sharing it.

The new states of the South Pacific have fought to replace the links provided by imperial bondage with regional linkages focusing around the South Pacific Forum. The diversity and introspectivity of the island states should not be allowed to prevent greater regional cohesiveness. Nonetheless in many other matters such as maritime consultation, labour conditions and human rights, as well as common approaches towards overseas investment and international organization, much work remains to be done to overcome the imperial legacy.

British and French rule ended ingloriously in the New Hebrides in 1980. Throughout the decades of British, German and United States annexations down to the end of World War I Australians were much exercised at the possibility of France extending temporal and spiritual power over the archipelago. Victorian Presbyterians were particularly active in lobbying for the extension of Britain's kingdom on earth. One of the arguments for federating the Australian colonies was that a national government would have more influence on Britain than the separate colonial governments. The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, which took effect at the start of the new century, gave power to the Federal parliament to legislate on 'the relations of the Commonwealth with the islands of the Pacific'. In February 1906 English and French officials drew up a protocol respecting the New Hebrides without informing Australia. Her feelings had to be communicated to the Colonial Office through the governor-general; not till 1928 were direct contacts established with the Dominions Office in London. On 20 October 1906 the protocol was confirmed by a convention. On 6 August 1914 another Anglo-French protocol was
The New Hebrides was on the agenda for the Imperial Conferences between the two world wars. On the eve of the 1923 conference New Zealand and Australia received the Devonshire despatch (the ninth Duke of Devonshire was colonial secretary under Bonar Law) putting three choices: (1) cession to France, (2) cession to Britain, or (3) partition between France and Britain. The conference discussed two mandates, one French and the other British. The Imperial Conference in 1926 decided on a formal approach to France for partition, which France rejected. The next year Britain asked Australia to take over her responsibilities; Australia urged Britain to make another approach to France for partition, but Britain declined. At the Imperial Conference in 1930 Australia and New Zealand declined to take over Britain's responsibility and it was decided that the MacDonald government should negotiate her withdrawal. Next year, however, the national coalition government decided not to proceed with withdrawal.

In November 1936 Australia placed 'British policy in regard to the New Hebrides' on the agenda of the last of the prewar Imperial Conferences. At the conference in May 1937 Australia at last offered to take over Britain's responsibilities. The Foreign Secretary, Eden, however, raised the possibility of negotiations between Britain, France and Germany on colonial questions and asked that the conference should not discuss the New Hebrides, which would provide one of the few colonial concessions which Britain had available. Lyons, Parkhill, Casey and Bruce, who represented Australia, seem to have gone along with the prospect of Hitler having a colony nearby; they were saved from the wrath of the Australian public by the confidentiality which attended such gatherings in those days.

In the 1950s the Menzies government fumbled some opportunities to reverse the balkanization of Melanesia. On 29 June 1950 the British government agreed to the Australian government's suggestion that Australia should take over Britain's responsibilities in the condominium. An approach was made to the French, who agreed to examine the proposition on the basis of the legal texts in force but who did not approach Australia for preliminary discussions. In 1952 Australia asked France to consider her offer withdrawn; Hasluck, who had become minister for territories in May 1951, had expressed the view that Australia did not have the staff to look after any territory other than Papua New Guinea. By January 1956, however, he had come to the view that Australia should accept responsibilities in the Solomons. He and Casey, the minister for external affairs, made a submission to cabinet. In May cabinet approved administrative cooperation with the Solomons but not a transfer of administration. In January 1960 Hasluck informed cabinet that Australia had the knowledge and capacity to undertake greater responsibilities in the Solomons, but the government as a whole appears to have realized that Australia would not have international support in assuming additional colonial responsibilities. There would not have been the same objection to a joint Anglo-Australian timetable for an independent state amalgamating the British Solomon Islands Protectorate and Papua New Guinea, which already included the north Solomons. When I raised this possibility in Port Moresby in January 1973 the chief minister of Papua New Guinea felt that he was fully occupied in preparing to take over responsibilities of
independence in his own country. By this time, moreover, the Protectorate had a governing council with an elected majority and was developing a separate national identity.

In the mid 1960s Britain raised the question of the New Hebrides afresh. In December 1964 she asked New Zealand and Australia to confirm that they did not desire to take over her responsibilities. In August 1966 Wilson's colonial secretary, Bottomley, visited Australia and found that she still had no desire to take over. Now the Liberal government's unstated motive was to deny Britain any excuse to abandon her responsibilities east of Suez.

Right to the end of the Anglo-French condominium the two powers maintained separate police forces, separate court systems, separate hospitals and separate schools. Under the Anglo-French Convention of 1906 a Joint Court (Tribunal Mixte) was established consisting of a British judge and a French judge with a president and public prosecutor appointed by the King of Spain, whose predecessor's Portuguese navigator had discovered the islands just three hundred years before. The first president was a grandee, el conde de Buena Esperanza (1851-1935). The first British judge (1908-1917) was Thomas Ernest Roseby, a Sydney graduate (BA 1890, MA 1901) and New South Wales barrister (1896) who was later chief justice of Mauritius; his reports and recommendations are in the National Library with the papers of Atlee Hunt, secretary of the Department of External Affairs. In Madrid in 1976 the head of the North American and Pacific branch of the Foreign Office recounted how his father, Alfonso Aguirre de Carcer, had been appointed prosecutor by Alfonso XIII. The last president (1936-1939), Manuel Bosch Barrett, was appointed, with the consent of Britain and France, by the president of the Second Spanish Republic. When he returned to France he wrote a book, Tres Años en las Nuevas Hébridas (Barcelona 1943).

Administration was incredibly dilatory. On 14 June 1973 I released the following agreed joint communiqué by the Australian and British governments:

The Australian and British Governments have agreed in principle that Australian lands in the New Hebrides known as the 'Commonwealth Lands' should be transferred to a Land Trust Board to be set up by the British Resident Commissioner in the New Hebrides under Queen's Regulations.

As part of a contract made in 1902 between the Australian Government and Burns Philp and Co. Ltd., Burns Philp transferred the right of disposal of approximately 25,000 acres of land in the New Hebrides, to which it held claims, to the Australian Minister for External (now Foreign) Affairs, in return for an increase in shipping subsidy.

Most of the land is registered in Burns Philp's name and the company has continued to act as agents for the Australian Government in dealing with the land. It will be the duty of the Land Trust Board to further the
use of land vested in it from time to time for the benefit of the people of the New Hebrides.

The 'Commonwealth Lands', with some possible exceptions to be agreed between the British Resident Commissioner and the Australian authorities, will be vested in the Board. In reaching this agreement the Australian and British Governments have had very much in mind the interests of the New Hebrideans. Detailed discussions and negotiations consequential upon the agreement will be held as soon as possible between the British Residency in Vila and the Australian authorities.

On a visit in July 1978 I was astonished to find that no changes in the use and ownership of the former Commonwealth Lands had been made and that none of them had yet been passed to indigenous New Hebrideans.

This year the New Hebrides have been more in the news in Australia than at any time in the last century. Not even Evelyn Waugh could have done justice to the departure of France and Britain from Vanuatu. The resident commissioners cooperated as effectively as the consuls Caesar and Bibulus. Their largest joint operation since Suez ended not with a bang but a whimper. The British paratroopers who were flown in and out seemed to be as effective as

The noble Duke of York,
He had ten thousand men,
He marched them up to the top of the hill,
And he marched them down again.

The predominantly anglophone government of Vanuatu suddenly learnt the meaning of Albion perfide. They will probably remember French duplicity, British complicity, Australian prevarication and Melanesian determination. But for Papua New Guinea troops, French colons and American investors would have turned Santo into a Mayotte. The Fraser cabinet had to hold two meetings before a score of Australian troops could accompany their Papua New Guinea comrades in arms. Australia cannot afford to be seen again in her own region to be so indecisive and pusillanimous. Australians should not be surprised that Papua New Guinea could not mount the operation unaided; Australian troops, from the Sudan to Saigon, have always had to rely on the logistic support of greater powers.

Vanuatu has now been welcomed into the South Pacific Forum and the Commonwealth. The indigenous inhabitants have ceased to be stateless persons. France still hesitates on the nature and extent of the aid she will give the new nation. In particular, France has spent great sums on francophone higher education. Her teachers were able to organize demonstrations against independence by their secondary pupils in Vila. If France boycotts Walter Lini as she boycotted Sekou Touré, she will not destroy his influence but her own.

Vanuatu has provided lessons for the South Pacific Forum, not least Australia and New Zealand, as the moves to independence gather pace in New Caledonia. The prime point to realize is that independence in New Caledonia is inevitable and unexpectedly imminent. If Australian
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politicians, bureaucrats, journalists and academics remain indifferent, those from the new nations will not. I am unabashed in my dogmatism on this issue because of my experience in relation to Papua New Guinea.

When Britain had already noted the winds of change in southern Africa, conservatives in Australia were still not sensing the breeze in the South Pacific. In October 1961 Hasluck, who had administered Papua New Guinea for ten years, had told the Economic Society of Australia and New Zealand that the necessary conditions for independence 'would appear unlikely under twenty years' or, indeed, anything 'up to fifty years'. The last Liberal minister for territories, Peacock, spoke in Port Moresby of independence by 1980.

The profound error in both these judgements, however well-intentioned, lay in the assumption that the presence of the colonial power promoted the self-confidence of the men and women who would be the eventual leaders and administrators of an independent nation; and that the presence was needed to bring not only the leadership but the general population to some required level of education and maturity (always of course, as defined by the foreign power); in short, that self-government is something to be taught, not learnt. It also assumed that Papua New Guinea was a special case, to be isolated from world trends and world events; and either that Australia was so benevolent a ruler or Papua New Guinea so backward a people that what happened in the rest of the world had no relevance. I must confess that I could never impart to British ministers, Conservative or Labour, the sense of urgency on the Solomons and New Hebrides that I felt on Papua New Guinea.

Undoubtedly there will be pundits who will give the warning on New Caledonia, as they did on Papua New Guinea, that the presence of the imperial power is necessary to obviate a bloodbath. In the Current Affairs Bulletin of July 1973 Santamaria opined that 'what Mr Whitlam's New Guinea policy is likely to accelerate is not independence but secessionism and insurgency, and cost the lives of many helpless New Guineans'. Thus the reason for Australia remaining in Papua New Guinea was the same as the reason for her intruding in Vietnam. The fact was that the longer Australia was a colonial power in Papua New Guinea, the greater became the pressure towards separatism and the greater grew the likelihood of insurgent movements against the central government, whether based in Canberra or Port Moresby.

As early as April 1965, at a seminar in Goroka organized by the Council on New Guinea Affairs, I had suggested 1970 as the appropriate target date for independence in New Guinea. If my statement in 1965 had had the same effect as my statements in 1970, then I believe independence could have been achieved as expeditiously and effectively in the 1960s as it was in the 1970s. The men and means available to make self-government work were not materially different. All that was needed was to unleash the will to apply them on the part both of Papua New Guineans and Australians, and the administrations in both Port Moresby and Canberra. My visit and statements in 1965 did not have that effect; my visit and statements in 1970 did. The only real difference was that by 1970 I could speak with the authority of a leader of the opposition, fresh from the success of the 1969 elections, and, therefore, with a fair chance of becoming prime minister. The relevance and urgency of what I was saying in 1970 arose not from what
had happened in Papua New Guinea in the intervening decade but from what had happened in Australia. If there had not been a change of government in Australia in 1972 it is likely that Australia would still be exercising authority in Papua New Guinea. Can anyone assert that Australians in executive positions there in the last two years would have behaved any more prudently and creditably than most of the Australian judges?

Some Australians will be impressed with the French argument, advanced by the president himself, that France will hand over authority as soon as the electors of New Caledonia express that wish. It is a spurious argument. The situation in New Caledonia is a common one in that overseas settlers have secured and retained the best jobs and the best land. It is uncommon in that the indigenes, the \textit{kanaques}, are now in a minority in their own country. During the 1960s, when Le Nickel was booming and the French empire elsewhere disintegrating, the French - settlers, officials, teachers, soldiers and pieds noirs - approached the \textit{kanaques} in numbers. French birds of passage have the right to vote. Immigrants from French Pacific territories, Vietnamese and Polynesians, identify with the metropolitan power. They are, if possible, less acceptable than the French themselves to the \textit{kanaques}.

New Caledonia is not the only country in the Pacific with an exotic majority; the difference is that the majority in Fiji does not cling to Indian citizenship in the manner that the majority in New Caledonia clings to French citizenship. Some Noumea newspapers were hysterical over the coming of independence to Vanuatu, which had long been deemed a \textit{cordon sanitaire}. At the 1979 elections for the Territorial Assembly it was clear that a majority of those born in New Caledonia favoured the Front Indépendantiste. The Front assisted Vanuaaku in its struggle and is encouraged by its success. It needs to be emphasized that the Front does not advocate the expulsion of the French or the Polynesians. It advocates an independent but multiracial New Caledonia. At the same time it is convinced that if the French were not prepared to fight for Algeria on the other side of their own Mediterranean they will not be prepared to fight for New Caledonia on the other side of the world.

The Australian public can expect very little guidance from its media on South Pacific issues. In July 1979 President Giscard d'Estaing spent six days visiting New Caledonia, where he also received a New Hebridean delegation, the Wallis and Futuna Islands and French Polynesia. His visit was not reported in the Australian media. The ABC and the commercial oligopolies will always run a story on East Timor or West New Guinea but cannot spare a staff correspondent in the New Hebrides or New Caledonia. The only exception occurred when a journalist employed by a weekly Australian magazine acted as a courier and ambassador for the stillborn separatist movement on Espiritu Santo. The television station owned by the same company then ran on its weekly current affairs programme a sycophantic and misleading story on the leader of that movement. The result of the poor coverage of the Pacific provided by the Australian media is an erratic pattern of sometimes hostile and exaggerated stories interspersed by long periods of indifference. There are already signs that in Europe French elements are peddling such stories about Vanuatu to Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists; a version will be cabled to Australia.
Many politicians, officials, businessmen and academics have tended to back off for fear of offending the French. The French, however, have already demonstrated their indifference to Australia's views. President Giscard gave Australia as wide a berth in 1979 as President de Gaulle gave in 1966. On the earlier occasion the presidential aircraft had to land at Darwin on the way from Phnom Penh to Noumea; the great man could not be disturbed by the Australian representative who called to pay respects. On the later occasion the aircraft, of greater range, was able to fly direct from Singapore to Noumea. On his foray de Gaulle made a five hour visit to Vila, whence he sent greetings to the Queen. (The French still affect the colonial style of 'Port Vila'.)

The French in New Caledonia have an ambivalent attitude towards Australia. Many regard Australians as picking up where the British left off in the confrontation between Consul Pritchard and Admiral Du Petit-Thouars over Tahiti in the 1840s. Some even see an imperial aspiration in the visit of HMAS Adelaide in 1940 to engineer the coup which transferred New Caledonia from Petain to de Gaulle. At the same time many feel reassured by the possibility of taking refuge in Australia and have bought accommodation and education here.

The external impetus for the independence of New Caledonia will not come from Australia but from the developing countries in the South Pacific Forum. Attempts by Australia and New Zealand to restrain Melanesian criticism of France, as at the 1979 Forum, will no longer succeed. In February 1978 when Peacock came closest to saying 'hou' to the French in answering a question in the House of Representatives on the political situation in the New Hebrides, French advisers prompted the Representative Assembly to pass a resolution asking the French government to declare the Australian consul in Vila persona non grata. It used to be alleged that Australians were stirring up Pacific islanders about French nuclear tests at Mururoa. Nobody suggests today that Australians have to stir up Pacific islanders about Japanese dumping of nuclear waste. When the Somare government and its foreign minister, Olewale, lost office it was thought that the succeeding government and minister in Port Moresby would take a more relaxed attitude about the French presence. Nobody says that now.

Australia, in selling uranium to France, which continues to conduct nuclear experiments in Polynesia against the wishes of all the island states, and to Japan, which contemplates depositing nuclear waste against their wishes, must expect to encounter some regional resentment. At the 20th South Pacific Conference in Port Moresby on 18 October 1980 the Papua New Guinea foreign minister canvassed the possibility of forming a strong political alliance of regional states along the lines of the Organization of African Unity and the Papua New Guinea minister for primary industry and leader of the delegation called for a South Pacific political alliance to protect island nations against foreign exploitation; it was understood that Australia and New Zealand were not contemplated as part of the proposed organization. On 4 November 1980 at the ESCAP Women's Conference in Suva, despite Australian reservations, delegates passed a resolution criticizing 'colonialization' by France, nuclear tests and dumping of waste, drugs and alcoholism. The statement, introduced by Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu, declared: 'The colonization which continues in the Pacific is an indignity shared by both men and women .... There remain Pacific sister islands, including New Caledonia and French Polynesia, who are
denied their inalienable right to self-determination, to walk in dignity as free Pacific peoples'.

Australia's preoccupations often fail to find support among neighbours. When Fraser attended his first Forum meeting the other prime ministers were not impressed by his strong, impromptu discourse about the menace represented by the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean. Australian institutions are not admired; no other member of the Forum is a federal state and only Fiji has a bicameral parliament. Australia has to give constant attention to her credentials as a concerned neighbour. Especially must she exercise her responsibility and influence with respect to the decolonization of the French territories in the South Pacific.

In 1946 France responded to the United Nation secretary-general's invitation to all member states to submit information on their territories, including New Caledonia. In 1947 France told him that the situation had changed as New Caledonia was now part of metropolitan France. There is a request from Papua New Guinea that New Caledonia be placed on the agenda of the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization (the Committee of Seventeen when established in 1961, and the Committee of Twenty-four since 1962). Australia was a foundation member of the Committee. The Gorton government withdrew in 1969 but my government rejoined in January 1973. Chile, China, Fiji and the USSR are the only other Pacific members of the Committee. The Committee frequently criticized the refusal of France and Britain to cooperate with it on the question of the New Hebrides. Among Pacific territories Tokelau, Pitcairn, American Samoa, Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands are included in the Committee's provisional list of dependent territories and, accordingly, will be considered formally by the Committee each year until the residents of these territories decide to terminate the present arrangements by an act of self-determination. Australia should not hesitate to vote in the General Assembly in favour of adding New Caledonia to the Committee's provisional list.

If Australia takes a negative attitude on the issues which her developing neighbours are now discussing at every available forum, she will be treated by them with as scant respect as she is now treated by ASEAN. If she resists their legitimate aspirations she could become as impotent a colossus in the region as the United States is in the Caribbean and Latin America.

REFERENCE